Oral Submission (Issue of Negligence)
My apologies for the misunderstanding. I will now create an oral presentation for you based on
the work you provided, focusing on the legal principle of negligence.
Your Lordships, Honored Members of the Court,
My name is [Your Name], and I appear before you today on behalf of the Appellant, Ms. Jane
Nakato. My Lord, it is our submission that the learned trial judge erred in failing to hold the
Respondent, Steelforge Industries Limited, liable for negligence.
Our argument is grounded on three fundamental legal questions:
1. Did Steelforge Industries Limited owe a duty of care to Ms. Nakato?
2. Was that duty of care breached?
3. Did that breach cause the damages suffered by Ms. Nakato and her family?
My Lord, we shall address each of these points in turn.
The Duty of Care
My Lord, the law of negligence begins with the existence of a duty of care. In the landmark case
of Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Atkin's famous "neighbour principle" established that a person
owes a duty of care to those who are so closely and directly affected by their actions that they
should reasonably have them in contemplation.
In the case before this court, Steelforge Industries is located directly adjacent to Ms. Nakato's
land. By its very proximity, Steelforge must have foreseen that its industrial activities—the
emissions of thick smoke and metallic dust, the excessive noise—would directly affect its
immediate neighbors, including Ms. Nakato.
Furthermore, my Lord, the law itself imposes this duty. The right to a clean and healthy
environment is protected by law, and a corresponding duty is placed on all persons to prevent
pollution. This includes incorporated companies like Steelforge. It is, therefore, our submission
that under both common law and statutory law, Steelforge Industries clearly owed a duty of care
to Ms. Nakato and the entire Kiganda community.
The Breach of Duty
My Lord, the second question is whether this duty was breached. As defined in Blyth v
Birmingham Waterworks Co, a breach occurs when an individual or company fails to act as a
"reasonable person" would. In this context, we must ask: would a reasonable company, operating
an industrial plant in a semi-urban area, have foreseen the harm caused by their emissions and
noise?
The facts presented in this case, my Lord, clearly show that Steelforge fell well below the
required standard of care. This is demonstrated through the factors established in Glasgow
Corporation v Muir:
Foreseeability of Harm: The continuous emission of thick smoke and metallic dust was an act
that any reasonable person would have foreseen could damage the health of a residential
community.
Magnitude of Harm: The harm was not insignificant. It was grave. Medical reports confirm that
Ms. Nakato and her children have suffered from respiratory diseases, and an NGO found high
levels of lead and cadmium in the community.
Cost of Precautions: Steelforge could have easily mitigated these risks by regularly upgrading
its air and water filtration systems and adhering to the noise limits set by the National
Environment Management Authority. They failed to take these simple, practical precautions.
Special Skills: As a steel production company, Steelforge possesses a high degree of technical
skill. They should have used this skill to ensure their operations did not harm the surrounding
community.
My Lord, given these facts, it is clear that Steelforge acted negligently by failing to meet the
standard of care required of a reasonable company.
Causation of Damage
Finally, my Lord, we must establish that the breach of duty caused Ms. Nakato's damages. The
"but for" test, as seen in Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management
Committee, is the starting point. But for Steelforge's negligent acts, would Ms. Nakato have
suffered from respiratory issues? The evidence strongly suggests yes. Local hospitals reported a
30% increase in respiratory illnesses since Steelforge began operations, and the medical experts
have attributed Ms. Nakato's health issues to prolonged exposure to the plant's emissions.
Even if a direct link cannot be proven beyond all doubt, my Lord, the court's decision in
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services is clear: a defendant is liable if their negligent act
materially increased the risk of the plaintiff's injury. Steelforge's emissions undeniably
increased the risk of respiratory diseases for Ms. Nakato and the entire community.
Conclusion
My Lord, the evidence before this court demonstrates that Steelforge Industries owed a duty of
care to Ms. Nakato, that they breached this duty by failing to act reasonably, and that this breach
was the direct cause of the harm suffered by our client. We, therefore, find it difficult to concede
that the learned trial judge's failure to find negligence in this case was anything but erroneous.
My Lord, I rest my case.
ALTERATIVE ORAL SUBMISION
May it please this Honourable Court,
I stand before you as lead counsel for the appellant, Ms. Jane Nakato, to submit on the first issue
of this appeal — whether SteelForge Industries Ltd. was negligent in failing to prevent
harmful emissions and noise, thereby breaching its duty of care to my client and the wider
Kiganda community.
My Lords, negligence was well defined in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) as the
omission to do something which a reasonable man would do, or doing something which a
reasonable man would not do. To establish negligence, we must answer three key questions:
1. Did SteelForge owe Ms. Nakato a duty of care?
2. Was this duty breached?
3. Did the breach cause the damage complained of?
1. Duty of Care
My Lords, the right to a clean and healthy environment is not only a constitutional guarantee but
also a statutory duty under Section 3(2) of the National Environment Act, Cap 181. Every person
— including incorporated companies — must maintain and enhance the environment and prevent
pollution.
