STORY

m Uemrs \Mmr
by.loseph Mirancla

Frederick's Field Army

t\,41d - 1757

ffiffiffi
ffiffiffiffi
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
ffiffi
Austrian Army, l\,11d 1757

W W
l!.rl
W W ffi W M ffi
M ffi M ffi M ffi NN
MM
When dcsiSning a wârg{rne on rDv {bject priù ro rhe 20th cer[rr! rhcF xre several
. .rêr.'.i,: noiLh'r,,n rh .r-t -rrrr'lr r-roJ,r,u.1ar. (,J). ,e.rdrr
engeùdcrcd hy uhal ls rcrnred in current US milirêry docrliùe ..C3t {omnrxnd. controt.
comnn r icarion!. and inrc lligence. To be success I u t. an 1 8Ltr cenlury comrnrDdcr hrd ro do a tor
of things which L(xlav are routilclv hardled by a srafl. Thus supply, mârch ptannrng. an.t
irlelligence opc.rtions suddeùly become crilical. The abitity ofa coDnnan.ler ro gel his rrooDs
.1i,lJru..'r.r..,
re:.1\r^r r;.or.r,rr. lr.l.J.er.rrt,,r'r,êh. r..J,J I re.l.t ,i i,,i r:,,t.r
l'ê"..rùl:.eds. lled. u .. e,r,l .,i tnori r,i.erru\ I .rJte.,n,dr
".,,.r-n)
nristrke!. But ifhc lâilcd. well ther. werc âlwals the Holo.s ofWarl

MOVES 5
 Seven Yeârs Wâr (Jr/a.eg) & rd.1Lr 163) sinùlâ1es aliro g olhcrs. $ rolc that 1hcBz ânce of Po$ff {as ccntrâl
lhe lvârbelween Fiederick the GreaC Pûssirând aCoalilion
s 10 u derslùdùg ]]urop.d coùlticl. TIle basic idea$as thâ1
oi hrropcân slâles, 17-56 61, for ûraster) of ]]urope. lAis no stâte $ân1cd to âllo$ âny other to become too strorg B)
wàs pàrl of â Seâler coûJlict ilhich war dt so loùght in \orth mâiûlaining â d)l]amic eqMli ty, evcry s1âle's independeDc
Anl.riq, thc Cùihbcàt, arrd lndiâ for nastery ol thc $ orld. ilâs assued E er)oneremenbered thcdeprcdatioN oflh€
ir the erd Prussia lrnùnphed. b(oning ltre dominalrl powcr 30 \'cirs $'ar lioln the pdor c€ 1ury, in $hich rùch of
ir certral Europc .Ird begnning the nârch to Germâû .lnlral Euop€ \râs Êdùced to fliû in Frsuit ol thc dreâm of
ùrificâtion alrd the wodd t!ùs. The rvar is i teresting ironr hcgcmoûj on the conli cnt. .\"obody in thc 18tb centur)
several standpoiûls, nor thc lcast ol which is tl-ât Prussia, r'ùtcd ro repeât thal perl oûiance, iffor no olhcr rcâson lhan
$ lùl( \e\ ercl) ou$umh R{. $J{ ahlc ro pullour a {r3rcr'. it coui.l lrigger lorces illlich $ould lead to cveryoùe's
victory. This r'âs largcly rhrcugh t]1e detenniûâtion of ovenhrow.llere $âs âlso the fact lhât tbis $zls the Àge of
frcderick the Cn1)al ârd the fighùng skills oi l}is offic€rs IhlighrûImenl. â!d krngs acnrâil) liked to think lhât drey
â.d lÎmps, às rvcll as the perseverancc of his âllies in s ere concemcd âtx)ùr the rçcltâre of lheir sùbjccls.
I lano\ trdrJ Rnldr \d(le.l ro Ùùs $ $ lhu unrqur vfl râûorl This is all ûeat\ handled ir ih€ gamc b) ùe Balance ol
of whâi âmounted 10 a'\orld wâr" fought nr rhe midst of the Powc' rack. ;\s a stâte gârns lictory on thc bâltlefield the
r\gc of Ènlightenme.lt a vcry inleresling game silùatur. balarc 'brfrs rr rt. ,acur 1tu.. .0 rum. !ir(. ir ûrorc
Sevm Y€6 W$covers thefightiry fi ltlrcI€ lhoughout diplor ac) pùnls. l hc prohlenr is that it the Ralance gæs ioo IàI
this p.edod. Tbe gdùc sàde is strategic, bul (lhmùgh dæ use of lhen lhe gamc cnds rf dcical the $cial ordcr is tom
â nrulual
rnulti-irnptrlse lumt grles the opportmiq lbropel"ùonnl asudet by mpacioùs mrics. p.$mr rclolls, and radical
level resolution of individu.d mâaeuven md baltcs. potiticians Cld th. bodd ùd gel reâdl for lhc Frcnch
Revolutior. Napol€on, Bolsherism. dd the \\'orld\laNl
APPROACH TO WAR So dJ.er. h,,'L r,' lLLf ,, lrmr ^n rl,eir ope'ârion\
\\heû I was designing Seven Years Wâr I fa.€d severâl N{odem playcrs rnal ch c at r}ùs. :ls the $pe of dccisile
desig1l problelns. Cfiicl ol thcsc wâs thât this was thc first opentioDs sc âll know aDdloicm lead lodisaster Bù1rhe
time in â Fhile that a gaiùc cov.nng â protracted war Ûas syslen actually gives the opporturi\ lbr $me cle'e. play.
published in a ûrgazinÈ iormat. $lxle we had lne'iousl-r' You cân lrade off tDilitât defeat for politial âd'âtlag€.
doDe suclr coDllicrs as Franco-Prussian warând Trîjan in thcreby mâipulâting dte coûflicl in youl fa1or.
S& I. these really deâl1 wilh câmpâigns lsting only a year or
so. Bùtthesituationi,SeyenYeâEwar$âsfundimenh y THE MITITARY IM PUTSE
more complex. Virtuall) all najor Eutupeirn powers !'!ere one thing we had to de(ermi e was the ùm€ se c lbr
irvolved, aûd the fightiDg ivent otr li,r (obliomly) se'en €ch {um. The sitùâ(ion rvàs similâr to thâl lâced bJ many
yeaN. l]ris meârt that mâny of the lx)liti&i l&lùrs hâd tobe Alrikâ Korys dcsignsr how ro snn âte a conflict in which
included ù a mâmer x hich gamers @ùld ndiplllâie. tjrerr rc lonA l).nnd' ôl hurldup n 'llu$rJ b) shùrr rùreo.L
'l'hc most obviors of tlrêse wâs Dplonâcy. This ivâs a p€riods ofnuneuv€rand combaL A ûurthly scnleûl.1) hâve
vi Ldpdt of I 8th an1ùr) conllicl, and wârs rvere setded as hâd too ùany tums, while a quarlerly slstcm rvoùld have
mùch in the oùncil ckùnbc.s tls oD lhe bâtdefield. In the losi aûy se,rse of idricâcy. \\:hât I cam€ qr with is not
gane, players reæivc Diplonacl Poinls. widr they ertirely ew, bul ro etheless quite applicable: a mdti
',rhich
ù.,nJurr ùd,rm,ûc coorlk1 I fu \illo$s rlrorloearn iLnpul.e rurn The \â) ir \ork. r. rlÉr .J(h rum i' ùne
ncw dd disrupt the eneny s coalitior. ll also allowed quârter of a year. Withir dral quffter, a pla) er can choose to
"lli€s .rr,rtrgr, fu.tor..u.hase.ptouape.
nrcr,)rrcluJc-m(,'rhfl initiâteone,l'!o.ortlreeimpr ses lneachimpulse,aplaycr
wbich is clcvcrl) iDlegrâlcd into the table mo\ e\ind rheuâriLk\.The k, ker r. Lbdllberedreincreî.n'S
Plqers receivc Diplonalic Points according to the penâlries to moïement ând discipline in rhe second ard drird
Ialue of ûe couûtries thq control. Sonc slalcs. such às inprrlses. So thc Dorc yoù prsh )où.,my, lhe greâter the
Bdiain, are more hcGùse the) agg.essivcly pursûq:l chùce ofit làling tLpàn dùc 10 aurition.
'!o.h
their politicâl obj€clives as çell as provided sùbsidics 1o Actuâlly, $hal dris does is givc ]où â sliding scile of
alliedcoùrtries lolinance trooprecruiting. Players rlso gct rinc. If ]où choosc ro perfomr lnore impùlscs yoû arc
pointsfortheBalarrceof l'ower. l'hemoreitis in)oùrlàvor, inc.casing thc lci cl ol operario al detail. Tbis givcs you the
the more points you gel. Bul, as will be sccn. this cù âlso chdcc for lnâncùvcring, fighling. drd withdrawâI. 1l also
work JgaiNl thc plâyer. plæs a prcniu'n on player nerve he w ho a! l)ush his force
tbômost$ill Fin-hutrvill a.lso ha!€ thc grqtcsl chææ of
BALANCE OF POWER somethirg slipping up arrd mârchirg lo disÀslerl
'lïe esseltial
ohlcm ur the gùne desier was anemptiry
pr
THE UNITS
to shon the wâr from lhe p€rsp€ctivc ol ùe pnn.Ês and lt€ld
mdshâls of the tine. \-obody was a Napoleon. Bisnarck. or Nlililâ4 fôrccs in thc gdnc dc dilided inlo disiincti'c
llitler; and nohod) ivânted to tr,!. ftederick rhc Grcâ1, ll'lt typ.s: lcadcls, infantr) . calall . ùrillcr' , pioneen,light

