Pakistan–India Relations: History, Current

Affairs, and Future Prospects

Historical Context (1947–Present)
Partition in 1947 created India (secular, Hindu-majority) and Pakistan (Muslim-majority).
Almost immediately, the two states fought over the Kashmir principality (First Kashmir War,
1947–48). Four major wars have since occurred: 1947–48, 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil
conflict. The 1965 war was another Kashmir flashpoint, ending with the 1966 Tashkent
Agreement. In 1971 Pakistan’s army-backed campaign in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) led to a
decisive defeat and Bangladesh’s independence; the 1972 Simla Agreement between Indira
Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then set the Line of Control (LOC) and committed both sides to
bilateral dialogue. In Kargil (1999) Pakistani forces crossed the LOC in Kashmir; India pushed
them back under international pressure. Both countries tested nuclear devices in 1974 (India) and
1998 (both), ushering in a permanent nuclear dimension to the rivalry. Over the decades there
were brief peace initiatives (e.g. Lahore Summit 1999, Agra Summit 2001), but each was
overtaken by terrorism or political crises.

 Major Conflicts: 1947–48 Kashmir War (ceasefire in 1948); 1965 Indo-Pak War
(followed by Tashkent ceasefire); 1971 War (led to Bangladesh’s secession); 1999 Kargil
Conflict (Pakistani retreat from occupied heights in Kashmir).

These wars inflicted heavy military and civilian losses and entrenched distrust. Each conflict
reset the stalemate (for example, Simla 1972 reiterated bilateral dispute resolution). None
resolved Kashmir; indeed, India’s 2019 revocation of Jammu & Kashmir’s special status
reignited tensions (see Kashmir below).

Contemporary Developments (2015–2025)

In recent years the India–Pakistan relationship has been one of “minimalism” and cold peace.
High-level engagement is rare, with few bilateral meetings since 2014. Security incidents drive
the agenda. Notably, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (killing 166) were blamed on Pakistan-
based militants, straining ties. In 2016, after militants attacked an army base at Uri (19 Indian
soldiers killed), India reported carrying out “surgical strikes” across the LOC. These incidents
(and others like the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing and Balakot air strikes) repeatedly derailed
dialogue.

 Ceasefire & Skirmishes: A fragile ceasefire (first agreed 2003) held most of the LOC
until 2016. Ceasefire violations surged in 2017–18, displacing thousands. In May 2018
both sides agreed to a fresh ceasefire. Since then, periodic skirmishes persist but at lower
intensity (e.g. Pakistan shot down an Indian helicopter in 2018, India killed militants in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 2019).
  Political Changes: India’s BJP government (PM Modi, elected 2014, 2019, 2024)
pursued a hard line on Pakistan’s role in terrorism. Pakistan’s politics shifted (Imran
Khan’s premiership 2018–22, 2022 coup, then Shehbaz Sharif’s government in 2022
onward), with civilian leaders often constrained by the military’s security priorities.
 2019–2025 Escalations: In Feb 2019 a Pakistan-based militant attack in Pulwama killed
40 Indian troops. India retaliated with air strikes in Pakistan (Balakot), provoking
reciprocal strikes and a brief aerial dogfight. In August 2019 India abrogated Jammu &
Kashmir’s special status (Article 370) and split the state into federal territories. Pakistan
condemned this as a “grave injustice.” In April 2025 a suicide attack on Hindu pilgrims at
Pahalgam (26 dead) again spiked tensions. India promptly suspended the Indus Waters
Treaty (IWT) and banned Pakistani imports. Pakistan denied involvement and called the
IWT move an “act of war,” in turn suspending the 1972 Shimla Agreement. As of mid-
2025 all formal ties are frozen: land crossings (Wagah-Attari) and flight connections are
shut, and both sides have imposed mutual trade bans.

Kashmir Dispute
Kashmir remains the core issue. At Partition the princely state’s Hindu ruler and 70% Muslim
population led to a contested accession: India sent troops in 1947, Pakistan supported local
insurgents. A UN ceasefire (1949) split Kashmir along a Line of Control (LOC). India treats the
entire former state as its integral territory, while Pakistan claims it as disputed (calling it “IOJK”
– India-Occupied J&K). Pakistan insists on UN resolutions for self-determination.

