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Originism: Ethics and extraterrestrial life

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 Originism:JBIS,
EthicsVol.
and60,
Extraterrestrial
pp.147-153, 2007
Life

ORIGINISM: ETHICS AND EXTRATERRESTRIAL LIFE

CHARLES S. COCKELL
Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK.
Email: [email protected]

How should we treat extraterrestrial life, if we ever find it, and does a different origin of life imply a different ethical status?
The most likely source of an ethical difference, or ‘originism,’ is the inability to find a coherent definition of ‘life,’ required to
assess moral relevance in the first place. Although from a normative point of view biochemical architecture, in itself, does not
provide a reason for a difference, there are numerous positions that might encourage us to treat an independent origin of life
differently to life that is related to life on Earth. For example, from an instrumental point of view it would provide an
opportunity to study another biological data point; it will be a new source of information about the evolution of life, and thus
it might be afforded special status. We might consider extraterrestrial life to be special as prudence against the possibility of its
mistreatment through an erroneous moral assessment of its worth. Whether extraterrestrial life exists of an independent origin
or not, this analysis ultimately can provide a useful device for considering how we should treat entities on Earth whose status
as ‘living’ organisms is disputed, specifically viruses.
Keywords: Originism, extraterrestrial life, bio-ethics

1. INTRODUCTION

The way in which we should treat extraterrestrial life, and the life-form, however lowly, must be more compelling if
ethical framework we would view it in, has been a matter of that life form represents a unique life form with an
previous discussion. The treatment of extraterrestrial life dif- evolutionary history and origin distinct from all other
ferently to terrestrial life, if it is ever found, has been termed manifestations of life.
‘originism’ [1]. At the heart of these discussions is the unre-
solved question of whether there is an ethical basis for treating And Lupisella, too, sees a potential difference between re-
life unrelated to life on Earth differently from life that is related lated and unrelated life [6]:
– in other words, whether there would be an acceptable basis
for an originist position to exist. If, however, that life occupies its own separate, unique
phylogenetic tree, we may find ourselves asking
An unrelated life form would arise from a situation where fundamental questions regarding its status in our world
life evolves on a planetary body in isolation from life on Earth, views.
and a related extraterrestrial life would result from the transfer
of microbe-bearing rocks from Earth to other planetary bodies These points suggest that an independent origin of life might
in asteroid and comet impact events – a possible destination either be treated better or worse than terrestrial life. Callicott’s
previously discussed being Mars [2]. observation suggests that if it is not kin, and it does not fit
within a Land Ethic, it might not command any claim to our
Traditionally, life not related to life on Earth has been seen respect. We might not even recognise this other life to fall
to be something that might be viewed very differently from life within the purview of our ethics at all.
related to us. Callicott, in examining the relevance of the Land
Ethic to extraterrestrial life, observes [3]: By contrast, as life derived from an independent origin of
life would provide opportunities for novel scientific
Extraterrestrial life forms, assuming that they were not understandings on the nature of life, then it is likely to be
of Earthly origin and inoculated somehow on some treated as something very valuable, a point explicit in Randolph
foreign body, or vice versa, would not be our kin… et al.’s comments.
Hence they would lie outside the scope of Leopold’s
land ethic. Other terms used in discussions on extraterrestrial life illus-
trate the ambiguity in where an independent origin of life would
By contrast, Hargrove suggests that [4]: sit within moral debate. The term ‘second genesis’ has been
..I suspect that the organisms would be considered more used to describe the possibility of an independent origin of life
valuable because they were not part of our system or on Mars [7]. This term is anthropocentric, as it implies that we
our history than if they were. are the first genesis; maybe we are the second genesis, if this
other origin of life occurred before the origin of life on Earth.
Similarly, Randolph et al. posit that [5]: Thus, in this case the scientific community has had a (probably
unintentional) propensity to put terrestrial life first. A better
From an ethical point of view, the need to preserve a phrase might simply be, ‘another genesis.’ The emergence of

