Operational Definitions

Author(s): Robert H. Ennis

Source: American Educational Research Journal , May, 1964, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May, 1964),
pp. 183-201
Published by: American Educational Research Association

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS*

ROBERT H. ENNIS

Cornell University

INTRODUCTION

On all sides we are warned that our results depend on the ins
and procedures used, and we are admonished to define our t
manner that takes account of these instruments and procedur
this admonition specifies that the definition should be operati
we want to express our conclusions in terms that are not limi
particular instruments and procedures. That sets my prob
can we give operational definitions without unduly restricting
ing of the terms in which we state our conclusions?
In this paper I shall examine various forms that operatio
nitions might take and shall develop and defend a set of g
making these definitions. These guides will enable us to co
abstract terms to our instruments and procedures without com
limiting the meaning of the terms to these instruments and pr

THE SPIRIT OF OPERATIONISM

An early expression of what has come to be called "opera

is found in P. W. Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics:
cept of length involves as much as and nothing more than
operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean
concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is
mous with the corresponding set of operations" (Bridgman, 19
Although Bridgman, who is regarded as the father of operation
too far in this statement, the focus on instruments and procedur
is the essence of operationism, comes through clearly. This focu
viewed as one of the empiricist and pragmatic trends of recen
as A. C. Benjamin has shown in his interesting summary and a
of Bridgman's ideas and their development under criticism (Be
1955).

* The preparation of this paper was supported through the Cooperative

Program of the Office of Education, United States Department of Heal
tion, and Welfare. An earlier version was presented to the Philosophy o
Society in San Francisco on April 8, 1963. I have profited from the cri
Professors H. Broudy, H. Burns, J. Canfield, D. B. Gowin, J. Millman, F
N. Champlin, and a number of my students at Cornell University.
183

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 184 ROBERT H. ENNIS

As a thesis, the spirit of oper

There is an important relationsh
instruments and procedures th
applies to a particular situation a

FORMS IN WHICH THIS SPIRIT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED

In the literature on operationism one finds four basic approaches to

operational definitions: 1) giving examples; 2) giving a set of operations
as the meaning of a concept; 3) equating a phrase or sentence containing
the term in question with a phrase or sentence about a combination of
operations and observations; and 4) providing implication relationships
among operations, observations, and the concept in question. The pro-
posed guides fit under the fourth approach, the description of which has
been vague because of the several variations possible.
Since the defense of these guides rests heavily on showing the diffi-
culties of the first three approaches, difficulties that are avoided if one
follows the guides, we must look carefully at all four approaches.

1. Giving Examples
Although Bridgman had something more rigorous in mind, the use of
examples of abstract concepts sometimes indicates the instruments and
procedures involved when using the concepts and, at an unsophisticated
level, does provide an empirical interpretation. G. A. Lundberg, the
sociologist, indicates endorsement of the example approach in the following
statement: "The simplest form of an operational definition of a word
is to point to its referent while enunciating the word. Thus we define the
word 'cat' to a child by pointing to a certain kind of animal or a succession
of animals denoted by the word in our language" (Lundberg, 1942a; p.
730).
Examples are very useful in clarifying terms because they connect
them to the concrete world-concreteness is one of the virtues of opera-
tional definitions. But in giving an example, one does not necessarily
specify a manipulation by an investigator, and thus exemplification misses
some of the spirit of operationism. The "cat" example above does not
specify a manipulation by an investigator; instead it specifies particular
cats.

Nevertheless, it would not be a serious error to treat examples as

operational definitions-provided that we have distinct names for what
would then be two different kinds of operational definitions. Obvious,
though rather wordy, names are "example-type operational definitions"
and "manipulative operational definitions." For verbal economy I prefer
to mark the distinction with the terms "example" and "operational defi-
nition," both of which have established usages. Accordingly, examples
would not be operational definitions.

