Criminality of Intention-How to adjudge mens rea?

Raghvendra Singh Raghuvanshi & Nidhi Vaidya1

TABLE OF CASES
1. Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 CrLJ 465 (SC)
2. Anup Singh v. State of HP, AIR 1995 SC 1941
3. AR Yelve v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 CrLJ 1718 (SC)
4. Baba lodhi v. State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1268
5. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1
6. Dajya Moshaya Bhil v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 CrLJ 1728 (SC)
7. Darshan Singh v. State of Rajsthan, (1995) 2 CrLJ 2138 Raj
8. Dasrathlal v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1979 SC 1342
9. Devramani v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 CrLJ 1534 218 (SC)
10. Dhanna v. MP, (1996) CrLJ 3516 (SC).
11. Dharam Pal v. State of UP, AIR 1995 SC 1988
12. Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja, (1869) 3 Beng LR (PC) 44,45.
13. Garib Singh v. state of Punjab, 1972 CrLJ 1286 (SC)
14. Ghanshyam v. State of UP, AIR 1983 SC 293
15. Harbans Nonia v. state of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 125
16. Hare Krishna Singh v., State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 863
17. Hari chand v. State of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 1477
18. Hari Om v. State of UP, AIR 1993 SCW 666
19. Hem Raj v. State (Delhi administration), AIR 1990 SC 2252
20. Jai Singh v. State, 1987 CrLJ 20 Delhi
21. Jaswinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 Sc 2327
22. Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413
23. Lala ram v. State of MP, AIR 1994 SC 1447
24. Lalai v. State of UP, AIR 1974 SC 2118
25. Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118
26. Maqsoodan v. State of UP, AIR 1983 SC 126
27. Mitter Sen v. State of UP, 1976 CrLJ 857 (SC)

1
The Authors are Lawyers practicing in High Court of MP, Indore, India and can be reached at
raghav_nliu@[Link].

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28. Muthu Naicker v. state of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1647
29. Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216
30. Parichhat v. state of MP, 1972 CrLJ 322 (SC)
31. Prabhu Babaji v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51
32. Prem Chand v. state, 1996 CrLJ 1217 (Delhi)
33. R v. Clark, (1991) Cr LR 625 (CA)
34. R v. Roberts, (1993) 1 All ER 583 (CA)
35. Ram Lal singh v. state of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 59
36. Ram Tahal v. State of UP, AIR 1972 SC 254
37. Ram Udgar Jha v. State of Bihar, 1987 CrLJ 1027 Gau.
38. Rana pratap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680
39. Ranbilas Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1593
40. Santosh v. State of Kerala, 1990 CrLJ 570
41. Sayed Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 CrLJ 3585 (Bom)
42. Shaikh Nawab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 169
43. Shangara v. State of Punjab, 1995 SCC (Cr) 163
44. Shreekantiah Ramayya, (1954) 57 Bom LR 632 (SC)
45. Shyam singh v. state of UP, 1992 CrLJ 1632 (All)
46. State of Karnataka v. Eshwariah, 1987 CrLJ 1659
47. State of Orisa v. Raghuram Sahu, 1979 CrLJ 502 (Orissa)
48. State of Punjab v. surjit singh, (1987) 1 SCC 520
49. State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, 1973 CrLJ 636 (SC)
50. Subhash v. State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1222
51. Sukhram v. state of MP, AIR 1989 SC 772
52. Taga v. State of Rajsthan, 1977 CrLJ NOC 240 (Raj)
53. Tara devi v. state of UP, AIR 1991 SC 342
54. Tripta v. state of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 948
55. Tukaram Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514
56. Yadu yadav v. state of Bihar, 1992 CrLJ 1743 (Pat)
57. Yogendra v. State of Bihar, 1984 CrLJ 386 (SC)
58. Yunus v. state, 1995 CrLJ 3205 (Delhi)

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Table of Contents

• Introduction
• Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

Principle

Ingredients of Section 34 IPC

Scope of this section
• Common Intention

How to prove common intention?

When there is no common intention
• Distinction between S.34 and S.149, IPC
• Important English cases
• Important Indian cases

Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor

Mahbub Shah v. Emperor

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad

Ram Tahal v. State of UP

Muthu Naiker v. State of Tamil Nadu

Rambilas Singh v. State of Bihar

Hem Raj v. state (Delhi administration)

Ghanshyam v. State of Uttar Pradesh
• Conclusion
• Bibliography

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 INTRODUCTION
A crime may be committed by an individual or in collaboration with others. In case an
individual commits a crime, there would be no difficulty in assessing his criminal guilt;
he would be punished according to the nature of the offence committed. The difficulty
arises when several persons are engaged in the commission of an offence and different
roles are played by each of such individuals. One of them might be engaged in the actual
task of commission, say murder, while the other might remain standing near the assailant
to put a knife in his hand, and still another might have chalked out the plan and given
assistance but stays away from the scene of occurrence throughout the commission of the
act. In such cases, a distinction is drawn between the acts of each of such individuals
according to their mode and degree of participation or involvement in the commission of
the offence for ascertaining guilt and awarding punishment. Such persons may broadly be
classified into principals and abettors.2
In a case where two or more persons are involved, either jointly or in group and it
is not possible to apportion criminal guilt of each of the participants, all the participants
are held jointly liable for the offence committed by any one or all the members of the
group. This is based on the contention that the presence of the accomplice gives
encouragement, prtection and support to the person actually engaged in the commission
of an unlawful act.
The doctrine of joint liability is justified on the common sense principle that if two
or more persons do an act conjointly, it is just the same as if each of them has done it
individually. Since the purpose is common, the responsibility is joint. The man who
actually strikes is no more liable than the man ready to place a knife in the hands of an
assailant for the purpose.
The provisions relating to group liability or joint liability have been elaborately
dealt with in Sections 34 to 38, 120A, 149, 396 and 460 of the IPC. These provisions may
be classified into three categories

First where the offence is committed with common intention of the groups (Ss. 34 -38).
Secondly, where the accused is a member of a conspiracy to commit an offence (Ss.
120A, 120B). thirdly, where the offence is committed with the common object of an
unlawful assembly (Sec. 149).