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Charles S. Cockell

the term, ‘second genesis,’ emphasizes the need to understand never had, bearing on the moral considerability of organisms,
where an independent origin of life would fit within our ethics or arguments about where the line of moral relevance should be
and to explore in more depth the moral relevance of extraterres- drawn. Most debates on moral relevance were developed long
trial life in general. before the discovery of DNA, so one might view this pre-DNA-
discovery world to be an age of pre-DNA ethics, since debate
These previous discussions show that originism could de- occurred within the milieu of a lack of knowledge of the
rive from several potential viewpoints. It could involve the fundamental genetic structures that link all life on Earth. For all
treatment of extraterrestrial life as being inferior on account of of these early thinkers, the question of moral relevance re-
a perceived inferiority of one or several of its characteristics volved around ‘reason’, ‘suffering’ and ‘being alive.’
(such as intelligence). It could involve the treatment of Earth
life as being inferior on account of the novelty of the extrater- Since the discovery of DNA, knowledge of the fundamental
restrial life and its perceived uniqueness – a sort of interplan- genetic structure of all living organisms (including the
etary and interstellar affirmative action. And finally, it could phylogenetic tree of life) has not informed ethical debate in any
derive from the simple fact that extraterrestrial life is so differ- meaningful way. There has, apparently, been no post-1954
ent that we do not recognise it to fit within any ethical context at renaissance in ethical debate or understanding. The likely rea-
all – in this case originism is not a result of prejudice, or even of son for this is that the discovery of DNA has not brought us any
ignorance, but just a difference so extreme it is outside our closer to a coherent definition of life; and without such a
comprehension. definition, we cannot determine what being ‘alive’ means, and
thus where the beginnings of moral relevance lie.
2. THE BACKGROUND ETHICAL DEBATE
To avoid a diversion, the author does not intend to review
Throughout the history of ethics the division between organ- the numerous and lengthy attempts to define life. A more recent
isms that are morally relevant and those that are not has been review by Cleland and Chyba [14] draws attention to the fact
predicated on exactly where we draw the line in numerous that life may be a ‘non-natural kind,’ an old term used by
different concepts thought to be important for assigning moral philosophers to designate a class of objects that are bound
relevance. To dualists such as Descartes and Kant, humans are together by an artificial definition. In other words, life is any-
the only organisms worthy of moral consideration because we thing that we choose to include within our definition of ‘life.’
can ‘reason’ [8]. Other ethicists, such as Singer, Regan and By contrast, gold, for instance, is an example of a natural kind –
Bentham, draw the line between organisms that feel ‘pleasure something that has a very specific definition based on its char-
and pain’, or that can suffer, and those that do not [9]. For them, acteristics as an element [15]. Perhaps one day we will under-
many non-humans animals, such as dogs, merit moral consid- stand life sufficiently to be able to accurately quantify and
eration, but trees do not. For other ethicists, such as Taylor or define it and it would then, like gold, become a natural kind.
Goodpaster, who assert that simply being ‘alive’ is sufficient
for moral consideration, then all life forms are morally relevant If life is a non-natural kind, then biochemical architecture
[10]. would have an influence on moral relevance if the organism did
not show the characteristics of being ‘alive’ within the defini-
Common to all these ethicists is the assertion that being tion that prevailed at the time. What has this got to do with
alive is a necessary prerequisite for having any moral rel- originism? To determine whether something has moral rel-
evance. Superposed on this requirement may be the further evance, whether it is alive and whether the characteristics it
requirements of being sentient and being able to reason. This is possesses of being alive would be sufficient to grant it entry
not exclusively true. Christopher Stone, for example, has pos- into that, often exclusive, club of having intrinsic value, and not
ited legal status for abiotic objects [11]. Significantly, in the merely instrumental value, turns on our ability to define life. If
context of space exploration, Holmes Rolston has considered we cannot adequately define life, then it is likely that we cannot
abiotic extraterrestrial planetary bodies and he suggests that develop an adequate and consistent morality to encompass an
anything with formed integrity, and anything that has a proper independent origin of life. Thus, biochemical architecture is
name, deserves our respect and should be preserved [12]. The not in itself a basis for treating extraterrestrial life differently,
apparent arbitrariness of the biotic-abiotic division in ethics is but it might be the cause of it, because one of its manifestations
explored by Hunt, who argues that drawing the line of moral is to take an entity outside the definition of life. This is egre-
considerability at ‘being alive’ is as arbitrary as using gious for the other entity, because it invites the possibility of ad
‘sentientism’ or ‘reason’ as the defining quality required for hoc definitions of life to include or exclude other entities at our
moral consideration, and he suggests that simply ‘being in own discretion – allowing for the possibility of deliberate
existence’ might be sufficient [13]. originism.

