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Topics
By Aristotle

Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge

----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK I

Part 1

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall

be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about
every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing
up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First,
then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in
order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our
search in the treatise before us.

Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down,

something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a)
It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning
starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them
has originally come through premisses which are primary and true:
(b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons
from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary'
which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves:
for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to
ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first
principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand,
those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every
one or by the majority or by the philosophers-i.e. by all, or by the
majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again (c),
reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to
be generally accepted, but are not really such, or again if it merely
seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted.
For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually
is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally
accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the
case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of
the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to
persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious
reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called 'reasoning'
as well, but the other should be called 'contentious reasoning', but
not 'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but does not really do
so. Further (d), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there
are the mis-reasonings that start from the premisses peculiar to the
special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry
and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ
from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure
reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally
accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not
assume opinions that are received either by every one or by the majority
or by philosophers-that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most
illustrious of them-but he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions
which, though appropriate to the science in question, are not true;
for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the semicircles
wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not
be drawn.

The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning.
In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and
to those which we shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount
of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose
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to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe
them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view
of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them
in some sort of way.

Part 2

Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for
what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three-intellectual
training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That
it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession
of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue about the
subject proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful
because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people,
we shall meet them on the ground not of other people's convictions
but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they
appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical
sciences it is useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties
on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth
and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use
in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several
sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles
proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles
are the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally
held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and
this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for
dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles
of all inquiries.

Part 3

We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we are

in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and
medicine and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that
which we choose with the materials that are available. For it is not
every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the
doctor to heal; still, if he omits none of the available means, we
shall say that his grasp of the science is adequate.

Part 4

First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now if
we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many, and what kind of,
things arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and
(h) how we are to become well supplied with these, we should have
sufficiently won our goal. Now the materials with which arguments
start are equal in number, and are identical, with the subjects on
which reasonings take place. For arguments start with 'propositions',
while the subjects on which reasonings take place are 'problems'.
Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or
a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too, applying as
it does to a class (or genus), should be ranked together with the
genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything part signifies
its essence, while part does not, let us divide the 'peculiar' into
both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence
a 'definition', while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology
which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as
a 'property'. What we have said, then, makes it clear that according
to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told,
namely either property or definition or genus or accident. Do not
let any one suppose us to mean that each of these enunciated by itself
constitutes a proposition or problem, but only that it is from these
that both problems and propositions are formed. The difference between
a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn of the phrase.
For if it be put in this way, "'An animal that walks on two feet"
is the definition of man, is it not?' or '"Animal" is the genus of
man, is it not?' the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an
animal that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' [or 'Is
"animal" his genus or no?'] the result is a problem. Similarly too

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in other cases. Naturally, then, problems and propositions are equal
in number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem if
you change the turn of the phrase.

Part 5

We must now say what are 'definition', 'property', 'genus', and 'accident'.
A 'definition' is a phrase signifying a thing's essence. It is rendered
in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term, or of a phrase in
lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the
meaning of a phrase as well. People whose rendering consists of a
term only, try it as they may, clearly do not render the definition
of the thing in question, because a definition is always a phrase
of a certain kind. One may, however, use the word 'definitory' also
of such a remark as 'The "becoming" is "beautiful"', and likewise
also of the question, 'Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?',
for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with questions
of sameness and difference. In a word we may call 'definitory' everything
that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions; and that
all the above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear on
the face of them. For if we are able to argue that two things are
the same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn
of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for
when we have shown that they are not the same we shall have demolished
the definition. Observe, please, that the converse of this last statement
does not hold: for to show that they are the same is not enough to
establish a definition. To show, however, that they are not the same
is enough of itself to overthrow it.

A 'property' is a predicate which does not indicate the essence of

a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly
of it. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar:
for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if
he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything
a 'property' which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. 'sleep'
in the case of man, even though at a certain time it may happen to
belong to him alone. That is to say, if any such thing were actually
to be called a property, it will be called not a 'property' absolutely,
but a 'temporary' or a 'relative' property: for 'being on the right
hand side' is a temporary property, while 'two-footed' is in point
of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations; e.g. it is a
property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing which
may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of A
is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is
asleep it is a man.

A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number

of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates
in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate
to mention in reply to the question, 'What is the object before you?';
as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is
appropriate to say 'He is an animal'. The question, 'Is one thing
in the same genus as another or in a different one?' is also a 'generic'
question; for a question of that kind as well falls under the same
branch of inquiry as the genus: for having argued that 'animal' is
the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that
they are in the same genus; whereas if we show that it is the genus
of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that these things
are not in the same genus.

An 'accident' is (i) something which, though it is none of the foregoing-i.e.

neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs to the
thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong to
any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may
belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 'whiteness',
for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white,
and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second
is the better: for if he adopts the first, any one is bound, if he
is to understand it, to know already what 'definition' and 'genus'

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and 'property' are, whereas the second is sufficient of itself to
tell us the essential meaning of the term in question. To Accident
are to be attached also all comparisons of things together, when expressed
in language that is drawn in any kind of way from what happens (accidit)
to be true of them; such as, for example, the question, 'Is the honourable
or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is the life of virtue or the life
of self-indulgence the pleasanter?', and any other problem which may
happen to be phrased in terms like these. For in all such cases the
question is 'to which of the two does the predicate in question happen
(accidit) to belong more closely?' It is clear on the face of it that
there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a temporary
or relative property. Thus the sitting posture is an accident, but
will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting,
while if he be not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively
to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent
an accident from becoming both a relative and a temporary property;
but a property absolutely it will never be.

Part 6

We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of

a 'property' and 'genus' and 'accident' will be applicable to 'definitions'
as well. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails
to belong only to the term defined, as we do also in the case of a
property, or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the
true genus, or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used
does not belong, as would be remarked also in the case of an accident,
we shall have demolished the definition; so that, to use the phrase
previously employed,' all the points we have enumerated might in a
certain sense be called 'definitory'. But we must not on this account
expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally
to them all: for this is not an easy thing to find, and, even were
one found, it would be very obscure indeed, and of little service
for the treatise before us. Rather, a special plan of inquiry must
be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished, and then,
starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case, it will
probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us.
So then, as was said before,' we must outline a division of our subject,
and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch
to which it most naturally belongs, speaking of them as 'definitory'
and 'generic' questions. The questions I mean have practically been
already assigned to their several branches.

