July 4, 2017

G.R. No. 231658

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,

EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231771

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A.

COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR.,
CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
i\[Link],KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO,
MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM,
VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF
OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 231774

NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA

P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a
state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;

WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law x x x';

WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that
'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the Government
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives';

WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi
City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and

WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to
sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts
of Mindanao.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a
period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.

SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the aforesaid
area for the duration of the state of martial law.

DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Seventeen.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more
recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the
authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the
Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among
others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group
(ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.1

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-
ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These
groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the
President's Report:

On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG,
and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with
armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these groups'
armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions
and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political
foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to
lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.

Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around
two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of
its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks
and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin
Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced
by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports
abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as
well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group.

The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives.2

In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in
Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus, to wit:

• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced their
attack on various facilities - government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi.

• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).

• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted on-duty
personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells.

• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisoner vans and
private vehicles).
• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights were
heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May 2017,
Marawi City's electric supply was still cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.)

• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi
Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was also taken.

• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi
City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.

• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.

• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-
empt military reinforcement.

• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi City,
including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following
barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao,
Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.

• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan City-
Marawi City junction.

• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria
Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were
taken from the church.

• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed by the
lawless groups.

• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation
and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.

• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among
other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen
guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the Hospital
and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.

• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, which they
later set ablaze.

• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered
one of its armored vehicles.

• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been
infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of
the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police
have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously wounded.
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities in
Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes and
forcing young male Muslims to join their groups.

• Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a strategic
mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating
killings of government personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the
government.3

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to
conclude that -

These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups'
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province
covering the entire Mindanao.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout
Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of
DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.

There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over
the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus,
and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and
remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.4

According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals,
brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel,
particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the
civilians, viz.:

Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have
been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road
blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic
services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and
from the city is likewise hindered.

The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-
based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other
armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi
City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao. 5

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it
plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible
tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy
access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used
provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.

Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and
lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive
action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity. 6

The President ended his Report in this wise:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao
until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 7

In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police
authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the
declaration of martial law.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No.
3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as
follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the

Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional
and in accordance with the law. The Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds no
compelling reason to revoke the sarne.9

The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of
Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS
NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF
MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN
THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.

The Petitions

A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,

Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph
of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that
acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to
remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 13 It
labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere
propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and
prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the
alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the
Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate
perceived capability".15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of the
military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS threat in
the country but that they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The
Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed
conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture
Hapilon.18 Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Group's armed
resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and
not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the Philippine Republic.19 It then posits
that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of
rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the declaration of martial law. 20

Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts". 21

It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak
Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's
Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured member to the
hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The
Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of the
Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank
employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the armored vehicle was
owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was commandeered. 23 It also labels as false the
report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of
May 24, 2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists. 24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on
the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the occupation of the Marawi City
Hall and part of the Mindanao State University.25

Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao
del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga siege,
the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It
contends that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began, had long
been resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested. 26

Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or any
ranking official27 before making the proclamation.

Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient
factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of the
House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-empting the
ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was
absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters
allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign
fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29

Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its
specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient
factual basis.30

In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman
Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.

On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were filed
and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658.32

B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)

The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" 33 of the Constitution, likewise seeks the
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual
basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. 34

In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events
happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that
Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire
Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that
public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36

The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups
to sow terror and cause death and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion
sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. 38 It also posits that there is no lawless
violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39

Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups
and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging.40

In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the
Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the
ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of Dansalan College
Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities.41

In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional
or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to declare the same as
unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao. 42

C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)

The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual
Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort 46 and should be invoked by
the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary
powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed
forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the
power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to,
the exigencies of the situation.49

According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the
imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a
public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law
can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is
compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.

Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to wit:
that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to deprive
the duly constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed
hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are
conclusions bereft of substantiation.53

The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without
waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the declaration
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition
insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the
presence of arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then the
burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents. 55 It thus
asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant information" 56 in order for it to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis.

In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel
respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as
unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.

The Consolidated Comment

The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by the Court.
Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the independence of
this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind one true flag
and defend it against all threats from within and outside our shores". 59

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the
authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. 60 The
OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy
through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG
suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may be availed of
using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5, of Article
VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but discretionary only,
on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the discretion not to give due course to the petition. 63

Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of
discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, should
be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.

The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to prove
that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis. It thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to
1 âwphi1

shift the burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to present proof on
the factual basis"66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must prove"67 and that
governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional.68

Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the
trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the
decision was made.69 It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not based
on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial law because to
do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard. 70 It
reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the information and data available
to him at the time he made the determination.71 The OSG thus asserts that facts that were
established after the declaration of martial law should not be considered in the review of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. The OSG suggests that the
assessment of after-proclamation facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose of
determining the propriety of revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court
considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether martial law
should be revoked or extended.72

It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports coming
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be expected to personally
determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to impose martial law is
vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the
Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its
validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.

Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by the
President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports
that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in
Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed," 75 and thus
inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed
on governmental acts".76

Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG still
endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt as to
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216".77

The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the Court's
Ruling.
 ISSUES

The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:

1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;

2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:

a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;

c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;

3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;

4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;

a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;

6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null
and void:

a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or

b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region;

7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao 1 region;

8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and

9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental
memoranda.

OUR RULING

I. Locus standi of petitioners.

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought
before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the
challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 80 Over the years, there has been a trend
towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of
Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the
suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer." 81

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women,
all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City". 83 In the Lagman Petition, however, petitioners therein
did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly
elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as Members of Congress
couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the House of Representatives
of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to
revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it
finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in
direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition.
Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well
as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-
restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to
accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing.
Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption of
jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the
Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for
them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf
as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing.
II. Whether or not the petitions are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.

All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. 88

The Court agrees.

a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative
act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It
is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from
the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held
to exist.91

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority
to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of
Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article
VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition
for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.

c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.

The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within
the ambit of judicial review.

"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of
the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects
of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission
that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:

The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand
Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions
during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part of
Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission, very much
aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to
dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included
revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the scope of
the powers, and review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)

To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide
whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts.
This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question and is within the ambit of judicial review. 96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration
of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme
Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98

Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.

d) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers.

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. 99 This is
clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on
whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong
and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed of his good
and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations
regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the
interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to
act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At
the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.

MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive
right to the President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion
and the second factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the
attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past administration. Proclamation No.
1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of
the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein
he made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:

Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the Communists
and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed
violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said,
among other things:

Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and properties,
widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the country,
which condition has been brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order to take over the government
by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against
our people and the legitimate government ...

And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare
martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion
of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the Congress'?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of [Link], he is undoubtedly an aberration
in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another
Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the
Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because
the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of
the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as
against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972 when
Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.100

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed
the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen
to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.
Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a
demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or
suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited
period of 30 days from date of filing.

e) Purpose of Section 18,

Article VII is to curtail the extent of
the powers of the President.

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed
in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.

During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz
Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:

The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year
term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office
of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail
the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.

The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of
martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the
lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised
only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not
exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or
proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More
importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding
jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts to adjudicate.

For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military
tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state
that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my tenure in
the Supreme Court in the martial law cases.101

f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
of Article VIII would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of
the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other
words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

g) Jurisdiction of the Court is

not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections I and 5 of Article VIII

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII.102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A). 103

h) Unique features of the third

paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
make it sui generis.

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be
treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The
usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to
promulgate its decision.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and
defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of
opposing judgments, and of executing."104 In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

III. The power of the Court to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.

During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two co-
equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in
resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and
not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the
President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

a) The judicial power to review

versus the congressional power to
revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On
the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise
events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and
further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of
the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

b) The framers of the 1987

Constitution intended the judicial
power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional
power to revoke.

If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and
Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the following exchange:

MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards that
Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.

MR. RAMA. Yes.

MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the
Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a proclamation was not
warranted?

xxxx
MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just
standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately be
applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x 107

c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo

Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set
aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that:

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. 109

xxxx

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or
suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x110

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and
surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse,
the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case
Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in
this proceeding.111

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default
on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency

of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.

The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the
armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial
law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by
revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the
scope of the powers, and review of presidential action."113
a) Extraordinary powers of the
President distinguished.

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes
necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. 116 In fact,
"the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial review." 117

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring
martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a
time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger
thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law.119 They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of
abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent
danger."121

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve
curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial
law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon the military to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore
order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the
Congress, and review by the Court.123

b) What really happens during martial law?

During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the
imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he could
not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely
does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second
lines in this provision state:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the
case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the
President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle
of separation of powers.

The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to
that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a
commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the
President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of law
but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In other
words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed
especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of war. 124

xxxx

FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial
law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it
is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual
theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is authorized
to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed
in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can the military
courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil
courts, in fact, are unable to function.

MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical
area.

FR. BERNAS. That is correct.

MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief.

FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The

understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians' has reference to the practice under the Marcos regime where military
courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that except in areas
where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for some kind of court to
function.125

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power,
with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for
the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of
the State.126

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice
Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under
a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media
and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x". 128

Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him
unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil
courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place
during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also
suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses
connected with invasion.129
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties, 130 the
Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.

c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by
which the Commander-in-Chief must
adhere to.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of
'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must
be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does
not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must
follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the
President decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-
Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the
situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among
these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the
President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to
address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State. 132

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so
would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement
on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

d) The framers of the 1987

Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the
President.

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of
the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the calibration
of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation.
Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of congressional
concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege. 133

MR. PADILLA.x x x

We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should not require
beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the Congress. However, as provided
by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the period of such
suspension.134
xxxx

MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because the
provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as
Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there is an
attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be
blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all
Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can see it.

Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.

And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a political
one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no
need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. x x x135

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase 'and, with
the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress...'

MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.

MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an exclusive
prerogative of the President?

MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be
shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or the
Senate may even revoke the proclamation.136

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. x x x

The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong
and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of his good
and substantial reasons?

MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations
regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the
interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to
act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At
the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the judiciary to inquire into the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an aberration
in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another
Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the
Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the
paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its
decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.

I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of
the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as
against the rights of citizens. x x x

MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?

MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What we
are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the other
hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to
protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should be a
concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of
such 60 days.

xxxx

MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative check
on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?

MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those
conditions.

MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?

MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of
Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to deal
with the circumstances.

MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?

MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the event
of an invasion or a rebellion.137

The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to
interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.

e) The Court must similarly

and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of
which among his extraordinary
powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.

It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of

martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time
element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1 concurrence
of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no
longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President
to act quickly to protect the country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President
the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the
Executive Department.

j) The recommendation of the

Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-
ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare martial law is
not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on
the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

g) In any event, the President

initially employed the most benign
action - the calling out power -
before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial
law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016,
declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is
extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential
actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use his
extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made the conscious
anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the
initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao,
the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve;
on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President
decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief
that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires
it.
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region.

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of
the phrase "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the
proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.

This argument lacks legal basis.

a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 140 "[A] statute or act may be
said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."141

b) Vagueness doctrine applies

only in free speech cases.

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who
does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague
law thus chills him into silence."143

It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. 144 Justice Mendoza explained the
reason as follows:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating
the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

xxxx

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x 145

Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking down
statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.146 "Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
abstract context having no factual concreteness."147

c) Proclamation No. 216

cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation No.
1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national emergency, on
ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is
not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like
Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

d) Inclusion of "other rebel

groups " does not make Proclamation
No.216 vague.

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.

In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
an ordinance that had made it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and
there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance what annoys some people but
does not annoy others.'

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is evident on
its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language - but
which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased - in which case, it may be 'saved'
by proper construction.151

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context
of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups"
found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.

Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has
no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or
data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension.
And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the proclamation
itself and the Report submitted to Congress.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued
after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said
orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations,
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these
areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress
in the exercise of its power to revoke.

VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.

216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.

a) The calling out power is in a

different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated
September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1 Police
(PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the
Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in
the Philippines.

In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different
category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law:

x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with
the revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification.153

In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although,
of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise of his power
to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only
be examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.155

In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to
sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific
injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying
the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis. 156

This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional
design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to prove
that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned
Presidential act/s.

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial
law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power through
Proclamation No. 55.

b) The operative fact doctrine.

Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the
President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is
recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.158

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American
Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of
constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official.

The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under the
Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions
is to that extent unwarranted and null.

The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative
attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the
more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or
ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical
then than to consider it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159

However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that
would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or invasion,
and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.

VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.

a) The scope of the power of

review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.

To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within
proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-
imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court first gave the
general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the Court said that its
power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by
appeal...in which cases the appellate court has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor to its power
of quasi-judicial administrative decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether 'there is
some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court accepted the Solicitor
General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the President's decision
is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the
writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.'164

Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing
only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact
done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.

b) The "sufficiency of factual

basis test".

Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution.
Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be
understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs
to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.

We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the
introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such,
must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well
as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at
the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.

Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as
these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.

As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the
President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and what
not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of the
situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and
confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the
written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since
these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used
only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but
not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court
should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in
the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all
facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's
appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-
making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm
the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining
would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but
would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow
the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the
emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his
possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated
to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as
credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment, 167 as
appears to be the case here.

At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:

President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the
supposed armed uprising was within their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency has
also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the 'Maguindanao
massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety warranting a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.

Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in
establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires. 168

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim
martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's
review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand
during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the
Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60
days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this
Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration. 169

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of
and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not
enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are
other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an
actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.

In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual
basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the
bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the
declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.

VIII. The parameters for determining the

sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a) Actual invasion or rebellion,

and public safety requirement.

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to
have the same technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did not define the term
"rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).172

During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then Commissioner
Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article 134 of the RPC:

MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual attack
on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event - this
Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an
actual act of rebellion?

MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the
purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135. x x x173

Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article
134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would also give
the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the Constitution see
k s to prevent.174

Article 134 of the RPC states:

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public
uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory
of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives."175

b) Probable cause is the

allowable standard of proof for the
President.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is
probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being
committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his
emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and
that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which
the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof,
which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his
exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely
necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on
common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed x x x by the accused."177

To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the
controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.

IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the

declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of
accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual
basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded
the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he received
before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:

1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval
or other armed forces or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives.178

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. 179 However, they insist that
the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political
purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces;
or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.

The contention lacks merit.

a) Facts, events and

information upon which the President
anchored his decision to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM, 180 the
Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were known to or have transpired on or
before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events
were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked
from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:

1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on

account of lawless violence in Mindanao;181

2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:

a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, killing and
wounding several soldiers;

b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the
Maute Group and other detainees;

3. On May 23, 2017:183

a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;

b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;

c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;

d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;

e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and

f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage
to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao; and the Report 184 submitted
to Congress:

1. Zamboanga siege;185

2. Davao bombing;186

3. Mamasapano carnage;187

4. Cotabato bombings;188

5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189

6. Sulu bombings;190

7. Basilan bombings;191

8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by combined forces of ASG and
the Maute Group;192

9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops;193

10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and establishments but
civilians as well;194

11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which paralyzed Marawi City; 195

12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a
DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province;196

13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready;197

14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed groups; 198

15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS; 199

16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to ISIS; 200

17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group; 201

18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:

a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked various
government and privately-owned facilities;202

b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the
escape of inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or
locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles;203
c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide power outage by
evening;204

d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station;
commandeered a police car;205

e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas; 206

f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by
the rebels;207

g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi junction;208

h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the
church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony;209

i) taking of hostages from the church;210

j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation; 211

k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central Elementary Pilot
School;212

1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213

m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214

n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital;215

o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armored vehicle; 216

p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; 217

q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218

r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and

s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in
Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel1 , and
committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the Government.220

b) The President's Conclusion

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following
conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:

1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the
crime of rebellion."221
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly
constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao
- starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government and its laws
and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and
to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of
the people therein and the nation as a whole."222

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic
State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President, foremost - of
their powers and prerogatives. "223

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the
groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province
covering the entire Mindanao."224

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout
Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of
DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government." 225

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over
the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus,
and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and
remove his supervisory powers over local governments."226

7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have
been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road
blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic
services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and
from the city is likewise hindered."227

8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden
other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in
Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao." 228

9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive
action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity." 229

Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising,
the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives,
leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is
being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was
the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice
Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:

x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of proof as to unduly
burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising such powers.

Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of
proof required for convicting an accused charged with a criminal offense.x x x

xxxx

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to require the President to
establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with such amount of proof before declaring martial
law or suspending the writ amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power to act as to
practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation against threats to
public safety.'

Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil cases, is
indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This amount of proof
likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof
greater than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.

Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is
demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law.

xxxx

Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides, before she can
act and impose martial law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails the President's emergency
powers.

Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of her
emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amount of proof required in administrative or quasi-
judicial cases, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices and
satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ.

Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the
prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been defined
as a 'set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested.'

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.

Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical, and
most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law x x x230

c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.

The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report
are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is
not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so
would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.

Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-evidence.231

FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE

(1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Statements made by:
Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital
there, among several locations. As of 0600H (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
of 24 May 2017, members of the Maute (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo
Group were seen guarding the entry gates of Carlos;
the Amai Pakpak Hospital and that they held (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard
hostage the employees of the Hospital and Arevalo; and
took over the PhilHealth office located thereat (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra
(Proclamation No. 216 and Report); denying that the hospital was attacked by the
Maute Group citing online news articles of
Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo
Radyo.232

2. that the Maute Group ambushed and Statements made by PNP Director General
burned the Marawi Police Station Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor
(Proclamation No. 216 and the Report); Majul Gandamra in the online news reports of
ABS-CBN News and CNN
Philippines233 denying that the Maute group
occupied the Marawi Police Station.