6 MARCH APRIL I994 #79

 Cuo'uf;J
lloop!. legxDs,
suPPtY
Iffântr), aNalrt,
and
conr o] s.
and
Line htantry x Dl.clpllnê
DISCIPLINE TABTE
Diêe rott
lighl ùniLs are brigides.
Crvalry za Clo3i
r!ith.ach
rcpresent;rg foù.
brigâde Light Troops E Guord
0(- I 2 3 4 5 é(+l

rcgiments.
toncâIl] , mosl hrigades
His-
E D

iveragcd rhree regi Robble D D t)

ûrenls. bùt the munler IE
ùi\ limilarion forced rror Lo,votLêotorêrrêloy,eooô.!o-yo,ê ., pê.
Arlillcry tl.
!âch u il has a
s(r€ûgth
disciplnc chss. and
1âctor, tr
moyemenl làctor r\s P Unii posses DisctpLne Check.
cân hc se.û from a * F Unii foils Drscip]ne check.
perùsal of the game
n es. the discidine Brigrde P (Noiè: the êifecTs of difiereri Drscrprne reslrlts depends
faclor is Lhe mosl upon whol ihe Dlscplinê check was mode fô.i thls ts
cridcJ . -rhere are four f exploi.ed undâ ihe opproprole rutes seciion9

. (hl.lrd I çoùld hare liked 10 hâyc assig ed hisrorical

identific{ions to tLeùûts. I harc a complere order ot bârdc
. hne for 17-56 ùd l?-57. Bul ûrc corstznrt reorgtùri72rion ol all
. liabblc pânies tùrniesmadelhisinpossible. So\tcharcrbce€rledc
l'lâ,yem ùsc disciplire clzlsscs a! a modifier in combâr ùni! idcnliliers i slcâd. Players rvho ârc iurcr$red in what
ând to delemrjne which linc will b. us€d on the Disc'tline thc brigâde ând rcgimental coùnùdcrs/tides were âre
'Iable. Thc Disc;tlire Tâble has t$o geûenl purposes: to âdliscd ro check oùt rhe order ol bàlllc iû.1&7 lû1.
make l)isciplinc Checks ând 10 Rrtlldemorâlized r.oops I l'ioneL.s aM artillcry are rirregillleùlll strcngrh becâuse
could hâvc jùst as easil] rscd rumbers ( I thoush :t) ibr the these reprcs€ût smallcr, more tccllrlie ly traired bodies of
d!.crplrn(.la*e.. b, LF(J rlt,h0 renr,s hràu,{ ir gr\(. ûo' 'p'. Tht. ( n Ê\i( l,lal) rel4û1I mnr. ol acoù(rnriûo
more of a lnstoricâl flâvor Il sounds bcucr 10 ralk abort oi lechnical e\pcdse thâx lhc] do ol specitic ù.i1s per sc.
conrnilliùg \our 'cuards bdgades torbeliâ) than addirg Armics routinel) assigned dlillcrybatteries ro dcb of their
â ' l. l-actor ulitl The Discipline Tâblc also allows nc ro lrrld \\b rh(anrllû\ r(:rmL nr, r(tre\eut i,
uruL, nr rbr
sho\rqualitâtilels $,.'11 asquantitatrlcdiller€nc€s Rcsùhs the rFo$ing tactical practice of nassirg g[ûs on the
Ior thc various cl$ses ofrùits cin bc diflerent. Ihe lower battlefield, as $ell as thc larger olih.r pre.€s ($hich :ùe
drsci in€ ùits ârc subjcd lo the 'Dcs.nion' resùl(. while usedin siegct. Ihe light aoops reprcscnr larioùs iDttùrrr-
the higher o es are nol. aM civalT fomâdons trâincd to conùrct shmishing,
lîch countrl hâs â dillûenl mix ol unir rypes ând relo râissance, ùd Euerrilli âcliors I showed hoiv ùe)
disciplincs, rcflectiûg their historic"l pertbmLaDce. Thc luncnoncd norc on the straregrc thau racticd le1 ci I rlrey get
Ihssians, ohrioùsly, hâvc a higher propo'1ion of aiuârd ând a larîrâble nodili€r shen loraging tlis alknvs them to
Yeierân infaûtfi. But thcirlight rroops de. for ihe ûrost part, opc.atc mo.c iDdependcntu, as 11â! rhe hisrûical c.1se.
râbblc. This is bc{:iùsc lrederick never quire figùrcd oû I)c iding r{hich troops rhould b€ considered light" was
ho$ 10 ùse his light tr(x)ps ûrosr ol dris aliegory bcing. i tricky trIan) of the ârmics had, for crdnple, considerâble
thc PnNsiaaâmr, lorv qrHlitt'liee corps." Thc Ausrriâns. bodies of hùsars (lighl cavalry) ailrched to theln. Hoivcvcr,
on the othr hùd, hal e a h.llcr prcportioû ol good qll.{ir} they $ere oscd pnm{il} as bâllc arvalry. or ar teast wi thin
ligbt iroops. âr thel hâd considcrâble erpenence D this aiea close range of the ntâin bod_v of an aro). So rhe_v âre fi$red
$:hat all tlùs .locs is give cach army a uniqnc calr tt atso into the gâme s car'âl ry brigades. Thc light rroops represenr
Sives plâ) crs the opportùn'$ 10 exploir the âdvarlages o{ùi s the doctnnal leap mâde in the lallcr 18rh certury rowârds
lioops. Arother thing to renember herc i s thar the relâti vetl lroops *hich coùld lunction ùniqùely bolh tâcùenl) and
higher qnâli(), ol lhc Prussians en bc a disad.! ânrâge. orc€ stratcgiolly fron the ngid hc.I organizations ofrhe period.
the Itussims hare tâken nmy losses. Sincc thc higher 1 )cpendrry ùpor dre nation. they represenr Jâcgers, Croats,
discipltuc class urits cost nore recruiting poinrs ro reptâc.. Cossacks. diles, ard e\cI regular roops ivirh specialized
it c.rn be difficult for the Prussians to replacc tbcir losses. rrâiniry.
'.<l
- z)
-/l
^\

-\ < ..'.
 C.ogç[
The legn J' âre âlso hislorial, atrhoùSh the) de
MARCHING ONWARDS
slighd ] ;r adrd.€ of $ hco rley âcrually :rlpcùed. IIan_\.
leadcrs expcrimeûted sùch tbrmârors. combitriûs \todem stùdeùts of ltritild) hisror) {lo not âppreciate
rnidrrr)..rj.:h' "irh
c,,.,ln..nJ .rarù ,rn gtc
L I \ trxde, hoF importurt comrnuiarriolrs are Radios, telephones,
'rôops srlellite ulliùLs.:ùrd the resr àllo'r r oùDânder 10 conlrd
comnander Legl('rs receivc a bo us Nh€û nârchiDg ân.l
Ëghùng, represcnring rheir supeior organiT,txnnl skitl op€râtiors acrûrs fl enlirc theâter of operarions. Bùr prior
\\'ilh âll theùnits under one colnmrnder.less rinr€ is r a1t€d ro rLr r\c
trrrh cenrur\. rh(\ siljtt\ J,J nor c'J.r
wnliùC ordc.s and so.ring out comlnn d Fcced€nce. CorNcqùeDlly. dre âbility ro qudilate troop ruoyelnellts
In etÈct. lcgioirs :ùd light roops allo* â tla)cr to $rs môre prohl€lllâlical. A chse e\mrinarioû of t8th
tIâNitioDto thc Nâpoleonic .cn1m y rilihl cânrl'âig1rs shows rhis r\ good e\ample is
erâ.
ùe Sùatogâ ctmpar gI in 177, s hcr€ seler:ù British coturùx
FIELD MARSHALS ON EVERY HAND i:nledtocoordi are on the stràregic ler e1.lcâding 1l) (iellerâl
Bugo)rc's isolâtl(ni upsllle Ne$ york ûdbis eveûtud
Le.dcrs are. obviousl]. ycry illrpoiûrL in this p.rio.i as
,leieir :lr the ll1lrl, ot \mrnri| orL+ ( ,rnnuox s.L\
thi\ \.F dn emur p. hJdenhip \lu.lteâderrrrul.jù(
named, sith âll dre ^on.J
najor leaders lûctuded. Fnch countrl
iiighd! beller rr Eùrope. Iiith (relâtilel)) bcrrcr
corùnunicâtions. but elcn the ruch $as dependcnt ùpoû
bd.rj:menc lrrlJr!tu\'rJl lea.to.nlternrrng,,'rrrr.,"r.
thc iîitiarire ol a commander
rrin,{ lea,l{,, llù' rLLucd rhe 'r,.ùn or rt'r \. rnre, n,r\
ldalsoeliminateddleneed to hâycanother gâmc subst srcrr This is rcnecl.d in S€ven YeâE wa. $ idr dre Llarch
âaorml lh the xlrnoler irt gencrds who iùrrc alrenrreh
'lablc. I o ft)r'e, où roll a dic. nxxlif_v ir lir lcadership. ard
10 !
promoted uùd slrcked. llch letLdcr is rated tin his strât.gic rhcn.pplt rhe resulL llterc is no c:rrcjul crlcrdaiion of
àrd tllcùol capabilirics. Srrâregic câpabitir] basicalh, mol.rrer( poirns:ùrd he\es There is no sue rhing. $tur
rnl,aru. rh. leÀler . ahitrrl rr, this does is falor rhe plâ) er ${rc sees s uùlàre âs x ctash ot
nur. rre. Lr.r,ur-
"onr1.r.r Nills râùcr marhe'Dllicâl câtculario . (X eou sr \ o,I
epabilit) i'nprores his chàrss ofçi ringabattte. Trcticat tlL1n a
.âpabililt also scnes to ndify dre Discipline (:heck ânil drLil,,rl,,r(rhr.{iit,.,,nJ tr(e.rr^,,J trrhqrrrrul|nreirt.
Iùtll] dic rolls, as drc presencc ofa comùtùrderis r rrtJ lor lnxrp figùre oûr r!lrâ1lhe besl possibiljlics ffe.
ûrorale. I based llc I ladernrirgs o theiracnl.d ILd onnàrccs. r-o$, e\rùre lhc \lârch Tâble lbcto"l tlle tâhlc
\l,rùrtr trllo$ùn a rnitor h3 t(pùti,rJbngùt 2 |r(r porales a Nlnbcr oI dificrcnr fàctd s. One ofrù{:R: is