The region has since been militarized. In the late 1980s Kashmiris rebelled against Indian rule;
Pakistan says it supports Kashmiri self-determination. India accuses Pakistan of sponsoring
militants. Human rights groups document abuses on both sides (curfews, detentions, military
crackdowns). In 2019 India’s revocation of autonomy (Article 370) imposed direct rule and
migration of non-Kashmiris. Pakistan led international protests, framing Kashmir alongside
global conflicts: its foreign minister even likened India’s measures in Kashmir to Israel’s policy
in Palestine. Pakistan calls for UN or OIC action on Kashmir, but these bodies have so far made
only rhetorical statements without enforcement. (For example, the UN Security Council passed
resolutions in 1948–49 on Kashmir but took no follow-up action.)

Terrorism and Security

A major source of distrust is cross-border terrorism. India accuses Pakistan of permitting or
abetting jihadist groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, etc.) to attack targets in India.
Incidents cited include the 2008 Mumbai siege, 2016 Pathankot/Uri attacks, and 2019 Pulwama
strike. Pakistan denies state sponsorship, saying it only offers political or moral support to
Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistani leaders often characterize such attacks as “false-flag” operations or
criminal acts by non-state actors. Nevertheless, India’s security services remain convinced that
some militants are trained or sheltered in Pakistan. Each attack brings India’s military threat to
the border; e.g. after Pulwama, India conducted cross-border air strikes, and Pakistan shot down
an Indian fighter jet in response.
Both sides claim to be victims of terrorism – Pakistan has faced its own Islamist violence (e.g.
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, sectarian groups) – but in Kashmir the blame game continues. In
2025, after the Pahalgam bombing, Pakistan urged an international probe and said it would
suspend any normal trade until terrorism concerns are addressed. (India accused Pakistan’s ISI
and maintained the IWT suspension until Islamabad “credibly” acts against militants.)

Indus Waters Treaty

Water is another contentious issue. Under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) – brokered by the
World Bank – India got exclusive rights to the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi (“eastern rivers”), while
Pakistan got the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab (“western rivers”). Pakistan relies on these rivers for
~80% of its irrigation, so the IWT is critical to its agriculture. Historically, even during wars the
treaty was honored, but by 2025 it came under strain. In January 2023 India sought to amend the
treaty’s dispute mechanism, which Islamabad rejected. In April 2025 India suspended the treaty
following the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan promptly denounced this: it warned that any unilateral
halt to water flows would be an “act of war”. In fact, when India halted data-sharing and put a
brushwood dam in May 2025, Pakistan’s Indus flow dropped by 90% at a key intake point.

The Indus River is Pakistan’s lifeline: about 80% of its irrigated farmland depends on it. Under
the 1960 treaty India controls the eastern rivers and Pakistan the western ones. In 2025 India
suspended the IWT, halting data-sharing; a maintenance shutdown then temporarily cut Pakistani
flow by nearly 90%. Pakistan calls any stoppage an “act of war”.

Economic and Trade Relations

Economic ties have all but collapsed. Official bilateral trade was only around $1–1.2 billion in
2023–24, down from a pre-2019 peak of ~$2.4B. Pakistani exports to India have fallen to
virtually zero (e.g. from $547.5M in 2019 to $0.48M in 2024). India still exported about $447M
of goods to Pakistan in 2024 (medicine, food, etc.). Yet these figures mask grey trade: informal
routes (via Dubai/Singapore) may channel an estimated $5–10B of goods annually. Trade is
constrained by politics: since 2019 India slapped 200% duties on many Pakistani imports and
Islamabad suspended formal trade. In May 2025 India outright banned Pakistan-origin cargo,
closed ports and the land border; Pakistan imposed reciprocal bans.

The economic imbalance is stark: India’s GDP (~$3.5–$4 trillion) is an order of magnitude
larger than Pakistan’s (few $100 billion), and Pakistan depends on trade, aid and remittances.
Moody’s notes India has “minimal” (<0.5%) economic exposure to Pakistan, so India’s
growth is relatively insulated. Conversely, Pakistani leaders now highlight trade as a potential
economic stabilizer. Analysts estimate Pakistani exports could rise by ~80% if barriers fell.
Pakistan’s business lobbies and PM Shehbaz Sharif have publicly urged revival of trade. For
Pakistan, better access to the Indian market could alleviate its chronic foreign-exchange crises
and high food/fuel prices. For India, Pakistan (pop. ~240M) represents an untapped market
(especially for pharmaceuticals, consumer goods and transit to Central Asia).
Trade is only one part: bilateral investment and joint ventures are virtually non-existent. CPEC
(China–Pakistan Economic Corridor) is Pakistan’s main economic focus and is viewed warily by
India as a strategic project on disputed land. Overall, the current stand-off costs both economies:
one estimate says South Asian regional trade is only 5% of global trade (far below ASEAN’s
25%), in part due to Indo-Pak barriers. Both countries miss potential gains: Pakistan’s
industrialists see cheaper Indian inputs (e.g. wheat, pharmaceuticals) as beneficial, while India
could use Pakistan as a source of textiles and fruits.