One obvious approach to preventing prejudice is therefore With no other life with which to test our definitions of life,
simply to grant moral relevance to everything; however, this there is no resolution to this dilemma. There is a good chance
does not get us very far in understanding the difference be- that we would recognise other entities to be alive within our
tween the moral significance of a rock and a dog – and there current definitions of life. Callicott considers that life probably
clearly is a difference in moral significance; few people would would be conative in that it would have the characteristics of
chastise you for kicking a rock. In this paper, at least, the author conation defined by Joel Feinberg [16] (‘urges and impulses,
will consider the quality of being ‘alive,’ as being regarded, at latest tendencies, directions of growth’), and thus Callicott is in
least by the majority of ethicists, as a basic requirement for some sense expressing the view that origin would not be impor-
being morally relevant, and he will consider this to be the tant for moral relevance. If we do recognise the entities to be
criterion of greatest historical importance in asserting a claim life because they reproduce, grow, evolve and have the collec-
to moral relevance. tive attributes of life that fit within a definition, then it seems to
me that they would fall within the purview of many of the moral
The biochemical architecture of life does not have, and has debates with which we are familiar.

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 Originism: Ethics and Extraterrestrial Life

However, it is clearly not this simple. Viruses are based on last survivor, or ‘last astronaut’ of this crash will soon die. He
DNA or RNA and yet we still debate whether they are alive or or she is running out of oxygen and food. The spaceship has
not. As they are responsible for the some of the most egregious landed on a planet that has life forms, but the astronaut has not
and influential diseases in human history and we are capable, in had sufficient time to characterise the life. The astronaut does
some cases, of driving them to extinction through concerted not know whether the life is similar to life on Earth or whether
global efforts (the 1970s smallpox eradication programme be- it has a completely novel origin. Before they run out of oxygen
ing the exemplar, although it stopped short of driving smallpox they can detonate the self-destruct explosives on the spacecraft
to extinction), understanding whether their deliberate extinc- to end their life and prevent a miserable end, and it will ex-
tion is acceptable turns on our ability to apply an ethic to them. plode, taking a large number of the indigenous life forms with
Our inability to decide whether viruses are alive or not may it. Alternatively, the astronaut could decide not to detonate the
explain why thirty years after the question was first raised [17], explosives, thus sparing some of the local wildlife. If the astro-
we still have not resolved the matter of whether deliberate viral naut detonates the explosives, is this unethical?
extinction is acceptable.
Our sense that this would be unethical might derive from our
The inability to find a robust definition for life has important concern that the life forms were sentient or even rational, but
ethical implications, because it implies an inability to define what if the last astronaut had managed to get as far as showing
moral considerability. The inability to define life probably lies that the indigenous life was neither rational nor sentient; is it
at the heart of our inability to define ‘intrinsic value,’ an ethical still immoral for the last astronaut to blow up the life forms? If
term that describes the value an object or organism has, inde- the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the reason
pendent of its use to the valuer. The question of whether living for this answer might lie in our sense that the life forms have
things have intrinsic value has been one of the most pervasive their own evolutionary trajectory or future – that is it unethical
and controversial debates in environmental ethics. The debate to destroy any life that has its own ‘purpose,’ even if that
has been vigorous because its resolution defines the extent to purpose is blind response to programmed instructions.
which we should respect living things in themselves, or whether
the biosphere and its components are just a resource to be used This sense of respect has been previously called
by humans for instrumental ends. ‘teloempathy’ [22]. Teloempathy bears some similarities to
Alan Scherer’s ‘disentropic’ ethic [23], which is an attempt
Callicott believes that any value in an object must derive to define an ethic on an Aristotelian notion of teleology.
from a valuer, although he suggests that things can still be Scherer bases his ethic on a thermodynamic definition of
valued for themselves, and not merely for their practical uses to life, which has been questioned by Dan McArthur and Idil
people, leading to his notion of ‘truncated’ intrinsic value [18]. Boran because they disagree with the idea that life attempts
Rolston, on the other hand, has, for a long time, defended to ‘oppose’ entropy [24]. Nevertheless, ‘disentropy’ and
intrinsic value as an objective quality of an object, quite inde- ‘teloempathy’ are both attempts to capture the idea of an
pendent of a valuer, something that derives from its very being ethic using the minimum characteristics of an entity that
[19]. It is suspected that the disagreement over the nature of define it as living to give it moral relevance.
intrinsic value lies in our inability to define ‘life,’ a necessary
precondition to really understand what ‘intrinsic value’ means The last astronaut thought experiment shows how this posi-
in terms of being alive, and what property of life might be tion is still predicated on the ability to define something as
examined to understand whether intrinsic value is a subjective ‘life.’ A coherent and consistent definition of life has proven, at
or objective property. This is implied by Rolston’s comments least so far, to be an insuperable problem. Unless such a defini-
[20]: tion is forthcoming, then the fate of extraterrestrial life depends
on its luck in fitting within our definition of life. If it does not,
Natural selection picks out whatever traits an organism for whatever biochemical reason, match our definition of life, it
has that are valuable to it, relative to its survival. When will find itself at the receiving end of a most pernicious form of
natural selection has been at work gathering these traits prejudice – an orginism resulting from a failure to fit within a
into an organism, that organism is able to value on the definition that lies at the heart of our deliberations concerning
basis of those traits. It is a valuing organism, even if the moral relevance.
organism is not a sentient valuer, much less vertebrate,
much less a human evaluator…..Dissociating the idea 3. SCIENTIFIC VALUE OF
of value from natural selection is difficult. EXTRATERRESTRIAL LIFE

