Ateneo de Davao College of Law

Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025

​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

pin Case Tracker: PFR Case Tracker ISSUE: WoN the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
Castro are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of
FORMAT: CALIBRI | 10 | JUSTIFIED Castro and Cardenas.
NOTE: Name the petitioners/respondents
Use pastel colors to highlight texts. Pretty please no neon ones RULING: YES
kay sakit sa eyes! Thankies.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the
law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law
ARTICLE 2-3: ESSENTIAL/FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
REPUBLIC V. CA 236 S 257 essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would
render the marriage void ab initio.
FACTS:
Republic posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
●​ On June 24, 1970, Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Malvar. license was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its
The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of non-issuance.
Castro’s parents.
●​ Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the The Court hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, court is sanctioned by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact,
the marriage contract itself state that marriage license no.
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.—A written statement by
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties
an officer having custody of an official record or by his
on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
●​ The couple did not immediately live together as husband and
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents.
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
●​ It was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However,
no such record or entry.
their cohabitation lasted only for 4 months. Thereafter, the
couple parted ways.
●​ On Oct. 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that
by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
●​ Castro’s daughter is now in the US, and she wanted to follow office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
her. So, she wanted to put in order her marital status before in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars
leaving for the States. are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining
●​ Through her counsel, she discovered that there was no a register book where they are required to enter all applications
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the
celebration of their marriage. date the marriage was issued and such other relevant data.
●​ In the certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila, it states marriage license no. 3196182 cannot The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
located and does not appear from our records. registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
●​ Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion
a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
○​ That the only affixed her signature on the certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
City. parties.
●​ But it was denied by the trial court. It held that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of
the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the “inability of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
issued.” either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to
the parents of the former.

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that Nov. 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in
the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of both their children’s birth certificate.
a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that
may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
NOTES: the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, number 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
-​ RULE 132 Sec 29: Cavite, yet, neither Filipina nor Fernando ever resided in Carmona.

SY V. CA 330 S 550 From the documents she presented, the marriage license as issues on
Sep. 17, 1974, almost 1 year after the ceremony took place on Nov.
FACTS: 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.
●​ Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy, both 22 years old, were
married on Nov. 15, 1973 at Church of Our Lady of Lourdes
in Quezon City. They had 2 children.
●​ However, on Sep. 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal SEVILLA V. CARDENAS 497 S 428
dwelling. Since then, they lived separately.
●​ On Feb. 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, FACTS:
and later on, it was amended to a petition for separation of Jaime O. Sevilla filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
property on the grounds that Fernando abandoned her marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas. He alleged that he never applied
for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and
without just cause; that they have been living separately for
never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
more than 1 year; and that they voluntarily entered into a consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing
MOA containing the rules that would govern the dissolution officer. He further alleged that although marriage license no. 2770792
of their conjugal partnership. was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he
○​ It was granted by the court. never applied for any marriage license. He presented three
●​ After the filing of criminal case against Fernando, Filipina certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan.
later filed a new action for legal separation. The RTC granted
The first two certifications state that "No marriage license Number
the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and
2770792 were ever issued by this Office. With regards to Marriage
sexual infidelity. License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the
●​ On Aug. 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration said number. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the you our full force locating the above problem." The third
grounds of psychological incapacity. But, the RTC denied certification states that the said application and license do not exist in
that petition, and ruled that the alleged acts do not constitute their Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
psychological incapacity.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims
●​ In CA, Fillipina raises the issue of the marriage being void for
that she and Jaime were married civilly and in a church ceremony
lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. thereafter. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual Manila and the National Statistics Office. Jaime is estopped from
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her
marriage certificate and marriage license are different and for 25 years.
incongruous.
The trial court declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on
the Jaime’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before
ISSUE: WoN the marriage of Filipina and Fernando is void ad initio a solemnizing officer. The CA reversed the decision.
due to lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony.
ISSUE:
RULING: YES WON the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued sufficient to declare their
It appears that, according to Filipina, the date of the actual celebration marriage as null and void ab initio?
of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous. RULING: No.

The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must

The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, categorically state that the document does not exist in his office
Sept. 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract. The date of or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes on Nov. 15, 1973. diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s
Court. body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
The first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement culminated in 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best Bangkok, Thailand.
efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License
No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications From then on, Silverio lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
was issued.
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from "female."
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or ISSUE: WoN Silverio should be granted the relief he asked for
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
RULING: No. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is civil status shall be governed by special laws.
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor
of the first and second certifications. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, Moreover, under the Civil Register Law (Section 5 of Act 3753), a birth
as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search
for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great immutable.
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight.
While Silverio may have succeeded in altering his body and
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
together for several years producing two offsprings, now adults authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
sometime in 1991. We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy The changes sought by Silverio will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC 537 S 373 found that the petition was but Silverio’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. Silverio alleged that he between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the
was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
and Anita Aquino Dantes. His name was registered as "Rommel female. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. His sex was reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
registered as "male." It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment. Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule of marriage. It further stipulates that marriages lacking any essential
131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the or formal requisite are void ab initio(with the exception of marriages
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected "solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
if Silverio’s petition were to be granted. [where] either or both parties believ[ed] in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so" ), that marriages
ADO-AN MORIMOTO V. MORIMOTO MARCH 15, 2021 attended by a defective essential requisite are voidable, and that
marriages attended by an irregularity as to formal requisites are
FACTS: valid, subject to the potential criminal, civil, or administrative
liability of those responsible for the irregularity:
●​ Rosario recalls that sometime before December 2007, a
friend introduced her to Yoshio as one with whom she ARTICLE 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
can simulate marriage as a way to facilitate her acquisition requisites are present: ​
of a Japanese visa. (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
●​ On December 5, 2007, she and Yoshio met at the Manila female; and ​
City Hall. There, they signed a blank marriage certificate, but (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
were assured by the solemnizing officer that the
certificate will never be registered or recorded in the ARTICLE 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: ​
Civil Registry. It was the last time she saw Yoshio. (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; ​
●​ Sometime later, Rosario went to the Philippine Statistics (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter
Authority to secure a Certificate of No Marriage. To her 2 of this Title; and ​
surprise, she found out that a Certificate of Marriage, (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
registered in the City of San Juan, indicates that she contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
officiated by a certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu. It also presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
appears that the marriage was predicated on Marriage
License No. 6120159, issued by the Office of the Civil
ARTICLE 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
Registry of San Juan.
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35
●​ On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration
(2).
of Nullity of Marriage before the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court. She maintained that the marriage attested to by the
marriage certificate she discovered never actually happened A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
and was never backed by a marriage license. voidable as provided in Article 45.
●​ During trial, Rosario presented the following documents as
evidence: (1) the Certificate of Marriage attesting to her An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
supposed marriage to Yoshio; (2) a June 17, 2008 marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
Certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
National Statistics Office, to the effect that "said office
mistakenly [stated] that a marriage was solemnized
As a special contract, consent is, by definition, indispensable to
between [Rosario and Yoshio];" and (3) a June 4, 2009
marriage. Accordingly, the Family Code stipulates the second
Certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
essential requisite of marriage to be "[c]onsent freely given in the
San Juan City, which states that "no record of Marriage
presence of the solemnizing officer."
License No. 6120159 was issued the parties[.]" She also
presented the testimony of Mary Ann C. Chico, Registration
Officer III of the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City, It is vital to distinguish the authentic, underlying consent of the parties
who authenticated the June 4, 2009 Certificate issued by the from the external manifestation of such consent during a marriage
office. ceremony. Jurisprudence therefore recognizes that, when there is no
●​ On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court issued a bona fide intention of becoming a spouse to another, a marriage is void
Decision 16 denying Rosario's Petition. for want of consent even when marriage ceremonies have been
●​ In its assailed October 10, 2018 Decision, 18 the Court of conducted and, there, the parties declared their intent to enter into
Appeals denied Rosario's appeal. married life.

ISSUE: WON the registered marriage between petitioner Rosario D. Petitioner categorically declared that her marriage with respondent
Ado-an-Morimoto and respondent Yoshio Morimoto should be declared Yoshio was totally simulated, made for the sole purpose of their
null and void? -YES ostensible marital relations being used as an artifice to bolster her
chances of obtaining a Japanese visa. One might be tempted to
RULING:​ dismiss this as a self-serving allegation, made only to obtain a
The Family Code provides for the essential and formal requisites declaration of nullity of marriage. However, to the contrary, this Court

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

finds petitioner's declarations of having participated in a duplicitous Accordingly, in addition to there being no consent to enter into
design to be worthy of even greater credence, as an admission against marriage and no actual marriage ceremony being performed, the
interest. registered marriage further lacks the formal requisite of a marriage
license. For a multiplicity of reasons, such marriage was inexistent.
Rosario's declarations run counter to her interest. Her admission of Therefore, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
simulating marriage by signing a blank marriage certificate when no denying Rosario's Petition for Declaration of Nullity.
marriage ceremony actually took place, and when she and
respondent Yoshio had absolutely no intent to marry, endangered The marriage between Rosario and Yoshio is decidedly a fake. It
her with the possibility of being held liable for falsification. was a ruse that reduced marriage to an artifice for acquiring a
visa. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals fail to see that
More importantly, a Certification was issued by the Office of the Civil to insist on this marriage's validity would be to unwittingly lend judicial
Registrar, Philippine Statistics Authority, stating that "said office approbation to transactional marriages used as fronts for illicitly
mistakenly certified that a marriage was solemnized between obtaining benefits, or for potentially more nefarious ends. This Court
[petitioner and respondent Yoshio.]" This categorical turnaround most certainly does not condone petitioner's ruse. But it will work
should, once and for all, negate any lingering doubt on whether the greater damage to society and its institutions if courts would let
supposed marriage between petitioner and respondent Yoshio actually themselves be used as unsuspecting endorsers of duplicitous designs.
transpired. It could even render this case moot. The original, underlying fraud here is the stratagem effected by Rosario
and Yoshio in simulating marriage. It is a fraud admitted by Rosario,
and a fraud through which this Court sees. Rosario and Yoshio never
Further, to reiterate, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage truly meant to be husband and wife, their registered marriage is a
was spurred by Rosario's failure to obtain a Certificate of No Marriage. nullity.
With the Philippine Statistics Authority now conceding that no marriage
between Rosario and Yoshio was solemnized, it could conceivably
proceed to issue a Certificate of No Marriage to Rosario. With the CARIAGA V. REPUBLIC AND HENRY CARIAGA DEC. 7, 2021
Philippine Statistics Authority's own factual affirmation that no marriage
ever transpired, it is baffling that the Regional Trial Court and the Court FACTS:
of Appeals would insist on what now turns out to be just their own
version of the facts, and the validity and subsistence of Rosario and [Lovelle] and [Henry] met while they were still attending college at the
Yoshio's supposed marriage. Technical University of the Philippines. Henry courted Lovelle and they
became sweethearts sometime in July of 1999. Lovelle was then 17
years of age while Henry was 21.
Ultimately, the registered marriage between Rosaario and Yoshio is
totally fictitious and inexistent, thereby warranting a declaration of
After she turned 18, Lovelle found out that she was pregnant. It was
nullity.
accordingly agreed upon by Lovelle, Henry and their parents that they
would have a civil wedding sometime in November of 2000 or after
Equally fatal to the registered marriage between Rosario and Yoshio is Lovelle would have given birth to their first child.
how no marriage license was ever issued to them. The lack of a
marriage license is borne by the evidence, most notably the June 4, To assist with the documentary requirements of their intended civil
2009 certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City wedding, Lovelle's parents sought the help of a friend. As planned,
stating that it "has no record of Marriage License No. 6120159." Lovelle and Henry got married on 10 November 2000.

it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence Sometime in 2013, the couple decided to live apart owing to their many
of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such differences and misunderstandings. Upon learning that Henry was in a
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the relationship with another woman, Lovelle consulted a lawyer regarding
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that her resolve to have their marriage annulled. This was in 2015.
no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
Lovelle was advised by her lawyer to verify with the Civil Registry of
Consistent with the standard laid out in Republic v. Court of Appeals Quezon City if the marriage license number appearing in their
and Castro, applied in Cario, Go-Bangayan, Abbas v. Abbas, and Certificate of Marriage had in fact been issued to them x x x.
clarified in Kho, this Court considers it adequately established that no
marriage license was ever issued in this case to Rosario and At the Civil Registry [Department] of Quezon City [(CRD-QC)], Lovelle
Yoshio. Moreover, it was neither alleged nor established that the discovered that Marriage License No. 131078 dated 09 November
marriage registered between them falls under any of the exceptional 2000 indicated in their [Certificate of Marriage] had been issued,
marriages, which Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code identify as not not to them but, to another couple, Mamerto O. Yambao and
needing a marriage license. Amelia B. Parado. Lovelle thus requested that a corresponding
certification be issued. She asked as well that she be furnished with

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

copies of documents related to the issuance of the said marriage Here, Lovelle hinges her Nullity Petition on the 2015 QCCR
license. Certification issued by ACCR Carino of the CRD-QC. This Certification
states that the marriage license indicated in the Certificate of Marriage
Lovelle was also given copies of the following documents: (1) evidencing her marriage with Henry was actually issued to another
Application for Marriage License of Mamerto O. Yambao and Amelia B. couple namely, Yambao and Parado. To reiterate, the 2015 QCCR
Parado; (2) Marriage License and Fee Receipt of P50.00; (3) Sworn Certification is worded as follows:
Statement that Advice of Parents or Guardian has been Secured
executed by Amelia B. Parado; and, (4) Notice of Application for This is to certify that as per Registry Records of Marriage License files
Marriage License of Mamerto O. Yambao and Amelia B. Parado. in this office, there is no record of Marriage License No. 131078 dated
November 9, 2000 allegedly issued in favor of HENRY G. CARIAGA
Armed with the x x x [2015 QCCR Certification] and the documents she and LOVELLE F. SAPLARAN. The said Marriage License No. 131078
was able to obtain from the [CRD-QC], Lovelle filed a petition for dated November 9, 2000 was issued to MAMERTO O. YAMBAO, a
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Henry [(Nullity Petition)] on 09 resident of 187th St. Goodrich Village and AMELIA B. PARADO, a
March 2016. resident of 4-A Illinois St., Cubao, Quezon City, valid until March 1,
2001.30 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: WON there exists a valid marriage between Henry and
Lovelle? From the foregoing, it is clear that the issuance of a valid marriage
license presupposes the submission of a sworn application duly
RULING: verified and entered by the local civil registrar in the Register of
NO. In cases where a certification issued by the local civil registrar is Applications for Marriage License. In other words, no valid marriage
presented to prove the absence of a marriage license, courts must not license can be issued unless the requisite application is properly filed
solely rely on the language employed therein. Rather, courts must take and entered in the Register of Applications for Marriage License of the
a holistic approach in assessing its sufficiency. locality where the application is filed. The absence of the proper
entry in the Register of Applications for Marriage License
The Court here clarifies that in cases where the absence of a necessarily implies the absence of a marriage license.
marriage license is sought to be established through a
certification issued by the local civil registrar, courts must take a Similarly, a Certificate of Marriage can only be deemed duly registered
holistic approach in resolving the case. To borrow the language in and entered in the Register of Marriages when it is presented to and
Vitangcol, the appreciation of the probative value of the certification thereafter accepted by the local civil registrar for registration after the
cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of completeness and correctness of the entries therein are verified.
action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the
certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. Bearing in mind the duties of the local civil registrar, the rules
Accordingly, courts must assess the sufficiency of the certification with governing the registration of applications for marriage license and
due regard to applicable law and procedure, the attendant facts, and certificates of marriage, and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
the evidence on record. the Court finds the 2015 QCCR Certification sufficient to establish
that Lovelle and Henry's marriage had been solemnized without a
Lovelle and Henry wed on November 10, 2000. Thus, the Family valid marriage license.
Code governs their marriage.
To recall, the first part of the 2015 QCCR Certification states that "per
The provisions of the Family Code are clear — the absence of a valid Registry Records of Marriage License files [in the CRD-QC] no record
marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio, except when the of Marriage License No. 131078 dated November 9, 2000 allegedly
marriage is among those exempted from the license requirement, as issued in favor of [Henry] and [Lovelle]"53 appears. This corroborates
set forth in Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. Lovelle's testimony to the effect that she never appeared before the
CRD-QC to file an application for marriage license.
There is no dispute that none of the exceptions apply here. Hence, a
valid marriage license is an indispensable requirement to the Hence, the first part of the 2015 QCCR Certification, when considered
validity of Lovelle and Henry's marriage since it is the marriage in light of the procedure outlined in the Implementing Rules and in
license that grants the solemnizing officer the authority to connection with Lovelle's testimony, confirms that Lovelle and Henry
solemnize the marriage and give it legal effect.28 did not file the required application for marriage license in connection
with Marriage License No. 131078.
For a marriage to be considered void due to the lack of a marriage
license, the absence of such license must be apparent on the The non-filing of the requisite application for marriage license is
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification rendered even more apparent by the second part of the 2015 QCCR
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was Certification, which states that the marriage license referred to in
issued to the parties.29 Lovelle and Henry's Certificate of Marriage had actually been issued to
Yambao and Parado. This statement is further supported by the
documentary evidence formally offered by Lovelle, namely: (i) the
Application for Marriage License filed by Yambao and Parado; (ii) the
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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Marriage License and Fee Receipt issued in favor of Yambao; (iii) the prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
Sworn Statement that Advice of Parents or Guardian Has Been entities.
Secured executed by Parado; and (iv) the Notice of Application for
Marriage License of Yambao and Parado.54 Petitioner's Contention: Illegal solemnization of marriage.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
As stated, the local civil registrar is then duty-bound to ensure that the marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
entries in each registrable document are correct. This duty on the part Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the
of the local civil registrar necessarily implies that in cases of simple expedient of paying the marriage fees. In addition,
registration of certificates of marriage, the local civil registrar is obliged respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts
to verify the correctness of the entries appearing thereon, including the and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the
marriage license number, among others. Hence, if the solemnizing reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
officer committed an error in indicating the correct marriage license marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
number on Lovelle and Henry's Certificate of Marriage, as the Republic was usually several days after the ceremony.
claims, then this error would have been flagged and corrected by the
local civil registrar prior to registration. The fact that the Certificate of Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local
Marriage in question had been registered despite the incorrect civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
entry casts doubt on the veracity of the Certificate of Marriage marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
itself, and consequently, the validity of Lovelle and Henry's marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the
marriage. latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.

Thus, the 2015 QCCR Certification, when read in conjunction with Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
applicable law and regulations, as well as the testimonial and Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code,
documentary evidence forming part of the record, shows that Marriage hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave
License No. 131078, purportedly authorizing the solemnization of strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
Lovelle and Henry's marriage, was actually issued on the basis of the marriage contract and to le the same with the civil registrar, but the
an application for marriage license filed by another couple. Based latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
on these premises, the presumed validity of Lovelle and Henry's subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license
marriage had been overcome. and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was led with the
civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the
Lovelle had done all that could reasonably be expected to be done by administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
a private party whose capacity to verify the civil registry books is limited marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not
by the mechanisms provided her by prevailing law and regulations. contain the date and place of marriage.

Notably, Lovelle had done precisely what Section 28, Rule 132 of the
ISSUE: Whether the marriages solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were
1997 Rules requires her to do, that is, to procure a written statement
valid. NO.​
from the CRD-QC as proof of non-issuance of her marriage license. In
Alt: W/N Judge Palaypayon is liable. YES.
fact, she had done so on two different occasions — first, prior to the
filing of the Nullity Petition, and second, after the issuance of the RTC
Decision. That the CRD-QC issued the 2017 QCCR Certification RULING:
bearing the same language as the 2015 QCCR Certification despite
Lovelle's request to make the former conform to the parameters of the Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that "in the absence
RTC Decision further highlights how she remains bound by the of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
language which the CRD-QC had chosen to employ in these void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not
certificates. Evidently, to require more from Lovelle would be to exact affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
more for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
He was found guilty of solemnizing marriages without a marriage
license. Bocaya & Besmonte's marriage was solemnized without a
ARTICLE 4: EFFECT RE. ABSENCE, DEFECT OR IRREGULARITY
THEREOF marriage license along with the other couples (void). The
testimonies of Bocaya and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs
taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized
COSCA V. PALAYPAYON 237 S 249
their marriage.