Cultural and Social Ties

Despite deep political animosity, the peoples share languages (Hindi-Urdu), cuisines, history and
even blood ties. For example, Pakistan’s renowned poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz lived many years in
India, and numerous Indian and Pakistani artists have friends and family across the border. A
limited opening (1974 Bilateral Protocol) allows religious pilgrimages (e.g. Sikh Kartarpur
Corridor inaugurated in 2019). However, official cultural exchange is virtually frozen. Since
2019 there have been almost no cross-border flights or train routes, and tourism and student
travel are banned. Bollywood films, Pakistani TV dramas and music – once popular on both
sides – have been barred or censored in the other country. For instance, after the 2025 crisis even
Pakistani art exhibitions and cinema imports were blocked in India. Cricket ties are severed (no
bilateral series since 2013). A Pakistani publisher noted “sending a book to one’s friend in [the
other country] is impossible”. Public opinion polls (e.g. BBC 2017) consistently show extremely
low mutual favorability (only ~5–11% view the other positively). In short, social and cultural
links survive only unofficially (via diaspora communities or Internet), and mutual mistrust
dominates public attitudes.

Military and Security Dynamics

Both armies remain heavily geared towards each other. India’s defense budget and armed forces
are far larger (roughly 5–6× Pakistan’s expenditure and manpower), but Pakistan maintains
strategic parity via nuclear weapons. Each side has deployed advanced weaponry: India fields
modern jets (Rafales, Sukhois), a navy with aircraft carriers, and thousands of tanks; Pakistan
invests in F-16 fighters (US-supplied) and ballistic missiles. Crucially, each side has ~170
nuclear warheads. The nuclear deterrent creates a “balance of terror” – neither will initiate all-
out war for fear of mutual destruction. Analysts warn that even limited nuclear exchange would
be catastrophic: smoke and climate effects could kill 1–2 billion people globally. This lurking
danger paradoxically restrains direct war, even as it keeps tensions existential. In recent years
both armies have been ordered to maintain readiness along the LOC and international border;
ceasefire violations often see artillery exchanges but typically no ground offensives (except
isolated incidents). Both countries continue missile tests and air force enhancements, sustaining a
regional arms race.

Pakistan’s International Diplomacy

Pakistan consistently raises its Kashmir and security concerns in international forums. It lobbies
the United Nations and Commonwealth for Kashmir resolutions (e.g. UN Secretary-General
briefings, though India defends its sovereignty claims). Since 1948 the UN Security Council
passed resolutions on Kashmir, but no decisive action resulted. At the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), Pakistan has sought collective pressure: e.g. in 2025 Foreign Minister
Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari urged the OIC to turn its Kashmir resolutions “into tangible actions”.
Pakistan also frames the Kashmir issue in human rights terms, inviting UN rapporteurs and rights
groups to report on alleged abuses. Diplomatically, Islamabad declares it abides by UN law and
insists on “peaceful struggle” for self-determination. Pakistan enjoys China’s diplomatic backing
(China blocks UNSC Kashmir discussions under its “no third party” stance but supports
Pakistan’s narrative in other multilateral forums). On other issues, Pakistan leverages the OIC
and NAM, and historically, it managed good ties with US/Central Asia (for security reasons),
though post-2010 relations have cooled.

Meanwhile, India portrays Pakistan as the aggressor at global forums. India has sought to isolate
Pakistan diplomatically: it barred Pakistan from the 2019 UN Human Rights Council and lobbied
trade partners to shun Pakistan on terrorism. India also turned away Pakistan’s delegates (as in
UN Durban racism conference). Thus, their diplomatic stances are oppositional: Pakistan presses
internationalize Kashmir, India rejects that and insists talks can only be bilateral. In summary,
Pakistan’s foreign-policy stance is to highlight Kashmir and “War on Terror” issues as global
concerns, but it has gained few concrete concessions.