Part 7

First of all we must define the number of senses borne by the term
'Sameness'. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly
speaking, into three divisions. We generally apply the term numerically
or specifically or generically-numerically in cases where there is
more than one name but only one thing, e.g. 'doublet' and 'cloak';
specifically, where there is more than one thing, but they present
no differences in respect of their species, as one man and another,
or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the
same species are said to be 'specifically the same'. Similarly, too,
those things are called generically the same which fall under the
same genus, such as a horse and a man. It might appear that the sense
in which water from the same spring is called 'the same water' is
somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: but really
such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the
things that in one way or another are called 'the same' in view of
unity of species. For all such things seem to be of one family and
to resemble one another. For the reaon why all water is said to be
specifically the same as all other water is because of a certain likeness
it bears to it, and the only difference in the case of water drawn
from the same spring is this, that the likeness is more emphatic:
that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way
or another are called 'the same' in view of unity of species. It is
generally supposed that the term 'the same' is most used in a sense
agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically one. But

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even so, it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense; its most
literal and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered
in reference to an alternative name or definition, as when a cloak
is said to be the same as a doublet, or an animal that walks on two
feet is said to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is
rendered in reference to a property, as when what can acquire knowledge
is called the same as a man, and what naturally travels upward the
same as fire: while a third use is found when it is rendered in reference
to some term drawn from Accident, as when the creature who is sitting,
or who is musical, is called the same as Socrates. For all these uses
mean to signify numerical unity. That what I have just said is true
may be best seen where one form of appellation is substituted for
another. For often when we give the order to call one of the people
who are sitting down, indicating him by name, we change our description,
whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not to understand
us; he will, we think, understand better from some accidental feature;
so we bid him call to us 'the man who is sitting' or 'who is conversing
over there'-clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same
object by its name and by its accident.

Part 8

Of 'sameness' then, as has been said,' three senses are to be distinguished.

Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those
out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed, is
by induction: for if any one were to survey propositions and problems
one by one, it would be seen that each was formed either from the
definition of something or from its property or from its genus or
from its accident. Another way to confirm it is through reasoning.
For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible
with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its
definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the
definition; if not, it is a property: for this was what a property
is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify the
essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of
the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the
definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms, then it
will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists
of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it be not one of those terms,
clearly it would be an accident, for accident was said' to be what
belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition
or its genus or a property.

Part 9

Next, then, we must distinguish between the classes of predicates

in which the four orders in question are found. These are ten in number:
Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State,
Activity, Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition
of anything will always be in one of these categories: for all the
propositions found through these signify either something's essence
or its quality or quantity or some one of the other types of predicate.
It is clear, too, on the face of it that the man who signifies something's
essence signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes
some one of the other types of predicate. For when man is set before
him and he says that what is set there is 'a man' or 'an animal',
he states its essence and signifies a substance; but when a white
colour is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'white'
or is 'a colour', he states its essence and signifies a quality. Likewise,
also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that
what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit, he will be describing
its essence and signifying a quantity. Likewise, also, in the other
cases: for each of these kinds of predicate, if either it be asserted
of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, signifies an essence: if,
on the other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,
it does not signify an essence, but a quantity or a quality or one
of the other kinds of predicate. Such, then, and so many, are the
subjects on which arguments take place, and the materials with which
they start. How we are to acquire them, and by what means we are to

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become well supplied with them, falls next to be told.

Part 10

First, then, a definition must be given of a 'dialectical proposition'

and a 'dialectical problem'. For it is not every proposition nor yet
every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in
his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor yet
make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people:
for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would
assent. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something
that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e.
either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these, provided
it be not contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably
assent to the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary to the
opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views
which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict
the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted,
and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts.
Thus, supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries
is the same, it might probably pass for a general opinion also that
the perception of contraries is the same: also, supposing it to be
a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar,
it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science
of flute-playing as well, whereas, if it be a general opinion that
there is more than one science of grammar, it might pass for a general
opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well:
for all these seem to be alike and akin. Likewise, also, propositions
contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general
opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good
to one's friends, it will also be a general opinion that one ought
not to do them harm. Here, that one ought to do harm to one's friends
is contrary to the general view, and that one ought not to do them
harm is the contradictory of that contrary. Likewise also, if one
ought to do good to one's friends, one ought not to do good to one's
enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the
general view; the contrary being that one ought to do good to one's
enemies. Likewise, also, in other cases. Also, on comparison, it will
look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to
the contrary subject: e.g. if one ought to do good to one's friends,
one ought also to do evil to one's enemies. it might appear also as
if doing good to one's friends were a contrary to doing evil to one's
enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will
be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries. Clearly
also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical
propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by
those who have made a study of these things, e.g. on a question of
medicine they will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry
with the geometrician; and likewise also in other cases.

Part 11

A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either

to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either
by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem.
It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion
either way, or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers,
or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves.
For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance,
e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful
to know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe
is eternal or not: others, again, are not useful in and by themselves
for either of these purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such
problems; for there are many things which we do not wish to know in
and by themselves, but for the sake of other things, in order that
through them we may come to know something else. Problems also include
questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then
being whether so-and so is so or not, there being convincing arguments
for both views); others also in regard to which we have no argument

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because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons,
e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into
questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire.

Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid. A

'thesis' is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts
with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible,
as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are
in motion; or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice
when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men's usual opinions
would be silly. Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned
theory contrary to men's usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained
by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come
to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian 'is' so without
ever having 'come to be' so, or being so eternally. For even if a
man does not accept this view, he might do so on the ground that it
is reasonable.

Now a 'thesis' also is a problem, though a problem is not always a

thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion
about them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem,
is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that
either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis,
or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves, seeing
that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion.
Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called 'theses'.
But it should make no difference whichever description is used; for
our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology,
but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them.

Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only
one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment
or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought
to honour the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment,
while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need
perception. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere
of demonstration, nor yet be too far removed from it: for the former
cases admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too
great for the art of the trainer.

Part 12

Having drawn these definitions, we must distinguish how many species

there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction,
on the other Reasoning. Now what reasoning is has been said before:
induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g. the argument
that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise
the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best
at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear:
it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable
generally to the mass of men, though reasoning is more forcible and
effective against contradictious people.

Part 13

The classes, then, of things about which, and of things out of which,
arguments are constructed, are to be distinguished in the way we have
said before. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with
reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions; (2) the power
to distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used; (3)
the discovery of the differences of things; (4) the investigation
of likeness. The last three, as well, are in a certain sense propositions:
for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of
them, e.g. (1) 'The desirable may mean either the honourable or the
pleasant or the expedient'; and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge
in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost,
while the former cannot'; and (3) The relation of the healthy to health
is like that of the vigorous to vigour'. The first proposition depends
upon the use of one term in several senses, the second upon the differences

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of things, the third upon their likenesses.

Part 14

Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding

to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition:
thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most
men or by the philosophers, i.e. by all, or most, or the most notable
of them; or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held;
and, again, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. We
must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary
to those that seem to be generally held, as was laid down before.
It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions
that actually are accepted, but also those that are like these, e.g.
'The perception of contraries is the same'-the knowledge of them being
so-and 'we see by admission of something into ourselves, not by an
emission'; for so it is, too, in the case of the other senses; for
in hearing we admit something into ourselves; we do not emit; and
we taste in the same way. Likewise also in the other cases. Moreover,
all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases, should
be taken as a principle or accepted position; for they are posited
by those who do not also see what exception there may be. We should
select also from the written handbooks of argument, and should draw
up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject, putting
them down under separate headings, e.g. 'On Good', or 'On Life'-and
that 'On Good' should deal with every form of good, beginning with
the category of essence. In the margin, too, one should indicate also
the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. 'Empedocles said that the
elements of bodies were four': for any one might assent to the saying
of some generally accepted authority.

Of propositions and problems there are-to comprehend the matter in

outline-three divisions: for some are ethical propositions, some are
on natural philosophy, while some are logical. Propositions such as
the following are ethical, e.g. 'Ought one rather to obey one's parents
or the laws, if they disagree?'; such as this are logical, e.g. 'Is
the knowledge of opposites the same or not?'; while such as this are
on natural philosophy, e.g. 'Is the universe eternal or not?' Likewise
also with problems. The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition
is not easily rendered in a definition, but we have to try to recognize
each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction,
examining them in the light of the illustrations given above.

For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according

to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion.
All propositions should be taken in their most universal form; then,
the one should be made into many. E.g. 'The knowledge of opposites
is the same'; next, 'The knowledge of contraries is the same', and
that 'of relative terms'. In the same way these two should again be
divided, as long as division is possible, e.g. the knowledge of 'good
and evil', of 'white and black', or 'cold and hot'. Likewise also
in other cases.

Part 15

On the formation, then, of propositions, the above remarks are enough.

As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat
of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try to
render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely say that justice
and courage are called 'good' in one sense, and that what conduces
to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another, but
also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic
quality they themselves have, the latter because they are productive
of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves.
Similarly also in other cases.

Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only, may

be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary
bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be

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one of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at
once displayed even in the names; e.g. the contrary of 'sharp' in
the case of a note is 'flat', while in the case of a solid edge it
is 'dull'. Clearly, then, the contrary of 'sharp' bears several meanings,
and if so, also does 'sharp'; for corresponding to each of the former
terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. For 'sharp' will
not be the same when contrary to 'dull' and to 'flat', though 'sharp'
is the contrary of each. Again Barhu ('flat', 'heavy') in the case
of a note has 'sharp' as its contrary, but in the case of a solid
mass 'light', so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings, inasmuch
as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, 'fine' as applied
to a picture has 'ugly' as its contrary, but, as applied to a house,
'ramshackle'; so that 'fine' is an ambiguous term.

In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used,

but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious:
e.g. in the case of 'clear' and 'obscure': for sound is called 'clear'
and 'obscure', just as 'colour' is too. As regards the names, then,
there is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings
is at once obvious: for colour is not called 'clear' in a like sense
to sound. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that
are the same in kind we have the same sensation, whereas we do not
judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of
colour, but in the latter case we judge by sight, in the former by
hearing. Likewise also with 'sharp' and 'dull' in regard to flavours
and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch, but in
the former by taste. For here again there is no discrepancy in the
names used, in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries:
for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is 'dull'.

Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another

has absolutely none; e.g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary
in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal
is incommensurate with the side has none, so that 'pleasure' is used
in more than one sense. To 'love' also, used of the frame of mind,
has to 'hate' as its contrary, while as used of the physical activity
(kissing) it has none: clearly, therefore, to 'love' is an ambiguous
term. Further, see in regard to their intermediates, if some meanings
and their contraries have an intermediate, others have none, or if
both have one but not the same one, e.g. 'clear' and 'obscure' in
the case of colours have 'grey' as an intermediate, whereas in the
case of sound they have none, or, if they have, it is 'harsh', as
some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. 'Clear', then,
is an ambiguous term, and likewise also 'obscure'. See, moreover,
if some of them have more than one intermediate, while others have
but one, as is the case with 'clear' and 'obscure', for in the case
of colours there are numbers of intermediates, whereas in regard to
sound there is but one, viz. 'harsh'.

Again, in the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if

it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning,
then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning;
e.g. 'to fail to see' a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1)
to fail to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power
to active use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows necessarily
that 'to see' also has more than one meaning: for there will be an
opposite to each sense of 'to fail to see'; e.g. the opposite of 'not
to possess the power of sight' is to possess it, while of 'not to
put the power of sight to active use', the opposite is to put it to
active use.

Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence
of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning,
then so will the remaining term: e.g. if 'to have sense' be used with
more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then
'to be wanting in sense' too will be used with more than one meaning,
as applied to the soul and to the body. That the opposition between
the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of
a certain state is clear, since animals naturally possess each kind

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of 'sense', both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body.

Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if 'justly' has more than
one meaning, then 'just', also, will be used with more than one meaning;
for there will be a meaning of 'just' to each of the meanings of 'justly';
e.g. if the word 'justly' be used of judging according to one's own
opinion, and also of judging as one ought, then 'just' also will be
used in like manner. In the same way also, if 'healthy' has more than
one meaning, then 'healthily' also will be used with more than one
meaning: e.g. if 'healthy' describes both what produces health and
what preserves health and what betokens health, then 'healthily' also
will be used to mean 'in such a way as to produce' or 'preserve' or
'betoken' health. Likewise also in other cases, whenever the original
term bears more than one meaning, the inflexion also that is formed
from it will be used with more than one meaning, and vice versa.

Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term,

and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the
same, then clearly the term is ambiguous: e.g. 'good' in the case
of food means 'productive of pleasure', and in the case of medicine
'productive of health', whereas as applied to the soul it means to
be of a certain quality, e.g. temperate or courageous or just: and
likewise also, as applied to 'man'. Sometimes it signifies what happens
at a certain time, as (e.g.) the good that happens at the right time:
for what happens at the right time is called good. Often it signifies
what is of certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount:
for the proper amount too is called good. So then the term 'good'
is ambiguous. In the same way also 'clear', as applied to a body,
signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is 'easy
to hear'. 'Sharp', too, is in a closely similar case: for the same
term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a
sharp note is a swift note, as the mathematical theorists of harmony
tell us, whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a
right angle, while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle
(point).

Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term, and
see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e.g.) 'donkey',
which denotes both the animal and the engine. For the definition of
them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be
declared to be an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an
engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there
is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e.g.) 'animal'
is the genus of 'raven', and so is 'bird'. Whenever therefore we say
that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of
animal, so that both the genera are predicated of it. Likewise also
whenever we call the raven a 'flying biped animal', we declare it
to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated
of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera that
are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we call a thing
an 'engine', we do not call it an animal, nor vice versa.

Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are
different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary:
for if its contrary bears several senses, clearly the term before
you does so as well.

It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use
of the term in combination, e.g. of a 'clear (lit. white) body' of
a 'clear note'. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted,
the same expression ought to remain over. This does not happen in
the case of ambiguous terms, e.g. in the cases just mentioned. For
the former will be body possessing such and such a colour', while
the latter will be 'a note easy to hear'. Abstract, then, 'a body
'and' a note', and the remainder in each case is not the same. It
should, however, have been had the meaning of 'clear' in each case
been synonymous.

Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares,

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and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e.g.)
any one describes what betokens and what produces health as 'related
commensurably to health', we must not desist but go on to examine
in what sense he has used the term 'commensurably' in each case, e.g.
if in the latter case it means that 'it is of the right amount to
produce health', whereas in the for it means that 'it is such as to
betoken what kind of state prevails'.

Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as 'more or less' or

as 'in like manner', as is the case (e.g.) with a 'clear' (lit. white)
sound and a 'clear' garment, and a 'sharp' flavour and a 'sharp' note.
For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp 'in a like
degree', nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the
other. 'Clear', then, and 'sharp' are ambiguous. For synonyms are
always comparable; for they will always be used either in like manner,
or else in a greater degree in one case.

Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the
differentiae also are different in kind, e.g. those of 'animal' and
'knowledge' (for the differentiae of these are different), look and
see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae
of genera that are different without being subaltern, as e.g. 'sharp'
is of a 'note' and a 'solid'. For being 'sharp' differentiates note
from note, and likewise also one solid from another. 'Sharp', then,
is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are
different without being subaltern.

Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves
have different differentiae, e.g. 'colour' in bodies and 'colour'
in tunes: for the differentiae of 'colour' in bodies are 'sight-piercing'
and 'sight compressing', whereas 'colour' in melodies has not the
same differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things
that are the same have the same differentiae.

Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything,

look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be
a species and another a differentia, as (e.g.) clear' (lit. white)
as applied to a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of
a note it is a differentia; for one note is differentiated from another
by being 'clear'.

Part 16

The presence, then, of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated

by these and like means. The differences which things present to each
other should be examined within the same genera, e.g. 'Wherein does
justice differ from courage, and wisdom from temperance?'-for all
these belong to the same genus; and also from one genus to another,
provided they be not very much too far apart, e.g. 'Wherein does sensation
differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera that are very far
apart, the differences are entirely obvious.

Part 17

Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging

to different genera, the formulae being 'A:B = C:D' (e.g. as knowledge
stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the
object of sensation), and 'As A is in B, so is C in D' (e.g. as sight
is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea,
so is windlessness in the air). Practice is more especially needed
in regard to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the rest,
we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness.
We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, to see
if any identical attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a man and
a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute,
in so far they are alike.

Part 18

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It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both
for clearness' sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he
asserts, if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may
have), and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall
be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to
the term used. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a
term is used, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner
are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once
it has been made clear how many meanings there are, and also upon
which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion,
the questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address
his argument to this. It helps us also both to avoid being misled
and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings
of a term, we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning,
but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to
the same point; and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be
able to mislead him, if our answerer happens not to know the number
of meanings of our terms. This, however, is not possible in all cases,
but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false.
This manner of argument, however, does not belong properly to dialectic;
dialecticians should therefore by all means beware of this kind of
verbal discussion, unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss
the subject before him in any other way.

The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings

about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular
thing is. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference
is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever
between the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they
are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is,
because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the
essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that
are proper to it.

The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive

arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to
the rendering of definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments,
because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that
are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for it
is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It
is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion
that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest.
If, then, with regard to any of them we are well supplied with matter
for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission that however
it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us: then when
we have shown the former we shall have shown, on the strength of the
hypothesis, the matter before us as well: for we have first made the
hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the
case before us, and have then proved the point as regards these cases.
It is useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able
to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it,
we shall be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object
before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which
is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the
genus. Likewise, also, in the case of objects widely divergent, the
examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition, e.g.
the sameness of a calm at sea, and windlessness in the air (each being
a form of rest), and of a point on a line and the unit in number-each
being a starting point. If, then, we render as the genus what is common
to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately.
Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: they
declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number, and the point
the startingpoint of a line. It is clear, then, that they place them
in that which is common to both as their genus.

