Top 25 Landmark Cases in India

1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)

Backstory and Context:

 Post-Independence Context: India, newly independent in 1947, was grappling

with communal violence, economic instability, and political dissent. The
government enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, to curb activities
deemed prejudicial to public order or state security, particularly targeting
communist and socialist agitators.
 A.K. Gopalan’s Arrest: Gopalan, a prominent communist leader, was detained
without trial in Madras (now Chennai) for his political activities. He challenged
his detention, arguing that the Act violated fundamental rights under Articles
14 (equality), 19 (freedom of speech, movement, etc.), and 21 (right to life and
personal liberty).
 Constitutional Debate: The case emerged at a time when the judiciary was
interpreting the scope of fundamental rights in a nascent Constitution. The
tension was between state security and individual liberties, with the government
arguing that preventive detention was necessary to maintain order.

Key Issues:

1. Does the Preventive Detention Act violate Article 21 by depriving liberty without
fair procedure?
2. Are Articles 19 and 21 interconnected, such that detention impacts freedoms
like speech or movement?
3. Does the Act violate Article 14 by arbitrarily classifying individuals for detention?
4. What is the meaning of “procedure established by law” in Article 21? Does it
include principles of natural justice or substantive due process?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (6-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice Kania):

o Article 21: The Court held that “procedure established by law” means
any procedure laid down by a validly enacted law. It does not include
American-style “due process” (fairness or natural justice). As long as the
detention followed the Act’s procedure, it was constitutional.
 o Articles 19 and 21: The Court ruled that Articles 19 and 21 are not
interconnected. Article 19 (freedoms) applies only to free persons, not
those lawfully detained. Thus, detention does not violate freedoms like
speech or movement.
o Article 14: The Act was upheld as non-discriminatory, as it applied
uniformly to those threatening public order, though the Court did not
deeply scrutinize the classification.
o The detention was deemed lawful, and the Act was upheld.
 Dissent (Justice Fazl Ali):
o Argued that Articles 19 and 21 are interlinked, as detention inherently
restricts freedoms like movement or speech.
o Suggested that “procedure established by law” should include fairness
and reasonableness, hinting at a broader interpretation.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Validated preventive detention laws, empowering the

state to curb dissent during a turbulent post-independence period. Gopalan
remained detained, and similar laws persisted.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established a narrow interpretation of Article 21, limiting it to
procedural compliance rather than substantive fairness. This view
persisted until Maneka Gandhi (1978) expanded Article 21 to include
due process.
o Sparked debates on the balance between state power and individual
rights, influencing later cases like Maneka Gandhi and ADM Jabalpur.
o Highlighted the judiciary’s early deference to legislative authority,
reflecting a cautious approach in the new republic.
 Broader Implications: The case underscored the challenges of protecting civil
liberties in a diverse, volatile democracy. It remains a reference point for debates
on preventive detention laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA).
2. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950)

Backstory and Context:

 Freedom of Press in Early India: Post-independence, the press was a vital tool
for political discourse, but governments sought to control it to curb communal
tensions and leftist agitation. The Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act,
1949, allowed the state to ban publications deemed prejudicial to public order.
 Romesh Thappar’s Case: Thappar, editor of the communist journal Cross
Roads, faced a ban on its circulation in Madras. He challenged the ban, arguing
it violated Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression).
 Political Climate: The case arose amid fears of communist uprisings, with the
government justifying restrictions to maintain stability. The judiciary faced the
task of defining the scope of free speech in a democracy with fragile public
order.

Key Issues:

1. Does the ban on Cross Roads violate Article 19(1)(a)?

2. Are restrictions under Article 19(2) (public order, security of state, etc.) valid if
they are vague or overbroad?
3. Does pre-censorship (banning circulation) violate free speech?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Justice Patanjali Sastri):

o The Court struck down the ban, holding that it violated Article 19(1)(a).
Freedom of speech includes the right to circulate publications, and the
ban was an unjust restriction.
o Article 19(2) Interpretation: Restrictions must be narrowly tailored and
directly related to specific grounds like “security of the state” or “public
order.” The Act’s vague provision allowing bans for “public order” was
overbroad, as it could cover minor disturbances unrelated to state
security.
o Pre-Censorship: The Court ruled that pre-censorship (banning before
publication) is a severe restriction and presumptively unconstitutional
unless justified by exceptional circumstances.
o The ban was lifted, and the relevant section of the Act was declared
unconstitutional.
  No Significant Dissent: The ruling was unanimous, reflecting the Court’s
commitment to free speech in the early years.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Protected press freedom, allowing publications like Cross

Roads to operate. Prompted the government to amend Article 19(2) via the
First Amendment (1951), adding “public order” and “incitement to an offense”
as grounds for restrictions.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established freedom of speech as a cornerstone of Indian democracy,
with a high threshold for restrictions.
o Clarified that Article 19(2) grounds must be specific and proportionate,
influencing cases like Shreya Singhal (2015) on internet speech.
o Highlighted the judiciary’s role in checking executive overreach,
especially in censorship DAGs (data generation and generation of data).
 Broader Implications: Set a precedent for robust press freedom, though later
laws (e.g., sedition, defamation) tested these principles. The case remains a
touchstone for free speech debates.

3. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)

Backstory and Context:

 Land Reforms and Constitutional Challenges: Post-independence, India

pursued land reforms to address feudal inequalities. The First Constitutional
Amendment (1951) introduced Articles 31A and 31B, protecting land reform
laws from judicial review and placing them in the Ninth Schedule, immune from
challenges for violating fundamental rights.
 Challenge: Zamindars (landlords) affected by Bihar’s land reform laws
challenged the amendment, arguing it violated their property rights under
Articles 14, 19, and 31, and that Parliament lacked the power to amend
fundamental rights.
 Political Stakes: The case pitted Jawaharlal Nehru’s socialist vision against
property rights, with the government arguing that amendments were necessary
for social justice.
Key Issues:

1. Can Parliament amend fundamental rights under Article 368 (amendment

procedure)?
2. Are constitutional amendments “laws” under Article 13, which prohibits laws
violating fundamental rights?
3. Does the First Amendment violate the Constitution’s basic structure (a concept
not yet articulated)?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (5-Judge Bench):

o The Court upheld the First Amendment, ruling that Parliament has
unlimited power to amend any part of the Constitution, including
fundamental rights, under Article 368.
o Constitutional amendments are not “laws” under Article 13, as Article
13 applies to ordinary legislation, not amendments.
o The Court rejected the argument that fundamental rights are sacrosanct,
holding that the Constitution is a living document subject to change.
 No Dissent: The ruling reflected the judiciary’s deference to Parliament in the
early years.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Enabled land reforms by shielding laws from judicial

challenges, advancing rural equity. The Ninth Schedule grew, protecting
numerous laws.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established Parliament’s supremacy in amending the Constitution, a view
later limited by Golaknath (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
o Laid the groundwork for debates on the Constitution’s core features,
culminating in the basic structure doctrine.
o Influenced the balance between social justice and individual rights,
shaping economic policy.
 Broader Implications: Highlighted the tension between parliamentary
sovereignty and judicial review, a recurring theme in Indian constitutional law.
4. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sardar (1952)

Backstory and Context:

 Special Courts for Speedy Trials: The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950,
established special courts with expedited procedures (e.g., no appeal, limited
cross-examination) for offenses threatening public order, amid post-partition
violence and communist unrest.
 Anwar Ali’s Case: Sardar, accused of rioting, was tried in a special court and
convicted. He challenged the Act, arguing it violated Article 14 (equality before
law) by arbitrarily selecting cases for special courts without clear criteria.
 Legal Context: The case tested the scope of Article 14, which was still being
interpreted. The government argued that special courts were necessary for swift
justice.

Key Issues:

1. Does the Act violate Article 14 by creating unequal treatment in trial

procedures?
2. Is the Act’s classification of cases for special courts reasonable and non-
arbitrary?
3. Does the Act’s vagueness in selecting cases violate equal protection?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (7-Judge Bench):

o The Court struck down the Act, holding that it violated Article 14. The
selection of cases for special courts was arbitrary, as the Act understand
arbitrary and lacked a rational basis, failing the test of reasonable
classification.
o The Act’s vague criteria allowed executive discretion without legislative
guidance, undermining equality.
o The Court emphasized that Article 14 prohibits discrimination and
requires a reasonable nexus between the classification and the law’s
objective.
 Significance:
 Short-Term Impact: Invalidated the Act, ensuring fairer trial procedures.
Prompted stricter legislative drafting to avoid arbitrariness.
 Long-Term Impact:
 o Developed the doctrine of reasonable classification under Article 14,
requiring laws to have a rational basis and legitimate objective, a
standard used in cases like Navtej Johar (2018).
o Strengthened judicial review of discriminatory laws, enhancing equality
jurisprudence.
 Broader Implications: Established Article 14 as a robust tool against arbitrary
state action, influencing anti-discrimination law.

5. In Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves (1960)

Backstory and Context:

 Post-Partition Border Disputes: The 1947 Radcliffe Award, which divided India
and Pakistan, left ambiguities in border areas like Berubari Union, a cluster of
villages in Jalpaiguri, West Bengal. Maps and descriptions conflicted, leading to
rival claims by India and Pakistan.
 Nehru-Noon Agreement (1958): To resolve disputes, India and Pakistan
agreed to divide Berubari equally and exchange enclaves (pockets of one
country’s territory within the other). This required India to cede part of Berubari
to Pakistan (later Bangladesh).
 Political Backlash: The proposal sparked protests in West Bengal, with critics
arguing that ceding territory violated India’s sovereignty. The government
referred the matter to the Supreme Court under Article 143 (advisory
jurisdiction) to clarify the legal process.
 Constitutional Stakes: The case raised questions about Parliament’s power to
alter India’s territory and the Preamble’s role in defining sovereignty.

Key Issues:

1. Can Parliament cede Indian territory without amending the Constitution?

2. Is a constitutional amendment under Article 368 necessary to transfer territory?
3. Is the Preamble, which describes India as a “Sovereign Democratic Republic,” a
binding limitation on ceding territory?
4. What is the legal effect of the Nehru-Noon Agreement?

Ruling:
  Advisory Opinion (7-Judge Bench):
o Territorial Cession: The Court held that ceding Indian territory involves
altering the definition of India under Article 1, which requires a
constitutional amendment under Article 368. A mere executive action
or ordinary law under Article 3 (altering state boundaries) is insufficient.
o Preamble’s Role: The Preamble is not a source of power or limitation.
It is a prefatory statement, not an enforceable part of the Constitution,
and does not restrict Parliament’s amending power (later overruled in
Kesavananda Bharati).
o Nehru-Noon Agreement: The agreement is a valid international
commitment but requires a constitutional amendment for
implementation, as it involves ceding sovereign territory.
o The Court advised that Parliament must pass an amendment to give
effect to the cession.
 No Dissent: The opinion was unanimous, reflecting consensus on the need for
an amendment.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Led to the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960,

enabling the partial transfer of Berubari and enclave exchanges. However,
implementation was delayed due to political opposition and logistical issues,
culminating in the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) of 1974 and its full
execution in 2015.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established that ceding territory requires a constitutional
amendment, a principle guiding subsequent border agreements (e.g.,
India-Bangladesh LBA).
o Clarified the Preamble’s limited role, though Kesavananda Bharati (1973)
later declared it integral to the Constitution’s basic structure.
o Highlighted the judiciary’s advisory role under Article 143, used in later
cases like the Ayodhya dispute.
 Broader Implications: Resolved a major post-partition dispute, strengthening
India’s border clarity. The case underscored the interplay of sovereignty,
international law, and constitutional processes.
6. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)

Backstory and Context:

 Land Reforms and Ninth Schedule: The 17th Constitutional Amendment

(1964) added land reform laws to the Ninth Schedule, shielding them from
judicial review for violating fundamental rights. This followed earlier
amendments (e.g., First Amendment) to protect agrarian reforms.
 Petitioner’s Challenge: The Golaknath family, affected by Punjab’s land ceiling
laws, argued that the amendment violated their property rights under Articles
14, 19, and 31. They contended that Parliament lacked the power to amend
fundamental rights.
 Political Context: The case arose during tensions between Nehru’s socialist
policies and judicial resistance to curbs on property rights. The judiciary was
asserting its role after earlier deference (e.g., Shankari Prasad).