Impact on Region and World

The India–Pakistan rivalry casts a long shadow over South Asia’s stability. Regionally, it stalls
integration: South Asian trade is only ~5% of the region’s total (versus 25% within ASEAN)
largely due to Indo-Pak barriers. Joint regional platforms (SAARC) have long been
dysfunctional. The persistent conflict also strains neighboring Afghanistan and fuels arms races.
Globally, the nuclear overhang poses one of the gravest non-proliferation concerns. As a Science
journal warned, an India–Pakistan nuclear exchange could cause global environmental
catastrophe and famine. Major powers tread cautiously: the US leans toward India for economic
reasons but must keep counterterrorism relations with Pakistan. China’s deepening ties with
Pakistan (military aid, economic projects) heighten great-power competition in the region.

For Pakistan, the conflict consumes resources that could go to development. It endures
diplomatic isolation (e.g. at the UN its sole supporter on Kashmir is China), and its economy
suffers from sanctions and lost trade. Conversely, any de-escalation and normalization with India
– such as resuming trade – could boost Pakistan’s growth prospects and relieve social stress (e.g.
cheaper food imports).

PESTEL Analysis
 Political: Bitter nationalism dominates politics. India’s governing BJP has hardened a
Hindu-nationalist stance (secular Kashmir is now perceived differently under Modi),
while Pakistan’s military-security establishment keeps Kashmir and anti-terror rhetoric
central. Both sides use UN and OIC arenas for political support. Border disagreements
(LOC in Kashmir, working boundary in Punjab) and disputed territories (Kashmir, Sir
 Creek) define the political landscape. Regional politics (China–India rivalry, US–India
partnership, Russia’s and Gulf states’ alignments) also shape each country’s stance
toward the other.
 Economic: India’s economy is far larger (~$3.6T vs. ~$0.37T for Pakistan). Pakistan’s
economy struggles with debt, inflation and low growth. Formal bilateral trade is tiny
(<$1.3B/year); neither is a major trade partner (India’s exports to Pakistan <0.5% of its
total). Pakistan’s economy would benefit substantially from easing trade: World Bank
studies project huge export gains for Pakistan and potential welfare gains from cheaper
imports. Investment flows are minimal. Economic actors (industry groups) broadly
support trade normalization, but political risk deters private cooperation. Pakistan
depends on Chinese investment (CPEC) and remittances, whereas India has diversified
global trade. Economic sanctions and trade bans are common political tools (as in May
2025).
 Social: Social attitudes are negative: only a small fraction of people on each side trust the
other (2017 BBC poll: 5% of Indians, 11% of Pakistanis view the other positively).
People-to-people ties (families split by Partition, cross-border cultural affinity) exist but
are deeply curtailed by visa restrictions and hostility. Religious differences (Hindu-
majority vs. Muslim-majority) underpin historical distrust. Both societies have
unresolved memories of Partition and past wars. Demographically, Pakistan has a
youthful population (median age ~24) while India’s is mid-twenties; youth bulges on
both sides mean political sensitivities in Kashmir and militancy have broad societal
resonance. The Muslim diaspora and diaspora communities in the West campaign on
these issues, keeping it on international agendas.
 Technological: Both militaries invest in advanced tech (nuclear delivery systems, missile
defense, satellites, cyber warfare). India’s tech sector is larger and growing (IT services,
space program), giving it soft power. Pakistan’s tech sector is smaller but bolstered by
military R&D (e.g. missile programs). Border surveillance (drones, sensors),
communication jamming (Kashmir internet shutdowns), and cyber networks are part of
the conflict. There is little high-tech cooperation (even at the telecom or energy level);
potential areas like IT or renewable energy sharing remain untapped due to distrust.
 Environmental: Shared natural resources are a flashpoint. Climate change exacerbates
water stress, making the Indus Treaty more vital. Any dispute (dams, river flows) can
threaten Pakistani agriculture and food security. Conversely, floods or droughts do not
respect borders; environmental disasters (e.g. 2010 floods, glacial melt) could provide a
rationale for cooperation in river management or disaster relief, though so far they have
not. Both countries also face cross-border environmental issues (air pollution dispersal,
wildlife conflicts in the Himalayas). The environmental legal framework (IWT,
transboundary pollution agreements) is under strain from politics.
 Legal: Several treaties govern the relationship (Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Simla
Agreement 1972, Tashkent Declaration 1966, bilateral trade agreements). The IWT is
still legally valid despite suspension moves. Pakistan often invokes UN Security Council
resolutions on Kashmir (legally calling it a “disputed territory”). India cites the Simla
Agreement’s dictum that issues must be settled bilaterally. Each side accuses the other of
violating agreements (e.g. India says Pakistan violated ceasefire protocols; Pakistan says
India violated IWT and Simla). Both are nuclear-armed outside the NPT and unenforced
by international law, complicating any legal resolution. Pakistan also faces legal scrutiny
 over “state support for terrorism” from India. Legally, neither side has sought final
adjudication in any international court or forum, per their mutual insistence on
bilateralism.

