A Level Politics Update Spring 2024 Issue 2 Magazine
A Level Politics Update Spring 2024 Issue 2 Magazine
update
Spring 2024 Issue 2
Contents:
UK POLITICS, 2019-2023: A CASE OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE CONGRESS: WHAT’S GONE WRONG?
THE SAFETY OF RWANDA BILL
THINKING ABOUT POLARITY
IDEOLOGICAL SCHISMS IN THE LABOUR PARTY
IDEOLOGICAL SCHISMS IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
THE HOUSE OF LORDS: A FLAWED INSTITUTION
CHANGING ALLEGIANCES: THE MPS WHO CROSS THE FLOOR
[Link]/politics
UK POLITICS 2019-23:
A CASE OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING?
by Andrew Mitchell
Edexcel Component 1 Democracy & Participation AQA 3.1 Democracy & Participation
‘Democracy’ can be quite a slippery political concept but, until relatively recently, most British
political commentators would have had no problem describing the UK as a democratic state
because it possessed the following features: free, fair and regular elections, universal suffrage,
electoral choice via a range of political parties, government accountability, high standards in
public life, pluralism within the media, pressure groups and individual rights.
Since 2019, however, there has been increasing concern that the UK has entered into a process of ‘democratic
backsliding’. In 2021, for example, the Democracy Index, produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),
ranked the UK in 18th place with a score of 8.1 (out of a possible 10) and noted that the country was ‘edging
closer to a flawed democracy classification’. Two years earlier, the EIU placed the UK in 14th position on a
score of 8.52. More recent reports, notably UK Democracy Under Strain (Unlock Democracy 2023) and The
Future of Democracy in the UK (The Constitution Unit 2023) have also concluded that UK democracy is not
functioning properly. Some of their main findings are discussed below.
Conclusion
Predictably, given the widespread evidence
of democratic backsliding since 2019, public
perceptions of the UK political system have
become more negative. For example, a YouGov
survey of over 4000 people, conducted in
September 2022, found that 52% were either
not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with
democracy in the UK (38% were either fairly
or very satisfied). In addition, some 66% felt
that the UK system of government could be
improved either ‘quite a lot’ or a ‘great deal’.
Only 27% considered that it ‘could not be
improved’ or ‘mainly’ worked well.
[Link]/politics 3
The least productive Congress...
US Secretary of State for Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas was impeached in January
2024 by the House of Representatives. This was the first time that a sitting Cabinet member
has been impeached, on charges that he “wilfully and systemically refused to comply with the
immigration laws, failed to control the border to the detriment of national security, compromised
public safety, and violated the rule of law and separation of powers in the Constitution”.
Whilst this might seem like a symbol of checks and balances in operation, it is a symptom of a
deep malaise that is affecting Congress right now. Mayorkas was the subject of a highly partisan
attack by Republican representatives. The irony is that the person responsible for bringing the
proceedings immediately signalled his intention to resign from Congress the following day – even
he is giving up on it! Republican Rep. Mark Green of Tennessee stated ‘This place is so broken’
and complained about the inability to get anything done.
He is not alone: 23 Democrats and 21
Republicans have announced their
intention to retire in the November
elections this year.
1
118th Congress to be most unproductive in modern history
([Link])
2
The (really) do-nothing Congress - POLITICO
3
5 Ways Republicans Have Made History in the Wrong Way in the
Last Year ([Link])
4
House makes history, removes McCarthy as Speaker | The Hill
[Link]/politics 5
4 Increased partisanship and an inability to and it has since gone up to the House. As I write, the new
‘cross the aisle’ Speaker Johnson is meeting with Trump most probably to
Aside from law making, Congress has been busy with discuss this bill. Johnson states he does not intend to bring
hyper-partisan projects which seem to be designed to the bill to the floor of the House.
disrupt their opposition. Currently, President Joe Biden is Inaction has consequences and the Biden administration
being investigated for a possible impeachment by the House blames Congress for the fall of Adviivka in Ukraine.