Key Issues:

1. Can Parliament amend fundamental rights under Article 368?

2. Are constitutional amendments “laws” under Article 13, subject to judicial
review for violating fundamental rights?
3. Does the 17th Amendment violate the Constitution’s core principles?
4. What is the scope of judicial review over constitutional amendments?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (6:5, led by Chief Justice Subba Rao):

o The Court held that fundamental rights are sacrosanct and cannot be
amended by Parliament, as they form the Constitution’s core.
o Constitutional amendments are “laws” under Article 13, and thus void
if they violate fundamental rights. This overruled Shankari Prasad.
o The 17th Amendment was upheld only because the Court applied
prospective overruling, meaning the ruling would not invalidate past
amendments but apply to future ones.
o The majority argued that allowing unlimited amending power could
destroy the Constitution’s essence, though the basic structure doctrine
was not yet articulated.
 Dissent (5 Judges):
 o Argued that Article 368 grants plenary amending power, including over
fundamental rights.
o Contended that treating amendments as “laws” under Article 13
undermines parliamentary sovereignty.
 Outcome: The 17th Amendment stood, but future amendments abridging
fundamental rights were subject to judicial review.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Limited Parliament’s power to amend fundamental rights,

prompting political backlash. The government responded with the 24th
Amendment (1971), clarifying that Article 368 allows amendments to any
provision.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Laid the foundation for the basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda
Bharati (1973), which balanced parliamentary power with constitutional
integrity.
o Expanded judicial review, making the Supreme Court a guardian of
fundamental rights.
o Influenced debates on the judiciary’s role in a democracy, with critics
arguing it overstepped parliamentary sovereignty.
 Broader Implications: Shifted the balance toward judicial supremacy, shaping
India’s constitutional evolution. The case remains a landmark for protecting
fundamental rights.

7. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) (Bank Nationalization Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Nationalization Drive: In 1969, Indira Gandhi’s government nationalized 14

major banks to align with socialist goals and curb private control over finance.
The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,
1969, transferred ownership to the state.
 Challenge: R.C. Cooper, a shareholder, argued that the Act violated Articles 14
(equality), 19 (freedom to carry on business), and 31 (property rights) due to
inadequate compensation and discriminatory selection of banks.
  Political Climate: The case reflected Indira Gandhi’s populist policies amid
economic crises and political polarization. The judiciary faced pressure to
balance social justice with property rights.

Key Issues:

1. Does the Act violate Article 31 by providing inadequate compensation for

nationalized banks?
2. Is the selection of 14 banks discriminatory under Article 14?
3. Does nationalization infringe on the right to carry on business under Article
19(1)(g)?
4. Are fundamental rights interconnected, such that nationalization impacts
multiple rights?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (10:1):

o The Court struck down the Act, holding that it violated Article 31 (right
to property, since repealed). The compensation was not fair or market-
based, effectively nullifying property rights.
o The selection of 14 banks was discriminatory under Article 14, as it
lacked a rational basis for excluding smaller banks, violating equal
protection.
o The Court rejected the A.K. Gopalan view that fundamental rights are
isolated, holding that they are interconnected. Nationalization
restricted shareholders’ rights under Articles 19 and 31.
o The Act was declared unconstitutional, though nationalization
proceeded after the 25th Amendment (1971) redefined compensation.
 Dissent (Justice Mathew):
o Argued that the compensation was adequate given the state’s social
objectives.
o Contended that Article 14 was not violated, as the selection was based
on economic policy.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Forced the government to revise compensation norms,

leading to the 25th Amendment. Banks remained nationalized, preserving
public control.
  Long-Term Impact:
o Developed the interconnectedness of fundamental rights, influencing
cases like Maneka Gandhi (1978).
o Strengthened judicial review of economic legislation, ensuring scrutiny
of compensation and discrimination.
o Shaped property rights jurisprudence, though Article 31 was later
repealed by the 44th Amendment (1978).
 Broader Implications: Highlighted tensions between socialism and individual
rights, influencing India’s economic liberalization in 1991. The case remains a
benchmark for challenging state overreach.

8. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

Backstory and Context:

 Constitutional Amendments Under Scrutiny: The 24th, 25th, and 29th

Amendments (1971-1972) were enacted to curb judicial review and property
rights, responding to Golaknath and R.C. Cooper. The 24th clarified Parliament’s
amending power, the 25th redefined compensation, and the 29th expanded the
Ninth Schedule.
 Petitioner’s Challenge: Kesavananda Bharati, head of a Kerala math, argued
that these amendments violated fundamental rights and the Constitution’s
core, seeking to limit Parliament’s power.
 Political Stakes: The case arose amid Indira Gandhi’s assertive governance and
judicial pushback. It was a defining moment for India’s constitutional
framework, with 13 judges hearing it over months.

Key Issues:

1. Is Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 unlimited?

2. Can amendments alter the Constitution’s basic structure?
3. Is the Preamble part of the Constitution, and does it limit amending power?
4. Do the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments violate fundamental rights or
constitutional principles?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (7:6, led by Chief Justice Sikri):

 o Introduced the basic structure doctrine, holding that Parliament can
amend any provision but cannot alter the Constitution’s basic structure
(e.g., democracy, secularism, federalism, judicial review, rule of law,
equality).
o Overruled Golaknath partially, affirming that fundamental rights can be
amended but not abrogated if they form part of the basic structure.
o Declared the Preamble as part of the Constitution, reversing Berubari,
and used it to identify basic features like sovereignty and justice.
o Upheld the 24th and 29th Amendments but struck down parts of the
25th Amendment that made compensation non-justiciable, preserving
judicial review.
 Dissent (6 Judges):
o Argued that Article 368 imposes no limits, and the basic structure
doctrine is vague and judicial overreach.
o Contended that Parliament, as the people’s representative, has plenary
amending power.
 Outcome: The basic structure doctrine became a cornerstone of Indian
constitutional law, balancing parliamentary and judicial roles.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Preserved the Constitution’s core while allowing flexibility.

Prevented potential authoritarian amendments during Indira Gandhi’s
Emergency (1975-1977).
 Long-Term Impact:
o The basic structure doctrine was applied in cases like Indira Gandhi
(1975), Minerva Mills (1980), and S.R. Bommai (1994), protecting
constitutional essentials.
o Elevated the judiciary’s role as the Constitution’s guardian, shaping
India’s democratic resilience.
o Influenced constitutionalism globally, with similar doctrines in
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
 Broader Implications: Redefined the balance of power in India’s democracy,
ensuring no single branch dominates. The case is celebrated as a judicial
masterpiece.
9. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)

Backstory and Context:

 Election Dispute: In 1971, Indira Gandhi won the Rae Bareli Lok Sabha seat,
defeating Raj Narain. Narain challenged her victory, alleging corrupt practices
(e.g., using government machinery, exceeding spending limits). The Allahabad
High Court voided her election in 1975, prompting an appeal.
 39th Amendment: To shield her position, Parliament passed the 39th
Amendment (1975), barring judicial review of the Prime Minister’s election
disputes and retroactively validating her election.
 Emergency Context: The case coincided with the Emergency (1975-1977), a
period of authoritarian measures, making it a test of judicial independence and
democratic norms.

Key Issues:

1. Does the 39th Amendment violate the basic structure by eliminating judicial
review?
2. Are free and fair elections part of the Constitution’s basic structure?
3. Was Indira Gandhi’s election voidable for corrupt practices?
4. Can Parliament retroactively alter election outcomes?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (5-Judge Bench):

o Struck down the 39th Amendment’s key clauses, holding that free and
fair elections and judicial review are part of the basic structure. Barring
courts from reviewing election disputes undermines democracy.
o Upheld the Allahabad High Court’s finding of corrupt practices, though
Indira Gandhi’s appeal was partly allowed due to procedural issues.
o Reaffirmed the basic structure doctrine from Kesavananda, applying it to
protect democratic processes.
 No Significant Dissent: The Court was united in defending judicial authority
during the Emergency.
 Outcome: The ruling indirectly pressured Indira Gandhi, contributing to her
calling elections in 1977, which she lost.

Significance:
  Short-Term Impact: Preserved judicial oversight of elections, reinforcing
democratic accountability. Bolstered opposition morale during the Emergency.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Cemented the basic structure doctrine’s role in safeguarding democracy,
influencing cases like Kihoto Hollohan (1992) on anti-defection law.
o Established elections as a constitutional cornerstone, shaping electoral
reforms.
o Enhanced the judiciary’s prestige as a bulwark against authoritarianism.
 Broader Implications: Demonstrated the judiciary’s resilience under political
pressure, reinforcing India’s democratic credentials.

10. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

Backstory and Context:

 Passport Impoundment: In 1976, the government impounded Maneka

Gandhi’s passport without reasons, citing “public interest.” She challenged the
action, arguing it violated Articles 14, 19, and 21.
 Post-Emergency Context: The case followed the Emergency, with the judiciary
seeking to restore civil liberties and curb executive arbitrariness. Maneka, a
journalist and Indira Gandhi’s daughter-in-law, was politically targeted.
 Legal Evolution: The case built on A.K. Gopalan’s narrow view of Article 21, with
the Court reevaluating its scope.

Key Issues:

1. Does impounding a passport violate Article 21 (right to life and personal

liberty)?
2. Is “procedure established by law” in Article 21 synonymous with due process,
requiring fairness?
3. Are Articles 14, 19, and 21 interconnected, such that passport restrictions impact
multiple rights?
4. Is the Passport Act’s provision allowing impoundment arbitrary under Article
14?
Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (7-Judge Bench, led by Justice Bhagwati):

o Expanded Article 21, holding that “procedure established by law”
includes substantive and procedural due process. The procedure must
be fair, just, and reasonable, not arbitrary, overruling A.K. Gopalan.
o Ruled that passport impoundment restricts personal liberty (Article 21)
and freedom of movement (Article 19(1)(d)), affirming the
interconnectedness of fundamental rights (building on R.C. Cooper).
o Held that the Passport Act’s provision was arbitrary under Article 14, as
it lacked guidelines and allowed unchecked discretion.
o Ordered the government to provide Maneka a hearing, restoring her
passport.
 No Significant Dissent: The ruling marked a liberal turn in constitutional
interpretation.
 Outcome: Revolutionized Article 21, making it a dynamic tool for protecting
rights.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Protected Maneka’s rights and curbed executive

overreach post-Emergency. Prompted reforms in passport and detention laws.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Transformed Article 21 into a repository of rights, encompassing
privacy (Puttaswamy, 2017), education, health, and more.
o Established due process in Indian law, influencing cases like Mohd.
Ahmed Khan (1985) on maintenance and Navtej Johar (2018) on
LGBTQ+ rights.
o Strengthened judicial review of arbitrary laws, enhancing Article 14’s
non-arbitrariness test.
 Broader Implications: Marked a shift toward a rights-centric jurisprudence,
aligning India with global human rights norms. Article 21 became the
Constitution’s most litigated provision.
11. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) (Habeas Corpus Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Emergency Declaration: On June 25, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

declared a National Emergency under Article 352, citing internal disturbance
amid political unrest, including the Allahabad High Court’s ruling against her
election. A Presidential Order under Article 359 suspended fundamental rights
(Articles 14, 19, 21), enabling preventive detentions without judicial review.
 Detentions and Challenges: Thousands, including opposition leaders like
Shivkant Shukla, were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act (MISA). Detainees filed habeas corpus petitions in High Courts, alleging
arbitrary detention. Several High Courts ruled in their favor, prompting the
government to appeal to the Supreme Court to assert its unchecked authority
during the Emergency.
 Political Climate: The case tested judicial independence during a period of
unprecedented executive dominance. The government argued that courts
lacked jurisdiction to review detentions when fundamental rights were
suspended, while critics decried authoritarianism and human rights violations.