MARCH TABTE Mqrch rêsulls:

Diê Roll Rêsull No March: The rôrce does noi move oi oU Seô Movemêni noi
-l or less No Morch
0 Morch, wilh Afifition
Mqrch: lhe lorce moves ot noÎn{r Mq rch ng speed. seo Movêmeni
I Fo Bock
2 N,,lorch, with Aitrilion
Forc€d Mdrch: The rorce moy mve Lrp to DO ! BLE iis nomqt tV o rchjng
3 No ûlorch Spêed, Seo Movement Dermitiêd
4 Morch Fdll Bock: the force musl .nove to any one unbesieged fûendty
5 Morch conirolled Fôdress thoi I con reoch lsing .omor rvtorching Speed
6 Forced l\rorch ond ôb'eying no'rno Morchrutes No lnjis rnay be d ropped ofi. I
7 [,4orch lo the Guns
the torce eniers o rrtendy
Fonrêss hêx, ii immedioietv ceoses
B Forced [/orch, w]lh AttriTion môvement. tliheforce co.not reoch onyniêôdty Fodress, treoilhe
resuli os o No Morch , Sêo MovêmênI .oi qt owêd.
9 or mole Forced Morch
MorchtoihêOunr: theforce must use ils nomot Morchhg Speed ond
nomor i\,4orch rùtês tô move odloceni to thê ctôsest ênemv
Die Roll modilêrs (cllmulotivê):
occupied hex (.ôunttheenemy,shexbrri no|hemorchingf orce,s
+? Strdlegic Volue of one friendly
her when delemin ng ctistonce in hêxêsj ownêr oi the morch ng
ledder
lorce ôrrooses in cose ôr a tie). Nôunitsmoybedroppedoff Itthe
+l force coniqins 50%or more Leoion
f orce connoi reoch ony hexconlajîing enemy unrts, jreol
SPs ihe lesu I
as Nô Morch sea Môveme.i not oiowed
+l Summer Gome turn
-l Winlet gomê lurn
Att iùon: Allercomptet ngmovement,ihêrorcemus|oseonvonê ùô I
-l force contoins 30 or more Sps
(excepi o Lêodet or ihe ownrng sde,s chotce. tonlyLeddeGore
-l Second,mpulse ovoilobe io iokethe ioss, no Atjjilion acclB Any non Leodsùnit
dropped off dlring the Îôrce,s Morch s eligibtê to ioke the bs
-2 Third lmpulse
Fo.ce us n9 Seo Movemênt suners ati.iiion.o.mo lv.
 lheaggr.ss e css ol th. coûnnandcrr thenset vcs. Theleis a relief force slx^led up plâyers hâd1(J so.r o t tL€ besicgcd,
a greâtcrchance oi gcuilga \{ùch ro rh€ (iuns res l$ith the b€siege$, thc rclieffore, plLs a'r.t-bqtl clse \!lrohappcncxl
a ltsher qualit) cotntnaûder. Ol q)wse, the p.obten ililh to show up. Wc fimlly.lccided toj unk thc sâme he\ srâcking
this is thal a cûmnanderrho is r(x} aggressir c will tead his and use lhe cùrert systcn which hàs cncmy forces atackilg
amr) irtoâdis:Lslcr couplcolotherûotes rbourthis. Ihc ftom âdjâæn1 he\es. Bur theD how ro âccoùrl for sicge t Ir
rersù for ûe ùcgâtire^ nodilier lor-10 or rnore facton is that order tobesiege â iortl€ss, â plà]s wot d b.rve ro co'er all
:ùrnies largc'r than this (tu gane tenns) would â:iuse 1oo sixhcxcssùrromdrngit. llhismeJrlruoæalisticâIlydisp€rsing
lnuch roâd corgestion. Marshal Sâ\c (anorg otlr.rs) onc s ârm) So the solùtion Ne cane rp lrirh ivas ttre
consids..d about {O,0O0 men to bc {hc nuxtlDùrr size of aD "Si.ge rule. The sa_v it wùrks is th.?t âr entrcnched forc€
arm) Bc)oidthat,arlm] codd nol bc lroperl] coùt(tlcd. (ù dæla.easiegcagainstândiac€nteæ1nylbnrcss'lhis
\or c.ùld it forâge ofi thc countr) sidc. Thi s cones ut tater fcvcnts the enemy from moving inro or out ol lhc lorrress
i thclogistics rulc. 11is assumed that the tÉsicging forc€ has rhc cir) enhrely
\orc. rlso, the incidcnce of atlriron. IIar).ifîotmos1, sunoùrdiDs by siese litus. It's all hâppeniDs oD a scale
of th bsses âr arm) suslain€d iir tlris period rrere dùc !o Iowerthânthatoftheûtaplkxes \\lilc pùn sts ùray disÈre
descrlioD, siclûlcss, e\hatBtion. drd rhe lite Nomrâlly this âpproâch, it noùclheless keeps cveqrhiry neâtly
tlt.c is oDlt â onc ir six ch:mcc 1lr gel an âtaidon resrilr,
uDless lhereà! Dcgalire die r)ll Drodifiers. In thc latrer c.ase, toGtsTtcs
the chânce iùcreases to one itr three. lhis ncdrs thatif)ou
Sùpply serl.{ a! a detilnre liûit to openrions in this
i
â sccond or lhird impùlse. ill q iDrcr, or iD rhe tàa
'narch
of thelleas:tnlRevoltLrerr,)oùsla dtotoscproportioùdl!
period Sirce dl pârties we.c w$illing b devastâre the
greater ihtù a nonnal narch
oùnlryside loprolisiortheiraflnies. ânDies codd adv rc€
.'nll a, fdr ll- rhr s'rt,pl) $Jsoo, cuuld lut t
lhe gàme ûrâkcs considerâblc itùportance ol-
To bc supplicd. a Iorce mùst eirher b€ in a lorrrcss or
iûtelligencc lhe iûtelligcne s]sten is lrid) sinlple. Yoù
e\pend a supplJ ùnit. Othsrvise,itùnNrfbragr. Fotuesses
caniol lmk at opposng i(rce stâcks ùnless you cùdùcr
combat, recoûraissarce, or cspbnage. lhis na) be
drcnrral ro lù!r\u'r\. becJU\e rhe\erep'e\ nr rbemâÊaaxe\
where sùpdies rrere â(ùmùlared. âs wcll as th€ depors
ukJdLrine ro n,ùr) pla)er\. hlr tlù\ i\ ho$ rt $i. rrhere troops were recruited. A tora mùst trace a Iinc ot
rencmber. ihis helbre the âgc ofsatellre recollla;ssarce I
$ ,Ls

