Transparency International

An overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Qatar

Author(s): Mathias Bak
Transparency International (2020)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24898
Accessed: 21-08-2025 15:14 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Transparency International is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to this content.

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer

An overview of corruption and

anti-corruption in Qatar
Author: Mathias Bak, [email protected]
Reviewer(s): Marwa Fatafta and Matthew Jenkins, Transparency International
Date: 23 January 2020

While petty corruption in Qatar is not a widespread issue, the country has few
checks and balances able to exercise oversight over the country’s leadership.
Power is heavily concentrated in the emir, and the ruling family has monopolised
most important policy areas and posts in the country. At the top, there are few
integrity mechanisms to ensure that narrow interests do not drive public policy or
exert undue influence over state functions.

In practice, opaque budgeting processes allow state elites free reign to arbitrarily
allocate state revenues off the budget, which creates a series of corruption risks.
The use of personal, clientelistic networks to obtain rents or contracts from the
state is also believed by analysts to be common practice. In addition, despite the
fact that Qatar’s wealth affords its citizens a relatively high quality of life, they
enjoy only limited civic and political rights.

© 2020 Transparency International. All rights reserved.

This document should not be considered as representative of the Commission or Transparency International’s
official position. Neither the European Commission, Transparency International nor any person acting on
behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.

This Anti-Corruption Helpdesk is operated by Transparency International and funded by the European Union.

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Query
Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Qatar.

Contents Main points

1. Background — Qatar has comparatively low levels of
2. Extent of corruption corruption by regional standards.
3. Forms of corruption However, it is far from immune to
4. Sectors vulnerable to corruption corruption. Powerful patronage
5. Anti-corruption framework
networks rooted in the royal family
6. Stakeholders
continue to wield control over state
resources with little transparency or
Caveat
accountability.
Where systemic checks and balances in the form
— In recent years, the government of
of transparent and accountable public institutions
Qatar has introduced legislation to
are absent, control of corruption is largely
dependent on the political will of incumbent address many of the previous gaps.
leaders. Literature reviews indicate that in For instance, Qatar has taken steps to
environments with restricted civil and political improve its public procurement
rights such as Qatar, anti-corruption strategies are practices, its money-laundering
less sustainable as they are unable to draw on the framework and has promised to reform
full range of anti-corruption measures, many of the sponsorship system.
which rely on the participation of non-state actors
(Kukutschka 2018). As such, any improvements in — Nonetheless, substantial issues
reducing corruption in these settings are remain. Few steps have been taken to
contingent on the caprice of a few individuals, limit discretionary spending, and
meaning progress in clamping down on national integrity systems do not
malfeasance is likely to prove fragmentary, short- operate independently of political
lived and volatile (Transparency International interests.
2019).

small state at the periphery of the global

Background marketplace into a wealthy country at the centre of
the world economy.
The State of Qatar is an absolute monarchy ruled
by Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (henceforth
One of the defining features of Qatar’s rapid
Sheikh Tamim) (CIA 2019). In just a few decades,
economic, political and societal transformation has
natural resources have transformed Qatar from a
been the burgeoning population of guest workers
2

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
from across the globe. In 1950, Qatar was a Qatar is often referred to as a “rentier state” due to
country of 25,000 people, most of whom were its reliance on oil (Tok et al 2016). The term refers
employed in the pearl or fishing industries. Today, to a country in which the government derives its
it has 300,000 citizens and more than 2.3 million revenues predominantly from the sale of its
1
residents. valuable resources to clients in other countries.
Some social scientists argue that, since rentier
These socio-economic transformations have been states are not dependent on tax revenues for their
accompanied by political developments. The first survival, their accountability to their citizens is
ministry in the country, the Ministry of Education, likely to be limited, which may lead to such
was founded in 1957, and throughout the 1960s countries being more tyrannical or corrupt than
Qatar established other government agencies (Tok other governments (Gray 2018).
et al. 2016). It was only in the latter half of the
1960s that the government of Qatar came to Qatar’s leaders’ international ambitions have led
develop a comprehensive bureaucratic structure the country to play an increasingly important role in
that resembled one seen in most other states (Tok geopolitics in recent years, with Qatar acting as
et al. 2016). both mediator and as an active participant in a
range of conflicts across the Arab world (Kamrava
The scale of political and social change has not 2011). In addition, the small state, located in one
always been straightforward for the country as of the Persian Gulf’s most strategic areas, houses
modernisation has brought sharp contradictions the largest American military base in the Middle
between tradition and modernity to the surface, not East (Tok et al. 2016).
least as Qatar has come to wield international
influence disproportionate to its size (Tok et al. Given its relatively small size, soft power has
2016). become the chief source of Qatari influence
(Roberts 2019). Al Jazeera, one of the most
After inheriting power in 2013, Sheikh Tamim has influential broadcasters in the Middle East and
largely continued the policies of his father Hamad beyond, has permanently altered the media
bin Khalifa Al Thani, though with a slightly more landscape of the region. In addition to Al Jazeera,
conservative emphasis. A key policy goal during Qatar also funds news networks across the region
both reigns has been diversifying the economy, such as the Middle East Eye – an English-
moving from an almost entirely oil-based economy speaking website that provides news and analyses
towards a more knowledge-based one with a on events across the Middle East and North Africa
larger role for services (BTI 2018; Tok et al. 2016). (MENA) region (Times of Israel 2019).
Despite this objective, Qatar’s oil and natural gas
still accounts for almost half of GDP and the Qatar’s ambitions have, however, increasingly
country is likely to be dependent on this sector for driven it to clash with other actors in the Gulf
the foreseeable future (CIA 2019). Cooperation Council (GCC), who have accused
Qatar of a range of misdeeds including terrorist