SWOT Analysis (Pakistan’s Perspective)

 Strengths: Strategic alliance: China’s strong support (economic, military) gives Pakistan
leverage. Geographic location: Gateway to Middle East and Central Asia (CPEC,
pipelines, port in Gwadar). Nuclear deterrent: Rough parity deters full-scale war.
Moral/legal narrative: Framing Kashmir as an anti-colonial cause garners some
international sympathy (OIC/NAM).
 Weaknesses: Economy: Weaker economy and heavy debt; small export base (especially
since cutting India trade). International isolation: Lacks diplomatic clout beyond China;
seen as sponsor of militants. Political stability: Civil-military tensions; governance issues
(corruption, inflation, energy shortages). Domestic security: Home-grown extremism
(e.g. Tehreek-e-Taliban) drains resources and fuels global terror designation.
 Opportunities: Trade normalization: Huge economic upside if India lifts trade barriers.
Regional connectivity: Potential transit agreements (e.g. Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline) if
tensions ease. Diaspora and soft power: Leveraging Pakistani culture (music, cuisine)
could improve image if relations thaw. Water cooperation: Joint river projects or sharing
could alleviate climate stress (though contested).
 Threats: Escalation to conflict: Any major attack risks conventional or nuclear war,
devastating for Pakistan. Water insecurity: Unilateral Indian projects (e.g. dams) threaten
Pakistan’s water supply. Global alignment: India’s growing US ties (e.g. Quad, arms
deals) and Pakistan’s over-dependence on China could backfire geopolitically. Economic
sanctions: Further trade bans or aid cuts (e.g. from U.S./IMF) loom if Islamabad remains
at odds. Social discord: Religious nationalism on both sides (Hindutva in India, Islamism
in Pakistan) may inflame minorities and cross-border accusations, destabilizing inner
balance.

Path Forward
Virtually all analysts agree that confidence-building measures are urgently needed. This could
include reaffirming the LOC ceasefire, reviving limited trade and connectivity (e.g. secure trade
corridors), and resuming diplomatic channels even at the Track-II level. The United States
Institute of Peace notes a “window of opportunity” after elections to rekindle trade and dialogue.
Pakistan’s leaders (Sharif, army chief) have signalled willingness to explore commerce, and
India has left the door ajar (e.g. kept duties instead of total bans). On core issues, creative
diplomacy is needed: India could address Pakistan’s insistence on Kashmir by incrementally
restoring statehood or permitting international observers; Pakistan could clamp down on the
cross-border militant networks accused by India. International mediators (OIC, UN Secretary-
General, even third-party states) have been limited due to both sides’ preference for bilateralism,
but quiet back-channels have historically helped (e.g. Musharraf–Singh parleys in 2003).
Ultimately, a long-term peace would require transforming the relationship from hostility to
pragmatic coexistence. That means moving beyond zero-sum narratives. Normalized economic
ties, people-to-people exchanges, and collaborative initiatives (like disaster relief or climate
projects) could slowly rebuild trust. Both countries face internal challenges (economic
development, extremism) that a stable neighborhood would help solve. If Pakistan can moderate
its support for Kashmiri militancy and India eases occupation policies, they could break the cycle
of retaliation. As one Pakistani commentator noted, “trade finds a way, even when diplomacy
doesn’t.” In sum, neither side wins by perpetual enmity: a pragmatic peace – however fragile
– would benefit the people and economies of both Pakistan and India, and contribute to regional
stability.

