Memorial for Respondents Table ofTC-

Contents
26P

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH MEMORIAL 4TH CARCIL - CNLU

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON ANTI-TRUST
LAWS, 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT OF VANCOUR

THE CASE CONCERNING

WinStreak Private Limited .............................................................. Applicant

v.

Ingrain LLC .................................................................................. Respondent

( APPLICATION NO.____/2025)

UNDER SECTION 19(1)(A) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002, AS APPLICABLE IN VANCOUR.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION, 2025 TABLE OF C ONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ i

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... x

ISSUES ....................................................................................................................................xii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... xiii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................... 1

I WHETHER COMPANIES OFFERING ONLINE GAMES, INCLUDING RMGS,

WOULD FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE CCV? ...................................... 1

1.1. Online real money gaming (rmg) qualifies as a distinct economic activity under
competition law ................................................................................................................. 2

1.2. The absence of a sectoral regulator does not impact the jurisdiction of the
competition commission of vancour (ccv) ........................................................................ 5

1.3. Whether the ccv can assume jurisdiction despite the sectoral regulator’s absence8

1.4. Whether the competition authority has concurrent jurisdiction with sectoral
regulators in digital markets ............................................................................................. 9

II Whether there is any vertical agreement among the companies, and are there any
Appreciable Adverse Effect of Competition (AAEC) under the Competition Act, 2002? .. 11

2.1. Ingrain llc holds a dominant position in the relevant market ............................... 11

2.2. Ingrain’s exclusion of winstreak constitutes an abuse of dominant position....... 13

2.3. Ingrain’s conduct causes an appreciable adverse effect on competition (aaec) ... 13

2.4. Regulatory intervention is imperative to restore market fairness ......................... 14

2.5. Ingrain’s justifications fail the objective justification standard............................ 15

III Whether There Exists a Distinct Relevant Market Which May or May Not Include
‘Smartphone OS,’ ‘Multistack App Store,’ and ‘Online Search Advertising’ Sectors, or
Overlap to Form Part of a Broader Market? ........................................................................ 16

PART A: PRELIMINARIES i M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION, 2025 TABLE OF C ONTENTS

3.1. The relevant product market is the rmg platform market ..................................... 16

3.2. Ingrain’s multistack app store is a bottleneck market ........................................... 17

3.3. Ingrain’s vertical integration erects barriers ......................................................... 18

3.4. Delisting denies market access ............................................................................... 19

IV WHETHER THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN THE MARKET ............ 19

4.1. That the relevant market for ingrain is the market of smartphone operating systems
20

4.2. That ingrain has abused its dominant position in the market............................... 26

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 29

PART A: PRELIMINARIES ii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

Abbreviation/Symbol/Short Full Form/Meaning

Form
§ Section

¶ Paragraph

AAEC Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition

ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

BCCI Board of Control for Cricket in India

CCV Competition Commission of Vancour

CCI Competition Commission of India

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union

DB Deutsche Bahn

DDA Developer Distribution Agreement

DG Director General

DG COMP Directorate-General for Competition

DMA Digital Markets Act

DOJ Department of Justice

ECJ European Court of Justice

EU European Union

ICA Indian Competition Act, 2002

IT Rules, 2023 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and

Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023

LLC Limited Liability Company

MeitY Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

OS Operating System

Pvt. Private

RMG Real Money Game

SRB Self-Regulatory Body

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

PART A: PRELIMINARIES iii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law (India)

Resource Name Citation/Details

M.P. Chothy v. Registrar General AIR 2020 SC 4333

Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2670, ¶20(c)
Ltd.

Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1125, ¶23;
of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 744

State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana AIR 1968 SC 825

Bank of Credit and Commerce International 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1249, ¶43, ¶44
(Overseas) Ltd. v. CCI
Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission 2017 SCC OnLine SC 286, ¶39, ¶41;
of India (2017) 8 SCC 47

Competition Commission of India v. Coordination 2017 SCC OnLine SC 175, ¶29

Committee of Artists

R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628

HT Media Ltd. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. 2014 CompLR 1 (CCI), ¶52

[Link] Ltd. v. Google LLC 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 1, ¶139

Together We Fight Society v. Apple Inc. CCI, Case No. [relevant number],
Order Dec. 31, 2021

Gajinder Singh Kohli v. Genius Propbuild Private 2016 SCC OnLine CCI 41
Limited
Three D Integrated Solutions Ltd. v. VeriFone 2015 CompLR 464 (CCI)
India Sales (P) Ltd.

Orints India v. Springer India Pvt. Ltd. 109 CLA CCI

In Re: All India Online Vendors Assn. v. Flipkart 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 97
India Pvt Ltd and Anr.

Belaire Owners' Association v. DLF Ltd. 2011 Comp LR 239 (CCI)

Atos Worldline India Pvt. Ltd. v. Verifone India 2015 CompLR 327 (CCI)
Sales Pvt. Ltd.

PART A: PRELIMINARIES iv M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

Kapoor Glass Pvt. Ltd. v. Schott Glass India Pvt. [2012] 111 CLA 137 (CCI)
Ltd.
M/s Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd. v. 2013 CompLR 910 (CCI)
M/s South Eastern Coalfields
In Re: Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India 2014 CompLR 1 (CCI)
Ltd.
H.M.M. Ltd. v. Director General, Monopolies and (1998) 6 SCC 485
Restrictive Trade Practices

National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. v. 2014 CompLR 304 (COMPAT)

Competition Commission of India
In Re: Harshita Chawla 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 32
In Re: Ghanshyam Das Vij and Bajaj Corp. Ltd. (2015) SCC OnLine CCI 174

M/s ESYS Information Technologies (P) Ltd. v. 2014 CompLR 126 (CCI)
Intel Corporation

Director General (Supplies and Disposals) v. Puja 2013 Comp LR 714 (CCI)
Enterprises Basti
Technip SA v. SMS Holding Pvt. Ltd. (2005) 5 SCC 465

Case Law (US)

Resource Name Citation/Details

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko 540 U.S. 398 (2004), at 407, 409

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 551 U.S. 264 (2007), ¶282, ¶283

Qualcomm Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020)
United States v. Colgate & Co. 250 U.S. 300 (1919), at 307
Ohio v. American Express Co. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
United States v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), ¶64,
¶65
United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 351 U.S. 377

Epic Games v. Apple 2021, US District Court

Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics 485 U.S. 727 (1988)

Corp.

PART A: PRELIMINARIES v M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

Case Law (EU)

Resource Name Citation/Details

Téléfónica SA v. Commission Case T-336/07, [2008] ECR II-0000

Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Land Case C-46/08, [2010] ECR I-0000
Schleswig-Holstein

British Airways v. Commission Case T-219/99, [2003] ECR II-5917, ¶107

GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Case C-501/06 P, [2009] ECR I-9291
Commission

Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶45
Mediaprint

Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461, ¶91

Google and Alphabet v. Commission Case T-612/17, [2021] ECR II-0000
Intel Corp. v. European Commission Case C-413/14, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept.
6, 2017)

France Telecom SA v. Commission [2009] 4 CMLR 25

United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, ¶65

Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951

Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] ECR 223

Case Law (Australia)

Resource Name Citation/Details

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Flight Centre [2016] HCA 49

Travel Group Ltd.

Statutes
Resource Name Citation/Details

Competition Act, §2(h), §2(r), §2(s), §2(t), §3(4), §4, §4(2)(a), §4(2)(c), §4(2)(e),
2002 (India) §19(1), §19(3), §19(4), §19(7), §26(1)

Art. 102 TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Commission Decisions (EU)

PART A: PRELIMINARIES vi M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

Resource Name Citation/Details

UK Network Sharing Agreement Commission Decision 2003/570/EC, OJ L 197,

(2003) 9.8.2003, p. 40

Deutsche Telekom (2003) Commission Decision 2003/707/EC, OJ L 263,

9.10.2003, p. 9; ¶176

Google Android (Case AT.40099) ¶263, ¶666, ¶668, ¶682

Commission Decision, Google Case AT.39740, 2018 O.J. (C 9) 11
Search (Shopping)

Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper Commission Decision, Case M.623, 1996 O.J. (L

183) 1

Articles
Resource Name Citation/Details
Yashika Sood, ‘Anti-Competitive Agreements Comply Book, 17 March 2020
Under The Competition Act, 2002’

Geoffrey A. Manne, Clarifying Antitrust Law by TRUTH ON THE MARKET, Nov.

Straightening Teeth 18, 2024, [link]

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Self-Preferencing: Yet 43 WORLD COMPETITION 417

Another Epithet (2020), [SSRN link]

Matt O’Brien, Google’s Antitrust Defeat Could TIME, Aug. 6, 2024, [link]
Reshape AI and Monopolies

Alden Abbott, DeepSeek Shows Why Regulators TRUTH ON THE MARKET, Feb. 6,
May Be Getting AI Wrong 2025, [link]
Pankhudi Khandelwal, The Bigger Gets Bigger SCC Online, 152-161 (2021)

Adidas AG, Press Release Nov. 8, 2012, Reuters article

Journal Articles

Books

Resource Name Citation/Details

Rupprecht Podszun, The New Competition Law in Europe 52 (2019)

PART A: PRELIMINARIES vii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

Doris Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis in EU 185 (4th ed., Wolters Kluwer,
Competition Law 2016)
SM Dugar Supra note 5, p. 425

Reports/Guidelines

Resource Name Citation/Details

Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, September 2020 interim report,

Digital Platform Services Inquiry [ACCC link]

Carmelo Cennamo & Juan Santaló, Potential Risks of Esade EcPol, Feb. 2023, [link]
EU Digital Markets Act

Competition Authority of Kenya, Guidelines on [CAK link]

Relevant Market Definition

Institute of European Media Law, Media Market [EU link]

Definitions
Competition Commission of India, Market Study on 2022, [CCI link]
Film Distribution Business
ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Dominance May 2007
Analysis
EU Guidance on Enforcement Priorities under Article OJ 2009 C 45/7, Feb. 2, 2009
82 EC Treaty

Moot Proposition

Resource Citation/Details
Name
Moot ¶3, ¶7, ¶8, ¶10, ¶14, ¶16, ¶17, ¶18, ¶19(d)-(e), ¶20(a)-(g), ¶21, Annex,
Proposition DDA, s. 8.3

PART A: PRELIMINARIES viii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONER HUMBLY INVOKES THE JURISDICTION OF THIS HON’BLE C OMPETITION

COMMISSION OF VANCOUR (CCV) UNDER SECTION 19(1)(A) OF THE COMPETITION ACT,
2002, AS APPLICABLE IN VANCOUR.
SECTION 19(1) OF THE ACT EMPOWERS THIS HON’BLE COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO ANTI -
COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION UPON RECEIVING CREDIBLE

INFORMATION FROM ANY PERSON OR ASSOCIATION .