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 185

2. Giving a Set of Operations as the M

(Form: Concept = Operations

This approach is suggested by a strict

statement quoted earlier. According to t
of operations, such as putting down a rul
counting the number of times this is done.
not a property of the thing you do it to
out; it means what you do when finding ou
If we apply this approach strictly to a
science research, IQ might mean admini
ing the California Test of Mental Matur
CTMM). An IQ would not then be a qu
would mean what you had done to him.
Another feature of this approach is tha
length (IQ, etc.) as there are ways of me
man, the concept length in length of a city
length in length of a large piece of land
for determining the first and measuring
second, because the sets of operations ar
14). Similarly, there would be as many c
for IQ and ways of administering the
a set of operations, different operations
man says, "If we have more than one se
than one concept, and strictly there sho
respond to each different set of operati
Thus, there are these two distinguishin
approach to operationism: (a) the meanin
operations, and (b) different operations i
criticize each feature.

(a) To treat the meaning of a concept (or term) as limited to set of

operations seems odd, to say the least. When I say that the length of a
bench is five feet, I intend to be talking about the bench-not about what
I did. When I say that Johnny has a low IQ, I intend to be talking about
Johnny-not about what I did. If one interprets Bridgman's original
formula strictly, there seems no way to include the observations that one
makes, observations that reveal the qualities measured. One cannot talk
about the things measured; one can talk only about what the experimenter
does-not about what he perceives.
It may be held that this reading of Bridgman's statements is unfair-
that he did not mean them as I have presented them. Perhaps so. I do not
see how anyone could really mean them that way although some soci-

"* To simplify the presentation, I have not given the form, edition, or level of the
tests discussed.

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186 ROBERT H. ENNIS

ologists and psychologists may

amination of The Logic of Mod
scientists reveals that it is hard
ever, my purpose here is not
vantages and disadvantages of
spirit. Strictly interpreted, thi
neglects the results one gets after
(b) There is no doubt that peop
Modern Physics and most social
ject) have taken seriously the
to operationism (that different
there has been considerable disp
thoroughly here because to do
the nature and content of scien
literature. I shall only commen
These comments are carefully
tribute substantially to refutin
to operationism.
The first point to clarify is ho
different. Is my administration
April 6, 1964, in Fall Creek Scho
istration of the CTMM at 10:00
Sherman School? The only diff
istration. To my knowledge, n
otherwise, has been provided b
operation. This is a significant w
tionsrequire different concepts. W
respects different, the operation
Let us, however, assume that
quire a judgment of different
measuring sticks and that of m
be different operations, as wou
Lorge-Thorndike Intelligence T
mometer, the alcohol thermome
be three different operations.
But why should there be two c
and three concepts of temperat
tions mentioned in the previo
length and two ways of measur
of estimating it? One concept o
mining it?
Let us consider the concept te
said about length, but these thin
"* For examples, see Lundberg (1
(1951, p. 11).

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 187

What would be the consequences of having t

say M-temperature for the mercury therm
alcohol thermometer, and R-temperature fo
Since there are many more ways of measur
of course, have to be many more concepts.
One difficulty is that people would misun
this view since people think of tempera
measured in various ways. But this is not
might stipulate three senses for the word
qualities highly correlated with one anothe
should be distinguished for scientists and
This is a plausible answer; scientists are no
their research.
A second difficulty, however, is that physics itself would become im-
mensely more complicated. The law of thermal expansion would become
three laws, one for each concept. (And since there are many more ways of
measuring temperature, there would have to be many more laws, where
previously we managed with only one.) Furthermore, the law based on
M-temperature would extend over a different range from that of the law
based on R-temperature since the two thermometers have different
ranges. Not only convenience would be sacrificed, but also simplicity and
elegance.
The attempt to explain differences in temperature would run into
difficulty. The model provided by the kinetic theory of heat explains them
by means of differences in the mean kinetic energy of molecules. There
is just this one phenomenon, the mean kinetic energy of molecules, to
explain differences in temperature. Minor aberrations and inconsistencies
between instruments at extreme points have auxilary explanations, but
the fact remains that there is one underlying phenomenon associated with
temperature in physical theory, which implies that temperature is just
one thing. (This discussion assumes ordinary contexts; later on, we shall
consider a special context with somewhat different results.)
Of course, we could conceivably elevate what I have called "auxiliary
explanations" to the status of central explanations, in which case we
could have a different central explanation for the phenomenon associated
with each instrument, but to do so would be inconvenient. The simplest ex-
planation, and the one that suffices in most cases, is the one that refers
only to the mean kinetic energy of the molecules.
What about fruitfulness-the ability of theory to generate new pre-
dictions and to suggest new ways of looking at other fields? It is difficult
to see how the complex structure that is implicit in the requirement that
different operations imply different concepts could be a provoker of new
ideas or an aid to seeing new applications; it would be so hard to see the
structure as a whole, to see it intuitively.
While there is ordinarily only one concept of temperature functioning