Oversight, Ways and Means and Judiciary committees. This
concerns the business dealings of Biden’s son, Hunter and 5 Unsuitable candidates had tarnished the reputation
was only initiated by former Speaker McCarthy as part of his of Congress further
attempts to keep his job. Concrete evidence against Joe For the first time in over 20 years a member of Congress
Biden seems to be slight – academics argue this is different was expelled. He was Republican representative George
from previous impeachment inquiries5. Additionally, this Santos of the 3rd congressional district in New York, whose
Congress has seen the most ‘censures’ of members of background was colourful to say the least and was accused
Congress since 1870 – each was a Democrat and it could of wire fraud, money laundering and identity fraud, having
be argued that these are partisan attacks made easier by lied in order to be elected in the first place8. He has pleaded
the rule changes negotiated by the House Freedom Caucus. not guilty to the charges against him.
Votes in Congress have also been highly partisan with party Americans have long had a dim view of members of
line voting being a pattern of behaviour. According to Congress, but such behaviour only intensifies the negative
ABC News, Democratic Senators voted with Biden 99% view. Pew Research Center notes how negatively the public
of the time in 20236. Whilst more established Senators perceive Congress – an astonishing 72% are unfavourable;
such as Susan Collins of Maine, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska with a decline in favourability since 2018. Only 38% now
and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina were willing to believe that representatives care about their constituents,
cross the aisle 50% of the time (Graham voted mostly to down from approximately 50%. Only 36% believe that their
support nominations, Murkowski and Collins supported representatives are doing a good job, down from 47% in
legislation) most Republican newcomers to the Senate were 20189.
less willing to do so, only voting with Biden 19% of the
Therefore, Congress can only hope for a more productive year.
time. This suggests a highly partisan environment.
Who knows, representatives may be stirred into action by the
Republican entrenchment and unwillingness to support a
prospect of an election to prove to their constituents that they
Democrat president has been fuelled by the outside
are worthy of their jobs!
influence of Trump. He has openly criticised those who
support Democrat measures and uses social media to
‘persuade’ GOP members not to do so. This has most
recently been seen with funding for Ukraine and Israel
alongside border security measures. The original bill
combined these measures, with surprisingly tough border
security policies. However, Trump opposed this and his
Republican supporters in Congress followed suit by blocking
the bill. Version 2 has separated them out – but a reason
that Republicans now oppose the Ukrainian/Israel funding
bill is that it does not include border security! The funding
bill passed in the Senate 70 votes to 29 (showing the
split in the Republican party over the issue of Ukraine)7
5
Impeachment inquiry into Joe Biden -
Wikipedia
6
How often every member of Congress voted
with Biden in 2023 - ABC News ([Link])
7
US national security bill: what’s in it for
Ukraine and Israel and will it pass? | US
national security | The Guardian
8
5 Ways Republicans Have Made History
in the Wrong Way in the Last Year
([Link])
9
What people think are the biggest problems
with Congress and other elected officials |
Pew Research Center
[Link]/politics 7
THE SAFETY OF RWANDA BILL: PARLIAMENTARY
SOVEREIGNTY OR ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP?
by Moyra Grant
Edexcel Component 2: 1 Constitution & 4 Relations Between Branches
AQA 3.1 Nature & Sources of the British Constitution, The Structure & Role of Parliament & The Judiciary
The chronicle of the UK government’s Rwanda policy began in April 2022 when Prime Minister
Boris Johnson and Home Secretary Priti Patel launched their plan to send asylum seekers
permanently to Rwanda (whether or not their asylum claims were ultimately found to be valid).
The government was trying to address rising levels of ‘irregular’ small-boat arrivals into the UK,
the rising costs of accommodating them, and rising hostility to them among some voters.
The UK signed an agreement with Rwanda - but it right to a fair hearing before a court - as well as
was merely a ‘memorandum of understanding’ rather other domestic and international laws, including the
than a legal treaty and it did not require parliamentary Refugee Convention and the UN’s ban on torture. This,
legislation, which displeased many MPs and peers. the government hopes, would almost entirely preclude
In June 2022, the government’s first attempt to potential court challenges to the government’s
deport asylum seekers to Rwanda was blocked by an Rwanda policy.