FACTS: In an administrative complaint led with the Office of the Court

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged
and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage
with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate,
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of
Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to Mercidita Arañes alleges that on 17 February 2000, Judge Occiano
return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
with them their marriage license. They already started without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
living together as husband and wife even without the formal which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained
that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a Arañes and Orobia lived together as husband and wife on the strength
real one. However, considering that there were pictures from of marriage until Orobia passed away. However, since the marriage
the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the was a nullity, Arañes’ right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia
marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
hard to believe that it was simulated. pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized Judge Occiano further avers that before he started the ceremony, he
marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under carefully examined the documents submitted to him by Arañes. When
Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its
they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the
was only 18 yrs months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
living together for 6 years already before they got married as what compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
13 years old when they started living together which is hard to stroke.
believe.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage
Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the render the marriage void. Arañes and Orobia assured Judge Occiano
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the day. When they failed to comply, Judge Occiano followed it up with
marriage license requirement. Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show Judge Occiano vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties
when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license.
their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being
sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that Arañes and Orobia
liability. filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on
By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity
in not complying with the formal requisites of marriage and under It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of
affected by the illegal marriage, and what we are providing for herein the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code On 12 September 2001, Arañes filed her Affidavit of Desistance. She
provides that "priests or ministers of any religious denomination or attested that Judge Occiano initially refused to solemnize her marriage
sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government. case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now
ARANES V. OCCIANO 380 S 402 bothered by her conscience.

FACTS:

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

ISSUE: W/N the marriage solemnized by Judge Occiano was valid granted on January 17, 1992 and took effect on February 17,

❤️
on the ground of lack of marriage license 1992.
●​ 2ND MARRIAGE (Lucio Maria): On October 4, 1992 -
RULING: NO Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen
sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
In Navarro vs Domagtoy, the Court held that x x x Judges who are ●​ CIVIL CASE: On September 21, 1993 - Lucio filed a
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a the RTC of Bohol on the ground that no marriage
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity ceremony actually took place.
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not ●​ On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with Bigamy, and
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to he pleaded not guilty.
administrative liability. ●​ RTC: Lucio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of Bigamy. Lucio appealed.
●​ CIVIL CASE DECISION: On October 23, 1997, or while
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of Judge Occiano is limited
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
the marriage of Arañes and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore
6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless,
then became final and executory.
he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
●​ CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC in toto.

Judge Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

ISSUE #1: W/N the marriage of Lucio and Lucia is valid. — NO
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held
that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license ISSUE #2: W/N Lucio is guilty of Bigamy — NO
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives RULING #1: NO. The trial court found that there was no actual
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
Judge Occiano did not possess such authority when he solemnized the solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
marriage of Arañes. In this respect, the judge acted in gross ignorance of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
of the law. solemnizing officer.

Judge Occiano cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
Desistance filed by Arañes. accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
MORIGO V. PEOPLE 422 A 376
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
FACTS:
of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long
●​ Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates way back become final and executory.
in Bohol and lost contact with each other until Lucio received
a card from Lucia from Singapore. They exchanged letters,
RULING #2: NO. AS TO BIGAMY: LUCIO IS ACQUITTED
then they became sweethearts.
●​ On 1986 - Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
❤️
Canada to work there.
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the Lucio
●​ 1ST MARRIAGE (Lucio Lucia): On 1990 - Lucia came
was never married to Lucia Barrete. Here, there is no first marriage to
back to the Philippines and proposed to Lucio to join her in
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
Canada. Both agreed to get married, and they were married
declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
on August 30, 1990, at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. In the same year, Lucia went back
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, Lucio
to Canada, leaving Lucio behind for work.
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage
●​ On 1991 - Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
Division) a petition for divorce against Lucio which the court
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona,
acquitted of the charge of bigamy. Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a
resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
HERE, No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification
authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio and Lucia Barrete merely states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" but their marriage
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly ISSUE: WoN the marriage between Restituto and Rosita is void. NO
valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a RULING: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
subsequent marriage. marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to
that petitioner has not committed bigamy. this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA 531 S 466 identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
❌ 💍 license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
👨 👩
FACTS: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
petitioner Restituto against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of
securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
🧖🤵‍♂️
for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The
🤴
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
💒
their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro , a Minister of
the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel . They got married on the same affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these,
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed,
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a issued in Carmona, Cavite.
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. Petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Answering Restituto’s petition for annulment of marriage, Rosita Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
👱‍♀️
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
🤱
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress
with whom he has three children . Restituto only filed the annulment mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
👮‍♂️
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact,
has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner. affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Restituto submits that at the precise time that his marriage with
the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
🔧
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. The which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument
🙅‍♂️
BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs. He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract confronted the former who admitted the said marriage Prior
reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage to their marriage, she asked Atilano O, Nollora, Jr. if he
license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not was single and the latter responded that he was single.
detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of She also knew that her husband was Catholic prior to their
said marriage license to the parties. marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a ●​ (2) She also claimed that after learning that her husband was
"fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The the allegations of the private complainant that she was
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a sought by the private complainant and that they had a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano
the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is NOT duty-bound O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and
to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because
and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been know the private complainant when she (private
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the complainant) filed this case.
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the ISSUE:
requirements of law.
1.​ Whether the Family Code shall apply to the marriage of
Nollora (YES)
2.​ Whether Nollora and Geraldino are guilty for the crime of
NOLLORA JR. V. PEOPLE GR# 191425 09/0716 bigamy (YES)

FACTS: RULING:

●​ An information was filed against Atilano Nollora, Jr. and 1.​ YES, Family Code shall be applied. Granting arguendo that
Rowena Geraldino for the crime of bigamy. Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of
●​ Atilano claimed that he was a Muslim convert even prior to both marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
his marriage. He explained that in his marriage contract with ceremonies ere not conducted in accordance with the
Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a Catholic Code of Muslim Personal. Laws, or Presidential Decree
Pentecostal but he was not aware why it was placed as No. 1083.
such.
●​ In his marriage contract with Rowena, his religion was also Indeed, Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
Catholic because he was keeping as a secret his being a states that "In case of a marriage between a Muslim and
Muslim. a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
●​ Petitioner’s Contention: (Atilano Nollora, Jr) He claimed Muslim law or this Code, the Family Code of the
that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert Philippines or Executive Order No.209, in lieu of the Civil
prior to their marriage because she told this fact when he Code of the Philippines shall apply" . Nollora's religious
was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred Nollora's marriages were solemnized according to Muslim
having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora
Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of
Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private bigamy.
complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena
P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if 2.​ YES, all elements of bigamy were present. The
she learns of his first marriage circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
●​ Rowena P. Geraldino’s Contention: (1) Accused Rowena bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and
P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this Pinat's marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the
incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that he does date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the
not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4)
and only came to know her when this case was filed. Nollora and Geraldino's marriage has all the essential
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since Nollora due to his prior marriage. Thus Nollora and
December 8, 2001 Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. Geraldino are guilty of crime of bigamy.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant she

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino ■​ That in turn, she did not pay him the
that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora's consideration because he never
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. processed her petition for citizenship
Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's ●​ When the Republic field a motion for reconsideration, it was
religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential denied by the RTC, explaining that the marriage was
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient declared void because the parties failed to freely give
proofs of Nollora's liability for bigamy. Nollora's false their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to
declaration about his civil status is thus further be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to
compounded by these omissions acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the
validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not ISSUE: WoN the marriage between Fringer and Albios is void ab
impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate inition on the ground of lack of consent.
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be
opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple RULING: No.
flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals Under Art. 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given”
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
that such a marriage although void ab initio, may still enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
produce legal consequences. Among these legal vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Articles 45 and 46 of the FC, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on undue influence. Consent must be also be conscious or intelligent, in
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of intoxication, drugs or hypnotism.
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS GR # 198780 10/16/12 also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
FACTS: impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is
best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
●​ On Oct. 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
were married before Judge Ofelia Calo of the MeTC, as willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
evidence by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
2004-1588. with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
●​ On Dec. 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for declaration of and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
nullity of marriage with Fringer, alleging that after their between them, since it was not precise legal tie which was necessary
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and to accomplish their goal.
wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential *How about their marriage by way of jest?
marital obligations; that their marriage is one made in jest,
and therefore, null and void ab initio. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
○​ The RTC declared their marriage void ad initio. into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
○​ According to the RTC, the parties married each status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
other for convenience only. Albios stated that bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
■​ she contracted Fringer to enter into a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not
marriage to enable her to acquire intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
American citizenship; whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
■​ that in consideration thereof, she agreed jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine
■​ That Fringer returned to the US and consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
never again communicated with her; bound in any way or for any purpose.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Albios’ marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. applicable law since it was already in effect when the marriage
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to was solemnized on Jan 9 1993.
create the very bond necessary to allow Albios to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to No issue with the essential requisites under Art 2, and no issue with
further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can the following formal requisites under Art 3: authority of solemnizing
officer and a marriage ceremony with at least 2 witnesses. Respondent
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
was, therefore, clearly present.
The Certification provided by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
ABBAS V. ABBAS GR # 183896 01/30/13 Carmona, Cavite was sufficient in establishing the absence of a
valid marriage license for Syed and Gloria, as the license number
reflected in their marriage contract was issued for other parties,
FACTS: (no valid ML, no MC)
further supported by a certified machine copy submitted to Court.
Recognizing the intent of the petitioner in filing this case, the Court
●​ Syed Azhar filed for the declaration of nullity of his said: “We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas on the grounds of the his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
absence of a marriage license. profit from his own deceit and perfidy.” However, the rule is that a
wedding ceremony conducted and a signed marriage contract do
●​ 1991, Syed and Gloria met in Taiwan. Aug 9 1992, not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
they got married at the Taipei Mosque. Later, Gloria The marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent,
claimed that she was uncertain if this marriage was therefore marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio
celebrated under Muslim rites because the solemnizing
officer was Chinese, and so was everyone around them
at the time.
●​ Jan 9 1993, 5pm, Syed was told by his mother-in-law that
he was going to undergo some ceremony as a requirement GO-BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN 700 S 702
for his stay in the Philippines. In the ceremony, he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed not to have known that it FACTS: Benjamin alleged that in 1973, he married Azucena Alegre in
was a marriage ceremony until Gloria told him later. Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin,
●​ 2001 and 2002, Gloria filed bigamy cases against petitioner. and Benjamin III.
Upon his counsel’s advise, Syed decided to ascertain the
existence of their marriage license, hoping to prove the
nullity of the marriage and the lack of grounds for the bigamy In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
suit. Go-Bangayan who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies
●​ Jul 2003: Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar business owned by Benjaminas family. In 1981, Azucena left for the
of Carmona, Cavite to check their marriage license. The United States of America. In 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
Registrar issued a certification dated Jul 11 2003 that
as husband and wife.
Marriage License No. 9969967 as stated in petitioner’s
marriage contract, was in fact issued to Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. No other license was found to be Sally’s father was against the relationship. In March 1982, in order to
issued under the names of petitioner and respondent. appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City
●​ Testimony of respondent’s witnesses (1) Rev. Dauz where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
solemnized the marriage of the two; (2) Atty Sanchez, one Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
witness, requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage
would not be registered.
license, although he did not know where the license was
obtained; (3) Felicitas was shown the license, but admitted to
not having read the contents thereof. She knew where it The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left
was obtained; (4) Mary Ann Ceriolas, another witness, for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley (their children) with her. She
could support the existence of the ceremony. then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
●​ Gloria only presented a marriage contract as proof of their documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract
marriage. No license was submitted as evidence.
●​ RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license and that as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
the marriage was void ab initio. CA overruled this decision non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before
on the grounds of sufficient testimonial and documentary the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
evidence proving a valid marriage. and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUES: WON the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid. ISSUE: WoN the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is valid​
Alt: Whether there’s a valid marriage license
RULING: No.
RULING: No. It is void ab initio.
Their marriage was void ab initio because no valid marriage license
has been issued for the couple. EO No. 209 (Family Code) is the

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena in 1973 was duly established as the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to
time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore
valid and subsisting. could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and void.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Oliveros testified
that there was no valid marriage license issued to them. Oliveros ISSUE: WON marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 is null and void ab initio? -YES
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further RULING:
testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License No. N-07568 to them. The certification from the local civil
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1,
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 12 Hence, the Civil
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
lack of a marriage license. requisites are complied with:

As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
Sally was made only in jest and as simulated marriage, at the instance
of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation (2) Their consent, freely given;
coming from relatives, friends, and the society, especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives. In short, it was a fictitious
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between exceptional character. 13
Benjamin and Sally.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be
KHO V. REPUBLIC AND KHO GR # 187462 06/01/16 solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
FACTS: resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
●​ Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, Racquel's
parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages
said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
papers were required for the intended marriage between peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages;
Racquel (petitioner) and Veronica (respondent) supposedly (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil
to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony; marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall
●​ Racquel and Veronica thereafter exchanged marital vows in under any of these exceptions.
a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around
3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage
there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the
wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. The
of same early morning of June 1, 1972; rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the
●​ Racquel has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
much less signed any papers or documents in into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the
connection with the procurement of a marriage license; requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
●​ Considering the shortness of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in Likewise guilty is the spouse in the subsequent marriage. Conversion
the maintenance of which the general public is interested. to Islam does not operate to exculpate them from criminal liability.

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued Further, a married Muslim cannot marry another. In exceptional cases,
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting a married Muslim man may do so if "he can deal with them with equal
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law." The
any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho formal requisites of the subsequent marriage under Presidential
[petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage Decree No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
was celebrated on June 1, 1972." Thus, on the basis of such Philippines (Muslim Code) entails the wife's knowledge of the
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and impending subsequent marriage.
respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges Nerrian Maningo-Malaki (Nerrian) claimed that on March 26, 1988, she
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to and Francis were married under the religious rites of Iglesia ni Cristo in
discharge that burden. Panabo City, Davao del Norte. They begot two children.

In 2005, Francis left the family home for Tagum City to find a job. He
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage later abandoned their family. Nerrian discovered that he was cohabiting
license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of with Jacqueline and that they contracted marriage on June 18, 2005,
Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any solemnized by a Municipal Trial Court judge.
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have
obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Francis and Jacqueline admitted that they got married while Francis'
Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage to Nerrian was subsisting. However, they claimed that they
marriage license,i.e., date of issuance and license number, could could not be penalized for bigamy as they converted to Islam
be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also prior to their marriage.
notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation
that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as In its May 7, 2012 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Francis and
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was Jaqueline guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It reasoned that
conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license the Muslim Code and Zamoranos v. People do not govern the
was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite circumstances of Nerrian, Francis, and Jaqueline considering that
respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to Nerrian is not a Muslim.
obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove
such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the ARGUMENTS
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
Petitioners claim that they are Muslims and were married under Muslim
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Law, respectively evidenced by petitioner Francis' Certificate of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce Conversion and their Certificate of Marriage. Thus, it is the Muslim
a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that Code which applies here.26 They contend that trying them for bigamy
such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached "defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the [s]tate on Muslim
ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a Filipinos."
total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to Petitioners assert that prior to their marriage on June 18, 2005 before
prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear Judge Conrado Bandala, which was merely ceremonial, they were
that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage already married on June 5, 2005 under Muslim rites.28 Petitioners fault
license is null and void. respondent for not proving this Islamic wedding.

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal Moreover, petitioners argue that pursuant to Article 3 of the Muslim
finding of the absence of the subject marriage license which rendered Code, when there is a conflict between Muslim law and the general
the marriage void. law, Muslim law prevails.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Francis D. Malaki, Sr. and

MALAKI V. MALAKI GR #221075 11/15/21
Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin are guilty of bigamy?

FACTS:
RULING:

A party to a civil marriage who converts to Islam and contracts another

YES. The general law, the Civil Code (superseded by the Family
marriage, despite the first marriage's subsistence, is guilty of bigamy.
Code), governs marriages not solemnized under Muslim rites, including

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

those between a Muslim and a non-Muslim.58 Crimes and offenses in bigamy a Muslim husband who subsequently marries "in accordance
connection with civil marriages are defined in the Revised Penal Code with the provisions of [the Muslim Code].
and special laws.
Petitioners' apparent nonchalance in complying with the Muslim Code
The Muslim Code allows subsequent marriages on certain conditions.59 is an evidentiary matter where the Regional Trial Court and the Court
The ponente maintains his views on the separation of Church and of Appeals' findings are in complete harmony. Factual matters are not
State.60 However, the reality is that the Muslim Code merely codified the province of the present Petition. Absent any showing that they are
previously acknowledged customs which Moros have observed since grossly in error, the findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court
time immemorial. of Appeals stand undisturbed.

Article 3 of the Muslim Code declares that its provisions shall not be
construed to the prejudice of a non-Muslim. Certainly, granting the ARTICLE 7-10: SOLEMNIZING OFFICERS
Muslim convert, like petitioner Francis, the recourse provided in Article
180 would be prejudicial to the abandoned wife, and the state, the ARANES V. OCCIANO 380 S 420
aggrieved party in criminal prosecutions.
FACTS:
Moreover, Article 186 of the Muslim Code directs its prospective
application on past acts, and that nothing "shall affect their validity or
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred
Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23
thereby[,]" except as otherwise specifically provided. Acts done prior
May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
to the effectivity of the Muslim Code remain governed by the Civil
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17
Code, the then pre-existing law of general application. Similarly,
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late
any protection which the Muslim Code may afford petitioner Francis
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and
when he converted to Islam – which is when the Muslim Code
at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
became applicable to him – must also be prospectively applied.

Indeed, in case of conflict with a general law, the Muslim Code Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
prevails.63 However, Article 13(2) of the Muslim Code explicitly Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties
spells out that the Civil Code64 governs marriages where either on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to
party is non-Muslim and which were not solemnized in Muslim the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
rites. There is no conflict with general law here. The nature, his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
consequences, and incidents of petitioner Francis' prior and admittedly However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
subsisting marriage to Nerrian remain well-within the ambit of the Civil difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to
Code,65 and its counterpart penal provisions in the Revised Penal Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Code. Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Whether petitioner Francis converted to Islam before or after his
marriage with petitioner Jacqueline, the subsequent marriage Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony,
consummated the crime of bigamy. He cannot successfully invoke the he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner.
exculpatory clause in Article 180, considering that the Muslim Code When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
finds no application in his then subsisting marriage with Nerrian, marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested
the marriage recognized by law that bars and penalizes a subsequent its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
marriage. parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the
occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
The Muslim husband must first notify the Shari'a Circuit Court, compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
where his family resides, of his intent to contract a subsequent aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
marriage. The clerk of court shall then serve a copy to the wife or stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
wives. If any of them objects, the Muslim Code mandates the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
constitution of the Agama Arbitration Council,66 which shall hear the would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
wife. Ultimately, the Shari'a Circuit Court decides whether to respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
sustain the wife's objection. afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
"In other words, the consent of the wife, or the permission of the reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at
Shari'a Circuit Court if the wife refuses to give consent, is a condition the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
sine qua non with respect to the subsequent marriage."67 Absent the
wife's consent or the court's permission, the exculpatory provision of
Article 180 shall not apply, since it only exempts from the charge of

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty of solemnizing the petitioner's Jerrysus consulted a clinical psychologist and Elizabeth was said to be
marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as
marriage outside his jurisdiction. histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
RULING:
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
YES, the respondent judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without matter, ratiocinating:
a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it
can validly [pass] upon the validity of church marriage in the
Pursuant to Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the light of the separation of the Church and the State as
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior court to enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution.
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as Withal, marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of
defined by the Supreme Court. In addition, under Family Code Art. 7 the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely
(1) Marriage may be solemnized by an incumbent member of the religious. Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction. annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by
an ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of
In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, we held that: “However, judges marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in governed by the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation of Church and
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid State finds application in this case.
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to ISSUES:
administrative liability."
(1)​ W/N the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is marriage pursuant to the provisions of the Family Code
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of (2)​ Alt Issue: W/N the declaration of nullity of marriage can only
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, be determined by an ecclesiastical tribunal
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of RULING: (1) YES; (2) NO
the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not
law on marriage. merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are
governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential as
Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the well as formal requisites for the validity of marriage.
requisite marriage license. … it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35
of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance (2).
of the law.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the
JERRYSUS TILAR V. ELIZABETH TILAR 831 S 116 validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FACTS: Jerrysus filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of Eizabeth’s psychological incapacity based No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and Elizabeth marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting
were married with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer; that parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
a son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
first few months but Elizabeth later became an extremely jealous, take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be
violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and Jerrysus being contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-go lucky and contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing
extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil
separated in 2002; and, that Elizabeth is now living with another man in registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party
Cebu City. habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

license is that it is the authority granted by the State to the (Australian Citizen) on March 1, 1987 at Malabon, Rizal.
contracting parties, after the proper government official has They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. ○​ DIVORCE: On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how an Australian family court.

