｡ ˚୨ EQUAL PROTECTION ୧˚｡ ⋆ work with the identification of the truth

4. Not limited to existing conditions only

BIRAOGO v. PTC 5. Applies equally to all members of the same
class
Issue:
Doctrine:
Whether EO 1 violates the equal protection
clause by

The equal protection clause prohibits

arbitrary differentiation between similarly
situated groups. If a classification targets
only one specific group (e.g., a past
administration), it risks being seen as
vindictive and arbitrary. A reasonable
classification must apply equally to all
members of a class, not just a select few.

Facts:

Before the May 2010 elections, President

Aquino condemned corruption with his slogan
“Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” To
implement this, he established the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) via EO 1 to
investigate corruption in the previous
administration. The PTC was an ad hoc body
tasked with investigating graft and corruption
by officials in the previous government.

By virtue of EO 1, the Philippine Truth

Commission (PTC) is created. This is a mere
ad hoc body formed under the office of the
President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices, and
accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its
findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress, and the Ombudsman.

It was limited to recommending actions but

couldn’t file
charges or impose penalties.

The characteristics of truth commissions,

such as the PTC, are as
follows:

1. They examine only past events

2. They investigate patterns of abuse
committed over a period of time, as
opposed to a particular event
3. They are temporary bodies that finish their
exclusively targeting the previous interest
administration for investigation. 3. Strict judicial scrutiny – in which a
legislative classification which
Held: impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect clasS
The Supreme Court ruled that EO 1 is is presumed unconstitutional, and the
unconstitutional because it violates the burden is upon the government to prove
equal protection clause. It unjustly singles that the classification is necessary to
out the previous administration, failing to achieve a compelling state interest and
treat similarly situated administrations
equally.

The Court emphasized that the equal

protection clause ensures all persons or
things similarly situated are treated the
same. The PTC’s focus on only one
administration created an arbitrary
distinction, which is impermissible.

Such classification shall pass the

reasonableness test:

1. Rests on substantial distinction.

2. Germane to the purpose of the law
3. Not limited to existing conditions
4. Applies equally to all members of the
same class

By excluding other administrations, EO 1

violated these principles and was struck
down.

SERRANO V GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC

DOCTRINE:

There are three levels of scrutiny at which

the Court
reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law:

1. The deferential or rational basis

scrutiny – in which the challenged
classification needs only be shown to be
rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest;
2. The middle-tier or intermediate
scrutiny – in which the government must
show that the challenged classification
serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least
substantially related to serving that
 that it is the least restrictive means to protect Equal Protection and Labor Protection: YES
such interest.

Facts:

Antonio Serrano, a seafarer, was employed by

Gallant Maritime Services under a POEA-
approved contract. He initially signed up as a
Chief Officer but was assigned a downgraded
position as a Second Officer. When the
employer failed to promote him back to the
promised position, Serrano was repatriated
after serving only two months and seven
days of his contract. He filed for constructive
dismissal and monetary claims, among other
damages. The issue eventually reached the
Supreme Court, challenging the
constitutionality of a provision in RA 8042
that limited the claims of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) for money due to an
unexpired contract.

Issues:

1. Impairment of Contracts: Whether the

subject clause of RA 8042 violated the
constitutional protection against the
impairment of contracts under Section 10,
Article III (Non-impairment of contracts).
2. Equal Protection and Labor Protection:
Whether the clause violated the equal
protection clause and the constitutional
protection of labor under Section 1, Article
III, Section 18, Article II, and Section 3,
Article XIII.

Ruling:

Non-impairment of Contracts:

The Court found that RA 8042 did not impair

existing contracts since the law was enacted
after the parties had entered into their
employment contracts. Even if the law were to
be applied retroactively, the Court ruled that it
would still stand because it was enacted under
the police power of the state to regulate
labor practices and protect the welfare of
OFWs, which allows for the modification of
contracts when necessary for public welfare.
 Constitutional Provisions: it discriminates against OFWs in two ways:

 Section 1, Article III guarantees that no 1. OFWs with contracts of less than one year
one will be deprived of life, liberty, or versus those with contracts of one year or
property without due process, and more.
everyone is entitled to equal protection 2. OFWs versus local workers with fixed-term
under the law. contracts.
 Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII
guarantee that labor rights, including
those of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), should be equally protected,
irrespective of their deployment.

These provisions translate to the economic

security and parity of workers, ensuring
that all workers within the same category
enjoy the same monetary benefits and
obligations.