urgent interim injunction from the European Court of
For some MPs on the Conservative right, however, the
Human Rights (ECHR), to allow time for the UK courts
bill is still too weak. Robert Jenrick resigned his post
to consider the issues. In November 2023, the UK
as immigration minister, saying that the bill “does
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Rwanda
not go far enough”. He, Suella Braverman and others
scheme was unlawful, partly because of Rwanda’s
fear further challenges from the ECHR and want
own questionable human rights record and also
to leave it altogether - but Rwanda itself opposed
because asylum seekers who were sent to Rwanda
that. In the end, though, only 11 Conservative critics
ran a high risk of being returned to their home country
(including Jenrick and Braverman) voted against
with its attendant dangers (a process known as
the bill on third reading in January 2024. The small
‘refoulement’). size of the rebellion highlighted the strength of the
In December 2023, the government signed a formal executive’s power and influence over its own MPs in
treaty with Rwanda - containing safeguards such as the Commons.
blocking refoulement - and introduced ‘emergency
So are the courts really the main threat to the
legislation’ to ratify it in the form of the Safety of
sovereignty of Parliament - or is it the control which
Rwanda Bill “to make the will of Parliament absolutely
a ‘majority’ government can usually exert over the
clear to the courts”. The bill compels all decision-
legislature from within?
makers, including judges, to treat Rwanda as a
safe country for deportations; clause 2 states that
“Every decision-maker must conclusively treat the
Republic of Rwanda as a safe country”. So Rwanda
would be ‘safe’ simply because Parliament says so.
As Thomas Cromwell is reputed to have said in the
sixteenth century, parliamentary sovereignty “could
turn man into woman”. The bill also gives ministers
the powers to disregard sections of the Human Rights
Act - including the right not to be tortured and the
[Link]/politics 9
THINKING ABOUT POLARITY
What is the emerging structure of the international system,
and why does it matter? by Ollie Riley
Edexcel Component 3b: 4.3 Polarity
Between 1989 and 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought
the international system to what Charles Krauthammer famously termed the ‘unipolar moment’.
The United States was the sole superpower and would, for a time, be free from the usual
constraints of great power politics. As President George H.W. Bush and his National Security
Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, reflected in their book A World Transformed (1998):
‘We were suddenly in a unique position, without experience, without
precedent, and standing alone at the height of power. It was, it is, an
unparalleled situation in history, one which presents us with the rarest
opportunity to shape the world and the deepest responsibility to do so
wisely for the benefit of not just the United States but all nations.’1
Since then, however, international politics has arguably undergone another transformation away from unipolarity and
toward a different structure. The nature of the emergent international order is a matter of intense debate among
international relations scholars.
Polarity refers to how power is distributed in the international system. Some argue that we are moving toward a
multipolar world (one with three or more great powers). Others contend that China’s rise and the increasing security
competition between the PRC and the United States suggest a bipolar structure (a system with two great powers vying
for hegemony). Finally, some scholars argue the international system is still unipolar because the United States’ hard
power capabilities continue to outstrip those of its nearest rivals.
This article has two main aims: the first is to explore the debate about the current nature of the international
system, including the theoretical and empirical claims underpinning each argument;
the second is to explain why the polarity question is important by examining
how the distribution of power affects the likelihood of conflict.
[Link]/politics 11
In contrast to realists, liberal scholars (sometimes called Back to bipolarity?
liberal institutionalists) focus on how power is exercised Despite the growth of emerging powers and regional
through and within international institutions. For liberals, institutions, it can be argued that the international system
in a world characterised by interdependence, even the only has two great powers: the United States and China.
most powerful countries cannot solve collective action The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy suggests that
problems on their own; thus, the cooperative mechanisms this is the view held in Washington, declaring that China
provided by international institutions are a crucial part of is ‘the only competitor with both the intent to reshape
any discussion of where power lies. the international order and, increasingly, the economic,
It is for this reason that scholars such as Anne Marie diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.’11
Slaughter argue that the European Union should count As evidence that the world is bipolar, one could highlight
as a major power.10 The EU leads on norms relating to the gap between the U.S., China and the next competitors.