❤️
marriage may be solemnized, thus: ●​ On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen.
●​ 2ND MARRIAGE (Rederick Grace) Petitioner Grace
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Garcia Recio (Filipino) and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or
"Filipino."
religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect
○​ LIVED SEPARATELY: Starting October 22, 1995,
and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within
Grace and Rederick lived separately without prior
the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
religious sect and provided that at least one of the
●​ On March 3, 1998, Petitioner Grace filed a Complaint for
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
church or religious sect;
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
●​ Rederick averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
●​ On July 7, 1998 – while the suit for the declaration of nullity
that effect.
was pending – Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the "marriage had irretrievably broken down.
requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of ●​ Grace’s Contention: Petitioner Grace argues that the
Jerrysus and Elizabeth which was solemnized by a Catholic priest certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
and was held in a church was in accordance with the Family Code was not submitted together with the application
above-quoted provisions. Although marriage is considered a for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof
sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. ●​ Rederick’s Reply: Respondent Rederick replies that the
Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
As Jerrysus correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry
nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the under Australian law.
Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the
parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another ISSUE: W/N the failure of Rederick, who is now a naturalized
matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the absence of a substantial requisite voiding Grace’s' marriage to
State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the Rederick.
eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church
and state finds no application in this case.
RULING: YES.

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national

law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
ARTICLE 21: ONE OR BOTH PARTIES IS/ARE FOREIGNERS the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
RECIO V. RECIO 366 S 437 authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
FACTS: license. As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that

❤️
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
●​ 1ST MARRIAGE (Rederick Editha) Respondent
Rederick Recio (Filipino) was first married to Editha Samson

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

CASE WAS REMANDED: Based on the records presented in this According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
case, the Court cannot conclude that Rederick, who was then a Philippines –
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Grace's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
the second marriage. wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994. Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
TLDR: Rederick was not able to prove under Australian law that when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
certificate of legal capacity to marry is not essential to contract 2nd until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
marriage if there is already an existing divorce decree. He only spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
presented a divorce decree with no attachment proving australian law respondent Crasus.

ARTICLE 26 (2)​ MARRIAGES BETWEEN A FILIPINO AND A REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO I 472 $ 14

FOREIGNER
FACTS:
REPUBLIC v. IYOY 470 S 50
●​ Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2
FACTS: Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a declaration of nullity of children.
marriage on March 25, 1997 based on Psychological Incapacity. In ●​ In 1986 Lady Myros left for the United States, obtained
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the US, a year after Fely left for the American citizenship and in 2000 obtained a decree of
U.S.A., respondent Crasus Iyoy received a letter from her requesting divorce and married one Innocent Stanley Cipriano.
that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said ●​ Thereafter, filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an ●​ The Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited provision
American, with whom she eventually had a child. is not applicable to the instant case because it applies only
to a valid mixed marriage that is, between a Filipino citizen
and an alien.
On the other hand, Fely asserted that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she
did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself ISSUE: WON the parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely naturalized as a foreign citizen validly obtains a divorce decree? (YES)
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship.
She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal RULING:
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed
by the law of her present nationality. YES.

ISSUE: WoN article 26 of the FC is applicable. NO. On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where
RULING: Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
is not applicable to the case at bar. citizen and a foreigner

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
Appeals. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a decree must first be judicially recognized by a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No.
under Philippine law and can thus remarry. 4, series of 1982.
●​ so , Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)
rule of reason, we hold that par. 2 of Article 26 should be with the RTC. However, it was denied by the court and ruled
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
a divorce decree. The Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and order for him or her to be able to remarry under
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact Philippine law.
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
literal purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its ISSUE: Whether or not the the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law. Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of par. 2 of Article 26 as follows: RULING: NO.

1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph
foreigner" and of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the Code.
time of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
latter to remarry. celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
CORPUZ v. SANTO TOMAS GR# 186571 08/11/2010 shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

FACTS: As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
●​ Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 29, 2000 to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
●​ On Jan. 18, 2005, Gerbert married Daisylyn, a Filipina, in Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
Pasig City. doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
●​ Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
left for Canada soon after the wedding. a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
●​ Sometime in April 2005, he returned to the Philippines, he considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without
discovered that his wife was having an affair with another the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
man. recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
●​ So, he returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
●​ On Dec. 8, 2005, the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce and took our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
effect on Jan. 8, 2006. bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
●​ Two years after, Gerbert wanted to marry his new Filipina absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
fiancée in the Philippines. He went to the Pasig CIty Civil foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
●​ Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

⭐FUJIKI v. MARINAY GR# 196049 06/26/13

*As to Gerbert’s petition* FACTS:

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily with each other.
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the started to contact Fujiki.
effect of foreign judgments.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
ground of bigamy.
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial
national law. Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the petition.
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, ISSUE:
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the bigamy AND
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the jurisdiction of other states.
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a

RULING:
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtains a divorce
foreign country.
decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to
simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of
a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
the Family Code.
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition
of the Rules of Court.
of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public
2. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” The interpretation of the RTC
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
Rañada, this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.”
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
“in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” and preserving the
the rules of evidence.
property regime of the marriage.

Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a

foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a Notes:
“presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their • Nature of the action brought before the court: recognition of foreign
successors in interest by a subsequent title.” Courts are not judgment

🇩🇪
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign • “Collateral attack”: raising an issue that is NOT germane to the
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be topic. GERMANE?! *high pitched voice*
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, • Remedies: read Fujiki vs Marinay
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine

Grounds to refuse to recognize
copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the
Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition,
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
ISSUE: WoN Doreen should be granted the opportunity to present
evidence
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in RULING: Yes. It bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgmentf The rule on The provision reads
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
states accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
1.​ Want of jurisdiction were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
2.​ Want of notice to the party in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
3.​ Collusion (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
4.​ Fraud
5.​ Pure mistake of law/fact Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

⭐KOIKE v. KOIKE GR#215723 07/27/16 Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
FACTS: Doreen Grace Parilla , a Filipino citizen, and Michiyuki Koike,
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
dissolution of the marriage.
Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was
born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4,
2007. NOTES:
Apart from the divorce decree, a foreign law (with authentication)
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of regarding divorce must also be proved
Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Divorce Law not proven - Fell short on reqs:
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in (1)​ "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Japan 2009," = not duly authenticated by the Philippine
Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the
said Rules
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her (2)​ Testimony is insufficient since she was not presented
as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at
Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition particularly those on family relations and divorce.
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. This means that
Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and "Family national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
Register of Michiyuki Koike” both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya or herself.
City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
How to Prove: National Law of alien spouse (see reqs) + Divorce
decree demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
Without authenticating the law of the alien, it will not be recognized distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
in our jurisdiction respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the

absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
⭐REPUBLIC v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO GR#221029 04/24/18 spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
⭐ country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
Spouse Initiating divorce: Marelyn Manalo (Filipino) = still recognized
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
in PH as divorce was validly obtained
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
FACTS: her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
●​ On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court on a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
December 6, 2011, which dissolved her marriage to Japanese the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
national Yoshino Minoro. marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
●​ The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance latter's national law.
for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
●​ As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
the court granted. is tantamount to trying a divorce case.
●​ Manalo was allowed to testify in advance and admit
documents as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
employment.
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
●​ The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse.
the allegations of Manalo.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
●​ On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
of merit citing Article 15 of the New Civil Code, which does not
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
allow Filipinos to file for divorce.
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are
●​ On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision holding that
no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if the Filipino spouse
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce.
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
●​ The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied;
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
hence, this petition.
the other.

ISSUE: (1)WON the divorce decree initiated and obtained by Manalo

(2) Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize
(Filipino) at the country (Japan) of her foreign spouse (Yoshino) is
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
valid? -YES
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be
(2)WON the presentation solely of the divorce decree by Manalo is proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
sufficient? - NO courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
RULING:​
(1) Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained In this case, Manalo was able to submit before the court a quo the ​
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; ​

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2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and ​ National Statistics Office (NSO).
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese
national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently be capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and
prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained a decree of absolute nullity has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia,
to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he obtained
the divorce decree.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC,
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
resolved in the negative. Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and
denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded by a motion
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the for reconsideration.[8]
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce?
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
RULING:
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court. As it NO. A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from
appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only
OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor covers void and voidable marriages that are specifically cited and
the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never
existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and
is usually due to circumstances arising after the marriage.

It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of Florie's appeal
Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the
procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special
proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the Court ruled that
REPUBLIC v. FLORIE GRACE COTE GR# 212860 MARCH 14, 2018
the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
FACTS: divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent
Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign
the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise
already blessed with a son, Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was born benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry.
in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America (USA). Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must
file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
marriage was irretrievably broken. This was granted on August 23, the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
2002 by the issuance of a decree. foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
(RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract, on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show

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the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1,
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the 2012. In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji before the RTC so
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her
passport and for her to be able to marry again.
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the
foreign divorce decree procured by her naturalized (originally Filipino) After the presentation and absent of any objection from the Public
husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil Registry of Quezon Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as
City and the NSO, the end sought to be achieved was the cancellation proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of
and or correction of entries involving her marriage status. the testimony of the witnesses.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al., the Court briefly explained the nature of
recognition proceedings vis-a-vis cancellation of entries under Rule The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It was held that while a divorce
108 of the Rules of Court, viz.: obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the
Philippines - provided that such decree is valid according to the
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register national law of the alien - the same does not find application when it
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the is not binding in the Philippines.
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce decree procured by the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
petitioner will be recognized in the Philippine jurisdiction.g
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place
RULING: Yes. Partly granted.
for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. x
x x.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce,
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2)
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth,
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in or her to remarry.
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is
encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:

Article 26. ​
DE LA CRUZ-MORISONO v. RYOJI MORISONO GR# 226013 JULY x x x​
2, 2018 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
FACTS: Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
(Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8, 2009. Thereafter, they lived
remarry under Philippine law.
together in Japan but were not blessed with a child.

Citing Manalo Ruling:

During their married life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to
Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much
older than Luzviminda. As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is

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effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. This is
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective because the divorce herein was consensual in nature,
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained
under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a Philippines.
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have ISSUE: W/N a divorce proceeding initiated by a Filipino spouse
the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be affects the application of the coverage of Par. 2 of Article 26 of the
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign Family Code.
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an RULING: NO
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
of Republic v. Manalo, the facts of which fall squarely on point with the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their
facts herein.
alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.
There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
should not affect the application nor remove him from the
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which
recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the
states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
presumably the Filipino citizen must prove the divorce as a fact and
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the
divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of depart from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of
this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where
initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino
for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on initiated proceeding.
divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are
questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court
remand to the court a quo is warranted.
similarly rules that despite the fact that Stephen participated in
the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that
STEPHEN JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC GR# 224015 JULY 23, 2018 she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from
the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
FACTS: Petitioner Stephen Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already
married in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. They eventually been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in
obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage. Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, Stephen shall
Thereafter, Stephen filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Judgment before the RTC, Camarines Norte.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant
●​ RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce Stephen’s Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our
Laws courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects
●​ But the CA set aside its previous decision. According to the thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in
appellate court, the second of the following requisites under any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together

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with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the court order. She was also informed by the National Statistics
judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign her to remarry.
authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies. Thus, ●​ She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her
what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies lawyer, and secured a Japanese Law English Version of the
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition.
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be ●​ On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry with the
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of ●​ RTC: Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a
his office. divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka's
national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself.
the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. ●​ Petitioner’s Contention:
What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese ○​ Racho argues that under the Civil Code of Japan,
Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon
family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges notification, whether oral or written, by both parties
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. and by two (2) or more witnesses.
○​ She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating
"Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce
issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref.,
Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to
RACHO .v TANAKA GR#199515, JUNE 25, 2018 868 S 52
prove that she and her husband have divorced by
(LEONEN)
agreement and have already effected notification
of the divorce.
DOCTRINE: Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the
○​ She insists that she is now legally capacitated to
national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded
marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan
and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino
states that a matrimonial relationship is terminated
spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find
by divorce.
that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse
according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's
ISSUE: W/N the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is
national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be
sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora
absolute.
Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by
the latter according to his national law.
FACTS:

RULING: YES.
●​ Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April
20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and
for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not
a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly
have any children.
obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law.
●​ December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce
was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by
The second paragraph Article 26 of was included to avoid an absurd
Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the
situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign
Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it
spouse even after a validly obtained divorce abroad. The addition of
authenticated by an authentication officer of the Department
the second paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
of Foreign Affairs.
have the marriage considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him
●​ She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine
or her the capacity to remarry.
Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed
that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity
required to return to the Philippines to report the documents
of remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any other liability, whether civil
for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial
or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to remarriage.
recognition of divorce.
●​ She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is
Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar
insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, this Court established the principle
since there was no court order recognizing it. When she
that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a
went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to renew her
separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take
passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper

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judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws OSG Contends: Divorce by agreement is not the divorce
require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.
spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial
courts. Court says: Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor
National law was duly proved - Japan law on divorce General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce
proceedings.
Tanaka's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner presented "a copy [of] the English Version of the Civil Code The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
of Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the Ministry of initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
Justice and the Code of Translation Committee."[44] Article 728(1) of inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
the Civil Code of Japan reads: national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
divorce.
In Republic vs. Manalo, OSG’s contention was already resolved.
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained
issued by Consul Takayama of Japan. The Certificate only certified abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes effective by proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
notification, orally or in a document signed by both parties and distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
two or more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the provisions respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
of Family Registration Law of Japan.
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may
The Divorce Decree was validly obtained and proved be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained,
regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of proceedings.
official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be
accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign and respondent was valid.
country.
OSG Contends: While petitioner Racho was able to prove that the
Here, The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, she was unable to "point
accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. to a specific provision of the Japanese Civil Code which states that
Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement will allow the spouses
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to remarry."
Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further
certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of Court Says: In Republic vs. Obrecido The Court is unanimous in our
the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
between petitioner and respondent. considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
notification." Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission
petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
respondent's national law.
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial
Interpretation of Art 26(2) relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that would
restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and 1.Petitioner argues that equity and substantial justice merit the grant of
respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. the petition. If Article 26 of the Family Code is not applied in this case,
an absurd situation would arise wherein she is still considered married
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the to her husband, while her husband is no longer legally married to her.
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of 2.Petitioner identified, presented, and formally offered in evidence the
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, Divorce Report issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City. It
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains clearly bears the fact of divorce by agreement of the parties. Both the
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to trial court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, declined to consider
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the the Divorce Report as the Divorce Decree itself. According to the trial
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction court, the Divorce Report was "limited to the report of the divorce
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according granted to the parties." On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or that the Divorce Report "cannot be considered as act of an official body
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed or tribunal as would constitute the divorce decree contemplated by the
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the Rules."
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its ISSUE: 1. WoN A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the
spirit or intent. Philippines although it was the Filipino spouse who obtained the same.
YES
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our
laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's 2. Were the Divorce Decree itself and the Japanese law on divorce
newfound companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better sufficiently proved in this case? YES
served if she is not discriminated against in her own country. As much
as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of
3. Was petitioner able to prove the applicable law on divorce in Japan
another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within the
of which her former husband is a national? Remand to the lower
institution of marriage.
court

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

RULING: 1. While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce,
Against Women (CEDAW).
Article 26 of the Family Code allows a Filipino married to a foreign
national to contract a subsequent marriage if a divorce decree is validly
obtained by the alien spouse abroad.
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE
BETWEEN MINURO TAKAHASHI AND JULIET RENDORA
Under the second paragraph of Article 26, the law confers jurisdiction
MORANA JULIET RENDORA MORANA v. REPUBLIC GR# 227605,
on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
DECEMBER 5, 2019 (LAZARO-JAVIER)
a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage.
FACTS: On June 24, 2002, petitioner Juliet Morana and Minoru
Takahashi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereafter, they
Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse
moved to live in Japan where they bore two (2) children.
who initiated and obtained the divorce decree, the same may be
recognized in the Philippines, viz.:
Ten (10) years later, the couple got estranged. Petitioner alleged that
her husband failed to perform his marital obligations to her. He refused
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x
to give support to their two (2) children, and worse, started cohabiting
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
with another woman. Because of her persistent demand for financial
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear
support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so the
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
and send them to school. Believing it was for the good of their children,
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
petitioner agreed to divorce her husband. Consequently, they jointly
should be the one who initiated the proceeding
applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City,
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
Japan.
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
On May 22, 2012, the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted
proceeding.
their application for divorce and issued the corresponding Divorce
Report.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
Court­-Manila an action for recognition of the Divorce Report.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the Indeed, our rules require more than a printout from a website
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to to prove a foreign law. In Racho, the Japanese law on divorce
the Filipino spouse. x x x Whether the Filipino spouse was duly proved through a copy of the English Version of the
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a Civil Code of Japan translated under the authorization of the
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. At
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will any rate, considering that the fact of divorce was duly proved
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will in this case, the higher interest of substantial justice compels
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the
who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may
same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated remaining party. In Manalo, the Court, too, did not dismiss the
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should case, but simply remanded it to the trial court for reception of
not make a distinction. evidence pertaining to the existence of the Japanese law on
divorce.
IMPORTANT NOTE!! How to approach petition for
recognition of foreign divorce under Article 26 (2): Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R. No. 224548, January 23,
2019
Finally, the Court has, time and again, held that the court's primary duty
is to dispense justice; and procedural rules are designed to secure and FACTS:
not to override substantial justice. On several occasions, the Court
relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial justice. More so here ●​ On July 29, 1997, Marlyn and Akira, a Japanese National,
because what is involved is a matter affecting the lives of petitioner and got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan. The union of
her children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance of the Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito.
Divorce Certificate was not due to petitioner's fault; and the ●​ Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so
relaxation of the rules here will not prejudice the State. they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement.
●​ In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in
True, marriage is an inviolable social institution and must be protected Japan. Thereafter the Divorce Certificate was issued by the
by the State. But in cases like these, there is no more "institution" to Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.
protect as the supposed institution was already legally broken. ●​ Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, by agreement was supported by an Acceptance Certificate
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is that was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains English translation of which forms part of the records.
bound to it. ●​ Thereafter, Marlyn sought recognition of the divorce decree
in the Philippines and filed a Petition for registration and/or
2. Records show that the Divorce Report is what the recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of
Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her husband entry of marriage with the RTC.
when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce ●​ RTC denied the petition, applying article 15 and 17 of the
judgment" to speak of because the divorce proceeding was civil code, arguing that Philippine courts do not recognize
not coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of divorce by agreement, basing it on the fact that Nullada also
the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. agreed to the divorce.
In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the
Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed ISSUE:
an act of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is
called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the
●​ WON Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a
"Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the
restrictive application so as to apply only in a cases
fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.
where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not
where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouse.
Notably, the fact of divorce was also supported by the Certificate of All
(NO)
Matters issued by the Japanese government to petitioner's husband
Minoru Takahashi, indicating the date of divorce, petitioner's name
RULING:
from whom he got divorced and petitioner's nationality as well.

3. Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere NO.

printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese law on
divorce and its English translation. There was no proof at As held in Republic vs Taneda Manalo, the letter of the law does not
all that these printouts reflected the existing law on demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
divorce in Japan and its correct English translation. proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Reiterating again, that the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to In any case, the proceedings were remanded to the court of origin
avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse remains married so that the petitioner could prove the Japanese laws allowing for
to the alien spouse who, after the foreign divorce decree that is the divorce.
effective in the country it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. Arreza v. Toyo, G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

While the opposition to the interpretation mentioned above is based on FACTS:

the nationality rule, such rule is not an absolute and unbending
rule. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code should be ●​ On April 1, 1991, Genevieve a Filipino and Tetsushi Toyo, a
deemed an exception to the general rule. Thus, the fact that the Japanese, were married in Quezon City.
divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not ●​ After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of
sufficient ground to reject the decree in this jurisdiction. Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku,
Osaka City, Japan received on Feb. 4, 2011. It was later
While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed, a recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the
recognition of the divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.
course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission ●​ On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the RTC a Petition
of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
that allows it. The Japanese Law on divorce must then be capacity to remarry.
sufficiently proved. "Because our courts do not take judicial notice of ○​ She submitted the following:
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the ■​ a copy of their Divorce Certificate
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and ■​ Tetsushi’s Family Register
proven x x x like any other fact." ■​ The Certificate of Acceptance of the
Notification of Divorce
In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. U, Echin, the Court reiterated the ■​ English translation of the Civil Code of
following rules on proof of foreign laws. Japan
●​ On Feb. 14, 2014, the RTC denied Genevieve’s petition. It
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was
Revised Rules of Court which read: accepted by the local government of Japan, she
nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan’s law.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents ○​ That the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any English translation submitted by Genevieve were
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a not duly authenticated by the Philippine
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila,
by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Philippines with certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office ●​ On the other hand, Genevieve asserts that she submitted in
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be evidence the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice.” She
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign contends that because it was printed by a public authority,
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the the Civil Code of Japan is deemed to be an official
record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office. publication under Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of
Court and, therefore, is a self-authenticating document that
need not be certified under Rule 132, Section 24.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of ISSUE: WoN the translation of the Japan Civil Code should be given
the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, judicial notice.
under the seal of such court
RULING: NO
Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records
only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, Settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign
merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only
Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300. the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's
national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that
This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the A Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce. laws.

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the
purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established translator's and advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness
by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator's
Rules of Court: and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the English
translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the Regional Trial Court
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a was correct in not considering the English translation as a learned
writing or document may be proven as a public or official treatise.
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal Galapon v. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a FACTS:
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married in
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the City of Manila, Philippines on February 27, 2012. Unfortunately,
the seal of his office. their relationship turned sour and ended with a divorce by mutual
agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on July 16,
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents Genevieve 2012 by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed before the RTC a
submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. The RTC
demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the granted the petition but the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration
copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation arguing that (1) The Recognition Petition should have been filed in the
insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these RTC of Manila because the marriage was celebrated and was
documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul recorded in the City Civil Registry of Manila and (2) considering that
in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of the divorce was obtained not by the alien spouse alone but by both
Foreign Affairs. spouses, Cynthia is not qualified to avail of the benefits provided by
[Article] 26 of the Family Code. The Motion for Reconsideration was
Notwithstanding, Genevieve is wrong when she argued that the denied by the RTC. The OSG appealed to the CA and the CA granted
English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication the appeal, hence this petition.
having been published under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice
and, therefore, is considered a self-authenticating document. ISSUE:

The English translation submitted by Genevieve was published by Whether the divorce decree obtained jointly by a Filipina spouse and
Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in her foreign spouse can be recognized in the Philippines – YES
publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be
known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations RULING:
are "not advertised as a source of official translations of
Japanese laws;" rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette
Article 26 of the family code states that “All marriages solemnized
where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in
outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
Japanese.
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by Genevieve is (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38 where a marriage between a Filipino
not an official publication exempted from the requirement of Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
authentication. validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. under Philippine law.
Under the Rules of Court, "[a] witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]" The evidence is In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of
hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness knows himself [or herself] Article 26 (2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is
but of what he [or she] has heard from others." The rule excluding obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Pursuant to the majority ruling in
hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but Manalo, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce
also covers written statements. decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the
Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino
The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value[.]" spouse. Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce
However, a published treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea. The
truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance
witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband
an expert in the subject. Park was not put in issue. Thus, the Court ruled that as confirmed by

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia’s ABEL v. RULE GR#234457, MAY 12, 2021
conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26 (2) and merits recognition
in this jurisdiction. FACTS: ​
*On December 18, 2005, Raemark S, Abel (Abel), a citizen of the
United States of America, and Mindy P. Rule (Rule), a Filipino
citizen, got married in the City of Los Angeles, California.​
Kondo v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 223628, March 4, 2020 *On November 18, 2008, Abel and Rule jointly sought the
summary dissolution of their marriage before the Los Angeles
FACTS: On March 15, 1991, Edna S. Kondo and Katsuhiro Kondo, a Superior Court. They neither acquired community assets or
Filipina and Japanese national, respectively, were married before the liabilities nor bore any children during the time they were married.​
Head of Hirano Ward in Japan. They registered their Marriage *On July 31, 2009, the Superior Court of California dissolved Abel
Certificate of even date with the National Statistics Office in the and Rule's marriage. Seven days later, Abel received a copy of the
Philippines. But on July 3, 2000, after around 9 years of marriage, they judgment of dissolution.​
obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan for which they were issued a *Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship and became a dual citizen
Report of Divorce. of the Philippines and the United States of America on December 3,
2008. On the other hand, Rule became a citizen of the United States
of America on September 21, 2012.​
In 2012, Edna, through her sister and Attorney-in-Fact Luzviminda,
*On January 10, 2017, an authenticated California judgment
filed a petition for judicial recognition of the divorce decree, citing
dissolving Abel and Rule's marriage was recorded with the City
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Registry Office of Manila. Abel then filed a Petition for the judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and correction of civil entry before
Edna essentially alleged that the divorce capacitated Katsuhiro to the Regional Trial Court .​
remarry under Japanese laws. She sought formal recognition of the *The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Opposition to Abel's
divorce decree and asked the trial court to direct the Civil Registrar to petition. It claimed that:
annotate the same in her Marriage Certificate.
(1)the divorce sought to be recognized was not obtained
Luzviminda presented, among others, the Report of Divorce and by the alien spouse, contrary to law, because Abel and
Katsuhiro's authenticated Family Register record, both with English Rule jointly filed the petition for summary dissolution of
translation, stating that he and Edna divorced by agreement on July 3, marriage;
2000.
(2)the Joint Petition was tantamount to a severance of
ISSUE: marriage upon a stipulation of facts, confession of
judgment, or even collusion between the parties, which
are all against State policy.
RULING: Indeed, the Court has time and again granted liberality in
cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed
marriages and free them from a marriage in which they are the sole *In his Reply, Abel asserted that: (1) the divorce was obtained in
remaining party. the course of judicial proceedings and not through mutual
agreement; (2)that the divorce was NOT against public policy
because he, as the foreign spouse, was the one who obtained it;
The Court sees no reason why the same treatment should not be
(3)the divorce was not vitiated by collusion or any other vice that
applied here.
would cause the denial of recognition of the foreign judgment.​
*On July 5, 2017, the Regional Trial Court found merit in the
First. Edna presented an Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese Opposition and dismissed the Petition.
Language; an English translation of the Report of Divorce; and an
Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro. She ISSUE: WON a divorce decree jointly obtained by a Filipino and their
also actively participated throughout the proceedings through her sister alien spouse can be judicially recognized in the Philippines. -YES
and attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda, despite financial and logistical
constraints. She also showed willingness to provide the final document RULING:​
the trial court needed to prove Katsuhiro's capacity to remarry. Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

The present case stands on meritorious grounds, as petitioner had ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
actually presented certified documents establishing the fact of divorce Philippines, in accordance with the laws, in force in the
and relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the State. country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner (respondent), a South Korean national, on April 18, 2007 in Quezon
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly City. In September of the same year, or 5 months after getting married,
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her petitioner and respondent left for South Korea and lived together
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to therein as husband and wife. After just a year into the marriage, their
remarry under Philippine law. relationship turned sour, with respondent becoming physically and
emotionally abusive towards petitioner. Fed up, petitioner decided to
A clear and plain reading of the provision shows that what is only return to the Philippines in 2008 and returned to South Korea after one
required is that the divorce must have been validly obtained abroad by (1) month.
the alien spouse. It does not impose an additional requirement for the
alien spouse to solely obtain the divorce. In 2011, petitioner was surprised to discover that respondent had filed
for divorce, which was approved by the Seoul Family Court on the
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the same year, on June 14, 2011. On the basis thereof, respondent
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien eventually remarried Kim Seonyeo, a Chinese national, on November
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the 8, 2011.
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly Seeking to remarry, as petitioner herself was also involved in a
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign relationship with another Korean national with whom she begot a child,
spouse is free to many under the laws of his or her country. Whether she filed the instant petition with the RTC, praying that the foreign
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a judgment of divorce be recognized in the Philippine jurisdiction, thereby
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or giving her the capacity to contract another marriage.
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who ISSUE: WHETHER THE FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE AND THE
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like NATIONAL LAW OF WOO NAMSUN RECOGNIZING HIS CAPACITY
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien TO OBTAIN DIVORCE WERE PROVEN DURING TRIAL?
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize RULING:
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the The petition is partly meritorious. The evidence to prove the judgment
latter's national law. of divorce and the divorce law of South Korea does not conform with
the requirements of Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
In Republic v. Manalo and succeeding cases, we have consistently Court.
held that it is irrelevant if the foreign or Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding. Thus, the question that should be raised Foremost is the fact that laws in this jurisdiction do not provide for
before the courts "is not who among the spouses initiated the absolute divorce, the same being contrary to our concept of public
proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained . . . was valid. policy and morality. Resultantly, courts are enjoined from issuing a
judgment granting the dissolution of marital bonds through divorce; in
The reality of joint petitions for divorce was acknowledged in Galapon fact, a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
v. Republic. divorce obtained abroad, pursuant to Articles 1536 and 1737 of the Civil
Code. Such principle, however, does not foreclose the recognition of
Applying Manalo and the later case of Galapon to the present case, divorce decrees procured abroad, either by spouses who are both
that the divorce decree was obtained jointly by petitioner, then a citizen aliens, or by an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen.38
of the United States of America, and private respondent, then a Filipino
citizen, is of no moment. They are deemed to have obtained the Pertinent to the present action is the last instance, which has been
divorce as required in Article 26(2) of the Family Code, capacitating entrenched in Article 26 of the Family Code.
them to remarry under the Philippine law.​
Inarguably the crux of the provision, the second paragraph was
included therein to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
RIVERA v. WOO NAMSUM et al GR# 248355, NOVEMBER 23, 2021
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." While the Court
has already dispelled any confusion in establishing the rule regarding
FACTS:
foreign divorce involving Filipinos, the Filipino spouse who benefits
from such a divorce cannot automatically remarry. As cautioned in
The action before this Court arose from a Petition for Judicial Republic v. Cote, before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he
Recognition of the Foreign Judgment/Divorce filed by Maricel L. Rivera or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
(petitioner) with the RTC on September 23, 2015. An Amended Petition
was subsequently filed on November 9, 2015. Petitioner alleged that The Court held in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas that the "starting point in any
she entered into a contract of marriage with Woo Namsun recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws." judgment should have been accompanied by a certificate issued by a
Thus, as early as 1922, in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, the Court has Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in South Korea,
declared that in establishing a valid foreign marriage, it is of utmost which must be authenticated by his seal — this, petitioner failed to
necessity to prove before the courts the existence of the foreign law as attach.
a question of fact, and then it is necessary to prove the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. Thus, the presentation solely of the On the other hand, to prove the law of South Korea as a fact, petitioner
divorce decree, without more, will not suffice; it is indispensable that in offered in evidence a copy of the Civil Act of South Korea, a letter of
order to breathe life into such foreign judgment, its authenticity must be confirmation from the Embassy of the Republic of South Korea in the
proven as facts as contemplated under the Rules on Evidence, Philippines, and an Authentication Certificate from the DFA.
together the alien's applicable national law, to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The law suffers the same fate as the judgment. Aside from being
authenticated by Chin Hyun Yong, who to reiterate, is in no position to
As the foreign divorce decree allegedly issued by the Seoul Family ensure its existence, there is no implication that the signature
Court, as well as the Civil Act of South Korea purports to be official appearing thereon is genuine. This Court also hastens to point out that
acts of a sovereign authority, they may be established by complying what the petitioner offered in evidence was an English translation of
with the requirements of Sections 24 and 25, Rule 13245 of the Rules of the Civil Act of South Korea without further proof whether such
Court, translation truly and accurately reflects the South Korean law on
divorce. Surely, an English translation, absent the original law in the
Otherwise stated, to prove the foreign judgment and the law on which it Korean language is less than what is needed to persuade Philippine
was based, the Section requires proof, either by (1) official courts of the copy's authenticity. In Racho v. Tanaka, this Court
publications; or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody affirmed the RTC's admission of the Japanese law as fact via the
of the documents. Should the copies of official records be proven to be presentation of a copy of the English version of the Civil Code of
stored outside of the Philippines, they must be (1) accompanied by a Japan, the translation of which was done under the authority of the
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. No such
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the evidence was offered of the same manner; neither was there any
record is kept; and (2) authenticated by the seal of his office. If copies manifestation that the said English translation was sanctioned by the
are offered into evidence, the attestation: (1) must state that it is a government of South Korea. Instead, all it mentioned was that the copy
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof; and (2) must be had been produced "within the area of consular authority of (or seen
under the official seal of the attesting officer, or if he be the clerk of a at) the Korean Embassy" of Manila. More damning to petitioner's cause
court having a seal, under such seal of said court. was her outright admission of her non-presentation of any certificate by
the Philippine Embassy in Korea or consular officials stationed in
In the instant case, petitioner failed to satisfy the foregoing Korea as required by Section 24, Rule 132 as proof of official records.
requirements.

To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented notarized copies of

⭐Republic v. Kikuchi, G.R. No. 243646, June 22, 2022
the said judgment with both English and Korean translations. Attached FACTS: In 2015, Jocelyn, through her attorney-in-fact, Edwin Asusano
thereto is a letter of confirmation by the Embassy of the Republic of (Edwin), filed before the trial court a Petition for judicial recognition of
South Korea in the Philippines, which was signed by Chin Hyun Yong, foreign divorce. She alleged that she was married to Fumio in 1993,
as counselor and consul, as well as an Authentication Certificate by the and in 2007, they jointly filed for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado
DFA. City, Saitama Prefecture. As the divorce was accepted, Jocelyn sought
the recognition thereof here in the Philippines. Finding Jocelyn's
This Court cannot deny the insufficiency of the evidence presented. petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC set the case for
While Chin Hyun Yong may be a counselor or consul of South hearing.
Korea, his capacity as such cannot be construed by this Court to
mean that he is an officer having legal custody of the judgment of
During the presentation of evidence, the following documents, among
divorce. In fact, the Authentication Certificate issued by the DFA only
others, were presented: ​
certifies that the latter was, at the time of signing, a counselor and
(1) the Acceptance Certificate issued by the Mayor of Sakado City,
consul of the Embassy of the Republic of South Korea. Glaringly,
Saitama Prefecture, Japan; ​
nothing in the submitted documents would even lead this Court to
(2) an Authentication from the Vice Consul of Philippine Embassy in
assume that he was indeed the legal custodian of the judgment of
Tokyo, Japan; and ​
divorce as contemplated by the Rules. Woefully, Chin Hyun Yong is,
(3) a photocopy of the Civil Code of Japan in English text.
therefore, in no position to attest that the judgment of divorce as
found in the records is a genuine and correct copy of the original,
RTC: Granted. The trial court held that Jocelyn indeed was able to
or a specific part thereof. Contrary to petitioner's insistence that the
establish the fact of divorce and the national law of Japan.​
records are found in the Philippines, it cannot be denied that the
CA: Affirmed. The CA held that Jocelyn was able to present
judgment of divorce is found abroad, being an official record of the
documents proving the fact of divorce and the law of Japan.
Seoul Family Court. Being stored outside of the Philippines, the said

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OSG: “Jocelyn failed to comply with the requirements of authentication Nevertheless, Jocelyn was UNABLE to establish the LAW of
and proof of documents concerning the Acceptance Certificate, and the Japan on divorce
Authentication by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan; that Edwin's
testimony as to the fact of divorce should have been excluded for being To prove that the divorce was valid under Japanese laws, Jocelyn
hearsay; and that the foreign law had not been proven.” submitted a photocopy of the English translation of the Civil Code
of Japan, published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. and stamped with
ISSUE: W/N Jocelyn was able to establish the fact of divorce "LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan,
between her and her Kikuchi and the law of Japan on divorce 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City." The Republic assails the
document for being insufficient to prove the law of Japan on divorce.
RULING: YES, but the LAW of Japan on divorce was NOT proven.
Not being an official translation, the document submitted by Jocelyn
Under Article 26 of The Family Code of the Philippines, a divorce does not prove the existing law on divorce in Japan. Unfortunately,
between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the without such evidence, there is nothing on record to establish that the
Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign divorce between Jocelyn and Fumio was validly obtained and is
spouse's national law consistent with the Japanese law on divorce.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the Given that Jocelyn was able to prove the fact of divorce but not the
party pleading it must first prove the FACT of divorce and its conformity Japanese law on divorce, a remand of the case rather than its outright
to the foreign LAW allowing it, the required proof are their official dismissal is proper.
publications or copies attested by the officers having legal custody
thereof, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Notes:

Jocelyn was ABLE to prove the FACT of divorce What are the evidence presented?
(1) the Acceptance Certificate issued by the Mayor of Sakado City,
To prove the fact of divorce, Jocelyn submitted the Acceptance Saitama Prefecture, Japan; ​
Certificate stating that her and Fumio's written notification of divorce (2) an Authentication from the Vice Consul of Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan; and ​
had been accepted, as certified by Kiyoshi Ishikawa, Mayor of Sakado
(3) a photocopy of the Civil Code of Japan in English text.
City, Saitama Prefecture. The Acceptance Certificate was
accompanied by an Authentication from the Philippine Embassy in Acceptance Certificate - valid
Tokyo, Japan. Photocopy of English translation - in proving Japan Law - rendered
it invalid - was not able to establish
Moraña v. Republic is instructive.
- Someone has to certify.
- She should’ve asked someone to translate the Japan law and
In that case, the petitioner submitted a Divorce Report (not a have it authenticated
judgment of divorce) to prove the fact of divorce. While both Ask someone to authenticate- the document (Translation of Civil
the trial and appellate courts rejected the document for not Code of Japan) Authentication is necessary.
being a "divorce judgment," the Court accepted it
considering that the divorce was coursed not through
Japanese courts, but through the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City which issues such document with respect to
Basa-Egami v. Bersales, G.R. No. 249410, July 6, 2022
divorce filings.​
x x x​
By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly FACTS:
the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence,
the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by -​ Petitioner Maria Teresa Dino Basa-Egami (Filipina), married
petitioner and her former husband. Hiroshi Egami (Japanese national)
-​ However, their union did not last long, as they eventually
Similarly here, the divorce was coursed not through Japanese courts parted ways. Not long after, Egami begot a child with another
but through the Mayor of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. The woman, prompting him to ask for divorce from Maria.
Acceptance Certificate was what was issued to Jocelyn and Fumio -​ A Japanese Divorce Decree was issued and recorded in
when they filed their divorce before the mayor. Hence, it already Nakagawa-ku, Nagoya City.
suffices as proof of the fact of divorce. -​ Maria filed a Petition for Recognition of Foreign
Judgment/Final Order before the RTC of QC to remarry.
-​ The RTC granted the petition recognizing the divorce and
As in Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, We rule that the Authentication
ordering the LCR to annotate the dissolution of the marriage.
submitted by Jocelyn is also sufficient.