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188 ROBERT H. ENNIS

within our normal range of ex

in extreme situations. When we
cessively farther from the earth
for different concepts because
ferent readings at the same po
coldness out in space calls for
The reading on a thermometer
exposed to radiant heat and, if
eter is aimed. This is someth
whether a thermometer is in t
so to speak, a concept, shade-
radiant-temperature. A therm
would indicate shade-temperatu
fully reflects radiant energy).
at one end (thus admitting ra
indicate directional-radiant-tem
tain as we leave the earth, it be
temperature since different op
radically different and since ou
ness, is radically affected by radi
In summary, once we are wil
upon violating the conventions
language, the difficulty with hav
of temperature measurement
conditions, given our interests
cause the results from two diff
greatly. The conclusion is that
imply different concepts altho
tain purposes, they may call for
Now, do the same consideratio
teachers and others who use th
is held to be one thing, estimat
various intelligence tests. But thi
cational scientists to adopt a u
matter is not that simple-the m
though they contain common e
rant calling them measures of
around .8. Thus they have muc
mon, and we know from analy
abilities, such as spatial reason
Furthermore, there is not yet
to the kinetic theory of heat.
to develop a number of concept
is part of what people are doin
is measured by a given intellige

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 189

But there still are the arguments for a

simplicity, intelligibility, and fruitfuln
tions, I treat IQ as a single concept for
Critical Thinking Project, with which I
measured with some accuracy by the var
is well-enough related to the intellectua
similarly motivated and whose backgrou
This is a matter about which reasona
argue that the verbal score yielded by t
Tests emphasizes verbal ability more tha
CTMM and therefore we should treat these scores as connected to differ-
ent concepts, perhaps verbal IQ and general IQ. If these scores correlate
quite differently with the variable in which we are interested at this
time-the ability to think critically, we have evidence for treating them
as being connected to different concepts. The main point is that this is
a question that must be settled by appealing to the circumstances and
purposes involved. Since it makes sense to argue about the question even
after it is agreed that the operations are different, it follows that different
operations do not by themselves imply different concepts of IQ.
Again a difference in operations by itself does not imply different con-
cepts, although different concepts are sometimes called for by different
operations in conjunction with certain circumstances. In spite of the fact
that the second approach to operational definitions is unsatisfactory on
the basis of the first feature alone, detailed examination of the second
feature was worth while because rejection of the claim that different
operations imply different concepts is a central part of the argument
against the third approach to operational definitions.

3. Equating a Phrase or Sentence Containing the Term With a Phrase

or Sentence About a Combination of Operations and Observations
This appears to be the approach of the radical behaviorists; for ex-
ample, B. F. Skinner (1953, p. 585). It is May Brodbeck's approach in
N. L. Gage's Handbook of Research on Teaching (Brodbeck, 1963; p.
50) and may be the approach actually intended by Bridgman in The
Logic of Modern Physics. A first statement of this form follows:

3.1a. "X has the property T" means the same as "A given operation was
performed and a given observation was made,"

where T is, or contains, the term being defined. Example 1 below is an

operational definition of IQ according to Form 3.1a.

Example 1: "X has an IQ of n" means the same as "X was given the
CTMM and received a score of n."

Form 3.1a is limited to cases where T is in a sentence that is equated to

another sentence. I should like to generalize the form so that T can ap-

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190 ROBERT H. ENNIS

pear in either a phrase or a se

sentence:

[Link]. "Tx" means the same as "OPx and OBSx,"

where Tx is a phrase or sentence containing the term T to be defined;

OPx is a phrase or sentence about the performance of operations; and
OBSx is a phrase or sentence about observations. OPx and OBSx may
be merged into one phrase or sentence. Example 1 fits Form 3.1b, as does
example 2 below.

Example 2: "A person's IQ" means the same as "a person's score resulting
from the administration of the CTMM" (or, more simply, "a person's score
on the CTMM").