Key Issues:

1. Can courts entertain habeas corpus petitions when Article 21 (right to life and
liberty) is suspended during an Emergency?
2. Does “procedure established by law” in Article 21 include natural justice
principles, or is it wholly suspended?
3. Does the suspension of fundamental rights eliminate judicial review of
executive actions for arbitrariness or mala fide intent?
4. Is there an inherent right to life and liberty outside Article 21, enforceable
during an Emergency?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (4:1, led by Chief Justice A.N. Ray):

o The Court held that habeas corpus petitions were not maintainable
during the Emergency. The Presidential Order suspending Articles 14, 19,
and 21 barred courts from reviewing detentions, even if they were
arbitrary, unlawful, or mala fide.
 o Ruled that Article 21 is the sole repository of the right to life and
liberty. Its suspension left no residual rights or common law protections
enforceable by courts.
o Emphasized that judicial interference would undermine the Emergency’s
purpose of maintaining national security, deferring to executive
discretion.
 Dissent (Justice H.R. Khanna):
o In a landmark dissent, Justice Khanna argued that the rule of law and
principles of natural justice exist independently of Article 21.
Suspension of fundamental rights does not eliminate judicial power to
review detentions for illegality or mala fide intent.
o Asserted that habeas corpus is a fundamental safeguard of liberty, and
courts must protect citizens from executive overreach, even during an
Emergency.
o Justice Khanna’s dissent, though solitary, became a moral and legal
beacon, though it cost him the Chief Justiceship.
 Outcome: The majority upheld the government’s detentions, legitimizing
Emergency-era excesses and limiting judicial recourse for detainees.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Enabled unchecked detentions, emboldening the

government to suppress dissent during the Emergency (1975–1977). Critics
argue it facilitated widespread human rights abuses, with thousands detained
without recourse.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Justice Khanna’s dissent inspired post-Emergency reforms, notably the
44th Amendment (1978), which amended Article 359 to prevent the
suspension of Articles 20 and 21 during future Emergencies, ensuring
habeas corpus remains inviolable.
o Exposed the judiciary’s vulnerability to political pressure, prompting
efforts to restore its independence, as seen in Maneka Gandhi (1978)
and subsequent cases expanding Article 21.
o Became a cautionary precedent against judicial deference in crises,
influencing stricter scrutiny of detention laws like the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act (UAPA).
 Broader Implications: The case remains a stark reminder of the fragility of civil
liberties during authoritarian regimes. Justice Khanna’s dissent is celebrated
 globally as a defense of constitutionalism and judicial courage, shaping human
rights jurisprudence and inspiring judicial resilience in democratic systems.

12. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)

Backstory and Context:

 42nd Amendment’s Overreach: During the 1975–1977 Emergency, the 42nd

Amendment (1976) was enacted to bolster executive and parliamentary
power. It amended Article 368 to grant Parliament unlimited amending power,
restricted judicial review, and gave Directive Principles precedence over
fundamental rights, aiming to shield Indira Gandhi’s policies from judicial
challenges post-Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
 Minerva Mills’ Nationalization: The Minerva Mills company, a textile firm in
Karnataka, was nationalized under the Sick Textile Undertakings
(Nationalisation) Act, 1974. The company challenged the nationalization and
the 42nd Amendment, arguing that they violated fundamental rights and the
Constitution’s core principles.
 Post-Emergency Climate: After the Emergency ended in 1977, the Janata Party
government sought to reverse authoritarian measures. The judiciary, regaining
its assertiveness, used this case to reaffirm its role as the Constitution’s
guardian.

Key Issues:

1. Do Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment, granting unlimited amending

power and prioritizing Directive Principles, violate the Constitution’s basic
structure?
2. Is the balance between fundamental rights and Directive Principles a basic
structure feature?
3. Does the nationalization of Minerva Mills violate property rights under Article
31 (pre-repeal)?
4. Can the Preamble’s objectives (e.g., social, economic, and political justice) guide
judicial review of constitutional amendments?
5. Does limiting judicial review undermine the Constitution’s integrity?
Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud):

o Struck down Section 4 of the 42nd Amendment, which declared
amendments immune from judicial review, as it violated the basic
structure by destroying judicial review, a core feature per Kesavananda
Bharati.
o Struck down Section 55, which gave Directive Principles absolute
primacy over fundamental rights, holding that the harmony between
fundamental rights and Directive Principles is a basic structure
feature. Unchecked primacy would negate rights essential to democracy.
o Upheld the nationalization of Minerva Mills, finding it compliant with
compensation norms post-25th Amendment (1971), as the state’s social
objectives were legitimate.
o Emphasized that the Preamble is integral to the Constitution, guiding
interpretation by prioritizing justice (social, economic, political) as a
balanced goal.
o Reaffirmed the basic structure doctrine, ensuring amendments
preserve the Constitution’s identity.
 No Significant Dissent: The ruling was unanimous, reflecting judicial
consensus on restoring constitutional balance post-Emergency.
 Outcome: Invalidated key parts of the 42nd Amendment, preserving judicial
review and the rights-directives balance, while allowing nationalization to
proceed.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Curbed the 42nd Amendment’s authoritarian provisions,

restoring the judiciary’s power to review amendments. Bolstered public trust in
the judiciary after the Emergency.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Cemented the basic structure doctrine as a constitutional safeguard,
applied in cases like S.R. Bommai (1994), I.R. Coelho (2007), and NJAC
Case (2015) to protect core principles.
o Established the harmony doctrine, ensuring fundamental rights and
Directive Principles are complementary, shaping socio-economic
jurisprudence in cases like Olga Tellis (1985).
 o Strengthened the Preamble’s role in constitutional interpretation,
influencing rights-based rulings.
o Reinforced judicial independence, countering legislative overreach and
preserving separation of powers.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India’s judiciary as a global model for
constitutional protection, balancing social justice with individual rights. The case
remains a cornerstone of constitutional law, ensuring no single branch
dominates the democratic framework.

13. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985)

Backstory and Context:

 Triple Talaq Dispute: In 1978, Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim woman from
Indore, was divorced by her husband, Mohd. Ahmed Khan, via triple talaq after
43 years of marriage. Left destitute, she sought maintenance under Section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which mandates maintenance for
wives unable to support themselves, applicable to all religions.
 Personal Law vs. Secular Law: Khan argued that under Muslim personal law,
his liability was limited to maintenance during the iddat period (three months
post-divorce), and Section 125 did not apply. The case sparked a clash between
secular statutory law and religious personal law, raising questions of gender
equality and uniform legal standards.
 Social and Political Climate: The 1980s saw rising communal tensions, with
Muslim orthodoxy resisting reforms to personal laws, while women’s rights
groups demanded equality. The case became a flashpoint, testing India’s
commitment to secularism and the constitutional directive for a Uniform Civil
Code (UCC) under Article 44.

Key Issues:

1. Does Section 125 of the CrPC apply to Muslim women, overriding Muslim
personal law?
2. Is a Muslim husband’s maintenance liability limited to the iddat period under
personal law?
3. Does denying maintenance to divorced Muslim women violate Articles 14
(equality) and 21 (right to life with dignity)?
 4. Should the Court advocate for a Uniform Civil Code under Article 44 to
harmonize personal laws?
5. Can Islamic law be interpreted progressively to align with modern notions of
justice?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice Y.V.

Chandrachud):
o Held that Section 125 of the CrPC is a secular provision applicable to
all citizens, including Muslim women, as its purpose is to prevent
destitution and vagrancy, irrespective of personal law.
o Ruled that maintenance under Section 125 extends beyond the iddat
period if the divorced wife remains unable to support herself, rejecting
the argument that personal law limits liability.
o Found that denying maintenance violates Article 21 (right to life with
dignity) and Article 14 (equal protection), as it discriminates against
Muslim women compared to others entitled to maintenance.
o Interpreted Islamic law progressively, noting that Quranic provisions
support maintenance for destitute women, aligning personal law with
constitutional principles.
o Observed that a Uniform Civil Code (Article 44) would promote national
integration and gender justice, urging Parliament to consider it, though
not mandating its implementation.
 Outcome: Upheld Shah Bano’s right to maintenance, ordering Khan to pay Rs.
179.20 monthly, a modest sum reflecting her needs.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Triggered intense controversy, with Muslim clergy and

conservative groups protesting the ruling as interference in personal law.
Political pressure from the Rajiv Gandhi government led to the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which limited maintenance to
the iddat period, effectively overturning the verdict.
 Long-Term Impact:
 o Advanced gender justice, inspiring subsequent cases like Daniel Latifi
(2001), which interpreted the 1986 Act to ensure lifelong maintenance,
restoring Shah Bano’s intent.
o Fueled debates on the Uniform Civil Code, contributing to reforms like
the triple talaq ban (2019) under the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Marriage) Act.
o Expanded Article 21 to encompass dignified living for women,
reinforcing Maneka Gandhi’s due process legacy and influencing cases
like Sarla Mudgal (1995) on bigamy.
o Highlighted the judiciary’s role in balancing secularism with religious
diversity, shaping personal law reforms.
 Broader Implications: The case remains a landmark for women’s rights,
exposing tensions between secularism and personal laws in India’s multicultural
framework. It catalyzed feminist movements and underscored the need for legal
uniformity, influencing global discussions on gender and religious law.

14. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) (Oleum Gas Leak Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Post-Bhopal Concerns: The 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy, which killed thousands,
exposed India’s inadequate industrial safety regulations. In 1985, a minor oleum
gas leak at Shriram Foods and Fertilisers in Delhi, a densely populated area,
raised fears of another disaster.
 M.C. Mehta’s PIL: Environmental lawyer M.C. Mehta filed a public interest
litigation (PIL) seeking the plant’s closure or relocation, arguing that hazardous
industries in urban areas endangered lives. The case was among the first major
environmental PILs, testing the judiciary’s role in addressing ecological harm.
 Legal Landscape: India lacked comprehensive environmental laws, relying on
tort principles and constitutional provisions like Article 21 (right to life) and
Article 48A (state’s duty to protect the environment, added by the 42nd
Amendment). The case emerged as industrial growth clashed with public safety.
Key Issues:

1. Does operating hazardous industries in populated areas violate the right to life
under Article 21?
2. What is the appropriate liability standard for industries causing environmental
harm?
3. Does the state have a constitutional duty to regulate hazardous industries to
protect public health?
4. Can the Court issue binding directions for environmental safety in the absence
of specific legislation?
5. Should the plant be closed, relocated, or allowed to operate with safeguards?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati):

o Held that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an integral
part of Article 21, as pollution and industrial hazards threaten life and
health.
o Introduced the absolute liability principle, replacing the strict liability
rule from Rylands v. Fletcher (1868). Industries engaged in inherently
hazardous activities are absolutely liable for harm, with no exceptions
(e.g., act of God, third-party sabotage), and must pay compensation.
o Ordered Shriram to implement stringent safety measures (e.g., leak
detection systems, worker training) but allowed it to continue operating
under strict oversight, balancing economic needs with public safety.
o Directed the government to frame environmental regulations, establish
safety committees, and relocate hazardous industries from urban areas
where feasible.
o Emphasized the state’s duty under Article 48A and the Preamble’s social
justice goals to protect the environment.
 No Dissent: The ruling was unanimous, reflecting the urgency of environmental
protection post-Bhopal.
 Outcome: Established a new liability standard and set the stage for
environmental jurisprudence.
Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Forced Shriram to adopt safety protocols, protecting Delhi

residents. Prompted immediate government action to regulate hazardous
industries.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established environmental rights as part of Article 21, influencing cases
like Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum (1996) (polluter pays principle)
and Narmada Bachao Andolan (2000) (dam displacement).
o The absolute liability principle became a global benchmark, applied in
Bhopal litigation and other industrial disaster cases.
o Strengthened public interest litigation (PIL) as a tool for environmental
justice, making courts accessible to citizens and NGOs.
o Catalyzed environmental legislation, including the Environment
Protection Act, 1986, and stricter industrial safety norms.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India as a leader in environmental
constitutionalism, influencing global environmental law. The case spurred the
green movement in India, emphasizing sustainable development and public
health over unchecked industrialization.

15. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) (First Judges Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Judicial Appointments Tensions: In the 1970s, Indira Gandhi’s government

faced accusations of appointing “committed” judges to align the judiciary with
executive policies, particularly during and after the Emergency. Controversies
arose over the non-confirmation of additional High Court judges and the
transfer of judges perceived as independent.
 S.P. Gupta’s PIL: Advocate S.P. Gupta filed a public interest litigation
challenging the government’s refusal to confirm additional judges in the Delhi
High Court and the transfer of Justice K.B.N. Singh from Patna to Madras,
alleging that executive dominance undermined judicial independence.
 Constitutional Framework: Articles 124 and 217 govern Supreme Court and
High Court appointments, requiring the President to act “in consultation” with
the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and other judges. The case sought to clarify the
extent of executive and judicial roles in this process.
  Post-Emergency Context: The judiciary was rebuilding its credibility after ADM
Jabalpur, making this case a test of its autonomy.