The means, then, whereby reasonings are effected, are these: the commonplace
rules, for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful,
are as follows.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

BOOK II

Part 1

Of problems some are universal, others particular. Universal problems

are such as 'Every pleasure is good' and 'No pleasure is good'; particular
problems are such as 'Some pleasure is good' and 'Some pleasure is
not good'. The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally
are common to both kinds of problems; for when we have shown that
a predicate belongs in every case, we shall also have shown that it
belongs in some cases. Likewise, also, if we show that it does not
belong in any case, we shall also have shown that it does not belong
in every case. First, then, we must speak of the methods of overthrowing
a view universally, because such are common to both universal and
particular problems, and because people more usually introduce theses
asserting a predicate than denying it, while those who argue with
them overthrow it. The conversion of an appropriate name which is
drawn from the element 'accident' is an extremely precarious thing;
for in the case of accidents and in no other it is possible for something
to be true conditionally and not universally. Names drawn from the
elements 'definition' and 'property' and 'genus' are bound to be convertible;
e.g. if 'to be an animal that walks on two feet is an attribute of
S', then it will be true by conversion to say that 'S is an animal
that walks on two feet'. Likewise, also, if drawn from the genus;
for if 'to be an animal is an attribute of S', then 'S is an animal'.
The same is true also in the case of a property; for if 'to be capable
of learning grammar is an attribute of S', then 'S will be capable
of learning grammar'. For none of these attributes can possibly belong
or not belong in part; they must either belong or not belong absolutely.
In the case of accidents, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent
an attribute (e.g. whiteness or justice) belonging in part, so that
it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute
of a man in order to show that he is white or just; for it is open
to dispute it and say that he is white or just in part only. Conversion,
then, is not a necessary process in the case of accidents.

We must also define the errors that occur in problems. They are of
two kinds, caused either by false statement or by transgression of
the established diction. For those who make false statements, and
say that an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to it,
commit error; and those who call objects by the names of other objects
(e.g. calling a planetree a 'man') transgress the established terminology.

Part 2

Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man has ascribed
as an accident what belongs in some other way. This mistake is most
commonly made in regard to the genera of things, e.g. if one were
to say that white happens (accidit) to be a colour-for being a colour
does not happen by accident to white, but colour is its genus. The
assertor may of course define it so in so many words, saying (e.g.)
that 'Justice happens (accidit) to be a virtue'; but often even without
such definition it is obvious that he has rendered the genus as an
accident; e.g. suppose that one were to say that whiteness is coloured
or that walking is in motion. For a predicate drawn from the genus
is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form, but always
the genera are predicated of their species literally; for the species
take on both the name and the definition of their genera. A man therefore
who says that white is 'coloured' has not rendered 'coloured' as its
genus, seeing that he has used an inflected form, nor yet as its property
or as its definition: for the definition and property of a thing belong
to it and to nothing else, whereas many things besides white are coloured,
e.g. a log, a stone, a man, and a horse. Clearly then he renders it
as an accident.

Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been either
asserted or denied universally to belong to something. Look at them

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species by species, and not in their infinite multitude: for then
the inquiry will proceed more directly and in fewer steps. You should
look and begin with the most primary groups, and then proceed in order
down to those that are not further divisible: e.g. if a man has said
that the knowledge of opposites is the same, you should look and see
whether it be so of relative opposites and of contraries and of terms
signifying the privation or presence of certain states, and of contradictory
terms. Then, if no clear result be reached so far in these cases,
you should again divide these until you come to those that are not
further divisible, and see (e.g.) whether it be so of just deeds and
unjust, or of the double and the half, or of blindness and sight,
or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that the
knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem.
Likewise, also, if the predicate belongs in no case. This rule is
convertible for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if,
when we have suggested a division, the predicate appears to hold in
all or in a large number of cases, we may then claim that the other
should actually assert it universally, or else bring a negative instance
to show in what case it is not so: for if he does neither of these
things, a refusal to assert it will make him look absurd.

Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of its

subject, either of both separately or else of one of them, and then
look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions.
Thus (e.g.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god, ask what is 'to
wrong'? For if it be 'to injure deliberately', clearly it is not possible
for a god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured.
Again, to see if the good man is jealous, ask who is the 'jealous'
man and what is 'jealousy'. For if 'jealousy' is pain at the apparent
success of some well-behaved person, clearly the good man is not jealous:
for then he would be bad. Again, to see if the indignant man is jealous,
ask who each of them is: for then it will be obvious whether the statement
is true or false; e.g. if he is 'jealous' who grieves at the successes
of the good, and he is 'indignant' who grieves at the successes of
the evil, then clearly the indignant man would not be jealous. A man
should substitute definitions also for the terms contained in his
definitions, and not stop until he comes to a familiar term: for often
if the definition be rendered whole, the point at issue is not cleared
up, whereas if for one of the terms used in the definition a definition
be stated, it becomes obvious.

Moreover, a man should make the problem into a proposition for himself,
and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative instance
will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. This rule is very nearly
the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been
attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the
argument.

Moreover, you should define what kind of things should be called as

most men call them, and what should not. For this is useful both for
establishing and for overthrowing a view: e.g. you should say that
we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean
by them, but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such
and such a kind, we should not here go with the multitude: e.g. it
is right to call 'healthy' whatever tends to produce health, as do
most men: but in saying whether the object before us tends to produce
health or not, we should adopt the language no longer of the multitude
but of the doctor.

