1. Som Prakash Rekhi v.
Union of India (1981)
Facts of the Case:
• Rekhi, a retired employee of Burmah Shell, was due his pension under the old scheme.
• After nationalization, BPCL (a government‑owned corporation) took over but withheld and delayed
his pension payment.
Issues:
• Whether BPCL qualifies as a “State” under Article 12.
• Whether Rekhi could file a writ petition under Article 32 against BPCL.
Observations by the Court:
• The court examined government ownership, deep control, and the public functions performed.
• Previous cases (e.g. R.D. Shetty and Ajay Hasia) were used to test if a corporation is an
instrumentality of the State.
Judgement of the Court:
• Declared BPCL an instrumentality of the State.
• Permitted the filing of a writ petition under Article 32.
• Directed BPCL to release Rekhi’s pension without further delay.
2. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002)
Facts of the Case:**
• Pradeep Kumar Biswas, employed by IICB (a unit of CSIR), was removed from his job.
• He contended that his termination was arbitrary and violated his right to equality.
Issues:**
• Whether CSIR, though registered as a society, is a “State” under Article 12.
• Whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be maintained against CSIR.
Observations by the Court:**
• The court reviewed factors such as financial dependency on and control by the Government.
• Despite its society registration, CSIR functioned as an extension of the State.
Judgement of the Court:**
• Held that CSIR is an instrumentality of the State.
• Allowed the writ petition, ensuring that employees in such institutions have constitutional
protections.
3. G. Basi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute (2003)
Facts of the Case:
• Employees of ICRISAT were terminated for misconduct according to the institute’s policies.
• The terminated employees challenged their dismissal as being arbitrary.
Issues:
• Whether ICRISAT qualifies as a “State” or “other authority” under Article 12.
• Whether the writ petition challenging the terminations was maintainable.
Observations by the Court:
• The Court noted that ICRISAT is funded by various international bodies rather than solely by the
Government of India.
• There was no evidence of deep and pervasive state control over its daily operations.
Judgement of the Court:
• Ruled that ICRISAT does not qualify as a “State” as defined under Article 12.
• Consequently, dismissed the writ petitions filed by the employees.
4. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005)
Facts of the Case:
• Zee Telefilms, a private broadcaster, lost cricket broadcasting rights when the Board of Control for
Cricket in India (BCCI) awarded them to another company.
• The petitioner alleged that the denial was arbitrary.
Issues:
• Whether the BCCI, despite performing functions related to a popular sport, should be considered a
“State” under Article 12.
• Whether a writ petition under Article 32 was the correct remedy.
Observations by the Court:
• The Court found that BCCI was a private, autonomous entity—not dependent on or controlled by
the government.
• Its public functions did not amount to state functions in the constitutional sense.
Judgement of the Court:
• Held that BCCI is not a “State” under Article 12.
• Declined the writ petition under Article 32, while noting that other legal remedies might exist.
5. State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Rai
Facts of the Case:
• Radhey Shyam Rai, employed at a government‑established and funded Sansthan (Uttar Pradesh
Ganna Kishan Sansthan), had his appointment terminated.
• The Sansthan was set up by the State and performed functions formerly managed by a government
department.
Issues:
• Whether the Sansthan qualifies as a “State” under Article 12.
Observations by the Court:
• Noted that the Sansthan was created, financed, and controlled by the government.
• Its functions clearly continued those of a government department.
Judgement of the Court:
• Determined that the Sansthan is a “State” under Article 12.
• Allowed the filing of a writ petition for grievances against it.
6. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (1951)
Facts of the Case:
• Menon was prosecuted under a pre‑constitutional Press Act, 1931, for publishing materials in his
newspaper.
• He argued that after the Constitution came into force, the Act violated his fundamental rights.
Issues:
• Whether Article 13(1) applies retrospectively to invalidate pre‑constitutional laws.
• Whether the ongoing prosecution under a pre‑constitutional law was valid.
Observations by the Court:
• Established that Article 13(1) has no retrospective effect.
• Introduced the “Doctrine of Eclipse,” whereby pre‑constitutional laws become unenforceable
(eclipsed) only for incidents after the Constitution’s enforcement.
Judgement of the Court:
• Upheld Menon’s prosecution for acts committed before the Constitution’s commencement.
• Clarified that the law remained valid ab initio for past actions.
7. Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955)
Facts of the Case:
• The CP & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (1947) enabled the State to nationalize the
transport industry, affecting private bus operators.