Key Issues:

1. Does the executive have primacy over the judiciary in appointing and
transferring judges under Articles 124 and 217?
2. What is the legal meaning of “consultation” with the CJI? Is the CJI’s opinion
binding?
3. Does executive control over appointments violate judicial independence, a
basic structure feature per Kesavananda Bharati?
4. Can the non-confirmation of additional judges or transfers be challenged as
arbitrary or mala fide?
5. Should judicial appointment processes be transparent and subject to public
scrutiny?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (7-Judge Bench, led by Justice P.N. Bhagwati):

o Held that the executive has primacy in judicial appointments and
transfers. The term “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 does not mean
concurrence, and the CJI’s opinion is advisory, not binding. The
President (acting on the government’s advice) makes the final decision.
o Ruled that judicial independence is a basic structure feature, but
executive primacy does not inherently violate it, as appointments involve
policy and administrative considerations.
o Upheld the non-confirmation of additional judges and Justice Singh’s
transfer, finding no evidence of mala fide intent or arbitrariness.
o Encouraged transparency in appointments and urged the government
to consider judicial input seriously, but deferred to executive discretion.
o Rejected the petitioners’ demand for public disclosure of appointment
deliberations, citing confidentiality.
 No Significant Dissent: The ruling reflected judicial caution in asserting power
post-Emergency.
 Outcome: Affirmed executive control over judicial appointments, leading to
concerns about politicization.
Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Enabled continued executive influence over judicial

appointments, raising fears of “committed” judges aligned with the
government. Sparked debates on reforming the appointment process.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Overruled by the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v.
Union of India (1993) (Second Judges Case), which established the
collegium system, giving the judiciary primacy in appointments through
a consultative body led by the CJI.
o Prompted further litigation, culminating in the NJAC Case (2015), which
struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission as violative
of judicial independence.
o Clarified judicial independence as a basic structure feature, reinforcing
the judiciary’s role in constitutional governance.
o Shaped the separation of powers, highlighting tensions between the
executive and judiciary.
 Broader Implications: The case underscored the judiciary’s vulnerability to
executive overreach, catalyzing reforms to ensure its autonomy. It remains a
reference point for debates on judicial appointments and accountability in
democratic systems worldwide.

16. Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1989) (Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Bhopal Disaster: On December 2–3, 1984, a catastrophic leak of methyl

isocyanate gas at Union Carbide’s pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh,
killed over 5,000 people instantly and injured over 500,000, making it the
world’s worst industrial disaster. Long-term health effects and environmental
damage persisted for decades.
 Legal Battle: The Indian government, acting as parens patriae under the
Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, represented
victims in lawsuits against Union Carbide, a U.S. multinational. Initial litigation
in U.S. courts was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, returning the case to
India.
  Settlement Negotiations: Amid delays in adjudication, the Supreme Court
mediated a settlement to provide swift relief to victims, balancing justice with
practical constraints like Union Carbide’s financial capacity and the scale of
claims.
 Social and Political Climate: The tragedy exposed lax industrial safety
standards and multinational accountability, fueling public outrage and
demands for compensation. It also highlighted India’s limited legal framework
for mass torts.

Key Issues:

1. What is the appropriate compensation for Bhopal victims, and who bears
primary liability (Union Carbide or its Indian subsidiary)?
2. Is the proposed settlement amount fair and sufficient under Article 21’s
guarantee of life and dignity?
3. Does the Bhopal Act’s assumption of victim representation by the government
violate due process or victims’ rights?
4. Can the Supreme Court approve a settlement without fully adjudicating liability
and fault?
5. Should criminal charges against Union Carbide be dropped as part of the
settlement?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice R.S. Pathak):

o Approved a $470 million settlement (approximately Rs. 705 crore in
1989) between Union Carbide and the Indian government, covering all
civil claims and extinguishing criminal liability. The amount was based on
estimates of deaths (3,000–5,000) and injuries (over 500,000).
o Held that the settlement was just, fair, and reasonable under Article
21, providing immediate relief to victims without protracted litigation,
given the complexity of proving liability and Union Carbide’s financial
constraints.
o Upheld the Bhopal Act, finding the government’s role as parens patriae
constitutional, as it protected victims’ interests and streamlined claims
processing.
o Dropped criminal charges against Union Carbide and its officials, a
controversial decision justified as necessary to secure the settlement,
though later revisited in Keshub Mahindra v. State (1996).
 o Directed the government to establish a mechanism for transparent
disbursement and to cover any shortfall in compensation.
 Outcome: The settlement was implemented, but victims criticized the amount
as grossly inadequate given the disaster’s scale.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Provided immediate financial relief to victims, though

delays in disbursement and bureaucratic corruption reduced effectiveness.
Ended Union Carbide’s immediate civil liability, allowing it to exit India.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Reinforced the absolute liability principle from M.C. Mehta (1987),
holding multinationals accountable for hazardous operations, applied in
subsequent environmental cases.
o Strengthened public interest litigation as a tool for mass torts, enabling
courts to mediate large-scale claims, as seen in later disaster cases.
o Exposed gaps in corporate accountability, leading to stricter laws like the
Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, mandating insurance for
hazardous industries.
o Prompted reforms in industrial safety and environmental regulations,
though enforcement challenges persisted.
 Broader Implications: The case raised global awareness of industrial safety and
multinational responsibility, influencing environmental justice movements. It
remains a symbol of corporate negligence and the struggle for victim
compensation, shaping international tort law and corporate governance
standards.

17. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

Backstory and Context:

 Misuse of President’s Rule: In the 1980s, the Central government frequently

imposed President’s Rule under Article 356 to dismiss state governments,
often for political reasons rather than constitutional necessity. In 1988, the S.R.
Bommai-led Janata Dal government in Karnataka was dismissed after losing
majority support, allegedly due to defections engineered by the Congress-led
Centre.
  Legal Challenge: Bommai challenged the dismissal, arguing that Article 356
was misused to destabilize a democratically elected government. Similar
challenges arose from dismissals in Meghalaya, Nagaland, and other states,
consolidated in this case.
 Federalism Concerns: The case arose amid growing concerns that Article 356
undermined India’s federal structure, with states accusing the Centre of partisan
overreach. Earlier cases like State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977)
granted the Centre wide discretion, prompting demands for judicial limits.
 Political Context: The rise of coalition politics in the 1990s highlighted the
need to protect state autonomy, making this case a turning point for federalism.

Key Issues:

1. Is the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356 subject to judicial review,
or is it a political decision beyond court scrutiny?
2. What constitutes a “breakdown of constitutional machinery” justifying
President’s Rule?
3. Does misuse of Article 356 violate federalism, a basic structure feature per
Kesavananda Bharati?
4. Can the Supreme Court reinstate a dismissed state government or invalidate
President’s Rule?
5. Should the Centre provide objective material to justify invoking Article 356?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (9-Judge Bench, led by Justice P.B. Sawant):

o Held that President’s Rule is subject to judicial review. Courts can
examine whether the imposition was based on relevant material or was
mala fide, arbitrary, or politically motivated.
o Defined “breakdown of constitutional machinery” narrowly, requiring
objective evidence of governance failure (e.g., inability to form a
government, widespread violence, or constitutional non-compliance).
Political instability or loss of majority alone does not suffice.
o Affirmed federalism as a basic structure feature, protecting states’
autonomy from Central overreach. Misuse of Article 356 violates this
principle.
o Found the dismissal of Karnataka’s government unconstitutional, as it
was based on political defections rather than a constitutional breakdown,
 but did not reinstate Bommai’s government due to practical constraints
(e.g., elapsed term).
o Directed the Centre to provide material justifying Article 356, ensuring
transparency, and suggested that floor tests in state assemblies are the
proper method to assess majority support.
 No Significant Dissent: The ruling unified the Court on the need to protect
federalism.
 Outcome: Invalidated Karnataka’s dismissal and set strict guidelines for Article
356, curbing its misuse.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Reduced arbitrary dismissals of state governments,

restoring political stability in Karnataka and other states. Forced the Centre to
justify Article 356 actions with objective evidence.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established federalism as a constitutional cornerstone, applied in cases
like Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) (Arunachal Pradesh) and
Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker (2020) (Madhya Pradesh).
o Enhanced judicial review of executive actions, reinforcing the judiciary’s
role in maintaining constitutional balance.
o Influenced coalition politics by empowering states, reducing the Centre’s
ability to manipulate state governments.
o Strengthened democratic accountability by mandating floor tests, now a
standard practice to resolve political crises.
 Broader Implications: Transformed India’s federal framework, ensuring a
balance between Union and state powers. The case is a global model for
protecting federalism in diverse democracies, highlighting the judiciary’s role in
decentralizing power.
18. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) (Mandal Commission Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Mandal Commission Report: In 1980, the Mandal Commission recommended

27% reservation for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs and
educational institutions to address social and educational backwardness. The
V.P. Singh government implemented the policy in 1990, triggering widespread
protests from upper-caste groups and legal challenges.
 Indra Sawhney’s Petition: Journalist Indra Sawhney challenged the reservation
policy, arguing it violated Article 14 (equality) by favoring caste over merit and
exceeded the 50% reservation cap suggested in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore
(1963). The case also questioned a 10% reservation for economically weaker
sections (EWS) introduced by the policy.
 Social Divide: The case polarized India, with pro-reservation groups (OBCs,
Dalits) advocating social justice and opponents citing reverse discrimination
and dilution of merit. Violent protests, including self-immolations, underscored
the policy’s contentiousness.
 Legal Context: Earlier cases like Balaji limited reservations, but the
Constitution’s affirmative action provisions (Articles 15(4), 16(4)) supported
special measures for backward classes.

Key Issues:

1. Is the 27% OBC reservation constitutional under Articles 14 (equality), 15(4)

(special provisions), and 16(4) (reservation in services)?
2. Can total reservations exceed 50% of available seats or posts?
3. Is caste a valid criterion for identifying backwardness, or should economic status
be prioritized?
4. Does the “creamy layer” (affluent members of backward classes) concept apply
to OBC reservations?
5. Is the 10% EWS reservation (pre-103rd Amendment) constitutionally valid?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (9-Judge Bench, led by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy):

o Upheld the 27% OBC reservation as constitutional under Article 16(4)
(reservation for backward classes in services) and Article 15(4) (special
 provisions for advancement), as OBCs were socially and educationally
backward.
o Imposed a 50% cap on total reservations (SC, ST, OBC combined) to
balance equality and affirmative action, except in extraordinary
circumstances (e.g., remote areas).
o Held that caste is a valid criterion for identifying backwardness, as it
reflects social and educational disadvantage, but must be supplemented
by economic and other indicators (e.g., occupation, literacy).
o Introduced the creamy layer concept, excluding affluent OBCs (e.g.,
those with high income or professional status) from reservation benefits
to ensure aid reaches the truly disadvantaged.
o Struck down the 10% EWS reservation, as it lacked a constitutional basis
and violated Article 14 by arbitrarily favoring economically weaker
sections without backwardness.
o Directed the government to establish objective criteria for identifying
OBCs and implement the creamy layer exclusion.
 Outcome: Implemented OBC reservations with safeguards, reshaping India’s
affirmative action framework.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Enabled 27% OBC reservations in central government jobs

and education, benefiting millions but fueling protests and social unrest. The
creamy layer rule refined policy implementation, reducing benefits for affluent
OBCs.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Established the 50% cap as a benchmark for reservations, applied in
cases like Maratha Reservation (2021) and EWS Reservation (2022).
o Clarified the scope of affirmative action under Articles 15(4) and 16(4),
influencing the 103rd Amendment (2019), which introduced 10% EWS
reservations.
o Empowered OBCs politically and economically, reshaping India’s social
and political landscape.
o Balanced equality and social justice, providing a framework for future
reservation policies.
 Broader Implications: Transformed India’s social fabric by institutionalizing
OBC empowerment, strengthening affirmative action as a tool for social equity.
19. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997)

Backstory and Context:

 Bhanwari Devi’s Assault: In 1992, Bhanwari Devi, a social worker in Rajasthan,

was gang-raped by upper-caste men for opposing child marriage as part of a
government program. The trial court acquitted the accused, citing lack of
evidence, sparking outrage among women’s rights groups.
 Vishaka’s PIL: Women’s organizations, led by Vishaka, filed a public interest
litigation in the Supreme Court, seeking legal protections against workplace
sexual harassment. The case highlighted the absence of specific laws, as India
relied on general penal provisions (e.g., IPC sections on assault).
 Global Commitments: India had ratified the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1993), committing
to gender equality, but lacked domestic laws to address workplace harassment.
 Social Context: The 1990s saw growing feminist movements in India,
demanding gender justice amid pervasive workplace discrimination.