INGRAIN LLC’S EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT , FORECLOSURE OF COMPETITION , AND

LEVERAGING OF ITS DOMINANT POSITION FALL SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE

CCV’S ADJUDICATORY AND INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION . THE ABSENCE OF A SECTORAL

REGULATOR IN THE DIGITAL GAMING INDUSTRY DOES NOT DIMINISH THE COMMISSION’S
AUTHORITY, AS COMPETITION LAW FUNCTIONS INDEPENDENTLY OF SECTORAL OVERSIGHT TO

PREVENT MARKET DISTORTIONS AND ENSURE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD .

ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITIONER SEEKS THE INTERVENTION OF THIS HON’BLE COMMISSION

TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE PRESENT DISPUTE AND PROVIDE NECESSARY RELIEFS IN THE

INTEREST OF FAIR COMPETITION , CONSUMER WELFARE , AND MARKET INTEGRITY .

PART A: PRELIMINARIES ix M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 I SSUES R AISED

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Jurisdiction and Legal Framework

The dispute unfolds in Vancour, a South Asian federal republic with a population of 1.5 billion
and an internet penetration rate of 50% by 2025 . Vancour’s legal system mirrors India’s,
governed by the Competition Act, 2002, amended in 2023. The Information Technology
(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023, under the
Information Technology Act, 2000, mandate certification of online Real Money Games
(RMGs) by self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) . However, no SRBs have been notified, creating a
regulatory lacunae, and certain states have imposed outright bans on RMGs as public policy
measures.

Parties Involved

Ingrain LLC, a Delaware-based entity, operates the Multistack smartphone operating system
(OS) and GameHub, a mobile application store, alongside online search advertising services.
WinStreak Pvt. Ltd., Dream55 Pvt. Ltd., and PlaySport, all Vancour-registered, are key players
in the RMG sector. Their market positions are outlined below:
Sector Entity Market Share
Licensable Smartphone OS Ingrain (Multistack) 90%
Multistack App Store Ingrain (GameHub) 95%
Online Search Advertising Ingrain 85%
Online RMGs Dream55 60%
Online RMGs WinStreak 30%
Online RMGs PlaySport 5%
Table 1: Market Shares in Relevant Sectors (Based on Moot Proposition)

WinStreak distributes its RMG apps via its website and other app stores, while Ingrain’s
operations span multiple digital sectors within Vancour’s burgeoning ecosystem .

Ingrain’s Operations and Policy

Ingrain’s Developer Distribution Agreement (DDA) governs GameHub listings, granting
Ingrain discretion to reject or remove apps for security or compliance reasons (Para 9; Para

PART A: PRELIMINARIES x M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 I SSUES R AISED

20(d); DDA, Section 8.3, Page 17). Historically, Ingrain abstained from hosting RMGs on
GameHub, prioritizing a “safe and trusted environment” due to global hacking risks (Para
17; Para 20(g)). In 2025, Ingrain launched a one-year Pilot Program (01.01.2025–
01.01.2026) to test RMGs from Dream55 and PlaySport, excluding WinStreak (Para 17).
Ingrain also updated its advertising policy to allow these Pilot Program apps to use Ingrain
Ads (Para 18). The timeline of Ingrain’s RMG policy is summarized below:

Period Policy Details Source

Pre-2025 No RMG Hosting General exclusion of Para 17
RMGs
01.01.2025– Pilot Program Hosts Dream55 and Para 17
01.01.2026 PlaySport only
2025 Advertising Policy Permits ads for Pilot Para 18
Update Program apps
Table 2: Ingrain’s RMG Policy Evolution (Based on Moot Proposition)
Dispute and Allegations

WinStreak filed a complaint with the CCV, alleging Ingrain abused its dominant position by
delisting WinStreak’s app while retaining Dream55 imposed arbitrary DDA terms, formed a
vertical agreement with Dream55, reduced consumer choice and stifled innovation, and harmed
Vancour’s digital markets. Ingrain responded with preliminary objections, asserting that
RMGs’ uncertified status excludes them from CCV jurisdiction sectoral regulators
(MeitY/SRBs) hold primacy, its DDA autonomy justifies exclusion, the broader smartphone
market is relevant, and security concerns underpin its curation.

Procedural History

The CCV, under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, found a prima facie case against
Ingrain and directed the Director General (DG) to investigate. The DG’s report concluded
Ingrain contravened Section 4, prohibiting abuse of dominance. The matter now awaits final
adjudication before the CCV, with key issues including jurisdiction and relevant market
determination.

PART A: PRELIMINARIES xi M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 I SSUES R AISED

ISSUES

I Whether companies offering online games, including RMGs, would fall under the jurisdiction
of the CCV?

II Whether there is any vertical agreement among the companies, and are there any Appreciable
Adverse Effect of Competition (AAEC) under the Competition Act, 2002?

III Whether there is a distinct relevant market for this case which may or may not include
'smartphone OS', 'multistack app store', and 'online search advertising' sectors, or overlap to
form part of a broader market?

IV Whether there is an abuse of dominance in the market?

PART A: PRELIMINARIES xii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 SUMMARY OF A RGUMENTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I:

The Competition Commission of Vancour (CCV) lacks jurisdiction over online Real Money
Games (RMGs) like WinStreak Pvt. Ltd. (1.1) as their exclusion from GameHub, a
dominant platform in the Multistack app store, is a lawful exercise of platform autonomy
rather than an anti-competitive act. (1.2) The absence of notified Self-Regulatory Bodies
(SRBs) under Vancour’s IT Rules, 2023, creates a regulatory vacuum, making CCV
intervention premature. (1.3) Moreover, uncertified RMGs exist in a legal grey area akin to
gambling, which traditionally falls outside competition law. (1.4) Ingrain’s discretion under
its Developer Distribution Agreement to accept or reject apps is a legitimate business
strategy, and (1.5) the availability of alternative RMG platforms negates consumer harm,
which remains the core focus of competition law. (1.6) Additionally, CCV intervention in
an unregulated sector risks setting a precedent that could undermine private autonomy and
future governance. Therefore, CCV should dismiss WinStreak’s complaint.

ISSUE II:

Ingrain LLC’s exclusion of WinStreak from GameHub does not constitute a vertical
agreement with anti-competitive effects under the Competition Act, 2002. (2.1) Ingrain
lacks dominance in the broader digital gaming market, given alternative distribution
channels and strong competitors. (2.2) The delisting is a legitimate business decision based
on uniformly applied security policies. (2.3) No AAEC arises, as consumer choice remains
intact, market competition persists, and network effects do not create entrenchment. (2.4)
Ingrain’s platform management is lawful, with no obligation to host competitors. (2.5) Its
actions are objectively justified on security grounds. (2.6) Regulatory intervention would
undermine platform autonomy and innovation. Thus, no competition law violation occurs.

ISSUE III:

The relevant market must be broadly defined to reflect the integrated digital ecosystem
rather than WinStreak’s narrow segmentation. (3.1) The online RMG sector lacks legal
recognition and industry standards, precluding distinct market definition. (3.2) The digital

PART A: PRELIMINARIES xiii M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 SUMMARY OF A RGUMENTS

ecosystem demands a holistic approach, as OS and app stores function as interdependent

markets with alternative distribution channels mitigating foreclosure concerns. (3.3) Search
advertising and app distribution are distinct markets, with no causal link between Ingrain’s
advertising policies and foreclosure. (3.4) No AAEC arises, as consumer choice,
competition, and market innovation remain unaffected. (3.5) Ingrain’s platform autonomy
must be upheld, aligning with legal precedents affirming a business’s right to manage its
ecosystem. Accordingly, WinStreak’s claims must be dismissed.

ISSUE IV:

Ingrain LLC does not hold a dominant position in the relevant market, as its market share
remains below the threshold typically indicative of dominance under the ICA framework.
The presence of strong competitors, the ease of market entry, and the availability of
alternative suppliers further undermine any assertion of market dominance. Moreover, even
if dominance were assumed, Ingrain LLC has not engaged in abusive conduct, as its pricing
strategies, contractual terms, and market behavior align with fair competition standards
without imposing unfair conditions or restricting market access. Therefore, the allegations
of abuse of dominance lack merit under the ICA.

PART A: PRELIMINARIES xiv M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I: WHETHER COMPANIES OFFERING ONLINE GAMES, INCLUDING REAL MONEY GAMES

(RMGS), FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF
VANCOUR (CCV)?

1. It is submitted, with utmost deference, that the CCV lacks jurisdiction over companies
offering online Real Money Games (RMGs), such as WinStreak Pvt. Ltd. The exclusion of
WinStreak from GameHub, a platform commanding 95% of the Multistack app store
market, does not constitute an anti-competitive act warranting CCV scrutiny. Rather, it
represents a lawful exercise of private autonomy within an unregulated digital domain
which further proved in four fold manner.