• The challengers argued that the law violated their rights under Article 19(1)(g).
**Issues:**
• Whether the nationalization law became void due to a conflict with constitutional fundamental
rights.
• Whether the subsequent constitutional amendment revived its enforceability.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Applied the “Doctrine of Eclipse”: laws conflicting with fundamental rights become dormant rather
than void.
• Noted that the First Constitutional Amendment removed the inconsistency with Article 19(1)(g).
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Held that the Act was not void from the beginning but was merely inoperative until remedied by the
constitutional amendment.
• Upheld the law’s validity post‑amendment, allowing the nationalization to continue.
8. State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Shri Ambica Mills challenged the transfer of “unpaid accumulations” (dues owed to employees) to a
government‑controlled Labour Welfare Fund.
• The company contended this transfer was arbitrary and violated its rights.
**Issues:**
• Whether the forced transfer of dues to the welfare fund violated Article 14 (equality) and Article
19(1)(f) (right to property/business)
**Observations by the Court:**
• Examined whether the classification in the legislation was reasonable.
• Found that the law’s purpose—labour welfare and preventing idle funds—was valid and not
discriminatory.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Held that the provisions were constitutional.
• Reversed the lower court’s decision and allowed the transfer as a valid exercise of state power for
social welfare.
9. Bashesher Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1959)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Bashesher Nath, fined for income tax evasion under a 1947 Act, later argued that his voluntary
settlement should be invalidated because the Act was unconstitutional.
**Issues:**
• Whether an individual can waive fundamental rights by entering into a voluntary settlement.
• Whether his acceptance of the fine prevented further constitutional challenge.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Emphasized that fundamental rights are for everyone and cannot be waived voluntarily.
• Asserted that accepting a settlement does not legitimize a law that has already been found
unconstitutional in principle.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Allowed Nath to challenge the settlement.
• Ruled that the waiver of fundamental rights is not acceptable, meaning the fine under the contested
law could not be enforced properly.
10. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, imposed a complete ban on the possession and use of liquor.
• Balsara challenged the Act, arguing that such a blanket prohibition infringed his economic rights.
**Issues:**
• Whether the ban, including in cases like industrial or medicinal use, violated constitutional rights
under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g).
• Whether the unconstitutional provisions could be separated from the valid ones.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Applied the “Doctrine of Severability” to remove only those parts of the Act that were unreasonable.
• Distinguished between general prohibition aimed at public welfare and exceptions for essential
purposes.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the overall prohibition as valid.
• Struck down the provisions that excessively restricted possession even for certain essential uses.
11. R.M.D.C. v. Union of India (1957)
**Facts of the Case:**
• A businessman, RMDC, organized prize competitions based on skill.
• The Prize Competitions Act, 1955, banned all prize competitions, treating even skill-based contests
as gambling.
**Issues:**
• Whether banning skill‑based prize competitions violated the right to trade and profession under
Article 19(1)(g).
• Whether the Act’s definition was overly broad.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Made a clear distinction between games of chance (gambling) and games of skill (legitimate
business activity).
• Found that banning skill‑based competitions was an overreach.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Declared the blanket ban on skill‑based competitions unconstitutional.
• Upheld only the prohibition on gambling-based prize competitions.
12. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman, challenged her divorce by triple talaq (instant divorce by
pronouncing “talaq” three times).
• She maintained that this practice was arbitrary and violated her rights.
**Issues:**
• Whether triple talaq is constitutional.
• Whether it violates her rights under Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non‑discrimination), 21 (dignity), and
even falls outside the protection of religious freedom under Article 25.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Reviewed Islamic texts and practices, finding that triple talaq is not an essential religious practice.
• Remarked that the provision created an unequal power dynamic and arbitrary treatment of women.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Declared the practice of triple talaq unconstitutional.
• Banned the practice, affirming that it violated fundamental rights and equality.
13. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Anwar Ali Sarkar was tried by a Special Court established under the West Bengal Special Courts
Act, 1950.
• He argued that the Act permitted arbitrary classification and resulted in an unfair trial.
**Issues:**
• Whether the Act violated the right to equality under Article 14 by allowing unchecked discretion in
referring cases to special courts.
**Observations by the Court:**
• The court stressed that laws must treat equals equally and unequals unequally only on rational
grounds.
• Found that the Act gave the State unfettered discretion without clear criteria.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Struck down the West Bengal Special Courts Act as unconstitutional.
• Ruled that it violated Article 14 by permitting arbitrary classification.
14. Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra (1952)
Facts of the Case:**
• Rawat, accused in a dacoity case, was tried in a Special Court established by a Saurashtra
Ordinance.
• He challenged that his trial under the special procedure was discriminatory.
Issues:**
• Whether the classification for referring certain cases to special courts was arbitrary under Article 14.
• Whether the criteria used by the State were justifiable.
Observations by the Court:**
• Noted that when referrals were based on an objective assessment of an offense’s seriousness, the
classification was reasonable.
• Distinguished it from cases where no such objective criteria existed.
Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the ordinance, ruling that the classification in this case was reasonable.
• Affirmed that special courts could be used provided clear and objective guidelines are followed.
15. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1993; 1992)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The case dealt with the reservation policy for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) recommended by the
Mandal Commission.
• There was controversy about the extent of reservations (27% for OBCs) and its impact on equality.
**Issues:**
• Whether caste can be used as a criterion to determine social and educational backwardness along
with other factors.
• Whether reservations in promotions and exceeding a total of 50% reservation are constitutionally
allowed.
• Whether the “creamy layer” within OBCs should be excluded from benefits.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Held that while caste may be a factor, it cannot be the only criterion.
• Maintained that reservations cannot extend beyond a 50% ceiling without special justification.
• Introduced the “creamy layer” concept to ensure benefits reach the truly disadvantaged.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the 27% reservation for OBCs subject to the exclusion of the creamy layer.
• Ruled that reservation in promotions is not permitted.
• Reaffirmed the 50% cap on total reservations.
16. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Following constitutional amendments, reservations in promotions for Scheduled Castes (SC) and
Scheduled Tribes (ST) were introduced.
• General category employees challenged the amendments, arguing that they compromised merit and
administrative efficiency.
**Issues:**
• Whether providing reservation in promotions violates the Constitution’s basic structure by affecting
merit and efficiency.
• Whether the government should first collect data on backwardness and inadequate representation
before granting such reservations.
• Whether the “creamy layer” principle should apply.
**Observations by the Court:**
• The Court clarified that reservation in promotions is an enabling provision rather than a fundamental
right.
• Emphasized the necessity of empirical data and clear criteria.
• Stressed that the creamy layer must be excluded to reach only the disadvantaged.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the amendments subject to conditions.
• Mandated the collection of quantifiable data and the exclusion of the creamy layer.
• Ruled that reservations should not hamper administrative efficiency.
17. Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The 93rd Constitutional Amendment provided for 27% reservation for OBCs in educational
institutions.
• The petitioner challenged this amendment, claiming it violated principles of equality and quality in
education.
**Issues:**
• Whether the amendment unduly favored a particular community and compromised merit.
• Whether caste alone is a sufficient basis for reservation or if social and economic indicators must be
considered.
• Whether the creamy layer exclusion should apply in educational contexts.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Stated that while caste can be one factor, it must be accompanied by socioeconomic criteria.
• Emphasized that benefits must target genuinely disadvantaged groups.
• Reaffirmed the need to exclude the creamy layer to prevent benefits reaching the already privileged.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the constitutional validity of the reservation policy.
• Ruled that reservations, including in educational institutions, are permissible provided the creamy
layer is excluded.
• Reiterated that caste can be used as an indicator only when combined with other measures of
backwardness.
18. Gulshan Prakash v. State of Haryana (2010)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The Haryana government introduced reservations in promotions for SC/ST employees in the public
service.
• Petitioners argued that the policy lacked supporting quantitative evidence and could affect
administrative efficiency.
**Issues:**
• Whether the policy was backed by sufficient empirical data on backwardness and inadequate
representation.
• Whether such reservations adversely impacted administrative efficiency.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Stressed the need for quantifiable proof before implementing reservation in promotions.
• Noted that blanket reservations without clear evidence could violate constitutional norms.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Struck down the Haryana reservation policy in promotions.
• Directed the state to provide quantifiable data before implementing such measures in the future.
19. State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale (1993, 1995)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The case involved allegations of untouchability—members of Scheduled Castes were prevented
from drawing water from a public well in a village in Karnataka.
• The accused were initially convicted but later acquitted by the High Court.
**Issues:**
• Whether denying access to the public well amounted to untouchability and violated constitutional
rights.
• Whether the acquittal was justified in view of social discrimination.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Emphasized that untouchability is a serious violation of dignity and fundamental rights.
• Criticized the lenient stance that undermined the protection against discrimination.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Overturned the High Court’s acquittal and restored the conviction.
• Reinforced a strict interpretation against untouchability.
20. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Advocate Balwant Singh Chaufal filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) alleging corruption and
mismanagement in the Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) government.
• He claimed that irregularities and corrupt practices were widespread in public administration.
**Issues:**
• Whether the PIL filed on these grounds was maintainable.
• What guidelines should regulate the filing of PILs to ensure they serve genuine public causes.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Reviewed the evolution and potential misuse of PILs.
• Noted that many PILs were being used for personal or political gains rather than for the public good.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Dismissed the PIL for lack of merit.
• Laid down guidelines to prevent frivolous or improper use of PILs, emphasizing that they must be
filed in genuine public interest.
21. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded without any explanation or opportunity for her to be
heard.
• She challenged this action, arguing it was arbitrary and violated her liberty.
**Issues:**
• Whether impounding a passport without giving reasons violates Articles 14, 19, and 21.
• Whether “procedure established by law” must also be fair, just, and reasonable.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Held that the procedure must be not only as prescribed by law but also fair and reasonable.
• Linked Articles 14, 19, and 21 together, stating that violations in one affect the others.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Ruled that the impounding was unconstitutional.
• Expanded the scope of Article 21 to include dignity, travel, and free movement.
• Directed the government to follow principles of natural justice in such matters.
22. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Justice Puttaswamy challenged the mandatory Aadhaar scheme, which required biometric and
demographic data from citizens.
• He argued that Aadhaar violated the individual’s right to privacy.
**Issues:**
• Whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right under the Constitution.
• Whether the collection and use of biometric data infringes on personal liberty.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Overruled earlier decisions that denied the existence of a fundamental right to privacy.
• Held that privacy is intrinsic to dignity and personal autonomy, protected under Article 21 and
linked with Articles 14 and 19.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Declared the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
• Laid out principles and safeguards for protecting privacy.
• Left some aspects of the Aadhaar scheme open for further examination.
23. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997)
Facts of the Case:
• D.K. Basu highlighted pervasive custodial violence and abuses by the police through a PIL.
• His letter to the Chief Justice detailed instances of custodial torture and deaths.
Issues:**
• Whether police brutality and custodial violence violate fundamental rights (Articles 21 and 22).
• What safeguards should be introduced to regulate police conduct during arrest and detention.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Emphasized that custodial violence is a breach of the right to life and personal liberty.
• Noted the need for strict directives to ensure natural justice and accountability during arrests.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Issued 11 comprehensive guidelines to govern police conduct in custody.
• Directed authorities to ensure the protection of detainees’ rights and dignity.
24. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)
**Facts of the Case:**
• A human rights organization filed a PIL highlighting exploitation during construction projects for
the 1982 Asian Games in Delhi.
• Allegations included non‑payment of minimum wages, forced labor, and employment of underaged
children in hazardous work.
**Issues:**
• Whether failure to pay minimum wages and other exploitative practices amount to forced labor
under Article 23.
• Whether private contractors can be held responsible for constitutional violations.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Expanded the concept of forced labor to include economic exploitation.
• Emphasized that the State has a duty to enforce labor laws and protect workers’ rights.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Ruled that non‑payment of minimum wages is unconstitutional and problematic.
• Directed the State to take necessary action against exploitation and ensure enforcement of labor
laws.
25. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Challenge was raised against an amendment that abolished the hereditary rights of temple priests
(archakas) in Tamil Nadu.
• Petitioners argued that this violated their religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26.
**Issues:**
• Whether abolishing hereditary priesthood violates the right to freedom of religion.
• Whether appointment of temple priests is a religious or secular function.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Distinguished between religious rituals and the management or appointment aspects (which are
secular).
• Held that while religious practices are protected, the appointment process can be regulated for
fairness.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the Act abolishing hereditary priesthood.
• Ruled that the State can regulate temple administration without infringing on core religious rituals.
26. N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board (2002)
**Facts of the Case:**
• N. Adithayan, a non‑Brahmin, was appointed as a temple priest by the Travancore Devaswom Board
in Kerala.
• Traditionalists argued that only Brahmins should hold priestly roles based on religious customs.
**Issues:**
• Whether restricting priesthood to Brahmins is an essential religious practice under Article 25.
• Whether temple administration may disregard caste‑based restrictions.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Categorized the appointment of priests as a secular administrative decision rather than a purely
religious one.
• Found that caste‑based restrictions violate the principle of equality.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the appointment of the non‑Brahmin priest.
• Ruled that temple management can decide appointments on merit rather than caste, ensuring
constitutional equality.
27. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (2004)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The Ananda Marga sect performed a Tandava dance as part of its ritual practices.
• The state banned public performances of Tandava citing public order concerns.
**Issues:**
• Whether the Tandava dance is an essential religious practice protected under Article 25.
• Whether the ban on public performance infringed on religious freedom.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Determined that the Tandava dance was not an original, essential component of the sect’s faith.
• Held that the State can impose reasonable restrictions to maintain public order.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the ban on public performances of the Tandava dance.
• Ruled that the restriction was valid and did not infringe upon genuine religious practice in private
spaces.
28. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986)
**Facts of the Case:**
• Three schoolchildren belonging to Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to sing the national anthem at school
due to their religious beliefs.
• The school expelled them for allegedly showing disrespect to the nation.
**Issues:**
• Whether expelling students for not singing the anthem violates their freedom of speech (Article 19)
and their freedom of religion (Article 25).
• Whether standing silently during the anthem shows disrespect.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Held that freedom of expression includes the right to remain silent.
• Found that the children’s conduct, rooted in sincere religious belief, did not amount to dishonoring
national symbols.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Declared the expulsion unconstitutional.
• Protected the children’s rights under Articles 19 and 25, stating that silence can also be a respectful
response.
29. Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (2003)
**Facts of the Case:**
• The dispute centered on the autonomy of private unaided educational institutions regarding
admissions and fee structures.
• Institutions sought clarity on the extent of state regulation after the T.M.A. Pai judgment.
**Issues:**
• Whether private institutions have absolute freedom over admissions.
• Whether the State can regulate fee structures to curb profiteering.
• The proper role of monitoring committees in admissions and fee regulation.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Ruled that while private institutions have autonomy, admissions must be fair and merit‑based.
• Determined that the State can step in to prevent exploitative fee practices.
• Directed that regulatory committees be established to ensure transparency and fairness.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Held that private institutions must adhere to reasonable state regulations regarding admissions and
fees.
• Imposed guidelines for merit‑based admissions and fee transparency, striking a balance between
autonomy and public interest.
30. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985)
**Facts of the Case:
• Several civil servants were dismissed or demoted without a formal inquiry under Article 311.
• Dismissals were carried out using exceptions provided under Article 311(2)(b) and (c).
**Issues:**
• Whether a mandatory inquiry is required before dismissing or demoting a civil servant.
• Under what circumstances can an inquiry be waived as “not reasonably practicable” or in the interest
of national security.
**Observations by the Court:**
• Recognized the importance of natural justice but also the need for exceptions in emergencies or
impractical situations.
• Stressed that any decision to dispense with an inquiry must be based on objective, recorded reasons.
**Judgement of the Court:**
• Upheld the dismissals as constitutional when a proper rationale existed for bypassing an inquiry.
• Confirmed that Article 311 permits dismissal without inquiry if the circumstances justify it, subject
to judicial review.
31. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
Facts of the Case:
• Kesavananda Bharati challenged land reform laws (specifically restrictions on temple property) in
Kerala.
• The case expanded to debate the extent of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.
Issues:
• Whether Parliament has unlimited power to amend the Constitution.
• Whether there exists a “Basic Structure” of the Constitution that cannot be altered by amendments.
• Whether amendments affecting fundamental rights can override constitutional principles.
Observations by the Court:
• Introduced the “Basic Structure Doctrine” listing essential features such as democracy, secularism,
federalism, and judicial review.
• Held that while Parliament can make amendments, it cannot destroy the Constitution’s basic
structure.
Judgement of the Court:
• Ruled that Parliament’s amending power is limited by the basic structure.
• Upheld the Kerala Land Reforms Act subject to constraints imposed by the Basic Structure
Doctrine.
• Provided a lasting safeguard for constitutional supremacy.
32. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1
Facts of the Case:
• The validity of laws placed in the Ninth Schedule, which were meant to be immune from judicial
review, was challenged.
• The focus was on whether even Ninth Schedule laws could escape examination if they violated
fundamental rights.
Issues:
• Whether laws in the Ninth Schedule are completely immune from judicial review.
• Whether such laws must still adhere to the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
Observations by the Court:
• Emphasized that judicial review is an essential part of the Constitution.
• Held that laws added to the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973, must respect the Basic Structure
Judgement of the Court:
• Ruled that judicial review cannot be completely excluded by placing laws in the Ninth Schedule.
• Determined that any law in the Ninth Schedule that violates the Basic Structure can be struck down.