1According to UN demographic data, available at:

https://population.un.org/wpp/
3

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
financing. In 2017, a number of regional states, led infrastructure is ready for the World Cup (Kelly et
by the “quartet” (Saudi Arabia, United Arab al. 2019). According to observers, promised labour
Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain), severed diplomatic reforms are inadequate and poorly implemented
ties with Qatar, prevented the country from using (Kelly et al. 2019).
their airspace and blockaded the country’s only
land crossing. Governance and control of corruption

Immediately following the embargo, the quartet Qatar is an absolute monarchy with most powers
presented Qatar with 13 sweeping demands to be centralised around the Al Thani family. The emir
met in just 10 days. These included cutting ties serves as the head of state, the chief of the
with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and executive and of the armed forces. He is assisted
the Islamic State, shutting down Al Jazeera and by the council of ministers (Qatar’s cabinet), where
stopping the funding of other news networks such the Al Thani family also controls key posts
as the Middle East Eye, terminating military including prime minister, ministry of foreign affairs
cooperation with Turkey and paying reparations for and the ministries of economy and interior. The
the damages that Qatar had allegedly generated in emir has the right to create and ratify legislation,
other countries in the region (Wintour 2017). set the agenda for the council of ministers and
enjoys a number of discretionary powers (Tok et
Qatar rejected the demands, and the embargo al. 2016). The council of ministers exercises the
remains in place more than two years later. While right to propose and draft laws and oversee the
the blockade has imposed a significant economic management of the administration.
cost on the country, Qatar has managed to
weather the storm. According to some observers, The legislative branch of Qatar’s government is the
the embargo has in fact led to deeper ties with Iran 45-member advisory council (Majli as-Shura). The
and Turkey, while Al Jazeera continues to function, advisory council decides the general budget and
and relations between the Qatari state and its supports legislation that has been proposed by the
citizens have strengthened in the face of foreign council of ministers. Thirty of its members are
hostility (Selmi 2019). elected in a secret ballot, while the remaining third
are directly appointed by the emir (Shura Council
The multiple controversies around the decision to 2019).
award the rights to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup
in Qatar is another source of external scrutiny of There have been plans to hold nationwide
the Qatari leadership’s probity. In addition to the democratic elections for the advisory council since
allegations of bribery in the bidding process that 2004, but these elections have continually been
have been all but confirmed (Gibson 2015; Ingle postponed. While elections have not yet been
2019), preparations for the competition have been held, the emir has created a committee tasked with
subject to much criticism by international human organising the elections (Reuters 2019a).
rights organisations over the labour standards for Nonetheless, the Shura Council currently cannot
the migrant workers, hundreds of whom have died be said to perform the typical role of a legislative
toiling under high temperatures to ensure Qatar’s branch in a state with a clear separation of powers
4

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
as it has no effective means of acting as a check Rulers in Qatar have extensive monopolistic and
on the executive (BTI 2018). discretionary powers as well as vast access to
material resources through oil rents (Kukutschka
Though the constitution of Qatar guarantees the 2018). However, there have been some efforts to
independence of the country’s secular courts, curb corruption over the past 25 years. The
court staffing is mostly determined by the emir. bloodless coup that brought Hamad bin Khalifa Al
Plus, judicial rulings are invariably in line with the Thani to power in 1995 was reportedly motivated
stance of the governing elite (BTI 2018; Freedom at least in part by concerns over governance
House 2019). issues (Khatib 2014).

Qatar does not have a known opposition (BTI Following the coup, Hamad bin Khalifa initiated a
2018). Independent civil society is virtually non- series of socio-economic reforms aimed at building
existent, and most of the country’s associations regime legitimacy among the populace to ensure
are affiliated with powerful patrons in the political stability (Kukutschka 2018; Khatib 2014).
government or with the state (BTI 2018). In First and foremost, these measures aimed to
practice, therefore, the emir and the Al Thani improve the social welfare system, which today is
family run Qatar virtually unopposed (BTI 2018). one of the most generous in the world.2
There are nonetheless some consultative
mechanisms through which citizens can voice their While this system, along with efforts to improve
opinions, most notably the majlis, which operate as administrative efficiencies, is believed to have had
traditional councils hosted by tribal leaders (Khatib some success in terms of reducing petty bribery,
2014). Policies such as the banning of alcohol in Qatar still lacks a number of conventional
some locations have been implemented at least in accountability mechanisms (Gray 2018). This
part due to demands from conservative parts of ensures that the control of corruption remains
society while reforms to labour regulation have largely dependent on the political will of incumbent
been postponed multiple times due to resistance leaders, some of whom are reportedly engaged in
from Qatari businesses (BTI 2018). Due to the “rampant” corruption (Khatib 2014).
existence of these channels, Qatar’s political
system has been described by some analysts as a Extent of corruption
“pluralised autocracy” (Tok et al. 2016).
With a score of 62 out of 100, Qatar is ranked 30
There are a number of factors that increase the out of 180 countries in Transparency
risk of corruption in an authoritarian monarchy. International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index
These include opacity in government operations (CPI). This makes Qatar among the best scoring
and the lack of systemic checks and balances in countries in the MENA region, second only to the
the form of transparent and accountable public United Arab Emirates. Since a significant drop in
institutions. 2015, the country’s score has remained relatively
stable.