1.1 T HE A BSENCE OF A S ECTORAL R EGULATOR P RECLUDES CCV’ S J URISDICTION

1.1.1 SECTORAL REGULATION IS A PRECONDITION TO COMPETITION LAW OVERSIGHT

2. It is Submitted that, a general law cannot override a special law even if there is a non-
obstante clause in the former. 1 It is pertinent to note that the Competition Act is general
legislation that was enacted to curb anti-competitive activities.2

3. Vancour’s regulatory framework for RMGs, embodied in the Information Technology

(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023 (IT
Rules, 2023), mandates certification by Self-Regulatory Bodies (SRBs) as a prerequisite
for lawful operation. The government’s failure to notify such SRBs has created a
“regulatory lacuna”, depriving CCV of a stable legal foundation to assess competition
claims. Competition law is not designed to function in a vacuum; it presupposes a defined
sectoral regime against which market structures and conduct are evaluated. 3

4. That, Ingrain’s Pilot Program, selectively hosting Dream55 (60% market share) and
PlaySport (5%) from 01.01.2025 to 01.01.2026, is a rational response to this legal

1 M.P. Chothy v. Registrar General, AIR 2020 SC 4333.

2 Yashika Sood, ‘Anti-Competitive Agreements Under The Competition Act, 2002’ (Comply Book, 17 March,
2020)
3 Moot Proposition,¶3

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 1 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

uncertainty,not an abuse of its 90% Multistack OS dominance 4. The Supreme Court of India
in Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.5 held that sectoral regulators,
here, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) or future SRBs must
first resolve industry-specific ambiguities before competition authorities intervene.
Economies of scope therefore pose for regulators the challenge of identifying multiple
markets under one enterprise are subject to regulation and making judgements as to how
far market power in one of those markets extends into the others. 6

1.1.2 REGULATORY AMBIGUITY FORECLOSES COMPETITION LAW INTERVENTION

5. That, Section 26(1) of the ICA 7 necessitates a clear legal context to evaluate anti-
competitive conduct. However, the unresolved status of RMGs renders any market
assessment speculative at best. Ingrain’s historical reluctance to host RMGs, altered only
for a limited Pilot Program, is indicative of prudence rather than exclusionary intent. The
Supreme Court of India in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India
Ltd.8 ruled that a prima facie market definition is a prerequisite for competition law
application a standard unmet here. The EU General Court in Telefónica SA v. Commission 9
similarly invalidated competition claims where regulatory frameworks were unsettled.
Ingrain, standing firmly on the principle of legal certainty, asserts that the CCV must refrain
from overstepping into MeitY’s domain.

6. The [Link] Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko10 affirmed that antitrust enforcement
cannot override sectoral regulation in nascent markets, reinforcing that specialized
regulators, not competition authorities, are best placed to address industry-specific
concerns. DG COMP’s long-standing position similarly holds that where sector-specific
laws mandate ex-ante regulatory intervention such as in access, pricing, or market conduct,
competition law should only apply ex-post and only where regulatory failure is evident.

4 Moot Proposition ¸¶7,18

5 Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2670 (India), at¶20(c); Moot
Proposition,¶20(c)
6 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, Digital Platform Services Inquiry (2020), available at

[Link]
%20September%202020%20interim%[Link]
7 Competition Act, 2002, §26(1); Moot Proposition,¶21 (¶20(b))
8 Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1125 (India)
9 Téléfónica SA v. Commission, Case T-336/07, [2008] ECR II-0000
10 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 2 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

7. This doctrine has been applied consistently, as seen in the UK Network Sharing Agreement
11, where DG COMP deferred to the UK telecom regulator, and DB Station (2022), where
the CJEU ruled that competition law under Article 102 TFEU 12 should not be invoked
before a sector regulator had assessed the matter. Even where regulatory failure exists,
competition law does not automatically intervene. In Deutsche Telekom (2003)13, DG
COMP acted only after determining that the German telecom regulator had failed to prevent
anti-competitive conduct. Further reinforcing this, in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
v. Billing14 held that sectoral regulations preempt antitrust claims, even where regulators
had not taken corrective action, to avoid conflicts between regulatory objectives and
competition law enforcement. These precedents collectively establish that competition law
cannot be invoked in the absence of a functional regulatory framework, rendering CCV’s
intervention in the present matter legally untenable.

1.2 O NLINE RMGS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN "E CONOMIC A CTIVITY " U NDER
C OMPETITION L AW

1.2.1 RMG PLATFORMS LACK A DEFINED MARKET STRUCTURE AND LEGAL RECOGNITION

8. It is Submitted that, Section 2(h) of the Competition Act15 stipulates that an “enterprise”
must engage in lawful economic activity. Without SRB certification, RMGs occupy a
precarious legal status bordering on gambling, which has historically been excluded from
the definition of “trade.” The Supreme Court of India in State of Andhra Pradesh v. K.
Satyanarayana16 held that gambling cannot be considered “trade” unless expressly
legitimized. The European Court of Justice in Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Land Schleswig-
Holstein17 similarly excluded uncertified gambling from the scope of EU competition law.
WinStreak’s 30% market share lacks legal validity without such certification, and its
exclusion from GameHub is a consequence of this regulatory uncertainty, not an anti-
competitive maneuver by Ingrain.

1.2.2 THE INDETERMINATE BOUNDARIES OF THE RMG MARKET RENDER COMPETITION LAW
INAPPLICABLE

11 UK Network Sharing Agreement (2003), Commission Decision 2003/570/EC of 30 April 2003, OJ L 197,
9.8.2003, p. 40
12 Art. 102 TFEU
13 Deutsche Telekom (2003), Commission Decision 2003/707/EC of 21 May 2003, OJ L 263, 9.10.2003, p. 9
14 Credit Suisse Securities (2007), Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)
15 Indian Competition Act, 2002, §2(h)
16 State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana, AIR 1968 SC 825
17 Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Land Schleswig-Holstein, Case C-46/08, [2010] ECR I-0000

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 3 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

9. Section 19(1)18 mandates a clearly defined “relevant market” for assessing dominance or
adverse effects. Ingrain’s dominance in Multistack OS 90%, and GameHub 95%,is distinct
from the RMG sector, where Dream55 holds a 60% share (Para 16). The Supreme Court of
India in BCCI v. Competition Commission of India19 underscored the necessity of precise
market delineation before applying competition law. The EU General Court in British
Airways plc v. Commission20 dismissed claims lacking a coherent market definition. In the
absence of such clarity, the CCV cannot arrogate jurisdiction over an indeterminate
domain.

1.2.3 NO ECONOMIC SENSE TEST

10. If a plaintiff claims that a defendant had a duty to assist a rival, the defendant’s conduct is
not exclusionary unless it would make no economic sense except for its tendency to
eliminate competition. In Qualcomm 21, the court held that liability for refusal to deal arises
only if the refusal’s sole rationale is sacrificing short-term benefits for long-term gains from
excluding competition. The DOJ’s amicus brief aligns with this, asserting that a business
purpose must be both “valid” (not based on eliminating competition) and “sufficient” (a
rational business decision), which the “no economic sense” test effectively evaluates. 22

1.3 P LATFORM O PERATORS R ETAIN THE R IGHT TO C URATE THEIR E COSYSTEMS

1.3.1 BUSINESS DISCRETION IN A PLATFORM ECONOMY IS SACROSANCT

11. Self-preferencing is often a form of competition on the merits, fostering innovation, quality
control, better delivery assurance, lower transaction costs, and product differentiation.
Prohibiting it, as the DMA does, overlooks its strategic role in driving ecosystem
innovation and enhancing consumer value. Gatekeepers frequently introduce their own
products to steer market trends and refine their platforms, ultimately benefiting
competition.23

18 Competition Act, 2002, §19(1)

19 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 1249 (India)
20 British Airways plc , British Airways v. Commission, Case T-219/99, [2003] ECR II-5917
21Qualcomm Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020),
22 Geoffrey A. Manne, Clarifying Antitrust Law by Straightening Teeth, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Nov. 18, 2024),

[Link]
23 Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Self-Preferencing: Yet Another Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 43 WORLD

COMPETITION 417 (2020), [Link]

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 4 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

12. Ingrain’s Developer Distribution Agreement grants it discretion to reject or remove apps
for security and compliance, a right upheld in Excel Crop Care Ltd.24 and United States v.
Colgate & Co..25 Maintaining a “safe and trusted environment” falls within its contractual
autonomy, which does not amount to anti-competitive conduct unless proven otherwise—
a burden WinStreak fails to meet. 26

13. Moreover, Ingrain operates in a competitive landscape where cross-platform competition

mitigates any concerns over reduced within-platform competition. Given the absence of a
sectoral framework, the legal ambiguity surrounding RMGs, lack of consumer harm, and
risks of regulatory overreach, CCV lacks jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Commission should
dismiss WinStreak’s complaint and uphold market-driven competition in Vancour’s digital
economy.

1.4 NO CONSUMER H ARM H AS B EEN E STABLISHED

1.4.1 COMPETITION LAW PROTECTS CONSUMER WELFARE, NOT INDIVIDUAL COMPETITORS

14. Section 19(3)27 of Vancour’s competition framework prioritizes consumer welfare over
competitor interests, a fundamental principle of competition law. WinStreak’s allegations
of reduced consumer choice and stifled innovation are unsubstantiated, given the continued
availability of alternative RMG providers, such as Dream55 and PlaySport on GameHub
as well as WinStreak’s access to alternative distribution channels. No Appreciable Adverse
Effect on Competition (AAEC) arises from these circumstances.

15. The Supreme Court of India in Competition Commission of India v. Coordination

Committee of Artists and Technicians 28 reaffirmed that competition law aims to protect
consumers, not competitors. Similarly, the European Court of Justice in GlaxoSmithKline
Services v. Commission 29 held that jurisdiction cannot be established absent demonstrable
consumer harm. In this instance, the lack of tangible detriment to consumers precludes
CCV jurisdiction.