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Maria testified and submitted the following documents as her evidence: appalling here is that those whose divorce end up getting rejected by
Philippine courts for such a flimsy reason would still be considered as
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought the dismissal of the engaging in illicit extra-marital affairs in the eyes of Philippine laws if
petition, arguing in the main that a consensual or mutual divorce, ever they choose to move on with their lives and enter into another
such as the divorce obtained by petitioner; is not contemplated by relationship like their foreigner spouse. Worse, their children in the
Article 26(2) of the Family Code; hence, it cannot be recognized by subsequent relationship would be legally considered as illegitimate.
Philippine courts
ISSUE #2 = W/N the word "obtained" in Art. 26 should be
ISSUES: interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse = NO)
-​ W/N Philippine courts may recognize a divorce by mutual
consent between a Filipino and a foreigner spouse = YES Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
-​ W/N the word "obtained" in Art. 26 should be interpreted to be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
by the alien spouse = NO of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of
-​ W/N Maria proved the fact of divorce obtained in Japan = the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
YES with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and
-​ W/N Maria proved the Japan law for divorce = NO statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.
RULING:
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
ISSUE #1: W/N Philippine courts may recognize a divorce by than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a
mutual consent between a Filipino and a foreigner spouse = YES foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of
Philippine courts may extend the effect of a foreign divorce
the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
"extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.] The noble objective
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where a Filipino
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to
remains married to his or her alien spouse, whereas the latter is
hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision x x x
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. The
aim was to solve the problem of many Filipinos who, under the Civil Manalo was indeed a salutary paradigm shift in jurisprudence x x x
Code, are still considered married to their alien spouses even after the The ruling was, no doubt, a big win for our kababayans who, for a long
latter have already validly divorced them under their (the spouses') time, had received the proverbial short end of the stick from their own
national laws and perhaps have already married again. country, no less, in view of such ambiguity in the law.

This is exactly the misery confronting Maria, whose divorce from her The OSG should now take note that Manalo is the prevailing
foreign spouse was not recognized by the appellate court. To date, she jurisprudence on the matter. As it was clearly spelled out in Manalo,
remains married under Philippine laws even though her former Article 26(2) only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
husband, a Japanese citizen, has long been freed from the shackles of abroad, without regard as to who initiated it. This felicitous ruling
a failed marriage in view of the more lenient laws of his country. was echoed in yet another seminal case of recognition of a divorce of
mixed marriage. In Racho v. Tanaka (Racho), rendered only a few
months after Manalo, the Court squarely dealt with the divorce by
●​ Contrary to the OSG's posture, the divorce by mutual
mutual consent of a marriage involving a Filipina and a Japanese
consent between petitioner and her foreigner spouse
national, the same situation in the petition at bar. Therein, the Court
may be recognized in this jurisdiction
unambiguously declared that pursuant to Manalo, a foreign divorce
If We are to follow the OSG's interpretation of the law, Maria would
may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly
sadly remain in limbo – a divorcee who cannot legally remarry – as a
obtained, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the
result of the ambiguity in the law, particularly the phrase "divorce is
divorce proceedings. Since then, there have been many other
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse." This perfectly
iterations of Manalo in jurisprudence.
manifests the dire situation of most of our kababayans in unsuccessful
mixed marriages since, more often than not, their divorces abroad are
obtained through mutual agreements. Thus, some of them are even
constrained to think of creative and convincing plots to make it appear
that they were against the divorce or that they were just prevailed upon ISSUE #3: W/N Maria proved the fact of divorce obtained in Japan
by their foreigner spouse to legally end their relationship. What is more = YES

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●​ The pieces of evidence submitted by Maria are sufficient

the Court dealt mainly, if not Herein, though, both the proof
to prove the fact of divorce
exclusively, with the issue of of divorce and proof of national
In Maria’s case, she submitted into evidence the following documents
proving the fact of divorce. The law are squarely put in issue by
to prove the fact of divorce between her and her former spouse: 1)
sufficiency of evidence relative to the CA and the OSG.
Notification of Divorce or Report of Divorce; 2) Certificate of
the national law of Japan was
Acceptance of Divorce, and 3) the Family Register of Hiroshi. As aptly
only discussed in passing.
found by the CA, however, ubiquitously absent from petitioner's list of
evidence is the divorce decree itself.
It should be noted on this score In this case, however, while the
that in Racho, petitioner therein RTC duly admitted the
As adverted to earlier, Racho's facts closely parallel the factual milieu
went directly to the Court after evidence of Japan's national
herein. Maria was also previously married to a Japanese national and
her petition was denied by the law on divorce, the CA rejected
their divorce was by mutual agreement. Furthermore, instead of
trial court. the same.
proving the fact of divorce by presenting the divorce decree itself,
petitioner submitted, inter alia, a Certificate of Acceptance of
Moreover, in Racho, the OSG Herein, however, the OSG is
Divorce, certified and authenticated by the proper officials of the
admitted that the petitioner explicitly assailing the ruling of
Philippine Consulate in Japan.
therein was able to prove that the the trial court that the petitioner
national law of Japan allows was able to prove the national
Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of
absolute divorce, albeit the law of her former spouse.
Japan issued to Maria and her husband when they applied for
petitioner therein supposedly
divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak of because the
failed to point to a specific
divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but
provision in said law relative to a
through the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima
spouses' right to remarry after the
Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued
divorce.
by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an
act of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the
the Court was able to rule in The Petition at bar is bereft of
Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in
favor of the petitioner therein any relevant attachments
Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by
because the records before it except for the decisions and
petitioner and her former husband.
were already sufficient to fully resolutions of the CA and the
resolve factual issues therein RTC.
ISSUE #4: W/N Maria proved the Japan law = NO

●​ Maria failed to prove foreign law In this vein, it bears noting that while the Court discussed Japanese
The divorce in this case cannot be given recognition by the laws in Racho, subsequent jurisprudence still required the
Philippine courts because Maria failed to properly plead and presentation of the pertinent Japanese laws on divorce, and the
prove the Japanese law on divorce. failure of the petitioner to properly plead and prove the foreign
law would be taken against him or her.
x x x mere presentation of the divorce decree is insufficient. A divorce
obtained abroad may be recognized in our jurisdiction only if the Notwithstanding, Maria argues that the English translation of the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Japan Civil Code is an official publication having been published
Accordingly, both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is
the alien spouse must be proven. considered a self-authenticating document.

Also, the OSG argued that the Civil Code submitted by Maria is a mere The English translation submitted by Maria was published by
photocopy of a book published by a private company, Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in
Elbun-Horei-Sha, Inc. It is not even authenticated, and neither is a publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be
statement or proof that the library of the Japanese Embassy is an known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations
official repository or custodian of Japanese public laws and records. are "not advertised as a source of official translations of
Japanese laws;" rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette
❖​ Maria’s Defense: 🙋🏻
vis-a-vis Racho ruling:​ where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in
Japanese.
Her argument that this Court should apply Racho under the
circumstances herein deserves scant consideration. This
time around, Racho differs from the present case. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not
an official publication exempted from the requirement of
authentication.
Racho Case at bar

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Republic .v Bayog-Saito, GR.. No. 247297, August 17, 2022 While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce, a divorce
obtained abroad by a foreign spouse may nevertheless be recognized
FACTS: in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The pertinent provision, Article 26 of the
Helen, a Filipino citizen, and Toru, a Japanese national, were married Family Code states:
on August 30, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila. They did not have any
children nor did they have conjugal properties. Due to differences in Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
culture and nationality, their marriage did not last. After years of in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
living separately, Toru asked Helen to sign the divorce notification they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
papers; Helen acquiesced. Toru submitted the divorce documents to valid in this country, except those prohibited under Article 35
Takashi Yamaguchi (Mayor Takashi), Mayor of Minami­-ku, Yokohama (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
City. The Notice of Divorce accepted as shown by the authenticated
Japanese-language "Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce Notification" Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
and its English translation duly authenticated by the Department of is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
Foreign Affairs (DFA). obtained by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
After the divorce notification was accepted, the divorce was recorded in remarry under Philippine law.
the family registry of Toru, as reflected in the authenticated copy of his
Family Register (in Japanese) and the English translation (Certificate The Court hereby quotes the pertinent portion of its ruling explaining
Pertaining to all Facts) duly authenticated by the DFA. Thereafter, the application of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code, thus:
based on the two (2) documents, Kengo Fukasawa (Vice Consul
Kengo), Vice Consul of the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, x x x Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
issued a Divorce Certificate which was then authenticated by the DFA. requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
OSG opposes the recognition of the foreign divorce decree on the who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
ground that it was purportedly obtained by Helen jointly with her It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
Japanese spouse, Toru. Petitioner avers that respondent cannot file petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
and obtain a divorce decree jointly with her foreigner spouse because
she is incapacitated to do such act under our national law. According to To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
petitioner, the provision under paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
Code only applies when the divorce decree was initiated or obtained spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
solely by the foreign spouse. Petitioner submits that because the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
divorce decree sought to be recognized is grounded on mutual spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
agreement of the parties, the provision under paragraph 2, Article 26 of where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
the Family Code does not apply. spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not; a
ISSUE: Whether a foreign decree of divorce JOINTLY obtained by favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
spouses abroad may be recognized in the Philippines. her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
RULING: YES. A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
Philippines although the divorce decree was jointly obtained by the circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
spouses abroad. initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
Divorce is the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
after the marriage. There are two types of divorce: Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law.
(1)​ absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage; and Here, the divorce was initiated by Toru who asked Helen to sign
(2)​ limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and the divorce notification papers; she agreed by affixing her
leaves the bond in full force. signature on the documents. In effect, the parties are considered
to have obtained divorce by agreement when they mutually
agreed to the divorce, which is allowed in Japan. After the
Under Philippine law, absolute divorce is not allowed. Pursuant to the
acceptance of the divorce notification, the marriage of respondent and
nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition
Toru has been dissolved as far as the Japanese laws are concerned
against absolute divorce. The prohibition against severance of
and Toru is then capacitated to remarry. Pursuant to the Court's ruling
marriages through the mode of divorce is rooted in the constitutional
in Manalo and Galapon, even though respondent jointly filed the
policy aimed at protecting the inviolability of the institution of marriage.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

divorce notification papers with her husband, the divorce decree A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do
obtained by the parties may be recognized in our jurisdiction. more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Verily, the fact of the divorce of Helen and Toru, as well as the Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first
Japanese law on divorce, had been sufficiently and satisfactorily avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code,
proven by Helen. More importantly, the dissolution of their marriage any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the
under the laws of Japan, has capacitated her former husband, Toru, to meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
remarry, and in fact, he has already remarried.[75] Hence, the Court Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital"
finds no reason to deprive Helen of her legal capacity to remarry under affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
our national laws. illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if
Tsutsumi v. Republic, G.R. No. 258130, April 17, 2023 We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
FACTS: On August 17, 1995, after about a year of courtship, petitioner
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
Regie David Tsutsumi and Ayahiro Tsutsumi (Ayahiro), a Filipino and
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection
Japanese national, respectively, got married in Tarlac City, Tarlac,
and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
Philippines. Their union was blessed with two children.
according to indigenous customs.

But nearly 21 years after, on April 11, 2016, for reasons they deemed
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the
unresolved and irreconcilable, they mutually decided to file a divorce
present time. With the advancement of communication and
application.
information technology, as well as the improvement of the
transportation system that almost instantly connect people
On March 7, 2018, they were issued a Divorce Certificate by the
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not
Embassy of Japan, duly authenticated by the Philippine DFA.
too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
Accordingly, this Divorce Certificate was recorded in the Civil Registry
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
of the City of Manila, Philippines.
more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
Consequently, petitioner (Regie) filed a Petition for Recognition of attainment of the individual's full human potential and self
Foreign Divorce before the Regional Trial Court. During the hearing, fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a
the trial court noted that no one came forward to interpose any marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
objection to the petition. The trial court then called for the presentation existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
of petitioner's (Regie’s) evidence. Thus, petitioner, through her Attorney truth that some of them are rotten quality.
In-fact Atty. Layawen, offered the following exhibits:
2. In the proceedings before the trial court, Atty. Layawen identified,
ISSUE: 1. WoN article 26 (2) is applicable. YES presented, and formally offered in evidence the Certificate of
Acceptance of Notice of Divorce written in Japanese and its official
2. WoN the divorce was sufficiently proved. YES. English Translation. This official English Translation of Certificate
of Acceptance of Notice of Divorce written in Japanese was
RULING: 1. Divorce has been sufficiently proved. Verily, in matters accompanied by a Certificate of Translation by Kenichi Usuki. In
pertaining to petitions for recognition of foreign divorce under turn, the Certificate of Translation by Kenichi Usuki was authenticated
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code, courts should by DFA Authentication Officer Manuel B. Duran.
endeavor to give all the leeway to the petitioner to prove the
matter of divorce, even going to lengths to instruct and use every Atty. Layawen also presented a Certified True Copy of the Divorce
provision of the rules for the petitioner to obtain a favorable ruling Certificate issued by the Vice-Consul Shuichi Nishimura of the
or at least provide a relaxation of rules. In Kondo v. Civil Registrar Embassy of Japan, issued by Registration Officer Rosario B.
General, the Court emphasized that, time and again it grants liberality Dionisio-Francisco of the City of Manila Civil Registry. This Divorce
in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in Certificate was authenticated by DFA Authentication Officer Manuel B.
mixed marriages and free them from a marriage in which they are the Duran, Jr., and later filed with the Office of the Civil Registry of the City
sole remaining party. After all, procedural rules are designed to secure of Manila. The latter Office issued its own Certification dated April 24,
and not override substantial justice, especially here where what is 2018, attesting that the Divorce Certificate has been filed and recorded
involved is a matter affecting the lives of families. in their office under Reg. No. 14762, Series of 2018

In Republic v. Manalo, the Court explained the realities moving forward The law of divorce in Japan has been sufficiently proven. Records
and declared that for this kind of petition, the Filipino spouse should not show that petitioner presented and formally offered in evidence the
be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice Japanese law on divorce in its official English translation. Upon careful
are to be served: consideration, the English translation of the Japan Civil Code, insofar

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

as the nature and legal effects of the divorce agreement, is deemed

sufficient. For one, Artide 763 thereof clearly states that a husband and
wife may divorce by agreement. Petitioner has duly established the
consequences of divorce by agreement on the custody of her child with
her former spouse under Article 766; reversion to her previous
surname under Article 767; distribution of property under Article 768;
and assumption of rights upon reversion to her previous surname by
divorce under Article 769

DISCUSSED CASES ART 34

NINAL VS. Badayog (Before the FC)

-​ Marriage is void not because they falsified their license, but

because of the presence of legal impediment to marry
-​ This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third
party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse SANTIAGO vs PEOPLE
-​ W/O ML- marriage is VOID
-​ Argued that for bigamy to exist, first marriage must be valid
MANZANO vs SANCHEZ (Under the FC) -​ Affidavit of cohabitation was fake

-​ SC said that the lack of legal impediment must also be

present at the time they enter into marriage
-​ It does not subscribe to the principle of continuity/exclusivity
in Niñal ruling

Before FC Under the FC

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a
Follow the Niñal Ruling Follow Manzano vs. Sanchez - bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal
impediment must be existing prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
only at the time of the individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
cohabitation character of this special bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals, we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws
on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
DAYOT VS DAYOT manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment."
-​ No ML - stated that both of them has lived as husband and
wife within 5 years
-​ Arguement: Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal
-​ Marriage was a sham + sworn affidavit was fraud acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her
-​ Marriage was VOID innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
the sanctity of marriage.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

DE CASTRO v. DE CASTRO 545 S 162

Bounsit-Torralba v. Torralba, G.R. No. 214392, December 7, 2022 DAYOT v. DAYOT 550 S 43

-​ Married in Cebu without ML CARLOS v. SANDOVAL 574 S 116

-​ Cohabitation was fraud - they did not live for 5 years straight.
Thus, they are not exempted from the license requirement SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE 763 S 54

The affidavit is patent fraud. Bounsit-Torralba v. Torralba, G.R. No. 214392, December 7, 2022

-​ They needed to obtain the marriage license = if not, void

ARTICLE 36: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

SANTOS v. CA 01/4/1995 240 S 20

ARTICLE 34: MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

REQUIREMENT/EFFECT ON FALSITY OF AFFIDAVIT OF
COHABITATION REQUIRED UNDER ARTICLE 34, FAMILY CODE

NINAL v. BADAYOG 328 S 122

MANZANO .v SANCHEZ 354 S 1

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply,

the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must

be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had

ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

CHI MING TSOI v. CA 01/16/1997 266 S 324 DE SILVA v. DE SILVA, GR #247985, OCTOBER 13, 2021

REPUBLIC v. CA and MOLINA 02/13/1997 268 S 19 JANICE MARISTELA-CUAN v. CUAN, JR. and REPUBLIC GR#
248518, DECEMBER 7, 2021
MARCOS v. MARCOS 343 S 755
Republic v. Claur, G.R. No. 246868, February 15, 2022
DEDEL v. CA 421 S 461
Santos-Macabata v. Macabata, Jr., G.R. No. 237524, April ,6 202
TENEBRO v. CA 423 S 272
Cayabyab-Navarrosa v. Navarrosa, G.R. No. 216655, April 20, 202
JARILLO .v PEOPLE 601 S 236
Egmalis-Ke-eg v. Republic, G.R. No. 249178, July 13, 2022
ANTONIO v. REYES 03/10/2006 484 S 353 9) NAJERA v. NAJERA
591 S 542 Fopalan v. Fopalan, GR. . No. 250287, July 20, 2022

NAJERA v. NAJERA 591 S 542 Baldovino-Torres v. Torres, G.R. No. 248675, July 20, 2022

PARAS v. PARAS 529 S 81 Dedicatoria v. Dedicatoria, G.R. No. 250618, July 20, 2022

HALILI v. HALILI 551 S 576 Quiogue, Jr. v. Quiogue, G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022

HALILI V. HALILI (Recon) 589 S 25 Mutya-Sumilhig v. Sumilhig, G.R. No. 230711, August 2, 2022

NGO-TE v. TE 02/13/09 579 S 193 Republic .v Amata, GR. . No. 212971, November 29, 202

TING v. VELEZ-TING 582 S 694 Rivo v. Rivo, G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023

AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC 05/26/09 588 S 196 Javate-Asejo v. Asejo, G.R. No. 247798, January 18, 2023

KALAW v. FERNANDEZ GR#166357 01/14/15 (Recon) Georfo v. Republic, G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023

DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO GR#222541 02/15/17 Clavecilla v. Clavecilla, G.R. No. 228127, March 6, 2023

DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE GR#188400 03/08/17 Candelario v. Candelario, G.R. No. 222068, July 25, 2023

DAN v. DAN GR# 209031 4/16/18 Yokogawa-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 254646, October 23, 2023

REPUBLIC v. JAVIER GR#210518 4/18/18 Zamora v. Magsalay-Zamora, G.R. No. 253993, October 23, 2023

REPUBLIC v. LIBERATO MOLA CRUZ GR#236629 July 23, 2018

SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL V. KEPPEL, G.R. NO. 202039, AUGUST 14, ARTICLE 40: NEED FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A
2019 23) Republic v. Calingo, G.R. No. 212717, March 1, 2020 PREVIOUS VOID MARRIAGE FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE

Calma v. Santos-Calma, G.R. No. 242070, August 24, 2020 DOMINGO v. CA 226 S 572

Santos-Gantan v. Gantan, G.R. No. 225193, October 14, 2020 FACTS: Delia and Roberto were married on November 29, 1976 at the
YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract
TAN-ANDAL v. ANDAL GR#196359, MAY 1, 2021 (EN BANC) Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with
Puyat v. Puyat, G.R. No. 181614, June 30, 2021 one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy.
DATU v. DATU GR# 209278, SEPTEMBER 15, 2021

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

In 1991, Delia filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ●​ According to Gregorio, he had lived with and later married
and Separation of Property against Roberto. Janet Monica despite lack of knowledge as to her family
background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to
ISSUE: give him such information even after they were married. He
RULING: also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet
Monica’s disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, JR. 243 S 32 ●​ Gregorio present his mother as his witness, Alicia. She
testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
CASTILLO v. CASTILLO GR# 189607, APRIL 18, 2016 expressed a desire to return to England even before she had
given birth to Gerry Nolasco on Dec. 7 1982. When asked
why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
DE GUZMAN YJUMAQUIO v. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 224742, AUGUST
Alicia replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural
7, 2019
way of life in San Jose, Antique. She also said that she had
tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had
ANABAN, ET AL. v. ANABAN-ALFILER, ET AL. G.R. NO. 249011.
given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she
MARCH 15, 2021
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00
for her expenses before she left on Dec. 22, 1982 for
DAVID AND THE HEIRS OF AGUAS, v. CALILUNG G.R. NO. England. She further claimed that she had no information as
241036. JANUARY 26, 2021 to the missing person's present whereabouts.