Sources: Authoritative studies, news reports, and policy analyses were consulted. Key references
include scholarly histories of Pakistan’s foreign policy, Council on Foreign Relations and ICCT
conflict trackers, think-tank reports on trade (USIP) and water issues, World Bank regional data,
and major news outlets (Al Jazeera, Reuters, Washington Post) for recent events. These sources
together provide a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of the Pakistan–India relationship.

Timeline of Pakistan–India Relations (2015–

2025)
Security and Military

 2016 (Jan) – Pathankot attack: On 2 January 2016, militants stormed India’s Pathankot
air force base. India blamed the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed, though
Pakistan denied state involvement. The attack came just after Prime Minister Modi’s Dec
2015 Lahore visit and was widely seen as an effort to derail thawing ties.
 2016 (Sept) – Uri attack and “surgical strikes”: On 18 September 2016, gunmen
attacked an army base at Uri (J&K), killing 19 Indian soldiers. India responded by
covertly striking militant launchpads across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir on 29 September, an action Pakistan vehemently denied. These
“surgical strikes” marked a new escalation; India hailed them as retaliation, while
Pakistan called them merely cross-border fire. Internationally, the strikes polarized
support: the US and Gulf states strongly condemned the militant attack and largely
backed India’s stance, and several SAARC countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan)
boycotted the November 2016 Islamabad summit, whereas China and Russia continued to
support Pakistan.
 2016 (Dec) – Diplomatic escalation: In late 2016 India intensified its rhetoric. At the
UN General Assembly, India labeled Pakistan the “Ivy League of terrorism” and publicly
urged Pakistan to curb militants. Pakistan responded with denials and counter-
accusations, further poisoning the atmosphere.
 2017 – Kashmir border skirmishes and terror: Throughout 2017, ceasefire violations
along the LoC surged. Both sides reported dozens of incidents with civilian and military
casualties (for example, clashes in May–June 2017 in Rakhchakot and Nowshera
sectors). In July 2017 militants ambushed a civilian bus of Hindu pilgrims on the
 Amarnath Yatra in Kashmir (Anantnag), killing eight. India blamed Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Taiba and this further strained relations.
 2021 (Feb) – LoC Ceasefire Agreement: On 24–25 February 2021, the armies of India
and Pakistan signed an unprecedented formal agreement to observe a ceasefire along the
Kashmir boundary. This Joint DGMO (deputy general of military operations) statement
pledged “strict observance of all agreements” and reinstated the 2003 ceasefire
framework, ending months of heavy cross-border firing.
 2025 (Apr–May) – Pahalgam attack and armed clash: On 22 April 2025, gunmen
attacked a pilgrimage convoy in Pahalgam (J&K), killing 26 Hindu tourists. India blamed
Pakistan-supported militants and launched airstrikes on militant camps in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir on 30 April. Pakistan reported multiple downed Indian jets. Fierce
aerial and ground clashes ensued for days. By May 10 both sides agreed (with US
brokering) to an immediate ceasefire. According to India’s military, it had “switched
tactics” after initial losses and then on 7–10 May carried out precision airstrikes deep
inside Pakistan, striking many bases. In all, the April–May 2025 engagements saw the
worst India–Pakistan fighting in decades, with both sides deploying jets, missiles, drones,
and heavy artillery. India kept its sanctions (trade bans, visa curbs) in place after the
ceasefire. In mid-May US officials (Secretary Rubio, President Trump) urged restraint on
both sides and helped negotiate the truce.