FâcLo s like intcl IigcDc€ give pla) ers ârother scl oi i âraltes
cômnmicâliors to â fortress for sùpplt . lle tengdr of a linc
of colnmûnicâiions is arormd hdf sn infàrlry unil s Darc]r
to nù;pulâtc. Like logislics. ;t was somcrhirg thc
radius, which was lhc usual accepied fienre. -\frcr a cerraii
coûrmturders of lhis penod lnd 10 be proficieùt ;n. 'Ihere
point, {lrrfl aniûuls ilol d consum€ most of th€ lupplies
rrerc no regular sraff orgâniTario s 1o I'hich thesc
responsihilities could be delegar.d
ln the original câmpaig1l, rnuch cmphâsis rvâs ptaed on
PIONEERING SYSTEMS cutling an cneny's lines of commurications. In the gâDe
ahe of tLc things I dore iû my pre-modeÛr desigls
h.1! c ],où cân scc whl. once c t ol I an annt lnùsr eilh€f fall bâck
is tùrrals inclùdiry rules lbr engineers (pioreers, eppers, or sùiiar from atlrition. Plâ)crs should nolc the simitârily ot
turd pontoo c$). lnthe 181h ceûh}I) ùcse rvere tlc lcchoicâl Seven Year's Wâr supply rules ro û(xe of dre Trajân
specialists Thet give drc tla]ers a chdrce to pcrfomr a syslcn l hey âre siùilâr simpl) bcaùse lhe marr logjsriot
laricl) of drllèrent operârions. eûhancing rheir ârDies. Foblcm \ras aaùlnt âting e ough tiFd for the ll)olrs.
LrcidcrLdl), ihis al so iûdicates the inportârce of rhc n t road
. V I ; l il u,. q? t t., ) {.3Dodem rrrnr ) exgrnL (rc
t
whcn theywerc lirstdevclopedinlhctnid-19ûc.n1ùry lhe
rJlroads âllowed an âlmosr ùnlimir€d resuppl) opabilit].
allow alirc€^ to cross nven ar no movemenl penaltj
sincemoïe cnl was no long dclcrdentùpon rhe speed and
. l. ieldlotifulltirrs: I\oùeers can hrild enh ùcbnenls .arr_\.illg capâcit) of wagolls. \'ou c.rt compare the supply
N Inch iftrcase their dclansive qpabtlil) and allow lhem ro
situalion inSev€n Y(:m Wârw;thlhliiù Fmnco-prussian
hcsiege cncm) fortrcsses
War (and in the upconriq Âustm-pru$iân Wâr, tbùghr jn
. )^t€gci Pjo eers cù enlùs ûrc die rolt used Nhen rhe'ourlk nr t)dn ulSere;l eârs vlâr'. rnrl., tnù{\ J:, ùr
nxl-king a Sicge âg:rirNt ar cDcmy forûi:ss. perio.l gùrcs, annics calr opcrâre ar mrscs târ beyond rhosc
Speîkrûg ol^ttack
sicge. this $as one of rhe lhonier ploblems .ôrceii cd ol by 18thce lùt geDerâls.
re lâed. Onginally. plâ]er could srâck rheir uûirs in rhe 1he Sùpplt L:tbie iho{ s the capabilii}, ro lb.age l his
same hex as cneml units. Collrbât wd! in rhe smc trex is depeMenl Lrpnthe t)læ of temiu rheforce rs in. Obviousl,v.
onuch as in Tràjân). Thi s was âcruat ly fâirll reâl is1ic, sir en lnore seltled areâs qn providc nore thc wal of grain,
dre s&rlc of the g:ûc ard tlle rva) battles $ crc lbughri i e. câitle. shcltcrs, elc. Pla! ers mav also usc verr1(]erlendthc
rhere sas no "front line". Howerer. rhis l.d ro problcns sulply rarge of ldtresscs. One ofrhc orerlooked àspccts of
$hen rl .rnr ro \r(ge. \ lreorU\ r,ru corLtd bilr.L ]|r ple-modem rvarfare $ as rhe in1porLtlrce of rir er rràjt ic in
cneny fbru€ss ûy moying irto the lbrLress' he)i. ùut I'heû norirg supplies. ,\cLually. rbe ri'ers serred âs rerirable
l0 MAacF APR L 1994 #79
 cgr.çr
COMBAT RESUTTS TABLE
nesu ls ogoinsl Atlocker ore lisied on lop, resulis ogornsl Defender on bollorn
Itt"tt L4' I 1lt I I I t5r or
| . | , I r ," | | | s,' I t I 0,, I-o,.
-2 ot 50,N4 À,4 50-M M 50-IV M 50-t\,1t\,4 50-t\, N,1 50-M tu] 30-MNn 20-tv \,l 1O-MM
less o 0 0 û 0 0 0 0 0
l 5û N,4 N,4 50,M r\,1 50-t\4 N/l 50-t\,1M 50-t\,4 M 30- Nl M 20M 20 t\,4 t0 tv
0 0 0 0 t0 t0 0 0 0
0 50-r\,1[,1 50-t\,1t\,1 50.MM 50-t\,4 t\t 30 t\l i\l 20,NI M 20-M 20-M l0,M
0 ô 0 0 t0 l0 t0 t0 t0
l 50 L4 t\t 50 [,4 L4 50 N,4 N/l 50 t\t N4 30 t4 t\l 20 tvl 20-t\,1 20- N/l r 0-M
'10
0 0 0 l0 t0 2AM 20M 2ôM
2 50-It M 50-Àt 30-l\TINiI 30-fr M 30-M 20-M 20-M l0 'lû
0 0 ^l t0 t0 l0-M 20-M 20,t\l 2at-M 3O MM
3 50-t\l tvl 30-lvll\i] 30-t\,1t\,1 20- N/ 20- N,l 20- l',4 t0 t0 t0
0 t0 t0 t0 20 l\,4 20M 20M 30 M N,4 30 MM
4 30-1\l M 30-M1\l 20-t\,1 20-M 20,tvt tû 10 t0 0
t0 l0 l0 20,M 20-M 20-tV 30.MM 30 MM 50 t\l t\l
5 30- N/ N/ 2A-M 2A-M 20-M l0 t\,1 t0 t0 0 0
t0 i0 20-i\l 20-N4 30 t\,1 30 N,4lV 30 M t\4 50-MM 50-MM
6 20-l{t 20-tu 20-M 20-M t0 t0 0 0 0
t0-M 20,IV 20,t\l t0 30 l\il[,4 50- N/ M 50.M M 50,MM 5O,MM
7 l0 t0 t0 t0 t0 0 0 0 0
l0- t\,{ 20'fil 2û tvl 20 [,4 N,,l 50 M fiil 50 MM 50.MM 50 MM 50 N,,lM