Part 3

Moreover, if a term be used in several senses, and it has been laid

down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S, you should show
your case of one of its several senses, if you cannot show it of both.
This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning
is undetected; for supposing this to be obvious, then the other man
will object that the point which he himself questioned has not been
discussed, but only the other point. This commonplace rule is convertible
for purposes both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. For

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if we want to establish a statement, we shall show that in one sense
the attribute belongs, if we cannot show it of both senses: whereas
if we are overthrowing a statement, we shall show that in one sense
the attribute does not belong, if we cannot show it of both senses.
Of course, in overthrowing a statement there is no need to start the
discussion by securing any admission, either when the statement asserts
or when it denies the attribute universally: for if we show that in
any case whatever the attribute does not belong, we shall have demolished
the universal assertion of it, and likewise also if we show that it
belongs in a single case, we shall demolish the universal denial of
it. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a preliminary
admission that if it belongs in any case whatever, it belongs universally,
supposing this claim to be a plausible one. For it is not enough to
discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute belongs
universally; e.g. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal, then
every soul is immortal, so that a previous admission must be secured
that if any soul whatever be immortal, then every soul is immortal.
This is not to be done in every case, but only whenever we are not
easily able to quote any single argument applying to all cases in
common, as (e.g.) the geometrician can argue that the triangle has
its angles equal to two right angles.

If, again, the variety of meanings of a term be obvious, distinguish

how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to
establish it: e.g. supposing 'the right' to mean 'the expedient' or
'the honourable', you should try either to establish or to demolish
both descriptions of the subject in question; e.g. by showing that
it is honourable and expedient, or that it is neither honourable nor
expedient. Supposing, however, that it is impossible to show both,
you should show the one, adding an indication that it is true in the
one sense and not in the other. The same rule applies also when the
number of senses into which it is divided is more than two.

Again, consider those expressions whose meanings are many, but differ
not by way of ambiguity of a term, but in some other way: e.g. 'The
science of many things is one': here 'many things' may mean the end
and the means to that end, as (e.g.) medicine is the science both
of producing health and of dieting; or they may be both of them ends,
as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries
the one is no more an end than the other); or again they may be an
essential and an accidental attribute, as (e.g.) the essential fact
that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and the
accidental fact that the equilateral figure has them so: for it is
because of the accident of the equilateral triangle happening to be
a triangle that we know that it has its angles equal to two right
angles. If, then, it is not possible in any sense of the term that
the science of many things should be the same, it clearly is altogether
impossible that it should be so; or, if it is possible in some sense,
then clearly it is possible. Distinguish as many meanings as are required:
e.g. if we want to establish a view, we should bring forward all such
meanings as admit that view and should divide them only into those
meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case:
whereas if we want to overthrow a view, we should bring forward all
that do not admit that view, and leave the rest aside. We must deal
also in these cases as well with any uncertainty about the number
of meanings involved. Further, that one thing is, or is not, 'of'
another should be established by means of the same commonplace rules;
e.g. that a particular science is of a particular thing, treated either
as an end or as a means to its end, or as accidentally connected with
it; or again that it is not 'of' it in any of the aforesaid ways.
The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that have
more than one object. For the 'desire of X' may mean the desire of
it as an end (e.g. the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e.g.
the desire of being doctored), or as a thing desired accidentally,
as, in the case of wine, the sweet-toothed person desires it not because
it is wine but because it is sweet. For essentially he desires the
sweet, and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry, he no longer
desires it. His desire for it is therefore accidental. This rule is
useful in dealing with relative terms: for cases of this kind are

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generally cases of relative terms.

Part 4

Moreover, it is well to alter a term into one more familiar, e.g.

to substitute 'clear' for 'exact' in describing a conception, and
'being fussy' for 'being busy': for when the expression is made more
familiar, the thesis becomes easier to attack. This commonplace rule
also is available for both purposes alike, both for establishing and
for overthrowing a view.

In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the same thing,

look at its genus; e.g. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness
are possible in regard to perception, and to perceive is to judge,
while it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly, then in regard to
perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. In the
present instance the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to
the species: for 'to judge' is the genus of 'to -perceive'; for the
man who perceives judges in a certain way. But per contra it may proceed
from the species to the genus: for all the attributes that belong
to the species belong to the genus as well; e.g. if there is a bad
and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition: for
'disposition' is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace
argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view, while
the second is true. For there is no necessity that all the attributes
that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for 'animal'
is flying and quadruped, but not so 'man'. All the attributes, on
the other hand, that belong to the species must of necessity belong
also to the genus; for if 'man' is good, then animal also is good.
On the other hand, for purposes of overthrowing a view, the former
argument is true while the latter is fallacious; for all the attributes
which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either;
whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity
wanting to the genus.

Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of necessity
have one of its species predicated of them, and since those things
that are possessed of the genus in question, or are described by terms
derived from that genus, must also of necessity be possessed of one
of its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species
(e.g. if to anything the term 'scientific knowledge' be applied, then
also there will be applied to it the term 'grammatical' or 'musical'
knowledge, or knowledge of one of the other sciences; and if any one
possesses scientific knowledge or is described by a term derived from
'science', then he will also possess grammatical or musical knowledge
or knowledge of one of the other sciences, or will be described by
a term derived from one of them, e.g. as a 'grammarian' or a 'musician')-therefore
if any expression be asserted that is in any way derived from the
genus (e.g. that the soul is in motion), look and see whether it be
possible for the soul to be moved with any of the species of motion;
whether (e.g.) it can grow or be destroyed or come to be, and so forth
with all the other species of motion. For if it be not moved in any
of these ways, clearly it does not move at all. This commonplace rule
is common for both purposes, both for overthrowing and for establishing
a view: for if the soul moves with one of the species of motion, clearly
it does move; while if it does not move with any of the species of
motion, clearly it does not move.

If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion,
look among the definitions, real or apparent, of the thing before
you, and if one is not enough, draw upon several. For it will be easier
to attack people when committed to a definition: for an attack is
always more easily made on definitions.

Moreover, look and see in regard to the thing in question, what it

is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question,
or what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question
be real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on
whose reality the reality of the thing in question will follow (for

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if the former be shown to be real, then the thing in question will
also have been shown to be real); while if you want to overthrow a
view, ask what it is that is real if the thing in question be real,
for if we show that what follows from the thing in question is unreal,
we shall have demolished the thing in question.