Key Issues:

1. Does the absence of laws on workplace sexual harassment violate Articles 14

(equality), 15 (non-discrimination on grounds of sex), 19(1)(g) (right to practice
profession), and 21 (right to life with dignity)?
2. Can the Supreme Court issue binding guidelines to address sexual harassment
in the absence of legislation?
3. Does the state have a constitutional duty to ensure safe workplaces for women?
4. Are international conventions like CEDAW enforceable in Indian courts to
protect women’s rights?
5. What constitutes sexual harassment, and what mechanisms should address it?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (3-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice J.S. Verma):

o Held that workplace sexual harassment violates Articles 14, 15,
19(1)(g), and 21, as it discriminates against women, restricts their
professional freedom, and undermines their dignity and safety.
o Issued the Vishaka Guidelines, a binding framework defining sexual
harassment (e.g., unwelcome physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct)
and mandating preventive measures, including:
  Employers must establish complaints committees with majority
women members to address grievances.
 Organizations must create anti-harassment policies and conduct
awareness programs.
 The state must enforce compliance in public and private sectors.
o Ruled that the guidelines would remain in force until Parliament enacted
legislation, filling the legislative void.
o Held that CEDAW provisions are enforceable if consistent with the
Constitution, reinforcing the state’s duty to protect women’s rights.
o Directed employers and the state to ensure safe workplaces, holding
them accountable for violations.
 Outcome: Established India’s first legal framework for addressing workplace
sexual harassment, applicable to all sectors.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Empowered women to report harassment, with public and

private workplaces adopting complaints committees. Raised public awareness
of gender-based violence and workplace rights.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Led to the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, codifying Vishaka’s guidelines
and expanding protections.
o Expanded Article 21 to include gender dignity and safety, influencing
cases like Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) (privacy) and Sabrimala
(2018) (temple entry).
o Strengthened judicial activism, enabling courts to fill legislative gaps in
human rights cases, as seen in Common Cause (2018) on euthanasia.
o Enhanced India’s compliance with international gender equality norms,
aligning with CEDAW.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India as a leader in workplace gender justice,
influencing global feminist jurisprudence. The case catalyzed India’s #MeToo
movement and remains a cornerstone for protecting women’s rights in
professional spaces.
20. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002)

Backstory and Context:

 Minority Educational Rights: The 1990s saw increasing state regulation of

private educational institutions, particularly those run by religious and linguistic
minorities, protected under Article 30 (right to establish and administer
educational institutions). Regulations like quotas and fee controls sparked
disputes over autonomy.
 T.M.A. Pai’s Challenge: The T.M.A. Pai Foundation, running a medical college
in Karnataka, challenged state laws imposing admission quotas and fee
restrictions, arguing they violated Article 30 and Article 19(1)(g) (right to
practice profession). Non-minority private institutions raised similar concerns.
 Educational Liberalization: The case arose amid India’s economic
liberalization, with private education expanding to meet demand. The judiciary
sought to balance institutional autonomy with public access to education.
 Legal Context: Earlier cases like Unni Krishnan (1993) restricted private
institutions’ autonomy, prompting a comprehensive review by an 11-judge
bench.

Key Issues:

1. What is the scope of Article 30’s right to establish and administer minority
educational institutions?
2. Can the state impose quotas, fee controls, or other regulations on minority
institutions without violating Article 30?
3. Do private (minority and non-minority) institutions have autonomy under
Article 19(1)(g) to manage admissions and fees?
4. How should the state balance minority rights with public interest, such as access
to education for disadvantaged groups?
5. What constitutes a “minority” institution, and how is its character protected?

Ruling:

 Majority Opinion (11-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice B.N. Kirpal):

o Held that Article 30 grants minorities the right to establish and
administer educational institutions, but this right is not absolute. The
 state can impose reasonable regulations to ensure educational
standards, transparency, and non-discrimination, provided they do not
destroy the institution’s minority character.
o Ruled that private institutions (minority and non-minority) have
autonomy under Article 19(1)(g) to manage admissions and fees, but
this is subject to regulations preventing profiteering or exclusionary
practices.
o Allowed merit-based admissions in minority institutions but permitted
state-mandated quotas for disadvantaged groups (e.g., SC/ST), as long
as they preserve the institution’s minority identity (e.g., maintaining a
significant minority student intake).
o Struck down excessive fee controls, affirming institutions’ right to charge
reasonable fees and generate profits, but prohibited commercialization
of education.
o Clarified that “minority” status depends on the institution’s founding
community and purpose, requiring protection of its linguistic or religious
character.
 Outcome: Granted greater autonomy to private institutions while allowing
regulatory oversight, reshaping India’s education sector.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Freed minority and private institutions from excessive

state control, boosting private education, particularly in professional courses
like medicine and engineering. Led to clarifications in P.A. Inamdar (2005) on
quotas.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Defined the scope of Article 30, balancing minority rights with public
interest, applied in cases like Aligarh Muslim University (2019) on
minority status.
o Promoted private education’s growth, addressing India’s educational
demand but raising concerns about commercialization and inequality.
o Strengthened judicial oversight of educational policy, ensuring fairness
in admissions and fees.
 Broader Implications: Transformed India’s education landscape, fostering
private investment while emphasizing inclusivity. The case is a global reference
for balancing institutional autonomy with state regulation in diverse societies.
21. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT, Delhi (2009) (Delhi High Court)

Backstory and Context:

 Section 377 Challenge: Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a
colonial-era law, criminalized “carnal intercourse against the order of nature,”
effectively targeting consensual homosexual acts with up to life imprisonment.
LGBTQ+ activists argued it violated fundamental rights.
 Naz Foundation’s Petition: The Naz Foundation, an NGO working on
HIV/AIDS, filed a PIL in the Delhi High Court, arguing that Section 377 hindered
HIV prevention by stigmatizing homosexual men and violated Articles 14, 15,
19, and 21.
 Social Context: In the 2000s, India’s LGBTQ+ movement gained visibility, but
societal stigma and legal persecution persisted. The case marked a turning point
for sexual orientation rights.
 Legal Context: The Supreme Court’s later reversal in Suresh Koushal (2013)
and reaffirmation in Navtej Johar (2018) make Naz Foundation a critical
milestone, though a High Court ruling.

Key Issues:

1. Does Section 377 violate Article 14 (equality) by arbitrarily criminalizing

consensual homosexual acts?
2. Does it infringe Article 15 (non-discrimination on grounds of sex) by targeting
sexual orientation?
3. Does it restrict Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of expression) and Article 21 (right
to life, privacy, dignity)?
4. Can the state criminalize private consensual acts between adults absent a
compelling public interest?
5. Should Section 377 be read down to exclude consensual homosexual acts?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (Delhi High Court, 2-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice
A.P. Shah):
o Held that Section 377, insofar as it criminalizes consensual homosexual
acts between adults in private, violates Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.
 o Ruled that the provision is arbitrary under Article 14, as it lacks a rational
basis for targeting homosexuals while permitting similar heterosexual
acts.
o Found that Section 377 discriminates on grounds of sexual orientation,
a facet of “sex” under Article 15, and violates Article 21 by denying
privacy, dignity, and autonomy.
o Read down Section 377 to exclude consensual adult homosexual acts,
while retaining it for non-consensual acts and acts involving minors.
o Emphasized that Article 21 includes the right to sexual autonomy and
that societal morality cannot override constitutional rights.
 Outcome: Decriminalized consensual homosexual acts, a historic victory for
LGBTQ+ rights.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Legalized consensual homosexuality in India, empowering

LGBTQ+ communities and reducing police harassment. Sparked public
discourse on sexual orientation rights.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Overturned by Suresh Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013), which
restored Section 377, but reinstated by Navtej Johar v. Union of India
(2018), which fully decriminalized homosexuality, citing Naz Foundation.
o Expanded Article 21 to include privacy and sexual autonomy,
influencing Puttaswamy (2017) (right to privacy) and Sabrimala (2018)
(gender equality).
o Advanced equality jurisprudence, recognizing sexual orientation as a
protected characteristic under Article 15.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India as a progressive force in global
LGBTQ+ rights, inspiring decriminalization efforts worldwide. The case
catalyzed India’s queer rights movement, challenging societal stigma and
paving the way for further reforms, like marriage equality debates.
22. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)

Backstory and Context:

 Tribunal System: The 42nd Amendment (1976) introduced Articles 323A

and 323B, enabling Parliament to establish tribunals for disputes like
administrative service matters and taxation, bypassing High Courts. The
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, set up tribunals to reduce judicial
backlog.
 Challenge: L. Chandra Kumar challenged the constitutional validity of tribunals,
arguing that their exclusion of High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226/227
(writ jurisdiction) violated judicial review, a basic structure feature.
 Legal Context: Earlier cases like S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) upheld tribunals
but suggested judicial oversight. The case tested the balance between efficiency
and constitutional checks.

Key Issues:

1. Does excluding High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 violate the basic
structure doctrine (judicial review)?
2. Are tribunals under Articles 323A and 323B constitutional substitutes for High
Courts?
3. Can tribunal decisions be subject to judicial review by High Courts or the
Supreme Court?
4. Does the Administrative Tribunals Act undermine the judiciary’s constitutional
role?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (7-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi):

o Held that judicial review is a basic structure feature per Kesavananda
Bharati, and excluding High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 is
unconstitutional.
o Ruled that tribunals are supplementary, not substitutes, for High Courts.
They can adjudicate specialized disputes but remain subject to High
Court writ jurisdiction and Supreme Court appeals under Article 136.
o Struck down provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act that barred
High Court review, ensuring tribunal decisions are reviewable for errors
of law or jurisdiction.
 o Upheld the validity of Articles 323A and 323B and tribunals, provided
they operate under judicial oversight.
 Outcome: Restored High Court jurisdiction over tribunals, balancing efficiency
with judicial review.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Ensured tribunal decisions were subject to judicial

scrutiny, protecting litigants’ rights. Strengthened High Courts’ role in
administrative justice.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Reaffirmed judicial review as a core constitutional principle, applied in
cases like I.R. Coelho (2007) (Ninth Schedule) and NJAC Case (2015).
o Clarified the role of tribunals, streamlining specialized adjudication while
preserving constitutional checks, influencing tribunal reforms.
o Strengthened the judiciary’s authority over quasi-judicial bodies,
ensuring accountability.
 Broader Implications: Reinforced India’s separation of powers, ensuring no
adjudicatory body operates beyond judicial oversight. The case is a global
model for balancing administrative efficiency with constitutional protections.

23. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) (Ninth Schedule Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Ninth Schedule Immunity: The First Amendment (1951) introduced the

Ninth Schedule to shield land reform laws from judicial review for violating
fundamental rights. Over time, non-agrarian laws (e.g., on nationalization,
reservations) were added, raising concerns about unchecked legislative power.
 I.R. Coelho’s Challenge: Coelho challenged the inclusion of laws in the Ninth
Schedule post-Kesavananda Bharati (1973), arguing that shielding laws from
judicial review violated the basic structure doctrine, particularly judicial review
and fundamental rights.
 Legal Context: The case built on Minerva Mills (1980) and Kesavananda,
testing whether the Ninth Schedule could bypass constitutional limits.
Key Issues:

1. Can laws placed in the Ninth Schedule post-1973 be immune from judicial
review for violating fundamental rights?
2. Does shielding laws violate the basic structure doctrine (judicial review,
fundamental rights)?
3. Are Ninth Schedule laws subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as other
laws?
4. Can the Court strike down Ninth Schedule laws that undermine the
Constitution’s core?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (9-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal):

o Held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973
(Kesavananda Bharati’s judgment date) are subject to judicial review.
They can be struck down if they violate the basic structure (e.g., judicial
review, equality, rule of law).
o Ruled that the Ninth Schedule does not grant blanket immunity. Laws
must conform to fundamental rights and the Constitution’s core, even if
shielded.
o Affirmed that judicial review is a basic structure feature, and excluding
it for Ninth Schedule laws undermines constitutional integrity.
o Clarified that pre-1973 laws remain protected unless they egregiously
violate the basic structure, balancing earlier precedents like Shankari
Prasad.
 Outcome: Restored judicial review over post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws, limiting
legislative overreach.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Enabled courts to scrutinize Ninth Schedule laws,

protecting fundamental rights. Invalidated several post-1973 laws that violated
constitutional principles.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Strengthened the basic structure doctrine, ensuring no law is beyond
constitutional scrutiny, applied in cases like NJAC Case (2015).
o Curbed the misuse of the Ninth Schedule, reducing Parliament’s ability
to shield arbitrary laws.
 o Enhanced judicial review, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as the
Constitution’s guardian.
 Broader Implications: Reaffirmed India’s commitment to constitutionalism,
preventing legislative immunity from undermining democracy. The case is a
global benchmark for limiting legislative power in constitutional frameworks.

24. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) (Right to Privacy Case)

Backstory and Context:

 Aadhaar Controversy: The Aadhaar program, launched in 2009, mandated

biometric identification for accessing government services, raising privacy
concerns. In 2012, retired Justice K.S. Puttaswamy challenged Aadhaar’s
mandatory use, arguing it violated the right to privacy.
 Legal Gap: India lacked a clear constitutional right to privacy. Earlier cases like
M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) denied privacy as a
fundamental right, though Maneka Gandhi (1978) hinted at its inclusion in
Article 21.
 Social Context: The case arose amid growing digital surveillance and data
breaches, with citizens demanding protection against state and corporate
intrusion.
 Constitutional Reference: A 9-judge bench was constituted to settle the
privacy question, given conflicting precedents and Aadhaar’s implications.