The term (or concept) IQ is tied down to a particular intelligence test

in this, the third, approach to operational definitions; but, in contrast to
the second approach, an IQ is a characteristic of a person, not of the
operations performed, though it is still dependent on those operations.
An immediate objection presents itself. In example 1, let us assume
that X actually has an IQ of, say, 120. If this is not known because he has
not yet taken the test, one is obliged to say that it is false that he has an
IQ of 120 since the statement alleged to be identical in meaning is false;
that is, it is false that X was given the CTMM, so it is false that he was
given it and got a score of 120. Hence, by this interpretation, it must be
false that he has an IQ of 120. This contradicts our assumption that he
has an IQ of 120. No matter what IQ we assume X to have, a contradic-
tion develops. Since he must have some IQ, the definition is faulty.
A similar problem exists for the phrase approach. According to ex-
ample 2, a person who does not have a score on the CTMM does not have
an IQ at all since "score on the CTMM" and IQ mean the same thing. If
that were so, it would make no sense for a principal to ask his guidance
counselor to obtain IQ's for new students who had never before been
tested since, by this interpretation, they have no IQ's (because they have
no scores on the CTMM).
A way out of this difficulty is to use between OPx and OBSx an im-
plication relationship that is expressed conditionally and can be put in
the subjunctive mood. The revised form is:

3.2. "Tx" means the same as "If OPx, then OBSx." Our sentence ex-
ample becomes:

Example 3: "X has an IQ of n" means the same as "If X is (were) given
the CTMM, he will (would) get a score of n."

Our phrase example becomes:

Example 4: "A person's IQ" means the same as "the score he will
(would) get if given the CTMM."

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 191

There are problems remaining, but the

be put in the subjunctive* solves this
taken the CTMM-even if he is never g
has an IQ, perhaps never to be known. A
score, there still is no inconsistency, for
given it again.
In future examples, reference to the s
simplicity's sake. But it should be under
tended to be convertible to the subjun
phrase-type examples will no longer be
cations, the general points to be made app
Let us now consider another difficulty
limits the meaning of a concept to a par
case discussed above, the administratio
the results of this set of operations. Th
implies that different operations require
earlier, this view is generally false-althou
and purposes, different operations do re
What is needed is a format that will not
operations require different concepts in
leeway. We must replace the relationship
that does not limit the meaning to a part
plication relationship that does not cla
meet this requirement. This idea leads u

4. Providing Implication Relationships Am

and the Concept

We can avoid the difficulty caused b

same as, by replacing it with the rela
amended form follows:

4.1. Tx; if and only if; if OPx, then OBSx.

The use of "if and only if" permits us t

* See Chisholm (1949), Goodman (1952), von

interesting discussions of counter-factual condi
us here unless we try to reduce all logical relati
(or something similar)-an unwise course, in my
t This approach is along the lines recomme
who has applied Rudolph Carnap's (1953) notio
formulation of operational definitions. My appr
the interpretation of the if-then relationship,
pretation and mine being an ordinary-languag
Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) for a d
reader who is unacquainted with this difference
sentences in the way to which he is accustome
tences as they are here intended.

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192 ROBERT H. ENNIS

kinds of operations to measure

can both be operational definiti
Example 5: X has a temperatur
thermometer is inserted in X, the t
Example 6: X has a temperatu
thermometer is inserted in X, the t

If "means the same as" appeared

only if," we should be committe
means the same as "alcohol ther
formulation allows several accur
If we apply this approach to t
lem becomes prominent. There
than there is among thermomet
seems too rigid. Consider these
IQ:

Example 7: X has an IQ of n; i
istered to X, X will get a score of n
Example 8: X has an IQ of n; i
Intelligence Tests are administered

Together these definitions com

the same score on the CTMM
two reasons we do not want to be
First, the conditions of admin
tests in any given pair of situa
standard conditions and the oth
scores. This difficulty can be
"under standard conditions." It is desirable that a list of standard condi-
tions be available, perhaps in the test manual. Incidentally, this same
qualification holds for thermometers when precision is necessary.
Second, each instrument has its idiosyncrasies, which inevitably
interfere with measurement at some level of precision. If these are large
enough to make a practical difference, some word like "approximately"
should be added to the operational definition. Since the idiosyncracies of
IQ tests do make a practical difference at the level of precision at which
they are used, "approximately" should probably be added to operational
definitions of IQ. I should not ordinarily add it to operational definitions
of temperature since the idiosyncracies of thermometers do not make a
significant difference in the contexts with which I am familiar. However,
for certain purposes and situations, some qualifying word should be
added for thermometers also.
To remind us of the qualifications, we can add "(WQ)," which stands
for "with qualifications," to Form 4.1:
4.2. Tx; if and only if: if OPx, then OBSx (WQ).