3. that lawless armed groups likewise Statement made by the bank officials in the
ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines on-line news article of Philstar234 that the
and commandeered one of its armored Marawi City branch was not ransacked but
vehicles (Report); sustained damages from the attacks.
 4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot Statements in the on-line news article of
School was burned (Proclamation No. 216 Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Schools
and the Report); Division Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto
denying that the school was burned and
Department of Education Assistant Secretary
Tonisito Umali stating that they have not
received any report of damage.

5. that the Maute Group attacked various Statement in the on-line news article of
government facilities (Proclamation No. 216 Inquirer236 made by Marawi City Mayor Majul
and the Report). Gandamra stating that the ASG and the
Maute Terror Groups have not taken over any
government facility in Marawi City.

However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It was
not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved
futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and
are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the
matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which
likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis.

Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in
these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report indubitably
showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands.

d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections not
Applicable.

Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be
admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this case
is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement,
which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial." 240 Here, the question
is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they said are
true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.

e) There are other independent

facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists
and that public safety requires it.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report;
along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely
than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or
inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's Report.
Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral
argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge
of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the
reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the
President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.

Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false
and/or hyperbolic.

X. Public safety requires the declaration of

martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a
concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their
properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; 243 road
blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages
were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced
to join their group;248 medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; 250 and the
security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251

These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a
level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared:

While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao
until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 252

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with.
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion
exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

XI. Whole of Mindanao

a) The overriding and

paramount concern of martial law is
the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
public.

Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos regime,
one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing from not resuscitating the
law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt about the necessity and
practicality of such specie of extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on the
Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.

Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary
for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is "precautionary , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the
purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our sovereign
people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies"
"especially in areas like Mindanao."254

Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public
safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise
be present.

b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant,
classified, and live information which
equip and assist him in making
decisions.

In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for
Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not, shows
that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes
that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion,
relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or
all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the
President has possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the contents of
which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These
documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of
firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers,
etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information came to light,
although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to
include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact,
petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion
of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President."255

It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is
for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified
evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of
the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded even "when
[the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."257

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the
right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with
his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
c) The Court has no machinery
or tool equal to that of the
Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground
conditions.

In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However, this
should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the function of
the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of
factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned not to
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have
to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive
Department will have to open its findings to the Court, 260 which it did during the closed door session
last June 15, 2017.

d) The 1987 Constitution

grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage
or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the
President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under
martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly
the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information
necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the
tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on
the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60
days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of
coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the
President.

e) The Constitution has

provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in-
Chief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only
be discouraged but also avoided.

Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would
engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a
stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society should
outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not
be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to
the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the
survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies
but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be
cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated
assumptions.

Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which
effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the
powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not
only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60
days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers
of the Court and Congress.

Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted his
colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by
elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:

MR. MONSOD. x x x

Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial law for a
fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous
violations of human rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold sufferings. Madam
President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion. We may not have any freedom to speak of
after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That might prevent the
President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like to suggest that,
perhaps, we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking at a very specific case.
We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are looking at actual
invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in those cases.262

Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards against
presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination of
the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite my concern for
human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard human rights and human lives as
well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate the powers of the President. Xxx 263

Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:

MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.

x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and delicate
nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to impose
martial law is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the Committee,
there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme
Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated Commissioner Monsod, it is
said that the power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers
may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other
hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of
the State are in arms against each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute the
laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x 264 (Emphasis supplied)

At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-
Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of the
presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes
that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would not
generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a
whole. Thus:

MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of these
encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion or rebellion,
given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually
impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x
x265 (Emphasis supplied)

f) Rebellion and public safety;

nature, scope, and range.

It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes, involving
crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We understand this
to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by exact metes and
bounds.

To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura,
Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered the
Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to remove from
the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines, particularly the
Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.

Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we validly
say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The possibility
that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be discounted. There is no
way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the Court's compound.

Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS
is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely
lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the crime
of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should congregate
in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government
for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered and
formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the government.
Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the armed public uprising actually
to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is
logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation did not
involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime of
rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable
cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and
suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the
territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?

To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial
scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to
put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that
martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed public uprising actually
transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at stake
is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the President has to respond quickly.
After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in
Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would
have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare
martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.

Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law
only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired,
he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the
coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
predetermined bounds.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the
prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from
significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is
an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be
physically measured by metes and bounds.

Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to
the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique
characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of
rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance". 270 Direct
assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to name a few, are
absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge."277 Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be
absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No.
1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense". 279 "All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated
and charged as separate crimes in themselves.280

Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is
stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more
makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed public
uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve center
of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.

In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to
the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no
fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence,
the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President
wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of
spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City,
but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of
Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual
rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof
ineffective and useless.

g) The Court must stay within

the confines of its power.

The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe
1â wphi1

upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to
the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of
separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system." 281

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine
the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It
would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the
territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of
martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand souls
would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have to
secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested
in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur;
and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch
an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict
that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of
Mindanao would best serve as forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in
Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan
of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the
Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order problem in
Mindanao.

Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded into
using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"282 by attempting to impose another
encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act."283

Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the
President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's experience under the
Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on the ills some of
us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the
insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:

MR. OPLE. x x x

xxxx
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive branch of
the government impotent, as though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are
rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the extraordinary
measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state of war existing in
this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos,
especially if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a
minimum flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I think the
Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any manner, shunned the task of putting
these powers under a whole system of checks and balances, including the possible revocation at
any time of a proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination
of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined by Congress in
the event that it is necessary to do so because the emergency persists.

So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it is attuned to the
freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the same
time, it allows for a vigorous representation of the people through their Congress when an
emergency measure is in force and effect.284

h) Several local armed groups

have formed linkages aimed at
committing rebellion and acts in
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao.

With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South." 285 On
April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi." 286 The city's first name,
"Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous.
Literally, it also means arrival or coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the
Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of
reference of all roads in Mindanao.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both
for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As
mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish
a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017,
Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as
Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military
and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the
contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.

Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:

a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Uno,
Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was wounded. 290

b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak,
Tawi-Tawi.291

c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan
resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of three others. 292
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the
BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding of several personalities. 293

e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu. 294

f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebels and
government troops.295

g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde. 296

h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days later. 297

There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and
other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to
other parts of Mindanao.

Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among
rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined
only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the
Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless
bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. 298 The Court cannot simply
take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has
reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and
called for by the circumstances.

i) Terrorism neither negates

nor absorbs rebellion.

It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While
some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism and
terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope
covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by
which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive,
its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and create a condition
of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping,
mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously
discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its
laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the
malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the
Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the
primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime
is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing
that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as
terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally
recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President
complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot
prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are
bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such
powers.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and
terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does
not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. 300

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.

At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or
correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or
champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a
crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as one
undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.

Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only God
or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war are
mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71 government
troops and 44 civilians.

Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences
and prejudices?

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216
and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See Dissenting Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 I concur, Please see my Separate
See Dissenting Opinion
Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I concur, see my Separate Opinion

See Separate Opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I concur, Please see my Separate

I concur, see Separate Opinion
Opinion
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I concur in the result. Please see

See separate concurring Opinion
separate opinion
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I dissent, see separate opinion See separate opinion

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate opinion w/ separate opinion

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

with separate opinion

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 37.
2
Id.

3
Id. at 38-39.

4
Id. at 40.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 40-41.

7
Id. at 41.

8
Id. at 42-43.

9
Id. at 43.

10
Id. at 44-45.

11
Id. at 3-32. 1

12
Id. at 15.

13
Id. at 16.

14
Id. at 16-17.

15
Id. at 17.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Id. at 19.

19
Id. at 20.

20
Id. at 20-21.

21
Id. at 23.

22
Id. at 24.

23
Id.

24
Id. at 24-25.

25
Id. at 25.

26
Id.
27
Id. at 26-27.

28
Id. at 28.

29
Id. at 29.

30
Id. at 29-30.

31
Id. at 48-50.

32
Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 80-83; rollo of G.R. No. 231774, pp. 47-50.

33
Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, pp. 4, 7.

34
Id. at 5.

35
Id. at 23. Italics supplied.

36
Id. at 23-24. Italics supplied.

37
Id. at 24.

38
Id.

39
Id. at 27.

40
Id. at 24-25.

41
Id. at 28-29.

42
Id. at 31.

43
Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 3.

44
Id. at 6.

45
Id. at 8.

46
Id. at 11.

47
Id.

48
Id.

49
Id. at 12.

50
Id. at 15.

51
Id. at l7.
52
Id. at 12.

53
Id. at 20-21.

54
Id. at 23.

55
Id. at 24.

56
Id.

57
Id. at 25.

58
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 85-135.

59
Id. at 130.

60
Id. at 105.

61
Id. at 106.

62
Id. at 105.

63
Id.

64
Id. at 107.

65
Id.

66
Id. at 111.

67
Id.

68
Id.

69
Id. at 112.

70
Id. at 113.

71
Id.

72
Id.

73
Id.

74
Id. at 114.

75
Id.

76
Id.
77
Id. at 119.

78
See Notice dated June 13, 2017, id. at 211-216.

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
79

Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 850.