Key Issues:

1. Is the right to privacy a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, and 21?
2. If privacy is a fundamental right, what is its scope and limitations?
3. Does the Aadhaar program’s biometric data collection violate privacy rights?
4. Can the state restrict privacy for legitimate objectives like welfare delivery or
security?
5. Do earlier rulings denying privacy (M.P. Sharma, Kharak Singh) remain valid?
Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (9-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar):

o Held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21
(right to life and liberty), as well as Articles 14 (equality) and 19
(freedoms), intrinsic to human dignity and autonomy.
o Defined privacy as encompassing informational privacy (control over
personal data), bodily autonomy, and spatial privacy (home, personal
spaces), but subject to reasonable restrictions for compelling state
interests (e.g., security, welfare).
o Overruled M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh to the extent they denied
privacy, affirming that privacy flows from the Constitution’s rights
framework and the Preamble’s dignity principle.
o Clarified that privacy is not absolute and must be balanced with
legitimate state objectives, subject to the proportionality test
(legitimate aim, rational nexus, necessity, minimal intrusion).
o Referred the Aadhaar challenge to a smaller bench, which later upheld it
with restrictions in Puttaswamy II (2018).
 Outcome: Established privacy as a fundamental right, setting the stage for data
protection and rights-based litigation.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Forced the government to revise Aadhaar’s

implementation, introducing safeguards like voluntary enrollment and data
minimization. Invalidated mandatory Aadhaar linkage for private services (e.g.,
bank accounts).
 Long-Term Impact:
o Transformed Article 21 into a robust privacy shield, influencing Navtej
Johar (2018) (decriminalizing homosexuality), Sabrimala (2018)
(temple entry), and Anuradha Bhasin (2020) (internet access).
o Paved the way for the Personal Data Protection Bill (pending as of
2025), aligning India with global privacy standards like GDPR.
o Strengthened judicial review of state surveillance, ensuring
proportionality in laws like the IT Act, 2000.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India as a leader in constitutional privacy
rights, influencing global data protection frameworks. The case empowered
 citizens to challenge intrusive policies, reshaping digital governance and
individual autonomy.

25. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)

Backstory and Context:

 Section 377’s Revival: The Delhi High Court’s Naz Foundation (2009) ruling
decriminalized consensual homosexual acts, but the Supreme Court’s Suresh
Koushal (2013) decision reversed it, reinstating Section 377 IPC’s
criminalization of homosexuality. LGBTQ+ activists, including Navtej Johar,
challenged Suresh Koushal, arguing it violated fundamental rights.
 Social Movement: By 2018, India’s LGBTQ+ movement had gained
momentum, supported by global decriminalization trends and the Puttaswamy
(2017) privacy ruling. Public attitudes were shifting, though stigma persisted.
 Legal Context: Puttaswamy’s recognition of privacy and autonomy provided a
strong basis to revisit Section 377, with the Supreme Court acknowledging the
need to correct Suresh Koushal’s error.

Key Issues:

1. Does Section 377 violate Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 19

(freedoms), and 21 (privacy, dignity) by criminalizing consensual homosexual
acts?
2. Is sexual orientation a protected characteristic under Article 15’s “sex” ground?
3. Does Section 377’s criminalization of private consensual acts meet the
proportionality test post-Puttaswamy?
4. Should Suresh Koushal be overruled, and Section 377 be struck down or read
down?
5. Can societal morality justify criminalizing homosexuality?

Ruling:

 Unanimous Opinion (5-Judge Bench, led by Chief Justice Dipak Misra):

o Struck down Section 377 to the extent it criminalizes consensual
homosexual acts between adults, declaring it unconstitutional under
Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.
 o Held that Section 377 violates Article 14, as it arbitrarily targets
homosexuals without a rational basis, failing the proportionality test.
o Ruled that sexual orientation is a facet of “sex” under Article 15, and
discrimination based on it is unconstitutional.
o Found that Section 377 infringes Article 19(1)(a) (expression) and
Article 21 (privacy, dignity, autonomy), as criminalizing private
consensual acts denies personal freedom.
o Overruled Suresh Koushal (2013), affirming Naz Foundation’s
reasoning and aligning with Puttaswamy’s privacy framework.
o Retained Section 377 for non-consensual acts, bestiality, and acts
involving minors, ensuring its limited applicability.
 Outcome: Fully decriminalized consensual homosexuality, granting equal rights
to LGBTQ+ individuals.

Significance:

 Short-Term Impact: Ended legal persecution of homosexuals, reducing police

harassment and empowering LGBTQ+ communities. Sparked celebrations and
increased visibility of queer rights.
 Long-Term Impact:
o Expanded Article 21 to include sexual autonomy and identity,
influencing cases like Sabrimala (2018) and ongoing marriage equality
petitions.
o Strengthened equality jurisprudence, recognizing sexual orientation as
a protected characteristic, paving the way for anti-discrimination laws.
o Overturned colonial-era laws, aligning India with global human rights
standards.
 Broader Implications: Positioned India as a progressive leader in LGBTQ+
rights, inspiring decriminalization efforts in other countries. The case
transformed India’s social landscape, fostering inclusivity and challenging
stigma, with ongoing implications for marriage, adoption, and employment
rights.
 The Story: Heenu’s Ladoo Land Adventure

Heenu’s sprawled on her bed, ladoo crumbs everywhere, panicking about her law
exam. “Arre, yeh cases kyun bhool jaati hoon?” she wails, forgetting A.K. Gopalan again.
Her phone buzzes—Mr. Pospsi, his beard gleaming like a disco ball on whatsapp video

calls. “Heenu beta, phir bhool gayi? Chalo, I’ll tell you a ladoo-fied story for all 25 cases.
Grab a ladoo and suno!” Heenu snatches a ladoo, eyes wide, as Pospsi transports her

to Ladoo Land, where each case is a quirky ladoo shop run by real case characters,
with legal dramas, court rulings, and Heenu’s forgetfulness causing chaos!

1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) - Gopalan’s Locked Ladoo Jail

Context: In Ladoo Land, Heenu races to A.K. Gopalan’s Ladoo Shop, but it’s locked
tighter than her exam notes! Gopalan, a fiery communist, is jailed under the Preventive

Detention Act, 1950, for stirring up post-Independence chaos in Madras. Heenu,

forgetting her order, cries, “Bhai, mujhe ladoo chahiye!” Gopalan shouts, “Meri liberty

gayi, Heenu! Yeh Act Articles 14, 19, 21 ko thokta hai!”

Ruling: The Supreme Court, sipping chai, says, “Chill, Gopalan! Article 21 ka ‘procedure

established by law’ bas valid law chahiye, not American due process drama. Articles 19
aur 21 alag hain, detention se speech ya movement nahi rukta. Act sahi hai, tu jail mein

hi ladoo bana!” Justice Fazl Ali dissents, muttering, “Thodi fairness toh banta hai, yaar!”

Legal Issues:

 Does the Preventive Detention Act violate Article 21 by snatching liberty

without a fair procedure?
Ans: Nahin, it’s just following the law’s script—no need for extra masala
fairness!
  Are Articles 19 and 21 besties, so detention messes with speech or
movement?
Ans: Nope, they’re like distant cousins—Article 19 is for free folks, not

jailbirds!
 Does the Act violate Article 14 by randomly picking people for detention?
Ans: Chill, it’s equal for all troublemakers—no ladoo favoritism here!
 What’s “procedure established by law” in Article 21? Does it need natural
justice or fancy vibes?
Ans: Just means any law’s procedure, no need for filmi justice!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her ladoo order, but Pospsi says, “Gopalan (Gop = jail) ka

shop locked hai, Article 21 ka lock khulega Maneka ke saath!” Trick: Picture Gopalan
in jail, shouting “Communist ladoos!” to recall his detention and the narrow Article 21

ruling.

2. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) - Thappar’s Ladoo Gossip Times

Context: Heenu subscribes to Romesh Thappar’s Ladoo Gossip Times (Cross Roads),
a communist newsletter dishing ladoo recipes. Madras bans it, saying, “Yeh public
order ka tamasha karta hai!” Heenu, forgetting her subscription, whines, “Mujhe free

speech ka ladoo chahiye!”

Ruling: The Court, twirling its mustache, says, “Oye, Article 19(1)(a) means free speech

aur circulation! Ban ke liye solid reason chahiye, not ‘public order’ ka vague bakwas.
Thappar, chhapo apna ladoo paper!” The ban’s trashed, and Heenu gets her gossip.

Legal Issues:

 Does banning Thappar’s paper violate Article 19(1)(a)?

Ans: Haan, it’s like stealing Heenu’s ladoo—free speech ka haq hai!
  Are Article 19(2) restrictions cool if they’re vague like bad ladoo recipes?
Ans: Nahin, too blurry, like Heenu’s memory—restrictions need to be sharp!
 Does pre-censorship of papers violate free speech?
Ans: Totally, it’s like banning ladoos before tasting—unless it’s a mega crisis!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her newspaper, but Pospsi says, “Thappar (Tap = print) ka
ladoo gossip chhapega, no ban!” Trick: Imagine Thappar printing ladoo news with a
giant “FREE SPEECH” stamp to recall the press freedom win.

3. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) - Shankari’s Ladoo Zamindari

Context: Heenu visits Shankari Prasad’s Ladoo Estate, but the First Amendment
snatches half for land reforms, shielding laws in the Ninth Schedule. Zamindars like
Shankari cry, “Yeh Article 14, 19, 31 ka dushman hai!” Heenu, forgetting her ladoo

recipe, asks, “Constitution amend kar sakte hain kya?”

Ruling: The Court, munching ladoos, says, “Haan bhai, Article 368 se Parliament sab
kuch amend kar sakti hai, even fundamental rights! Amendments aren’t ‘laws’ under

Article 13, so ladoo estate ab government ka!”

Legal Issues:

 Can Parliament amend fundamental rights like they’re changing ladoo flavors?
Ans: Yup, Article 368 is the boss—no limits!
 Are amendments “laws” under Article 13, like a sneaky ladoo thief?
Ans: Nahin, they’re VIP amendments, not regular laws!
 Does the First Amendment break the Constitution’s core like a bad ladoo?
Ans: Basic structure? Kya hai yeh? It’s all good for now!
Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her estate, but Pospsi says, “Shankari (Shank = chain) ka

ladoo land amend ho gaya!” Trick: Picture Shankari’s estate as a giant ladoo field,
chopped by an amendment axe, to recall Parliament’s amending power.

4. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sardar (1952) - Anwar’s Speedy Ladoo Court

Context: Heenu orders ladoos from Anwar Ali Sardar’s Shop, but Anwar’s in a special
court for rioting, with no appeal or cross-examination. Heenu, forgetting her order,

asks, “Yeh kaisa court hai?” Anwar says, “Article 14 bolta hai equality, yeh toh ladoo
injustice hai!”

Ruling: The Court, waving a gavel, says, “Special courts ke liye clear reason chahiye,

yeh toh random ladoo selection hai! Article 14 says equal treatment, so Act out!” Anwar
gets a fair trial.

Legal Issues:

 Does the Act violate Article 14 by giving Anwar a dodgy trial like stale ladoos?
Ans: Haan, it’s unfair and unequal!

 Is the classification for special courts reasonable or just ladoo-level chaos?

Ans: Nahin, it’s random like Heenu picking exam answers!

 Does the Act’s vagueness violate equal protection like a missing ladoo recipe?
Ans: Yup, too vague, no fairness!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her trial date, but Pospsi says, “Anwar (An = unfair) ka

speedy ladoo court cancel ho gaya!” Trick: Imagine Anwar in a turbo court with no
ladoo breaks, struck down for equality, to recall Article 14.
5. In Re: Berubari Union (1960) - Berubari’s Border Ladoo Swap

Context: Heenu’s at Berubari Union’s Ladoo Stall, but India and Pakistan are
swapping border ladoos via the Nehru-Noon Agreement. Locals in West Bengal riot,
“Yeh sovereignty ka ladoo chheenna hai!” Heenu forgets the map and asks, “Territory

de sakte hain kya?”

Ruling: The Court, adjusting its specs, advises, “Territory cede karne ke liye Article 368
amendment chahiye, not just executive ladoo deal. Preamble ka ‘sovereign’ bas drama

hai, no legal power. Amend karo, then swap!”