These rights can be modified by Congress,

but any classification made in legislation
must meet specific criteria:

1. Based on substantial distinctions.

2. Relevant to the law's purpose.
3. Not limited to current conditions.
4. Applies equally to all within the class.

Levels of Scrutiny:

The Court uses three levels of scrutiny to

evaluate
whether a law’s classification is constitutional:

1. Rational Basis Scrutiny: The

classification must be rationally related
to serving a legitimate government
interest.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny: The
classification must serve an important
government interest and be
substantially related to it.
3. Strict Scrutiny: If a law affects a
fundamental right or a suspect class, it
is presumed unconstitutional unless the
government proves it serves a
compelling state interest and is the
least restrictive means to achieve
that interest.

Discriminatory Intent and Impact of RA 8042:

While RA 8042 appears neutral on the surface,

Before RA 8042, both OFWs and local workers who
were illegally dismissed were entitled to 1. must rest on substantial distinctions;
monetary claims for the entire unexpired 2. must be germane to the purposes of the law;
portion of their contracts. 3. must not be limited to existing conditions
only;
After RA 8042, illegally dismissed OFWs with 4. must apply equally to all members of the
same class
contracts of one year or more are capped at a
three-month salary limit, whereas local workers
and OFWs with shorter contracts are not
subject to such limits.

Court's Ruling:

The Court identified the clause as creating a

suspect classification because it unfairly
burdens OFWs with longer contracts while
providing better protection for local workers
and OFWs with shorter contracts. Given that
OFWs are a vulnerable group under
constitutional protection, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to assess whether the law
serves a compelling state interest.

The Court concluded that the law imposed an

unfair and discriminatory limitation (a cap on
money claims of OFWs) that favored
recruitment agencies and foreign employers
over the rights of OFWs. The Court held that no
compelling state interest justified such a
distinction, especially given the lack of
protection for OFWs under the current law. The
Court found that existing mechanisms (like
POEA rules) already provided less restrictive
means to achieve the desired goals without
infringing on the rights of workers.

Conclusion:

The Court ruled that the clause in RA 8042

is unconstitutional because it discriminates
against OFWs in a manner that violates their
right to equal protection under the law. It
failed the strict scrutiny test, as the
government could not prove a compelling state
interest justifying the disadvantageous
treatment of OFWs.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY VS.

CABILES DOCTINE:

A reasonable classification:
FACTS: process.

Petitioner Sameer is a recruitment and A reasonable classification:

placement agency to which respondent
Joy Cabiles submitted her application for 5. must rest on substantial distinctions;
a quality control job in Taiwan. 6. must be germane to the purposes of the law;
7. must not be limited to existing conditions
only;
Joy’s application was accepted and was later
asked to pay a placement fee when she 8. must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
signed a one-year employment contract.
Thereafter, she was deployed to work for
Taiwan Wacoal. Contrary to the terms in
the employment contract as quality
control, she was asked to work as a
cutter.

Suddenly, Wacoal informed Joy, without prior

notice, that she was terminated and was
asked to prepare for immediate
repatriation. According to her, Wacoal
deducted her salary to cover her plane
ticket back to Manila. Thus, she filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner Sameer and Wacoal.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged

that respondent's termination was due to
her inefficiency, negligence in her duties,
and her “failure to comply with the work
requirements of her foreign employer."
Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation
with petitioner had already been transferred
to the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. (Pacific). Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by
Pacific Manpower, which moved for the
dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It
alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between them.

ISSUE:

Whether the clause was unconstitutional

because
it
infringed on workers’ right to contract.

HELD:

The Court found that the reinstated clause in

Republic Act No. 10022, which limits the
money claims of illegally dismissed
overseas workers based on the length of
their contracts, violated the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due
Invalid Classification: The clause distinguished wrongful dismissals. This reduction in liability
between overseas workers based on the length is seen as a "bargain" that comes at the
of their contracts, which the Court determined expense of the OFWs, who are denied full
was an arbitrary classification with no real or compensation for the unexpired portion of
substantial distinctions. Specifically, it limited their contracts. This creates unequal
the claims of overseas workers with contracts treatment between
of at least one year to a maximum of three
months’ salary, while those with contracts
under one year could claim the full unexpired
portion of their salary. This distinction was
unjustified, as there was no reasonable basis
for treating workers differently based on the
length of their contract.