Id., citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937); Police General Macasiano (Ret.) v.
80

National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 64 (1993).

81
Bernas, Joaquin G., Constitutional Rights and Social Demands, 2010 ed., p. 795.

82
Rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 7.

83
Rollo of G.R. No. 231774, p. 6.

84
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 4-5.

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
85

Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 852.

86
Id. at 85l.

87
TSN of Oral Argument, June 13, 2017, p. 83.

88
Id.at21-22.

89
De Jesus v. Garcia, 125 Phil. 955, 959 (1967).

90
Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 ed., p. 167, citing Pimentel v. Commission
on Elections, 189 Phil. 581, 587 (1980) and Dimagiba v. Geraldez, 102 Phil. 1016, 1019
(1958).

91
De Jesus v. Garcia, supra at 960.

92
149 Phil. 547 (1971).

93
Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, 2003 edition, p. 109.

94
Bernas, Joaquin, G ., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.

95
91 Phil. 882, 887 (1952).

96
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 585-586.

97
206 Phil. 392 (1983).

98
Id. at 419.

99
See also Cruz, Isagani, A., Philippine Political Law, 2002 edition, pp. 225-226.
100
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).

V RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 1009-10 10 (October 15, 1986).

101

Emphasis supplied

102
"The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose."

"Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case
103

or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." (Emphasis supplied)

Ballentine, J., Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 1948 ed., p. 1023; Bouvier, J., Law
104

Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, 8th ed., Vol. II, p. 2730.

105
TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, pp. 99-100.

106
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 767 (2006), citing Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 643 (2000).

107
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 503-504 (July 31, 1986).

108
Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 684 Phil. 526 (2012).

109
Id. at 558.

110
Id. at 561.

111
Any reference in the Majority Opinion and in the Dissent of Justice Antonio T. Carpio
in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo to acting ''in tandem", "not only sequentially, but in
a sense jointly'', and "sequential or joint" pertains to the interplay of powers/actions between
the President and the Congress; not of the Judiciary. See Fortun v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo, id. at 557, 560, 604.

112
CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18.

113
Bernas, Joaquin G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 456.

114
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 780.

115
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 642 (2000).

116
Id. at 639-640.
 Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and
117

Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 472.

The difference in the treatment of the calling out power vis-a-vis the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial
law is explained in this wise:

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by the Congress and review by this Court. (Id. at 479.)

Bernas, Joaquin, G., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and
118

Cases Part I, 2010 ed., p. 474.

119
Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the I 986 Constitution Writers, I 995 ed., p. 456.

120
Id. at 458.

121
Id.

122
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.

123
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra note 115 at 643.

124
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 398 (July 29, 1986),

125
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 402 (July 29, 1986).

Bernas, Joaquin, G. Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government, Notes and

126

Cases Part I, 20 10 ed., p. 473.

127
Supra note 106.

128
Id. at 781-782.

See Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio, Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note

129

108 at 599.

130
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 781.

131
SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 510-511 (2004).

132
Id. at 518.

133
Bernas, Joaquin, G., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 464.
134
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 469 (July 30, 1986).

135
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).

136
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 471(July30, 1986).

137
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).

138
11 RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 476-477 (July 30, 1986).

WHEREAS, this [May 23, 2017 Marawi incident] recent attack shows the capability of the
139

Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property
not only in Lanao <lei Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel & Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127
140

Phil. 306, 325 (1967).

141
People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988).

142
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 354 (2001).

143
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 122 (2014).

144
Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 390-391 (2008).

Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 142 at

145

430-432.

146
Id. at 355.

147
Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 283 (2004).

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452,
148

490 (2010).

149
Supra note 106.

150
Supra note 141.

151
Id. at 286-287.

152
690 Phil. 72, (2012).

153
Id. at 91-92. Emphasis supplied.

154
Supra note 115.

155
Id. at 640.

156
Id. at 632-634.
157
CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 18, par. 3.

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
158

Commentary; 1996 ed., p. 865.

159
Id. at 864-865, citing Fernandez v. Cuerva, 129 Phil. 332, 340 (1967).

160
Supra note 92.

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution do not have the equivalent provision of Section 18,
161

par. 3, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, supra note 92 at 586. See
162

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p.473.

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
163

Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 475.

164
Id. at 473.

According to petitioner Lagman, "the length of the proclamation and the assertion of facts
165

therein is the call of the President; see TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2017, p. 67.

See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-

166

Arroyo, supra note 108 at 607.

167
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).

MR. NATIVIDAD. And the Commissioner said that in case of subversion, sedition or
imminent danger of rebellion or invasion, that would be the causus beli for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But I wonder whether or not
the Commissioner would consider intelligence reports of military officers as evidence
of imminent danger of rebellion or invasion because this is usually the evidence
presented.

MR. PADILLA. Yes, as credible evidence, especially if they are based on actual
reports and investigation of facts that might soon happen.

MR. NATIVIDAD. Then the difficulty here is, of course, that the authors and the
witnesses in intelligence reports may not be forthcoming under the rule of classified
evidence of documents. Does the Commissioner still accept that as evidence?

MR. PADILLA. It is for the President as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces to

appraise these reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the
suspension of the writ. After all, this can also be raised before the Supreme Court as
in the declaration of martial law because it will no longer be, as the former Solicitor
General always contended, a political issue. It becomes now a justiciable issue. The
Supreme Court may even investigate the factual background in support of the
suspension of the writ or the declaration of martial law.
 MR. NATIVIDAD. As far as the Commissioner is concerned, would he respect the
exercise of the right to, say, classified documents, and when authors of or witnesses
to these documents may not be revealed? ·1

MR. PADILLA. Yes, because the President, in making this decision of suspending
the writ, will have to base his judgment on the document because, after all, we are
restricting the period to only 60 days and further we are giving the Congress or the
Senate the right or the power to revoke, reduce, or extend its period.

See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco in Fortun v. President Macapagal-

168

Arroyo, supra note 108 at 629.

169
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986).

See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-

170

Arroyo, supra note 108 at 610.

171
Agpalo, Ruben, E., Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition, 2003, pp. 187-189.

See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-

172

Arroyo, supra note 108 at 592.

173
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 412 (July 29, 1986).

See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-

174

Arroyo, supra note 108 at 595.

175
Id. at 594-595.

176
Id. at 597-598.

177
Id.

Caraig, Benjamin R., The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, 2008 revised
178

ed., p. 59.

179
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 267.

180
Id. at 380.

181
See Proclamation No. 216, 1st Whereas Clause.

182
See Proclamation No. 216, 4th Whereas Clause.

183
See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause.

184
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 187-193.

185
Id. at 189.
186
Id.

187
Id.

188
Id.

189
Id.

190
Id.

191
Id.

192
Id.

193
Id.

194
Id.

195
Id.

196
Id.

197
Id.

198
Id.

199
Id.

200
Id.

201
Id.

202
Id. at 190.

203
Id.

204
Id.

205
Id.

206
Id.

207
Id.

208
Id.

209
Id. at 191.

210
Id.
211
Id.

212
Id.

213
Id.

214
Id.

215
Id.

216
Id.

217
Id.

218
Id.

219
Id.

220
Id.

221
See Proclamation No. 216, 5th Whereas Clause.

222
See Report, p. l, 1st par., rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 187.

223
Id. at 3, last par., id. at 189.

224
Id. at 6, 1st par., id. at 192.

225
Id., 2nd par., id.

226
Id., 3rd par., Id.

227
Id., 4th par., Id.

228
Id., 5th par., Id.

229
Id. at 7, penultimate par., id. at 193.

230
Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 112 at 595-598.

231
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 275-276.

232
Id. at 320-332.

233
Id. at 331-332, 343-344.

234
Id. at 320-323.

235
Id.
236
Id. at 347-348.

237
Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000).

238
See rollo of G.R. No. 231771, p. 29.

239
621 Phil. 498 (2009).

240
Id. at 517.

241
TSN of the Oral Arguments, June 14, 2017, pp. 10-23.

242
See Report, p. 3, 2" par. Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, p. 189.

243
Id. at 4; id. at 190.

244
Id.; id.

245
Id. at 5; id. at 191.

246
Id.; id.

247
Id.; id.

248
Id.; id.

249
Id. at 6; id. at 192.

250
Id.; id.

251
Id.; id.

252
Id. at 7; id. at 193.

253
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 710 (July 17, 1986).

254
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 774 (July 18, 1986).

255
TSN of Oral Argument, June 14, 2014, p. 67.

256
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).

257
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470 (July 30, 1986).

258
David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 106 at 767.

Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p.
259

486.
260
Id.

261
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 394 (July 29, 1986).

262
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482 (July 30, 1986).

263
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 483 (July 30, 1986).

264
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 485 (July 30, 1986).

265
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986).

266
People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488 (1995).

People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 96 (1956); People v. lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 488
267

(1995).

Definitions of PUBLIC SAFETY<[Link]/definition/PUBLIC SAFETY> (visited

268

July 3, 2017).