Legal Issues:

 Can Parliament give away territory like free ladoos without amending?
Ans: Nahin, Article 368 ka amendment zaroori hai!
 Is a constitutional amendment needed to transfer territory?
Ans: Haan, it’s like rewriting the ladoo menu!
 Does the Preamble’s “sovereign” stop territory swaps like a ladoo guard?
Ans: Nope, it’s just a fancy poster, no legal muscle!
 Is the Nehru-Noon Agreement a done deal?
Ans: It’s cool but needs an amendment to work!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets the border, but Pospsi says, “Berubari (Berr = border) ka

ladoo swap amendment ke saath!” Trick: Picture a ladoo stall split by a border line,
needing an amendment to swap, to recall territorial cession.
6. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) - Golaknath’s Ladoo Land Grab

Context: Heenu’s at Golaknath’s Ladoo Farm in Punjab, but land ceiling laws,
shielded by the 17th Amendment, snatch extra ladoos. Golaknath cries, “Fundamental
rights ko amend nahi kar sakte!” Heenu, forgetting the law, munches a ladoo.

Ruling: The Court, stroking its chin, says, “Fundamental rights are like sacred ladoos—

no amending them! Amendments are ‘laws’ under Article 13, so no violations. But we’ll
let old amendments slide with prospective overruling.”

Legal Issues:

 Can Parliament amend fundamental rights like swapping ladoo flavors?

Ans: Nahin, they’re untouchable like Heenu’s favorite ladoo!

 Are amendments “laws” under Article 13, like a sneaky ladoo tax?
Ans: Yup, they can’t dodge Article 13’s radar!

 Does the 17th Amendment mess with the Constitution’s core?

Ans: It’s okay for now, but future amendments better watch out!

 What’s the scope of judicial review over amendments?

Ans: Courts can eyeball future amendments like a ladoo inspector!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her land, but Pospsi says, “Golak (Goal = protect) ka ladoo
farm rights ke liye safe!” Trick: Imagine Golaknath guarding his ladoo farm with a “No

Amend!” sign to recall fundamental rights protection.

7. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) - Cooper’s Ladoo Bank Heist

Context: Heenu invests in R.C. Cooper’s Ladoo Bank, but Indira Gandhi nationalizes
14 banks, including Cooper’s. He cries, “Mujhe fair compensation chahiye, Articles 14,
19, 31!” Heenu, forgetting her shares, eats a ladoo.

Ruling: The Court, banging its gavel, says, “Yeh nationalization ekdum bakwas hai!

Compensation is peanuts (Article 31), and picking 14 banks is random like Heenu’s
study schedule (Article 14). Rights are besties, so Act out!”

Legal Issues:

 Does the Act violate Article 31 by giving chindi compensation for banks?
Ans: Haan, it’s like paying one ladoo for a whole shop!

 Is picking 14 banks discriminatory like choosing bad ladoos?

Ans: Yup, no logic, just tukkebaazi!

 Does nationalization mess with Article 19(1)(g)’s business vibes?

Ans: Totally, it’s like banning ladoo baking!

 Are fundamental rights a ladoo gang, working together?

Ans: Haan, they’re like Heenu’s ladoo squad!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her bank PIN, but Pospsi says, “Cooper (Coop = bank) ka
ladoo heist unfair tha!” Trick: Picture Cooper’s bank as a ladoo vault, nationalized with
no cash, to recall interconnected rights.
8. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) - Kesavananda’s Ladoo Temple

Context: Heenu visits Kesavananda Bharati’s Ladoo Temple in Kerala, but the 24th,
25th, and 29th Amendments threaten its land and rights. Kesavananda says,
“Constitution ka basic structure hai, bhai!” Heenu forgets the Preamble and munches

a ladoo.

Ruling: The Court drops a bombshell: “Basic structure doctrine! Amendments karo, but
democracy, secularism, judicial review mat chhedo! 24th, 29th okay, but 25th ka

compensation part is thok do!” Preamble’s now a star player.

Legal Issues:

 Is Parliament’s amending power unlimited like Heenu’s ladoo cravings?

Ans: Nahin, basic structure is the boss!
 Can amendments ruin the Constitution’s basic structure?
Ans: Nope, it’s like a ladoo recipe you can’t change!
 Is the Preamble part of the Constitution?
Ans: Haan, it’s the Constitution’s ladoo topping!
 Do the amendments violate rights or principles?
Ans: Some parts are naughty, so chop them!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets the temple, but Pospsi says, “Kesavananda (Kes = key) ka

ladoo temple basic structure se safe!” Trick: Imagine Kesavananda’s temple with a
“Basic Structure” sign to recall the doctrine’s birth.
9. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) - Indira’s Ladoo Election Drama

Context: Heenu votes for Indira Nehru Gandhi’s Ladoo Party, but Raj Narain says,
“Election mein ladoo cheating!” The 39th Amendment tries to shield Indira’s win, but
Heenu forgets her vote and eats a ladoo.

Ruling: The Court, wearing shades, says, “Free elections aur judicial review are basic

structure ladoos! 39th Amendment’s clauses barring review are out! Indira’s cheating
was real, but we’ll tweak her penalty.” Democracy wins!

Legal Issues:

 Does the 39th Amendment violate basic structure by blocking judicial review?
Ans: Haan, it’s like banning ladoo quality checks!

 Are free and fair elections part of the basic structure?

Ans: Totally, they’re the ladoo of democracy!

 Was Indira’s election void for corrupt practices?

Ans: Yup, she used government ladoos for votes!

 Can Parliament retroactively fix elections like a ladoo recipe?

Ans: Nahin, that’s cheating the voters!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her vote, but Pospsi says, “Indira (In = unfair) ka ladoo
election basic structure ne bachaya!” Trick: Picture Indira tossing ladoos to voters,

stopped by the Court, to recall election integrity.

10. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) - Maneka’s Ladoo Passport

Context: Heenu’s at Maneka Gandhi’s Ladoo Travel Agency, but the government
snatches Maneka’s passport without reason, saying, “Public interest, bhai!” Heenu,
forgetting her ticket, asks, “Passport kyun chheena?”

Ruling: The Court, doing a bhangra, says, “Article 21 means fair procedure, not just

any law! Passport chheenna affects Article 19’s movement and Article 14’s fairness.
Maneka, get your passport and a hearing!” A.K. Gopalan is overruled.

Legal Issues:

 Does snatching Maneka’s passport violate Articleachan 21’s liberty?

Ans: Haan, it’s like stealing her ladoo travel dreams!

 Is “procedure established by law” just any rule or a fair ladoo recipe?

Ans: Needs fairness, not just any bakwas law!

 Are Articles 14, 19, 21 a ladoo gang?

Ans: Yup, they’re like Heenu’s ladoo crew!

 Is the Passport Act’s impoundment rule arbitrary?

Ans: Totally, it’s like picking ladoos blindfolded!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her passport, but Pospsi says, “Maneka (Man = freedom)
ka ladoo passport Article 21 ne wapas diya!” Trick: Picture Maneka waving her

passport with a ladoo to recall due process expansion.

11. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) - Shukla’s Ladoo Jailbreak

Context: During the Emergency, Heenu’s at Shivkant Shukla’s Ladoo Shop, but he’s
detained under MISA with no habeas corpus. The government says, “Article 21
suspended, no court drama!” Heenu forgets her order and cries, “Liberty kahan?”

Ruling: The Court, sadly, says, “Habeas corpus nahi during Emergency. Article 21 is the

only liberty ladoo, and it’s gone. Courts can’t interfere.” Justice Khanna dissents,
shouting, “Rule of law zindabad, liberty hai!”

Legal Issues:

 Can courts hear habeas corpus when Article 21 is on vacation?

Ans: Nahin, it’s like a ladoo shop closed for Emergency!

 Does “procedure established by law” need natural justice vibes?

Ans: Nope, it’s suspended, no fairness needed!

 Can courts check if detentions are sneaky or mala fide?

Ans: Nahin, Emergency means government ka ladoo raj!

 Is there a liberty ladoo outside Article 21?

Ans: Nope, Article 21 is the only liberty chef!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her jail key, but Pospsi says, “Shukla (Shu = shut) ka ladoo
jail Khanna ne chhodne ki koshish ki!” Trick: Picture Shukla in a dark jail with Khanna’s

dissent as a ladoo light to recall the Emergency loss.

12. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) - Minerva’s Ladoo Factory

Context: Heenu’s at Minerva Mills’ Ladoo Factory, nationalized and hit by the 42nd
Amendment, which gives Parliament unlimited amending power and Directive
Principles over rights. Heenu forgets her order and asks, “Yeh kaisa law?”

Ruling: The Court, flexing, says, “42nd Amendment’s Sections 4 and 55 are out! Judicial

review and rights-directives balance are basic structure ladoos. Nationalization’s fine,
but don’t mess with the Constitution’s soul!”

Legal Issues:

 Do Sections 4 and 55 violate basic structure by giving crazy amending power?

Ans: Haan, it’s like giving Heenu unlimited ladoos—chaos!

 Is the rights-directives balance a basic structure ladoo?

Ans: Yup, they’re like ladoo and jalebi—equal partners!

 Does Minerva’s nationalization violate property rights?

Ans: Nahin, it’s fair with proper compensation!

 Does the Preamble guide amendment reviews?

Ans: Haan, it’s the Constitution’s ladoo mission statement!
 Does limiting judicial review ruin the Constitution?
Ans: Totally, it’s like banning ladoo quality checks!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her factory, but Pospsi says, “Minerva (Min = minimum) ka
ladoo factory basic structure ne bachaya!” Trick: Picture Minerva’s factory with a “Basic
Structure” shield to recall the balance doctrine.
13. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985) - Shah Bano’s Ladoo Maintenance

Context: Heenu’s at Shah Bano Begum’s Ladoo Stall, but her husband, Mohd.
Ahmed Khan, divorces her via triple talaq and stops maintenance. Shah Bano
demands support under CrPC Section 125. Heenu forgets her order and asks,

“Maintenance kyun nahi?”

Ruling: The Court, with a wink, says, “Section 125 is for all, even Muslim women!
Maintenance goes beyond iddat if Shah Bano’s broke. It’s Article 21’s dignity ladoo.

Uniform Civil Code? Nice idea, Parliament, socho!” Khan pays up.

Legal Issues:

 Does Section 125 apply to Muslim women, ignoring personal law?

Ans: Haan, it’s like a universal ladoo for all needy wives!
 Is maintenance only for iddat, like a short ladoo break?
Ans: Nahin, it’s lifelong if she’s out of ladoos!
 Does denying maintenance violate Articles 14 and 21?
Ans: Yup, it’s like stealing her dignity ladoo!
 Should the Court push for a Uniform Civil Code?
Ans: It suggests it, like a ladoo recipe for unity!
 Can Islamic law be tweaked for justice?
Ans: Haan, Quran supports ladoos for destitute women!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her maintenance, but Pospsi says, “Shah Bano (Sha = share)

ka ladoo maintenance CrPC ne diya!” Trick: Picture Shah Bano with a ladoo labeled
“Maintenance” to recall women’s rights win.
14. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) - Mehta’s Ladoo Gas Leak

Context: Heenu’s near M.C. Mehta’s Ladoo Factory in Delhi when an oleum gas leak
scares everyone post-Bhopal. Mehta files a PIL to shut it, saying, “Article 21 ka right to
life!” Heenu forgets her mask and coughs.

Ruling: The Court, in a hazmat suit, says, “Article 21 includes clean air ladoos!

Hazardous factories face absolute liability—no excuses! Mehta’s factory stays open
with safety fixes, and government, make green laws!”

Legal Issues:

 Does a risky factory violate Article 21’s life ladoo?

Ans: Haan, pollution is like a rotten ladoo!

 What’s the liability for environmental harm?

Ans: Absolute liability, like paying for all spilled ladoos!

 Does the state have to regulate risky factories?

Ans: Yup, it’s their job to keep ladoos safe!

 Can the Court order green rules without laws?

Ans: Haan, it’s like a ladoo chef writing recipes!
 Should the factory close or get safety gear?
Ans: Safety gear, so ladoos keep rolling!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her mask, but Pospsi says, “Mehta (Met = mess) ka ladoo
gas leak absolute liability se thok diya!” Trick: Picture Mehta with a gas mask and a

ladoo labeled “Clean Air” to recall environmental rights.

15. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) - Gupta’s Ladoo Judge Drama

Context: Heenu’s at S.P. Gupta’s Ladoo Court, where the government refuses to
confirm judges and transfers Justice Singh. Gupta says, “Judicial independence ka
ladoo chheenna hai!” Heenu forgets her court date.