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 193

An operational definition of IQ might look like

Example 9: X has an IQ of approximately n; i

is administered to X under standard conditions, X

In this example, "approximately" was insert

the concept being defined, IQ. This is the pr
when we are trying to judge what someone'
mination gives an approximation. On the othe
ing from an assumption about what some
score, "approximately" should appear in the

Example 10: X has an IQ of n; if and only if;

tered to X under standard conditions, X will ge

Thus, the location of the qualifiers, as well a

to make them explicit, depends to some ext
forth I shall use "(WQ)" in the examples,
qualifiers to be determined by the context.
People who are not adept at dealing with c
tionships tend to find Form 4.2 hard to und
the suggestion that a person who has not be
have an IQ. They also are puzzled by the thr
"if" so close together. A more understandabl

4.3. If OPx; then Tx, if and only if, OBSx (W

Example 11: If the CTMM is administered

tions; then X has an IQ of n, if and only if, he g

Although this new formulation is easier t

say quite the same thing as Form 4.2. To see
in which we are trying to make a judgment
the basis of his score on the CTMM. Using 4
probably has an IQ of approximately n, w
have. However, using 4.2, we cannot draw
auxiliary assumption: our conclusion that X
n depends on the generalization that n is th
takes the test; it does not rest simply on hi
time. To make this generalization, one would
score we have is typical for him, an assumpt
with test scores. Form 4.3 has this assumptio
use 4.3 unless we are fairly confident that t
basing our judgments are typical.
Neither formulation allows us to escape th
The problem is faced in applying 4.2 and in
want to adopt 4.3 without being completely c
all the scores are typical, the word "probabl
the qualifiers referred to by "(WQ)."

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194 ROBERT H. ENNIS

Forms 4.2 and 4.3 suffice

operational definition of a c
for all cases? The trouble
conditions as both necessar
containing the concept. Fo
CTMM under standard con
roughly a necessary and suf
IQ is approximately n. Tha
mitment can be seen in a situation that faced the staff of the Cornell
Critical Thinking Project. The discussion will use 4.3 as a springboard,
but with appropriate modifications I could say the same things starting
from 4.2.
We built a test called The Cornell Conditional Reasoning Test, Form
X. Among its seventy-two items are six that supposedly test for mastery
of the principle that denial of the consequent implies denial of the
antecedent; in other words, knowledge that the following form is valid:
p implies q (p is the antecedent; q the consequent)
q is false (denial of consequent)
therefore, p is false (conclusion: denial of antecedent)
Here is one of the six items:

29. Suppose you know that

If the bicycle in the garage is Bob's, then it is red.

The bicycle in the garage is not red.

Then would this be true ?

The bicycle in the garage is not Bob's.
A. YES It must be true.
B. NO It can't be true.
C. MAYBE It may be true or it may not be true.
told enough to be certain whether the ans
YES or NO.

The correct answer is YES.

The other five items embodying this principle vary in several ways:
the valid conclusion is denied (making the answer NO); the content is
abstract; the premises are reversed and the antecedent negated; the
truth status of the conclusion is obviously different from the validity
status of the argument. The six items are numbered 8, 16, 22, 29, 35,
and 39.
Our problem, somewhat simplified, was how to give an operational
definition of "mastery of the principle that denial of the consequent
implies denial of the antecedent." One approach is to change the concept.
As stated, it refers to a dichotomous variable, mastery, whereas we
could shift to a continuous variable, degree of mastery. (IQ and tempera-
ture are continuous variables.) The revised question would be: "What is

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 195

an operational definition of 'degree of

denial of the consequent implies denia
answer that question with the following ope

Example 12: If X is given The Cornell

Form X; then X has mastered to the degre
the consequent implies denial of the antec
score of k right on the following items: 8,