269
People v. Dasig, 293 Phil. 599, 608 (1993). Italics supplied.

270
People v. Lovedioro, supra note 266 at 488.

271
People v. Dasig, supra 269 at 608-609.

272
People v. Mangallan, 243 Phil. 286 (1988) cited in People v. Dasig, supra at 609.

273
People v. Lovedioro, supra at 488.

274
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, 267 Phil. 603, 612 (1990).

278
Id.

276
Id.

277
People v. Dasig, supra at 609.

278
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 603.

279
People v. lovedioro, supra at 490.

280
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Amin, supra at 61l.

281
People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 550 (1956).

282
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 509 (July 31, 1986).

283
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 510 (July 31, 1986). Emphasis supplied.
284
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (August 6, 1986). Emphasis supplied.

285
History of Lanao del Sur <[Link] (visited July 3, 2017).

Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background

286

<[Link] (visited July 3,

2017).

Islamic City of Marawi: Historical Background

287

<[Link] (visited July 3,

2017).

288
Rollo of G.R. No. 231658, pp. 40-41.

289
Id. at 156.

290
Id. at 146.

291
Id.

292
Id.

293
Id. at 147-148.

294
Id. at 146.

295
Id.

296
Id.

291
Id.

298
President Duterte's Report to Congress, May 25, 2017, p. 3; id. at 37.

299
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,
lists the following predicate crimes of terrorism:

a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine
Waters);

b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

c. Article 134-a (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private persons;

d. Article 248 (Murder);

e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction, or under

 (1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Waste Control Act of 1990);

(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of
1968);

(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);

(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974); and,

(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws
on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives).

300
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note
148 at 493, the Court held that the elements of terrorism are as follows: (1) the offender
commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or
under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime
sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee

MALCOLM, J.:

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict
revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the trial
court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the
maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of
that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of the case and of
the facts, an opinion on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible error be found,
regarding the appropriate penalty, will be taken up in the order named.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the
household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of
the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the
policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and
member of the Philippine Constabulary.

The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle
Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary
soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag
was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.

The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private
Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a
Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa
Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police
force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state
of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding
officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the
Barracks.

During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in
Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the
streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received
the night before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal
by the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked
him to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio
was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the
window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with
rifles and ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals. When outside of the
quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.

One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American
policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in
the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of
policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the face of overwhelming odds,
her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that in response
to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.

A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without
considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a
volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding
three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose
Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the
command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing and advanced in
order that he might administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.

The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman,
assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala,
arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by
Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly
afterwards of patrolman Saplala.

About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real
near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed
themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of
patrolmen Trogue and Sison.

Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime,
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna
opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle
occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were
passing along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real,
Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was
mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately
into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Calles
General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.

General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the
Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after
another returned to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers
was, however, made.

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary
officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of
the night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time, numbering
some one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and when this was done, the
soldiers were separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English
with the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made to
all of the soldiers two statements.

What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel
Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which
ones had been out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting, which they did,
and to tell me the names of those who were with them and who were not then present, which they
did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-three) present and they named five (four) others." Again
the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out on the previous night for any purpose
whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward and gave them five minutes to think it over before
doing so. To those who stepped forward that had gone out for any purpose whatever I asked those
who took part in the shooting the night before that in justice to themselves and to the other men who
had not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned, that they step forward and they did." The
names of the four who took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present,
were noted by Captain Gallardo.

The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same
day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in English or
Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers, translated not
their dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or
three witnesses.

Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in
substance they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L.
Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be
selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally transcribed:

1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254
years of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the
Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.

2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? — First Company,

General Service of the Constabulary.]

3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,

1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.

4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.

5. For what reason, and where did you go? — We went in search of the policemen and
secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having
standing grudge against now since we have been having a standing grudge against the
police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and
then abused by the same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this woman to
an American; after this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely
accusing them of keeping women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of
Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag did
nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor
spread among us that the police department of Manila had given orders to the policemen to
fire upon any Constabulary soldier they found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor
was not without foundation since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of
Manila, Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this
reason we believe that if we did not put an end to these abuses of the policemen and secret
service men, they would continue abusing the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we
did what we had done last night.

6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? — I saw that almost all
the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in the barracks and
so I followed.

7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.

8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the
night before last on Calle Real? — Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our comrade.

9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? — Indeed, yes,
not only was I offended, but my companions also were.

10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. — I cannot tell precisely
the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I
fired more than once.

11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the victim
was a policeman or a civilian. — I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any civilian.

12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. — I cannot given an exact account of
the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle
Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching
the barracks.

13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did you
use? — I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I
placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.

14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? — By the window of the quarter of the
Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.

15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? —
Yes, sir.

16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? —
Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.

(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.

Witnesses:

S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes
of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges
of first instance.

All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E.
Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but
later, after the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty
were permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the
prosecution, in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants,
introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made by
Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The prosecution
further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising.

The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the
defendants and was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not
freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente
Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque Ebol,
Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario
Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Deceña, Venancio
Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect
these men did not take part in the riot.

The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however, distinguished
fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos,
Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario
Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed, and of the three
sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine
of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were divided proportionately among the defendants.

For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who
presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case.
As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the
same in both cases.

In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The
rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in
passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio
[1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance appears.

OPINION

An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the
assignment of error merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart
in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente
Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio
Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol,
Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M.
Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks in the night
of the tragedy, is predicated on the special defense raised in the lower court for these defendants
and three other and which was found untenable by the trial court. Any further discussion of this
question falls more appropriately under consideration of assignment of error No. 4, relating to the
conspiracy between the accused.

Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that the
policemen were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the
evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.

The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused
(assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the
conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5,
sedition case).

1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76

Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is
alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who
had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact
so participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for
the good of the service" in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still
others simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made
in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were sometime taken in al
language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused entered timely objection to the
admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in stating otherwise.

Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines
Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received as
evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court that
it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of
promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the
same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly announced by this and
other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it
constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U.
S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not voluntarily made or was
obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)

What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The
source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the
confession is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer.
With military orders given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of
the defendants must have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more
important, there could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the confessions as written
down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in
the investigation were of the same service as the defendants in their own men.
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the Insular
Police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical experience,
these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses.
Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and
whatever of credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire
for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de corps, is the instinct of self
preservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten
as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel prudence rather than rashness;
secretiveness rather than garrulity.

These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any
promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose
credibility has not been successfully impeached.

We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.

2. The conspiracy between the accused

The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the
accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "who asked you to
join the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the
appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called psychology of crowds
theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were
mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their companions and of their uniform. From both the
negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of
conspiracy between the accused.

The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of
Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people may
be on solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case which reaches
the same result.

It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible
for all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if
the act is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5
Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of September
29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)

Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants pursued
by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion
that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts
before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which
was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment
animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was followed.

The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of
actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not
along are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their
carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are
responsible for the legal consequences therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.

3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law

Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of
sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and we believe that such finding
is correct.

Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No.
292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public
functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of
the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the
Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one
scene there was a fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an
unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.

We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5,
paragraph 3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

JUDGEMENT

The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined in
section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding
ten years, or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the private
soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña, Baldomero Rodriguez,
P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano
Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana,
Timoteo Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia,
Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio,
Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis,
Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña, Domingo
Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente
Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado,
Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano
Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade,
Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and to pay one seventy-
seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the window through
which the defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos,
Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario
Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P5,000 and one
seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and
Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and one
seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the
discretion which the law reposes in him.

We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent observations
found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned
opinion, Judge Harvey said:
 Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so
villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this case
with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for
ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the enormity of the offense.
Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is worthy of a
better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved
ones, and using the means furnished to them by the Government for the protection of life
and property, they sought by force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a
fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the
government of the city of Manila.

Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these
same defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose penalties in this
case, yet it is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh of
the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS
V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer,
PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. [Link] S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu
vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as
the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify
them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule
113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial
admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

 5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas corpus exists as a

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3

speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of
the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is
illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decisi on dated 9 July 1990, looked
into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would
follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

The law
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6

expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which,
like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such

crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has
just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by

A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10

on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow
man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was
listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot
wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and support ed by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Du ral; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third
— as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitiou s and the wounded man
was in reality Rolando Dural.
 believe
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13

that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital
management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable
sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was
made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was
thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers).
On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were
found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore,
caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule
113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests
without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within
judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to
remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied
by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information,
the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when
Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he
was a ranking member of the CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
 3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military
agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the
agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose
house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of
Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make
the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the
other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of
the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the
safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his posse ssion were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by
the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That
would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to

An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to

prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21

arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are
met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed
guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties
and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent

But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24

can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
 Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November

Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
1988. 28

uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to
sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 De cember 1988, or 14
days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several f acts and events
surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein
as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order date d 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering
said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
 At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case
and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests
of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section
5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicia l admission.

that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in
her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It
pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and
all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution,
are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met,
then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the
end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some
groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the,
majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo
Nazareno for the crime of murder.