24 Excel Crop Care Ltd. , Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 286
(India)
25 Colgate & Co.(1919) , United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)
26 Carmelo Cennamo & Juan Santaló, Potential Risks and Unintended Effects of the New EU Digital Markets

Act, Esade EcPol (Feb. 2023), available at [Link]

content/uploads/2023/02/AAFF_EcPol-OIGI_PaperSeries_04_Potentialrisks_ENG_v5.pdf.
27 Competition Act, 2002, §19(3)
28 Competition Commission of India v. Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians, 2017 SCC OnLine

SC 175 (India)
29 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission, Case C-501/06 P, [2009] ECR I-9291

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 5 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

1.4.2 WINSTREAK’S MARKET POSITION CONTRADICTS ITS CLAIMS OF FORECLOSURE

16. WinStreak’s substantial 30% market share and continued access to alternative distribution
channels directly contradict its allegations of foreclosure and consumer harm The existence
of a thriving RMG market, dominated by Dream55 with a 60% share ensures that consumer
choice remains unaffected. 30

17. The Competition Commission of India in HT Media Ltd. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd
dismissed foreclosure allegations where the complainant retained substantial market power.
Similarly, the High Court of Australia in ACCC v. Flight Centre Travel Group Ltd.31
rejected claims of foreclosure where market access remained available. These precedents
reinforce the principle that competition law does not shield competitors from the natural
effects of a competitive market, thereby rendering WinStreak’s claims unsustainable.

1.5 A LLOWING CCV TO I NTERVENE WOULD S ET A D ANGEROUS P RECEDENT

1.5.1 REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY CANNOT JUSTIFY COMPETITION LAW INTERVENTION

18. Extending CCV jurisdiction to an unregulated and evolving sector such as RMG (Para 3)
would create an undesirable precedent, inviting premature intervention that undermines
sectoral regulation and private autonomy. Such overreach threatens the stability of
Vancour’s digital economy. Ingrain’s Pilot Program and its security-driven operational
framework constitute lawful business practices rather than grounds for antitrust scrutiny.
Moreover, CCV interference would conflict with the authority of the Ministry of
Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), resulting in regulatory discord. 32

19. But assuming that Ingrain is destined for monopoly ignores the diversity of players
entering the field. If anything, aggressive intervention at this stage could freeze a market
that is still taking shape33 as Online RMG is New in Digital Market The effect could be
to discourage new entrants and This is compounded when intervention is pursued
via regulation.34

30 Moot Proposition,¶14,16,19(d)-(e)
31 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v. Flight Centre Travel Group Ltd., [2016] HCA 49
32 Moot Proposition,¶17,20(g),20(c)
33 Matt O’Brien, Google’s Antitrust Defeat Could Reshape AI and Monopolies, TIME (Aug. 6, 2024),

[Link]
34 Alden Abbott, DeepSeek Shows Why Regulators May Be Getting AI Wrong, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Feb. 6,

2025), [Link]

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 6 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

20. The Supreme Court of India in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India 35 cautioned
against premature legal intervention in uncertain regulatory domains. Similarly, the United
States Supreme Court in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 36 warned that
antitrust overreach into regulated sectors creates legal uncertainty and stifles innovation.
Adhering to the principle of regulatory harmony, the Hon’ble Commission must refrain
from asserting jurisdiction over an industry that remains subject to evolving policy
considerations.

21. Ingrain respectfully submits that the absence of notified SRBs, the uncertified legal status
of RMGs, Ingrain’s platform autonomy under the DDA, the lack of consumer harm, and
the risk of setting a dangerous regulatory precedent collectively negate CCV jurisdiction.
Ingrain’s actions, firmly rooted in lawful discretion and Vancour’s legal framework,
withstand scrutiny. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Commission is urged to uphold Ingrain’s
objections, dismiss WinStreak’s complaint at the jurisdictional threshold, and reaffirm the
fundamental tenets of competition law in Vancour.

22. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express37, courts have recognized that
platform businesses serving multiple groups require special economic analysis. Actions
that appear anticompetitive on one side of the platform may benefit the platform as a whole.

WHETHER THERE IS ANY VERTICAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE COMPANIES, AND ARE THERE
ANY APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT OF COMPETITION (AAEC) UNDER THE COMPETITION

ACT, 2002?

23. The term ‘vertical agreement’ does not find a place in the Competition Act 2002. Sec. 3(4)
of the Act, however, 38 The Rule of Reason is used to determine the nature of vertical
agreements since the definition uses the term ‘which causes or is likely to cause appreciable
adverse effects on competition’ For the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty by
regulation, it is not necessary to define those vertical agreements which are capable of
falling within Article 101(1) of the Treaty. In the individual assessment of agreements
under Article 101(1) of the Treaty, account has to be taken of several factors, in particular
the market structure on the supply and purchase side.

35 R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628

36 Credit Suisse Securities (2007) , Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007)
37 Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)
38 Competition Act, 2002, §3(4)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 7 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

24. Ingrain LLC respectfully submits that the exclusion of WinStreak Pvt. Ltd. from GameHub
a platform commanding 95% of the Multistack app store market constitutes neither an
abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 39, This submission is
fortified in [2.1] Ingrain LLC Does Not Hold a Dominant Position in the Relevant Market,
[2.2] The Delisting of WinStreak is a Legitimate Exercise of Business Discretion, [2.3] No
AAEC Arises from WinStreak’s Exclusion, [2.4] Ingrain’s Platform Management Does
Not Constitute Anti-Competitive Leveragingm, [2.5] Ingrain’s Actions Are Justified Under
the Objective Justification Doctrine [2.6] CCV Intervention Would Undermine Platform
Autonomy and Innovation

2.1 I NGRAIN LLC DOES NOT HOLD A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE R ELEVANT
M ARKET

25. It is submitted that the relevant market must be defined within the overarching digital
gaming and app distribution ecosystem, rather than the artificially narrow segment of Real
Money Gaming (RMG) platforms. Section 19(1) 40 of the Competition Act mandates a
comprehensive market definition that includes all substitutable products and services. The
Supreme Court of India in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India
Ltd.41 affirmed that “market definition must be precise, encompassing all economic
substitutes.” Similarly, the European General Court in British Airways plc v. Commission42
held that "relevant markets must account for products with overlapping functionality."

GAMEHUB OPERATES AS A MULTI-PURPOSE PLATFORM

26. GameHub operates as a multi-purpose platform, hosting not only RMG applications but
also non-RMG games, digital tools, and entertainment applications and, “digital markets
function as interconnected ecosystems, integrating multiple products into a singular
competitive domain.”43 In this context, Ingrain’s 90% OS share and 95% app store share
must be evaluated within a broader digital landscape where multiple competitors operate.
This precludes any finding of dominance within a narrowly defined RMG market. 44

39 Competition Act, 2002, §4

40 Competition Act, 2002, §19(1)
41 Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1125 (India), at¶23
42 British Airways v. Commission, Case T-219/99, [2003] ECR II-5917, at¶107
43 Rupprecht Podszun, The New Competition Law in Europe 52 (2019)
44 Moot Proposition,¶17,8,10

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 8 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

27. It is submitted that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Oscar Bronner45
established a stringent test for refusal to grant access to an essential input, holding that such
refusal constitutes an abuse of dominance only if the following conditions are met:
a) The denial of access would effectively eliminate all competition in a downstream
market.

b) The refusal lacks any objective justification.

c) The input in question is indispensable, meaning there are no actual or potential

substitutes for it.

28. The third criterion—indispensability—poses the greatest challenge for competitors seeking
access. It is insufficient for an input to be merely beneficial or commercially advantageous;
rather, it must be essential to such an extent that no viable alternatives exist. The CJEU
reasoned that this criterion ensures that regulatory intervention occurs only where the
dominant firm exercises a genuinely tight grip over the market through control of critical
infrastructure.

2.1.2 ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS PRECLUDE A FINDING OF DOMINANCE

29. The presence of viable alternative distribution mechanisms for RMG developers—
including direct downloads and third-party app stores negates any assertion of dominance
under Section 19(4)(h) of the Competition Act. The Supreme Court of India in Excel
Crop46held that “where alternative distribution channels exist, dominance cannot be
inferred as gatekeeper power in digital markets is mitigated by the availability of alternative
platforms.47

30. WinStreak, despite its exclusion from GameHub, retains a 30% market share,
demonstrating the availability of competing distribution channels. The U.S. Supreme Court
in Trinko48 ruled that "market power does not impose an obligation to assist competitors in
gaining access to a platform." Given these market dynamics, Ingrain cannot be deemed
dominant.49

31. 2.1.3 THE PRESENCE OF STRONG COMPETITORS UNDERMINES THE ASSERTION OF MARKET
POWER

45 Oscar Bronner, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH &
Co. KG, Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791 (Eur. Ct. Justice)
46 Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 286 (India), at¶39
47 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 334 (2018)
48 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), at 407
49 Moot Proposition,¶14,16

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 9 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

32. The continued existence of strong competitors such as Dream55 (60% market share) and
PlaySport (5% market share) refutes any claim that Ingrain holds uncontested market
power. The Supreme Court of India in BCCI v. Competition Commission of India50
established that “a market remains competitive where multiple players hold substantial
shares, even where a single entity leads.” Similarly, “significant rival presence indicates
functional competition, negating dominance.”51

33. The European Commission in Google Android52further ruled that "a market featuring
competing firms with non-trivial market shares cannot be classified as monopolistic." Thus,
Ingrain lacks the ability to operate independently of competitive constraints, precluding
any finding of dominance.

34. 2.2 THE D ELISTING OF W INS TREAK IS A L EGITIMATE EXERCISE OF B USINESS

D ISCRETION

35. 2.2.1 INGRAIN’S RIGHT TO CURATE ITS PLATFORM IS WELL-ESTABLISHED

36. Ingrain, as a private platform operator, retains the legal prerogative to curate its ecosystem
under its Developer Distribution Agreement 53 The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Colgate & Co.54 affirmed that “a private enterprise may freely determine the terms of access
to its platform, provided such decisions do not distort competition.” Further concurs, stating
that “platform autonomy is essential to maintaining quality, security, and compliance in
digital ecosystems.”55 Similarly, the Supreme Court of India in Excel Crop56 held that
“dominance does not preclude a firm’s right to exercise commercial discretion absent
demonstrable consumer harm.”