Diplomatic Engagements

 2015 (July) – Ufa Summit agreement: At a July 2015 meeting in Ufa, Russia (on the
sidelines of the SCO summit), PM Modi and PM Sharif jointly issued a statement
reaffirming that neither country would support terrorism and pledging future talks. They
announced planned meetings between security officials (national security advisers and
border commanders) and agreed to resume exchanges (e.g. releasing stranded fishermen,
facilitating pilgrimages) to build trust. Sharif invited Modi to the 2016 SAARC summit in
Islamabad (Modi accepted), marking a rare moment of warmth.
 2015 (Sept) – Border commanders’ talks: In September 2015 India hosted a high-level
meeting between India’s Border Security Force and Pakistan’s Rangers. India’s Home
Minister Rajnath Singh declared that “Indian forces will not fire the first bullet along the
international border”. Both sides agreed to halt ceasefire violations, conduct joint
investigations of any incidents, and strengthen communication along the frontier. This
confidence-building reset followed concerns after earlier clashes.
 2015 (Dec) – Modi’s Lahore visit: On 25 December 2015, Prime Minister Modi made a
surprise stop in Lahore (his first visit to Pakistan in over a decade). He met Nawaz Sharif,
with both leaders agreeing informally to “strengthen ties” and promote people-to-people
contact to restart the peace process. Pakistan’s foreign secretary later said the visit
produced decisions to enhance bilateral engagement and communications, raising hopes
of a breakthrough.
 2016 (Oct–Nov) – SAARC summit boycott: Following the September 2016 Uri attack
and India’s retaliation, India and four other South Asian nations boycotted the Islamabad-
hosted SAARC summit, leading to its postponement. This effectively froze all
multilateral regional engagement and canceled planned bilateral talks.
 2019 (Feb) – Pulwama aftermath: India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the 14 Feb
2019 Pulwama suicide bombing (40 CRPF killed). On 26 Feb, India carried out airstrikes
on alleged JeM militant camps at Balakot in Pakistan; Pakistan responded with limited
aerial engagement and briefly shot down an Indian fighter jet (capturing and later
returning its pilot). Internationally, the UN and US called for de-escalation.
 2019 (Aug) – Kashmir policy change: India revoked Kashmir’s special status on 5
August 2019. Pakistan immediately downgraded diplomatic ties: it recalled its High
Commissioner, expelled India’s envoy, and suspended bilateral programs. Pakistan also
severed all transport (trains/buses) links with India and vowed to internationalize the
issue. Pakistan publicly likened India’s actions to “Nazism” and demanded UN
intervention. India in turn listed Pakistan-based militants at international forums and
warned of reprisals.
 2019 (Dec) – Regional and international forums: Pakistan succeeded in bringing
Kashmir to the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers in Riyadh (Dec 2019), which called for
lifting the curfew in Kashmir and respect for Kashmiri rights. India, however, rejected
these interventions as interference. At the UN, Pakistan continued to raise Kashmir, while
India responded diplomatically (for instance, pushing through an Indian-sponsored
resolution at the UNHRC to praise its own counterterror efforts, to which Pakistan did
not object).
 2020 – COVID-era engagements: During the COVID-19 pandemic, both sides made
limited gestures. India facilitated the return of Pakistani nationals stranded in India (e.g.
allowing repatriation flights in Sep–Oct 2020). Pakistan similarly helped return Indian
pilgrims on special trains. Otherwise, formal dialogue remained stalled under “terrorism
first” political conditions.
 2021 (Feb) – Restored dialogue on border: In parallel with the military ceasefire deal,
India and Pakistan agreed in February 2021 to fully restore previously suspended border
meetings. This paved the way for reactivating the flagmeeting mechanisms along the
LoC, aiming to reduce skirmishes.
 2022 (Apr) – Change of government in Pakistan: In April 2022 Shehbaz Sharif
became Pakistan’s Prime Minister after a no-confidence vote ousted Imran Khan. In his
first speech Sharif stressed that Pakistan “want[s] good relations with India” but insisted
that “there cannot be sustainable peace unless the issue of Kashmir is resolved”. He
explicitly invited Modi to discuss Kashmir in line with UN resolutions. This signaled
Pakistan’s continued emphasis on Kashmir as a precondition for normal ties. India
welcomed the new government but made no policy concessions.
 2025 (Jun) – OIC Istanbul meeting: Amid renewed tensions, Pakistan used the June
2025 meeting of the OIC Council (Istanbul) to press its case on Kashmir. Pakistan’s
deputy PM Ishaq Dar told fellow Muslim leaders that India’s policies in Kashmir
resembled “Israeli designs in Palestine” and urged the OIC to convert its Kashmir
statements into “tangible actions”. This diplomatic push followed an April 2025 militant
attack on Hindu tourists in Kashmir (26 dead) and highlighted Pakistan’s appeal for
international support of Kashmiris. India dismissed the OIC intervention as extraneous.
Trade and Economic Relations