2 There is an extensive system of cash handouts to month also have access to free healthcare and education
citizens, who in addition to a stipend of around US$7,000 a (Kukutschka 2018)
5

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 corruption indices, if one compares Qatar to other
Composite 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
top 20 countries in terms of GDP per capita, Qatar
indicator
fares rather poorly.
Corruption 71 61 63 62 62
Perceptions Khatib (2014) emphasises that both the World
Index Bank and Transparency International indices do
not fully capture the extent of neopatrimonialism
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by and particularistic forms of governance in the
the World Bank (2019) accord the following scores country. Indeed, as described in subsequent
in percentile rank3 to the country: sections, while rates of petty corruption are very
low, the use of patronage networks and personal
WGI indicator 2015 2016 2017 2018
connections is common practice to find jobs and
Control of 78.4 79.8 76.4 77.4
obtain public services, licences or permits that
corruption
would otherwise be out of reach or would take time
Government 77.4 74.5 74.5 74.5 or effort to secure.
effectiveness
While Khatib (2014) in her study of corruption in
Political stability 84.3 76.7 69.5 69.1
Qatar defines the practice as the “particular (non-
and absence of
universal) allocation of public goods due to abuse
violence/terrorism
of influence”, she notes that many Qataris do not
Regulatory 73.1 74.0 67.8 70.7 consider the use of social connections to access
quality special privileges to be corrupt.
Rule of law 76.0 76.9 76.4 75.5
Voice and 16.8 16.3 15.3 14.3 Forms of corruption
accountability
Neopatrimonialism
In absolute terms, Qatar’s score for control of
corruption on a scale of -2.5 to + 2.5 has declined The process of reconfiguring networks of tribal
from 0.89 in 2015 to 0.72 in 2018 (World Bank authority to facilitate state building was key to the
2019). Equally, the consistently low (and centralisation of political power in Qatar throughout
deteriorating) percentile ranks for voice and the latter half of the 20th century (Crystal 2016).
accountability indicate the highly restrictive During this period, a compromise was forged
environment for independent journalists, between tribes and the state, according to which
opposition figures and critics. the tribes would continue to wield influence and
assert their stake over state resources and rents.
While Qatar performs better than some Such influence is exercised in the form of political
consolidated democracies on international appointments and via informal channels of
influence (Crystal 2016).

3Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank
countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 (World Bank 2019).
6

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 other countries across the Middle East and North
The inclusion of tribal patronage networks has been Africa, the use of wasta can be instrumental in
credited as a central factor contributing to regime securing access to privileges, ensuring permits or
resilience in Qatar (Crystal 2016). Indeed, winning contracts (Gray 2018, see also Global
according to the CIA World Factbook, one of the Corruption Barometer 2019).
key reasons that Qatar did not witness significant
unrest during the 2011 tumult across the region was Combined with limited budgeting accountability
due to its extensive patronage network (CIA 2019). and opportunities for discretionary spending, wasta
is often associated with embezzlement and the
At the same time, this tacit agreement has also diversion of public funds, and can be a major
allowed informal networks to permeate state factor in deciding institutional outcomes (Gray
institutions (Gray 2018). In fact, regime resilience 2018).
is possible chiefly because these patron-client The fact that the Al Thani family and a set of tribal
networks are strong enough to keep elites satiated allies and clients control many of the state’s political
and society well-serviced. Gray (2018) posits that and economic decisions significantly expands the
Qatar simply generates so much rent from natural scope for corruption in the country by allowing well-
resources that it can purchase the quiescence of connected individuals to act as powerful brokers to
all sectors of society, even though it distributes key decision-makers (Gray 2018).
rents unevenly. Rents are sufficiently large and
stable enough to keep salaries high, which Grand and political corruption
reduces incentives for petty corruption (Gray
2018). It is believed to be fairly common for high-ranking
Qatari officials to have private financial interests
Paradoxically, therefore, Qatar’s political economy related to various commercial activities (BTI 2018).
and resource wealth has both nurtured neo- The Al Thani family, for instance, have extensive
patrimonial systems of governance while business ties and is engaged in a range of
simultaneously reducing incentives for petty ventures (Khatib 2014).
bribery (Khatib 2014; Gray 2018). While well-
connected clients are able to leverage their The royal family also wields extensive influence
network to obtain special privileges, wealth is still over the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), a
extensive enough to benefit all Qatari citizens, sovereign wealth fund chaired by Sheikh Temim
though this rarely trickles down to resident foreign (Khatib 2014). It is not clear whether the private
workers (Gray 2018). investments of the royal family are made under the
umbrella of the QIA, but in any case the authority
Wasta does not operate independently of the personal
interests of Qatar’s political elites (Khatib 2014).
The practice of wasta can be defined as “the
intervention of a patron in favour of a client in an Mediators and local fixers are reportedly important
attempt to obtain privileges or resources through a for foreign firms looking to invest in the country or
third party” (Mohamed and Mohamad 2011). As in gain access to Qatari markets. These brokers are
7