SteelForge, being adjacent to Ms. Nakato’s land, had a clear duty to avoid acts that would harm
her crops, her water sources, and her family’s health. This is consistent with Donoghue v
Stevenson, where Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle obliges one to take reasonable care to avoid
acts or omissions that are reasonably foreseeable to injure their neighbour.
Ms. Nakato, residing directly next to SteelForge, was unquestionably a neighbour in law. The
learned trial judge therefore erred in failing to find that such a duty existed.
2. Breach of Duty
My Lords, breach of duty occurs when a defendant falls below the standard of care, as held by
Justice Stephen Mubiru in Jane Akello v Attorney General. In Glasgow Corporation v Muir,
Lord Macmillan explained that the standard depends on several factors: foreseeability,
magnitude of harm, practicability of precautions, social utility, and the defendant’s special skills.
Foreseeability: SteelForge’s continuous emission of thick smoke and metallic dust was
clearly foreseeable to cause harm to residents in a semi-urban area.
Magnitude of harm: The harm was grave — Ms. Nakato’s children developed
respiratory illnesses, and an NGO confirmed lead and cadmium levels in her soil
exceeding permissible limits. The entire community saw a 30% rise in respiratory
problems after SteelForge began operations.
Practicability of precautions: SteelForge could easily have upgraded its air and water
filtration systems, yet it chose to deem them sufficient. It could have kept its noise within
the NEMA-prescribed 55 decibels, but instead subjected residents to 70 decibels at night.
These were simple, reasonable precautions.
Social utility: While SteelForge contributes to industry and employment, this cannot
justify exposing an entire community to toxic harm.
Special skills: SteelForge, as a professional steel manufacturer, had the technical know-
how to prevent harm. Its failure to use such skill is further evidence of breach.
Therefore, applying these factors, SteelForge clearly fell far below the required standard of care.
3. Causation
On causation, My Lords, the “but for” test applies: but for SteelForge’s negligence, Ms. Nakato’s
children would not have developed respiratory illness, nor would her crops and water have been
contaminated.
Even if doubt arises, the law recognises liability where negligence materially increases the risk
of harm, as held by Lord Bingham in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services. SteelForge’s
emissions undeniably increased the risk of respiratory illness and environmental damage in
Kiganda.
This Honourable Court should therefore find that the learned trial judge erred in failing to
connect the harm suffered by Ms. Nakato to the negligent omissions of SteelForge.
Conclusion on Negligence
In conclusion, My Lords, SteelForge owed a duty of care, it breached that duty, and that breach
caused substantial damage to my client and her family. The trial court’s failure to so find was a
grave error, and I respectfully pray that this Honourable Court corrects that error by holding
SteelForge liable in negligence.
I am obliged, My Lords.
Facts of each case.
1. Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Ex 781
Facts: The defendants installed water mains with hydrants. In an unusually severe frost, a
hydrant burst and flooded the claimant’s property. The claimant sued for negligence.
Holding: The court held that the company was not negligent — the frost was extraordinary and
unforeseeable.
👉 Principle: Negligence means doing what a reasonable man would not do, or failing to do what
a reasonable man would do.
2. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
Facts: Mrs Donoghue drank ginger beer purchased for her by a friend. The opaque bottle
contained a decomposed snail, causing her illness. She sued the manufacturer despite no direct
contract.
Holding: Lord Atkin established the “neighbour principle” — one must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions reasonably foreseeable to injure one’s neighbour.
👉 Principle: Duty of care extends to those closely and directly affected by one’s actions.
3. Jane Akello v Attorney General, Civil Suit No. 0009 of
2009 (Uganda H.C.)
This is a summary of Jane Akello's claims regarding an incident on November 18, 2008.
On November 18, 2008, while working as a nursing assistant in the maternity ward of Lacor
Hospital, Jane Akello claims she was injured when security personnel threw a teargas canister
onto the hospital grounds.
She states the teargas caused her to suffer from a persistent headache and partial loss of her
eyesight.
Because of these injuries, she says she is no longer able to do basic chores at home and that her
work productivity has significantly decreased.
4. Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448
Facts: A church hall manager allowed a group with a tea urn to pass through while children were
buying sweets. The urn was accidentally dropped, scalding the children.
Holding: No negligence was found, but Lord Macmillan clarified how to assess breach of duty:
by considering foreseeability, magnitude of harm, cost of precautions, social utility, and the
defendant’s skills.
👉 Principle: Standard of care depends on context — what risks were reasonably foreseeable and
what precautions could have been taken.
5. Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management
Committee [1969] 1 QB 428
Facts: A night watchman went to hospital vomiting after drinking tea poisoned by a stranger.
The hospital negligently sent him away without treatment. He died.
Holding: The hospital was negligent, but not liable, because the man would have died anyway
even with treatment.