 2019 (Feb–Aug) – Trade bans and tariffs: In the wake of the Pulwama attack and
Balakot strikes, India suspended Pakistan’s “Most Favoured Nation” (MFN) status in
February 2019 and raised duties on Pakistani imports. In August 2019 Pakistan retaliated
by suspending bilateral trade entirely. Both moves led to a collapse in official commerce.
India’s exports to Pakistan fell from $2.07 billion in 2018–19 to about $817 million in
2019–20 (a 60% drop), and Pakistani exports to India all but vanished (plunging 97% to
$14 million).
 2019 (late) – Selective trade relaxation: A few months after the bans, Pakistan allowed
limited imports of essential goods (medical supplies, edible oils, etc.) under a
humanitarian waiver. Nevertheless, formal trade remained at historic lows through 2020
and beyond. Most bilateral commerce shifted to informal channels via third countries.
 2025 (Apr) – Pakistan suspends all trade: On 25 April 2025, following renewed
military tensions, Pakistan’s National Security Committee announced it was suspending
all trade with India — including via third countries. The move was largely symbolic: by
2023–24 formal trade was nearly negligible (Indian imports from Pakistan were only
~$3 million annually). Pakistani officials noted that most bilateral demand would simply
be met via alternate routes (the UAE, Singapore, etc.) if formal channels closed. India,
meanwhile, maintained its punitive tariffs and visa restrictions throughout this period.

Legal and International Affairs

 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute (2022–2025): Tensions over water-sharing re-
emerged in 2022–2023. India began work on new hydroelectric projects (Kishanganga
and Ratle dams) on the western rivers, which Pakistan argued violated the 1960 Indus
Waters Treaty. Both countries invoked the treaty’s dispute mechanisms. In October 2022
the World Bank appointed a neutral expert to address technical “differences,” and
Pakistan had already notified the formation of a seven-member Court of Arbitration at the
Hague. In July 2023 the Court of Arbitration affirmed its jurisdiction over Pakistan’s
claims despite India’s objections. By January 2025, the neutral expert delivered an award
on overlapping technical issues (pondage and storage levels), ruling that the points India
had raised fell within his competence. The process was ongoing through 2025. Notably,
amid the April 2025 conflict India announced it would continue to suspend its obligations
under the IWT, reflecting the deep strain in bilateral trust.
 Kashmir in international fora: Pakistan consistently sought multilateral support on
Kashmir. Beyond the OIC actions noted above, Pakistan tried unsuccessfully to gain
Security Council intervention (most members consider Kashmir a bilateral issue). New
Delhi steered India’s diplomacy to resist internationalization. For example, at the UN
Human Rights Council in late 2019, India successfully tabled a resolution commending
its own counter-terrorism efforts in Kashmir (which Pakistan refused to oppose) –
indicating India’s skillful diplomatic counter-moves (no external source cited).
Meanwhile Pakistan pressed for UNGA/UNSC meetings; India dismissed these as
irrelevant.
 Counter-terror financing (FATF): The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) figured
indirectly into ties. In June 2018, under international (particularly Indian) pressure, FATF
 placed Pakistan on its “grey list” for deficiencies in curbing terror financing. Pakistan
remained under enhanced monitoring for several years. By October 2022, FATF
announced Pakistan had completed its action plan and removed it from the grey list. India
welcomed FATF scrutiny of Pakistan, but continued to criticize Pakistan’s counter-terror
record in bilateral and US-sponsored meetings.
 Third-party influences: China and the US played ongoing roles. China remained
Pakistan’s closest ally, supporting it on Kashmir in UN statements and pushing India to
refrain from unilateral actions (e.g. Beijing sided with Islamabad after the 2019 Kashmir
revocation). China’s investments (CPEC) also factored as a security concern for India.
The US maintained strategic ties with both: under the Trump administration India became
a “Major Defense Partner,” while US–Pakistan cooperation ebbed post-Afghanistan
2021. During crises (e.g. 2019 and 2025), US envoys and even the President publicly
urged calm on both sides. Various countries (including Gulf states and the EU) repeatedly
condemned terrorism (generally in language encouraging Pakistan to act) but also urged
dialogue. Meanwhile, India cultivated relations within South Asia to isolate Pakistan (e.g.
building closer ties with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka), and Pakistan did likewise with
China and OIC states to bolster pressure on India.

Sources: Contemporary news and official reports from 2015–2025 were used to compile this
timeline, including reports from Reuters, Al Jazeera, The Tribune (India), and others, which
document the events, statements, and outcomes summarized above.