Ruling: The Court, sipping chai, says, “Executive is the boss for judge appointments.

‘Consultation’ with CJI isn’t binding, just a chat. Independence is cool, but government
decides.” Heenu’s shocked!

Legal Issues:

 Does the executive rule judge appointments like a ladoo king?

Ans: Haan, they’re the ladoo boss for now!

 Is “consultation” with CJI binding or just ladoo gossip?

Ans: Just gossip, not a must-do!

 Does executive control mess with judicial independence?

Ans: Nahin, it’s still independent enough!

 Can non-confirmation or transfers be called sneaky?

Ans: Nope, no proof of ladoo mischief!
 Should judge appointments be public like a ladoo sale?
Ans: Nahin, keep it secret like a recipe!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her judge, but Pospsi says, “Gupta (Gup = gossip) ka ladoo
judge executive ne chuna!” Trick: Picture Gupta arguing with a judge holding a ladoo

to recall executive primacy.

16. Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1989) - Carbide’s Ladoo Disaster

Context: Heenu’s near Union Carbide’s Ladoo Factory in Bhopal when a gas leak kills
thousands. The government, as parens patriae, demands compensation. Heenu forgets
her safety suit and panics.

Ruling: The Court, wiping tears, says, “$470 million settlement for victims is fair under

Article 21. Carbide pays, criminal charges drop, and government handles payouts.”
Victims grumble it’s too little.

Legal Issues:

 Who pays for Bhopal’s ladoo disaster—Carbide or its Indian sidekick?

Ans: Carbide, the big ladoo boss!

 Is $470 million enough for Article 21’s dignity?

Ans: It’s okay for now, better than no ladoos!

 Does the Bhopal Act’s government role violate rights?

Ans: Nahin, it’s like a ladoo guardian!

 Can the Court settle without proving fault?

Ans: Haan, quick ladoos for victims!
 Should criminal charges go with the settlement?
Ans: Dropped for now, like spilled ladoos!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her suit, but Pospsi says, “Carbide (Car = crash) ka ladoo
disaster settlement ne thik kiya!” Trick: Picture a leaking ladoo factory with a $470M

bandage to recall the settlement.

17. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) - Bommai’s Ladoo Government

Context: Heenu’s at S.R. Bommai’s Ladoo Government in Karnataka, but the Centre
imposes President’s Rule, saying, “No majority!” Bommai says, “Article 356 ka misuse
hai!” Heenu forgets her vote.

Ruling: The Court, in a fedora, says, “President’s Rule is reviewable! Federalism is basic

structure. Bommai’s dismissal was bakwas—no real breakdown. Floor tests are the way,
Centre, behave!”

Legal Issues:

 Is President’s Rule a court matter or political ladoo game?

Ans: Courts can check, no ladoo politics!

 What’s a “constitutional breakdown”?

Ans: Big chaos, not just losing a ladoo vote!

 Does Article 356 misuse violate federalism?

Ans: Haan, it’s like stealing state ladoos!

 Can courts bring back a sacked government?

Ans: Tough, but they can call it illegal!
 Should the Centre show proof for Article 356?
Ans: Yup, like showing ladoo receipts!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her government, but Pospsi says, “Bommai (Bom = boom)
ka ladoo government federalism ne bachaya!” Trick: Picture Bommai with a ladoo

crown, saved by federalism, to recall Article 356 limits.

18. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) - Sawhney’s Ladoo Reservation

Context: Heenu’s at Indra Sawhney’s Ladoo Job Fair, where the Mandal Commission
gives 27% OBC reservations. Sawhney says, “Yeh Article 14 ka violation hai!” Heenu
forgets her job form.

Ruling: The Court, balancing ladoos, says, “27% OBC reservation is cool under Articles

15(4), 16(4). 50% cap, creamy layer out, but no 10% EWS reservation—it’s random!”
OBCs cheer.

Legal Issues:

 Is 27% OBC reservation okay under Articles 14, 15(4), 16(4)?

Ans: Haan, it’s like extra ladoos for backward folks!

 Can reservations cross 50% like Heenu’s ladoo stash?

Ans: Nahin, 50% is the ladoo limit!

 Is caste okay for backwardness, or just money?

Ans: Caste works, but add other ladoo factors!

 Does the creamy layer get reservation ladoos?

Ans: Nope, rich OBCs are out!
 Is 10% EWS reservation legal?
Ans: Nahin, it’s like a fake ladoo coupon!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her job, but Pospsi says, “Sawhney (Saw = share) ka ladoo
reservation 50% cap ke saath!” Trick: Picture Sawhney with a ladoo quota sign to recall

OBC reservations.
19. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) - Vishaka’s Ladoo Workplace

Context: Heenu’s at Vishaka’s Ladoo Office, but women face harassment. After
Bhanwari Devi’s assault, Vishaka files a PIL for workplace safety. Heenu forgets her ID
and asks, “Safe workplace kahan?”

Ruling: The Court, in a superhero cape, says, “Harassment violates Articles 14, 15, 19,

21! Vishaka Guidelines: complaints committees, anti-harassment policies, CEDAW

vibes. Safe ladoo workplaces zaroori!”

Legal Issues:

 Does no harassment law violate Articles 14, 15, 19, 21?

Ans: Haan, it’s like leaving ladoos unguarded!

 Can the Court make guidelines like a ladoo chef?

Ans: Yup, till Parliament bakes a law!

 Does the state have to ensure safe workplaces?

Ans: Totally, it’s their ladoo duty!

 Are CEDAW rules enforceable in India?

Ans: Haan, if they match our ladoo Constitution!
 What’s sexual harassment?
Ans: Unwelcome ladoo-stealing behavior!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her ID, but Pospsi says, “Vishaka (Vish = wish) ka ladoo
workplace safe ho gaya!” Trick: Picture Vishaka with a ladoo shield for women to recall

workplace safety.
20. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) - Pai’s Ladoo College

Context: Heenu’s at T.M.A. Pai’s Ladoo College, but state quotas and fee controls irk
minority institutions. Pai says, “Article 30 ka right hai!” Heenu forgets her admission
form.

Ruling: The Court, with a chalkboard, says, “Article 30 gives minorities autonomy, but

reasonable regulations okay. Private colleges can set fees, admissions, but no
profiteering. Balance ladoo access and rights!”

Legal Issues:

 What’s the scope of Article 30 for minority colleges?

Ans: Big autonomy, like running a ladoo empire!

 Can states impose quotas or fee caps?

Ans: Yes, but don’t crush the ladoo spirit!

 Do private colleges have Article 19(1)(g) rights?

Ans: Haan, but no ladoo profiteering!

 How to balance minority rights and public access?

Ans: Like mixing ladoos and jalebis—fairly!
 What makes a minority institution?
Ans: Its ladoo founder’s community vibe!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her admission, but Pospsi says, “Pai (Pay = fees) ka ladoo
college autonomy jeeta!” Trick: Picture Pai’s college with a ladoo minority flag to recall

educational rights.
21. Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi (2009) - Naz’s Ladoo Love

Context: Heenu’s at Naz Foundation’s Ladoo Love Café, but Section 377 bans
homosexual ladoo love. Naz says, “Yeh Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 ka violation hai!” Heenu
forgets her order.

Ruling: The Delhi High Court, with rainbow ladoos, says, “Section 377’s ban on

consensual gay acts is unconstitutional. It violates privacy, equality, and dignity. Read
it down, love is free!”

Legal Issues:

 Does Section 377 violate Article 14 by banning gay ladoos?

Ans: Haan, it’s like banning only pink ladoos!

 Does it mess with Article 15’s “sex” clause?

Ans: Yup, sexual orientation is ladoo sex!

 Does it block Article 19(1)(a) and 21’s freedom?

Ans: Totally, it’s like jailing ladoo lovers!

 Can the state ban private consensual acts?

Ans: Nahin, no ladoo police in bedrooms!
 Should Section 377 be tweaked?
Ans: Yes, only for non-consensual ladoos!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her love ladoo, but Pospsi says, “Naz (Nazz = jazz) ka ladoo
love free ho gaya!” Trick: Picture Naz with rainbow ladoos to recall homosexuality

decriminalization.
22. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) - Chandra’s Ladoo Tribunal

Context: Heenu’s at L. Chandra Kumar’s Ladoo Tribunal, but it skips High Court
review under Articles 323A, 323B. Chandra says, “Judicial review ka ladoo chheenna
hai!” Heenu forgets her appeal.

Ruling: The Court, with a crown, says, “Judicial review is basic structure! Tribunals are

helpers, not High Court replacements. High Courts can review, so Chandra’s appeal is
on!”

Legal Issues:

 Does skipping High Court review violate basic structure?

Ans: Haan, it’s like banning ladoo quality checks!

 Are tribunals equal to High Courts?

Ans: Nahin, they’re like ladoo assistants!

 Can tribunal decisions be reviewed?

Ans: Yup, High Courts and SC are ladoo bosses!

 Does the Act undermine the judiciary?

Ans: Yes, but fixed with review powers!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her appeal, but Pospsi says, “Chandra (Chan = check) ka
ladoo tribunal review ke saath!” Trick: Picture Chandra with a ladoo tribunal under a
High Court gavel to recall judicial review.
23. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) - Coelho’s Ladoo Shield

Context: Heenu’s at I.R. Coelho’s Ladoo Law Shop, where Ninth Schedule laws dodge
review. Coelho says, “Post-Kesavananda, yeh basic structure ka violation hai!” Heenu
forgets her law book.

Ruling: The Court, with a sword, says, “Post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws are reviewable!

If they violate basic structure, they’re out. Judicial review is king, no ladoo immunity!”

Legal Issues:

 Can post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws dodge review?

Ans: Nahin, they face the ladoo judge!
 Does shielding laws violate basic structure?
Ans: Haan, it’s like hiding bad ladoos!
 Are Ninth Schedule laws like regular laws?
Ans: Yup, same ladoo rules apply!
 Can courts strike down shielded laws?
Ans: Yes, if they mess with the ladoo core!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her shield, but Pospsi says, “Coelho (Co = cover) ka ladoo

shield review ne khola!” Trick: Picture Coelho with a ladoo shield pierced by a judicial
arrow to recall Ninth Schedule scrutiny.
24. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) - Puttaswamy’s Ladoo Privacy

Context: Heenu’s at Justice K.S. Puttaswamy’s Ladoo Data Vault, but Aadhaar
demands her biometrics. Puttaswamy says, “Privacy is my ladoo right!” Heenu forgets
her PIN.

Ruling: The Court, in a digital glow, says, “Privacy is a fundamental right under Articles

14, 19, 21! It’s not absolute, but Aadhaar needs proportionality. Old cases denying
privacy? Thok do!”

Legal Issues:

 Is privacy a fundamental right like a secret ladoo stash?

Ans: Haan, it’s baked into Article 21!

 What’s privacy’s scope and limits?

Ans: Covers data, body, home, but state can peek with ladoo reason!

 Does Aadhaar’s data grab violate privacy?

Ans: Maybe, sent to another bench for a ladoo check!

 Can the state limit privacy for welfare?

Ans: Yes, but only with a fair ladoo balance!
 Are old privacy-denying cases still cool?
Ans: Nahin, they’re stale ladoos!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her PIN, but Pospsi says, “Puttaswamy (Put = protect) ka
ladoo privacy fundamental hai!” Trick: Picture Puttaswamy locking a ladoo vault to
recall privacy rights.
25. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) - Johar’s Ladoo Love Fest

Context: Heenu’s at Navtej Singh Johar’s Ladoo Love Fest, but Section 377 bans
homosexual ladoo love. Johar says, “Yeh Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 ka dushman hai!” Heenu
forgets her invite.

Ruling: The Court, tossing rainbow ladoos, says, “Section 377’s ban on consensual gay

acts is out! It violates equality, dignity, and privacy. Sexual orientation is protected,
Suresh Koushal thok do!”

Legal Issues:

 Does Section 377 violate Articles 14, 15, 19, 21?

Ans: Haan, it’s like banning ladoo love for no reason!

 Is sexual orientation part of Article 15’s “sex”?

Ans: Yup, it’s a ladoo flavor of sex!

 Does Section 377 pass the proportionality test?

Ans: Nahin, it’s a rotten ladoo rule!

 Should Suresh Koushal be trashed?

Ans: Totally, it’s like a bad ladoo batch!
 Can morality ban homosexuality?
Ans: Nope, love is a ladoo right!

Mnemonic: Heenu forgets her invite, but Pospsi says, “Johar (Jo = joy) ka ladoo love
fest free ho gaya!” Trick: Picture Johar at a rainbow ladoo party to recall homosexuality

decriminalization.