climate and the regulation of big technology firms; the China spends more on defence than Russia, India and
Euro is now the world’s second-largest reserve currency Saudi Arabia combined, and its GDP is over double the
behind the U.S. dollar and the political unity provided combined total of its fellow BRICS members (Brazil,
by the European Union arguably makes it a stabilising Russia, India and South Africa).12 Taken together, the
force in a continent that has historically been savaged by United States and China account for around 35% of
inter-state conflict. Believing that regional institutions like global GDP and 53% of global military spending.
the EU might count as poles in the international system
reflects a more nuanced understanding of power as What might a bipolar system with the United States and
comprising “soft” elements that realists typically ignore. China as the two dominant states mean for the prospect
of war and peace? Realists such as Cliff Kupchan have
Liberals might point to the growth of other international argued that the emerging international order resembles
institutions as evidence of multipolarity. For example, that of the Cold War; the United States and China are
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank - founded in engaging in an intense security competition, but the
2016 with its headquarters in Beijing - challenges the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation will deter both sides
dominance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from provoking conflict with one another.13 Similarly,
the World Bank in global economic governance. The John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz both argued that
Association for South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) also bipolar international systems are the least war-prone
has an increasingly important role in managing geopolitical because achieving mutual deterrence is easier and the
tensions in Asia and fostering deeper economic integration, chances of miscalculation are fewer in a world with only
as does the African Union in its continent. two great powers.14
If the international system is becoming multipolar, what However, other realists have suggested that a U.S.-China
might this mean for the prospect of peace and war in rivalry carries a huge risk of direct conflict. For example,
international politics? Most realists believe that multipolar Graham Alison of Harvard University coined the term
systems are the most war-prone because the greater the “Thucydides Trap” to describe the historical tendency for
number of great powers, the more opportunities there new great powers and existing hegemons to become
are for one state to feel threatened by the capabilities extremely suspicious of each other’s intentions and
of its rivals. In other words, security dilemmas between eventually engage in war.15 The increasing animosity
states are more common in a multipolar system. For between China and the U.S. over numerous issues
liberals, the stability or instability of a multipolar system (notably Taiwan, freedom of navigation, trade and human
is indeterminate; much depends on the level of economic rights) suggests the past may have worrying prescience
interdependence between states and the effectiveness of for the U.S.-China relationship.
international institutions in mitigating security competition
and fostering cooperation instead.
Still unipolar?
Finally, there is a small number of academics who argue that
the international system is still unipolar, with the United States
as the hegemon. The most prominent scholars espousing this
view are Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth of Dartmouth College.
Brooks and Wohlforth are realists who are sceptical about the narrative
of U.S. decline, pointing out how the U.S. is still in a pre-eminent
position militarily and economically.17 For example, they note how
American military spending is still higher than the next ten countries
combined and U.S. defence spending as a percentage of the total
global spend has only fallen slightly from around 46% in 1990 to 40%
in 2020.18 In the economic realm, where the United States and China
are more closely matched, they claim the U.S. is still in a dominant
position given its advantage in high-tech sectors.
[Link]/politics 13
Brooks and Wohlforth also claim that states are not successfully balancing against the U.S., which would be the case
if it were a multipolar or bipolar system. Instead, they note how ‘almost all the world’s real alliances bind smaller
states to Washington’. For example, whilst China still only has one official security ally (North Korea), the United States
is extending its alliance commitments. The ever-presence of NATO, the start of the AUKUS nuclear security partnership
with Australia and the UK, and the deepening security ties the U.S. is forging in Asia with the likes of Japan, South Korea
and Vietnam are evidence of this.
However, the unipolar argument rests on the view that multipolarity or bipolarity requires great powers in the international
system to have roughly equal capabilities. Most commentators agree that this definition is too demanding. To be
considered a ‘pole’, a great power must have the ability to exert significant influence on geopolitics in key regions -
matching the material capabilities of the strongest state is not necessary to do this.
Summary
The international system we inhabit in 2024 is undoubtedly
very different to the one that emerged at the end of the
Cold War. The U.S. no longer stands alone at the height of
power, but there is still disagreement about the kind of order
that is emerging. Much of the debate revolves around
theoretical disagreement over what it means to exercise
“power” in international politics. Liberals are willing to focus
on the “soft” elements of power exercised within international
institutions, whilst realists confine their analysis to nation-
states’ military and economic capabilities. However, even
though realists derive their conclusions about the distribution
of power from ostensibly objective data, they can’t agree on
the polarity question because there isn’t a clear definition
of what it means to be a great power. The implications of
changing polarity on the likelihood of war are also up for
debate. Ultimately, what may matter more for the prospect
of peace is not the distribution of power between states but
the quality of their relations – whether states characterise
each other as enemies to be competed against or partners
whose cooperation is needed to solve the pressing problems
of the world.