Equal Protection and Due Process: The Court

emphasized that both overseas and local
workers, regardless of their employment
location, should have equal rights when it
comes to claims for illegal termination. The
classification between overseas workers with
contracts over or under one year was deemed
arbitrary, violating the equal protection clause.
Furthermore, the clause also undermined the
due process rights of workers by limiting their
claims for wages after illegal dismissal.

In conclusion, the Court found the clause

unconstitutional, stating that it unnecessarily
discriminated against overseas workers,
particularly those with contracts of at least one
year. This violated both their equal protection
and due process rights.

The Court ruled that the reinstated clause in

Republic Act No. 10022, which limits the
monetary claims of illegally dismissed overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) to three months' salary,
violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Here’s why:

1. Unreasonable Classification: The law

creates distinctions between different
categories of OFWs without a valid reason.
It differentiates between OFWs based on
the duration of their contracts (less than
one year vs. one year or more) and the
remaining period of their contracts when
they are dismissed. This classification lacks
a substantial basis and does not meet the
requirements of reasonable classification.
2. Discriminatory Impact: The law unfairly
benefits recruitment agencies and foreign
employers by reducing their liability for
 OFWs and other workers who are not equality, but rather that laws apply fairly to
subject to such limits on their claims. everyone within a specific class or group.
3. Arbitrary Deprivation of Rights: The Court Legislation is allowed to make distinctions
found that between different groups, as long as there
there is no reasonable justification for are reasonable grounds for doing so, and the
limiting the claims of OFWs, especially law applies equally within those groups.
when compared to the protections
afforded to other workers (like local
workers). The law deprives OFWs of
their full rights without any valid public Facts:
purpose, rendering it arbitrary. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
4. Favoring Private Interests: The law other alien residents, corporations, and
elevates the interests of recruitment partnerships adversely
agencies and foreign employers, giving
them a financial advantage while
sacrificing the rights of OFWs. This
conflicts with the constitutional
protection of workers and violates the
equal protection principle, which
requires that laws treat people in
similar situations alike.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY VS. CABILES

DOCTRINE:

Limitations on police power:

SECTION

1.
(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law,
nor any person be denied the equal
protection of the
laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees, which

embody the essence of individual liberty
and freedom in democracies, are not
limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, color, or
nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed.
220, 226.)

The equal protection clause

The equal protection clause prevents

discrimination by ensuring that all people
are treated equally under similar
conditions. It does not require absolute
affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. pursuance of the police power. Is there public
1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
Act is unconstitutional contending that: accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is
it not unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive? Is
1. It denies alien residents the equal there sufficient foundation or reason in
protection of the laws and deprives them connection with the matter involved; or has
of their liberty and property without due there not been a capricious use of the legislative
process of law. power? Can the aims conceived be
2. The subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof.
3. The Act violates international and treaty
obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines.
4. The provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail
business through hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business,
violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of
the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether RA 1180 denies alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without
due process of law.

Held:
No. The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either
in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the

reasonableness of legislation enacted in
achieved by the means used, or is it not in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity
merely an unjustified interference with and has not misled the legislators or the
private interest? These are the questions segment of the population affected; and that
that we ask when the due process test is it cannot be said to be void for supposed
applied. conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the
The conflict, therefore, between police subject and the police power may not be
power and the guarantees of due process curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
and equal protection of the laws is more other conventional agreement.
apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed
to coexist. The balancing is the essence
PEOPLE V CAYAT
or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet
there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So
the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty, and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard,
as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction
and classification have been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.

The law does not violate the equal

protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of the occupation regulated,
nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to
carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact. It
seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary, and in any case such matter
falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced
DOCTRINE:  Must not be limited to existing conditions
only.
 Must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
Protection of laws is not violated by
legislation based on reasonable classification.
The classification to be reasonable:

1. Must rest on substantial distinctions.

2. Must be germane to the purposes of the
law.
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions
only.
4. Must apply equally to all members of the
same class.

FACTS:

Respondent Cayat, a native of Baguio,

Benguet, and a member of the non-Christian
tribe, was found guilty of violating sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an
intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is
not a native wine.

Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of

the Philippines who is a member of the non-
Christian tribe from buying, receiving, and
possessing any intoxicating liquor other than
their so-called native wines. Consequently,
Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act

No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection
of the laws, is violative of due process, and is
an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUES:

Whether Act No. 1639 violates the equal

protection clause?

RULING:

No, Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal

protection clause.