This point of view is not one with which all environmental Although there appears to be no normative basis for deliberate
ethicists, let alone biologists, would agree given the nebulous originism (although reasons have already been discussed as to
nature of the term ‘value’ in a biological context, but it shows why it might manifest itself), there are instrumental and opera-
explicitly that the notion of intrinsic value in nature has previ- tive reasons to invoke an originist view of extraterrestrial life.
ously been inextricably linked to problems in defining the From the point of view of its instrumental value (here ‘instru-
nature of life and the characteristics of organisms that give mental’ is taken to mean an opportunity to advance our under-
them value. In this case, Rolston hangs intrinsic value on the standing of the natural world, not as a resource to be destroyed
property that life has of being subject to the process of natural for some industrial application), extraterrestrial life forms of an
selection. independent origin would offer profound scientific insights
into the origin of life. The chemical reactions responsible for
A simple modification of Val Routley’s well-known ‘last the origin of life on Earth are not understood. Some of the
man’ thought experiment [21] can be used to investigate our potential pathways that led to the first nucleic acids, sugars and
sense of the intrinsic value of life, independent of its origin, and amino acids have been investigated [25], but our understanding
to illustrate the pervasive problem of the definition of life. of these processes would be greatly improved by another
Consider a spaceship that has crashed on another planet and the lifeform.