5
Stockholm International Peace 7
[Link] 8
Mearsheimer, J. (2014). Why the 9
Department of Defense (2018).
Research Institute (SIPRI) (2023). datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: National Defense Strategy of the
Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament ADVEC/WEOWORLD The Liberal Delusions That Provoked United States of America.
and International Security. Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77-89.
0
Slaughter, A. (2023). The Long United States National Security
11
International Monetary Fund (2024).
12
Kupchan, C. (2022). Bipolarity is
13
Unipolar Moment? Debating American Strategy 2022. GDP Based on PPP, share of world. Back: Why It Matters.
Dominance. Foreign Affairs, 102(6),
163-166.
14
Mearsheimer, J. (1990). Back to 15
Allison, G. (2015). The Thucydides Office of the United States Trade
16 17
Brooks, S.G. & Wohlforth, W.C.
the Future: Instability in Europe After Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed Representative (2022). China Trade (2023). The Myth of Multipolarity:
the Cold War. International Security, for War? The Atlantic. September 24. and Investment Summary. American Power’s Staying Power.
15(1), 5-56. Foreign Affairs, 102 (3), 73-91.
[Link]/politics 15
IDEOLOGICAL SCHISMS IN THE LABOUR
PARTY by Moyra Grant
Edexcel Component 1: 2.2. Established Political Parties AQA 3.1 Political Parties & 3.3 Socialism
Starmer has moved against the left of his party, removing the party whip from Corbyn and barring him
from standing as a Labour candidate at the next election over accusations of antisemitism. Other left-
wing candidates have also been barred; and Labour frontbenchers were forbidden from joining public
service strikers on the picket lines in 2023, angering many trade union allies. Former Blair adviser Pat
McFadden is now shadow Cabinet Office minister and national campaign coordinator, crucial roles
ahead of this year’s general election.
[Link]/politics 17
Current policy divisions
Economy
Labour’s 2019 manifesto pledged to nationalise energy, water, railways, Royal Mail and other key industries. The
party now plans to renationalise only the railways. It also plans to replace the National Minimum Wage with a
‘genuine living wage’ that takes into account the real cost of living. It is still committed to scrapping ‘non-dom’
tax status - which pleases all wings of the party by addressing a perceived injustice and also bringing in more
tax revenue. Labour also promises to offer all workers basic employment rights regardless of their employment
status, to end ‘fire and rehire’ practices, ban the use of zero-hour contracts and boost collective bargaining rights.
However, at a 2024 conference packed with business leaders, Starmer said, “We are the party of business”.
Welfare
In addition to the U-turns outlined above, the party is now arguing for more, rather than less, private provision in
the NHS. Also, the 2019 manifesto promised to freeze the state pension age at 66; the party under Starmer has not
reaffirmed this position.
Foreign Affairs
Left-wing MPs are largely pro-Palestinian, whereas the leadership backs UK/US government support for Israel
over the 2023 Hamas attacks and has angered some MPs by refusing to call for a ceasefire. One Labour MP had
the whip removed for saying Gaza should be remembered as a genocide on Holocaust Memorial Day; another had
to apologise for saying that PM Sunak had “the blood of thousands of innocent people on his hands” over Gaza.
Labour had already been losing significant support from formerly loyal British Muslim voters due to its perceived
inaction on Islamophobia. That said, attitudes towards Israel are now hardening on all sides over the scale of
deaths and hardship in Gaza.
Conclusion
The Labour leadership is keenly aware that many voters
mistrust it on fiscal responsibility, and they also remember
leader Neil Kinnock’s misplaced hubris on the eve of the
1992 election; hence Shadow Chancellor Rachel Reeve’s
iron discipline on spending pledges and Starmer’s repeated
exhortations to his MPs to avoid any complacency about the
forthcoming election.