Equal protection of the laws is not violated by

legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be
reasonable:

 Must rest on substantial distinctions.

 Must be germane to the purposes of the
law.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.
In this case, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a
1. On the first requisite, the classification petition for a Temporary Protection Order
rests on real and substantial (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia,
distinctions. The non-Christian tribes under Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti- Violence
refer not to the religious belief, but Against Women and Children Act). She
more directly to the natives of the accused him of physical, emotional,
Philippines of a low grade of psychological, and economic abuse following
civilization. his affair with a bank manager, which led to a
2. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to series of confrontations and emotional
insure peace and order among the distress. Petitioner also prohibited her from
non-Christian tribes. The experience of accessing information about their businesses,
the past and the lower court observed further impacting her financially.
that the use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non- Christian tribes
often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, which hampered the efforts of
the Government to raise their standard
of life and civilization
3. Third, the said Act is intended to apply for
all times as
long as the conditions exist. The
legislature understood that the
civilization of a people is a slow
process and that, hand in hand with it,
must go measures of protection and
security.
4. Fourth, the Act applies equally to all
members of the same class.

GARCIA V

DRILON

DOCTRINE:

The Supreme Court upheld the

constitutionality of R.A. 9262, ruling that
the law does not infringe upon the equal
protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution and does not unduly delegate
judicial power. The Court held that
immediate protection is warranted under
the law to prevent further violence against
victims and that the law is substantial in
differentiating the experiences of women
from men in domestic violence scenarios.
BPOs issued by barangay officials are
considered an extension of executive, not
judicial, functions, enacting the legislative
intent to address domestic violence
expeditiously.

FACTS:
The RTC issued the TPO on March 24, 2006,
after finding reasonable grounds that the In this case, Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
respondent and her children faced imminent Against Women and Children Act) was found to
danger of violence. The TPO was extended have a valid classification because it addressed
multiple times until September 26, 2006, as the real and substantial distinction between men
petitioner continued to deprive them of and women in terms of vulnerability to violence.
financial support and harassed them. Thus, it did not violate the

Petitioner filed a petition before the Court of

Appeals challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 and the validity of the TPO. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating
that petitioner failed to raise the constitutional
issues in the trial court, which had jurisdiction
to address them. After his motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioner
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. 9262 violates the equal

protection clause.
2. Whether R.A. 9262 violates the due process
clause.
3. Whether R.A. 9262 gives undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.

HELD:

I. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty

of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:

The equal protection clause allows for

classification in law, meaning laws can
treat groups differently as long as the
classification is reasonable.

The classification to be reasonable:

5. Must rest on substantial distinctions.

6. Must be germane to the purposes of the
law.
7. Must not be limited to existing conditions
only.
8. Must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
equal protection clause by providing more Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
protection to women as victims of violence. available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial physical harm to the woman or her child; and
distinctions. The unequal power (b) threatening to cause the woman or her
relationship between women and men; the child physical harm. Such function of the
fact that women are more likely than men Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
to be victims of violence; and the nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
widespread gender bias and prejudice Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
against women all make for real differences and ordinances," and to "maintain public
justifying the classification under the law. order in the barangay."

II. The classification is germane to the

purpose of the law. The distinction between
men and women is germane to the purpose
of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, as
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.

III. The classification is not limited to

existing conditions only, and applies
equally to all members. Moreover, the
application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as
well, for as long as the safety and security
of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse.

II.R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due

process clause of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) ex parte
(without notice to the respondent) does not
violate the right to due process. Similar to a
writ of preliminary attachment, an ex parte
TPO can be issued to protect victims of
violence, particularly in urgent situations
where waiting for a hearing might lead to
further harm or even death. The court
emphasized that while the respondent must
be notified, the law ensures they have a
chance to contest the order by filing an
opposition within five days. The essence of
due process is the opportunity to be heard,
which can be done through written
pleadings, and as long as this opportunity is
provided, procedural due process is not
violated.

III. There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials. As
clearly delimited by the aforequoted
provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
 and due process, and inappropriately exercised
police power by the state. His petition was
XXX VS. AAA, G.R. NO. 187175. JULY 06, 2022 elevated to the Supreme Court for a final decision.

DOCTRINE: ISSUES:

The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine

that laws are
presumed to be constitutional, and parties
challenging the constitutionality of a law must
prove their case convincingly. It also
highlighted the State’s policy of protecting
women and children against violence and
threats to their security and affirmed the broad
protective scope of Republic Act No. 9262,
which covers victims in various intimate
relationships with the offender.