In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to
sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that
Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the
authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."

I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless
arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be
considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious
remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly
seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp.
23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short though it might
seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be considered as
covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact
just been committed."

The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days
after the commission of the crime imputed to him.

Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular
provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law [Link] agents and
even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude
among their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be
tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits"
(Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary
to law, is beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the
law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.

Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a
warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others to commit any
of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable
for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a
question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that any of
the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and
expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests; those of the State as
against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is
made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to
sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in
view of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless
arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be

underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator
is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if
has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices
trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the
roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the accused to prove membership by
force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of
enlistment.

It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in
fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old
rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just
'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting
opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).

I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was provided by the
Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been
committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough
to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra,
at p. 15).

Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out
the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
 informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by
telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arressted, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the
court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at
554).

These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian
components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who
faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community.

I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a
political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in
finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually
have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of government
and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith should be reposed on the officials
implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable
both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties. Victims of abuses
should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.

If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted
peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the Constitution to
uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them.
Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming
before us.

People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom
and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing order
through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values
Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast
liberating themselves.

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

xxx xxx xxx

Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the
tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.

Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the
petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and
ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their
motions for reconsideration.

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that
that was inciting to sedition.

This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech.

"Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied
to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who
would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the
liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of
the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are
asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we
consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of
speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously;
(3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what constitute
the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we
allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the
ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all
pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of
expression. At the very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is
essential in this type of offense.

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is
to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or
sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence
to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming
around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump
to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever
seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be
validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards.
Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up
with those actually taking up arms against the Government.

The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless
arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's
surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants
of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the
warrantless arrest.

In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that Narciso
Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28, 1988
or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days
have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is
essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not
cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A
government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:

(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R. No.
83162;

(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;

(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and

(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.

CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were
arrested in flagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military, or
voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable
circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.

But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that
they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes.

We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with approval
in the original ponencia:

The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of
bail of the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
govenment forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. (Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of
beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application of
the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to
be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate
government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that the processes of the local courts are
not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed
to have renounced by their defiance of the government.

But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat the
rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder,
including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these — in our
country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those guaranteeing due process,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and presuming the innocence of the
accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the
"exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants — is not justified in the
present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws.
Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are by
such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture
of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no
impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the "continuing
offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is thus substituted for
municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic
matter.

As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which this
Court has also adopted as its own:

. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by simply
placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so
placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the
process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the
time is a perfectly innocent act.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of
undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in
his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification,
the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the
hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the
determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a
warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing
the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.

In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed
to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as having
been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the
considerable time lapse.

It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day
of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a
warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of
the Identification of the suspect.

Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense
"has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just,"
which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made
almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting
officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.

I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be
the start of another dangerous doctrine:

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed
by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the
arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.,
that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt,
G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may
have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug.
This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession
that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was
the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself."

I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests
made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were
wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short
memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate
defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of
mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security. Whatever
their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill
of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what democracy is all
about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.

At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority
principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests
without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite
unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily
pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the
Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated,
which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the
majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes"
doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements are obiter,
they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of
the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored.

1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of
persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the
rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests
made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure,
are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.

2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are
unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in Section
5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an
officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously
securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113 follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that
judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they
are: they are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to
such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional
rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and
seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such
provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are cast fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision, rather than the exception. 1 This
rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory
provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with
especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to keep vital and
significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance, 3 this Court, stressing that:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of
the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be given
a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and
seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189;
Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So.,
613. (emphasis supplied)

held that:

. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. 4

In People vs. Burgos, 5

this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception
must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by
law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often vilated
and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)
4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of
the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting
officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The

If no overt, recognizably
term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7

criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer
could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be
committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not
externalized in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system.
For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be
an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor
perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate and
ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious necessity for instant
action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to capture the doer of
the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of warrantless arrests
under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be
sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting
officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha
the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first
requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still
visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person staggering
around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual
shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to have been committed
"in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a
requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the
arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person, no matter
what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon
a person dead on the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is
sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the
person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive
through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible
effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time
interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be
brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the
second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously
render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the
presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-
days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along with other persons, cannot
by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without
warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was
suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days, still it
must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not
reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require it,
that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and
ending the next day in the hospital.

7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who
is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the
standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers,
ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer
must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of
the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the
majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in
the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the
arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without
a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the person
unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected
of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier
crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact
committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust
committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.

8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"
shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that
the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the
person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion
of the majority Resolution reads:

. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. . .
. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a
"sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would
have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.,
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels
the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of
overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)

9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in
our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine,
in my submission, does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in
character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed
when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes"
doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless
arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between specific lawless and commit
the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two
(2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of determining
whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is
raised.

10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or
elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other
ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or
malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the
essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very
nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing," then the court
within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a
person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed to be continuing
because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the
second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The
criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the
defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the
crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of whether
one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually
alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same
crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed
covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused constituted
discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the double jeopardy
defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the
unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the
single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving
the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some
of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested
without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a
crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the
presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing
crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous
criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of
a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as
membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization.
For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the
unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for
instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:" 13

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other document of the
organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;

c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;

xxx xxx xxx

f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise the reof;

xxx xxx xxx

h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes o f such
association or organization;
 xxx xxx xxx

k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police
agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces
but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce
the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or
excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.

REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:

While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some
reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.

It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arre st without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."

I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace officer or a private person to effect a
warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."

It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules of Crimina l Procedure, the
particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.

Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28
December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has
emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge o f factual indications regarding the
complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been d esigned to obviate the
practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely
professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth.

Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from imputation s based on dubious
motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been committed. The recency contemplated here, in rela tion to the making of the warrantless
arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person
making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests
could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the
consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or
reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the inte rval, the more attenuated are
the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen
(14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the informatio n he is acting upon and to
acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.

It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this
instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and stability must also be taken into a ccount. However, for the reasons
above elucidated, I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. It is true that
the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the
rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for u nwarranted incursions into
civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1

the majority has not shown why the arrests in question should after
all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant
and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule
113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense
(subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal
knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly
no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly
reasonable:

. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. 2

As I said, I dissent.

First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3
is made up of "overt
acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by
force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination
of a foreign power.
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has
taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to
make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that
above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise
the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean mere
"membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere membership.

I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would interpret it,
as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual
facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal
knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the accused has
committed an offense, in this case, membership in a subversive organization with intent to further
the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6)
spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably encompassed "actual belief or
suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the majority. Section 5(b) as amended,
however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to give to "personal knowledge"
the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had
been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural.
Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not
personal knowledge.

I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest
because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . .
." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos
involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant).
Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on
grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in good
faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to
the contrary, Santos suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police, the arrest is
nevertheless subject to question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information, and
that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital
authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We
have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species of information because of the lack of
"compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential
Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to
"government health authorities" — not to the military.

I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the
military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants.
As People vs. Burgos held:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12

I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-
82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip -the
military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority can say that since
Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that
Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this
Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the
petitioner's arrests.

More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-
so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be
abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the
majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."

It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the accused still has to be
established, since meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the
majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure").

I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked
up for inciting to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:

Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is
not saying that it is either, but that:

. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on
the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only
for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14

And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as

far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15
and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind, it is
a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's
constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words"
recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Court—whether or not the
statement in question constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly
legal question to my mind and I am wondering why we can not answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of course,
the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following day" "soon
thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless
arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or
escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as there
was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving
vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in
favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration,
first, because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government),
and second, because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty — as the custodian of
the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not
understand why these cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling
us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases involved, incidentally, people
who think differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities
came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23

With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on individua l rights (and statutory
construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co -responsible for the acts of my colleagues
and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.

Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities must have "personal knowledge."

In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed. In n o way can the authorities
be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can no t possibly be "personal knowledge" of a
crime that had "just been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks
before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules.

I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling
criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military
should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so -called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only

— today it is fourteen days,

through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24

tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact
unreasonable, following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found
out only later," as the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that
it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and
none of us can possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone—we
are talking of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not
people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully
submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully
submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because
Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am not to be
mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can
not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was an NPA
courier so that the military could pounce on him.

I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better
days. I do not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability
are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels." 28 First and
foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with
"Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second,
"Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate
tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third, Garcia and
Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the
rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document
(Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is
evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless
arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer
be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality,
via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the
petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their
continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be
elated.

A Final Word

As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate one
principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State
action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter likewise states, "values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." 32 The Constitution states the
general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule, and the rule the exception. With all
due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information with
which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal, information. I
submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in
question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule.

Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was
arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen days
after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because
the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a
provision that has not been written there.

"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what is
important is that the Court be right." 33

Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or
not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of
whether or not this Court, in approving the military's actions, is right.