The strategy seems to be working: the polls have put Labour
ahead by about 20% for over a year, and the party has had
huge by-election wins in several former Conservative safe
seats. Even many over-65s - traditionally solid Conservative
voters - are drifting towards Labour. Former Tory donors,
such as millionaire entrepreneur Richard Walker and property
tycoon Nick Candy, are now backing Labour. The party’s shift
to the right under Starmer has infuriated his left wing, but he
sees that as the acceptable price of electoral success.
Traditional Conservatives
The Conservative Party used to do just what it said on the tin: it sought to conserve traditional institutions, property
ownership, ways of life and the ‘natural’ organic hierarchy in society, on the grounds that - as Michael Oakeshott has
said - humans need familiarity, not risky forays into the unknown.
One-Nation Conservatives
One-nation conservatism is the largely pragmatic response of traditional conservatism (since the late nineteenth
century) to threats of social instability when inequality in society becomes too great and creates what PM Benjamin
Disraeli described as “two nations”. It is a form of paternalist, benevolent welfarism (whether from church, charity or
state). As Disraeli put it, “When the cottages are happy, the castle is safe”. This strand was prominent in the post-war
1950s-1970s era of ‘consensus politics’ when the Conservative Party pragmatically accepted the Keynesian mixed
economy, Labour’s nationalisations, welfare reforms and the new NHS. The One Nation group in the party today is
probably the largest faction, with over 100 MPs, but it is usually less vocal and vigorous than the many, smaller New
Right factions.
New Right neo-conservatives
The rise of the New Right since the 1980s has divided conservative thought. Neo-conservatism is - like traditional
conservatism - organic, mistrustful of human nature and keen to maintain the sovereignty and stability of the state
and society. However, its response to possible social unrest is not paternalist but authoritarian. This entails punitive
law and order, combative foreign policy (e.g. Thatcher in the Falklands conflict), Euroscepticism and unease about
multiculturalism. These MPs have been most enthusiastic about Brexit, and they often also want to leave the ECHR.
As strong advocates of ‘traditional Victorian family values’, they opposed PM Cameron’s socially liberal reforms,
notably the legalisation of gay marriage. Current Tory leadership frontrunner Kemi Badenoch - described by the BBC
as the “anti-woke darling of the right” - is a supporter of the UK’s ‘hard’ Brexit; and she opposes the net zero target,
identity politics and gender-neutral toilets. Although she denies manoeuvring against Sunak behind the scenes, she
is a member of a WhatsApp group of fellow MPs called ‘Evil Plotters’.
New Right neo-liberals
Again, the clue is in the name. All the above strands of thought view society as a collective organic entity, but
neo-liberalism derives from classical laissez-faire liberalism and sees society as an individualist ladder of
competitive economic meritocracy. It favours privatisation and deregulation, low taxation, low public
spending and low welfare, with market competition in health and education sectors. At the
launch in 2024 of a new, neo-liberal party faction called Popular Conservatives
(PopCon), MP Jacob Rees-Mogg said - wrongly -
“What underpins every view of every Conservative is
that we put the individual first, not the collective”.
[Link]/politics 19
Another key member, MP Liz Truss, called her government’s plan to ban disposable vapes “profoundly unconservative...
an extension of the nanny state”. Neo-liberalism coexists with neo-conservatism to create the New Right paradox
of the ‘free economy, strong state’.
Sunak’s Conservative Party
Rishi Sunak became leader in 2022 after a period of party turmoil following the Brexit referendum, and was the fifth
consecutive Conservative PM in six years. Despite an apparently comfortable parliamentary majority, he has struggled
to keep his party united, and it has been falling in the polls.
Policy U-turns
Sunak has made numerous policy U-turns - including more than one on his net zero targets - largely to appease the
warring factions of backbench MPs, especially those on the right:
• Delayed the ban on new fossil-fuelled cars and boilers until 2035.
• Dropped plans to fine landlords who fail to upgrade their properties to energy efficiency standards.
• Scrapped the northern leg of high speed rail link HS2.
• Abandoned the 2019 manifesto promise of no increases to any main taxes; this Parliament has overseen the
highest tax burden in 70 years.