1. Protection Orders: Immediate issuance is

warranted to prevent further violence
against victims.
2. Coverage: Extends to women who are in
a dating relationship with or have a
common child with the offender, thereby
protecting live-in partners and their
children, irrespective of age.
3. Key Provisions: Sections 5 (definition of
violence), 8 (protection orders), and 15 &
16 (temporary and permanent protection
orders) of Republic Act No. 9262.

FACTS:

The case revolves around the long-term live-in

relationship between AAA and XXX, which
produced three children, namely BBB, DDD
(deceased), and CCC. The relationship began in
the early ’80s, with XXX being married to
another woman but estranged. Over the years,
AAA endured various forms of abuse from XXX,
including physical, psychological, economic,
and sexual abuse. This culminated in AAA
filing charges under Republic Act No. 9262, or
the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004, leading to the issuance of
a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) by the
Regional Trial Court in favor of AAA, BBB, and
CCC.

XXX contested the constitutionality of Republic Act

No. 9262 and the issuance of the PPO, arguing
that it violated men’s rights to equal protection
 1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 9262 of changed conditions since their
is unconstitutional for allegedly enactment.
violating the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution. Judicial Review Standards for Equal Protection
2. Whether Republic Act No. 9262’s
provisions on protection orders When the government enacts a law or policy
contravene rules and policies previously that classifies individuals or groups in
established by the Supreme Court. different ways, courts must determine
whether such classifications violate the Equal
HELD: Protection Clause.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and

upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262. The Court clarified that the Act
does not violate the equal protection and
due process clauses, as it is based on
substantial distinctions and serves its
statutory purpose of protecting women and
children from violence and threats.

Moreover, the Court ruled that the immediate

issuance of protection orders under the Act
does not infringe upon the due process
rights of the accused, as it is necessary to
prevent further violence and ensure the
safety of the victims.

Concerning the issuance of the PPO in favor of

AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Court found no
error in the trial court’s decision. It
interpreted the coverage of Republic Act
No. 9262 to extend protection to victims
in a dating relationship with the offender
or those with a common child, thus
including AAA and her children within its
protective scope, regardless of their age.

CBEA V

BSP

DOCTR

INE

1. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'

Union - The guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state.
2. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey -
Statutes became invalid as denying
"equal protection of the law," in view
1. Strict Scrutiny – Applied when a law
classifies individuals based on suspect RATIO
classifications (e.g., race, religion,
national origin) or affects fundamental The issue at hand was whether Section 15(c),
Article II of
rights (e.g., voting, speech).
R.A. No. 7653 violated the constitutional
2. Intermediate Scrutiny – Applied when a
guarantee of equal protection under the law.
law involves quasi-suspect classifications
(e.g., gender or legitimacy).
3. Rational Basis Test – The least stringent
standard,
applied to all other classifications,
particularly economic or social legislation.

FACTS

In 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (New Central Bank Act)

was enacted, creating the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) and abolishing the old Central
Bank of the Philippines. Eight years later, the
Central Bank Employees Association filed a
petition challenging the constitutionality of the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653. The petitioners argued that the
provision created an unconstitutional
distinction between BSP officers (exempt from
the Salary Standardization Law or SSL) and
rank-and-file employees (subject to the SSL).
They claimed this classification was arbitrary,
unreasonable, and violated the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondents, including the Executive

Secretary and Solicitor General, countered
that the classification was constitutional, as
it was based on substantial differences aimed
at fostering professionalism and excellence in
BSP, in line with its fiscal and administrative
autonomy. They argued that the law’s intent
was to address the BSP's competitiveness in
attracting officers, not to discriminate against
rank-and-file employees.

ISSUE

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section

15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653 runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that "No person shall
be . . . denied the equal protection of the
laws."