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
typically well-networked individuals in the royal Open Budget Index (International Budget
family (Kukutschka 2018). Partnership 2017a)4, Qatar ranks as the least open
country in terms of budget transparency in the
Recent years have seen a number of scandals in world, together with Somalia, Venezuela, Niger,
the small country, illustrating the close intersection Equatorial Guinea and Yemen, all of whom score 0
between political and economic interests. In 2018, out 100.
for instance, a French magazine exposed a
significant amount of unexplained wealth held by There is evidence to believe that a significant
Qatar’s attorney general, Ali Bin Fetais Al Marri, amount of oil revenues are not declared and are
who also serves as the chair of the Rule of Law channelled into private hands or used to finance
and Anti-Corruption Center. Al Marri owns a series secretive government transactions (Al Shebabi
of luxury estates in Paris, Geneva and other 2017). This off-budget spending is believed to
places in Europe that cannot be explained by his consist primarily of transfers to foreign actors,
official salary (Gulf News 2018). military spending and allocations to royal and tribal
families (Al Shebabi 2017).
In addition, two individuals working for the Qatar
Foundation, the largest non-profit association in Not all members of the Shura Council are entitled
the country, have been sentenced by Qatari courts to inspect the detailed state budget (Al Shebabi
for extracting bribes from an insurance company in 2017). Only the ministerial council is entitled to see
exchange for renewing contracts with the the numbers for royal stipends and certain forms of
foundation (BTI 2018). military spending (Al Shebabi 2017).

Sectors vulnerable to While Qatar does have a national audit institution,

corruption the State Audit Bureau, this offers only limited
transparency to the public and cannot be
Public financial management considered politically dependent (Al Shebabi
2017). The Open Budget Survey’s country paper
Public financial management has long been a on Qatar finds that there is virtually no oversight of
complicated issue in Qatar. Embezzlement and the budget in the country, and the State Audit
misallocation of state revenue used to be a chronic Bureau has not published any fiscal or audit
problem; in 1970, an astonishing 33 per cent of reports (International Budget Partnership 2017b).
Qatar’s entire budget was allocated to the different
members of the royal family (Kukutschka 2018). Exactly how much of Qatar’s oil revenues is not
While that figure is reportedly much lower today, it declared is unknown. However, somewhat dated
is difficult to ascertain accurately as the Qatari numbers show that the Institute of International
budgeting process is completely opaque. In the Finance’s (IIF) figures for Qatari oil and gas

biennial assessment, the 2017 survey evaluated 115

4 “Launched in 2006, the Open Budget Survey (OBS) is the countries across six continents, adding 13 new countries to
world’s only independent, comparative assessment of the the survey since the last round in 2015.” (Open Budget
three pillars of public budget accountability: transparency, Index 2017)
oversight and public participation. The sixth round of this

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
exports are much higher than its declared over wasta by allowing each government entity to
revenues. In 2011, for instance, the IIF estimated form its own tendering committees and abolishing
that Qatari oil exports stood at US$108 billion, the Central Tendering Committee.
whereas the officially declared revenues were
US$42.1 billion (Al Shebabi 2017). Previous years According to some observers, the new law should
show a similar tendency. Indeed, while these reduce corruption risks as decentralised tender
figures may be somewhat inaccurate, they can be committees are believed to be more
seen as an indication of the large gap between knowledgeable about the technical qualities of the
declared and real revenue. different bids (GAN Business Anti-Corruption
Portal 2016). Despite this, there is still a moderate
Procurement risk of corruption for companies engaging in public
procurement processes in Qatar (GAN Business
In the past, Qatar has been criticised for applying Anti-Corruption Portal 2016).
public procurement regulations in an inconsistent
manner, partly due to an inadequate legal Checkbook diplomacy and terrorist
framework. The previous tendering law (Law 26 of financing
2005, articles 6 and 7) left considerable loopholes
for procuring agencies to avoid competitive Since the advent of oil, the rich GCC states have
tendering processes. For instance, there was no used their vast wealth to spread their influence
need for an open competition where a case was across much of the world as part of what is often
deemed to be “urgent” or where a direct referred to as checkbook diplomacy. These fund
agreement between the procurement committee transfers can be channelled in many ways, for
and the supplier existed. In practice, this led to the instance, through the national development
extensive use of wasta to rig tenders to ensure agency, though as noted above, a significant
that personal relationships and networks trumped amount of the discretionary spending to advance
proper procedure (Khatib 2014). foreign policy objectives is off-budget and is not
accounted for (Al Shebabi 2017).
There were limited ways for unsuccessful bidders to
dispute or complain about a lost tender, even in While not assessed as a high-risk jurisdiction with
instances where there were clear indications that strategic deficiencies by the Financial Action Task
the process was not conducted fairly (Khatib 2014). Force, the country still faces some significant
Foreign companies in particular are known to issues, particularly with regards to terrorist
complain about the lack of justification where they financing (MENAFATF 2008). The politicisation of
are disqualified from a procurement processes these concerns has been a central element in the
(GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2016). GCC split that led to the current embargo of Qatar.