• Ditched the promise of mandatory house-building targets.
• Ditched the ban on onshore wind turbines.
• Ditched the ‘Brexit bonfire’ promise to review or scrap all 2,400 EU laws in the UK.
• Dropped the promise to ban ‘conversion therapy’ (which seeks to change a person’s sexual orientation).
• Reduced the earnings threshold for British citizens to bring foreign dependents to live in the UK.
This last one will help to keep skilled workers in the UK but has angered right-wing neo-conservative factions such as
the New Conservatives and the Common Sense Group. All these policy shifts have prompted Keir Starmer to call him
‘the blancmange Prime Minister’.
Immigration
Neo-conservatives, in particular, want big cuts in both legal and illegal immigration, despite its many
economic benefits from a neo-liberal perspective. Sunak has therefore vigorously pursued Johnson’s plan
for the permanent deportation of asylum seekers to Rwanda, and he (unsuccessfully) made “stop the boats”
one of his five key policy pledges for 2023. Some one-nation Conservatives have criticised the lack of
compassion implied by this policy, which has further divided the party.
Foreign Affairs
For most Conservatives, there is no going back on the UK’s ‘hard’ Brexit, and the government has been seeking
new trade deals around the world. They have strongly backed Ukraine against the Russian invasion - though
its costs are a concern to neo-liberals. They strongly backed Israel after the Hamas incursions in 2023, but are
increasingly anxious about Israel’s strategy of attack in Gaza. They are awaiting the outcome of the US presidential
election in November 2024, albeit with growing concerns about both Biden and Trump.
Conclusion
PM Sunak’s personal popularity has fallen, from a high as Chancellor
‘dishy Rishi’ during the 2020-21 giveaway Covid furlough scheme,
to a low of -40% in 2024. Many MPs on the right are blaming him
personally for the party’s consistently low polling, and some are
quietly contemplating whether to replace him even before the general
election. At the time of writing, 60 Conservative MPs have declared
that they will be standing down at the next election. There are
predictions that, if the Conservatives lose the election, the party will
move further to the right. Party unity seems a distant prospect.
[Link]/politics 21
The House of Lords
A FLAWED
INSTITUTION?
by Andrew Mitchell
Edexcel Component 2: 2 Parliament
AQA 3.1 The Structure & Role of Parliament
[Link]/politics 23
The House of Lords is not representative:
2 geographical imbalance
One often overlooked feature of the upper chamber is that it is geographically unrepresentative of the UK as a whole.
A survey of the Lords, conducted in 2022, found that over half (55%) of the peers with identifiable places of residence
are based in London, the south-east and the eastern counties. In stark contrast, barely 6% of peers live in the Midlands.
At the time of the survey, some 250 peers had not divulged their place of residence. This regional imbalance in the
composition of the House of Lords has left many parts of the UK significantly underrepresented. To redress this, critics
have called for the Lords to be replaced with a territorial second chamber which better reflects the nations and regions
of the UK.
The House of Lords is not representative:
3 ‘pale, male and stale’
Critics also argue that the House of Lords is unrepresentative because it is socially skewed towards particular groups
in the UK. Older white males predominate. At present, the average age of a peer is 71 and, as a 2020 investigation
revealed, some 451 members of the upper chamber were in their 70s, 80s or 90s, whereas just 30 peers were under
50. Furthermore, women are underrepresented in the Lords relative to UK society in general since over 7 out of 10
members of the upper chamber are male. Similarly, there are only 55 peers (6.6%) with an ethnic minority background
even though the 2021 Census indicates that 18% of the UK population falls into this category. Many have argued that
a reformed upper house, elected by Single Transferable Vote, would address the geographical and social imbalances
evident in the Lords.
The House of Lords and the problem of patronage
Finally, opponents maintain that the Prime Minister in particular, and, to a lesser extent, the other party leaders, are
able to reward political loyalists with life peerages through the honours system. Presently, some 29% of peers were
politicians before being elevated to the Lords (most of these are former MPs) and 8% of upper chamber members
were previously political staff or held senior party positions. Numerous party donors have also been given life peerages.