PULIDO v. PEOPLE GR# 220149, JULY 27, 2021 (EN BANC) ISSUE: WoN Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead.
Genio y Santos v. People, G.R. No. 261666, January 24, 2024
RULING: No.

The Court cited Art. 41 and compared it with the old provision of the
ARTICLE 41: NECESSITY RE. OBTAINING DECREE OF Civil Code.
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
According to the Court, when

is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it

superseded, the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41,
REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO 220 S 20
the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened
to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
FACTS:
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also,
●​ Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman and he met his wife, Janet
Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the
Monica Parker, a British subject in England.
Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
●​ Since then, Janet Monica lived with him on his ship for 6
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is
months until they returned to Gregorio’s hometown in San
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
Jose, Antique on Nov. 19, 1980.
present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
●​ On Jan. 15, 1982, Gregorio married Janet Monica in
Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well
Cathedral of San Jose.
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition
●​ After the marriage, Gregorio obtained another employment
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in
Antique.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites
●​ Sometime in Jan. 1983, Gregorio received a letter from his
for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
mother informing him that Janet had given birth to his son,
Family Code:
and informed him that Janet Monica left Antique. So, he
immediately returned home, and arrived in Nov. 1983.
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
●​ He said that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38
391, Civil Code;
Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
is dead; and
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. was dead.

The Court believes that Gregorio failed to conduct a search for his Nolasco testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to
belief” that she is dead. return to San Jose, Antique. However, 4) he did not explain the delay
of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly from his captain, to November 1983 when he finally reached San Jose.
conducted by Nolasco in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica’s Nolasco, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. Also, 5) he
well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
Antique after learning of Janet Monica’s departure, instead of seeking police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
another seaman’s contract and went to London, a vast city of many Nolasco’s subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

His testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool Also, the Court notes that Nolasco even tried to have his marriage
and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in annulled before the trial in the same proceeding.
England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
While the Court understands the need of Nolasco’s young son, Gerry
. . . Well, while the cognoscente would readily know the Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a prevail. Since Nolasco failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be
one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and denied.
where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time
they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan He failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by
City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
"We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
places of destination does not appear to be fatal. dead.

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO 4/16/00 330 S 201
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three FACTS:
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking ●​ Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of
into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect survived by his wife, herein Marietta Calisterio.
what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent ●​ Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
search. previously been married to James William Bounds.
●​ James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February
The Court also views 1) Nolasco’s claim that Janet Monica declined 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
to give any information as to her personal background even after later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
she had married him too convenient an excuse to justify his secured a court declaration that James was presumptively
failure to locate her. 2) The same can be said of the loss of the dead.
alleged letters Nolasco had sent to his wife which he claims were all ●​ Herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving
returned to him. Nolasco said he had lost these returned letters, under sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court, a
unspecified circumstances. petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Neither can this Court give much credence to Nolasco’s bare assertion ●​ Petitioner, claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
that 3) he did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court and void.
of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence ●​ The trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano
during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
credibility. As noted before, there are serious doubts to Nolasco’s Teodorico.
credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony ●​ CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to
ISSUE:

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Whether the marriage of the deceased Teodorico and Marietta is valid, This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime
that, in turn, would be determinative for her right to inherit? -YES of the Civil Code. should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
ALTERNATIVE ISSUE: James Bounds.
WON the subsequent marriage contracted by Marietta was null and
void for lack of juridical declaration of presumptive death? -NO, the The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marieta, no evidence having
marriage is valid property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common.

Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should
RULING: Yes. rightly be divided in two equal portions - one portion going to the
Marriage is valid. surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters
1988. or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is
one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is nieces, being entitled to the other half.
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, MANUEL v. PEOPLE 11/29/05 476 $ 461
unless:
Article 41 applies when the first marriage is under the Civil Code and
1.​ The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or the second marriage is under Family Code. (shield from bigamy)
2.​ The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive There is a need to obtain a decree of presumptive death.
years at the time of the second marriage without the Apply the law at the time of marriage to acquire the validity of the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, marriage.
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and FACTS: Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. In the same year, Rubylus
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of also went missing and was unheard of since then. 1996, Eduardo
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001, the latter became curious and
is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. made inquiries with the NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo had
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three been previously married. Sued for bigamy, Eduardo avers that when he
cases until declared null and void by a competent court." married Tina in 1996, Rubylus has been “absent” for 21 years since
1975.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless He points out that, under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law because if one has
law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held presumed dead for all purposes except for succession. Thus, the
valid, the spouse present/not the absentee spouse) so contracting the presumptive death of the absentee spouse arises by operation of law
later marriage must have done so in good faith. upon the satisfaction of 2 requirements; the specified period and the
present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. Nowhere
Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must be a
conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court would apply.
does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
ISSUE: WoN the spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage during
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee a spouse is not the subsistence of a previous marriage still be liable for bigamy despite
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. the absentee spouse having been missing for 21 years

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that Marietta's first husband, RULING: AS A RULE YES, BUT SHOULD THE PRESENT SPOUSE
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more PRESENT BEFORE THE COURT EVIDENCE THAT HE/SHE HAS A
than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. DEAD, HE MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR BIGAMY

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Here, Roberto failed to do so. Roberto has the burden of proof to prove ●​ On July 9, 2001, Alan also reported Lea's disappearance to the
his defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he had a well-founded National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her
for more than 20 years since 1975. Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He
declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from
He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the
by article 349 of the RPC. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof barangay ever since. Lea's father, who was his compadre and the
that Roberto acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was.
his part when he married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be
held guilty of bigamy. ISSUE: WON Alan (Alegro) established a well-founded belief for the
presumptive death of his wife Rosalia? -NO

REPUBLIC v. CA and ALEGRO 12/09/05 477 $ 377 RULING:

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than
FACTS: Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present
●​ On January 20, 1995, Alan B. Alegro (Alan) and Rosalia (Lea) A. Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he
Julaton were married in Catbalogan, Samar. allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On
●​ On February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the
berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told
she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
go back to her parents. Lea did not reply.
●​ On February 7, 1995, When Alan reported for work, Lea was still The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995
in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was after he chided her for coming home late and for being always out of
nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home to
parents' house. However, Lea did not return to their house her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left
anymore. their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate
●​ On February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her
Lea's parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month
not there. He also went to the house of Lea's friend, Janeth after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed
Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea's whereabouts
Janette's brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the
Manila. When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his
learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father
that she left without notice. Alan sought the help of Barangay was the owner of Radio DYMS.
Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He
also inquired from his friends of Lea's whereabouts but to no avail. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police
●​ Sometime in June 1995, Alan decided to go to Manila to look for authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought.
Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan the RTC.
agreed. However, Lea did not show up.
●​ On August 27, 1995, Alan then left for Manila. He went to a house In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove
in Navotas where Janeth, Lea's friend, was staying. When asked that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the
where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
failed to find out Lea's whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free AS to Belief:
time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He
returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an
failed. overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
●​ On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
Julaton. attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
●​ On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea's disappearance to the local conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on
July 4, 2001. their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his
death.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and the latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse not become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had
upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and
the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that
she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the
SSS v. VDA. DE BAILON 3/24/06 485 S 376 petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true
that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she
FACTS: having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after
she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon
Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted used to visit her even after their separation.
marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later or on
October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. benefits by letter to the SSS. In a subsequent letter, she reiterated her
request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice
or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting
(respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her
as his beneficiary.
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof SSS maintained the denial of her claim. It advised her, however, that
effective July 1994, died. Teresita thereupon filed a claim for funeral she was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
benefits, and was granted P12,000 by the SSS. On March 11, 1998 Respondent thus filed a petition against the SSS before the SSC for
she filed an additional claim for death benefits which was also granted the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension. In the
by the SSS on April 6, 1998. meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under
protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she
received,
A certain Cecila Bailon-Yap, who claims to be the daughter of Clement
with another woman opposed Teresita’s claim. By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC (Social Security Commission)
found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and,
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife.
and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent
second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of marriage? NO
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s
medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by RULING:
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to
Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of death determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
pension benefits to Teresita and the issuance of an order for the at the time of their celebration.
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999
representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the Article 83 of the Civil Code provides:
ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid and void from its performance, unless:
to respondent has been collected.
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, the SSS advised (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
Teresita of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise.
declared null and void by a competent court. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage be questioned except in a direct action for annulment
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab
initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or ADD: As to when action for annulment must be invoked when one
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears of the parties died
noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio instructs:
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party
assailing the second marriage. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having
consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the any one of the parties involved. — No action for annulment was
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the brought under Art 83 of the Civil Code
subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent VALDEZ v. REPUBLIC GR#180863 09/08/09
marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
FACTS:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article Petitioner (Angelita Valdez) married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in
shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, Angelita gave birth to the
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to Angelita, she and Sofio
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not
bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in
be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They
case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) executed a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner
saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.
the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the
filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for
marriage. naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland
Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was
If the absentee reappears, but NO step is taken to terminate the subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive
absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in death of Sofio.
the subsequent marriage, will NOT terminate such marriage. Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that RTC: Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." This belief, must be the
spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
is terminated as provided by law.

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

ISSUE: Whether the petition for the declaration of presumptive death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the
of Sofio must be denied? -YES settlement of the absentee’s estate.

RULING: In re Szatraw:
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and ​ x x x In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is
holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his
Code. right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of Angelito to Sofio dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any
both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code. pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83: The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made,
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person presumption is already established by law. A judicial
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be
and void from its performance, unless: a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. x x x
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse The Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead presumption of death is established by law and no court
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is
declared null and void by a competent court. to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states: Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of
"well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion.
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring
petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration The SC held that the petition must be dismissed since no decree on
of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse the presumption of Sofio's death can be granted under the Civil Code,
has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, it
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former declared that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration is legal and valid.
of the marriage. Further, the Court explained that presumption of death

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

SANTOS v. SANTOS GR# 187061 10/08/14 ⭐

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17,
Doctrine: The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive 2008. This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision
death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore,
declared presumptively dead has never been absent. filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic
fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
FACTS: Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila. They were engaged in the buy
and sell business, which did not prosper. As a result, Celerina The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the
She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila and present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence
further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to of another marriage.
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know
their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
believed that she had passed away. reappears. Thus:

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
remedies. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left
in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
declaring her presumptively dead. Celerina claimed that she never residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
abroad. She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling to such fact is disputed.
cohabit with another woman.
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
ISSUE: W/N a petition for annulment of judgment is the remedy for a spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death. mere reappearance.

RULING: YES. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of

the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the dead.
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of several conditions: ​
jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopoulos v. City (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
of Legaspi: declaring it void ab initio; ​
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances
has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the of reappearance; ​
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could reappearance; and ​
have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a determined.
parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his
case, such that there is no fair submission of the The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not
controversy. always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause ●​ Thereafter, Edna claimed to have done the following efforts
the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the to determine the whereabouts and the status of her
conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present. husband:
1.​ She took a vacation/leave of absence from her
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or work and returned to the Philippines to look for her
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has husband.
already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; ​ 2.​ She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City
(2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the and from their common friends in the same city
civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; ​ and in Valencia City.
(3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or ​ 3.​ She went as far as the birthplace of her husband
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she could inquire
and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of from her husband’s relatives.
reappearance. ●​ On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to
declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his Family Code.
petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the ●​ RTC and CA: Granted the petition on the basis of
subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for well-founded belief of Romeo’s Death.
being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is
because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief ISSUE: W/N Edna has a well-founded belief that Romeo is dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the
exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply RULING: NO. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a
judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief that the
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed.
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent Well-founded Belief. The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
Celerina is correct. under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to
that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second would not suffice.
marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
Burden of proof. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but,
an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie. more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.

This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of

REPUBLIC v. VILLANUEVA GR# 210929 07/29/15 presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a
tool to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State’s policy to
FACTS: protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never
●​ ​Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in allow procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter
Iligan City. standard required by the Family Code is met.
●​ In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while
her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Despite Edna’s efforts, she averred that she received negative
Bukidnon. responses from them because none of them had knowledge of the
●​ In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo existence of her husband who had been missing for 15 years. Edna’s
had left their conjugal home without reason or information as efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her
to his whereabouts. absent husband’s death. Her claim of making diligent search and
inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. She also indeed missing and could not be found. It also contends that Jose did
failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would
whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie.
from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant and
was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage.

Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation ISSUE: W/N Jose complied with the requisites of Article 41. NO
that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years
already. As the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek RULING: Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared. requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

Verily, it makes sense to conclude that Edna’s efforts were not 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
diligent and serious enough to give meaning to her well-founded consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
belief that Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state that her disappearance occurred where there is danger of
petition should have been denied at the first instance. The RTC, death under the circumstances laid down in Article
however, granted it, reasoning 391 of the Civil Code;

REPUBLIC v. JOSE SAREÑOGAN, JR. GR 199194 02/10/16 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

FACTS: On November 4, 2008, Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
Petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. that the absentee is dead; and,
Sareñogon (Netchie).
4. That the present spouse files a summary
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
1991. They later became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they the absentee.
got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived
together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to The degree of diligence and reasonable search required by
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons
helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries
Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse’s
had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home after purported disappearance or death to the police or mass
his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and media, and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence might or
friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she would only show that the absent spouse chose not to
was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract dead.
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it
Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande. These two must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding that
witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family
and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything,
separate destinations abroad. These two added that they had no Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie
information regarding Netchie’s location. are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he
Petitioner Republic’s Contention: The Republic claims that based on had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals
engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search
dead. It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he
efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as
assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined
National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what
of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying
Administration. It likewise points out that Jose did not present any the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the latter was search.

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REPUBLIC v. TAMPUS GR#214243 03/16/16 The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
FACTS: and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
●​ Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
(Dante) on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates
●​ Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was of any news that such an absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
assigned. The couple had no children. communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
●​ Since then, Nilda has heard no news from Dante. She tried would not suffice.
everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile.
●​ On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried
declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
years without any kind of communication from him, she know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however,
firmly believes that he is already dead Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have
●​ She testified on the allegations in her petition, affirming that called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
she exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not
parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding
also not aware of his whereabouts. She averred that she him.
intends to remarry and move on with her life.
●​ RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance,
to the effect of his reappearance. she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said
●​ Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of petitioner mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed a petition for thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for
certiorari] before the CA assailing the RTC Decision. her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
●​ CA denied the OSG's petition and affirmed the RTC Decision asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict
declaring Dante as presumptively dead. standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded
belief of his death”.

ISSUE: Hence, Dante cannot be declared presumptively dead.

●​ WON Dante should be declared presumptively dead. (NO) REPUBLIC v. CATUBAG GR#210580 4/18/18

RULING: FACTS:
●​ Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, Ludyson
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four husband and wife, and had 2 children.
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well founded ●​ In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, Ludyson
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. took work overseas, while Shanaviv stayed behind in the
Philippines to tend to the needs of their children.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), ●​ On June 26, 2003, Ludyson and Shanaviv married at the
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of Office of the Municipal Judge.
presumptive death: ●​ Sometime in April 2006, Ludyson and his family were able to
acquire a housing unit. Thereafter, Ludyson returned
(1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) overseas to continue his work. While abroad, he maintained
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the constant communication with his family.
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death ●​ On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, Ludyson was
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and
Code; never returned. In the meantime, his relatives took care of
(2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; the children. So, he immediately flew back home.
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the ●​ He looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He
absentee is dead; and then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for from their close friends and relatives, but they too could offer
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. no help. Ludyson traveled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv
was born and raised, but he still could not locate her.

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●​ Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo reasoned that while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the
Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse
the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's to seek the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse.
disappearance. Moreover, he searched various hospitals and Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present
funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no avail. spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the
●​ On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, absentee spouse.
Ludyson filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife
declared presumptively dead. It was granted. Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager,
Ludyson bases his "well-founded belief” on bare assertions that
ISSUE: WoN Ludyson has sufficiently complied with the essential he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the
requisites in a petition for declaration of presumptive death. present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of
evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a
RULING: NO. well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

The Court enumerated the 4 requisites that must be complied with for Taken together, the Court is of the view that Ludyson’s efforts in
the declaration of presumptive death to prosper: searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. He
1.​ The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or
occurred where there is danger of death under the justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who
circumstances laid down in Art. 391 of the Civil Code; alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than
2.​ The present spouse wishes to remarry; mere allegations.
3.​ The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; Stripped of Ludyson’s mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting
4.​ The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the his wife's alleged disappearance through a known radio station was
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. corroborated. This act comes nowhere close to establishing a
well-founded belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it
Notably, the records reveal that Ludyson has complied with the first, just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she abandoned the family.
second, and fourth requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is
whether or not he successfully discharged the burden of establishing a On this basis, it is clear that Ludyson failed to fulfill the requisite of
well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead. establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

In this case, Ludyson first took a leave of absence from his work in the
UAE and returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then
proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from their friends
and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next, he aired over Bombo Radyo
Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance MATIAS v. REPUBLIC GR#230751, APRIL 25, 2018
of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and
funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities. FACTS:
On April 10, 2012, Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in the Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of
previous jurisprudence, the Court finds that Ludyson’s efforts falls short presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).
of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons: Estrellita Tadeo-Matias is married to Wilfredo Matias a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since
First, Ludyson claims to have inquired about his missing wife's August 24, 1967[;]
whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have
carried out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in the place The Estrellita and Wilfredo entered into a lawful marriage on January 7,
where his wife was born and raised. However, he failed to present 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their
"inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City.
held in the previous cases, failure to present any of the persons from [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15,
whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a member
search. of the Philippine Constabulary.