Moreover, look at the time involved, to see if there be any discrepancy

anywhere: e.g. suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished
of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished,
but they do not always grow. Likewise, also, if he has said that knowing
is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time, whereas the
other has to do also with the present and the future. For we are said
to know things present and future (e.g. that there will be an eclipse),
whereas it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the
past.

Part 5

Moreover, there is the sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw

our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be
well supplied with lines of argument. This process is sometimes a
real necessity, sometimes an apparent necessity, sometimes neither
an apparent nor a real necessity. It is really necessary whenever
the answerer has denied any view that would be useful in attacking
the thesis, and the questioner thereupon addresses his arguments to
the support of this view, and when moreover the view in question happens
to be one of a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument.
Likewise, also, it is really necessary whenever he (the questioner)
first, by an induction made by means of the view laid down, arrives
at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement:
for when once this has been demolished, the view originally laid down
is demolished as well. It is an apparent necessity, when the point
to which the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful,
and relevant to the thesis, without being really so; whether it be
that the man who is standing up to the argument has refused to concede
something, or whether he (the questioner) has first reached it by
a plausible induction based upon the thesis and then tries to demolish
it. The remaining case is when the point to which the discussion comes
to be directed is neither really nor apparently necessary, and it
is the answerer's luck to be confuted on a mere side issue You should
beware of the last of the aforesaid methods; for it appears to be
wholly disconnected from, and foreign to, the art of dialectic. For
this reason, moreover, the answerer should not lose his temper, but
assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking the thesis,
adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not agree
with the view. For, as a rule, it increases the confusion of questioners
if, after all propositions of this kind have been granted them, they
can then draw no conclusion.

Moreover, any one who has made any statement whatever has in a certain
sense made several statements, inasmuch as each statement has a number
of necessary consequences: e.g. the man who said 'X is a man' has
also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped
and capable of acquiring reason and knowledge, so that by the demolition
of any single one of these consequences, of whatever kind, the original
statement is demolished as well. But you should beware here too of
making a change to a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence,
and sometimes the original thesis, is the easier to demolish.

Part 6

In regard to subjects which must have one and one only of two predicates,
as (e.g.) a man must have either a disease or health, supposing we
are well supplied as regards the one for arguing its presence or absence,
we shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. This
rule is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that
the one attribute belongs, we shall have shown that the remaining
one does not belong; while if we show that the one does not belong,
we shall have shown that the remaining one does belong. Clearly then

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the rule is useful for both purposes.

Moreover, you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term

in its literal meaning, with the implication that it is most fitting
so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. the expression
'strong at heart' will suggest not the courageous man, according to
the use now established, but the man the state of whose heart is strong;
just as also the expression 'of a good hope' may be taken to mean
the man who hopes for good things. Likewise also 'well-starred' may
be taken to mean the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says 'well-starred
is he who has a noble soul'.' For a man's star is his soul.

Some things occur of necessity, others usually, others however it

may chance; if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur
usually, or if a usual event (or, failing such an event itself, its
contrary) has been stated to occur of necessity, it always gives an
opportunity for attack. For if a necessary event has been asserted
to occur usually, clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be
universal which is universal, and so has made a mistake: and so he
has if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then
he declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong. Likewise
also if he has declared the contrary of what is usual to be necessary.
For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare
attribute: e.g. if men are usually bad, they are comparatively seldom
good, so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to
be good of necessity. The same is true also if he has declared a mere
matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually; for a chance event
happens neither of necessity nor usually. If the thing happens usually,
then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he
meant that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily, it is
open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it
happens necessarily: e.g. if he has stated without any distinction
that disinherited persons are bad, you may assume in discussing it
that he means that they are so necessarily.

Moreover, look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident

of itself, taking it to be a different thing because it has a different
name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and
good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing, to wit, Pleasure.
If then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of
cheerfulness, he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute
of itself.

Part 7

Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways,

and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety, we must grasp
the subject of contraries, in order that it may help us both in demolishing
and in establishing a view. Well then, that the modes of conjunction
are six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary verbs will be
conjoined to each of the contrary objects; and this gives two modes:
e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies, or per contra
to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. Or else (2) both
verbs may be attached to one object; and this too gives two modes,
e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends, or to do good
to enemies and to do evil to enemies. Or (3) a single verb may be
attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes; e.g. to do
good to friends and to do good to enemies, or to do evil to friends
and evil to enemies.

The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute

any contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not contrary
to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and
belong to the same disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends
contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable
and belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is
not generally thought to be the contrary of another, unless the one
be an expression denoting an excess, and the other an expression denoting
a defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class

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of objectionable things, and likewise also a defect. But the other
four all constitute a contrariety. For to do good to friends is contrary
to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds from the contrary
disposition, and the one is desirable, and the other objectionable.
The case is the same also in regard to the other conjunctions: for
in each combination the one course is desirable, and the other objectionable,
and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition and the other to a
bad. Clearly, then, from what has been said, the same course has more
than one contrary. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary
both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends.
Likewise, if we examine them in the same way, we shall find that the
contraries of each of the others also are two in number. Select therefore
whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the thesis.

Moreover, if the accident of a thing have a contrary, see whether

it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been
declared to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not
belong; for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong
at the same time to the same thing.

Or again, look and see if anything has been said about something,
of such a kind that if it be true, contrary predicates must necessarily
belong to the thing: e.g. if he has said that the 'Ideas' exist in
us. For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at
rest, and moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of
thought. For according to the views of those who posit the existence
of Ideas, those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought; while
if they exist in us, it is impossible that they should be unmoved:
for when we move, it follows necessarily that all that is in us moves
with us as well. Clearly also they are objects of sensation, if they
exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize
the Form present in each individual.