BY ITSELF, NO; WHEN CONSTRUED WITH OTHER

LAWS, YES
The Court examined the classification GFIs’ rank-and-file employees were also
created by this provision, which exempted from the SSL.
distinguished between BSP officers, who
were exempt from the Salary The classification between BSP officers and
Standardization Law (SSL), and the rank- rank-and-file employees was initially
and-file employees, who were not. Initially, grounded in a reasonable policy to establish
the Court found that the classification was professionalism and competitiveness at the
valid under the current standards of equal BSP. However, as other GFIs received similar
protection. This is because the equal exemptions, the classification became
protection clause does not prevent the arbitrary, and the continued application of
legislature from establishing reasonable the provision violated the equal protection
classifications, so long as these clause. The Court ruled that the exemption of
distinctions are not unreasonable. BSP rank- and-file employees from the SSL
was discriminatory and lacked substantial
The Court explained that a valid justification. As a result, the Court held that
classification does not require complete Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
equality but must be based on substantial was
distinctions that make real differences.
The classification in question, which
exempted BSP officers from the SSL while
the rank-and-file were subject to it, was
justified by the need to attract qualified
and competent officers to the BSP. This
was particularly important for the BSP to
remain competitive and fulfill its mandate.

However, the Court noted that the

exemption given to BSP officers was
originally meant to address the BSP's lack
of competitiveness in attracting
executives. Over time, the situation
changed, particularly when other
government financial institutions (GFIs)
like the GSIS, LBP, DBP, and SSS, also had
their personnel exempted from the SSL.
This subsequent legislative action made
the initial classification between BSP
officers and rank-and-file employees
arbitrary and unreasonable. The
exemption for the rank-and-file employees
of other GFIs, who were similarly situated
to BSP rank-and-file employees,
highlighted the disparity in the treatment
of these groups, rendering the provision
unconstitutional.

The Court further clarified that while a

statute might have been constitutional
when enacted, it could become
unconstitutional over time if
circumstances change. In this case, the
exemption for the BSP rank-and-file
employees lost its validity as it no longer
served a legitimate distinction after other
unconstitutional because it violated the Three tests for reasonableness: The Court
equal protection clause of the Constitution. applies three tests to determine the
reasonableness of a classification:
The passage argues against applying Strict
Scrutiny to Article II, Section 15(c) of the New 1. Strict scrutiny test: Applies when a
Central Bank Act, which exempts BSP officers classification interferes with fundamental
from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) rights or burdens suspect classes.
but not rank-and-file employees. 2. Intermediate scrutiny test: Applies when
the
1. No Violation of Rights: The provisions in classification does not involve suspect
the Constitution discussed are principles, classes or fundamental rights but requires
not specific rights, and don’t apply to this heightened scrutiny,
case. The law does not infringe on workers'
rights as outlined in Article XIII.
2. No "Suspect Class": The rank-and-file
employees of the BSP are not a "suspect
class" because they do not face
discrimination or a history of unequal
treatment based on race, religion, or other
protected categories.
3. Economic Class is Not a Suspect
Classification : Financial need is not
considered an inherently suspect trait
under the law. Classifications based on
financial need are not subject to Strict
Scrutiny but are evaluated under the
Rational Basis Test.

ZOMER V SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION OF COURT

OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE:

The decision reaffirmed the constitutionality

of Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791,
emphasizing that the equal protection clause
allows for reasonable classification based on
substantial distinctions with a legitimate
government interest.

All that is required for a valid classification is

that it be

1. reasonable, which means the

classification should be based on
substantial distinctions that make for real
differences;
2. it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. it must not be limited to existing conditions
only;
4. it must apply equally to each member of
the class.
 such as in classifications based on under similar circumstances. The law can
gender and legitimacy. differentiate based on real distinctions and
3. Rational basis test: Applies to all other doesn't mandate identical treatment for all.
subjects not Therefore, the equal protection clause
covered by the first two tests. permits legislation to apply differently to
groups or individuals with differing
conditions.
FACTS:

Zomer Development Company (Zomer)

owned 3 parcels of land in Cebu City
which it mortgaged to International
Exchange Bank (IEB) as security for its
loan. When Zomer failed to pay its
indebtedness, IEB foreclosed on the
properties. During the auction, IEB
emerged as the highest bidder. The
Certificates of Sale provided for a period
of redemption of 12 months from
registration, “or sooner and/or later, as
provided for under applicable laws.”

Zomer filed a complaint for the

declaration of nullity of the sale on the
ground that Section 47 of R.A. 8791
(General Banking Act) of 2002 is
unconstitutional in violation of the equal
protection clause since the law provides a
shorter period for redemption of 3 months
or earlier to juridical entities compared to
the 1-year redemption period given to
natural persons.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On the

other hand, the CA dismissed the appeal
“without prejudice to appellants’ filing of
the case before the Supreme Court.”

ISSUE:

Is there a violation of the equal protection?

HELD:

No. The petition is denied.