Second, Ludyson did not seek the help of other concerned Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga
government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with Estrellita
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court nor to his relatives; That according to the service record of [Wilfredo]

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issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
declared missing since 1979 x x x; Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any
civil purpose.
Estrellita constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any
news regarding [her] beloved husband Wilfredo, but the Philippine Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.
have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the
assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
Family Code.

Weeks became years and years became decades, but the Estrellita
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility
never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of
that such misconception may have been peddled by no less than the
waiting,she is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of
specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first
now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the
to her in order to survive; death benefits of a missing serviceman. In view of the foregoing
circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
That one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a guidelines—culled from relevant law and jurisprudential
pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making
proof of death or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the
or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of
Honorable Court; the petitioner:

That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to
1.​ The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits
claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended. of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first
produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such
ISSUE: soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make
Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code applies in the instant case their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented
- the declaration of presumptive death for purposes of claiming by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under
benefits? Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of
RULING: law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual
No. Article 41 does not apply in the case at bar. conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.
Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court
declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a
The Court ruled that the petition for the declaration of presumptive missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established
death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the jurisprudence on the matter.
application of Article 41 of the Family Code which shows that the 2.​ In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant
presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which shows
Thus: that the concerned soldier had been missing for such
number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed
"Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four presumptive death.
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief 3.​ The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh
that the absent spouse was already dead. the evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their
sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions
specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient" sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption
of death and pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is
declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the
for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof,
death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of
No. 1638 a amended. administrative remedies.

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a
filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the missing soldier
presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil

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The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a Republic v. Quiñonez, GR. . No. 237412, January 6, 2020
missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court
declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims,
FACTS: In 2001, Lovelyn, the wife, asked her husband’s permission to
the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis
of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of go on a three-month vacation in Manila to visit some relatives. Despite
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or Remar’s reluctance, he agreed to his wife’s request.
not. It must be stressed that the presumption of death under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, During the first three months, Lovelyn constantly communicated with
without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions Remar through cellphone. Thereafter, the calls and text messages
mentioned in the said articles are established. Hence, requiring the tapered off until the communication between the spouses ceased
claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the
altogether.
presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes
established jurisprudence on the matter.
At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cell phone, so he
inquired about her from their relatives in Bislig City. Someone informed
1.​ In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the
claimant need only present before the PVAO or him that his wife was then already cohabiting with another man. Remar
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may filed for an emergency leave of absence from his work and let for
be, any "evidence" which shows that the Lingig, Surigao del Sur. After almost ten years of trying to know about
concerned soldier had been missing for such the whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile, Remar
number of years and/or under the circumstances filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death.
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here
ISSUE: WoN there was sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration
excludes a court declaration of presumptive
death. of Lovelyn’s presumptive death
2.​ In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the
claimant need only present before the PVAO or RULING: No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides the requirements
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may for a declaration of presumptive death. Mere absence of the spouse,
be, any "evidence" which shows that the lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
concerned soldier had been missing for such communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
number of years and/or under the circumstances
would not suffice.
prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here
excludes a court declaration of presumptive death. The efforts exerted by Remar fell short of the degree of diligence
3.​ The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may required by law and jurisprudence. To recall, Remar’s efforts are
then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant marked by the ff acts:
and determine their sufficiency to establish the 1)​ Remar traveled to several places were his wife had been
requisite factual conditions specified under Article reportedly seen particularly, Bislig City and the Municipality
390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the
presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the of Lingig in the province of Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila,
AFP determines that the evidence submitted by Batangas, and Cavite;
the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate 2)​ Remar constantly communicated with Lovelyn’s relatives for
to apply the presumption of death and pay the a period of ten years in order to ascertain Lovelyn’s
latter's claim. whereabouts.
4.​ If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the
evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of
to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil
Code and denies the latter's claim by reason the search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have
thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the gone. He also failed to identify which of Lovelyn’s relatives he had
Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the communicated with, and disclose what he learned from these
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. communications.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a This leaves the Court with no basis to determine whether the
petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. information Remar learned is sufficient to engender a well-founded
And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an belief that Lovelyn is dead.
appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
REPUBLIC v. PONCE-PILAPIL GR# 219185, NOVEMBER 25, 2020
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the
Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate
FACTS:
experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.
●​ On June 5, 2000, Josephine Ponce-Pilapil (Josephine) and
Agapito S. Pilapil, Jr. (Agapito) got married in Mandaue City and
had a Son (Juan Miguel Pilapil).
●​ Sometime in November 2000, Agapito left without information
where he was going. She knows of no reason why Agapito would

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leave her as they did not even quarrel prior to that. Insofar as she Withal, the pieces of evidence on record were too bare and
knows, her husband had a cyst in his right jaw which was getting self-serving. Mere allegation is not proof. Moreover, Josephine's acts
bigger. fail to convince the Court that she indeed went out of her way to locate
●​ Josephine knows that Agapito's parents are all deceased, having Agapito, and her search for Agapito's whereabouts cannot be said to
died from a calamity which hit Ormoc City sometime in the 1990's. have been diligently and exhaustively conducted. In all, Josephine's
With this predicament, [Josephine], after [Agapito's] efforts were just too flimsy to serve as concrete basis of a well-founded
disappearance, tried to look for him from [Agapito's only surviving belief that Agapito is indeed dead.
relative], Lydia Bueno Pilapil. The Lydia told Josephine that she
does not have any knowledge or idea where Agapito was, in A declaration of presumptive death must be predicated upon a well
response to her letter. founded fact of death. The fact that the absent spouse is merely
●​ Josephine also inquired from their friends if they saw or heard from missing, no matter how certain and undisputed, will never yield a
Agapito, but all answered in the negative. She honestly believes judicial presumption of the absent spouse's death. Josephine in this
that her husband Agapito is already dead considering that more case only successfully established that the whereabouts of Agapito are
than six (6) years have lapsed without any information on his indeterminable. As circumstances that definitely suggest Agapito's
whereabouts. She filed the instant petition for purposes of death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider Josephine's civil
declaring her husband Agapito presumptively dead so that she can status as that of a widow.
remarry.

ISSUE: WON Josephine established a well-founded belief for the

presumptive death of Agapito? -NO ARTICLE 42: REQUIREMENT IF ABSENTEE SPOUSE
RE-APPEARS
RULING:
Josephine's efforts to search for Agapito only consisted of inquiries not
C/F SANTOS v. SANTOS GR# 187061 10/08/14
even done personally but by mere letter-correspondence facilitated by
another person.
FACTS:
Moreover, Josephine's pursuit of Agapito is evidently lackadaisical
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
based on the following circumstances:
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
First, her personal knowledge of a growing cyst on Agapito's jaw does
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
not produce an inevitable conclusion that the latter was already
suffering from some terminal illness prior to his disappearance. No
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
medical document or expert testimony on Agapito's physical ailment
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her
was submitted by Josephine for the courts' assessment to prove such
husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition
circumstance.
for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17,
Second, while Josephine attempted to find Agapito, her supposed
2008.
informers and their information were unreliable. The "friends" whom
Josephine allegedly contacted were unnamed. The letters written by
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo
Josephine and Agapito's sister, Lydia Bueno Pilapil (Lydia), were never
alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San
presented as evidence before the court. Lydia did not even take the
Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.[3]
witness stand to testify to the veracity of the contents of her purported
After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy
letter as alleged by Josephine. Marites Longakit Toong (Marites),
and sell business.[4]
Josephine's letter-courier to Lydia, did appear as a witness before the
trial court; however, the truth behind Marites' statements that Lydia had
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.[5] As a result,
told her of Agapito's absence remain hearsay and unconfirmed.
Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong.[6] Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
Third, Josephine could have resorted to police assistance in seeking
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad.[7] She allegedly applied in
out her husband. While the act of seeking investigative aid from
an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left
authorities will not automatically secure a positive conclusion of a
Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.[8]
"diligent search," official documents could still have been procured to
attest that she had assiduously investigated the disappearance of
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He
Agapito. Josephine never did so. This further weakened the
went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not
seriousness of her efforts to find her missing husband and blurred the
know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from
possibility of the latter's death.
other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
had passed away. circulation. Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived
of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only presumptively dead.
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for
remedies. declaration of presumptive death were false. Celerina further claimed
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given
judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She copies of Ricardo's petition.
argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite
his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon ground/s for annulment of judgment.
City.[16] This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling
since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.[17] As a result of Ricardo's The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead. reappears. Thus:

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to an preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
employment agency in February 1995.[21] She also claimed that it was recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
newspaper.[25] She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
Ricardo's petition. the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008,
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
wrong mode of remedy.[27] According to the Court of Appeals, the spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, mere reappearance.
declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.[28] The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of
the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy dead.
for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death?
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
RULING: termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the
YES. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3)
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of undisputed or judicially determined.
jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause
court with respect to her residence. Ricardo also falsely claimed that

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the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent
conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present. marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn
statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the
subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the ARTICLES 45-47 VOIDABLE
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in MARRIAGES/GROUNDS/PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance. VILLANUEVA v. CA 505 $ 565

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration

FACTS:
of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva
already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption
before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992,
should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced
The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly
him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his
dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he
marriage.
did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several
incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17,
of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
2008. This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision
harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted
declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore,
his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka
filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic
Celso, a supposed member of the New People's Army whom Orlando
fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at

On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando's allegations and she said that
the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage in Palawan for
almost a month and Villanueva wrote 13 letters to her after he returned
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to
to Manila, during which Lilia visited him personally; and that Orlando
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude
knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son
the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other
being born prematurely.
remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action
ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground
in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family Code.
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."
RULING: NO

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not
Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive
safety.
death and the subsequent marriage.
The Court is not convinced that Orlando’s apprehension of
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, Oralndo worked as a
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is
marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of
reasonable to assume that Orlando knew the basics of self-defense, or,
the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be
at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. For
considered legitimate.[62] Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive
sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
Orlando, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the
security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities

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of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he
denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their
Orlando also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
believe by Lilia that the latter was pregnant with his child when they children
were married. Orlando’s excuse that he could not have
impregnated the Lilila because he did not have an erection during Dr. Garcia (psychologist) concluded that Manuel is psychologically
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying
his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty
the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital
died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, relationship was generally harmonious. Manuel countered that the true
the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children.
Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of discipline on the children.
cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the He also defended his show of affection for his mother.
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of Manuel said that Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials
as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.
influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor
his marriage must be upheld.
ISSUE: W/N homosexuality is a ground for annulment
ALMELOR v RTC OF LAS PIÑAS CITY 563 S 4 47
RULING: NO.
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent
Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married. After eleven (11) years of Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to marriage, not homosexuality per se.
annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel at the San swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks.Three failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
years after, they got married. establish psychological incapacity.

Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual
long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that the perceived
described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential
easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on marital obligations.
their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
mother and his dependence on her decision-making were consent by virtue of fraud.
incomprehensible to Leonida.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the
Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's
affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the ○​ DNA test revealed that there was a 0.0%

🥺😲
lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with probability that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia.
Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as ●​ Melvin received a text message from Janufi stating that she
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it had no intention to deceive Melvin into acknowledging
proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual paternity but it only happened once while she was drunk,
at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his and that she never thought her one-time "sin" would "bear
wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not fruit." The message also stated that Janufi was shocked at
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent the result of the DNA test and could not believe that Melvin
party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud was not the father of Mejan Dia.
the other party in giving consent to the marriage. ●​ On March 6, 2011, Melvin received another text message
purportedly sent by Janufi admitting to telling white lies
The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances because she did not want to hurt Melvin.
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, ●​ Melvin filed a petition for annulment of marriage before the
but its concealment. RTC on March 15, 2011. On May 11, 2011, Janufi filed her
answer with prayer for support pendente lite.
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal ●​ RTC: Annulled the marriage as Janufi fraudulently concealed
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul "the very painful truth that before her marriage [to Melvin],
a marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but she slept with another man and that it resulted in her
is one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that pregnancy by said man."

✅
respondent failed to prove. ●​ OSG’s Argument: (SC agrees with OSG)
○​ RTC’s is not in accord with law and
Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy jurisprudence because the Family Code expressly
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage provides that a marriage may be annulled on the
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from basis of fraud through concealment only if "at the
bed and board. time of the marriage, the wife was pregnant and
she concealed the fact that such pregnancy was

✅
RP v. VILLACORTA GR# 249953, JUNE 23, 2021 by a man other than her husband.
○​ It it is clear from Janufi's messages that she
FACTS: had no intention to deceive Melvin into
●​ Melvin and Janufi became sweethearts but ended their acknowledging the paternity of Mejan Dia. While
relationship in 2000. Janufi may have misrepresented the state of her
●​ Thereafter, Melvin heard that Janufi began dating someone chastity, it cannot be discounted that she honestly
who was working near the establishment where she was believed that Mejan Dia was sired by Melvin.
then employed.
●​ For months, Melvin and Janufi did not communicate with one ISSUE: W/N the facts do not warrant annulment under Article
another. Later, however, Janufi asked Melvin to see her. In 45(3) in relation to Article 46(2) of the Family Code
March of 2001, Melvin visited Janufi and eventually asked
her about the rumor that she was dating someone else. RULING: YES. It bears emphasis that "marriage is a special contract
Janufi denied the same and insisted that "no one touched of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
her" and nothing happened between her and any third party. accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
Thus, Melvin and Janufi reconciled. is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
●​ In April of 2001, Melvin learned that Janufi was pregnant. nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
Melvin was "surprised" and "doubtful" to learn Janufi was subject to stipulation." In view thereof, it may be terminated only for
already one month pregnant because they had sexual limited grounds as prescribed by law. "The state is interested in the
intercourse only in March of 2001. Although Melvin permanency of the marriage relation. The preservation of that relation
doubted the paternity of the child, Janufi supposedly assured is deemed essential to public welfare. The fundamental policy of the
him that he was the only person she had sexual intercourse state, which regards marriage as indissoluble and sacred, being the
with. This put his doubts to rest. foundation upon which society rests, is to be cautious and strict in
●​ On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl granting annulment[s] of marriage."
named Mejan Dia and she and Melvin then began living
together. In this regard, the Family Code provides:
●​ After almost three years or on August 14, 2004, Melvin and
Janufi finally got married. ART 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
●​ During their marriage, the couple quarreled about ordinary existing at the time of the marriage:
things among this is the paternity of Mejan Dia. This drove
Melvin to finally take a DNA test at Hi-Precision Diagnostics.

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(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts annulment. But Article 86 (Art 46) was also enacted, expressly and
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding
husband and wife; article" and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous
Although fraud to vitiate consent has been defined by the Civil Code as conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that
insidious words and machinations which lead a party to enter into a Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress
contract without which he would not have entered into, this general further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was
definition of fraud in the Civil Code is not absolutely applicable to followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
marriage since the subsequent article of the Code (referring to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
Article 86 of the Civil Code - NOW Art 46 in FC) limits the kinds of give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
fraud which will serve as grounds for annulment. Consequently, in
order to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, the fraud must Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another
consist of one of those enumerated in Article 86 (Now Art 46)." woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
ART 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or
referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: deceit as to [x x x] chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after
husband; her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an
institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that to constitute fraud that
warrants annulment under Article 46(2): As Janufi's purported fraud does not squarely fall under Article
(1)​ the wife must have been pregnant by a man other than 46(2), the same cannot serve as a ground for annulment. It is of no
her husband at the time of the marriage and moment that the RTC found that Melvin would probably not have
(2)​ the wife must have fraudulently concealed the same married Janufi had he known that he was not the father of Mejan Dia.
Not falling within the restrictive grounds provided under Article 46, the
The essence of the fraud in this case is the non-disclosure of the wisdom of whether Janufi's purported fraud should likewise be
present pregnancy of the wife x x x the pregnancy must exist at considered a ground for annulment is a policy question better left to the
the time of the celebration of the marriage, thus, if the wife had political branches of the government. "The lawmaker's intent being
previous relations with other men and as a consequence of which she plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
became pregnant or bore a child previously, the concealment thereof with the rule or not."
will not be a ground for annulling the marriage if at the time the
marriage was celebrated the wife was not pregnant." It is the Even assuming that Article 46(2) was applicable, the Court finds that
concealment of the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time Melvin failed to discharge his burden of proving that Janufi acted with
of marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. "No bad faith and fraudulent intent with clear and convincing evidence. The
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune OSG correctly holds that while Janufi may have misrepresented the
or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for state of her chastity prior to her and Melvin's reconciliation, it appears
the annulment of marriage. that she honestly believed in good faith that Mejan Dia was the
child of Melvin. As there was no bad faith on her part, she cannot
In the instant case, the facts readily reveal that Mejan Dia was already be guilty of concealment.
almost three years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on
August 4, 2004. As Janufi was not pregnant at the time of the
marriage, any purported fraud she may have committed to induce ARTICLE 48 APPEARANCE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Melvin to marry her cannot be considered the fraudulent concealment
contemplated under Article 46(2). Indeed, the Court has held that not ANCHETA v. ANCHETA 424 S725
all fraudulent acts can be invoked to annul a marriage. The
circumstances of fraud under Article 45(3) are exclusive and restrictive.
FACTS: Spouses Rodolfo (Respondent) and Marietta (Petitioner)
separated-in-fact, but had their conjugal partnership property dissolved
Fraud. The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that
judicially. One of the properties adjudicated in favor of Marietta was a
can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the
resort named Munting Paraiso that is now used as residence of the
foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the
petitioner and the children.
causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85 (now Art 45), fraud is the
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article (Art 46) within
Rodolfo intending to remarry, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were
marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity of the wife.
otherwise. Congress would have stopped at Article 85 (Art 45), for,

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Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at Munting Paraiso, he ●​ They acquired several properties in both the Philippines and
had the summons served at another address. the USA:
●​ In the Philippines: a house and lot in Sampaloc,
For failure to file an Answer, Rodolfo had Marietta declared in default Manila, agricultural land in Dipaculao, Aurora, and
and was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. The public prosecutor other parcels of land in Maria Aurora and Baler,
appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the Aurora.
respondent who appeared with counsel. After the grant of the petition, ●​ In the USA: a house and lot in Daly City,
Rodolfo contracted another marriage with Teresita. Marietta then filed a California, along with various personal properties
petition for the annulment of the order of the RTC. and financial assets.
●​ David returned to the Philippines in 2001 due to business
Marietta alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her reverses.
and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s ●​ In December 2002, Leticia authorized David to sell the
failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on Sampaloc property.
whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the ●​ By September 2003, Leticia claimed David had abandoned
Solicitor General to appear for the State. the family and was living with another woman in Aurora
province.
ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid. NO ●​ Leticia filed for divorce in California, which was granted on
June 24, 2005, awarding her custody of the children and all
RULING: We cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court the couple's properties in the USA.
a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the ●​ Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court Property in the RTC of Baler, Aurora, citing David's failure to
granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. comply with a Joint Affidavit regarding the division of the
The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he Sampaloc property proceeds.
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court ●​ The RTC ruled - dissolving the absolute community of
forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and property and awarding the Philippine properties to David,
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest subject to the payment of the children's presumptive
from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the legitimes.
public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code. ●​ The Court of Appeals modified the RTC's decision- directing
an equal division of the Philippine properties and ordering
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is both to pay their children P520,000.00 each as their
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, presumptive legitimes.
declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of ISSUE:
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or 1.​ WON marriage between David and Leticia has been
suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the dissolved pursuant to the divorce decree issued by The
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the Superior Court of California (NO)
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the 2.​ Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application proper in accordance with the Family Code. (YES)
for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own 3.​ Whether the two common children of the parties are entitled
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. to support and presumptive legitime. (YES)