The Electoral Reform Society argues that this form of patronage is problematic because it treats membership of the
House of Lords as a political ‘pay off’ and lacks any form of democratic oversight. The appointment of very young life
peers (such as Carmen Smith and Charlotte Owen) in recent honours lists, for example, raises the prospect that they
will be able to legislate for 50-60 years in the Lords without any public accountability for their decisions.
Conclusion
Although the perceived deficiencies of the House of Lords
are widely acknowledged, in recent decades reform of the
upper chamber has made little headway. There are two
fundamental reasons for this lack of progress. First, many
Conservative MPs and peers oppose reform of the Lords on
the grounds of tradition and argue that it fulfils its role as a
revising and scrutinizing body effectively. Second, there is
little consensus among those who wish to replace the
House of Lords. Some reformers champion a fully appointed
chamber, others propose an elected body and a third group
prefer a partly-appointed, partly-elected upper house. In
2000, Tony Blair called for an upper chamber ‘more
representative of our diverse society’ – this is still some
way off.
[Link]/politics 25
CHANGING ALLEGIANCES:
MPS WHO ‘CROSS THE FLOOR’
Edexcel Component 2: 2 Parliament AQA 3.1 The Structure & Role of Parliament
by Andrew Mitchell
On March 11, 2024, amid a blaze of media publicity, Lee Anderson, the MP for Ashfield and
former Tory deputy party chairman, switched from the Conservatives to Reform UK. In so
doing, Anderson became the 38th MP since the 2019 general election to change their party
affiliation and thus ‘cross the floor’ of the Commons. This high-profile defection illustrates
an interesting, if relatively uncommon, aspect of MPs’ behaviour.
How do MPs switch political parties? How often do MPs change allegiance?
The UK political system permits MPs to switch their party Since 1979, 200 MPs have changed their political
allegiance whenever they like, as long as the leadership affiliations in the Commons, either by resigning from the
of their new preferred party will accept them. MPs who do party (43%) or having the whip withdrawn (56%). This
this are said to ‘cross the floor’ because they usually move feature has been particularly marked during periods of
from the government to the opposition benches (or vice heightened political division in parliament, such as the
versa) in the Commons. However, they remain the chosen early Thatcher era (1979 – 83) when 31 MPs switched
representative of their constituency because, under the their party allegiances and the immediate post-Brexit
first-past-the-post system, individual MPs, not parties, years (2017 – 19) during which there were 60 instances
are elected to parliament. of shifting affiliations in the Commons. In February 2019,
three Conservative and eight Labour MPs (including Anna
Why do MPs change their political affiliation? Soubry, Heidi Allen, Chuka Umunna and Chris Leslie)
MPs ‘cross the floor’ for a variety of reasons, including defected to form Change UK, a short-lived centrist pro-EU
disenchantment with the political direction of their party, political party. Seven months later, Boris Johnson’s
having the party whip withdrawn, a growing affinity with government withdrew the whip from 21 Conservative
another party and personal ambition. In 2022, for example, MPs (including Kenneth Clarke, David Gauke, Justine
Christian Wakeford, the Conservative MP for Bury South, Greening, Caroline Nokes, Dominic Grieve and Rory
switched to Labour because of a growing disillusionment Stewart) for voting to delay the UK’s official departure
with Boris Johnson’s leadership of the Tory government. date from the EU. A parliament-by-parliament breakdown
Lee Anderson’s recent decision to jump ship to reform is given below based on figures provided by the House
came after he had lost the Conservative whip in February of Commons Library.
2024 for making remarks which were widely condemned
as Islamophobic. If a member loses the party whip or is
suspended from the parliamentary party, they can also sit
as an independent MP. Jeremy Corbyn and Diane Abbott,
for example, who lost the Labour whip in 2020 and 2023
respectively, have chosen this option.
Conclusion
Some MPs who switch allegiances go on to enjoy an
extended parliamentary career. The most notable recent
example is Alan Howarth, a Conservative MP and Tory
minister, who switched to Labour in 1995. He was
re-elected as a Labour MP in 1997 and subsequently
served as a minister under Tony Blair. More often though,
MPs who change their political affiliations tend to stand
down or lose their seats at the next election, as happened
to the founders of Change UK in 2019.
[Link]/politics 27
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