To account for these shortcomings, Qatar Qatar has been accused of sponsoring Jabhat Al-
introduced the Regulations of Tenders and Nusra as well as the broader Al Qaeda network,
Auctions Law in 2015 (State of Qatar 2015). This and various lesser known militias operating in the
was intended to address some of the concerns conflicts in Libya and Syria (see Reuters 2017; Al
9

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Shebabi 2017). In addition, Qatar reportedly financial information with foreign countries (The
supports a range of hardline Islamists in Tunisia, Peninsula Qatar 2019).
Algeria, Mali and Afghanistan (Roberts 2019).
Qatar has been a particularly avid sponsor of the Security sector
deposed Muslim Brotherhood of President
Mohamed Morsi, supporting his regime with Qatar’s defence sector is at “critical” risk of
US$7.5 billion (Al Shebabi 2017). corruption, according to Transparency
A 2018 study on the political economy of Gulf International’s Government Defence Integrity Index
investments in the Horn of Africa describes how (TI Security and Defence 2019). There is little
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund was used to directly oversight of Qatar’s large defence budget and
support incumbents in the Somali elections, and, in correspondingly little accountability (Al Shebabi
general, much Gulf investment in the region seems 2017). The highest risk areas within Qatar’s
driven largely by geostrategic objectives (Meester defence sector are judged to be within
et al. 2018). procurement as well as the policy sphere and
financial environment (asset disposal, links to
In addition, large charities such as the Sheikh Eid business, secret budgets) (TI Security and
Bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Foundation Defence 2019).
and Qatar Charity are of concern to some
observers (Shideler, Froehlke and Fischer 2017). Procurement decisions in the defence sector are
These organisations conduct humanitarian work in heavily influenced by powerful individuals, while
areas controlled by violent extremist groups and procurement decisions are almost never subject to
there are claims that these two charities have a competitive tendering process (TI Security and
supported terrorist organisations under the guise Defence 2019). Many high-ranking officials,
of humanitarianism, claims that Qatar rejects including the defence minister, have conflicts of
(Shideler, Froehlke and Fischer 2017; Gartenstein- interests as they act as key players in key arms
Ross and Zelin 2013; Al Jazeera 2017). consortia and are heavily influential in the state’s
procurement decisions (TI Security and Defence
In 2019, Qatar introduced new anti-money 2019). Al Attiyah Group, Qatar’s largest
laundering and terrorist financing laws to tackle conglomerate active across several sectors, has
some of the outstanding gaps highlighted in the close ties with the defence ministry (TI Security
2010 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (Reuters and Defence 2019). Military procurement is highly
2019b). The new legislation sets out regulations secretive and decisions and data on purchases are
that require charities and financial institutions to rarely shared with the state auditor (TI Security
cooperate with Qatar’s Central Bank on anti- and Defence 2019). TI Security and Defence has
money laundering and terrorist financing issues. not been able to find any evidence of internal
These measures, which were accompanied by a auditing either (TI Security and Defence 2019).
memorandum of understanding with the United
States, are also intended to strengthen Finally, there is little public discussion around
international cooperation and the sharing of defence and foreign policy in Qatar, and the

10

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
legislative has no real say in defence decisions (TI covered by the employer (James 2015; Amnesty
Security and Defence 2019). International 2019). Such unpaid labour after the
contract period has run out has, in many cases,
Construction gone on for months (Amnesty International 2019).

The successful bid for the World Cup in 2022 has There have been some modest reforms in the
brought with it US$220 billion worth of investments residency policies of Qatar, though other
in infrastructure, predominantly in Doha (Tok et al. government attempts to overhaul the kafala
2016). The preparations for the World Cup have system have met with fierce resistance from Qatari
magnified concerns among labour and human businesses (BTI 2018). Nonetheless, in 2019
rights defenders about the potential for corruption Qatar promised to attempt reforms of the kafala
created by the system of sponsorship (kafala) system to end the abuse and corruption that
employed in Qatar, whereby the legal status of a currently characterises the labour market of
worker depends on the employer (BTI 2018; Qatar’s construction sector (Conn 2019). The new
Freedom House 2019). The system permits laws, if implemented, will allow workers to change
employers the opportunity to confiscate passports jobs and leave Qatar without seeking a certificate
and deny workers the right to exit the country or from employers. In addition, Qatar will institute a
leave their job. minimum wage (Conn 2019; UN News 2019).