The Constitution guarantees equal

protection of the laws, ensuring fairness
and preventing discrimination or
favoritism. However, it doesn't require
absolute equality among all individuals. It
allows for classifications as long as they
are reasonable, treating people the same
The very idea of classification is that of  Juridical entities: Corporations have
inequality, so it goes without saying that the distinct advantages over natural persons,
mere fact of inequality does not determine such as limited liability. Corporations have a
the matter of constitutionality. separate personality from their officers or
stockholders and may incur liabilities, but the
All that is required for a valid classification is officers or stockholders are not personally
that it be liable. They are often focused on commercial,
income-generating properties and have
1. reasonable, which means the
greater resources for protection.
classification should be based on
substantial distinctions that make for real
differences;
2. it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
3. it must not be limited to existing conditions
only;
4. it must apply equally to each member of
the class.

The Court has held that the standard is

satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Recognition of degrees of harm: The equal

protection guarantee does not preclude the
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to the evils
as they may appear.

Three tests for reasonableness: The Court

applies three tests to determine the
reasonableness of a classification:

1. Strict scrutiny test: Applies when a

classification interferes with fundamental
rights or burdens suspect classes.
2. Intermediate scrutiny test: Applies
when the
classification does not involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.
3. Rational basis test: Applies to all other
subjects not covered by the first two tests.

Suspect class definition: A "suspect class" is

a group with disabilities, a history of unequal
treatment, or political powerlessness, which
commands extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.

Juridical Entities vs. Natural Persons:

 Natural persons: Properties of and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage
natural persons are typically used for collection fees.
residential purposes, and individuals
are directly responsible for liabilities Section 3 of SP-2095 provides:
they incur. They are often not
equipped with the same resources as SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special
juridical entities. assessment equivalent to one-half percent
(0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess
Rational Basis Test for Juridical of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
Entities: Juridical entities are not (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City
considered a "suspect class" and thus fall Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized
under the rational basis test. This test Housing Programs of
requires that there be a legitimate
government interest and a reasonable
connection between that interest and the
means used to achieve it.

Example of Rational Basis:

 Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47: The

rational basis test is applied in this case,
where a longer period of redemption is
given to natural persons whose
properties are often used for
residential purposes, while a shorter
period of redemption is given to
juridical entities whose properties are
often used for commercial purposes.
 The shorter redemption period for juridical
entities
helps ensure the solvency and liquidity
of banks. It also reduces the
uncertainty in ownership of
commercial properties, enabling
mortgagee-banks to dispose of assets
quickly.
 Thus, there is a legitimate government
interest in
protecting the banking industry and
the foreclosed residential properties of
natural persons. The shorter period of
redemption for juridical entities is a
reasonable means of achieving both
interests.

FERRER V BAUTISTA

Facts:

Petitioner, a QC property owner, assails the

constitutionality of two QC ordinances,
namely Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or
the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City
the Quezon City Government. The special development and housing programs. The law
assessment shall accrue to the General Fund allows the government to select tax subjects,
under a special account to be established for and such classifications do not
the purpose (i.e., programs and projects for infringe on constitutional
low-cost housing and other mass dwellings). equality.
 Confiscatory or Oppressive: The SHT is not
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S- confiscatory or oppressive. The tax is
2013 on garbage collection places the rates of reasonable, as it applies only to lands with an
the imposable fee dependent on the land or assessed value over P100,000 (higher than
floor area and whether the payee is an the threshold set by the law).
occupant of a lot, condominium, social
housing project, or apartment.

Issues:

1. WON SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized

Housing Tax (SHT) is valid.

a. WON the SHT is a tax which is within

the QC government to
impose.
b. WON the SHT violates the rule on
equality.
c. WON the SHT is confiscatory or
oppressive.

2. WON SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is

valid.

a. WON the Ordinance on Garbage Fee

violates the rule on double
taxation.
b. WON it violates the rule on equality.