Again, if there be posited an accident which has a contrary, look

and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary
as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. Thus (e.g.) if he
has asserted that hatred follows anger, hatred would in that case
be in the 'spirited faculty': for that is where anger is. You should
therefore look and see if its contrary, to wit, friendship, be also
in the 'spirited faculty': for if not-if friendship is in the faculty
of desire-then hatred could not follow anger. Likewise also if he
has asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. For if it were
capable of ignorance, it would be capable of knowledge as well: and
this is not generally held-I mean that the faculty of desire is capable
of knowledge. For purposes, then, of overthrowing a view, as has been
said, this rule should be observed: but for purposes of establishing
one, though the rule will not help you to assert that the accident
actually belongs, it will help you to assert that it may possibly
belong. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit
of the contrary of the accident asserted, we shall have shown that
the accident neither belongs nor can possibly belong; while on the
other hand, if we show that the contrary belongs, or that the thing
is capable of the contrary, we shall not indeed as yet have shown
that the accident asserted does belong as well; our proof will merely
have gone to this point, that it is possible for it to belong.

Part 8

Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number, you should
look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms, converting
the order of their sequence, both when demolishing and when establishing
a view, and you should secure them by means of induction-such arguments
(e.g.) as that man be an animal, what is not an animal is not a man':
and likewise also in other instances of contradictories. For in those
cases the sequence is converse: for 'animal' follows upon 'man but
'not-animal' does not follow upon 'not-man', but conversely 'not-man'
upon 'not-animal'. In all cases, therefore, a postulate of this sort
should be made, (e.g.) that 'If the honourable is pleasant, what is
not pleasant is not honourable, while if the latter be untrue, so

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is the former'. Likewise, also, 'If what is not pleasant be not honourable,
then what is honourable is pleasant'. Clearly, then, the conversion
of the sequence formed by contradiction of the terms of the thesis
is a method convertible for both purposes.

Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the thesis,
and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the
other, either directly or conversely, both when you are demolishing
and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind
as well by means of induction, so far as may be required. Now the
sequence is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice:
for upon the one of them virtue follows, and vice upon the other;
and upon the one it follows that it is desirable, while upon the other
it follows that it is objectionable. The sequence, therefore, in the
latter case also is direct; for the desirable is the contrary of the
objectionable. Likewise also in other cases. The sequence is, on the
other hand, converse in such a case as this: Health follows upon vigour,
but disease does not follow upon debility; rather debility follows
upon disease. In this case, then, clearly the sequence is converse.
Converse sequence is, however, rare in the case of contraries; usually
the sequence is direct. If, therefore, the contrary of the one term
does not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or
conversely, clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other
in the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the
case of the contraries, it must of necessity do so as well in the
original statement.

You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a

state in like manner to the case of contraries. Only, in the case
of such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence
is always bound to be direct: e.g. as sensation follows sight, while
absence of sensation follows blindness. For the opposition of sensation
to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence to the privation
of a state: for the one of them is a state, and the other the privation
of it.

The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner to

that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as well
is direct; e.g. if 3/1 is a multiple, then 1/3 is a fraction: for
3/1 is relative to 1/3, and so is a multiple to a fraction. Again,
if knowledge be a conceiving, then also the object of knowledge is
an object of conception; and if sight be a sensation, then also the
object of sight is an object of sensation. An objection may be made
that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place, in the
case of relative terms, in the way described: for the object of sensation
is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not knowledge. The
objection is, however, not generally received as really true; for
many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation.
Moreover, the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary
purpose, e.g. to show that the object of sensation is not an object
of knowledge, on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.

Part 9

Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of

the terms in the thesis, both in demolishing and in establishing it.
By co-ordinates' are meant terms such as the following: 'Just deeds'
and the 'just man' are coordinates of 'justice', and 'courageous deeds'
and the 'courageous man' are co-ordinates of courage. Likewise also
things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are called co-ordinates
of that which they tend to produce and to preserve, as e.g. 'healthy
habits' are co-ordinates of 'health' and a 'vigorous constitutional'
of a 'vigorous constitution' and so forth also in other cases. 'Co-ordinate',
then, usually describes cases such as these, whereas 'inflected forms'
are such as the following: 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily',
and such as are formed in this way. It is usually held that words
when used in their inflected forms as well are co-ordinates, as (e.g.)
'justly' in relation to justice, and 'courageously' to courage; and
then 'co-ordinate' describes all the members of the same kindred series,

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e.g. 'justice', 'just', of a man or an act, 'justly'. Clearly, then,
when any one member, whatever its kind, of the same kindred series
is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all the rest as well come
to be shown to be so: e.g. if 'justice' be something praiseworthy,
then so will 'just', of a man or thing, and 'justly' connote something
praiseworthy. Then 'justly' will be rendered also 'praiseworthily',
derived will by the same inflexion from 'the praiseworthy' whereby
'justly' is derived from 'justice'.

Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in the
case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue that
good is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or
that, if the latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice
be knowledge, then injustice is ignorance: and if 'justly' means 'knowingly'
and 'skilfully', then 'unjustly' means 'ignorantly' and 'unskilfully':
whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the former, as in the
instance given just now: for 'unjustly' is more likely to seem equivalent
to 'skilfully' than to 'unskilfully'. This commonplace rule has been
stated before in dealing with the sequence of contraries; for all
we are claiming now is that the contrary of P shall follow the contrary
of S.

Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing,

and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it, both in
demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose modes
of generation rank among good things, are themselves also good; and
if they themselves be good, so also are their modes of generation.
If, on the other hand, their modes of generation be evil, then they
themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of destruction the converse
is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things, then
they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if the modes of destruction
count as evil, they themselves count as good. The same argument applies
also to things tending to produce and destroy: for things whose productive
causes are good, themselves also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive
of them are good, they themselves rank as evil.

Part 10

Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and
see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has
more than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess
sight be to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise
also in the case of other things, both those which are and those which
are generally held to be like. The rule in question is useful for
both purposes; for if it be as stated in the case of some one like
thing, it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it
be not so in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the
case of the others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike
as regards a single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there
is a discrepancy. Thus, if to 'know' a thing be to 'think of' it,
then also to 'know many things' is to 'be thinking of many things';
whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but
not to be thinking of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not
true, neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz.
that to 'know' a thing is to 'think of' it.

Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to greater

degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See whether a greater
degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e.g.
if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater
good: and if to do a wrong be evil, see whethe

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