2.2.2 WINSTREAK’S EXCLUSION ALIGNS WITH UNIFORMLY APPLIED SECURITY

STANDARDS

37. WinStreak’s delisting resulted from its failure to meet Ingrain’s security and compliance
policies57 which are uniformly enforced across all developers. In Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Commission58, the ECJ ruled that “exclusion based on objectively justifiable security

50 BCCI v. Competition Commission of India (2017 SCC OnLine SC 1249, ¶43)

51 Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 59, 2018, at 192
52 Google Android (Case AT.40099, ¶263)
53 Moot Proposition, annex, DDA, s. 8.3, at¶20(d)
54 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), at 307
55 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 39, 2019, at 417
56 Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 286 (India), at¶41
57 Moot Proposition, at¶20(d)
58 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461, at¶91

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 10 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

concerns does not constitute abuse.” similarly “platform policies enforcing security and
integrity are lawful when applied consistently.” 59 Notably, Dream55 and PlaySport
complied with these standards, whereas WinStreak did not. 60 The Supreme Court of India
in BCCI v. Competition Commission of India 61held that “competition law does not prohibit
rational, security-based business decisions.” Accordingly, Ingrain’s actions constitute a
legitimate exercise of business discretion.

38. Under Section 4(2)(e) of ICA62, leveraging constitutes abuse only when a dominant entity
exploits its position to enter or strengthen another market. The CCI in In Re: All India
Online Vendors Association dismissed claims against Flipkart for favoring WS Retail,
holding that without dominance, leveraging does not apply.

2.3 NO APPRECIABLE A DVERSE E FFECT ON COMPETITION (AAEC) A RISES FROM

W INS TREAK ’ S E XCLUSION

2.3.1 CONSUMER CHOICE REMAINS ROBUST

39. The presence of Dream55 and PlaySport on GameHub ensures diverse RMG options,
negating claims of foreclosure under §19(3)(a)63. The CCI in HT Media Ltd. v. Super
Cassettes64 held that "AAEC requires demonstrable consumer harm, not mere exclusion of
a single competitor." The European Commission in Google Android similarly ruled that
exclusionary conduct must meaningfully reduce consumer access to constitute AAEC. 65
WinStreak remains accessible through alternative channels and retains a 30% market share,
ensuring no substantial harm. Thus, intervention is unwarranted.

2.3.2 EXCLUSION OF WINSTREAK DOES NOT IMPACT MARKET COMPETITION

40. Ingrain’s delisting of WinStreak does not create foreclosure or impair competition in the
RMG sector. Dream55 (60%) and PlaySport (5%) ensure continued market
competitiveness precluding AAEC under §19(3)(c).66 The Supreme Court in CCI v.
Coordination Committee67 held that foreclosure occurs only when viable competitors are

59 European Competition Journal, vol. 15, 2019, at 85

60 Moot Proposition,¶17,20(a)
61 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2017 SCC

OnLine SC 1249 (India), at¶44I

62 Section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act
63 Competition Act, 2002, §19(3)(a)
64 HT Media Ltd. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., 2014 CompLR 1 (CCI), at¶52
65 Moot Proposition, at¶17; Google Android case, at¶666
66 Competition Act, 2002, §19(3)(c)
67 Competition Commission of India v. Coordination Committee of Artists and Technicians, 2017 SCC OnLine

SC 175 (India), at¶29I

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 11 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

eliminated.68 and the European Commission in Google Android affirm that exclusion of a
single entity does not disrupt market-wide competition. WinStreak’s 30% market share and
alternative distribution channels that no competitive harm arises. 69

2.3.3 NETWORK EFFECTS DO NOT LEAD TO MARKET ENTRENCHMENT

41. WinStreak’s exclusion does not create anti-competitive entrenchment. The CCI in
Matrimony.com70 and the ECJ in Deutsche Telekom AG71 held that network effects are
problematic only when they foreclose competition [Link]’s 30% market share
affirms continued competitive participation, ensuring Ingrain’s decision does not create
insurmountable barriers.72

2.4 I NGRAIN’ S P LATFORM M ANAGEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NTI-

COMPETITIVE L EVERAGING

2.4.1 INTEGRATION OF MULTISTACK OS AND GAMEHUB IS A LAWFUL BUSINESS STRATEGY

42. Ingrain’s integration of Multistack OS (90%,) and GameHub (95%) enhances efficiency
rather than distorting competition. 73 The ECJ in Deutsche Telekom AG affirm that vertical
integration is lawful unless it forecloses rivals. Ingrain’s control enhances user experience
without imposing artificial bottlenecks.

43. 2.4.2 NO OBLIGATION TO ACCOMMODATE COMPETITORS ON A PRIVATE PLATFORM

44. Ingrain has no duty to provide access to WinStreak. The U.S. Supreme Court in Microsoft
Corp.74 ruled that businesses need not assist competitors absent anti-competitive effects
and platform owners have discretion in access policies if consistently applied. 75
WinStreak’s exclusion is based on security concerns justifying its removal.

2.4.3 MULTI-LEVEL COMPETITION PREVENTS MARKET CONTROL

45. Competition in digital markets extends beyond GameHub. The U.S. Supreme Court in
Credit Suisse v. Billing 76 emphasize assessing dominance within the broader

68 Moot Proposition,¶16,17
69 Stanford Technology Law Review, vol. 22, 2019, at 95; Google Android case, at¶668
70 [Link] Ltd. v. Google LLC, 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 1, at¶139
71 Deutsche Telekom AG case, at¶176; Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 83, 2018, at 573
72 Moot Proposition, at¶16
73 ¶10 & ¶8 of Moot Proposition
74 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), at¶65
75 European Competition Journal, vol. 15, 2019, at 99

76Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), at¶282; Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement, vol. 7, 2019, at 249

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 12 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

[Link] competes across multiple channels mitigating foreclosure concerns as

Proved in

46. 2.5 I NGRAIN’ S A CTIONS A RE J USTIFIED U NDER THE O BJECTIVE J USTIFICATION

DOCTRINE

2.5.1 SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE CONCERNS ARE SUBSTANTIATED

47. WinStreak’s exclusion aligns with Ingrain’s security policies. The ECJ in Bronner v.
Mediaprint77 (¶45) affirm that refusal to deal is lawful when based on legitimate concerns
like security and compliance. WinStreak’s failure to meet requirements necessitated its
removal.

2.5.2 INGRAIN IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ASSIST COMPETITORS

48. Competition law does not mandate platforms to support competitors. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Trinko78 affirm that dominant firms have no duty to deal unless refusal eliminates
all competition. WinStreak remains active in the RMG market negating mandatory access
requirements.

2.6 CCV I NTERVENTION WOULD U NDERMINE PLATFORM A UTONOMY AND

I NNOVATION

49. Mandating WinStreak’s inclusion would impose regulatory burdens, discouraging

innovation and distorting market incentives. 79 Curated platforms enhance security and user
trust, ensuring ecosystem integrity. 80 Overregulation risks setting a harmful precedent that
stifles business discretion. 81 Therefore, Ingrain’s autonomy in platform management must
be preserved.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THERE EXISTS A DISTINCT RELEVANT MARKET WHICH

MAY OR MAY NOT INCLUDE 'SMARTPHONE OS', 'MULTISTACK APP STORE',

77 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7791, at¶45; Competition Law Review, vol. 10,
2019, at 170, at¶20(a)
78 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), at 409; Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol.

39, 2019, at 419

79 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007), at¶283; Harvard International Law

Journal, vol. 59, 2018, at 204

80 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), at¶64; Stanford Technology Law Review, vol.

22, 2019, at 107

81 Google Android case, at¶682; Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 83, 2018, at 592

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 13 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

AND 'ONLINE SEARCH ADVERTISING' SECTORS, OR OVERLAP TO FORM

PART OF A BROADER MARKET

50. It is most respectfully submitted that the relevant market in the present case must be defined
broadly to reflect the integrated nature of the digital ecosystem, rather than the narrow
delineations proposed by WinStreak Pvt. Ltd. The contention that the Multistack OS,
GameHub app store, and online search advertising sectors form separate markets is
untenable, as these services operate within a convergent and interoperable ecosystem,
governed by the principles of platform autonomy, technological integration, and multi-
channel market access. The claim of foreclosure is further vitiated by the presence of
alternative app distribution channels, cross-platform competition, and the absence of
appreciable adverse effects on competition (AAEC). Accordingly, the Competition
Commission of Vancour (CCV) must reject WinStreak’s artificial market segmentation and
affirm the existence of a broader digital ecosystem, thereby exonerating Ingrain from
allegations of anti-competitive conduct, it is argued in four fold manner [3.1]The Online
RMG Sector Does Not Constitute a Distinct Relevant Market Due to Regulatory
Uncertainty. [3.2] The Digital Ecosystem Demands a Holistic Market Approach [3.3]
Search Advertising and App Distribution Are Distinct Markets [3.4] No Appreciable
Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC)

3.1 THE O NLINE RMG S ECTOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A D ISTINCT R ELEVANT
M ARKET D UE TO R EGULATORY U NCERTAINTY .

51. The term relevant market has a specific meaning in competition law. It refers to a “market
worth monopolising”82 and as per Section 2(r) of the Act 83, ‘relevant market’ means the
market which may be determined by the Commission with reference to the ‘relevant
product market’ or the ‘relevant geographic market’ or with reference to both the markets.
Relevant market is a market comprising all those products or services which are regarded
as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of characteristics of the

82 Competition Authority of Kenya, Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition, available at

[Link]
83 Competition Act, 2002, §2(r)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 14 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

products or services, their prices and intended use. 84 Additionally, the factors enumerated
under Section 19(7) of the ICA85 need to be borne in mind while assessing relevant market.

52. It is most respectfully submitted that the determination of a relevant market is fundamental
to establishing allegations of dominance and abuse thereof. under Section 4of the ICA 86,
prohibits abuse of dominant position within a defined relevant market, necessitating a
precise assessment of product and geographic substitutability. WinStreak Pvt. Ltd. contends
that Ingrain LLC’s Multistack App Store operates as a distinct market, warranting scrutiny
under competition law. However, it is submitted that the alleged foreclosure of WinStreak
cannot be sustained unless a distinct, isolated market is established for Real Money Games
(RMGs), separate from the broader digital ecosystem.