2
Gaur KD, Criminal Law, at p.211.

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 In this Paper, I shall be focusing mainly with Sec.34 of IPC.

Section 34 IPC
“When a criminal act is done by several persons in the furtherance of common
intention of all, each of them is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done
by him”

This section is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between
the acts o the individual members of a party or to prove exactly what part was taken by
each of them in furtherance of the common intention of all. The reason why all are
deemed guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplices gives encouragement,
support and protection to the person actually committing an act. The elements, which are
required to be proved for this section, are:

1. Several persons,
There should be at least more than one person to bring any case under Sec.34.

2. Common intention to commit an offence,

All the persons involved must have a common intention regarding the commission of the
offence and there should be a pre meeting of mind.

3. An act in furtherance of the common intention.

All of them must do an act in furtherance of the common intention.

Principle of intention
This section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
Therefore Sec.34, IPC, would apply even if no charge is framed under that section
provided of course from the evidence it becomes clear that there was pre-arranged plan to
achieve the commonly intended object.3 Thus where six persons were charged under Ss.
148, 302/149 and 307/149, IPC, but two were acquitted, the remaining four accused could
be convicted on the charges of murder and attempt to murder with the aid of Sec. 34 of

3
Garib Singh v. state of Punjab, 1972 CrLJ 1286 (SC); Yogendra v. State of Bihar, 1984 CrLJ 386 (SC)

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the Penal Code.4 This section really means that if two or more persons intentionally do a
thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually.5 It is a well-
recognised canon of criminal jurisprudence that the Courts cannot distinguish between
co-conspirators, nor can they inquire, even if it were possible, as to the part taken by each
in the crime. Where parties go with a common purpose to execute a common object, each
and everyone becomes responsible for the acts of each and every other in execution and
furtherance of their common purpose; as the purpose is common, so must be the
responsibility.6 All are guilty of the principal offence, not of abetment. In combinations of
this kind a mortal stroke, though given by one of the party, is deemed in the eye of the
law to have been given by every individual present and abetting. The person actually
giving the stroke is no more than the hand or instrument by which the others strike.7 But a
party not cognizant of the intention of his companion to commit murder is not liable,
though he has joined his companion to do an unlawful act.8 If the criminal act was a fresh
and independent act springing wholly from the mind of the doer, the others are not liable
merely because when it was done they were intending to be partakers with the doer in a
different criminal act.
The court can take recourse to s.34 even if the section is not specifically mentioned in the
charge.9
Participation - The Supreme Court has held that it is the essence of the section
that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime. He need
not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate outside ready
to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road
ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the
occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or
other at the time crime is actually being committed.10 The leading feature of this section is
the element of participation in action.11 The essence of liability under this section is the
existence of a common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a
criminal act in furtherance of the common intention. The Supreme Court has emphasized

4
Ram Tahal v. State of UP, 1972 CrLJ 227 (SC)
5
B.N. Shrikantiah, AIR 1958 SC 672
6
Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja, (1869) 3 Beng LR (PC) 44, 45.
7
Nga Aung Thien, (1935) 13 Ran 210.
8
Ram Udgar Jha v. State of Bihar, 1987 CrLJ 1027.
9
Dhanna v. MP, (1996) CrLJ 3516 (SC).
10
Shreekantiah Ramayya, (1954) 57 Bom LR 632 (SC)
11
Shaikh Nawab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 169

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that proof of participation by acceptable evidence may in circumstances be a clue to the
common intention and that it would not be fatal to the prosecution case that the culprits
had no community of interests.12 The participation need not in all cases be by physical
presence. In offences involving physical violence, normally presence at the scene of
offence may be necessary, but such is not the case is respect of other offences when the
offence consists of diverse acts which may be done at different times and places. The
physical presence at the scene of offence of the offender sought to be rendered liable
under this section is not one of the conditions of its applicability in every case.13 Thus is a
case of house breaking where considerable quantity of copper wire had been stolen by
opening the lock with a duplicate key supplied by one of the accused whose presence at
the time of breaking the godown was not made out from evidence but whose presence at a
weighbridge where an attempt was made to dispose of the stolen goods was proved, it
was held that he would still be liable for the criminal act with the aid of s.34 and s.107,
IPC.14 Then again, even in regard to an offence involving physical violence it is not
necessary that every accused must take an active part in the attack on the victim. Thus
where one accused stood on guard with a spear in hand to facilitate the murder of the
deceased by the other accused, the first mentioned accused was successfully convicted
under s.302 read with s.34, IPC.15 The Supreme Court has reiterated that even though the
other accused persons stand acquitted and even though there is no evidence that the
convicted accused caused one of the fatal injuries, he cannot escape conviction under
s.302 read with s.34, IPC when his participation with the three other assailants in the
attack on the deceased has been established beyond reasonable doubt.16 "Even in injury
Nos. 1 and 2 which are the fatal injuries had been inflicted by the accused No.1 and not
by the accused No.2, the latter would be as guiltier of the offence of murder as the former
because of the common intention forget between the two".17 Sometimes, however,
absence of actual participation may serve an important purpose as it happened, for
example, where in a love triangle the paramour killed the woman's husband and she
remained sitting with the dead body inside the house without opening the door. The main
accused having been acquitted, the Supreme Court held that the woman alone could not
be convicted under s.302 read with s.34 particularly in view of the fact that the nature of
12
Baba lodhi v. state of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1268
13
Jaikrishna Desai, (1960) 3 SCR 319
14
tukaram Ganpat v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514
15
Lalai v. State of UP, AIR 1974 SC 2118
16
Subhash v. State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1222
17
State of Punjab v. surjit singh, (1987) 1 SCC 520