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Charles S. Cockell

If an independent origin of life was similar to the origin of otherwise. In other words, prior to a proper understanding of how
life on Earth, it would provide a permutation on the origins of extraterrestrial life fits into our existing ethical frameworks, we
life that would reveal information about the stringency of the assume that they possess the attributes that give them the highest
pathways required for the origin of life. A lifeform with a moral relevance in any ethical code available. This position mini-
completely novel biochemical architecture would reveal infor- mises damage to extraterrestrial life, and it minimises the chances
mation about the many possibilities for the origin of life and of mistakes in the treatment of life. Most importantly, it allows us
how different prebiotic chemistries can converge to develop to indefinitely treat any living thing with respect (it may be that we
into a self-replicating system. In either case, this other life never manage to resolve whether they are ‘sentient’, a problem
would have enormous instrumental value and might be consid- that even afflicts our assessment of many lifeforms on Earth and
ered to be more valuable scientifically than terrestrial life, thus their position in our ethics.)
which would have been comparatively highly studied.
Within this position is a form of originism – in that we are
This instrumental view of the value of an independent origin according special status to extraterrestrial life just because it is
of life might lie at the heart of comments from previous writers different. However, in this case it is a not a systemic prejudice
that assert a potentially higher value for life unrelated to life on borne of a flawed ethic, but rather a pragmatic approach to
Earth, and it would provide a reason for treating extraterrestrial minimise the chances of the mistreatment of extraterrestrial
life as being more special than terrestrial life, from the scien- life. The originism might be temporary, in that once we under-
tific perspective. stand the new life better we might be able to place it into an
ethical code.
4. PRAGMATIC ORIGINISM
‘An assumption of highest moral relevance’ is Kantian in its
Independently of its scientific value, we might consider originism establishment of a rule or principle concerning extraterrestrial
to be a wise position to take with extraterrestrial life, if we have life. This can be regarded as reflecting a more fundamental
recognised it to be life in the first place. A life form of inde- ethical problem. Lack of knowledge of extraterrestrial life, its
pendent origin could exhibit characteristics that are not familiar character and behaviours, frustrates any ability to make a ro-
to us. Its biochemical architecture and its behaviours may be so bust moral calculation on how to behave toward extraterrestrial
novel that they do not fit within any previously understood life, which is required for a utilitarian ethic. If extraterrestrial
formal definitions of ‘conations’ or ‘sentience,’ or at least their life was discovered and its nature could be completely under-
behaviours might require research to determine the extent to stood, then a consequentialist approach to dealing with this life
which they are aware of the things happening around them. would become realistic since the consequences of various moral
actions could be calculated and the best course of treatment
This argument bears similarities to the arguments about the could be evaluated. In this sense Kantian ethics is suited to
difficulty in defining ‘life,’ but it extends the problem to our extraterrestrial life – it puts in place a principle to follow that
difficulty in defining the other previous benchmarks of moral minimises the chance of mistreatment in lieu of an understand-
relevance, including ‘sentientism,’ ‘reason,’ and any other ing of that life that allows for a moral calculation to be made on
etymologically diffuse terms that lack a robust biological under- the consequences of our actions.
pinning. These terms, furthermore, make fundamental assump-
tions about the nature of the evolutionary process on Earth and its When applied to viruses this position may seem to imply
universal application. As Kenneth Goodpaster notes [26]: that we may not destroy them. However, in their specific case
we have established that they do not feel pleasure or pain and
Nor is it absurd to imagine that evolution might have they are not able to reason, despite the fact that we cannot
resulted (indeed might still result?) in beings whose decide whether they are 'alive'. In view of this understanding
capacities to maintain, protect, and advance their lives and their importance in causing death to large numbers of
did not depend on mechanisms of pain and pleasure at humans it seems reasonable that we have sufficient knowledge
all. not to need to grant them 'highest moral relevance', but rather to
act to control their (sometimes) destructive influence on human
In such a case, the lack of a capacity to feel pleasure and society.
pain has the potential to put an otherwise reasoning being
outside the ambit of any moral position of utilitarianism. Imag- 5. SPECIESISM
ine a hypothetical situation, far in the future, where we find
some plant-like forms on an extrasolar planet. They appear At least from a practical, operative, position we might even
sessile and exhibit all the qualities of plants on Earth. We argue that originism is not merely prudential, but a moral
imagine them to have moral relevance, but they do not appear obligation. The term ‘speciesism,’ coined by Ryder [27] and
sentient, so we kill many of them to make way for a research brought to public attention by Singer [28], denotes the idea of
station, just as we might with plants on Earth. Later, we dis- the prejudicial treatment of life because it is of a different
cover we have killed a population of intelligent organisms. species. The term has been widely adopted by the animal
They just happen to work on time scales far longer than us and liberation movement, because Singer was interpreted by this
they do not feel pleasure and pain in our conventional sense of community to have made the case that speciesism is simply the
these words. We have, essentially, murdered them. Utilitarian- next tier beyond racism – the next level of prejudice to be
ism is a most unpleasant philosophy for a rational extraterres- confronted and removed (in fact Singer called for equal consid-
trial that does not feel pleasure and pain in the way in which we eration; he never claimed equal moral significance for all
understand these terms. animals, something we would posit for all human beings). But
as has been pointed out so many times, the analogue between
To avoid such a situation we might take ‘an assumption of racism and speciesism is specious anyway. There is no basis to
highest moral relevance.’ Within the purview of this axiom we treat humans differently from one another because of their race.
assume that life forms are intelligent and sentient, until proven There is no empirical evidence, for example, that one national-