3.1.1 LACK OF LEGAL CERTIFICATION UNDERMINES THE RMG MARKET DEFINITION

53. It is respectfully submitted that WinStreak’s contention that the online real-money gaming
(RMG) sector constitutes a distinct market is legally untenable, as the Information
Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules,
2023 (IT Rules, 2023), which mandate the formation of self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), have
not yet been notified by the Vancour government 87The absence of statutory recognition for
RMG platforms precludes them from constituting a standalone market under Section 19(1)
of the Competition Act, 200288, which requires a legally recognised industry structure for
market delineation as Market shares can be calculated only after the boundaries of a market
have been defined.89

3.1.2 ABSENCE OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS PRECLUDES MARKET DELINEATION

54. Further, submits that the lack of uniform industry standards and regulatory oversight
negates the ability to define RMGs as a distinct relevant market. The Supreme Court of
India in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.90 held that market

84 Competition Act, 2002, §2(t); Institute of European Media Law, Media Market Definitions-Legal Analysis,
available at
[Link]
(hereinafter Media Market Definitions)
85 Competition Act, 2002, §19(7)
86 Competition Act, 2002, §4
87 Moot Proposition, at¶3
88 Competition Act, 2002, §19(1)
89 Supranote. 82
90 Competition Comm'n of India v. Steel Auth. of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744 (India)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 15 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

definition requires clear delineation based on industry norms and consumer expectations,
which remain absent in the evolving RMG sector. Given the historical exclusion of RMGs
from GameHub and the absence of statutory norms governing competition within the
industry, WinStreak’s claim that RMGs operate as an independent market must be
dismissed. 91

3.2 THE DIGITAL E COSYSTEM D EMANDS A H OLISTIC M ARKET APPROACH

3.2.1 OS AND APP STORES FUNCTION AS INTEGRATED MARKETS

55. Multistack OS (90% market share) and GameHub (95% market share) are inseparable
components of a broader digital ecosystem. Courts have repeatedly recognized that
operating systems and app stores are functionally interdependent (U.S. v. Microsoft,;
Google v. Commission,)92. Digital platforms, as recognized in Google Shopping93and Ohio
v. American Express, operate as interconnected systems, necessitating a holistic
competition analysis.

3.2.2 ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS UNDERMINE FORECLOSURE CLAIMS

56. WinStreak’s exclusion from GameHub does not equate to market foreclosure, as multiple
alternative distribution channels—third-party app stores (Regan, Phoenix, Letter) and
direct downloads—ensure market access. Courts have ruled that foreclosure claims fail
where viable alternatives exist. 94unctional and reactive substitutability between RMGs and
other digital games further negates the need for a distinct market definition. 95.

3.3 S EARCH A DVERTISING AND A PP DISTRIBUTION A RE DISTINCT M ARKETS

3.3.1 SEARCH ADVERTISING OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY OF RMG DISTRIBUTION

57. Ingrain’s dominance in online search advertising (85%) does not constitute an anti-
competitive factor affecting RMG distribution. CCI v. Google and Google Shopping

91 Competition Comm'n of India, Market Study on Film Distribution Business in India (2022), available at
[Link]
92 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Google and Alphabet v. Comm'n, Case T-

612/17, [2021] ECR II-0000

93 Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), 2018 O.J. (C 9) 11; Ohio

v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)

94 Competition Comm'n of India, Order in Case No. 30 of 2012, [Link] Ltd. v. Google LLC & Ors.,

Oct. 25, 2018, available at [Link] Google and Alphabet v. Comm'n, Case T-
612/17, [2021] ECR II-0000 , United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); [Privacy and
Synthetic Datasets], Stanford Tech. L. Rev., 2019, at 107
95 Adidas AG, Press Release, Nov. 8, 2012, available at Reuters article on sales forecast , together We Fight

Society v. Apple Inc., CCI, Case No. [relevant number], Order Directing Investigation, Dec. 31, 2021

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 16 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

establish that search advertising is a distinct market, separate from app distribution. 96
Market segmentation must reflect economic realities rather than artificial constructs. 97

3.3.2 NO EVIDENCE OF CAUSAL LINK TO FORECLOSURE

58. WinStreak’s claim that Ingrain’s advertising policy benefits Dream55 and PlaySport lacks
merit, as no causal link exists between policy shifts and foreclosure. Alternative advertising
and distribution avenues undermine allegations of exclusionary conduct. 98

3.4 NO APPRECIABLE A DVERSE E FFECT ON COMPETITION (AAEC)

3.4.1 CONSUMER CHOICE AND MARKET COMPETITION REMAIN INTACT

59. WinStreak’s exclusion does not harm consumer access, as competing RMG platforms like
Dream55 (60% market share) and PlaySport (5%) continue to operate. Courts reject AAEC
claims where alternative consumer options exist HT Media v. Super Cassettes.99

3.4.2 MARKET INNOVATION REMAINS UNAFFECTED

60. Competition law safeguards overall market innovation, not individual players held in Intel
v. Commission.100 WinStreak’s continued market presence negates foreclosure concerns.

3.5 I NGRAIN’ S P LATFORM A UTONOMY M UST B E P RESERVED

61. Platform operators retain the right to manage their ecosystems. U.S. v. Colgate101affirms
that businesses have discretion over distribution unless anti-competitive harm is
established, which is absent in this case. Ingrain’s exclusion of WinStreak aligns with
legitimate platform governance principles

62. It is respectfully submits that WinStreak’s artificially narrow market definition must be
rejected in favour of a broader, integrated digital ecosystem encompassing multiple
competing app stores, OS providers, and distribution channels. Given the lack of regulatory
clarity in the RMG sector, the availability of alternative market access, and the absence of

96 CCI v. Google (2012) [Link] Ltd. v. Google LLC, CCI, Case No. 40 of 2011
and Google Shopping (2021) Google LLC v. European Comm'n, Case T-612/17, ECLI:EU:T:2021:763 (Nov.
10, 2021)
97 (Kimberly-Clark, EC; Excel Crop Care, SC), Commission Decision, Jan. 16, 1996, Case M.623, Kimberly-

Clark/Scott Paper, 1996 O.J. (L 183) 1Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI, (2017) 8 SCC 47
98 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trink, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
99 In Re: M/s HT Media Ltd. & M/s Super Cassettes Indus. Ltd., CCI, Order dated Oct. 1, 2014 , Hoffmann-La

Roche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461

100 Intel Corp. v. European Comm'n, Case C-413/14, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632 (Sept. 6, 2017)
101 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 17 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

any demonstrable consumer harm or AAEC, it is prayed that the Honourable Bench dismiss
WinStreak’s claims and affirm Ingrain’s lawful business practices.

ISSUE4: WHETHER THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN THE MARKET

63. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that the commencement of the pilot
programs for the hosting of two RMG applications does not constitute an abuse of
dominance. This shall be substantiated in a threefold manner: Firstly, the relevant market
must be correctly defined, wherein the relevant product market encompasses the broader
smartphone digital ecosystem, including OS, app stores, and related services, and the
relevant geographic market is Vancour [1.1.] Secondly Ingrain is not dominant in the
relevant market [1.2]. Thirdly, In Arguendo, even if Ingrain was dominant in the relevant
market, there was no abuse of dominance [1.3].

4.1 THAT INGRAIN OPERATES IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

64. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that to determine an enterprise's
market power and position under § 4 of ICA,102 it is necessary to establish the relevant
market within which Ingrain operates. Before proving dominance of a player in the market
who has been alleged to be abusive in the market it is necessary to establish the relevant
market.103

65. The ascertainment of the relevant market is essential for analyzing a case of abuse of
dominance.104 The position of an dominant enterprise or a group within an indentified
‘relevant market’ has to be established first. 105 It is further submitted that relevant market
revolves around the market with respect to the relevant geographical market or the relevant
product market or any market in which the enterprise functions.106 This clearly implies the
need to prove that there was a relevant market in which Ingrain operated in order to prove
its dominance in the market can be substantiated in a two-fold manner. Firstly, the relevant
product market [1.1]. Secondly, the relevant geographical market is Vancour [1.2].

102 Id.
103 United States v. E.L. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 351 US 377. See Also, Gajinder Singh Kohli v. Genius
Propbuild Private Limited, 2016 SCC OnLine CCI 41; Three D Integrated Solutions Ltd. v. VeriFone India Sales
(P) Ltd., 2015 CompLR 464 (CCI); Official Journal of the European Communities, 97/C 372/03 (Notified on
December 9, 1997).
104 Orints India v. Springer India Pvt. Lt,109 CLA CCI
105 Competition Act 2002, Explaination 2-sec4(2)
106 The Competition Act, 2002, § 2(r), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 18 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKET IS

66. It is humbly submitted that the relevant product market can be regarded as all those goods
and services that consumers consider interchangeable or substitutable due to the nature of
the goods and services.107 It indicates that there must be sufficient levels of
substitutability108 in between the products that make up the same market as well as effective
competition between those products.

67. That is , Ingrain LLC operates within the broader Smartphone Digital Ecosystem, where
Multistack OS, GameHub, and online search advertising function as interconnected
services rather than separate markets. This ecosystem enhances user accessibility and
technological integration by offering a seamless digital experience. Users engage with
multiple facets installing apps, using OS-based security features, and interacting with
embedded search functions within a unified framework. Accordingly, the relevant market
is not confined to individual components like app stores or search advertising but
encompasses the entire smartphone ecosystem as a single, competitive landscape.

68. Furthermore, relevant market of Ingrain LLC cannot be restricted to only online markets or
app stores. A parallel can be drawn to platforms like Google109 and Apple,110 where
operating systems, app distribution, and search services coexist within a single
competitive landscape, ensuring seamless consumer access. The different components
of a digital ecosystem are to be treated as interconnected distribution channels rather
than distinct relevant markets. Therefore, the relevant market for Ingrain LLC
encompasses the broader smartphone digital ecosystem, wherein Multistack OS,
GameHub, and Ingrain Ads operate as integrated services rather than independent
markets.