Using this definition, we obtain a scor

six and that indicates degree of mastery
has limitations. It means little to peop
with the test or with the scores of othe
mastery of this principle is known. Yet
likely to consist largely of such people.
Another drawback is that one of our interests is the determination
of the per cent of students of a given description who have mastered the
principle. This interest calls for the judgment that a particular student
has or has not done so; it does not call for a judgment about his degree
of knowledge. We need a definition that will fit our attempts to judge
with some assurance whether a student has mastered this principle.
One might suppose that these difficulties could be handled by a defi-
nition that gave a certain minimum score as a necessary and sufficient
condition for having mastered the principle. For example,

Example 13: If X is given The Cornell Conditional Reasoning Test, Form

X; then X has mastered the principle that denial of the consequent implies
denial of the antecedent, if and only if, X answers correctly at least four of
these items: 8, 16, 22, 29, 35, and 39 (WQ).

In this example, getting at least four items right is a rough necessary-

and-sufficient condition for a person's knowing the principle (we assume
that he takes the test). However, we do not want to be committed to
any one minimum score as both necessary and sufficient; we do not want
to draw that sharp a line between mastery and nonmastery. What we
should like to say is something to the effect that getting at least five right
is a probable sufficient condition and getting at least four right is a
probable necessary condition. That is, we should like to say of a student
who gets at least five right that he probably has mastered the principle
and of a student who gets fewer than four right that he probably has not
mastered it. About the students who get exactly four right, we are not
sure what to say. They are borderline cases-and we should like a defi-
nition form that will allow us to leave them that way.
The following form permits us to present the sufficient condition:

4.4. If OPx; then, if OBSx, then Tx (WQ).*

* The sufficient-condition form corresponding to 4.2 is: Tx; if; if OPx, then
OBSx (WQ). This form, with the adjacent "if's," is harder to understand.

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 196 ROBERT H. ENNIS

The operational definition cor

form follows:

Example 14: If X is given The Cornell Conditional Reasoning Test,

Form X; then, if X answers correctly at least five of items 8, 16, 22, 29, 35,
and 39, X has mastered the principle that denial of the consequent implies
denial of the antecedent (WQ).

The following form permits us to present the necessary condition:

4.5. If OPx; then, Tx, only if OBSx (WQ).*

The operational definition corresponding to this necessary-condition

form follows:

Example 15: If X is given The Cornell Conditional Reasoning Test,

Form X; then X has mastered the principle that denial of the consequent
implies denial of the antecedent, only if X answers correctly at least four of
these items: 8, 16, 22, 29, 35, and 39 (WQ).

To give an operational interpretation of the concept, knowledge that

denial of the consequent implies denial of the antecedent, we supply both
operational definitions, each of which provides a partial interpretation.
Combined, they still do not provide a complete interpretation of the
concept, but they give a basis on which to work and reason.
It is not necessary to agree with our specific decisions in the case
above to see the need for Forms 4.4 and 4.5. That is, without contradict-
ing my basic thesis, one can hold that answering correctly a minimum of
one certain number of the items should be considered both necessary and
sufficient, or one can hold that the number of items in the necessary
condition should differ from that in the sufficient condition but that four
and five are not the proper numbers. It is necessary only to see that these
forms may sometimes be needed.
In summary, I recommend that operational definitions start with an
if-clause that specifies an operation or a set of operations and that this
clause be followed by an implication relationship between a phrase or
sentence containing the concept (or term) to be defined and a phrase or
sentence specifying an observation or a set of observations. Appropriate
qualifications should be implicit or explicit.

OPERATIONAL INTERPRETATION VERSUS OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Now that all these qualifications have been introduced, one may
wonder if the result is a definition at all. It does not exhaust the meaning
of a concept; it is loose; and a pair of operational definitions of the same
concept sometimes implies an empirical fact. For example, the two defi-
nitions of IQ using the CTMM and the Lorge-Thorndike imply a high
correlation between the tests; this is certainly an empirical matter. Some
"* The necessary-condition form corresponding to 4.2, which again is harder to
understand, is: Tx; only if; if OPx, then OBSx (WQ).