I 0 0 0 t0 t0 0 0 0 0
'10-l\,1
20M 20-M 30-i\,4 [, 50.M M 50.M M 50-N4 M 50-l\,41\,4 50-tv1M
9or 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
rnole ]O MM 2O,MM 30- N/ N,4 50.M M 50 MM 50 t\,1t\,1 50 t\,4 M 50 MTI 50 MM
Côlulnn modmers:3êê T€[oin Elièch Ch<'lt
Dle roll modifiers (ADD to die roll if Altocker quolifiesj SUBTRACT frôm die roltii Detender quotiiies)l
? One leodefs TôctlcolVotue
I 500/6 OR MORE ot o slde's lololSPs ore cuord (G) ond/ol Veleron (V) in qood order
I Covolry SuperioiTyr the side wjth oi leosi DOUBLE lhe enemy's number ot Covotrv SPs tn good
I per Adillery unjl1n good order
I Lig hl Troop Superio lyIone side hos oi leosi DOUILE the enemy's number ol Ltghi Ttoop SPstn good
order, AND bqllle occLrrsin a Rough or Dellle hex
I per Leglon (Advonced Gorie)
Results:
10,20,30,40.50i Percenloge oi f endly combof sirenglh eliminotêd: see the Pêrcentoge Loss Chort.
The indicoled number ol5Ps MUSI be eliminoied. MoreSPsThon lhe resulf moy hoveio be removed duê
io lhe number ond size oi unils in o poriiculor iorce- Thê owning side setecis units.to be ettminoted.
Mr Eoch unil rolls once on lhe Discipline Toble. Results q re exptoined below
MMi Eoch unil rolls IW!CE on the Discipline Tobte. ResuLts ore exptained beiow.
Discipline Toble Resulls:
P (Poss):no eliect.
F (Foil)r Demorollzed. A currenily Demorolized unil jseliminoted.
D (Desert): unii elimiôoled; return il io the oppropriote Recruiiinq Pool.
 highwals. sinæ it sas far easier lo loâd ercryrhiry on bffgcs syslen where plâyers each pick a tsatde \fdkcr ivhich lisrs
ând theû float them dorvnslrealD (or hâul th€m upsrreân). the pcranlage of cnemy fores elininatcd dd demoratized.
The trrulùer of supply units in rhe gâme is strictly limircd. ând gives sp€ciàl outcomes for siege $ùrs, cavalry, ând
Thiswastol]reve plâ)crsfiomùùealisricallyâccumùtatiry nitrâilleuse.
WhaL Iunded updoing ioSeren Yeâr\ Wr.$.{ uslrg
â standffd bùl heaviiy modificd odds cor$â1 rcsutrs tabl€.
WHAT ELSE? llayers figure odds and roll the dr€, but the dic ro itself is
Onginally. playcrs Iâd fi)rtcss garrisoû ùits. There sùjecled ro the followins modifien:
was ore of thesc Ibr eâch forùcss, in apprôpriâre nariûL1t . Ieders' tacticâl skill
c(tors Eur this overloaded thc courter ûri\. Sonethiryhâd . Majoriry oi "Veterânicùard" rypes
to go, so instead $e ùâde the tbûress garrisons intriffic ând, . A 2i I or more superionly in cârâlry
wher etiminated, you simply plâce â NO G RRISON . Presenc€ ol Anillery .egimeûts
nÉrker on the hex. This is adiriitedly clurnsy, bùt f€:f not. The enphasis on di€ rcll modifiers gives ihe CRT â rhid
ln an upconnlrg issuc of S&7 we will be Foviding rhe dimeû3ion. This natcs combât ûore than a simple
gârriso.lmits(protublyinissue l69ivirhrheOnToMG.ow conpârison of strength; mther, il is the non,marerial facton
which beconc decisile. To urdersrând rhis $,e hâve to look
at thehistoricâl circùmstânc€s iû $ hich bafles were resolved.
COMBAT Ceneft l] rr \ ds Lonù ded rbdtâtsr, nÈomsup€rionI)
l)esigning acombât systcm for a pre mûlem gane hâs in ûrânpowerrdrillery o. lhe bâtdeficld ça.s sufiicient to
1(l take i o a@olnrt the irnportance of bâr c. h modem cnsure lictor] if all other factors lfer equâI. Êùt if one
wârfare it is not tnrcoûmon for a anny to lighr merous sid€ had superior leadership or trâining rhfl the odds would
bâttles along r contiùroÙs 1lolr. Burprior to thc 20thcennry slift drun?iic€Ily. The CRT shows this through the use of
d arù) rDiBh' lishr oûJ] ùne uJor bârdr !n a cânpâgn die roll nodiliers. A small, r ell led and highly disciplincd
Consequenll). this wor d ofren becomc d "âll or roûtug ' fonre ù ill get fâvorable modifieff which ivil âtlor! ii ùo putl
,ffair. Â vi.lory coutd lùû rhe côurse oIa rvar 'llis ivâs dùe ort a rictory agâinst a larger but less cohesive forc€, such ar
not jusl to câsualties inllided. bû ro the psychologi.âl ftc.dcnck did ât Rossbâlh_
shock. -{ losirrs ârn]l would be denoralizE{t ând scâ(crcd Onc other thing I wâ ed ro inregrate inro lhc CRT was
A ïiclory would enlânc rhe rviincr's morale. This would the gowing imponarce of 'ct)Inbined arms" warfùe. ff a
rl.o lllre dilto drr. trIl(:rùo \, rb( s rmd $â\ .. player hâl at leâst 1wiæ as many câvalry fâcbm as tus
gcnerally percen ed among lrulopem opinion ro have
eneny, then he g.ts an addilio{al Inodifier. Thus, while
accornplishcd sornething. I canno( overemphàsizc the câvilD is weâlcl ùan infarrry on a srricr point by poinr
psychologiùl iûrportânce of batrle. Lôsses in conbâr lvhere bÀsis, it câr provide a good nodifier it prop€rty handled.
ofter less than those s sramed from nnarch âlrridon aM Similar wiù artilery. The fftiller] regiments rep.csenr
disease Bârde rook on âpoliricâl sigmficaûce fâr beyond rhe
major concentarions of guns on rhc batttetietd ivhich caû
nâtedal damage iûliclcd blow holes in the enemy line.
Another thing tolook ât is rL:tr in this era il wâs orunor Aside fron rhe die rcll nodifiers, ron mâtenrl facrors
forlhecolllnalderrocoûmândo thebarilefield. Corainly âreal3ointegrâl.di table. Thcrc are ti{o
o rhc resuhs on ttre
FredÛick did! A field mtrshal rol oùt-\' nâneùvcrcd his tlTEs of outcornes: nùmcicâl losses Àlrd Dscipline Checks.
arnics strategicâlly, he also 1oo1i chârgc on the bâidcfietd. A lorc€ which must matrie a Discipline Check rols oûce for
Gvcn this se1of circumslarces. the generâl $argame çchunit prescrr. ]'his câll leâd to urirs b€ing d€morâli?Êd
practi.! of using a single di€ rol 10 rslolve combat is or desertirlg. At the higher die roll rângcs it is podsible ro
inâppropriate. Orc is risking too much 10 alow ir all to inflict a donble ltsciplile (theck on the €nemy. Unils $hich
depud blindly or chance. Plâyers næd sone measure oi are demordized by the first check ând ûe demoraliz.d agair
conlrol here; they mustbe.one racticifis ar wel as strateeisrs. iheû sùrroqder ând are elimi,rared. This is very imporratt,
Scverâl ditlèrent wârg:une approactres have h€en aied 1() because n allows a player ro desùoy ar enerny force. Bu. this
rcJolve tbis sort ofissùc. Orcis rhe "bâttle board". tlsing $ill generally or work againsr aù enemy composed of
_v
this, players transfer Iorces ro a sepârârc tactical lcvcl lo'vcr qmlity (Liûe ùd Râbble) u irs. Thererore. ù rte
subgâmc, and lighl the battle où1 in detail. $r'e tried this in gamc as in reâlity, numbe$ câû be indecisivc. \Vbne a
the onsinal Trqiar game. while dce in rbeo4, rhis has pltryff ûray thir* he is kirging great strenglh ro a battte,
nany problems in application. lïe flâin ore is ttr1t ir slows u ess it is wêll led ând hisbly rrâircd it stânds a chance lo
dowr play.onsidembly. 11àlso requnes an additiond nâjor
rules scction. with the ânendùr problems of playtesting. Iû order to understârd how rhe CRT wâ,s constncted I
Ànolher approâch is drc "tsânlc Plâr". In ihis. plâye eâch would like to refer p]âyers ro rhc summâry of Battles ùom
pick a tactic and cross iidcx lhsn to give some sorl of this penod Gee pnge 13). You'll noria thar in ihe
oùtc(ll11e. In Franco-Prnssian Wâr. I used a r'âriânt ot rlis overw helming mâioriry of bâl1les, borl the winner and loser
t2 MAnCH.APn L t994 #79
 cgyfJ
MODUTE: Moior Botllês of ihe Seven Yeqrs Wor
. Sollie lnlonlry Cavolry Guns Sotdiels LGsês %Mrtnner Totosses
(Men/6uft) /loser
. Lobodt (l oclober I756)
k)
Prussio ns (Frederic blns sgsqdrns 9/
25 29,OAO 2,900 84 lO0
Ausnions (Broune) bins 12 rgls
19 94 34,500 2,9oa
. Plogue (6 Moy I756)
Piussions(F ederick) 66 btns ll3sqdrns 214 65,000 14,300 105 1O7
Aunrions (Cho es) 59 btns lTrgls 177 62.000 13,400/60
. Kolin (18 June I757)
Austions(Doun) 42bhs ]/rgls 145 44,000 9,000 136 é5
Prussions (Fredenck) 32 blns ll6sqdrns 88 32,000 13,800
. Gross'Jogersdod (30 August 1757)
Russions {Aproskin) 90 a'ins I I rgis 260 c. 70,000 5,250. 273 I17
Prussions(von Lehwold) 22 blns 50 sqdrns 55 25,600 4,500
. Rossboch (5 November 1757)
Prussio ns Fred e(ck)
{ 27b1ns 4ssqdrns 79 22,OOO 550 54 5
Relchsome (S H) l4 bins 42 sqdrns 12 10,900 3,550
French (Richelieu) 49 btns 40 sqdrns 32 30,200 6,600
. Breslou (22 November I757)
Ausirions (Chorles) 2 blns ? rgls 22O c.84,000 5,851 323 92
Prussions (Brunswick Bevern) s9 bins lol sqdrns 80 28,000 ô,350/29
. Leuihen (5 December 1757)
Prussions (Fredêrlck) 48 bins l29sqdrns 167 33,000 lt,é00 5t 53
Ausnions (chorles) 85 bins l25sqdrns 2to 65,000 22.000/13'l
'Zorndort (25 August I758)
Prusslons (Frederick) 38btns 83 sqdrns 193 36,000 12,800 83 é9
Rusians (Femor) ssbtns 21 sqdrns 136 43,300 t8,500
. Hochiirk (14 Octobê '7571
Arist ans (Doun) ? blns ? rgts 340 80,000 7,600 25a 84
Prussions (Frededck) 35bins T3sqdrns 200 31,000 9,100/t0t
. Koy (23July August I /59)
Ausdons (SolTkov) 54 b'ins 53 sqdrns 186 40,000 4,850 143 5A
+8 Coss rgis
Prusslons ? blns ? sqdrns 56 c.28,000 8.300113
. KuneBdorf 02 August I759)
Russions (Solikov) 68 bins 36sqdrns 200 4t,0OO 13,500 lll 8t
Auslrions (Loudon) 18 btns 35 sqdrns 48 B,5OO 2,000
russlo ns (tredertc k)
P 53 blns 9Ssqdrns 140 so,90o t9,too/t/2
. Liêgnitz 05 Augusi I760)
P ns (Frederlc k) 36 btns 78 sq.i'ns 74 30,000 3,400 125 4a
'ussio ns Loudon)
Austulo ( ? blns ? sqdrns 80 24,000 0,500/80
. Iorgou (3 November Augusi I7ôO)
Prussions (Frederlck) 62 bins 102 sqdms 309 50,000 16,/00 Bt |l
Ausnlons(Doun) ? brns ? sqdrns 275 62,0A0 t5,7OO 49

I commqnders in poreniheses
2 W nner !s tsied firsi for eoch bollle
3 Losseslncude killed, wounded, pisoners, ond missng
4 ?"w nner/ oser - percentage ôr w nnets ioio sirength io osers ioiot snength.
5 %Lôsses = percenioge or wrnner's ToTat tosses iô tosels toiol losses