4.1.2 THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET IS VANCOUR

107 The Competition Act, 2002, § 2(t), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
108 F. Wijackmans, &F. Tyutschavever, Vertical Agreemnts in Competition EU Law, 106
109 Google Android Case (Google v. Commission, Case T-612/17, 2021, EU)
110 Epic Games v. Apple, 2021, US District Court

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 19 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

69. It is humbly submitted that the relevant geographical market, in the instant case, should be
taken as Vancour.111 This is because, as per § 2(s) of ICA,112 the relevant geographic market
comprises of the region where the level of competition is clearly homogeneous. 113
Additionally, for the purpose of RMG’s, the conditions of the competition is Pan-Vancour.
Accordingly, the geographical market in the instant case should be considered ‘Vancour’.

4.2. THAT INGRAIN IS NOT DOMINANT IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

70. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that dominance is a strong position
that a company enjoys in the market that allows it to function independently from
competitive market forces or favourably impacts customers and/or competitors. 114

71. In the present matter, Ingrain is not dominant in the relevant market as it does not fulfill the
relevant factors within the scope of § 19(4) of ICA. 115 The same would be substantiated in
a three-fold manner. Firstly, the Market share of the enterprise [4.2.1]. Secondly, the size
and importance of the competitors [4.2.2]. Thirdly, the dependence of consumers on the
enterprise [4.2.3].

THE MARKET SHARE OF THE ENTERPRISE

72. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that the dominant position is
associated with the theory of market power that enables an enterprise to act without
considering the competitive forces.116 The market share of an enterprise 117 acts as an
essential indication of the market structure 118 and of the relevant importance of the active
competitors present in the relevant market. 119

111 In Re: All India Online Vendors Assn. v. Flipkart India Pvt Ltd and Anr., 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 97. See
Also,
Sunil Bansal v. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine CompAT 434; Coal India Ltd. v. Competition
Commission of India, 2017 SCC OnLine CompAT 25; Sai Wardha Power Company Ltd. v. Western Coalfields
Ltd., 2014 Comp LR 265.; In Re: Pankaj Aggarwal v. DLF Gurgaon Home Developers Private Limited, Case
No.
13 & 21of 2010 & 55 of 2012 (CCI).
112 The Competition Act, 2002, § 2(s), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
113 France Telecom SA v. Commission of European Communities, [2009] 4 CMLR 25.
114 The Competition Act, 2002, Explanation to § 4, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
115 The Competition Act, 2002, § 19(4), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
116 52 Belaire Owners' Association v. DLF Ltd Haryana Urban Development Authority Department of Town and

Country Planning, State of Haryana, 2011 Comp LR 239 (CCI).

117 The Competition Act, 2002, § 19(4)(a), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
118 54 HT Media Ltd v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd, 2014 Comp LR 129 (CCI). See Also, In Re: Meru Travel

Solutions Pvt Ltd, Case No. 25-28 of 2017; M/s Shubham Sanitary wares v. M/s HSIL Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine
CCI 156 (India); Competition Commission of India v. Fastway Transmission (P.) Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 316.
119 M/s ESYS Information Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Intel Corporation (Intel Inc.), Intel Semiconductor Ltd. and

Intel Technology India (P) Ltd., 2014 CompLR 126 (CCI).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 20 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

73. Accordingly, Ingrain states that the threshold to determine dominant position is the power
to behave independently of its competitors.120 Further, the dominant position has to be
tested based on the factors contained in Section 19(4) of the 2002 Act.71 Ingrain submits
that it is not placed in a dominant position for the following reasons.

74. In the present case, from the statistics available, it can be inferred that Ingrain LLC is not
dominant within the broader smartphone digital ecosystem. While Multistack OS holds
90% market share in licensable OS, it competes with iOS and alternative distribution
channels. Similarly, GameHub’s 95% share exists within Multistack OS but faces
competition from third-party app stores and direct downloads. These figures confirm that
Ingrain operates in a competitive environment, negating any claim of dominance.

75. It is further submitted that an enterprise's capacity to keep one step ahead of its competitors
through ongoing innovation and the creation of pilot programmes may also lead to a
continually high market share. 121 This cannot be accounted for dominance in the relevant
market. Furthermore, the commission also considers that the vertical agreement with
Dream55 and PlaySport broadens the relevant market.

INGRAIN DOES NOT OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE COMPETITIVE FORCES

PREVAILING IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

76. The first requirement of dominant position is not fulfilled presently. Operating
independently refers to when an enterprise can manipulate the relevant market in its favour
to the economic detriment of its competitors and consumers.122Presently, Ingrain is
incapable of operating independently of the competitive forces due to the skepticism around
the legal status .

77. Assuming but not conceding that Ingrain was in a dominant position, Ingrain could have
played a significant role in determining the prices and would have influenced the market
forces of demand and supply. However, Ingrain cannot influence the market since there is

120United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, ¶65 [hereinafter “United Brands”]; Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Commission, [1979] ECR 461, ¶38.
12157 The ICN’s Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Dominance/Substantial market power analysis pursuant to

unilateral conduct laws, (May, 2007).

122 SM Dugar, supra note 5, p. 425.

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 21 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

a ceiling price in place and therefore Ingrain is not operating Independently of the
prevailing market forces.

78. Dominance of an enterprise is to be ascertained on the basis of a host of stipulated factors

which are prescribed under the § 19(4) of the Act. 123 Due regards are to be given to other
factors in addition to market share in order to assess or test whether an enterprise is in a
position to operate independent of competitive forces.124

DEPENDENCE OF CONSUMERS ON INGRAIN

79. It is humbly submitted that the heavy dependence of customers 125 on an enterprise is an
essential factor in attributing dominance. 126 Herein, users' dependence on other RMGs is
not restricted.127 Furthermore, there is a presence of other strong competitors, such as
PlaySport, WinStreak and Dream 55 among others the users could rely upon. It is to be
noted that the presence of competitors in the market is one of the most important factors in
determining dominance.128 The basic idea of independence in the market comes from
analyzing competitors in the market and the same prima facie indicates that no player is
dominant in the market.

80. Thus, it is humbly submitted that Ingrain is not dominant in its relevant market, as proven
above through the relevant clauses of § 19(4) of ICA. Any further clauses to establish
dominance are irrelevant in the present case.

IN ARGUENDO, EVEN IF INGRAIN IS DOMINANT, THERE IS NO ABUSE

OF DOMINANCE

81. It is humbly submitted that, in arguendo, even if Ingrain is dominant, there is no abuse of
dominance. Thereby it is submitted that the conduct of Ingrain does not constitute abuse
within the meaning of § 4 of ICA. The same would be substantiated in a two-fold manner.
Firstly, Ingrain has not violated the provisions under § 4(2)(a)(i) of ICA65; Secondly,

123 Atos Worldline India Pvt. Ltd. v. Verifone India Sales Pvt. Ltd., 2015 CompLR 327 (CCI)
124 Kapoor Glass Pvt. Ltd. v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., [2012] 111 CLA 137 (CCI).
125 The Competition Act, 2002, §19(4)(f), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
126 Belaire Owners' Association v. DLF Ltd Haryana Urban Development Authority Department of Town and

Country Planning, State of Haryana, 2011 Comp LR 239 (CCI). See Also, Commercial Solvents v. Commission
of European Communities, [1974] ECR 223.
127 M/s Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd. v. M/s South Eastern Coalfields Ltd., 2013 CompLR 910

(CCI).
128 In Re: Shamsher Kataria Informant v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd., 2014 CompLR 1 (CCI). See Also,

Maharashtra State Power Generation Co Ltd. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. and Ors., 2013 Comp LR 910 (CCI).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 22 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

Fitness Freak has not abused its dominant position by leveraging its position to enter into
another market as of § 4(2)(e) of ICA66 .

INGRAIN HAS NOT VIOLATED THE PROVISION UNDER § 4(2)(A)(I)

82. It is humbly submitted that for a trade practice to be unfair, it must be seen that it leads to
any kind of loss or injury to the consumer. 129 Imposition of unfair conditions on the
purchase/sale of goods or services and unfair pricing amounts to abuse of dominance. 130

83. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that Ingrain LLC has not restricted
market access or forced exclusivity upon users or developers. The presence of third-party
app stores and direct downloads ensures that developers, including WinStreak, have
alternative distribution channels. This instance was seen in the case of the 2021 order given
by the CCI in the Facebook-Jio deal131, wherein it was held that users who do not want their
data to be shared could delete WhatsApp.

INGRAIN HAS NOT MET THE CONDITIONS FOR LEVERAGING

84. It is humbly submitted that an enterprise must be dominant in one relevant market for
violation of § 4(2)(e) of ICA71 A dominant enterprise or a dominant group of enterprises
must deal in two distinct relevant markets for abuse under § 4(2)(e) of ICA.132

85. In the instant case, Ingrain is not dominant in its relevant market; in arguendo, even if they
are considered to be, expansion of Ingrain to the relevant market of RMGs has further
widened scope of its competitors, hence, making it difficult to have a dominant position.

86. Furthermore Ingrain LLC does not hold a dominant position in the broader smartphone
digital ecosystem. However, arguendo, even if Ingrain is assumed to be dominant within
its defined market, its expansion into the online real-money gaming (RMG) sector has only
intensified competition rather than eliminating it.

129 H.M.M. Ltd. v. Director General, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, (1998) 6 SCC
485.
130 The Competition Act, 2002, Explanation to § 4(2)(a), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
131Pankhudi Kandelwal, The Bigger Gets Bigger: The Need to Closely Monitor the Facebook-Jio Deal through

Competition Law, SCC Online, 152, 152-161 (2021). See Also, Sunil Bansal v. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd., 2016
SCC OnLine CompAT 434; Saurabh Tripathy v. Competition Commission of India, Appeal No. 16 of 2017
(COMPAT); Air India v. Intel Globe Aviation, Case No. 108 of 2015 (CCI).
132 The National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, 2014 CompLR 304

(COMPAT).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 23 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

87. A firm’s dominance is assessed based on its ability to operate independently of competitive
forces and restrict market access for others.133 However, in the present case, Ingrain’s entry
into the RMG sector has diversified competition by introducing a new player into an
already fragmented market. Dream55, PlaySport, and multiple third-party RMG providers
continue to hold significant market shares, negating any argument that Ingrain’s presence
has resulted in anti-competitive effects.