In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture, hamletting, bombings , saturation drives, and
various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:

An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;

Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;

Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated salvage, and 109 remained mis sing after their arrest;

Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were wounded;
The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;

Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;

From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;

One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34

It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am
soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too late.

Motions denied.

Footnotes

1 G.R. No. 61388, April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.

2 G.R. No. 70748, October 21,1985,139 SCRA 349.

3 Section 1, Rule 102: "To what habeas corpus extends. — Except otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the right ful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

4 Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778.

5 Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.

6 Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948).

7 Republic Act No. 1700 known as the "Anti-Subversion Act" titled "An Act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations, penalize
membership therein and for other purposes." (1957); and the subsequent related decrees such as Presidential Decree No. 885, e ntitled
"Outlawing subversive organizations, penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes." (1976); and Presidential Decree No. 1835
entitled "Codifying the various laws on anti-subversion and increasing the penalties for membership in subversive organizations."

8 G.R. No. 61388. April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.

9 US vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 (1917).

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Records of G.R. No. 81567, affidavit dated 4 February 1988.

13 Rollo, pp. 311-312 (G.R. No. 81567).

14 Presidential Decree No. 169 requires attending physicians and/or persons treating injuries from any form of violence, to report such fact
to the Philippine Constabulary and prescribing penalties for any violation thereof.

15 Decision dated 9 July 1990, pp. 19-20.

16 Decision, pp. 10-11.

17 Ibid., p. 12.

18 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

19 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

20 Decision, p. 18.

21 United States vs. Sanchez, No. 9294, March 30,1914, 27 Phil, 442.

22 Ibid: "The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but . . . upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent
purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.

"In People vs. Ancheta, it was held that "the legality of detention made by a person in authority or an agent thereof ... doe s not depend
upon the juridical and much less the judicial fact of crime which, at the time of its commission, is not and cannot definitively be determined
for the lack of necessary data and for jurisdiction but upon the nature of the deed. . . . ."

23 United States vs. Santos, supra.

24 Ibid.

25 Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ART. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds. detains a person, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its maximum period, if the detention has not exceeded
three
days. . . .

26 Damages for the impairment of rights and liberties of another person.

27 Affidavit of Avelino Faustino dated 23 November 1988; Return of the Writ dated 25 November 1988; Decision dated 9 July 199 0, pp. 23-
24.

28 Joint Affidavit of 5 police agents, dated 23 November 1988; Decision, supra.

29 Affidavit of police agents, dated 28 December 1988, marked Exhibit "A" at the RTC, Biñan, Branch 24.

30 Decision of 9 July 1990, pp. 9 and 12.

31 Decision of 9 July 1990. p. 13.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1 Salaysay vs. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956).

2 Realty Investments Inc. vs. Pastrana. 84 Phil. 842 (1949)-l Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 (1948)

3 64 Phil. 33 (1937).

4 64 Phil. at 44.

5 144 SCRA 1 (1986).

6 144 SCRA at 14.

7 See e.g., U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 (1910).

8 In People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988), the Court, in nullifying a warrantless arrest, said, through Mr. Justice Cruz:

"In the many cases where tills Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators on the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been
shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113
was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension . It was
the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him." (163 SCRA at 409-410) (emphasis supplied)

9 People vs. Burgos, 114 SCRA 1 (1986).

10 121 SCRA 472 (1983).

11 Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, 22 SCRA 638 (1968); U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913); U.S. vs. Santiago, 27 Phil. 40 8 (1914);
U.S. vs. Laureaga, 2 Phil. 71 (1903).

12 E.g. People vs. Zapanta and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 688 (1951) where the Court held that each instance of sexual intercourse cons titute a
separate crime of adultery, though the same persons and the same offended spouse are involved, and that a second information may be
filed against the same accused for later acts of sexual intercourse.

13 Section 6, P.D. 1835, 16 January 1981.

Sarmiento, J.: dissenting:

1 Resolution, 1.

2 Supra; emphasis in the original.

3 The majority cites Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 1835 and "related decrees;" both Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 183 5 have
been repealed by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 267.

4 Please note that under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1835, "[t]the following acts shall constitute prima facie evidence of
membership in any subversive organization: (a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization; (b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such asso ciation or organization in
any form whatsoever; (c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other
forms; (d) Executing orders, plans, or directives of any kind of such association or organization; (e) Acting as an agent, courier, messenger,
correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity, on behalf of such association or organization; (f) Conferring with office rs or other
members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof; (g) Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of
such association or organization orally or in writing or any other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign or code; (h)
Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such
association or organization; (i) Mailing, shipping, circulating, distributing, or delivering to other persons any material or propaganda of any
kind on behalf of such association or organization; (j) Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information, suggestions, or
recommendations to officers, or members or to any other person to further the objectives of such association or organization; and (k)
Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or organization." Please n ote that
none of these are alleged by the military in this case, assuming that the Decree still exists.

5 Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382; emphasis supplied. In Taruc vs. Ericta (No. L-34856, Nov. 29, 1989, 168 SCRA 63,
66-67), I held that People vs. Ferrer is no longer a good basis for sustaining the Anti-Subversion Act. I am not here invoking Ferrer to
sustain it, but to discuss its elaboration of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700.

6 Resolution, supra.

7 G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.

8 Supra, 14.

9 36 Phil. 853 (1917).

10 Resolution, supra, 10.

11 People vs. Burgos, supra, 15.

12 Supra.

13 Resolution, supra, 15.

14 Supra, 16.

15 Supra.

16 See United States vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 (1907).

17 Resolution, supra; emphasis supplied.

18 Supra.

19 At 15.
20 G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988, 163 SCRA 402.

21 Resolution, supra.

22 Supra, 17.

23 Supra.

24 See RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 112, sec. 5, on the number of days a judge may act.

25 Resolution, supra.

26 G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.

27 G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.

28 Resolution, supra, 18-19.

29 Resolution, supra, 19.

30 Except for Rolando Dural, the rest of the petitioners have been acquitted by the lower courts trying their cases.

31 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

32 Supra, art. II, sec. 11.

33 Resolution, supra, 19.

34 Manila Chronicle, October, 1990.

G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007

ANGEL CELINO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 16,
Regional Trial Court, Capiz, Roxas City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated April 18, 20051 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.’s Motion to
Quash; and Resolution dated September 26, 2005 2 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the said Decision.

The following facts are not disputed:

Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging
petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban), 3 and Section 1,
Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 82944 (illegal possession of firearm), as follows:

Criminal Case No. C-137-04

That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly carry outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with
two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the
election period – December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 – without first having obtained the proper
authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila, Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Criminal Case No. C-138-04

That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number
3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same
caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary permit to possess the said
firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban
violation charge.7

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash8 contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was
also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the
same set of facts x x x."9
By Order of July 29, 2004,10 the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this
Court’s11 affirmation in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses12 of therein respondent judge’s denial of a similar
motion to quash on the ground that "the other offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated
under R.A. 8294 x x x." 13 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by September
22, 2004 Resolution,14 hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 15 before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision dated April 18, 2005,16 the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Motion
to Quash. Petitioner’s May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration17 having been denied by Resolution
of September 26, 2005,18 petitioner filed the present petition.

The petition fails.

Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the appellate court’s decision and resolution was to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a
copy of the appellate court's resolution on October 5, 200519 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005, 20 a
good 58 days after he received the said resolution.

Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the question being
raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not
have been raised on appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced. 21

While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially if filed within the reglementary period under said Rule, it finds nothing in the present case
to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification having been proffered, as just stated,
why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, 22 especially considering that it is
substantially just a replication of the petition earlier filed before the appellate court.

Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — x x x.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

xxxx

(Underscoring supplied)

The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored proviso. Petitioner, citing
Agote v. Lorenzo,23 People v. Ladjaalam,24 and other similar cases,25 contends that the mere filing of
an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearm. The Solicitor General contends otherwise on the basis of Margarejo v. Hon.
Escoses 26 and People v. Valdez.27

In Agote,28 this Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for gun ban violation but exonerated him of
the illegal possession of firearm charge because it "cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at
the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban." 29 Agote is based
on Ladjaalam30 where this Court held:

x x x A simple reading [of RA 8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
"other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning
of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. x x x

xxxx

x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it
did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. 31

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no
other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word "committed" taken in its ordinary
sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence,32 necessarily implies a prior
determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary
admission.33

Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is,
therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession
of firearms because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.34 In the
present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC
gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in
fact commit the other crime charged.35 Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.
More applicable is Margarejo36 where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to
quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that "the other offense charged
[i.e., violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x." 37 in
consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez 38 that "all pending cases involving illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly
indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x."39

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of
firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide,40 or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition
or attempted coup d’etat.41 Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should
continue to be prosecuted.

Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him
to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.42 Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a
grave abuse of discretion,43 the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error
is not attendant in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING *
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO **
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On Official Leave.