blns = boilôliôns
rgts = reglrnenls
sqdrns = squadrons
Coss. = Cossock
sH=SaxeHdburghousen
 OPTIONAL RUTES
Oplioùal Ruler are used 1o cxtÈdment rvith {re gafre sysrem. ertendacrcss an all sea or oountâin hexside)
These aÈ. tbr the most pan ideâs we.âme upfith bûl rejecred
b 'Iactical 7-ones do nol exrc.d inlo nexs occupied by
as \€ lelt thèy were âdding exha coûplcxiu$ lvii,'1ôùt necesarilt,
enemy ùnils {rcgÂrdless of the sizc or tlpe ot enedy u.it) Nole
enhan.ingtlre.eâlisn, or$erc duplicatine other gane tùnctionr. j|is neâns Urarfonnotem.rl, tracing tincs of comùnicàtions,
Bùtyoùcan try thcn oùl loryouselyes. .elrcal etc , tbè proseùce or a sinele (or ùrore) ifiendly uDjt nr
NAIIONAt CHARACTERISIICS a lexagon neans rhar the enemti ta.tical zone is neeate.l i! flrat
Ea.h plâye! my expend Diplodacy poilts to sile forces ot b.r. TheÈ|otu, a moling fone is artecled by a,, q,eûy
.c.taincolnlnesadditioral adranbges, Êf rcieùrirgspecial'zed Tactical Zoùe in a hex unlc$ there ir ai.cady a fiiehdlr ùnitiu
national charâclenslics ivhich aÈ nôt othe^vise accounted tôr ir lhe hexagon it i$ aboùÎto move into
c 'factical Zoûcs doextendinto herès phich aE entinh-
l. It@€dùrc: I)tsignale the fo.cc lo which lhe Nâional
chaÉcbnsnc is to bè âpplied, expendoæDiptôhàcypoinl, ald 3. Èft?cb of Te.tical Zones:
Moyemeûr Enenrl ùnns nrayùeelyfr ôveinro, thôùgh,
â.
2. Nâllonâl cha.acterhlics are as lollo$s: ând oùt ol encnv 'Iâdical Zones Gùbecr to Nreetihg
. Pru$ian CeartulX@tion:1he Plisials cân âdd ,,+l ro ]lngagement attack9.
thât lôrcc s \{a..hdic rôll (iD additioD to any ôther ûodifies). b. Combat ltnils ir èhemy Iacrical Zrrnes ae \oT
. Fle Ela': aiçe a +1 dje dt moditicr ro an) one
ch
combât in ùlich at leal -!0 peÉcùt of the ATTACKjNG .. Lines of Comdùnicationr A plaler may nor ltuc a l_ine
streûgth poûrts aÈ French gua.d, veterin, aùd/ortrrc u.its. This ofcommuni.atiô!THRoLrGHanerenyTaclicalZoæs A rine
iÉ inêddino! b any othe. die roll modiiieff.
ol.lnmunication may be lraced into OR oul ot enem]. .fâ.lical
. Russian Stolidij: Glre a I die rcl! rnoditier to a.y one
7rnes, bùr not both inro A ND oùt ot the same Tactical tune.
.ombat in which at least Al perce.tofthe DEFENDT\o s treùgth
d Rclreat A lbrce mal rerreat into àn eùemy,Iacrical
points are Rtrsian g!dd, rcte€n, ed,brlineunih This is tr
Zonè al no pe.âl$ (aùd the enemy m) rot co!.l!cr â lvreetilg
addition to any other die .oll nodilics. Interception âttâck a€pinll retreating unirs)
. Altùian Lig]tt Ttoo?s: ll1is k do!€ in aùy Coâliinrn
4. I ût€rceplion: whenevera ineldty torce ]]NTEIis ânenèmy
Re.ùiUng segDreùt. lhe Ausrdans immediatel! reccive 6 TacÙcal Zone dùnng its nolement sègnent rhe enemy plâ\e.
È.ruiting pojnls worù ol Li-shl ttups per Diptoûacy point na) attempt to conduct !n irter.eplion.
*?ended. Thoyareplacedorùyfrlen.nyùnbesiesc{lrofl res(èt
in Aùstria. This ùaybe done onty once p€r tùm.
(1) The non-hoyinE pta)er rolls on die. lf tre nùnber
. rdrd, Dric?,re: This aloçs lhe Brjtish lo àdd ..1 ,,!o au
rclled is le$ tha! o. eqnal to rhe teâdel s strategic fâ.tor, then
DisciphE checks o. rally att€mpls ,or êny onc Brft'lh torcr
. heèlnrg eùgagerrent my take plà.e
3. !'dr th€ Pr{slian, F.ench, Rùsstar ard F.itirh (:)'Ihè
leader and any/all urits in his hei imnèdiarely
châiâc!€ristics, no moÈ lhan oùe Diplomacy point Day be
nove into lhe mor ing force s trex. lhi! cnds lhe nolenentot
expended per force per ih?ulse.
TACTICAI. ZONES & MEENNG ENGAGEMENTS (3) The intercepting player ma! rheD imncdiaiety coùdùcr
The sE hexes surc.ndin8 a ùnit are câllcd rhe 1.acri.âl Zone. a! âltack aenihl tire ûoving forcc ifne so desnes (note this
Tacllcàl Zones inay be uled to block enehy lines ot allows the player to âllack iÀ thc eneny môlcment segnènt).
communication ând to condù.t ilrerceFtions. Interceprion combat is .ordù.ted e$ctly.s tromd combat,
l. In oraler lor ù ùtrit to hâre a ÎÂcrimt Zone, rhe folloiving *ilh the followi.g exceprioùs:
tTheinrÊ,,.p lCp',)eri. r, o ar\er àr,J reror, g
a- Ila!ô a conbar hctorôtêlle.st 1 pâr..er is considcFd the defeùdèr (in effect ÉveNjng rotes ).
b.l.Iâve a moseûènt facror of at leâsr l . TIe moliùg lorcô
Sels tre adyùlâgc ot rermin (since ir
c. tse$iegedùnits do ûot hdre aTâ.ti.alZone.
d. rèltical Zones alply irner\er or not a unil is lace up o, b. A noring Jôî/r $\ich is bv jnlelcepton cômbat
inverted (a plaFr nrust infom the enemy ita ùnitis qualiiied 10 cea$cs ih moîenenl ànd may^tracked
not mole ant tudher rhàt 1,m.
e\cn a !â.ticatZone wlen an.ncmy ùnit no'es adja.rù! toâ c.A, îû|tceptins Jorce can orly conduct oùc Interceprôo and
lïeDdlr lo.ce or àlrcmpL\ to race a Line otComnù.icatons hrrerceptloù Combât por tuft
adjacenl b thâr hi!)_ d lJ tnor. thû
oae Jôtce eter$ a-ràcticâl Zone on a bex. thev
I ljnits nhi.h arc læared in a hea.lqùarters di$ftey still rd) êa.l '
drdu( r.n i rereôhnnred n.ta mo\ ind rùr!. s hh I
exert'lactj.al Zores (trasmùch as rhey are coNidere.l to be ttr enters a sirgle he\; howe!er, each âtâckis resot!ed sepanrely,
the headquadels her on thc na!). iù âny order the iniercepling ptalcr wishes.
g. DemoraliTed uùiis nairtai! their Tacrical Zofts ;t lhev e. UaÎ.)rce tures ihlo a\exin which rher t anorher friendlv
arc otheMise qualified io hâye them lur. ê cnd .hp pl.ler .iÊ.tdre, an tnh iaptrori. lhcn rh:
2. Extenr ôfTa.ti.at Zônes :
^rher
!où moving ùnits eo considcred lo be parr ot lhe moving lorce
a Tâctical zrnes exteDd thrcugh all six adjacent heÂes
rc8aidlôs ol terain (except lemin *hich a udt woutd nol J. Utits ehi.h a.e dû@ked hy Interception conibar mày slill
,o.mally be ùnàble to mor. iniot (e. g. â'Iactical Zonovoùld not â$acL ir thcir oun .ombal scgmert of thàl tum.
{.oftzrzl
l4 MARCH APA r9A4 *7A
 CuotfJ
toôk rlmo( dre sam€ amounl ol câsuâllies (plùs or Ilrrus 20 âlongn\erlincs,\lsonolethnlnv€rs glreor ):rmr.inut
pcrccnl) lhere are odl â corryle of e\ceptiorrs. such .ts delensilebcnclit,\cnulh.ri\ers$ererorallthâruseliilas
ttossbich. Nhere one side $âs roùed a1lù1le cosr 10 lhe dclensir c lirrcs 1n lhose dnls. llte Éi reâson ras lhilil
\iclor. .\gair. lhis demorsrales the imponàncc ol lhc qâs dilllcùll foran annj lo corerân entire n\erlùe j and ar
m.rJl( irn|J. r ,'n hr,,l( \\hJL' r,r',,,J,F\LrL lr\i,,pro rggr.stil e coùnander could J*a\ s gcr doùùd a dclendÈr
desrr)\ sas not so tnùch the elrenl) s ann) as lxs Nill to b] feidmg m one dircction ând crosriûg ir ddhcr.
light Vjnuall] alltheresr tso dre(lRl ililli llict losses Thc lortresses arc tle ke] lcaturc. llre) 1É\e
onbolh sid€s âlld, udess or)eis lighting ât rhe e\ùsne ru-ges coNiderable r'alùe as rccruiting. sulpl). :ùd delènsi\e
ofmodrfie odds,)o 1!ill be kling as nzùr} bsses$)our !rÛlçr. .o !rlrtrr\ J.,srll l" -rrJ rr"rr rh,;' dnFJg'.
o them. llùs c'ân rc.ùl) hdloul lhe lTussidn pl..)cr whe
tsut \rhere the differerc€ lies is iû the Discipll e Checks he is or the defensire. The rcrsor is ihât m order tor lhe
(the \I and U\l rcsulls) Il is here thal ]où hale the Coalitio an cs tordrance, tbe) !ùrsr bck.?1iù so e sort
oppo.tulrl! ro g.rn thal grexl \ icrort. BùrtLis \1i}]onlt \\'ork of supplj. or l:!cc loss 1() atlrition, drd il is lbe lbrlresses
il )ou hâre supcrior qudir) ùoots. $hichâIc thc sutpl) soùræs
tie pla) ers nmsl rùai\ c ol nftregJ in temrs of lh€
THE MAP 18lh cetiùrt. Uilit.!,a gcogrâph),li)r c\tùnpl.. Tdre lh€
inere is oûlt so ùuch iûforlllatiolr Iou cn1r place oû a hussiân frolinf ol Sllcsia Vicwcd lrcm the nodenr
gime m.rp wilhoù1 olerloâdiùg il h this case Ill1d 1(] I]crspecrrvei Silcsia $ould seem 10 be d ùndeltndable
Lou.rJLrt o.<[qnL(. $ h ( h sere ûo.r(n r(.J oùâ.Lj]r.s( salicnljrllir! into erem) lerfilory,{ edgedbÊ1$een Dohcùâ
scale since this is. i the erld. a stalegic game. lhe nost ÂndPol,ùd. Ru1ll s i s nor quile rhe liâbilit) ilappcds Tl1is
proûri eûrgeoerâphicnllèâtùreistheûiouûninchai r\hich is not lhe tNenlierh century. rlirh ils front lines The
sepamtes Iloheniâ fron Gcmân! . ,\clùàllr,I hale gorlcn làNsians do not hai e ro del eùd ereq last he\ ol the bordd
ftlher lâmiliù $ith this ràngc, since il shons ùp in â laler llre) rn, (ldelenJ onl) rh( lr) lunk*e, lkplolrneûr,\llor
S&Ig,mc I did (Aûstro-Prussian War) this scncs as a lnear. sprexd oul orer ur cDti.c lroùhcr. Inneâd. i1 is
natur.d dclinsc; bulitis rporous dclctrsc,inasmuch as thcrc ''point." lhât is, cach dm} ooupi.d onl ) one he\. Dcfense
ûc scrcml najorpasscs wlich an b. c\ploitcd i\ ùot a ùa1lcr ol holding âll ore's lerrâin Itisatnallerol
Rivcn cÙl cùùra rr offensil e if th. plalc.s properly holding keJ terrâiû: in this câse. the fortesses. \\'bilc thc
ùndcrstand rhcm S ina amres cân ùse th€m (o erlend their Coalition tnay be âble 1o deplo) ûoÉ arùies tL.irn rhc
lines ol connnùnialions,plale$ shouldconsiderâdyancing Prussiùs. giren their coûnând contol probleûrs they iliii