Ruling:

1. SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing

Tax (SHT) is VALID.
 Validity of the Tax: The Socialized Housing
Tax (SHT) imposed by Quezon City is valid.
The city has the power to impose this tax
as it is intended to fund urban development
and low-cost housing projects. The tax
serves a regulatory purpose and is an
exercise of the city's police power for the
general welfare, benefiting both
underprivileged residents and property
owners by improving the community's
security and value.
 Equality: The SHT does not violate the rule
on equality.
The distinction between real property
owners and informal settlers is justified,
as the tax is aimed at promoting urban
 Additionally, the ordinance offers a tax occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m.
credit starting from the sixth year, making it and less have to pay a fixed rate of
fair and just. Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage
fee is imposed regardless of whether the
resident is from a condominium or from a
socialized housing project.
2. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is
INVALID. Although it does not violate Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance
the rule on double taxation, it No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared
nonetheless violates the rule on purpose of promoting shared responsibility
equality. with the residents to attack their common
mindless attitude in over-consuming the
a. SP-2235 does NOT violate the rule present resources and in generating waste.
on double taxation. The fee imposed Instead of simplistically categorizing the
for garbage collections under payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or
Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed unit of a condominium, socialized
for the regulation of an activity. In
Progressive Development Corporation
v. Quezon City, the Court declared that
if the generating of revenue is the
primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not
make the imposition a tax. In a U.S.
case, the garbage fee was considered
as a "service charge" rather than a tax
as it was actually a fee for a service
given by the city which had previously
been provided at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention
that the garbage fee under Ordinance
No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double
taxation must necessarily fail.

b. Yes, SP-2235 violates the rule on

equality. For the purpose of garbage
collection, there is, in fact, no substantial
distinction between an occupant of a lot,
on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in
a condominium, socialized housing project
or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these
types of occupants is uniform and does not
vary to a large degree; thus, a similar
schedule of fees is both just and equitable.
The rates being charged by the ordinance
are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a
200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or
socialized housing project has to pay twice
the amount than a resident of a lot similar
in size; unlike unit occupants, all
housing project or apartment, respondent City was internal and did not infringe upon due
Council should have considered factors that process.
could truly measure the amount of waste
generated and the appropriate fee for its ISSUE:
collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five
collection, population density of the barangay years of service as judges of first-level courts
or district, capacity to pay, and actual before they can
occupancy of the property.

VILLANUAVE V

JBC DOCTRINE:

The Supreme Court reiterates that the JBC

has the prerogative to establish additional
qualifications and standards for judicial
appointments beyond constitutional
requirements as long as these are
reasonable, based on rational classification,
and published accordingly.

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed as a presiding

judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) on 18
Sept 2012. On 27 Sept 2013, he applied for a
vacant position as a presiding judge in the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs), but on 18 Dec
2013, he was informed by the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) that he was not included in
the list of candidates.

The petitioner sought reconsideration, but on

3 Feb 2014, the JBC upheld its decision, citing
a policy that only judges with at least five
years of service in their current position are
considered for promotion to second-level
courts.

Petitioner's Argument: The petitioner

argued that the JBC's five-year service
requirement violated the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Constitution
and hindered equal opportunity for
employment. He contended that he met the
qualifications, including the required 10 years
of legal practice.

JBC & OSG's Response: The JBC and the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defended
the policy, stating it was based on performance
and experience and did not violate equal
protection. They also argued that the policy
qualify as applicants to second-level screen and differentiate applicants from the
courts violates the equal protection competition. The number of years of service
clause. provides a relevant basis to determine
proven competence, which may be measured
HELD: by experience, among other factors.

NO. The classification created by the challenged

policy satisfies the rational basis test.
The equal protection clause of the Substantial distinctions do exist between
Constitution does not require the lower court judges with five years of
universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what
it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification.

Based on the JBC's collective judgment,

those who have been judges of first-level
courts for five (5) years are better
qualified for promotion to second-level
courts. It deems the length of experience
as a judge as indicative of conversance
with the law and court procedure. Five
years is considered a sufficient span of
time for one to acquire professional skills
for the next level court and gain extensive
experience in the judicial process.

A five-year stint in the judiciary can also

provide evidence of the integrity, probity,
and independence of judges seeking
promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for
their promotion, they must have had a:

"Record of, and reputation for,

1. honesty,
2. integrity,
3. incorruptibility,
4. irreproachable conduct, and
5. fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards."

Likewise, their decisions must be

reflective of the soundness of their
judgment, courage, rectitude, cold
neutrality, and strength of character.

Consideration of experience by JBC as one

factor in choosing recommended
appointees does not constitute a violation
of the equal protection clause.

The JBC does not discriminate when it

employs the number of years of service to
experience and those with less than five
years of experience, like the petitioner, and
the classification enshrined in the assailed
policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules
that the questioned policy does not infringe
on the equal protection clause as it is based
on reasonable classification intended to
gauge the proven competence of the
applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid
and constitutional.