** Acting Chairperson.

1 CA rollo at 99-103.

2 Id. at 149.

3Rules and Regulations on: (A) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting Firearms or Other Deadly
Weapons; (B) Security Personnel or Bodyguards; (C) Bearing Arms By Any Member of
Security or Police Organization of Government Agencies and Other Similar Organization; (D)
Organization or Maintenance of Reaction Forces During the Election Period in Connection
with the May 10, 2004, Synchronized National and Local Elections.

4 An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended, entitled
"Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
distribution of firearms, ammunitions, or explosives or instruments used in the manufacture
of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposing stiffer penalties for certain violations
thereof and for relevant purposes." (Took effect July 6, 1997)

5 CA rollo at 24. No copy found in RTC records.

6
Records, p. 1.

7 Rollo, p. 8.

8 Records, pp. 25-31.

9
Id. at 27.

10 Id. at 48-52.
11 En Banc.

12 417 Phil. 506 (2001).

13 Id. at 512.

14 Records, p. 91.

15 CA rollo, pp. 2-60.

Id. at 99-103. Penned by Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with the concurrence of Justices
16

Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.

17 Id. at 108-117.

Id. at 132. Penned by Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with the concurrence of Justices
18

Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.

19 Id. at 131.

20 Rollo, p. 128.

Heirs of Griño v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 165073, June 30, 2006, 494
21

SCRA 329, 341 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).

Id. at 342, citing The President, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of
22

Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688.

23 G.R. No. 142675, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 60.

24 395 Phil. 1 (2000).

Evangelista v. Sistoza, 414 Phil. 874 (2001); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158 (2002);
25

People v. Bernal, 437 Phil. 11 (2002); People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198 (2003); and
People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637 (2003).

26 Supra note 12.

27 364 Phil. 259 (1999).

28 Supra note 23.

29 Id. at 75.

30 Supra note 24.

31 Id. at 35-36.

32 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14, par. (2).

33Vide People v. Concepcion, 55 Phil. 485, 491 (1930), where this Court held that "inasmuch
as every defendant is presumed innocent until convicted by a competent court after due
process of law of the crime with which he is charged, [the accused] is still innocent in the
eyes of the law, notwithstanding the filing of the information against him for the aforesaid
crime."

34Maintenance of drug den and direct assault with attempted homicide in Ladjaalam; robbery
in Evangelista; kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal detention in Garcia and in
Pangilinan; murder and gun ban violation in Bernal; illegal possession of drugs in Almeida;
and gun ban violation in Agote.

35On the contrary, petitioner even claimed, through his "not guilty" plea in Criminal Case No.
C-137-04 that he did not commit a violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban. (Rollo, p. 8)

36 Supra note 12.

37 Supra note 13.

38 Supra note 27.

39 Id. at 279.

40 R.A. No. 8294, Sec. 1.

41 Ibid.

42 Soriano v. Casanova, G.R. No. 163400, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 431, 439.

43 Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 176 (1996).

G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs.
Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In
Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons
and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres
Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn
their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.;
they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.

The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:

I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines,
and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and
take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed
public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance
to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or
"Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and
there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and
army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the
 crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen
attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10,
1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August
26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)

II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated
the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several
others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee
on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or
associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent
success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres
Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:

That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and
the place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the
different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps"
(HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having
come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082,
14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the
crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in
said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
together with many others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing
of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the
Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in
fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings,
planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
 August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950).

A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.

APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:
(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,
Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as
other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and
held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a
mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the
military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the
Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the
CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches
encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.

The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress
of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was
organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos,
Guillermo Capadocia, etc.

We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the
court.

Testimonial Evidence

Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October,
1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was
given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis".
He made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:

(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Comrade Luis Taruc.

(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and
the CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party. 1äwphï1.ñ ët

(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the
World Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by
the people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he
preferred to go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.
 (4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the
frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement
cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go
to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.

(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and
incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four
comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.

(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at
330 P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to
give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only
way out was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and
that Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino,
etc.

(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to
the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming
heroes by fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.

The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the
CLO since August, 1948.

On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a
Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of
the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO
was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.

(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee
of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by
the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially
the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct
its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
 eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution
contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579").
Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated
Communist ideas by:

(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;

(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders
of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and
World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V-899,
V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);

(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the
"Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor
Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;

(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.

(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of
the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and
organizers to different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the
union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will
register said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the
workers is continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the
Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under the
control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its
aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-
Communist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis
will be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides
and made them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the
simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the
CLO.

Important Documents Submitted at Trial

1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".

(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter
of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists
abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-2001-
2004)
 (b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." — mentions different groups of labor unions of which
Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU
(Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)

(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez
as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)

(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor.
(Exh. 1103)

(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.

(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor.
(Exh. D-463-64)

(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party. (Exh.
D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)

(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with

Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)

(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that
he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)

(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground.
(Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2)
His election as President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)

2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.

(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)

(b) To SOBSI Jakarta — that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
East. (Exh. V-82)

(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.

W-116-120)

(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 — Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle — "the
liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)

(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)

(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)

 (g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)

(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like
Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)

(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker — condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)

(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-
79)

(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO — Praises Balgos and

Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)

(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" — Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army
and Government. (Exh. V-94) .

(m) Letter to Taruc — June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)

(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" — States of a delegation to Roxas attacking

unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)

(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" — (Exh. V-287)

(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" — (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)

(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)

(r) Press statement of Hernandez — opposes acceptance of decorations from

Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)

3. Other Activities of Hernandez.

(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)

(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks.
(Exh. C-364)

(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan
for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)

(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)

(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs,

Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
 (f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)

(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)

(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh.
D-451-451-A)

(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.

The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB),
and National Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in
their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the
creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950
the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a
body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National
Finance Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the
country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6)
that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and
since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national
liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the
decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such
plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also of the
HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB
from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.

Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations
for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of
the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in
May, 1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26,
1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August
19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950;
March 29, 1950.

The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:

The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had
taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been
committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct
participation in the commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases
have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution
and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the
organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).

The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the
absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts
when the National Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven
permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist
Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of
which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:

Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates
was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party
and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia,
which is one of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays
its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of
help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done
by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of the educational department as well as
researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.

Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader,
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the
CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It
seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions
which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant
the same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the
CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist
Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.

On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.

Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he
dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy
to overthrow by force the constituted authority.

Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If,
as testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures,
meetings and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely
allowed Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the
CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also
indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by
making demands from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the
same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out
and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would
intervene and carry the revolution — it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no
function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It
was only a preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the
CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the
actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the
rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and
indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by
the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.

The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground,
with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it
was decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The
court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the
Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The
seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went
underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among
all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he
took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone
underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused
to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.

We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial
and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches
of Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of
revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive
Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise
that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no
evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the
resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the
uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.

The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.

The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:

11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.

And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda,
making speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders
directed him to publish.

That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of
the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the
CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.

As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista
Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to
want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational
procedures."

The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field.
But the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p.
49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not
been received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had
come from a crew member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a
portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine
received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President
Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.

Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts
in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions
as a Communist.

The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information. And his refusal to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned by
his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the
Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the
Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his
Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the
Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal
case.

The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision
reads:

ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a

criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy
of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As
a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does
he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States:

In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must
be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an
organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized
by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .

What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may
indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical
impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part
of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a
conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated
in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor
leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the
CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to
support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he
was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to
advance his political aspirations.

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor
has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated
action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the
leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding,
evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with
said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.
Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he
acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not
appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or
to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster
the rebellion or the uprising.

We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and
rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there
was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in
arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:

CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia
que se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque
fuera preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera
responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la sedicion? — El Tribunal Supreme ha
resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo
contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay
conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un delito y
resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que
se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de
induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo
de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso,
resulta evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de
Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)

In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.

APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

Legal Considerations. — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of
their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere
membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or
of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual
rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising
or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by
such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such
membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion punishable by law.

And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of
the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he
commits rebellion.

In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the
"Katipunan", the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the
defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held
that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and
not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:

From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the
crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each
of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy
by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et
al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)

JUAN J. CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of
the CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.

There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.

AMADO RACANDAY

The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of
the CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of
letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.

Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.

The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion
that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of
the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.

GENARO DE LA CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these
facts being corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.

His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist,
Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters
at Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies
of the "Titis" magazine. `

While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk
rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

JULIAN LUMANOG

The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.

He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is
for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber
Unions and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.

Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the
use of the said unit.

Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that
by giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government
and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.

FERMIN RODILLAS

The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his
house at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of
the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.

Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with
the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court
was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-
conspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.

BAYANI ESPIRITU

This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a
member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party,
when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.

The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted
in court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the
PKP.

Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government
and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as
courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that
not having actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.

TEOPISTA VALERIO

The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga,
under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella"
and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a
son.

Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva
Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the
Central Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the
mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We
are satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB
from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and
considering that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there
cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the
constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION

In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been
apprehended at the time of the trial.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED

In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
aims against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under
Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against
appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held
guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.

On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership
in any organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the
appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the
commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act
punishes participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-
appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and
the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R.
No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay their proportional share of the costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Barrera and Regala, JJ., took no part.