88. Similarly, the introduction of a new service within a competitive industry does not
inherently imply dominance but rather increases market dynamism.134 Similarly, Ingrain’s
expansion into RMGs has neither foreclosed competitors nor limited consumer choice, but
instead widened the scope of competition, making it economically unsound to allege that
Ingrain wields market power sufficient to be considered dominant.

89. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that when the market is quite large with
renowned players competing a mere pilot programme hosting 2 rmgs for testing does not
amount to being leveraged into another market to protect or further its interest. 135 Similarly,
Ingrain was not in the position of dominance to leverage itself into another relevant market
to protect or further its interest.

IN ARGUENDO, INGRAIN DOES NOT VIOLATE § 4 OF ICA

90. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that INGRAIN LLC has not abused
its alleged dominant position in the relevant market as firstly, neither does Ingrain have any
significant market power (1) nor is a dominant player (2) and secondly, in-arguendo even
if Ingrain is considered to be a dominant player, it has not abused its dominant position
under § 4 of ICA (3).

THAT INGRAIN LLC DOES NOT HAVE THE MARKET POWER

91. It is humbly submitted that the agreements sought between the Ingrain LLC and the Dream
55 and PlaySport have miniscule and very insignificant effect on the market owing to the

133 United Brands v. Commission (1978, EU)

134 Google v. Commission (2021, EU)
135 In Re: Harshita Chawla, 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 32. See Also, In Re. [Link] Ltd. v. Google India

(P)
Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 155.

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 24 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

De minimis Doctrine. 136 Market share is a valuable indication of the market structure and
of the relevant importance of the other competitor’s activeness in the market. 137

92. Furthermore, it is submitted that a very large market share generally constitutes 50% or
more of the relevant market, as established in Tetra Pak II138 and Hoffmann-La Roche,139
where dominance was found at 90% and 75% market shares, respectively. Conversely, it
has been observed that a market share of 40% or less is unlikely to confer dominance upon
an enterprise.140 In the present case, Ingrain LLC, despite its significant market presence,
operates within a competitive digital ecosystem where multiple alternatives exist,
preventing it from exercising independent market power. Therefore, its market share does
not automatically establish dominance, nor does it indicate an ability to foreclose
competition or harm consumer choice.

93. Secondly, even the platform may have the ability to apply vertical restrictions to eliminate
competition, this does not necessarily guarantee that it is doing so. Vertical constraints
might be imposed to increase productivity and address free-riding problems. Because the
platform always secures an edge over its opponent anytime it delivers a better product, the
restriction may eliminate competition. There may not be an AAEC in the market if a
competitor cannot provide the same quality. 141

THAT INGRAIN LLC IS NOT A DOMINANT ENTERPRISE

94. It is humbly submitted that Fitness Freak is not INGRAIN LLC in the market of “Real
Money Games”. The same can be established from the fact that there are a lot of other
players in the market. The presence of competitors with good reputation in the market,
prima facie indicate that no player is dominant in the market.

95. In the present case, there exists multiple players in the form of Dream 55, PlaySport, which
excels in the same relevant market as that of Winstreak. Thus, Ingrain llc does not enjoy a

136 In Re: Ghanshyam Das Vij and Bajaj Corp. Ltd., (2015) SCC OnLine CCI 174 (India).
137 M/s ESYS Information Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Intel Corporation (Intel Inc.), Intel Semiconductor Ltd. and
Intel Technology India (P) Ltd., 2014 CompLR 126 (CCI).
138 Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, 1996] ECR I-5951.
139 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission of European Communities, [1979] ECR 461 (ECJ).
140 European Union, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC

Treaty
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 14 (OJ 2009 C 45/7). (Issued on February 2,
2009).
141 In Re: Ghanshyam Das Vij and Bajaj Corp. Ltd., (2015) SCC OnLine CCI 174 (India); Automobiles Dealers

Association, Hathras, UP v. Global Automobiles Ltd. and Pooja Expo India Pvt. Ltd., 2012 Comp LR 827
(CCI);
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 US 727 (1988).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 25 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

position of dominance so as to impede the competition142 within the relevant market and
therefore no case of contravention of § 4 of ICA be made out.

THAT INGRAIN HAS NOT ABUSED ITS ALLEGED DOMINANT POSITION

96. It is humbly submitted that having dominance in the market is not prohibited under the Act.
However, the abuse of such dominance is prohibited. In consequence, it is submitted that
even if Ingrain is considered to be in a dominant position in the market, the exclusive supply
agreement still did not amount to an abuse of dominance as firstly, Ingrain has not imposed
any unfair or discriminatory conditions on developers or consumers [a]; and secondly, the
conduct of Ingrain does not lead to denial of market access [b].

IMPOSITION OF UNFAIR CONDITIONS

97. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Commission that the term ‘unfair’ has not been
defined in the Act. It has to be examined either in the context of unfairness in relation to
customers or in relation with that of a competitor. An agreement as under § 2(b) of ICA97
does not only include an agreement but includes any arrangement, understanding or action
in concert however so informal 143, regardless of whether it did not intend to create any
enforceable obligations and liabilities between the parties. 144

4.5.1 NO DENIAL TO MARKET ACCESS

98. It is humbly submitted that Ingrain’s conduct does not amount to denial of market access
as provided for in § 4(2)(c) of ICA.145 It is stressed that the determination of market power
should not be based on market share alone146 as it is an insufficient criterion. 147

99. Furthermore, the above mentioned deduction is in consonance with the De minimis
doctrine, according to which if an enterprise does not have significant share in the market,
its vertical agreements will not be able to create anti-competitive effects.148 Ingrain cannot
be termed to be in a dominant position as it does not fulfil the criteria provided under §
19(4) of ICA. Hence, the vertical agreement which was sought was to improves certain

142 In Re: All India Online Vendors Assn. v. Flipkart India Pvt Ltd and Anr., 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 97.
143 Director General (Supplies and Disposals) v. Puja Enterprises Basti, 2013 Comp LR 714 (CCI).
144 Technip S A v. S M S Holding Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 465 (India).
145 The Competition Act, 2002, § 4(2)(c), No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
146 The ICN’s Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Dominance/Substantial market power analysis pursuant to

unilateral conduct laws, (May, 2007).

147 HILDEBRAND, DORIS, THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: THE

EUROPEAN SCHOOL, 185, (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer, 2016).

148 Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in

Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 194–96, 198–212 (2002).

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 26 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

supply chain efficiencies and upon such condition the commission on balancing factors
provided under §19 of ICA may deduce it does not have any anti-competitive effects.149

[Link] is humbly submitted that Ingrain LLC, as a private enterprise, retains full autonomy in
determining its business partnerships, including the discretion to list or delist applications
from GameHub. The fundamental principle of freedom of contract and business autonomy
allows private entities to engage with partners of their choosing, provided such decisions
do not amount to anti-competitive foreclosure or consumer harm. Ingrain’s ability to curate
its platform aligns with global jurisprudence, which upholds that platform operators and
digital marketplaces have the right to manage their ecosystems without external
interference.

101.A private company has the right to exercise discretion over whom it chooses to do business
with,150 as long as it does not engage in exclusionary conduct with an intent to harm
competition. Even if dominant, is not obligated to deal with or provide access to its
competitors unless specific regulatory requirements exist.151 The Supreme Court of India
reaffirmed that platform owners retain the right to refuse access or impose conditions on
third parties unless such conduct demonstrably restricts competition. 152

[Link] the present case, Ingrain’s decision to delist WinStreak does not constitute anti-
competitive behavior but rather falls within the scope of its legitimate business discretion.
GameHub, as a proprietary platform, is not a public utility nor an essential facility, and
developers have alternative means to distribute their applications via third-party app stores
and direct downloads.153 Here, WinStreak remains accessible through alternative channels,
negating any claim of foreclosure.

[Link], Ingrain’s right to determine its business partnerships, including app listings and
delistings, is a lawful exercise of its commercial freedom and does not constitute an abuse
of dominance. Any attempt to impose mandatory hosting obligations on Ingrain would
amount to an undue restriction on private enterprise, contrary to well-established
competition law principles.

149 The Competition Act, 2002, § 19, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
150 U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co. (250 U.S. 300, 1919)
151 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (540 U.S. 398, 2004)
152 CCI v. Bharti Airtel (2018, India)
153 Google v. Commission (T-612/17, 2021, EU)

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 27 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 A RGUMENTS A DVANCED

[Link] is respectfully submitted that CCV lacks jurisdiction over RMG companies like
WinStreak due to the absence of a sectoral regulator, the uncertain legal status of RMGs,
and Ingrain’s platform autonomy. The lack of notified SRBs creates a regulatory vacuum,
making competition law intervention premature, RMGs do not qualify as a recognized
economic activity, as gambling is excluded from "trade" unless expressly legitimized.
Ingrain’s platform curation rights are not anti-competitive. No AAEC is evident, as
WinStreak retains a 30% market share with alternative distribution channels. Granting
CCV jurisdiction would disrupt Vancour’s digital economy and contradict established
legal principles. Hence, the complaint must be dismissed at the jurisdictional threshold.

PART B: A RGUMENTS A DVANCED 28 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS

JUSTICE U. P. SINGH M EMORIAL NATIONAL M OOT C OURT C OMPETITION , 2025 PRAYER

PRAYER

The Respondent humbly prays that this Hon’ble Commission may be pleased to:

1. Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, as the regulatory lacuna precludes CCV’s
oversight.
2. Hold that Ingrain LLC has not engaged in anti-competitive conduct, and its actions are a
lawful exercise of platform autonomy.
3. Declare that RMG does not constitute a distinct relevant market, and no appreciable
adverse effect on competition (AAEC) arises.
4. Grant any other relief deemed just and proper in the interest of justice and fair
competition.

And pass any other order that this Honorable Authority may deem fit in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

SD/-

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT

DATE: 7 DECEMBER 2023

PART C: PRAYER 29 M EMORIAL FOR R ESPONDENTS