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 Originism: Ethics and Extraterrestrial Life

ity is less intelligent than another, although there have been bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried
many execrable attempts in human history to prove otherwise. females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred
By contrast, to not recognise species differences would in itself duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to
be prejudicial against the individuals that comprise the species, kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of
because there clearly are very big differences between species, interfering.
from their physiological to social needs. To treat an elephant
like a microorganism would be most egregious for the elephant. Similarly, Michael Ruse considers the hypothetical case of
Mary Midgley describes the idea of the treatment of all species an extraterrestrial intelligence for whom rape was acceptable
as being the same as a ‘supercilious insult’ [29]. [31]. Being evolved from a species where the females come
into heat at one particular time of year and males develop an
Perhaps the same argument would, a fortiori, apply to an uncontrollable urge to copulate, rape in this advanced civiliza-
alien species. Perhaps to treat all extraterrestrial life like terres- tion would be considered quite normal.
trial life would be an insult to the obvious differences in physi-
ological needs and, in the case of intelligent organisms, emo- Darwin examined the evolution of morals and formulated a
tional (or their equivalent) needs. Originism would, like theorem for how they evolved, based on natural selection. He
speciesism, not result from a flawed prejudice, but to the con- argues, for example, that a sense of kinship towards one’s
trary, it would result from the recognition of the differences nearest family members increases their chance of survival.
between terrestrial life and this ‘other’ life, and the importance Individuals lacking this moral sense will not care for their
of understanding those differences. family and offspring, and their offspring will have a greater
chance of being killed. From this point of view, assuming that
But this does not change the position that biochemical archi- natural selection and its processes are universal (organisms are
tecture, in itself, is not a basis for the different treatment of selected out that do not survive the environmental conditions at
other life, although the practical effects of this biochemical hand) one might argue that certain aspects of morality (e.g.,
architecture (its “genetic code” and the manner in which it kinship) would also be universal. But as the hive-bees demon-
evolved) may well lead to practical differences in physiology strate, the behavioural results of this need not necessarily be
and behaviour that demand that we treat it differently. As we universally the same. The vast diversity of interactions that
may find these differences obvious, but nevertheless difficult to occur in the natural world on Earth, both within and between
understand at first, it helps to return to the point about ‘an species, whose moral implications are very different from the
assumption of highest moral relevance’ as the means to deal morals with which we are familiar amongst humans, suggests
with these differences and operatively to recognise that originism that extraterrestrial intelligences are more likely to have ethics
has valuable use as a position of prudence. Thus, like speciesism, that are very different from ours than ones that are similar.
orginism has a valid basis, but it would not provide a justifica-
tion to systematically treat alien life better or worse than terres- Human moral norms become entrenched within a society.
trial life just because it is different. Human moral norms vary widely both geographically and tem-
porally. The sight of a woman on a nudist beach to a English
6. MORALITY AND ORIGINISM Victorian woman who considered it improper to show even her
knees would probably have caused revulsion. So clearly, even
Although it has been argued that there is no ethical basis for within a single intelligent species, there is great potential diver-
orginism (at least there is no basis to be originist because of sity of moral benchmarks. What is the chance that an alien
biochemical architecture alone), it would express itself in quite species would have exactly the same moral norms as the society
powerful ways following contact with extraterrestrial intelli- on Earth that first makes contact with it, and at that particular
gences, if they exist. point in history?