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 197

people regard the implication of empirical f

presumably definitions should give the mea
facts.
Fortunately, the utility of the guides that
depend on the resolution of this difficult que
the examples I have given "operational def
tional interpretations." In either case they h
a concept, and they do so by focusing on co
manipulations of investigators. They help b
the meaning of a concept. What harm is the
tions" so long as we remember that they di
of definition, which provides expressions th
Since their purpose and function is to indica
able term for them, it seems to me, is "ope
do not insist on this, for not much turns on th

THE NECESSITY FOR DELIBERATE MANIP

Carl Hempel, among others, has suggested

tion by an investigator is not really necessar
nition-that all we need is some condition,
manipulation or not. He points out that alth
operations "is of great interest for the prac
it is inessential in securing experimental im
(Hempel, 1961; p. 59). It is true that a delibe
necessary condition for experimental impor
distinction in discussions of the methodolog
tween those definitions that specify manipul
other conditions.
If we were proceeding on the assumptio
operationally defined, Hempel's advice sho
all terms require manipulation by an expe
interpretation (unless such activities as look
ulations, in which case operationism reduc
Hempel offered his advice in the context of
that all terms be operationally definable.
recommendation, one can preserve an ind
term "operationism," a meaning that empha
an investigator. In this case, a recommendat
* The philosopher would say that the sharp dis
synthetic statements is blurred by using the term
difficult and subtle one, but I might note that the
the area of empirical science has been questioned r
Carl Hempel, who says (1961, p. 66), "It . . appear
tinction between analytic and synthetic sentences
a formal model of the language of empirical scien
provided a valuable discussion of this question.

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 198 ROBERT H. ENNIS

operationally would imply that

fide manipulations by the researc
As with the case in which it w
examples "operational definitio
independent meaning of "opera
term, perhaps "conditional defi
definitions and definitions that are similar in form but contain a non-
manipulative condition in the first if-clause. This approach will preserve
the necessary distinctions without violating the original spirit of opera-
tionism as expressed by Bridgman and recognized for its value by many
empirical scientists.

SUMMARY

In this paper I have examined various forms for the operational defi-
nition of concepts, or terms, and have formulated the following set of
guides:

A. Operational definitions should

1. start with an if-clause specifying the nature of the operation
performable by the investigator.
2. contain an implication relationship that holds when a given
operation has been performed. This relationship can be
necessary (but not sufficient), sufficient (but not necessary),
or both necessary and sufficient.
3. be convertible to the subjunctive mood if they are not
already in the subjunctive.
4. not be taken to require a separate concept for each opera-
tional definition. Some concepts will have many operational
definitions.
5. contain, either explicitly or implicitly, qualifying words or
phrases like "approximately," "probably," and "under stand-
ard conditions."

B. Three useful forms for operational definitions follow:

Let: Tx represent a phrase or sentence containing the term
(or concept) T being defined. For example, "X has
an IQ of n," in which IQ is the concept.
OPx represent a phrase or sentence about the perform-
ance of an operation or a set of operations. For ex-
ample, "X is (were) given the CTMM."
"* Rudolph Carnap (1953) has suggested "reduction sentence," a term in wide-
spread use among philosophers. Because this term is closely associated with truth-
functional logic and suggests that abstract concepts are reduced to concrete terms
without loss (this is not Carnap's intent), I prefer "conditional definition." This
term is free from these connotations and indicates the conditional aspect of the
definition.

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 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 199

OBSx represent a phrase or sentenc

tion or a set of observations. Fo
score is (will be, would be) n."
WQ indicate that certain qualifica
imately" and "probably" should b
definition.

Form 1. In which OBSx is a necessary an

given OPx:
If OPx; then Tx, if and only if, OBSx (WQ). (4.3)
Example: If X is given the CTMM; then X has an IQ of n, if
and only if, X's score is n (WQ).

Form 2. In which OBSx is a sufficient condition, given OPx:

If OPx; then, if OBSx, then Tx (WQ). (4.4)
Form 3. In which OBSx is a necessary condition, given OPx:
If OPx; then Tx, only if OBSx (WQ). (4.5)

It was not claimed that all definitions in the empirical sciences sh

be operational. It was assumed that it is often a good idea to de
concepts (or terms) operationally because the specific connection
leged between the concrete world and an abstract concept are impo
and because an especially important set of these connections inv
the particular instruments and procedures used by the investigator.

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