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 the injuries (gandasa blows with a heavy hand) made it explicit that they were the
handiwork of masculine power and not that of feminine hands.18 It is also necessary to
remember that mere presence of the offender at the scene of murder without any
participation to facilitate the offence is not enough. Thus where the accused went to his
field with his friends to protect crop from being forcibly reaped by the opposite partly and
in course of the scuffle he killed a man of the opposite party, others could not be
convicted for homicide by invoking s.34, IPC. Accordingly, he alone was convicted under
part I of Sec.304, IPC.19 By merely accompanying the accused one does not become
liable for the crime committed by the accused within the meaning of Sec.34, IPC.20 The
degree of participation is also an important factor. Where the wife of the accused inflicted
a single below on the head of the deceased and thereafter stood as a mute witness to the
accused along with others inflicting injuries with sharp edged weapons, it was held that it
could not be said of her that she shared the common intention of causing death. Her
conviction was changed to that for grievous hurt under Sec.323.21

CASE - Where only one of the accused fired at the victim and no overt act was assigned
to the other accused who were merely present at the scene of occurrence, it was held that
common intention to commit murder was not established and the other accused could not
be convicted with the help of Section 34.22

Ingredients of Section 34 IPC

Before a man can be held liable for acts done by another, under the provisions of this
section, it must be established that:

(i) There was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between the two, and

(ii) The person sought to be so held liable had participated in the act constituting the
offence. Unless common intention and participation are both present, this section cannot
apply.23

18
Tara devi v. state of UP, AIR 1991 SC 342
19
State of Orisa v. Raghuram Sahu, 1979 CrLJ 502 (Orissa)
20
Dasrathlal v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1979 SC 1342
21
Darshan Singh v. State of Rajsthan, (1995) 2 CrLJ 2138 Raj
22
Yadu yadav v. state of Bihar, 1992 CrLJ 1743 (Pat)
23
State of Karnataka v. Eshwariah, 1987 CrLJ 1659

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Scope - This section deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several
persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the
result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for that act and the act in the latter part
of the section must include the whole action covered by 'a criminal act' in the first part
because they refer to it. This section refers to cases in which several persons both intend
to do and do an act. It does not refer to cases in which several persons both intend to do
and do an act. It does not refer to cases where several persons intend to do an act and
some one or more of them do an entirely different act. In the latter class of cases, s.149
may be applicable if the number of the persons is five or more and the other act was done
in prosecution of the common object of all.24 Common intention has relevance only to an
offence and not to a right of private defence.25

COMMON INTENTION
Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan.
It must be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged
plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act in point of
time, which need not be a long gap. Under this section a pre-concert in the sense of a
distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about
a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with
reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Though common
intention may develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time to the
commission of the crime showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert.26 In Amrik
Singh's case it has further been held that though common intention may develop in course
of the fight but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference.27

24
Jai Singh v. state, 1987 CrLJ 20 Delhi
25
Shyam singh v. state of UP, 1992 CrLJ 1632 (All)
26
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413
27
Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 CrLJ 465 (SC)

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Hari Om v. State of UP,28
There were four persons, all of them armed with knives and one with a 'lathi', went to the
house of a man and started abusing him in a loud voice. A 70 year old neighbour objected
to their behaving like that when it was 11 p.m. whereat they turned to him and attacked
him with knives and he died. Those coming to his rescue were also attacked. The man
with the 'lathi' also wielded his weapon to keep off the rescuers.

It was held that common intention can be formed in the course of occurrence
without prior conspiracy. All the accused including the one armed with 'lathi' shared the
common intention to inflict injuries on the old man, they being suddenly provoked by his
intervention.

The essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention

animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention. It must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of
the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, if this is shown, then
liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if
the act were done by him alone.29

Common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre arranged plan

because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act
must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Accordingly
there must have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously
attack a man and each can have the intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can
individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention
required by the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre
arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury be
caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the
prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of
the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case. Care must be
taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention; the partition which

28
AIR 1993 SC 666
29
Mahbub Shah Case, Infra.

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divides their bounds is often very thin, nevertheless the distinction is real and substantial,
and if overlooked with result in miscarriage of justice. The plan need not be elaborate, nor
is a long interval of time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly. But there must
be pre arrangement and premeditated concert. It is not enough to have the same intention
independently of each other. The crucial circumstance is that the pre arranged plan must
precede the act constituting the offence. That some persons were standing on the side of
the accused when he gunned down the deceased, is not enough to constitute either
common intention or participation.30 The fact that some persons accompanied the accused
over a matter of land dispute, without there being any evidence that any body other than
the accused participated in the dragging of the deceased from a compartment and causing
of his death is not enough to prove common intention.31 Before a Court can convict a
person for any offence read with s.34, it should come to a definite conclusion that the said
person had a prior concert with one or more other persons, named or unnamed, for
committing the said offence.