There is a perception that interaction with an extraterrestrial It is a characteristic of human civilization that other humans
intelligence would involve the coming together of rational that do not share our moral norms often have been considered
creatures that will learn a great deal from each other and share inferior or derisory, particularly when those moral norms appear to
knowledge about the Universe. Perhaps our view of contact us to be ‘obviously’ wrong. British society will not accept random
with extraterrestrial intelligence (considering the earlier point street rape to be acceptable, under any circumstances. So what
about the difficulty of defining sentientism and reason) is based happens when such a society meets Ruse’s extraterrestrial intelli-
on idealism among people who wish to believe that any contact gence for whom rape is quite normal? Will we shrug it off as an
would occur at a high level of mutual respect and communica- interesting alternative lifestyle or consider it to be wrong? In all
tion. Any creature that has the technology to communicate with likelihood it will offend us, regardless of the fact that it may have
another intelligence would surely know enough about the Uni- an objective sociobiological explanation behind it. Many indi-
verse to have a highly developed sense of respect for another viduals might regard these aliens as being morally flawed and
form of life, as they would recognise us to be the remarkable therefore, probably, morally inferior. We will probably go about
product of organic (or whatever) evolution, like them? trying to ‘civilise’ them.

However, it has been recognised previously that an equally Laurence Thomas has referred to this problem as one of
likely outcome is that we will share little in common with them ‘moral uptake’ and states [32]:
on an ethical level, even if we did find a means to communicate
coherently with them. If all moral behaviour is bounded, then a problem arises
when two groups of rational creatures, which differ
Charles Darwin, in the Descent of Man, observed that [30]: markedly from one another with respect to either their
emotional or anatomical structure, encounter one
If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were another. It arises precisely because these differences
reared under precisely the same conditions as hive- will present insuperable problems…’