👉 Principle: Introduced the “but for” test of causation — liability only arises if, but for the
defendant’s negligence, the harm would not have occurred.
6. Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL
22
Facts: Employees contracted cancer after exposure to asbestos while working for multiple
employers. It was impossible to prove which exposure caused the illness.
Holding: The House of Lords allowed liability, ruling that materially increasing the risk of harm
is sufficient for causation.
👉 Principle: Courts may relax strict causation rules when defendants materially increase the risk
of harm.
ISSUES TWO ON STRICT LIABILITY
Your Lordships, Honored Members of the Court,
My Lord, my name is [Your Name], and I am here today to submit our argument on behalf of the
Appellant, Ms. Jane Nakato. My Lord, it is our submission that the learned trial judge erred in
failing to find the Respondent, Steelforge Industries Limited, strictly liable for the damages
caused to our client under the principles of Rylands v Fletcher.
To establish our position, I will begin by briefly outlining the established precedents in this area
of law.
Brief Facts of Cited Cases
Rylands v Fletcher: In this foundational case, the defendant built a reservoir on his land,
which was filled with water. The water escaped through disused mine shafts and flooded
the plaintiff's mine on an adjacent property. The court found the defendant liable,
establishing the principle of strict liability for things that escape from one's land and
cause damage to another.
Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd: In this case, an employee was injured by an explosion while
working in a munitions factory. She attempted to sue under the rule of strict liability. The
House of Lords rejected her claim, ruling that for the rule to apply, there must be an
"escape" of the dangerous thing from the defendant's land to an area outside of their
control.
The Four Principles of Rylands v Fletcher
My Lord, as established by Judge Blackburn, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is based on four
fundamental principles, all of which are met in the case now before this Honourable Court.
1. That the defendant brought something onto his land.
o In the case of Steelforge Industries Limited, it is indisputable that they brought
heavy machinery and materials for the production of steel rods onto the land
adjacent to our client, Ms. Nakato's property. This satisfies the first principle.
2. That the defendant made a non-natural use of his land.
o My Lord, a non-natural use of land is defined in Rickards v. Lothian as a
"special use that increases danger to others." Operating an industrial plant that
produces steel rods is a far cry from the ordinary use of residential land. It is
precisely the type of use that increases the risk of harm, as evidenced by the
emissions and noise.
3. The thing in question is likely to do mischief if it escapes.
o My Lord, similar to the water in the Rylands v Fletcher case, the metallic dusts,
thick smokes, and excessive noise from Steelforge's plant, while not inherently
dangerous in isolation, are highly likely to cause damage when they escape in
large quantities. The emissions contain cadmium and lead levels far above the
permissible limits set by NEMA, and the noise exceeds the acceptable residential
limit.
4. The thing did escape and cause damage.
o My Lord, as defined in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd, an escape is from a place
under the defendant's control to a place outside of their control. The facts before
this court clearly show that the metallic dusts and thick smoke escaped from the
Steelforge premises and settled on Ms. Nakato's land and crops. Ms. Nakato
herself has suffered from respiratory diseases, and the noise has exceeded
tolerable levels. All of this is documented proof of the escape and the damage it
caused.
Conclusion
My Lord, with all due respect, it is our firm conviction that the trial judge failed to properly
apply the principles of Rylands v Fletcher. The evidence overwhelmingly proves that
Steelforge Industries Limited brought a substance onto their land for a non-natural use, which
escaped and caused substantial harm to our client. We therefore pray that this Court finds the
Respondent strictly liable for the damages caused.
My Lord, I rest my case.
Here are the brief facts of the cases you used in your presentation, focusing on their relevance to
the principle of strict liability.
Rylands v Fletcher
The defendant, Fletcher, hired contractors to build a large reservoir on his land.1 The
contractors, while digging, discovered old, abandoned mine shafts that they did not properly seal.
When the reservoir was filled with a large amount of water, it flooded through the mine shafts
and into a neighboring mine owned by the plaintiff, Rylands, causing significant damage. The
court held that Fletcher was liable even though he was not personally negligent, because he had
brought something onto his land that was likely to cause mischief if it escaped.2
Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd
The plaintiff, Ms. Read, was an inspector working in a munitions factory during World War II.
An explosive shell detonated inside the factory, causing her injuries. She sued the factory owner,
J Lyons & Co Ltd, under the rule of strict liability. The House of Lords rejected her claim
because the explosion and injury occurred on the defendant's property. The court clarified that
the principle of Rylands v Fletcher only applies when the dangerous substance "escapes" from
the defendant's land and causes harm on an adjacent or outside property.
Rickards v Lothian
The plaintiff's premises were flooded by water that escaped from a lavatory on an upper floor
that was owned by the defendant. The overflow was caused by the malicious act of a third party
who had plugged the waste pipe and turned on the tap. The court held that the defendant was not
liable because the use of water in a normal domestic plumbing system was considered a "natural
use" of the land and not the type of non-natural use that would invoke strict liability.