J A pld\et nd, tut lhte..eption 10 a11a.k an enemf ùsùaily laken to depby; iroweqr, it may co.@ct doûalies
^eno encûy foices mored rhis lu.n
occùpied her inn) Fhich caùsed b]' playc lrljrg 10 ùùrcalislicêlly us€ in<livid@l uûjls
lNoler Tâciicâlzones are NOT zonesolc@trcl, ard shoùld 1o dclal iarger fo.ces).
not bê confùsed wilh zore ol conllol rules fbm other gmesll INCREASED RECRUITING
OVERWHELM Genenl Rùlc: A pla\er mây dexlare lnc.eased Recruiting
Il a pla,ver noles âdjacehl tr
a hex in Fhich it is rcveated tlar during any Ninter Lecruitirr8 segnenl. lbis allops him ro
he has six times thè cômbat iactos ol the enemy all thsc doùble the Recruiting Mdlifle lôr thc courrics inlohed.
enemy ùnirs are elinimled inmedialelv (corsidcred io bave r. A pialtr hà) declare incrcased ltecruiting io. sone, !one,
or 311 coùntncs be conlrols.
l Oveùhelm is deteeined at the insrânt a forceenre$ a hex âA player ma,v de.lale InÙeasedRe.tuiting o!l) in the
.ônraining ene v ùnits (ûd tho$c units are flipped lrcm tbeir
tog of Far 1o open stâi$) b A plaret nnr nol dcclaro hcrcasod Recruiling in the
? The oreNhehed ùnils êp comideÈd 10 hale suftn.lered lan t4o tù!$ ol lhc game
and bæome Prisoren oiçà. :. 'fhis aptlies ùnly t Winter RecruiriDg, not to ollmap
3 The oleNhdning unih may contiùremorir8. reiiilorcenenh or olhcr reintorcemeDts.
{Thefri: o-o\ pmer'r pnrn . onroU,eah( u. .
'me4c1)
5 Fbrtilicàtions ànd ùnits irr lo.tificâtions ûay ncrer tre t. l_:ot cach coùrtry ihe player declires lÀcrcêsed
ltècruiiing, sùilr lhe Balaù.e oflrorver irdex oûe h lhe eneny s
6, Dehordizaù)r lttcc ts (lial!in8 ol.obbar sLrcngth) is tate!
inlo accolnl for oremn b. On the foltNiDg Vjntcr FecroiliDg tunr. $c country
?. olen,hèlm counls asariclory(iithere are sfiicieht.neml lEs its lècruidtrÈ \lulrrple hah'ed.
c ltlheclerL Peasantlèrolt €cls a! an) lne in lhc )cr
& If a plaJer moves adjacent 1<) â hc\ conhning ody 0' lô11ôùing the declamlior ol lncÊased Lectuiting irr a coutry,
skngthùnits and hâs at least one conbat fa.lor in his for.c. theù Lhe Rei'oltæcùrs regddlc* i1 th.re de â!y Pillaged mdkes
thenthc 0" strèn$hunibarecoù$deredoreNtrelmcd (Note: on the nap. (Comnclr this rcpcrents th! distuption lo sæie1]
thls nrle is a.tually noL hisloncall]' accuRte eiren the rihr and lhe economy frcn ûù$ nobilizatioD.
^
ftovEs l5
 HISTORICAL EVENTS TABLE
Roll 2 diccr lst die.oll x10; 2nd die Nll \1 (e.g'3 and t'' = 3t)
.I I 13. Co.lltion Infighting:This l!m. slrB'aRA(]t.oNE( I )ftom aI coalrioi \IarcI die rclls
.1.r. Coaiilion UtriryrTnis tuni, ADD ONÈ{+1) loatlCoatjtio! \ra.ch dic roth.
.15. Coâliliôn Conmander Sâ.ked: Cloêlilion side fr ùst i ûmedialely ptace any one Coâlition tcader Irr iheC@tition
Recruiting Pùt A replacenrent leader liom the same State cùlcrs pta) it at least onc is cùrcnrly àvajtable in the Rectuiting
l'@1. Th.lcader ente$ according to rulcs lor "Ilades ùndcr Reinforcemeûr ( t 5)
. 16. l)russiân Allied ComDander Sacked: 'fhc lr.ussiân -\llied sdo nùsr immediarely pla.e ant ohc lead€. jù rhe
PnssianÀllied Rcc.ujtingPool  replaceûcnl leader lrcm the same State eùtes plây itat leasr onè is cùrenly avaitabte
nr the Re.ruitirg l1d. 'rhc leader enter-\ a.cordin8k)des lor "Lrades ùi.ter Renrfo.cencrr (15).
.21. OttoùraN Atlack Anstiâ:Thc sjde controhB Aûslria nust immediare,y romore trcn p1ày 20 Aùstri&n Sps aDd
plncc thenr in the Coalition RccruihDg Pool. Il urertly have ..No
the ,\ lstnàns c less ihan 2{) Sps on rhc hàt, lrcar as E ena..
.22 Ottùnars lkck Iiù$ia:'lhc
A yidc
controu'n8Itùsia rnùst immediatety remo!e irom play 2O Rdsian Sps an.l lrtace
tlem ln thc tu cùdlt Recrulting Pool. 1l Rusia cumDrly has lcss rhan 20 SPs on the ûât or is \eùir!I, heàt âs ..No ltvenr.
. 23- tsritish Advànces in Frelch & Iûdiàn war: The side contolting France nùst tmmed'atety relDve from play I
0
SPs and pLacè theû in the ldendly Lecruiting P(nn. Il Frarce curertty hâs lcss thnn 10 Sps où the ùrap or is \eûkàl rr.ar

. 24 |r€ncb Àdrances in Norlh A neica: l he side conrrclljng Brltain nùst nnnedjaietr reûô,r
fronr ptay l0 sPs and
pla.e them in the hendlyRe.ruitiùg P61 llBnhir.lkrtlyhdlesthanl0Sl\ontbema!orisNeur€l tcâ1as..No

. 2126 Prussian l]èsdliôr: rhe Coalilion side selèch any one hex containing elemy ùnil3 où lhe map. fhe prussian
AIIièd sjde mùsl imrnediâlcly roli oùce o. the Disciplinc Table for ea.h conbat ùlil i! thc hcx. Resùlts:P no efe.r Ir=
=
Deûoralizanon D = tnit eliminsted
.31-32 ar@lilior Desenioli Thc Ptù$ian side selects atry onè hex contlining e.cmy units où the nâp. 'Ihe
^llièd
Cliralilioh side ûùsl rnmediâteiy ftrllonce on rheDis.ipli.e Table loreach conbat unil in rle !.x. Resùlts: p = no ûitecl F
= DeDroFlizatioû i D = Unit elimittated.
. 3:1 hus sian Allied Re.ruils lhe Pûssiaû !\llied side imm€diâtel) receiles ù! to 12 Recruit
foiûts rvorrh of..Recruit
conbat ùni1s and oûe leader ti)r âh) one allied Stare. pRI:SSIA \t^y \OT B! Cri iOSEN Atl rhe uriis mùst .ome trom
the tlussian Allied Recruitirg PoôI. Use shndard tlrli Placenenl" rùles tbr Recnit ùrils t5).
{
.35. C@lilion Recruits: the C@lition sde inmediately rcceires up to 12 Recruit poirrts wontr ot..Recrujr. combal ùits
ànd one ]eader lor ànl one auied shte. a tisl}ilÀ tllAt BE ctHostN. ,\lt the uni$ mùst.oee tronr tbe a-oalttion Recrujling
RDl. lhè slanda.d l,:nit l,lacenen1' rules fo. Recruit uni B ùrder Rectuihenl ( 15).
t36. PnNsia û clory: The PrussianAllred sjdc selects any one eremy coùntry EXarLpT AIISTRIA io become Neùtûl
Itthehusian fiederick leade. has tren elininared or is cùrenrly a rjnw ôrit{ris evenrhas atready beer re*ilcd orce
dùrinC a 8aftc, thcn r.eat as "NoErcnl
.:11 Poland Re\.olh: Polaùd inrnediâtct y becoùes \etrrnl, tf not alread} so.
r 42-45. No avenl
.46 \_o E\.e!t (Basic came O!rl.v)
.-5i 66. \oEvent (tssic(jame Ortv)

Advonced Gqme Evenls

.46. Lf8bns:BOTIt sid.s rùal ceate irgior units durine thc cuenrân.laI subsequenr Recruiring sègmenb.
. sl 53. |easani Rclolt SUBTR\CT ONË ( t tiom tne \rarcn die roll oi eâch
) foree that is jnside a Shte Nhich has
âny PII -LAGLD narte^ within its bo.dcs. À hex.ontairring a Bordcr.ouùrs forÀLLcounttes rcpreselted in rtre hex tor

'5:l Age of Enlighleùnenr ti theie arc c unenny no pt I_t ,AtiÈD mârk.rF anyilbèrc on the maf, cach side immediâtely
.eceiresoft Dplomacy Poinl
.55. tsdtishPùblic Opinion:'rhe side cureùttI tâvored où rhe Balancc of poùe, rndeireceiles one Dipiomacr- poinr
ll ùc lndex is 'neuLal no point ic a\larded. Ihis evènt æcu$ eren whcn Britain is neutmt.
.56 c-oflespùdcnce with volrrirc: Tbe Prusian Atlicd side imnediately Éccires onè Diploôàcy poinr if the
FÉdcrick leaderis curorrly in play
. 61 66. Diplonàli. Reyolxtioû: The side curcntlv lnyorcd on the tsâtaice
ot poBer rndcx jDmediateilj T.OSES nLL
ITS DIPLONûC]' POiNt S. Thè bn poirk arcawâded lo rhe opposing altiance, bur;rs lolâl poinh may not ercced the

lô MAr?cÈ ÂPRLL tçer *7ç

 cg,u.çç
nol be abl. to cood;nale rhcir tbces tropert,v. The end h\orstoloscalihisDiplornâricPoi rs. Thisr€flectslhc\.r
rcsult is rhat tlÉ Ptussians. h) rapid nûre l'er :ùd shârp rril (o drtroo. ôl lxth (1,,|lLr.1 p,*rrr potrrr,.
âtticks, can dcicâr an) ûurnhcrs ofiaes ".rc i
unething pla].'.s mustk.q) anelc on cir..n rbaltln, çil
IN THE EVENT oc:cur about on& $ert ycar llnd â half, il aùr lea(l ro a
t he gdre alsoincludesârurdome'cDrs chart. Ihishas frequcnt relcrsal ofibrrur€s Agâin, tbis rclkcrs lhecentrd
a.ritici impact on rh. coùrs. ot the gdùe. ,\sidc froûr fcalurc of BiJ â'rce ol Poirer polir;cs: if ) où are Nltn r: b)
aJrLr! \'ur(b.r,rn.ni ll,,\.r ir di.n.Jr,{. c.l ùer,,rnregrir( turmuch,1ourallies*'illre atigûthensclicssirh)oùrtocs
a numbcr of dill(].€lrt lûn.aiors irrlo th€ slslcn l,liù!. in order to m":ti tton rhe eqûilibriùûr
rdurr .Ih.) {<ùr. s nr, h $ortJ ,,'heru rj. t,,,!. to trJ,: couple ol notes on sorne of thc other e\cnls: rhc
'ln ^ Public Opinion evcnr is (here hccaùre B.i {,ù n. aton.
bcco accorrtcdforb] scparare rulcs ard âdd'tonal sreps in British
the s€qucùce ofpix) cù aûrotg ihc Èuropçrl towcrs, had consid€ûrbte disscDrinr
be hùdity accoùnlcd for droùgh
pùblic opidon which coùld changc thc coùrse ofsor cNùcn I
the ùsc of random c\eDts. Id e\amptc. I coùtd hale policy. The Co.r€spondcnce 11 ith Voltâire turd prussiân
inclrd.n a l)cscrriqi' scgmcnr in rhe s.rluence 01 plây.
lorcing pla)ers ro mal(c â check for polsible losscs lo his Clory erenls poinl ûp lhe intp( lânce ol lir.denck s

litres lrom û,rops Leding ld thc triils on thcir orïn. Nrso'rdit) in shâpmg rhe coursc oi Èlllopctn hi!ror).
I',.r(JJ., in, ludEil l1,s$illdrd( Jrû,r,Desedione\L1u\
^
IN SUM
lhis 11a). p1â) ers har c ro deal wilhrt oûly il hcn is rcl1cd Seven Yeâ6 Wâr !!âs
1î
ilxer ed to gire pl \ers a
Thc lnon inporiart e!e!lis Diplomatic Revolurion. difererl gaûùDg .\pei.ra \ ou 1Lù c to rcalh rhùù iù
lhis aùses ùe pl.r)cr Nhon rhc Bâlancc ot p(nler rnck ru ll3lb
tenDs of ccDhù_.\ {cncral to $ù.
^
pioneer, dnd .1 suirpllr ùlils Depjoy on an\ pru$iâq srlcaaù,
ADDITIONAT SCENARIO or sa\on Frorlrcss(es) with lhè e\ceprion ot\{nrdcn.
. Haravt Allicd: ll-atJct Fèr.dinahdi I ..\'..and I ,.1_,
ROSSBACH-I,EUTHENI
inl"nlrr l'.\"anr { ,d\"
This scenârio shows the situarion at thcbegilningotrhe second
llûovc.(iia) aqrE$(e, '. ^ l.unt,\ rL t..tt.. r. ".)
lcarof thÈwar. IÙit Frcdcri.krvonhjs greatesliàcrrcal viclorics t ,'.irriù i I iader, c-uDberlandi I c and i..V
al Rosbach (against a Fnnco,ccmàn torcc) and Leùlùen hf.nrry,
(agairNtrhc Ausrriàht
i G andI V.a!al.v, I anillrD I engirecr
GAME I.ENGTH .Ncûe ahdi:1t^r1ct Èield N1amhal, : 1 ..!.. and 1..L,
FiniTurn: Aùxrmn 1757 iùlantry l V andt l- cavitry. 1,tussian A]tie.j !i{tc deplots
I-st Tûrn: t75ti unil\ scta.arel) or toecthcr in âny i"cthcdards {\c) tortreses.
^ùtMr
DIPI-OYMCNT .Palardr 2 L irlanky, t {l andt.L,ca\âlry. analirion
sidc deploys units sepamtely or logerher n, !n]' potish (pol)
l Auied S1ùles I À ùsriâ, Frîlce. Rrssia, Sarony Flot,v Ronan
RÊINFORCEMENlS
2. lnlliat lôrces (deploy !r()
. .1dr!a l-eades ..Fictd
\Iâ^hat.: a
-Ch!des, Dauù RECRUITIN6 POOLS
Field Amy uniLs and: Suppjyùnjts Deploy ilr ânt lrslnân
Coâlilion: lll undeployed Reùu!l lnils belorging to,\ustria,
Forlres(e9itrB.hemia Nlomltr or Austriatropcr.
hance, Russiâ, Saxor),Iloty ltoma. Enpire, Slrcden.
t a/.r?.e: Laders aharles, Soùbise, .,Fictd \,1arslùl:., âll
tsieldAmy units and 2
- Itus\lân \llicd: \IunJ,nt,1,, e,c,.,ir ..r,.Nto.p Ci.
sùppl),ùùits Defloy i. anyfonress(es)
Prussli, IlanoleÉAlLed. and Brihih
u the tlôlt Rolnan FmfiÈ.
BALANCE OF POWER INDEX
' Rurriai Leâdcr .\praksnr alr tictcr amy unirs. Deploy
in any ùon loitre$ hex in poland. \1lldly Pro Pù\iaD. t,lace narkcr nr the,.,.1..box
. .ldrftl: AI1 ldts corsjd$cd etiminaled (an.t iù ilE DIPTOMACY POINTs
.Holt Rona Etupite: tsort" t _ine" clâss intanr) b.igadès l
three l-ine" class caralry brjgades. Dcplo! i!1 âil iorhe$(cs)
i! SPECIAL RUTES
lhc Ho\ Roman Èmpi.c
.,t"ed?Èl€ade.- Field Mârshat'i3"v irrtanxaân.l2
'\ .x\a.r\_retù\r.J . ... r,fa-r\ o101-r :rrr, T}IE CAMPAIGN GAME
in Sùakùrd lbnress (llt9) ii SFedjsh pom.rania. Pliycr who desire lo pl.y oùl the enii.e gane shning àl ltris

l. Allied Stâtes: Britain. llsssia.llanole. Àllied Gâme Leng.h:

2. kilid lôr.es (deploy secondl l"i8t îût: ,\ùttûti l7:1
. P/r.'r'a: leades -- Frededck, scldtitz
Zeithen, trhwâld, I-àst Tùrn: \\rinter rTril
llenrf, Freld i\,lasbal r"l ai àndar'V i1nantry,2.,c;,,ard6 ,\11 oth.r sceùano iDloftaLion idcntical b .i-lÉ tirsr
Tear''
''V calalry 3 L inianrry 2 t- caralry,3 L , arille.y, 1 ..L,. sccnari()
^ l,/
i\,lOVtS