Kafala is believed to contribute to a culture of World Cup 2022

corruption as rules can change instantly and
unscrupulous managers can use a number of ploys Qatar’s bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup has been
to extort as much money and value from migrant plagued by irregularities and claims of corruption
workers (James 2015). Contracts are often subject both at senior levels of FIFA and Qatar. Indeed, it
to sudden and unlawful changes5 that leave migrant was the decision to award the competition to Qatar
workers vulnerable to deductions in salary (James that set in motion investigations into FIFA that
2015). have become one of the largest event scandals in
sport (Gibson 2015). Various allegations have
Additional fees can be demanded by middle painted a picture of an outright “machine” of
managers or HR staff who demand facilitation corruption that was in operation to ensure Qatar’s
payments to allow paperwork to proceed (James bid won (Gibson 2015).
2015). Workers who protest are often taken by the
police and extorted for the money (James). There During the last couple of years, a number of leaks
are numerous cases where contracts have expired have exposed the level of corruption involved in
but workers are coerced to keep working to pay off the nomination process, particularly at FIFA’s
the “debt” they have incurred for various reasons executive committee. By 2015, the vast majority of
such as travel expenses that were supposed to be the executive committee that helped ensure

5 These include the sudden removal of reimbursement of

travel expenses or health insurance as well as incurring
exorbitant “security costs” that were not previously agreed.
11

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Qatar’s successful bid have been suspended due corruption purposes. Moreover, ACTA receives
to corruption or complicity in Qatari bribery (RTE and helps verify complaints of corruption that
2015). concern ministries and public administrations in
Qatar.
Anti-corruption framework
The State Audit Bureau
Qatar ratified the UN Convention against (https://sab.gov.qa/en)
Corruption (UNCAC) in 2007, and, in 2010, Qatar
signed the Arab Convention to Fight Corruption. The State Audit Bureau functions as the supreme
As such, Qatar has formally committed to counter audit institution of Qatar. Originally founded in
bribery, money laundering, embezzlement, abuse 1973, it was strengthened in 2016 and is now
of office and other forms of corruption, such as more financially and politically independent than
obstruction of justice, and to establish specialised previously. Nonetheless, while the bureau stresses
institutions to enhance corruption prevention. its administrative independence, its current head,
Sheikh Bandar bin Mohammed Al Thani, was
In the years following Qatar’s accession into appointed by the emir and is a member of the Al
UNCAC, it has taken a number of steps to meet its Thani family. Moreover it rarely publishes findings
commitments, particularly through strengthening or audit reports (Khatib 2014). While it does not
its institutional anti-corruption framework. appear to lack capacity, in practice it is difficult to
find substantive evidence that it operates
Institutional anti-corruption framework independently of the ruling elite.

The Administrative Control and The Qatar Financial Information Unit

Transparency Authority (ACTA) (http://www.qfiu.gov.qa/)
(https://www.acta.gov.qa/) The Qatar Financial Information Unit is the
ACTA was founded by the emir in 2015. ACTA’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) of Qatar, mandated
mission is to advocate for integrity and to collect and analyse money laundering and/or
transparency across Qatar’s public institutions and terrorist financing transactions. It can issue
contribute to the prevention of corruption. It is directives and guidelines for financial institutions
mandated to develop and oversee the and charities and request information from relevant
implementation of Qatar’s national strategy for bodies. It works closely with law enforcement and
preventing corruption. As such, it is also prosecutors. Qatar’s FIU is a member of the
responsible for implementing the principles of Egmont Group and FATF.
UNCAC and other relevant conventions such as
the Arab Anti-Corruption Convention. The Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre
(https://www.rolacc.ch/)
ACTA can review and propose legislation and ROLACC is an international anti-corruption think
internal integrity systems in various public bodies tank with headquarters in Doha and Geneva.
across Qatar. It also undertakes a range of Originally founded in Qatar by Emir Tamim Bin
educational and capacity building activities for anti- Hamad Al Thani, ROLACC implements training

12

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
courses and conducts research on corruption Gulf Centre for Human Rights) are generally based
issues in cooperation with the University of outside of the Gulf region.
Sussex. It also helps various private sector
companies and state-owned enterprises to The right to organise for women, minorities, non-
implement anti-corruption systems. Islamic religious associations, labour unions and
other groups are heavily restricted (Freedom
ROLACC has been embroiled in significant House 2019). Freedom of expression is also
controversy due to highly irregular practices. The limited and residents, and citizens in Qatar face
most significant case is that of self-enrichment by penalties for expressing sensitive opinions in
the head of ROLACC, Mr Marri, who personally public spaces or on social media.
owns ROLACC’s office buildings in Geneva as well
as a series of luxury estates in Switzerland and Nonetheless, since the 2017 embargo, Qatari
France (Gulf News 2018). ROLACC also stands citizens have been observed as becoming more
accused of attempting to bribe individuals from engaged in political discussions and public debate
other anti-corruption agencies, including the head and is judged by Freedom House (2019) to have
of France’s FIU who declined luxury watches from become a bit more open.
ROLACC (Davies 2018).
Media
According to Petite (2017), ROLACC has largely
ignored corruption allegations levelled at Qatari The space for media to engage in critical discussion
officials, and critics have argued that it may be little and to expose corruption is heavily restricted in
more than a means for Qatar to whitewash its own Qatar. While no journalists have been killed in the
reputation. country in the last two decades (Committee to
Protect Journalists 2019), Qatar ranks 128 out of
Other stakeholders 180 countries on the 2019 Reporters Without
Borders’ Press Freedom Index. Qatar’s position on
Civil society the index has fallen in recent years, in particular due
to the controversial 2014 Cybercrimes Law that
Citizens and residents in Qatar enjoy limited civil criminalised news that is either “false” or could
liberties. Qatar is ranked “not free” by Freedom upset the “general order” (Freedom House 2019;
House (2019) with a score of 25/100. The Reporters Without Borders 2019).
government of Qatar does not allow the formation
of independent political parties, and in the State censorship is widely applied, and the state
municipal elections only independent individuals has, in the past, shut down media outlets.
are allowed to run (Freedom House 2019). There Reporting on the royal family remains risky and is
are no known Qatari human rights or anti- virtually never done (Reporters Without Border
corruption NGOs operating independently of the 2019). In 2016, Doha News, an English-speaking
state (Freedom House 2019). Organisations who news website, lost its permit to act as a news
advocate for increased rights in Qatar (such as the source (Freedom House 2019).