ARTICLES 50-51 EFFECTS IF MARRIAGE SI ANNULLED UNDER RULING:

ARTICLE 45 OR VOID UNDER ARTICLE 40
1.​ NO.. The trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS GR#188289 August 20, 2014 which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
FACTS: proven as facts under our rules on evidence (RULES 132,
SEC. 24), together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
●​ David A. Noveras and Leticia T. Noveras married on
herself.
December 3, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines.
●​ They moved to California, USA, acquired American
In this case, the required certificates to prove
citizenship, and had two children: Jerome (born November 4,
its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
1990) and Jena (born May 2, 1993).
divorce were not presented. Even if we apply the doctrine
●​ David worked in the courier service business, and Leticia
of processual presumption, divorce is not recognized
was a nurse in San Francisco.
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The the appellate court explained in this wise:
trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal
share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both
2.​ YES. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the
Any of.the following shall be considered sufficient Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
cause for judicial separation of property: contributions came from, the same is presumed to have
come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not
Xxxx entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses XXXX

have been separated in fact for: at least one year
and reconciliation is highly improbable Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code,
"(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
The records of this case are replete with evidence that both consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father
parties had indeed separated for more than a year and that and of the mother. The children arc therefore entitled to half
reconciliation is highly improbable. of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community. which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
First, it is undisputed that the spouses had been covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in
living separately since 2003 when David decided the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
to go back to the Philippines to set up his own including the receivables from Sps. Paringit- in the amount of
business. P410,000.00.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. amount of. P520,000.00 as their. presumptive legitimes
Third and more significantly, they had filed for therefrom
divorce and it was granted by the California court
in June 2005.
ARTICLES 55-67 LEGAL
Having established that Leticia and David had actually. SEPARATION/GROUNDS/DENIAL/EFFECTS
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be SIOCHI v. GOZON 616 $ 87
granted.
FACTS:
●​ This case involves a property/parcel of land situated in
3.​ YES. Under Article 99,
Malaban, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of
the absolute community terminates:
“Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon.”
xxx
●​ On Dec. 23, 1991, Elvira filed a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo. She also filed a notice of lis
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during
pendens, which was then annotated on the title of the said
the marriage under Articles 134 and 138
subject property.
●​ On August 31, 1993, while the legal separation was still
Following this, Article 102 provides for the dissolution of the
pending, Alfredo and Siochi entered into an Agreement to
absolute community property regime,
Buy and Sell involving the property. The agreement contains
the following stipulations:
Article. 102:
○​ Alfredo would secure an Affidavit from Elvira that
. Upon dissolution of the absolute community
the property is his exclusive property and to
regime, the following procedure shall apply:
annotate the Agreement on the title
xxx
○​ He would secure the approval of the court to
`(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common
exclude the property from the legal separation
children shall be delivered upon partition, in
case
accordance with Article 51.
○​ Secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens in
the title.
The SC affirmed the modification made by the Court of
●​ However, Alfredo failed to comply with the stipulations. So,
Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
after paying the earnest money as partial payment of the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

purchase price, Siochi took possession of the property in Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer
Sep. 1993. was already withdrawn.
●​ On June 29, 1994, the trial court granted the legal separation
filed by Elvira. 2.​ NO.
○​ RTC Decision: The conjugal partnership of gains
of the spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in
and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, the net profits and the same is awarded to Winifred.
respondent (Alfredo) is deprived of his share in
the net profits and the same is awarded to their Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
to petitioner. other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
●​ As regards the property, the trial court held that it is deemed
conjugal property. (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership
●​ On Aug 22, 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred. spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits
●​ The property was then sold to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
●​ Siochi then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary the provisions of Article 43(2);
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
●​ The Court nullified the Agreement between Alfredo and innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of
Siochi because such conveyance was done without the this Code; and
consent of Elvira, and that the agreement between Afredo
and IDI is also null and void. The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
ISSUE: provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
1.​ W/N Alfredo can sell the property forming part of the the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse.
- NO - it would render the sale VOID Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
2.​ WoN the ½ undivided share of Alfredo in the property preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
was already forfeited in favor of their daughter. NO. *mas
related ni sya sa topic) (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
RULING: liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
1.​ NO. The sale is void. bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
The Court said that this case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code, children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in
particularly Article 124. default of children, the innocent spouse;

In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net
sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share
property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of
the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The the Family Code provides that "for purposes of computing the net
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and
sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution."
that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share
for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits
without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely of the conjugal partnership property.
void. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing
offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is NET PROFITS: Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "for
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits

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shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses'
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same
partnership property. applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2)
QUIAO v. QUIAO 675 $ 642 of the Family Code.

Facts The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and got four children. They had no separate properties prior to their under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
separation for cohabiting with another woman. 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife."
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal
separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the While one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the
custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
innocent spouse. and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact,
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children;
in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when
the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus,
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses properties.
and debts.”
And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
decision stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted
to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has
been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the "net profits." And
Issue: Whether or not the offending spouse (Brigido) acquired vested since the legal separation share decision of Brigido states that the in
rights over ½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership. the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left
with nothing.
Ruling: No.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, "the husband
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or

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benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the period of 30 years, then in 1972, they separated from bed and board
marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his for undisclosed reasons.
and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. The Court of Appeals denied the writ of habeas corpus but awarded
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. visitation rights of Potenciano to Erlinda and emphasized that the same
shall be enforced under the penalty of contempt in case of violation or
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court refusal to comply.
that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part Issue : WoN the Petition for Habeas Corpus is proper
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses Ruling : No, to justify the grant of the petition and restrain of liberty
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom and action.
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, nominal or moral. Evidence shows that there was no actual and
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be that would justify the issuance of the writ.
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the
party's favor. right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private
NET PROFITS: reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached
to the exercise of his right.
Q: Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the conjugal
partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
profits" earned in the absolute community? -YES not be enforced by the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court
is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
In this case, with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by a compulsion of a writ
-​ ART 102 applies ONLY for the definition of “net profits” of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other process. It is a
-​ ART 129 appies for the property relations of the parties matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
> CPG woman’s free choice.

In ART 102, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to
both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article ARTICLE 87 DONATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE DURING
102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal MARRIAGE/PROHIBITION/INCLUSION OF COMMON LAW
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. RELATIONSHIP

Difference: the difference lies in the processes used under the

dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the
ARCABA .v TABANCURA 370 $ 414
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

FACTS
●​ On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
ARTICLES 68-73 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was
HUSBAND AND WIFE
418 square meters.
●​ After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his
ILUSORIO v. BILDNER 332 S 169 mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter
Facts : Erlinda Kalaw is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio, waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Potenciano is about 86 years of age possessed an extensive property Francisco.
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of ●​ On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with
the Board of President of Baguio Country Club. On July 1942, Erlinda the Registry of Deeds.
Kalaw and Potenciano contracted marriage and lived together for a ●​ Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin,

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Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to
to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real
●​ On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco estate lessor with a health certificate, and the death certificate of
executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Francisco. These documents show that Cirila saw herself as
Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in
donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC
268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to
was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that
Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by Cirila as indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
its absolute owner. Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a
●​ On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed
●​ On February 18, 1993, Vda de Batocael et al (respondents) filed a with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason
complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. common-law spouse.
Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his
heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Code. Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
●​ On February 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondents- holding the donation void under this provision of the Niexon L. Perez, Jr. v. Avegail Perez-Senerpida, G.R. No. 233365.
Family Code. March 24, 2021
●​ The Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration of Arcaba
(Petitioner) and affirmed RTC. FACTS:

ISSUE: WON the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in favor of Spouses Eliodoro Q. Perez (Eliodoro) and Adelita M. Perez (Adelita) x
Cirila is void pursuant to Art 87 of the FC? -YES x x [were] the registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot 2
Block 9 of the consolidation subdivision plan (LRC) Psc-13291 with a
RULING total area of 350 square meters located at Olongapo City [(subject
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living property)] and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
together as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, T-7396.
but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course,
means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the Out of the marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita, which was celebrated on
parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the December 10, 1975 at Infanta, Pangasinan were born two children,
very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a Avegail and Adonis Perez (Adonis). Prior to his marriage with Adelita,
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, Eliodoro was married and had several children, one of whom was
thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret Nicxon Perez, Sr., who sired Nicxon.
meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated,
do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely On [October 29, 1995, a sworn statement denominated as
meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient Renunciation (sic) and Waiver of Rights [(RWR)] was executed by
proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, Adelita in favor of her husband Eliodoro. Said instrument was inscribed
a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children. on TCT No. T-7396 on [July 20, 2004.

Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila On [July 27, 2004, Eliodoro donated the said parcel of land to
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. [Nicxon] without the conformity of Adelita. TCT No. T-7396 was
It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 12547 was issued to [Nicxon].
Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept Subsequently, a Real Estate Mortgage was executed by [Nicxon] in
in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated favor of Rolando Ramos on November 163, 2009.
that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that
of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. On February 1, 2005, Eliodoro filed against Adelita a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that On June 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision (Marriage Nullity
Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and Decision) declaring the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita void
Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented ab initio. On July 11, 2005, an entry of judgment was issued, stating
documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As

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​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

that the Marriage Nullity Decision became final and executory as of For onerous dispositions or encumbrances of any community
July 6, 2005. property or conjugal partnership property by a spouse, the written
consent of the other spouse or an authority of the court is
Eliodoro died on June 28, 2008. On April 14, 2009, an Extrajudicial required. In the absence of such consent or authority, the disposition
Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver was executed and signed by his or encumbrance shall be void; however, the transaction shall be
legitimate and compulsory heirs. construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
On September 30, 2010 Avegail brought an action for Annulment of the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
Donation and Title with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against [Nicxon]. [Avegail] alleged that
she is one of the children of the late Eliodoro and Adelita. Eliodoro Thus, among married couples wherein the ACP or the CPG is their
executed solely a Deed of Donation [(DoD)] involving the subject property regime, the consent of both spouses is required under
property on the basis of the alleged [RWR] executed by her the Family Code whether the disposition is gratuitous or onerous.
mother Adelita. She claimed that the [RWR] and [DoD] are clearly
prejudicial to her interest because it affected her future inheritance or Under Article 147 of the Family Code, which covers the exclusive
legitime. Thus, the said documents, together with TCT No. T-12547 in cohabitation of a man and woman as husband and wife without the
the name of [Nicxon], should be annulled. benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, there is unfortunately no
direct prohibition on donation of any property acquired during the
[Nicxon] filed his Answer (With Counterclaims) in which he denied cohabitation by one party without the consent of the other.
[Avegail's] allegation that Adelita is part owner of the subject property
together with the late Eliodoro and argued that even if she was indeed It is true that Article 147 provides that the property acquired during the
part owner, she has no more right thereon when she executed the cohabitation shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership and
[RWR] on [October 29, 1995. pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code, in a co-ownership: "Each
co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
[Avegail] contended that her mother, Adelita, was a part owner of the benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
[subject property] considering that the [RWR] she executed in favor of mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the late Eliodoro was null and void as it was not supported by any valid except when personal rights are involved[; b]ut the effect of the
consideration. alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
ISSUE: Whether the DoD executed by Eliodoro in favor of Nicxon is upon the termination of the co-ownership."
valid? NO - VOID
With Article 493 of the Civil Code as basis, Eliodoro could have
RULING: alienated onerously or gratuitously his part or share in the subject
While both the CA and the RTC correctly ruled in this case that the property to Nicxon without the consent of Adelita, who was half
RWR is void based on Article 87 of the Family Code, their reliance on co-owner thereof, and the alienation would have been limited to the
that provision of the Article referring to "[e]very donation or grant of half portion allotted to Eliodoro upon termination of the co-ownership or
gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during partition.
the marriage shall be void" is incorrect — borne out by the fact that
they erroneously believed that the marriage between Eliodoro and Even the donation by Eliodoro of the entire subject property to Nicxon,
Adelita was valid and subsisting until Eliodoro's death. To be clear, without the consent of Adelita, could produce valid effect under Article
therefore, the provision of Article 87 that squarely applies to the 493, which would be limited to his share.
case is: "The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage." Consequently, if Article 493 of the Civil Code were to be applied, the
donation to Nicxon of the subject property could only affect the one-half
Parenthetically, the Court takes this opportunity to dispel the notion that share of Eliodoro and the one-half share of Adelita could not have
assuming the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was valid at the been transferred to Nicxon by virtue of the DoD.
time the RWR was executed and it had valuable or material
consideration the RWR would have been valid. The RWR would still be However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede, and
void because the sale between the spouses during their marriage is must yield to, Article 147 of the Family Code, which expressly
proscribed under Article 1490 of the Civil Code. mandates that: "Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
It has been opined that a donation made by the husband, without the and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
consent of the wife, would be subject to attack as a fraudulent termination of their cohabitation."
alienation, or an alienation impairing the interest of the wife in the
conjugal partnership property. x x x In ordinary co-ownership, a co-owner may validly alienate or
encumber his undivided share in the common property without
the consent of the other co-owners. This article [(Article 147)]

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

creates an exception in the special co-ownership it recognizes against the wishes of Jose's children. By then, Jose was 77 years
between parties living together as husband and wife. As long as old while Maria was 61 years old.
the cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition
inter vivos of such undivided share can be validly made by one On May 28, 2002, the Gaspar family executed three documents
party without the consent of the other. denominated as "Deed of Donation" wherein they gave a total of
6,000 square meters of rice land allegedly as "Disturbance
Given the above express prohibition of a party to the cohabitation Compensation of Tenant." Of the 6,000 square meters given to Jose,
to encumber or alienate by acts inter vivos even his or her share he either sold or donated segregated portions of the property.
in the property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other party until after the On December 4, 2007, Jose executed a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob
termination thereof under Article 147, then the donation of any Pala gratuitously transferring in favor of Maria. The subject portion was
property acquired during the cohabitation by one party without further subdivided. As a result, the subject property now is registered in
the consent of the other can only be but VOID. The rules on the name of "Jose L. Santos, Filipino, of legal age, widower, now
ordinary co-ownership cannot apply to vest validity on the married to Maria Santos." He built a concrete house for himself and
undivided share of the disposing party. The donation is simply Maria, a sari-sari store, and other rental concrete structures. Both
void. parties admit in their respective pleadings that while the size of the
property donated to Maria was 805 sqm, the actual size of the property
If a disposition of a party’s share in the property under special co­ left at the time of Jose's death is only 694 sqm covered by TCT No.
ownership created by virtue of Article 147 without the consent of 289268
the other party is proscribed by law, then, and with more reason,
should the disposition of the entire property under such special On June 1, 2010, Jose died without a will. He was survived by Maria
co-ownership by a party without the other party's consent be and five of his children from his first marriage. After Jose passed away,
considered void as well. his surviving children and grandchildren asked Maria to divide the 694
sqm lot into 9 equal portions for distribution to Jose's children and
To conclude, while the Court finds merit in Nicxon's contention that the grandchildren from his first marriage and Maria. Maria opposed,
lower courts in the present case erred in finding that the property insisting that she is the sole owner of the subject property by virtue of
regime between Adelita and Eliodoro was governed by the ACP as the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob Pala.
their marriage subsisted until Eliodoro died, the DoD to him of the
subject property is, nonetheless, void as this is a prohibited Thus, on September 1, 2010, Edgardo's group (petitioner) filed a
disposition under Article 147 of the Family Code. complaint for Partition, Accounting and Damages against Maria.
Maria asserted that property acquired during marriage is presumed to
Santos v. Santos, GR.. No. 250774, June 16, 2021 (c/f Art. 93 FC) be conjugal. For Maria, upon Jose's death, one-half of the property
was automatically reserved for her as her share in the conjugal
FACTS: partnership.
MARIA: 2nd Wife (respondent)
JOSE: Intestate Husband (rip)​ ISSUES:
JOSEFA: 1st Wife 1.​ Whether Maria became the sole owner of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-289268 by virtue of the Kasulatan ng
Respondent Maria D. Santos (Maria) was 16 years old when she first Pagkakaloob Pala Jose executed before his death;
met Jose Santos (Jose), a rice farmer, who was then married to 2.​ Whether the subject property is excluded from the
Josefa Santos (Josefa). No romantic relationship materialized even community property of Jose and Maria
though they liked each other. Maria married Dominador Mendoza
(Dominador) with whom she had seven children. Dominador died on RULING: (the donation was onerous btw)
May 6, 1990. Jose allegedly had eight children with Josefa. Josefa
died on November 10, 2000. 1.​ Jose's donation of the subject property through a
document called Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob Pala to
Jose got involved in an agricultural tenancy dispute with his landlord, Maria is NULL and VOID.
the Gaspar family. Jose was granted the right to "peaceful
possession of the land cultivated and possessed by him for the Article 87 of the Family Code states:
past 18 years." The Decision became final and executory on July 9,
2000. Article 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
After Jose's wife died, he courted Maria. On March 17, 2001, Jose shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
asked Maria to live with him in a small hut on the land he was give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
cultivating in Barangay Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan owned by the prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
Gaspar Family. On April 25, 2002, Jose and Maria got married husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)

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Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

●​ Article 996 of the Civil Code- the surviving spouse has the
Based on the foregoing provision, donations between spouses during same share as that of each of the children.
the marriage are prohibited. The donation of the subject property Jose ○​ In this case, the one-half share of Jose in the
made in favor of Maria through the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob Pala subject property shall be divided in nine equal
prior to his death is null and void. Accordingly, Maria cannot claim to parts representing:
be the sole owner of the subject property based on the void ■​ ½ Jose's surviving spouse, Maria,
donation. ■​ ½ Jose’s eight children, namely:
Zenaida, Edgardo, Corazon, Armando,
2.​ The subject property is included in the absolute Sonia, Nestor, Milagros, and Ruben.
community of property of Jose and Maria. ●​ Since Nestor, Milagros and
Ruben predeceased Jose,
For marriages that took place after the effectivity of the Family their respective children shall
Code, in the absence of any marriage settlements, property relations inherit their corresponding
between husband and wife are governed by the absolute community share by right of
of property regime. Since the marriage between Maria and Jose took representation.
place on April 25, 2002, the property regime governing their marriage ○​ Article 974 of the
is the absolute community property regime. Civil Code,
"[w]henever there is
As a general rule, absolute community of property shall consist of all succession by
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the representation, the
marriage or acquired thereafter. According to Article 93 of the Family division of the
Code, estate shall be
made per stirpes, in
"[p]roperty acquired during the marriage is presumed to such manner that
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of the representative
those excluded therefrom." The following are excluded from or representatives
the absolute community of property: shall not inherit
more than what the
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title person they
by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income represent would
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, inherit, if he were
testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community living or could
property; inherit."
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. ○​ In this case:
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; ■​ Cielito,
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse Evelyn,
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. Felixberto
(201a) (Emphasis supplied) shall
divide
In the present case, it was already established that the subject property equally
was acquired by Jose by onerous title during his marriage to Maria the share
despite being denominated as donation. The subject property was Nestor
acquired by way of disturbance compensation. Thus, it shall form part would
of the community property of Jose and Maria and one-half of the have
property belongs to Maria. inherited
if he were
PROPER COMPUTATION: still alive.
■​ Jerome
As have already been discussed, the subject property was acquired by and
way of onerous transfer and forms part of the community property of Jerick are
Jose and Maria. Thus, one-half portion of the property automatically also
belongs to Maria. entitled to
the share
The share of Jose which consists of the remaining one-half portion of Milagros
the subject property shall be divided among all his compulsory heirs. would
have

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 Ateneo de Davao College of Law
Persons and Family Relations | 2024-2025
​ ​ ​ Atty. Emiko Antonette Escovilla - Ceriales

inherited
and this
shall be
divided
equally
between
them.
■​ Bettina
and
Reuben
Joseph
are also
entitled to
the share
Ruben
would
have
inherited
and this
shall be
divided
equally
between
them.

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