When two accused are convicted under s.302 read with the section and one of the
accused is acquitted in appeal, the other accused cannot be convicted under s.302
simpliciter in the absence of proof of exact nature of injuries caused by each accused. It
cannot be postulated in such circumstance that the other accused alone caused all the
injuries. Following this and other cases32 the Supreme Court held that where one of the
two who came to burn a residential hut and claimed two lives because the fire spread, was
specifically named in the FIR and he was acquitted by the High Court, the conviction of
the other could not be maintained unless there was proof of the specific role played by the
other.33

Where three accused entered a house to commit robbery and one of them applied
pressure on the ace and neck of the householder woman who died of asphyxia, s.34 was
held to be not applicable. The one who applied force could be convicted under s.304 Part
II but not his companions.34

30
Hare Krishna Singh v., State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 863
31
Ram Lal singh v. state of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 59
32
Prabhu Babaji v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51
33
Sukhram v. state of MP, AIR 1989 SC 772
34
Santosh v. State of Kerala, 1990 CrLJ 570

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 Where the act of murder by the main accused was facilitated by two others by
catching hold of the victim but without knowing nor having the intention of causing
death, it was held that the only common intention that could be inferred was that of
causing grievous hurt.35 Where the accused had no knowledge that the other accused had
a dangerous weapon with him and there was no previous enmity with the deceased, it was
held that he did not share the common intention to kill the deceased but, as he had
physically assaulted the deceased, he would be guilty of sharing common intention to
cause simple hurt.36 Where the accused had inflicted lathi blows causing injuries only on
the eyewitness and not on the deceased, he could not be said to have shared the common
intention of committing murder of the deceased. He was acquitted for the charge of
murder and was convicted us.325.37

Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To

constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be
known to the rest of them and shared by them.38

What to speak of similar intention even same intention without sharing each
other's intention is not enough for this section. In a case like this, each will be liable for
whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of
the others.39 In fine, if common intention cannot be inferred from the evidence of facts
and circumstances of the case, s.34, IPC, cannot be invoked.40 A party of farmers was
cutting their crop. The deceased took away a portion of the harvested crop. The night
when he was returning from a barat, 16 persons waited for him on the way. They came
towards him and the convict who was carrying a knife gave him a stab wound on the neck
which proved fatal. The others did not know that he had a knife and all of them being
with bare hands, it could not be said that they had the common intention of causing death.
They could as well have thought that after surrounding the accused he would be called
upon to return or pay for the harvest taken away by him.41 In another case of the same
kind, a party of three spotted their common foe and to teach him a lesson, two held him

35
Harbans Nonia v. state of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 125
36
Yunus v. state, 1995 CrLJ 3205 (Delhi).
37
Dharam Pal v. state of UP, AIR 1995 SC 1988.
38
Tillu Ahir, (1949) All 127
39
Parichhat v. state of MP, 1972 CrLJ 322 (SC).
40
Mitter Sen v. State of UP, 1976 CrLJ 857 (SC).
41
Ranbilas Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1593.

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and the third started stabbing him. They ran away when they were counter attacked, but
the injured died. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that about the two accused
who were merely holding the deceased, it could not be said that they knew that their
victim would be stabbed to death, nor there was proof of the fact that they continuously
held him through all the stab wounds, but that they did have the common intention of
causing grievous injuries.42

Tripta v. State of Haryana43

A person gifted his land to one of his grandsons. His other son along with his wife fully
armed, the man with a lathi and the woman with a gandasa came to protest. The man lost
control and donee grandson and his father intervened to save the situation but they
received lathi blows and died. The woman struck only her brother-in-law with the
gandasa causing a non fatal injury.

Her husband was convicted for murder but her punishment was reduced to causing
grievous hurt because it appeared that the whole thing was a spot happening and not a
planned affair.

How to adjudge/prove Common intention?

Undoubtedly it is a difficult thing to prove even the intention of an individual and,
therefore, it is all the more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons.
But however difficult may be the task, the prosecution must lead evidence of facts,
circumstances and conduct cases it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other
relevant circumstances of the case in hand. This inference can be gathered by the manner
in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and
concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by one or some of them,
the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the concerted conduct
subsequent to the commission of the offence, for instance all of them left the scene of the
incident together and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in
determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must

42
Rana pratap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680.
43
AIR 1992 SC 948.

13

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be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a
common intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted.

It is, however, not necessary to show that any overt act must have been done by a
particular accused. The section will be attracted if it is established that the criminal act
has been done by all or any one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common
intention. Before an inference of common intention can be reached in a given case, the
incriminating facts from which such inference is to be drawn should be held to be firmly
established. The facts should firmly and wholly warrant the inference that more than one
accused persons acted in furtherance of common intention of all; they must be wholly
incompatible with the contrary inference; and incapable of being explained on any other
reasonable hypothesis.44 Where the co-accused whispered something into the ears of her
accused husband before the incident gave him a bundle of new clothes and told him as to
what he should be looking for, no inference could be drawn that she incited the accused
and shared his intention to kill his brother. 45

Common intention has to be judged by the part played by all the accused, nature
of injuries inflicted and the surrounding circumstances.46 Where the accused did not
inflict any blow of any weapon on the deceased but he had caught hold of him when the
other accused stabbed him fatally, it was held that the accused shared the common
intention to cause death of the victim.47 Where the accused armed with 'lathi' entered the
'baithak' of the deceased in the company of other accused and facilitated the attack on the
deceased and the eyewitnesses, it was held that they shared the common intention of
murdering the victims of their assault. The fact that the injured eyewitnesses did not
attribute any positive act on the part of the accused was immaterial.48

44
Sayed Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 CrLJ 3585 (Bom)
45
Jaswinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 2327
46
Shangara v. State of Punjab, 1995 SCC (Cr) 163
47
Prem Chand v. state, 1996 CrLJ 1217 (Delhi)
48
Hari chand v. State of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 1477

14

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 Anup Singh v. State of H.P49.
A person was confined in a police post and was given beating by two constables as a
result of which he died, they were convicted under section 217, 330 and 348 read with
section 34 and the S.I. In-charge of the police post, though had not actually given any
beating was held equally liable with the aid of section 34 because the beating was not
possible without his tacit consent and connivance.