13

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
There are no fully independent media outlets
inside Qatar. Though Al Jazeera is privately
owned, it receives support from the Qatari
government and is subject to the same censorship
criteria as all other outlets (Freedom House 2019).
Indeed, while Al Jazeera continues to cover events
across the MENA region, it often ignores or
trivialises issues inside of Qatar (Reporters
Without Borders 2019).

14

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
References y-of-sussex-under-fire-for-masters-course-in-qatar-
on-corruption-3cc4d34f7e51
Al Jazeera. 2017. 'UN: We are not bound by Saudi
Arabia's 'terror list".' Freedom House. 2019. ‘Qatar’.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/bound- https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
saudi-arabia-terror-list-170609184543168.html world/2019/qatar

Al Shebabi, O. 2017. ‘Show Us the Money: Oil GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal. 2016.
Revenues, Undisclosed Allocations and ‘Qatar’.
Accountability in Budgets of the GCC States’, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-
London School of Economics Kuwait Programme profiles/qatar/
Paper Series: 44.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84521/1/show-us-the- Gartenstein-Ross, D. and Zelin, A. 2013.
money_V1.pdf ‘Uncharitable Organizations’. Foreign Policy, 25
February 2013.
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/25/uncharitable-
‘Qatar’. organizations/
https://www.bti-
project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/ Gibson, O. 2015. ‘Five Years after FIFA’s World
2018/pdf/BTI_2018_Qatar.pdf Cup Gift to Qatar that Set a Timebomb Ticking’,
The Guardian, 2 December 2015.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2019. ‘The https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2015/de
World Factbook: Qatar’. c/02/fifa-five-years-2018-2022-world-cup
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/qa.html Gray, M. 2018. ‘Theorising Politics, Patronage and
Corruption in the Arab Monarchies of the Gulf’, in
Committee to Protect Journalists. 2019. ‘Qatar’. Elvira, Schwarz and Weipert-Fenner (eds.)
https://cpj.org/mideast/qatar/ Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and
North Africa. London: Routledge
Conn, D. 2019. ‘Qatar to Abolish ‘Kafala’ Labour https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/978135116
Next January Before 2022 World Cup’. The 9240
Guardian, 16 October 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/oct/16/qat Gulf News. 2018. ‘The Mysterious Fortune of
ar-abolish-kafala-january-world-cup-2022 Qatar’s Anti-Corruption Chief’, Gulf News, 1 March
2018.
Crystal, J. 2016. ‘Tribes and Patronage Networks https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/the-
in Qatar’, in Rabi (eds), Tribes and States in a mysterious-fortune-of-qatars-anti-corruption-chief-
Changing Middle East. 1.2181390
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/a
cprof:oso/9780190264925.001.0001/acprof- Herb, M. and Lynch, M. 2019. ‘The Politics of
9780190264925-chapter-003 Rentier States in the Gulf’ in Hertog (eds), The
Politics of Rentier States in the Gulf, Middle East
Davies, J. 2018. University of Sussex Under Fire Political Science, George Washington University
for Masters Course in Qatar on Corruption. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101386/1/Hertog_what_wou
https://medium.com/@johndavies_63427/universit ld_the_saudi_economy_have_to_look_like_to_be_
post_rentier_published.pdf
15

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Laughland, O. 2017. ‘Fifa Official Took Bribes to
Ingle, S. 2019. ‘Fifa facing Urgent Calls to Back Qatar’s 2022 World Cup Bid, Court Hears’,
Investigate Qatar World Cup Bid Claims’, The The Guardian, 15 November 2017.
Guardian, 10 March 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/mar/10/ Meester, J. van den Berg, W. and Verhoeven H.
qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022-damian-collins 2018. Riyal Politik The Political Economy of Gulf
Investments in the Horn of Africa. Clingendael
International Budget Partnership. 2017a. Open Institute.
Budget Index 2017. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018
https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget- -04/riyal-politik.pdf
survey/open-budget-index-rankings/
MENAFATF. 2008. Qatar Mutual Evaluation
International Budget Partnership. 2017b. ‘Qatar’. Report.
https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp- http://www.fatf-
content/uploads/qatar-open-budget-survey-2017- gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%2
summary-english.pdf 0Qatar.pdf

James, P. 2015. ‘Corruption in the Middle East Mohamed, A. and Mohamad, M. 2011. The Effect
Management: Implications at a Qatar Construction of Wasta on Perceived Competence and Morality
Project’, Journal of Management Research, in Egypt.
vol.7(5). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2541893
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fe82/1f73fb242e9 67_The_effect_of_wasta_on_perceived_competen
15819a1634be82a4a74fb84e9.pdf ce_and_morality_in_Egypt