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Charles S. Cockell

Differences in ethical norms would likely also be com- ligence that evolved from Darwin’s hive-bee-like society, where
pounded by differences in behavioural traits and ways of com- the females murder their brothers. They do not try to impose
municating. Mary Midgley, in an essay in which she frequently their morals on us, and nor do we impose our morals on them.
uses extraterrestrial allegories to examine the problem of But there now appears a new group of male individuals amongst
‘speciesism,’ rhetorically asks of the super-intelligent extrater- the aliens who think that the ‘right to life’ is a good idea and
restrials, the Quongs [29]: they no longer wish to be killed. They argue that the moral
benchmark of humans is correct and it is timely for alien
The virtuous and superintelligent Quongs are offering to society to become more enlightened. They set about establish-
adopt human babies. Shall we let them? What do we ing societies to promulgate their right to life. Suddenly, we are
need to know first? The first thing, I should guess, a threat to the extraterrestrials; we have become an indirect
concerns emotional communication. Do the Quongs smile threat because our ideas on the value of life are infiltrating into
and laugh? Do they understand smiles and laughter? Do their society by example.
they cry or understand crying? Do they ever lose their
temper?... Then - what about play? Do they play with No matter how developed our ideals on non-interference,
their young at all? If so, how?...Without going any further, the prejudice of originism would likely be impossible to pre-
it seems clear that, unless they are the usual cheap vent. In essence, although we would try initially to accept each
substitute for alien beings which appears in films – that others morals, the cross-transfer of ideas and norms, and par-
is, more or less people in make-up – we shall find that ticularly the cross-transfer of normative ethics that are in con-
the answers to many of these questions give us some flict with sociobiological realities, would cause conflict.
reason to refuse their offer completely, even if reluctantly.
There would be no obvious moral solution, but the point is
Later, in a somewhat more direct way, she observes [29]: that no matter how good our intentions of contact with extrater-
Baboons, presumably, do not ask themselves whether restrial intelligence would be, originism would be a pervasive
the baboons of a strange invading band are really proper problem, made more acute by the certainty of profound differ-
baboons at all, but people can ask this question, and ences in our behaviour, and our ethical and moral systems of
can answer it with a no. conduct. They, and we, might prefer, following detection, to
politely decline contact.
Similarly Scherer asks us to [23]:
7. CONCLUSIONS
Imagine a human being meeting an intelligent, self-
reflective creature which had led an absolutely hermitic These ethical discussions might appear indulgent, in that at the
existence. What might be the basis of this creature’s self- time of writing we have not discovered extraterrestrial life.
respect? What maxims of human moral codes should a However, the ethics of dealing with extraterrestrial life shed
human being introduce, or refrain from introducing, to important light on our treatment of life on Earth, and contribute
such a creature? to several important points of discussion in ethics in general.
Thus, it is, at the very least, a useful device for understanding
The possibilities for ethical incompatibility with extraterres- ethics on Earth. Some of the points relevant to terrestrial ethics
trial intelligence are vast. How would we cope with it? One that this discussion on originism sheds light on are:
approach would be to train ourselves to accept any moral
norms held by another intelligent species and to understand that i. The foundations of moral considerability rely on a definition
those moral norms have a biological and/or historical basis that of ‘life.’ Without a coherent definition of life, there can be
we must simply learn to accept, no matter how repulsive we no coherent ethic for dealing with all living things. The
may consider them to be. This ideal, of course, works provided discussion is circular, because if something lies outside the
they do not try to impose their morals on us and vice versa. prevailing definition of life, then it is not used, as a matter
of definition, to expand the envelope of moral consideration.
However, the likelihood that we can develop this outlook on The problem is not merely one of academic interest – it has
our extraterrestrial contacts is not given hope by our historical direct practical implications, for instance, for the ethics we
experiences on Earth. Why are humans easily offended by apply to viruses, which have notoriously been a point of
those who do not conform to their moral norms? Probably it is discussion about whether they are alive or not [34]. Without
because moral norms form such a fundamental part of our way a coherent definition of ‘life,’ we are left in a position of
of ordering and rationalizing our lives, both as individuals and being unable to determine the moral considerability of this
as a society. Perpetually fearing that the ethical edifice will important branch of biological entities, which are responsible
come crashing down if moral norms are dismantled, leading to for many influential diseases. The ethically problematic
anarchy and social instability, there are immensely powerful decision of whether to attempt to take the smallpox virus to
incentives to maintain the status quo. extinction [17] depends on the value of viruses within
environmental ethics, and, a posteriori, on the definition of
This characteristic of human society is beautifully examined life.
by Albert Camus in his extraordinary book, The Stranger [33], ii. The discussion brings us closer to an understanding of
which explores the fate of a human being caught up in a the nature of ‘intrinsic value,’ a ubiquitous point of
situation in which his moral norms do not fit what is considered discussion in environmental ethics. Do lifeforms have a
‘normal’ (here ‘normal’ meaning ‘average,’ or ‘typical,’ not value in themselves independent of a valuer? By
‘normative’). The Stranger is not immoral or even just amoral, considering the importance of the definition of life within
he is just different, and he is eventually guillotined for a murder ethical debate and our inability to define the quality of
in which he seems to have inadvertently drifted. being ‘alive,’ we start to arrive at a more fundamental
understanding of the locus of intrinsic value and whether
Consider, for example, contact with an extraterrestrial intel- it is a property of valuers, or something actually manifest

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 Originism: Ethics and Extraterrestrial Life

in the living thing itself. The problem of defining ‘intrinsic erroneously assigning it lower moral relevance than it
value’ may itself rest in our ability to define ‘life’. If deserves, or maybe none at all. However, such a
‘life’ is a non-natural kind – a mere semantic construction position applies to any ambiguity about life on Earth.
– then it is likely that so too is intrinsic value. If such a position had been consistently taken, for
example, by explorers towards indigenous peoples
iii. The inability to define ‘life,’ ‘sentientism’ and ‘reason’ and animals in past centuries, then perhaps much
cautions us to take a position of ‘highest moral barbarity, and extinction of non-human life, would
relevance’ with extraterrestrial life to avoid have been prevented.

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(Received 12 February 2007)

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