When there is no common intention

The five accused persons attempted to take away the wife of one of them from her
brother's home. Evidence showed that the husband, while in scuffle with his brother-in-
law, intentionally shot at him causing instantaneous death. The others were held not liable
to be punished for murder because they had no common intention to bring about
anybody's death or even knowledge that death was a likely consequence.50 Where there
was a long standing and deep-rooted animosity between the parties due to claim over
certain land and one of the accused killed a woman of the other party and there was no
evidence to show that other accused participated in the crime or exhorted the assailant
accused or even carried any weapon, it was held that the other accused did not share the
common intention to kill the woman.51

Distinction between Ss.34 and 149, IPC

Though both these sections relate to the doctrine of vicarious liability and sometimes
overlap with each other there are substantial points of difference between the two. They
are as under :

(i) S.34 does not by itself create any specific offence whereas s.149, IPC, does so.

(ii) Some active participation, especially in a crime involving physical violence is necessary
under s.34 but s. 149, IPC, does not require it and the liability arises by reason of mere

49 AIR 1995 SC 1941

50
Lala ram v. State of MP, AIR 1994 SC 1447
51
Ram Lal singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 59

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 membership of the unlawful assembly with a common object and there may be no active
participation at all in the preparation and commission of the crime.52

(iii) S.34 speaks of common intention but s.149,IPC, contemplates common object which is
undoubtedly wider is its scope and amplitude than intention. If the offence committed by
a member of an unlawful assembly is in prosecution of the common object of the
unlawful assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of the common object, all other members of the unlawful
assembly would be guilty of that offence under s.149, IPC, although they may not have
intended to do it or participated in the actual commission of that offence.

(iv) S.34 does not fix a minimum number of persons who must share the common intention
whereas s.149, IPC, requires that there must be at least five persons who must have the
same common object.

Judicial Pronouncements from West:

R. v. Roberts53
Two persons (accused) went to the house of an aged recluse with a view to commit
robbery. A struggle ensued in which the victim was killed by blows from a blunt
instrument. In their statements to the police each blamed the other for the attack. They
were convicted.

The court said that a person involved in a joint enterprise could be guilty of murder if he
realised that the other party might kill or inflict really serious bodily harm and continued
to participate in the joint venture and the other party, with the requisite intention, killed in
the course of the venture. The principle applies whether weapons were carried or not and
whether the object of the venture was to commit only some unlawful act like burglary.

52
Taga v. State of Rajsthan, 1977 CrLJ NOC 240 (Raj)
53
(1993) 1 All ER 583 (CA)

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R. v. Clark54
Two persons went to the house of the former girlfriend of one of them. They broke into
the house, destroyed some material and set alight a chair. The fire spread. Both of them
ran off in different direction. Later they came together. In their versions to the police each
blamed the other for the fire. Their appeal against conviction was dismissed.

The court said that there was clear evidence of joint enterprise. Both were in the house
when the fire was started. They caused other criminal damage which was not separable by
arson. There was clearly joint enterprise to break into the house and they met again later.

IMPORTANT INDIAN CASES INVOLVING INTENTION

55
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor

On 3 August 1923, the sub-postmaster at Sankaritolla post office was counting money at
his table in the back room, when several men appealed at the door, which leads into the
room from a courtyard, and when he inside the door, called on him to give up the money.
Almost immediately afterwards they fired pistols at him. He was hit in two places, in one
half and near the armpit, and died almost at once. Without taking any money is assailants
fled, separating as they ran. One man, though he fired his pistol several times, was
pursued by a post-office assistant and others with commendable tenacity and courage, and
eventually was secured just after he had thrown it away. This man was the appellant; the
others escaped. According to the prisoner, he was the man outside the room. He said that
he stood in the courtyard and was very much frightened.

The charges preferred were murder under s 302 of the IPC

The appellant's argument in brief, was that in s 34 'a criminal act', in so far as murder is
concerned, means an act which takes life criminally within s 302, because s 34 concludes
by saying 'is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act were done by himself
alone' and there is no act done by himself alone which could make a man liable to be
punished as a murderer, except an act done by himself and fatal to his victim.

54
(1991) Cr LR 625 (CA)
55
AIR 1925 PC 1

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 Thus the effect is that, where each of several persons does something criminal, all
acting in furtherance of a common intention, each is punishable for what he has done, as
if he had done it by himself. Such a proposition was not worth enacting, for if a man has
done something criminal in itself, he must be punishable for it, and none the less so that
others were doing other criminal acts of their own at the same time and in furtherance of
an intention common to all. In effect, this means that, if three assailants simultaneously
fire at their victim and lodge three bullets in his brain, all may be murderers, but, if one
bullet only grazes his ear, one of them is not a murderer, but, if one bullet only grazes his
ear, one of them is not a murderer and, each being entitled to the benefit of the doubt, all
must be acquitted of murder, unless the evidence inclines in favour of the marksmanship
of two or of one.

This argument evidently fixes attention exclusively upon the accused person's own
act. Intention to kill and resulting death accordingly are not enough, there must be proved
an act, which kills, done by several persons and corresponding to, if not identical with,
the same fatal act done by one. The answer is that, if this construction is adopted, it
defeats itself, for several persons cannot do the same act as one of them does. They may
do acts identically similar, but the act of each is his own, and because it is his own and is
relative to himself, it is not the act of another or the same as that other's act. The result is
that s 34, construed thus, has no content and is useless.

The other sections of this part of the IPC make it plain that the words of s 34 are
not to be eviscerated (deprived) by reading them in this exceedingly limited sense. By s
33, a criminal act in s34 includes a series of acts and further, 'act' includes omission to
act, for example, an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being done before
one's very eyes.

To this, the reply was made before the High Court, that, in a case where death results
from the cumulative effect of different acts whether because it cannot be shown that it
was not his act or acts, each actor must be deemed guilty of murder, though alone which
took the victim's life, it is not easy to determine. The section really means 'when a joint
criminal act has been done by the acts of two persons in furtherance of a common
intention each is liable for that joint criminal act as if he had done it all by himself.

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 Decision: Therefore on the above grounds, the accused was held guilty and accordingly
the appeal was dismissed.

Mahbub Shah v. Emperor56

On 25 August 1943, at sunrise, the deceased, Allah Dad, and a few others had left their
Khanda Kel, by boat for cutting reeds growing on the banks of the Indus river. When they
had travelled for about a mile downstream, they saw Mohammad Shah, father of Wali
Shah (absconder) bathing on the bank of the river. On being told that they were going to
collect reeds, he warned them against collecting reeds from land belonging to him.
Ignoring his warning they collected about 16 bundles of reeds, and then started for the
return journey. While the boat was being pulled upstream by means of a rope, Ghulam
Quasim Shah, nephew of Mohammad Hussain Shah (acquitted) who was standing on the
bank of the river asked Allah Dad to give him the reeds that had been collected from his
uncle's land. He refused.... Quasim Shah then caught the rope and tried to snatch it away.
He then pushed Allah Dad and gave a blow with a small stick, but it was warded off on
the rope. Allah Dad and gave a blow with a small stick, but it was warded off on the rope.
Allah Dad then picked up the lari from the boat and struck Quasim Shah. Quasim Shah
then shuted out for help and Wali Shah and Mahbub Shah came up. They had guns in
their hands. When Allah Dad and Hamidullah tried to run away, Wali Shah and Mahbub
Shah came up. They had guns in their hands. When Allah Dad and Hamidullah tried to
run away, Wali Shah and Mahbub Shah came in front of them and Wali Shah fired at
Allah Dad who fell down dead and Mahbub Shah fired at Hamidullah, causing injuries in
him.

On the above facts the learned judges of the High Court came to the conclusion
that Ghulam Quasim was wrongly convicted of murder under s 302/34 of the IPC on the
following reasons:

1. Bhandari J with whom Teja Singh J concurred, first held that Ghulam Quasim had no
common intention of killing any member of the complainant party when he went to the
bank of the river in order to demand the bundles of reeds which has been collected from
his uncle's lands.

56
AIR 1945 PC 118. Also popularly known as Indus River case.

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2. The court further said that so far as Quasim Shah was concerned he did no more than
ask his companions to come to his assistance when he was knocked with a pole by the
deceased and that he could not have been aware of the manner in which assistance was
likely to be rendered to him or his friends were likely to shoot at and kill one man and
injure another. In the result he was acquitted of all offences.
3. The learned judge stated that the case of Mahbub Shah, who was armed with a single
barrelled gun, and of Wali Shah, who had a double-barrelled gun, however stood on
different footing on the following ground :
4. As soon as they ran to the assistance of Ghulam Quasim Shah, they fired simultaneously
in the direction of the complainants killing Allah Dad on the spot and causing injuries
on the person of Hamidullah Khan. It is difficult to believe that when they fired the
shots they did not have the common intention of killing one or more of the complainant
part. If so, both of them are guilty of murder notwithstanding the fact that the fatal shot
was fired by only one of them, namely, Wali Shah, absconder.
5. According to the learned judge a common intention to commit the crime came into
being when the appellant and Wali Shah fired the shots.
6. This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment of the Lahore High Court
confirming on appeal the conviction of the appellant of the murder of one Allah Dad and
the sentence of death passed on him by the sessions judge. The main question ... is
whether the appellant has been rightly convicted of murder upon the true construction of
s 34 of the IPC.

Issues Involved:

1. Whether the above reasoning is correct, and s 34 of the IPC, has been rightly applied to
the facts of the case. As it originally stood, the section was in the following terms :

When a criminal act is done by 'several persons' each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.

2. Whether a common intention' to commit the crime which was eventually committed by
Mahbub Shah and Wali Shah came into being when Ghulam Quasim Shah shouted to
his companions to come to his rescue and both of them emerged from behind the bushes
and fired their respective guns.

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 In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words 'in furtherance of the
common intention of all' after the word 'persons' and before the word 'each', so as to
make the object of the section clear. Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in
the doing of a criminal act. The section does not say 'the common intentions of all'; nor
does it say 'an intention common to all'. Under the section, the essence of that liability is
to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of s 34
successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act complained intention of all; if this is
shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same
manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the principle, common intention
within the meaning of the Section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused
of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in
concert pursuant to the prearranged plan.

In the present case there was no evidence and there were no circumstances from
which it might be inferred that the appellant must have been acting in concert with Wali
Shah in pursuance of a concerted plan when he along with Wali shah rushed to the rescue
of Ghulam Quasim........There was no evidence to indicate that Ghulam Quasim was
aware that the complainat party had beeb cutting reeds from his uncle's lands, or that the
appellant and Wali Shah had been kept behind the bush to come and help him when
called upon to do so. The evidence shows that Wali Shah'happened to be out shooting
game' and when he and the appellant heard Ghulam's shouts for help they came up with
their guns; the former shot the deceased, killing him and the appellant shot at Hamidullah
inflicting injuries on his person.

Their Lordships are prepared to accept that the appellant and Wali Shah had the
same intention, namely, the intention to rescue Quasim if need be by using the guns and
that in carrying out this intention, the appellant picked out Hamidullah for dealing with
him and Wali Shah, the deceased, but where is the evidence of common intention to
commit the criminal act complained against in furtherance of such intention? Their
Lordships find none. Evidence falls far short of showing that the appellant and Wali Shah
ever entered into a premeditated concert to bring about the murder of Allah Dad in
carrying out their intention of rescuing Quasim Shah. Care must be taken not to confuse

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same or similar intention with common intention; the partition, which divides 'their
bounds', is often very thin; nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial.

The appellant was therefore not rightly convicted of the offence of murder under s 302
read with s 34.

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad57

On 7 December 1950, about 3 pm, Ramchandra Shilke, who had gone to his field near a
river called papana was attacked by five accused with axe and stick resulting in his death
on the spot almost immediately. Rasika Bai (deceased's wife) and Subhana (servant) who
were present at the scene have stated that (i) Tukia struck Ramchander on his cheek and
also on his head; and (ii) Panduang hit him on the thigh with his stick.

The medical evidence shows that the injury that caused death of Ramchander was the one
on the neck and Bhilia was responsible for that for which he was charged and was rightly
convicted under s 302 of IPC. His conviction was accordingly upheld by the court.

As regards Tukia, it was proved that Tukia alone caused the fatal injury on the
cheek which caused a lacerated wound on the left side of the face which crushed the
upper and lower jaws including the lips and teeth. The court accoringly held his
conviction under s 302 was justified.

In case of Pandurang it was proved that he caused a non-fatal injury on the head,
which was not sufficient to cause the death of the deceased.

As regards the application of s 34 of the IPC, the court said that it is well
established that a common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged
plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another,
the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Since
there is no evidence of any prior meeting between the accused before the attack or even
immediately before the question of application of s 34 of the IPC does not arise. Each
case must rest on its facts and the mere similarity of the facts in one case cannot be used
to determine a conclusion of fact in another Careful perusals of facts in Pandurans's case

57
AIR 1955 SC 216.

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 do not warrant an inference of common intention. Hence, even if a charge to this effect
had been made, no conviction could take place on that basis. Pandurang could be liable
only for what he actually did. His case accordingly falls under s 326. A blow on the head
with an axe, which penetrates half an inch into the head, is likely to endanger life and is
not sufficient to cause death.

The court accordingly set aside the sentence of death in case of Pandurang and altered it
to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. In case of the other two accused death sentence
was commuted to the life imprisonment.

Ram Tahal v. State of UP58

Six accused were charged with offences under IPC s 302 read with s 149, s 307 read with
s 149 and s 149 for having formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the
common object of demolishing the thatch of one Ram Badal Complainant PW 1 on 30
November 1967, at about 9.30am at Mohalla Alawalpur, Qasba Utraula, District Gonda
and for having committed the murder of Ram Harakh alias Karkhey and Jagga, the
brother and mother-in-law respectively of said Ram Badal.

The first question that has been urged before us is that none of the accused were
charged for individual acts but were found guilty under s 304 Part I read with s 149 which
requires the presence of five persons who share the common object, but since three of
them were acquitted, then whether the conviction of the appellant is illegal.

It is true that before s 149 which prescribe vicarious or constructive criminal

liability for members of an unlawful assembly which under s 141 of the IPC must consist
of five or more persons can be called in aid the court must find with certainly. However,
when the identity of one or more is in doubt, a conviction of the rest with the aid of s 149
would be good.

A five judge Bench of this Court in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab59, has further
reiterated this principle where it was pointed out that like s 149 of the IPC, s 34 of the IPC

58
AIR 1972 SC 254

59
AIR 1963 SC 174.

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also deals with cases of constructive liability but the essential constituent of the vicarious
criminal liability under s 34 is the existence of a common intention, but being similar in
some ways the two sections in some cases may overlap. Nevertheless common intention,
which s 34 has as its basis, is different from the common object of unlawful assembly. It
was pointed out that common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily
postulates a prearranged plan, a prior meeting of minds and an element of participation in
action. The acts may be different and vary in character but must be actuated by the same
common intention which is different from same intention or similar intention... the
question is whether the convictions under s 302 and s 307 can be sustained on the ground
that they had a common intention to commit the said offence.

There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the

commission of the crime showing a pre arranged plan and prior concert and though, it is
difficult, in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, it has to be inferred from
the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be
gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the sense and mountedf the
attack., the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries
caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries
the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence for instance, that all
of them had left the scene of the incident together and other acts, which all or some may
have done, as would help in determining the common intention. The totality of the
circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the
accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be
convicted.

This court had held in the Krishna Govind Patil case, that the pre arranged plan
may develop on the spot during the course of the commission of the offence but the
crucial circumstances is that the said plan must precede the act constituting the offence.
When on the shouts for help, given by the complainant and the injured, others came to
their rescue, all of them ran away together. In our view the totality of the circumstances
indicate without doubt the inference that there was a pre-concerted plan and a common
intention to remove the thatch and to attack any person if he resisted. The accused in the
furtherance of that common intention began to remove the chhaper and when Ram

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Harakh obstructed, they beat him and others who came to resist their attack and
aggression. Hence the appeal was dismissed.

Rambilas Singh v. State of Bihar60

Facts : It was alleged in the First Information Report (FIR) that before one
accused caused a stab wound, the accused, sixteen in number, had lain in wait and
surrounded the deceased in retaliation to an incident earlier and the co-accused were
convicted for murder on the ground that the act of the accused was in furtherance of the
common intention of all the accused assembled or in prosecution of a common object
formed by all of them, the conviction was not sustainable when a significant factor to be
borne in mind was that there was no evidence to show that the co-accused had known that
the accused was carrying a knife when they surrounded the deceased and the accused had
come without any weapons. If the co-accused had no knowledge that the accused was
carrying a knife, they could not even have remotely thought that he would be inflicting a
stab injury on the deceased.

Further, if it was the intention of all of the accused that the deceased should be done to
death, it was inconceivable that they would have come without any weapons except for
the knife brought by one of the accused and that they would not have launched an attack
on the deceased and would have rested content with the single stab inflicted by the
accused. The decision of Patna High Court was reversed. The appeal was allowed.

Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration)61

On 5 October 1972 at about 7.30 am while PW 16 was standing in the verandah of his
house, the appellant alongwith the acquitted accused persons came there and shouted. On
hearing the hue and cry, Ravinder Kumar came outside. Accused Madan and Naresh
(since acquitted) caught hold of Ravinder and Daulat (since acquitted) instigated the
appellant to kill Ravinder. The appellant took out a knife from his pyjama and inflicted a

60
AIR 1989 SC 1593
61
AIR 1990 SC

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stab on the chest of Ravinder. When PW 16 tried to intervene, he was hit with a stone on
his nose by Daulat Ram. After causing injuries to Ravinder and PW 16, all the accused
took to their heels by the side of Desh Bandhu Gupta Road. Ravinder ran after the
accused for a short distance and fell down and died in the hospital. The occurrence had
happened in a spur of moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.

The above inference is fortified by the admission of PW 17 admitting that both the
appellants and the deceased suddenly grappled with each other and the entire occurrence
was over within a minute. Thus, it is clear that it was during the course of the sudden
quarrel the appellant gave a single stab which unfortunately landed on the chest of the
deceased causing injury which in the opinion of the medical officer was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.

It was decided that the offence committed by the appellant is the one punishable under s
304 Part II but not under s 302 of the IPC.

Ghanshyam v. State of Uttar Pradesh62

The appellant Kehar Singh with his brother Dhir Singh and father Ghanshyam and
acquitted accused Hukum Singh were tried by the learned Third Additional District and
Session Judge, Saharanpur, for having committed an offence under ss 302/34 and Ss
323/34 of the IPC. Kukum Singh was acquitted. The remaining three accused including
Kehar Singh were convicted for both the offences.

A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the
conviction and sentence of Ghanshyam and Dhir Singh but while confirming the
conviction of appellant Kehar Singh the High Court set aside the sentence and referred his
case to the State Government under s 32 of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act 1951. Leave
was granted to appellant Kehar Singh alone and rejected the petition of the other
appellants.

There was some civil dispute between the deceased Dhoom Singh and the father
of the appellant, Kehar Singh. Dhoom Singh apprehending danger to his life had sent an
application on 16 June 1975 to the Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur, complaining

62
AIR 1983 SC 293.

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that not only his life but the life of his son was in danger at the hands of Ghanshyam,
Hukum Singh and others.

On 21 June 1975, the deceased Dhoom Singh, PW 2 Dharampal and one Chuttan,
when they were on their way to Pir Ka Maidan, were intercepted by the acquitted accused
Hukum Singh and the three co-accused. Hukum Singh had a tobal with him and each of
the three co-accused, including the present appellant was armed with a lathi. It is the
prosecution case that all the four accused persons started belabouring Dhoom Singh. PW
2 Dharam Pal intervened to rescue Dhoom Singh and in the process suffered a lathi blow
at the hands of accused no 1 Ghanshyam Singh. Accused 2 Dhir Singh is said to have
given a lathi blow on the head after Dhoom Singh had fallen down. Dhoom Singh fell on
the ground and died on the spot. The limited question was whether the participation by
Kehar Singh is established.

Appellant Kehar Singh, a young boy of fifteen years of age is ascribed the role in
vague terms, may be because he was present. But is this evicence sufficient to inculpate
him? Could he be said to be sharing the intention of his father and elder brother who gave
repeated blows? Evidence of other two witnesses, PW 3 Ram Pal and PW 4 Ved Prakash
is to the same effect. The meeting at a place where the incident is alleged to have
occurred is purely accidental because there is no evidence to show that the accused knew
in advance that the deceased and his companions were to pass by that route. In this state
of evidence we are not satisfied that appellant Kehar Singh, a young boy participated in
the attack. It is reasonable to believe that he might have been present at the time of
occurrence but mere presence in the circumstances of this case is not indicative of sharing
the intention of the father and brother. Therefore, the judges were satisfied that there is no
convincing and reliable evidence to hold that the present appellant shared the common
intention of his father and brother and participated in the assault on the deceased and that
the charges under ss 302/34 and ss 323/34 of the IPC, have been brought home to him.

It was decided to quash the conviction and the accused was acquitted. .

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 CONCLUSION

In this Paper, I have endeavored to understand the requirement of common intention in

case of joint liability. The analysis of section 34 of IPC is given in the project and on the
basis of the above cases I can conclude that:

1. Section 34 of the IPC deals with doing of separate acts similar or diverse several
persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, the person is liable for the
result of them all, as if he had done himself, for that as and 'the act' in the latter part of
the section must include the whole section covered by a 'criminal act' in the first part
because they refer to it.

2. Common intention to commit an offence need not be confused with same or similar
intention. The partition, which divides 'their bounds', is often very thin; nevertheless the
distinction is real and substantial. 'Common intention' requires some meeting of minds
before the incident. Proof of holding the same intention, or of sharing some other
intention is not enough.

3. Common intention must be anterior in time to the commission of crime. Common

intention has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other circumstances of the case. In
short, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a
conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit the offence or not.

4. Thus, on the basis of these observations we can conclude that along with the elements,
which are required to be proved under section 34 of IPC, we also have to keep in mind
the above principles to get a real picture of the whole section as section 34 is essential to
prove joint liability.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Gaur, K.D., A Textbook on The Indian Penal Code, 2nd edn., Universal Law
Publishing Co., Delhi, (2001).

2. Pillai, P.S.A., Criminal Law, 9th edn., Butterworths, New Delhi, (2000).

3. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 28th edn., Wadhwa & Co., Nagpur,
(2001).

4. Chandrachud, Y.V., The Indian Penal Code, Wadhawa & Company, Nagpur, Nagpur,
(2000).

5. Mishra, S.N., Indian Penal Code, 10 edn., Central Law Publications Allahabad,
(1998).

6. Ahmed, Ejaz, Law of Crimes, Vol. I, 4th edn., Rajasthan Law House, Jodhpur, (1994).

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