Kamrava. M. 2011. ‘Mediation and Qatari Foreign The Peninsula Qatar. 2019. ‘Qatar Issues New
Policy’, Middle East Journal, vol.64(4), pp. 539-556 Law to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41342739 Financing’, The Peninsula Qatar, 11 September
2019.
Kelly, A. McIntyre, N. and Pattison, P. 2019. https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/11/09/2019/Q
‘Revealed: Hundreds of Migrant Workers Dying of atar-issues-new-law-to-combat-money-laundering-
Heat Stress in Qatar Each Year’, The Guardian, 2 and-terrorism-financing
October 2019.
Petite, S. 2017. Le Qatar s’offre un prix contre la
Khatib, L. 2014. Corruption in Qatar? The Link corruption. Le Tempts, 8 December 2017.
between the Governance Regime and Anti- https://www.letemps.ch/monde/qatar-soffre-un-
Corruption Indicators. Carnegie Middle East prix-contre-corruption
Center.
https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/05/08/corruption-in- Reporters without Borders. 2019. ‘Qatar’.
qatar-link-between-governance-regime-and-anti- https://rsf.org/en/qatar
corruption-indicators-pub-55615
Reuters. 2017. ‘Qatar-linked People, Groups on
Kukutschka, R. 2018. Anti-corruption Strategies for Terror List’, Reuters, 9 June 2017.
Authoritarian States. U4 Helpdesk Answer 2018. https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/qatar-linked-
http://u4.no/publications/anti-corruption-strategies- people-groups-on-terror-list-1.2040686#
for-authoritarian-states.pdf

16

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Reuters. 2019a. ‘Qatar Takes Step Towards First https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/qatar/
Shura Council Election: QNA Agency’, Reuters, 31
October 2019. Times of Israel. 2019. ‘News site claims Mossad
head met Saudi, UAE, Egypt intel officials on Gulf
Reuters. 2019b. ‘Qatar Says New Anti-Money visit.’ https://www.timesofisrael.com/news-site-
Laundering Law Meets International Standards’. claims-mossad-head-met-saudi-uae-egypt-intel-
Reuters, 12 September 2019. officials-on-gulf-visit/

Roberts, D. 2019. Reflecting On Qatar’s “Islamist” Tok, M. Pal, L, and Alkhater, L. 2016. Policy-
Making in a Transformative State: The Case of
Soft Power. Brookings Institution.
Qatar. Palgrave McMillan.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-
content/uploads/2019/04/FP_20190703_qatar_rob 137-46639-6_1
erts.pdf
Transparency International. 2019. Middle East &
RTE. 2015. ‘FIFA Executive Committee 2010: North Africa: Corruption Continues As Institutions
Where Are They Now?’, RTE, 1 December 2015. and Political Rights Weaken.
https://www.rte.ie/sport/soccer/2015/1201/750480- https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/regiona
fifas-executive-committee-where-are-they-now/ l-analysis-MENA

Selmi, J. 2019. Despite Blockade, Opportunities UN News 2019. New Labour Laws in Qatar
are increasing for Qatar to Develop Broader Benefiting Migrant Workers a “Momentous Step
Regional Ties, Washington Institute Middle East Forward”, International Labour Organisation.
Center. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1049471
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/vie Wintour, P. 2017. ‘Qatar Given 10 Days to Meet 1
w/despite-blockade-opportunities-are-increasing- Sweeping Demands by Saudi Arabia’, The
for-qatar-to-develop-broader Guardian, 23 June 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/cl
Shideler, K., Froehlke, S. and Fischer, S. 2017. ose-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-
The Role of Select Non-Governmental demands-to-end-blockade
Organizations in Doha’s Support for Terrorism,
Centre for Security Policy. World Bank. 2019. ‘Worldwide Governance
https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp- Indicators’.
content/uploads/2017/09/NGO_Doha_Terror.pdf https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/R
eports
Shura Council 2019. ‘Advisory Council’.
https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/advisory-
council/

State of Qatar. 2015. Law No. 24 of 2015

Regulating Tenders and Auctions.
https://www.scribd.com/document/416394979/Law
-No-24-of-2015-Regulating-Tenders-and-Auctions

TI Security and Defence. 2019. ‘Government

Defence Integrity Index: Qatar’.

17

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk

Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 “Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answers provide practitioners around
the world with rapid on-demand briefings on corruption. Drawing
on publicly available information, the briefings present an
overview of a particular issue and do not necessarily reflect
Transparency International’s official position.”

Transparency International
International Secretariat
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin
Germany

Phone: +49 - 30 - 34 38 200

Fax: +49 - 30 - 34 70 39 12

[email protected]
www.transparency.org

blog.transparency.org
facebook.com/transparencyinternationa
l twitter.com/anticorruption

1
8

Transparency International chapters can use the Helpdesk free.

Transparency International Anti-Corruption Helpdesk
Email us at [email protected]
Qatar: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

This content downloaded from 122.176.198.25 on Thu, 21 Aug 2025 15:14:22 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms