After the Arab Spring

Power Shift
in the Middle East?

SPECIALREPORT
SR011 May 2012
 SPECIALREPORT

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2
 Contents
SR011 May 2012

Executive Summary 3
Nicholas Kitchen, Editor, IDEAS Reports

From the ‘Arab Awakening’ to the Arab Spring;

the Post-Colonial State in the Middle East 5
Toby Dodge

The Arab Uprisings: Revolution or Protests? 12

George Lawson

The Uprisings

Tunisia 18
Fatima El-Issawi

Egypt 23
Ewan Stein

Bahrain 28
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Libya 33
Ranj Alaaldin

Syria 37
Christopher Phillips

Yemen 43
Tobias Thiel

Power Shifts?

Iran 49
Naysan Rafati

United States 53
Nicholas Kitchen

Israel 59
Yaniv Voller

Conclusion: the Middle East After the Arab Spring 64

Toby Dodge

1
 Executive Summary
Nicholas Kitchen, Editor, IDEAS Reports

The events of the Arab Spring were an inevitable surprise. In a region where political oppression and
economic under-development were most keenly felt among a demographic bubble of well-educated
youth, the classic conditions for revolution were met. However, few could have predicted the spark that
would ignite a wave of protest across the region, the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor who
felt humiliated by his treatment at the hands of petty local officials.

The final outcome of the protests across the region is still uncertain, but more than a year on, events
have settled into patterns sufficiently to allow an interim assessment of their success. Four dictators have
been forced from power. Relatively orderly and peaceful political transitions are underway in Tunisia and
Egypt, the two countries that led the revolutionary wave in 2011.

Yet the positives are few and far between. Tunisia’s transition is mired in sectarian rancour and economic
malaise. In Egypt, the hopes of the Tahrir protestors have given way to a military authority concerned
only for its interests and no more concerned for human rights than the regime it had refused to support.
The Libyan rebels that with NATO’s assistance defeated Gadaffi’s forces now fight among themselves
for the direction of an increasing fractured transition. Syria is in the throes of civil war with no end in
sight; Yemen appears to be heading in the same direction.

Moreover, the Arab monarchies, for so long coup-proofed by their oil wealth and US patronage, remain
redoubtable, their survival assured by their strategic and economic importance. The world’s wealthy
returned to the region just last week for the Bahrain Grand Prix despite the continuing repression of
protestors by the regime.

Toby Dodge concludes this report by noting that ‘successful revolutions are very rare indeed’. Revolutions
entail not just regime change, but a reordering of politics: the replacement of ideas as well as elites. There
is little evidence that the events of the Arab Spring represent such a revolution in the region. In most cases,
the regimes have emerged scarred but broadly intact. Where the protestors have succeeded in forcing
regime change, the emerging new elites are conspicuous by their ties to the discredited structures of
the past. Moreover, as George Lawson notes here, the protests themselves lacked a genuine narrative of
change; united by little more than a generalised commitment to individual rights the protests articulated
little in terms of what might replace the prevailing socio-economic contracts in the region.

Behind the headlines then, this report’s conclusions are pessimistic. The authors here find little evidence
to suggest that future historians will rank the events of 2011 with those of 1848, or 1989. Simply too
few of the fundamentals of social, economic and political organisation in the Arab world have been
successfully contested by the protests. Of course, the resistance is not over, and this can only be an
interim assessment, particularly as policymakers in Washington appear set to escalate the United States’
commitment to regime change in Syria, and as the prospect for greater conflict with Iran persists.
The transitions underway may yet prove more far-reaching and durable than we predict. But as 2011’s
Spring turns into 2012’s summer, the answer to the question of whether there has been a power shift
in the Middle East, is a decisive ‘not yet’.■

2
After the Arab Spring:
Power Shift in the
Middle East
Contributors

RANJ ALAALDIN is a PhD candidate at the LSE, studying the Shias of Iraq. He is a Senior Analyst at the
Next Century Foundation and travels regularly to the MENA region, including recent stints in Iraq and Libya.

TOBY DODGE is a Reader in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at LSE.
He is also the Head of the Middle East Programme at IDEAS.

DR FATIMA EL ISSAWI is a visiting fellow at POLIS, the journalism and society think tank in the Department
of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics. She is leading a research project
on ‘Arab revolutions: Media Revolutions’ looking at transformations in the Arab media industry under
political transitions, funded by Open Society.

NICHOLAS KITCHEN is a Research Fellow at LSE IDEAS and the Editor of IDEAS Reports. His book,
Strategy in US Foreign Policy, will be published by Routledge in 2012.

GEORGE LAWSON is a Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at LSE and a member of
the LSE IDEAS Management Committee. His books include: Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic,
South Africa and Chile (2005), and Anatomies of Revolution (2013).

CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS is Lecturer in the International Relations of the Middle East at Queen Mary,
University of London. He was formerly Syria and Jordan analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit.
His first book, Everyday Arab Identity: the Daily Reproduction of the Arab World will be published by
Routledge in September 2012.

KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN is the Research Director of the Kuwait Programme on Development,
Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, based in the Department of Government at the London
School of Economics and Political Science.

EWAN STEIN is a lecturer in politics and international relations at the School of Social and Political
Science, University of Edinburgh.

TOBIAS THIEL is a PhD Candidate in the International History Department at LSE. He has conducted
field research in Yemen between 2010 and 2012 for his dissertation about collective memory, social
movements and political violence in Yemen.

YANIV VOLLER is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the LSE, where he works on separatism
and Middle East geopolitics. He is also an assistant for the Middle East International Affairs Programme
at LSE IDEAS. He holds degrees in Middle East Studies from Tel Aviv University and SOAS.
From the ‘Arab Awakening’
to the Arab Spring;
the Post-colonial State
in the Middle East
Toby Dodge

T he consequences of the political turmoil that swept across the Middle East in 2011 support
the claim that those twelve months have been the most politically significant in the region
for over fifty years. The tragic self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi
Bouzid on December 17, 2010 was not just the final desperate act of an individual ground down
by state corruption, repression and incompetence. His suicide gave rise to a region-wide wave of
sympathy, an empathy that was quickly politicised by the mass recognition of his desperation:
the long-term failure of Arab states to deliver on promises of citizenship, political freedom
and economic development. Mohamed Bouazizi’s death triggered a powerful movement of
political mobilisation challenging the governing elites of the Middle East. Within a month this
movement had forced the Tunisian President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to seek refuge in Saudi
Arabia after twetnty-four years of rule. Ten days after his departure, mass demonstrations
spread to Egypt and dominated the centre of Cairo. Faced with a popular movement of Cairo’s
youth, the army were reluctant to face public opprobrium and chose not to fire on the crowd.
By February 11, Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for thirty years, was forced from office.
The strength of popular protest was such that two dictators had been driven from office,
and the remaining ruling elites in Tunisia and Egypt were compelled to hold free and fair
parliamentary elections in an attempt to meet the democratic demands of its population.

The arrival of democratic government in the Middle East has long been predicted, but, until 2011,
perennially delayed. Much to the surprise of historians and social scientists, and to the anger of a great
deal of their own population, the externally imposed, weak and illegitimate post-colonial states of the
region had proved to be remarkably stable and militantly autonomous in the face of sustained domestic,
regional and international challenges.

With the exception of Iran in 1979, after the initial phase of post-colonial consolidation it was the
mid-1980s that saw the first major ‘crisis’ of the Middle Eastern state. This was caused by the collapse
of the international oil price in 1985 and the failure of import substitution-led industrial growth.
By the mid-1980s, an economically liberal if not politically democratic breakthrough appeared imminent
as the capacity of states to deliver on promises of economic and social development came to an end.

5
The sense of democratic possibility again came to THE RISE OF POST-COLONIAL ARAB STATE
the fore after the Gulf War of 1990–1. The fall of
the Berlin Wall, the liberation of Kuwait by US-led Part of the reason for the longevity of ruling regimes
forces and the increasing influence of the International across the region rests on the fact that post-colonial
Monetary Fund and the Word Bank were all thought states of the Middle East entered the international
to be potential catalysts for change. Sadly, the hopes system at a specific economic and ideological moment.
of the early 1990s were not realised. They bear the heritage of this admission both in the
economic policies the regimes deployed until the
Finally, in the aftermath of Al-Qaeda’s attacks in the 1980s and in the regime type and leadership method.
United States on September 11, 2001, a degree of The seizure of the Egyptian state by Gamal Abdel
hope spread amongst the liberal intelligentsia of Nasser and fellow free officers in 1952 signalled not
the Middle East. Discussions amongst democratic only the abolition of the Egyptian monarchy but also
activists across the region and their colleagues in the rise of radical republicanism at the heart of the
exile in Europe and America were bolstered by an Middle Eastern state system. It is the final removal of
optimism that the atrocities committed in New the descendents of this influential regime that makes
York and Washington would act as a catalyst for the Arab Spring so historically important.
long awaited political change. This liberal optimism
predicted that the outmoded and anachronistic rulers, The republican states of the Mashreq and Maghreb,
embarrassing relics from the post-colonial Cold War Algeria, Tunisia, Libya Egypt, Iraq and Syria, strove to
era, would finally succumb to the inexorable forces of distance themselves from their former colonial masters
globalisation. The hoped-for result would see the rise between the 1950s and 1970s. The independence
of democratic government, eagerly anticipatedlong they strove to establish was influenced by the then
awaited in the salons, diwaniyya and lecture theatres dominant international economic and political trends
of the region. that gave legitimacy, financial support and technical
assistance to state-driven modernisation across the
To a certain extent the pundits of the liberal diwaniyya third world. Both Eastern bloc and Western aid
were not initially disappointed. The administration of donors favoured state-led development models, with
George W. Bush agreed with their analysis of Middle academics in the developing world also encouraged
East state autonomy and the need for a muscular the state’s dominance of the economy, as a way of
external stimulus to trigger change across the region. increasing the national autonomy of late-industrialising
However, the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq countries in the international economy.
were unexpected. Regime change in Baghdad did
send shock waves across the region. But, if anything, As the Arab post-colonial republican regimes strove
the chaos and violence that exploded in Iraq in its to consolidate their power, they faced indigenous
aftermath allowed the rulers in the region to tighten economic classes that lacked the financial power or
their grip, as they could portray themselves as social coherence to pose an effective challenge to
guardians of order and stability. the state’s dominance of its population. The military
bureaucrats that now staffed the main institutions of
Against this background, it is the indigenous popular the state were comparatively unrestrained by domestic
movements triggered by the death of Mohamed interest groups as they attempted to transform society
Bouazizi, rather than external catalysts, that have by unleashing what Ellen Trimberger aptly described as
had the transformatory effects long awaited across a ‘revolution from above’. Their aim was to ‘modernise’
the Middle East. Their destabilising dynamics are still both economy and society without mobilising a mass
unfolding in both Libya and Syria. However, these political movement that could threaten their newly
movements raise the larger analytical question of why obtained political power. This strategy of sustained
did it take so long? Why, until 2011, have the regimes demobilisation was broadly successful until 2011.
of the Middle East been able to defend their autonomy
in the face of economic failure, international change
and domestic discontent?
6
The ‘revolutions from above’ pursued by republican Clientalism provided the link between the ruling
regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Syria elite and its immediate trusted circles and, by way of
were pragmatic, and implemented in a step-by-step widening circles of patron–client relationships, a sizable
manner. However, the economic goals of state-driven minority of the population. This system did not link
development served political ends. By intervening politicians with the ‘public’ in a democratic contract
directly in the economy, by instigating widespread but tied patrons personally with their associates, clients
land reform in the name of national development, the and supporters.
republican regimes directly attacked the foundations
of the ancien regime and replaced those formerly Neo-patrimonialism as a method of political rule is
empowered by colonial state building. The policies of inherently unstable. It is based on unequal access
state-driven development were intended to destroy to government resources and it constantly creates
large landowners whose prestige and economic wealth and recreates constituencies of the dispossessed and
had constituted the unstable social base of the previous resentful. It was these constituencies that eventually
regimes. In addition, by taking the dominant role in the united in 2011 to unseat Ben Ali and Mubarak in
economy the republican regimes denied space for an Tunisia and Egypt. However, clientalism does have
indigenous Arab bourgeoisie to gain enough economic advantages for Middle Eastern leaders who control the
weight or political influence to challenge the state. pinnacle of the neo-patrimonial networks. By the very
nature of neo-patrimonialism, the relations between
The legacy of this political and economic approach state and society that it nurtures are unofficial, diffuse
was ambiguous to say the least. After taking power, and for the most part implicit. This means they are
the Arab republican states quickly developed all the organic and flexible, changing to suit the needs of
trappings of modern government, with large and both patron and client in times of political turmoil or
complex bureaucracies, powerful armies, urbanisation economic scarcity. Ultimately, access to state patronage
and a degree of welfare provision. But, as Nazih has defined the shape of the public sphere across the
Ayubi persuasively argued, although they acquired Middle East. Economic opportunities, group loyalties
the ability to deploy violence frequently against their and social and political identities have all been shaped
populations, they lacked the institutional capacity and reshaped, based upon where a specific individual
to extract resources regularly and efficiently in the stands in relation to the state-sponsored patronage
form of taxation. In this sense they were certainly networks that prevailed in the region.
‘fierce’ states, but not strong ones. They lacked
the institutional power and political legitimacy to
implement government policy effectively and regulate THE CRISIS OF THE ARAB STATE
society throughout their territory. State intervention
in society was often unwelcome; regarded by the The combination of state-driven development policies
population at best to be a necessary evil and at worst and dependence on neo-patrimonialism to secure the
as an illegitimate intrusion. political loyalty of key constituencies ensured that
the economies of Middle Eastern states were shaped
Against this background, the Arab governments in the image of the regimes that came to power
involved in post-colonial state formation proved between the 1950s and 1970s. Already modest private
unable or unwilling to institutionalise legal-rational sector, perceived as economically unviable, were swept
bureaucratic links to their populations. This led to the aside in the name of national development. The state
creation of more informal and personal networks of gradually took more and more responsibility for the
social control and mobilisation. Individuals were forced economy, moving from a planning and coordinating
to rely on personal contacts with people in positions role to direct investment in and management of
of power in order to guarantee their economic survival industrial production. This worked well as a strategy for
when state institutions and market mechanisms alike increasing regime power, both by integrating potentially
failed to provide resources. As a result, neo-patrimonial influential entrepreneurs directly into the state
structures of political organisation predominated. and making their success heavily dependent on state

7
favours. But it also had the effect of politicising the strategies pursued from the 1950s onward had been
performance of the economy. Post-colonial Arab directly and indirectly sheltered from the dynamics of
governments that promised rapid modernisation in the global economy by increasing oil wealth and its
return for loyalty were taken at their word. When associated inter-Arab aid and worker remittances.
economic success was meagre or non-existent the By the mid-1980s this oil-based autonomy was in
blame was directed at the policy and behaviour of serious doubt. OPEC had become a victim of its
the ruling elites. own success, as the high cost of oil forced Western
consumer economies to improve fuel efficiency and
During the 1980s and 1990s two related phenomena made exploration for oil in non-OPEC areas more
arose that placed distinct limits on the political cost-efficient.
autonomy that Arab states had enjoyed for thirty
years. The first was the growing influence that the The repercussions of the oil price collapse of the mid-
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 1980s can be gauged by noting the dependence of
came to have over the indebted non-oil-producing non-oil-producing states on inter-Arab aid and worker
states of the region. By the mid-1980s the Bretton remittances sent home from the Gulf states. For Syria
Woods institutions insisted that the economies of the assistance it received from the oil-producers was
recipient states were ‘structurally adjusted’ as a equal to 25 percent of the state budget. The Middle
condition for further borrowing. The economies East’s real gross national product in the 1980s fell by
of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt all succumbed to the a yearly average of 2.4 percent. The end of bipolarity,
prescriptions of market reliance at the heart of the the increased power of the IMF and the World Bank
neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by the and the collapse of oil prices placed severe pressure
IMF and World Bank. In return for receiving large on Arab regimes, which were forced to search for
loans those states had to limit their involvement alternative sources of finance, further limiting their
in the economy, removing import quotas, cutting capacity for autonomous policymaking.
tariffs and interest rate controls and moving towards
the privatisation of state industries. Even states like Domestically, there seemed to be little alternative to the
Syria that fought hard to maintain control over their neoliberal prescriptions for the socio-economic woes
economic sovereignty had to conform to some extent facing Middle Eastern states. The failure of the statist
to the new economic zeitgeist in the face of poorly model was as apparent to Arab populations as to their
performing economies and increasing indebtedness. leaderships. Trade imbalances and increasing foreign
debt forced governments to cut back expenditure,
The second, and in many ways more shocking, threat further depressing employment and growth. State-
to the autonomy of Middle Eastern states arose from imposed austerity highlighted the structural crisis
the dynamics of operating in a unipolar world. A of the economy, the ineffectual nature of previous
number of republican regimes – notably Syria and government policy and the state’s dependence on
Iraq – depended on the Eastern bloc for weapons external funding.
and technology, and more importantly, for diplomatic
leverage in their relations with Israel, the United States The inability of regimes to maintain, let alone improve,
and the United Nations. With the sudden demise of living standards directly affected their legitimacy. The
their Communist allies their international autonomy collapse of the Soviet Union and its statist ideology
was radically curtailed. Diplomacy became a more undermined comparable regional ideologies and liberal
delicate operation; it had to be carried out unilaterally triumphalism at the end of the Cold War influenced
and with a greater sense of vulnerability. domestic Arab political opinion. By the early 1990s,
in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the
International threats to the political and economic predictions of proponents of globalisation seemed
sovereignty of the Middle East were compounded to be justified and the republican regimes of the
by the fall in the price of oil, which had a significant Middle East appeared increasingly anachronistic. State-
effect at the regional level. State-driven development driven development had failed to deliver economic

8
modernisation to the vast majority of the population. from the collapse of the statist economic model
Tens of thousands of graduates produced by ambitious in the mid-1960s and an accompanying foreign
education programmes were facing a very bleak exchange crisis that effectively brought import
future as urban unemployment increased. The states substitution-led industrial growth to an end. Nasser’s
themselves were increasingly indebted and were successor, Anwar Sadat, saw the opportunity for
imposing austerity measures to meet balance-of- redress by seeking financial investment from the Gulf
payments crises. Food subsidies were cut and the states in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 oil
Egyptian government faced bread riots. The triumph price rises. Sadat realigned Egypt’s foreign policy with
of liberal democracy (if not quite the ‘end of history’ Washington, judging the Americans would be able to
predicted by Francis Fukuyama) appeared well- broker a favourable deal with the IMF and the World
grounded, even inevitable, and not just the bombastic Bank in return for the strategic alliance he offered.
celebration of market capitalism.
Domestically, Sadat’s move away from the state’s
dominance of the economy allowed him to forge a
new alliance with the entrepreneurial section of the
TRANSFORMATION POSTPONED upper middle classes. The breaking of landowner
and bourgeoisie political and economic power under
The political and economic transformation of the Nasser enabled Sadat to integrate a weak, fractured
Middle East predicted in the 1990s did not transpire for and dependent business class into the lowest levels
the rest of that decade and well into the new century. of the patronage system without threatening his
Although Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia all sustained power base. This limited economic liberalisation was
structural adjustment, their leadership remained accompanied by the theatre of elections and the
stubbornly in place. The structures of political power installation of a parliament. However, the dangers of
remained robust after the Cold War ended despite the political and economic liberalisation became apparent
increasing influence of the Washington Consensus. when the new bourgeoisie developed autonomous
Even the retreat of the state from the economic sphere links with the international economy and social unrest
was halting and ambiguous. From the 1990s until flared as a result of the unequal distribution of the
2011, the post-colonial autonomy of Arab leaders new financial resources. The ensuing crackdown by
proved robust in the face of sustained political and the state set the template for Egypt’s infitah – slow
economic challenges from the international system. and sporadic economic liberalisation followed by
authoritarian state action when the process appeared
The survival strategies of the Arab ruling elites persisted to be moving beyond state control.
during the 1980s and 1990s because the challenges
they faced were not constant, homogeneous nor Egypt’s pioneering if ambiguous experimentation with
wholly indigenous. Regimes muddled through liberalisation accentuated the strategy the majority
successfully by partially or temporarily addressing of Arab ruling elites adopted to stay in power.
problems in one sphere while ignoring or using They continued to rule from the 1990s through
intimidation in another. Key players in the international to 2011 because they put political survival above
system could be bought off with limited but well-timed the welfare of their populations. The post-colonial
diplomatic initiatives. states of the Middle East carefully constructed the
economic setting within which economic liberalisation
Egypt’s extended flirtation with restricted economic unfolded. The bourgeoisie, identified by theories of
and political liberalisation became both a template liberalisation as the shock troops of reform, were
for others and a warning about the threat to regime highly dependent upon the state. As a consequence,
autonomy if strict limits were not placed on the whole until the Arab Spring, political and economic changes
process. Egypt’s infitah or economic opening, declared were successfully managed by incumbent regimes for
in April 1973, was the consequence of state economic their own ends. Liberalisation was never allowed to
failure but also of the availability of regional assistance threaten a regime’s power base or its ability control
and international support. Egypt’s problems sprang the population.
9
 The main ambition of the reform process was to back in, but having been given a large stake in
manage economic imbalances without damaging the status quo they were not inclined to push for
political autonomy. To that end financial resources democratisation. Until 2011, elections were held
were sought from donors who would minimise and parliaments stocked with representatives who
conditionality. The most attractive source of finance debated and passed laws, but the locus of power
was indigenous capital that had been removed from never moved from the presidential palaces as the
the domestic economy in order to escape the reach day-to-day management of politics remained largely
of the state, capital that often belonged to elements untouched by democratic trappings contrived to please
of the bourgeoisie and landed classes decimated in the international community. The system created
the early years of state-building. Ironically, the very glaring inequalities of wealth, increasingly obvious
regimes that set out to destroy the power of the ancien government corruption and uneven economic growth.
regime in the 1950s and 1960s were by the 1990s For the best part of the three decades preceding
basing a major element of their survival strategy on the Arab Spring a cynical, demobilised population
them. Expatriate capital was welcomed to fill the space struggling to get by in a poorly performing economy
vacated by the state’s reduction of its own economic was constrained by a brutally coercive state.
role, with the hoped-for economic growth produced
by this new wave of investment meant to lessen the
social tensions created by government austerity. Yet
THE CAUSES OF THE ARAB SPRING
whilst this crony capitalism brought the bourgeoisie
back into the domestic economy, it heightened their William Quandt has astutely argued that authoritarian
dependence on the regime and its maintenance of regimes base their survival on four ingredients:
the status quo and further exacerbated inequalities ‘ideology, repression, payoffs, and elite solidarity’.
of wealth. In Tunisia and Egypt the ideological justifications for
rule had long since failed to have any purchase on
The privatisation process in Algeria, Egypt, Syria
the population. The acceptance of neoliberal rhetoric
and Tunisia was thus dominated by a small set of
by the governing elite stripped them of their socialist
businesspeople with close links to the highest echelons
and developmental justification for authoritarian
of the regime. The relationship became symbiotic,
rule. In its place they increasingly resorted to a
with those in positions of political power increasingly
conspiratorial nationalism, blaming economic failure
developing private economic interests. This process
on a shadowy and shifting coalition of external actors.
went a step further as the old Nasserist elites in
Given Hosni Mubarak’s close working relationship
Egypt were sidelined in the 1980s and replaced by
with the Israeli government and Egypt’s financial
economic technocrats. The change in personnel and in
dependence on American aid, the use of nationalist
government rhetoric was indicative of a realignment in
paranoia as a justification for rule was bound to
the social coalition the regime was based on. The urban
have a limited appeal. This was especially the case
working class and the peasantry, previously carefully
amongst an increasingly youthful population who
mobilised to support the regime, were marginalised
had no memory of the post-colonial glory of Nasser
as the newly empowered bourgeoisie were integrated
in Egypt or Bourgiba in Tunisia.
into the regime as subordinate partners, leaving both
urban and rural populations alienated from the state The increasingly brazen nature of regime corruption
and the ruling elites. in both Egypt and Tunisia was enabled through the
exclusion of the majority of the population from
The ramification of this controlled economic reform
the economy. Family members of the ruling elite
was the birth of a ‘liberal’ authoritarianism in the
flaunted their wealth in the streets of Tunis and Cairo
Middle East during the 1990s. The state surrendered
as standards of living for the majority of the population
some of its economic roles, but only in order to
stagnated. The constituency for revolutionary change
consolidate its political position. The ruling coalition
steadily expanded as the percentage of the population
was broadened and the bourgeoisie were brought
between 15 and 29 years-old rose, by 50 percent in

10
Tunisia and 60 percent in Egypt since 1990. Finally, as the membership of the coalition of the dispossessed
increased, the ability of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes to provide pay-offs was also put under increasing
pressure. In order to buy off its population the Egyptian government was reportedly spending $3 billion a
year subsidising the price of bread (Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat with Tunisia coming in at
number seventeen). Through 2007 and 2008 the world price of wheat steadily rose, causing a thirty-seven
percent increase in the price of bread in Egypt.

Although the death of Mohamed Bouazizi acted as a catalyst for the sustained protest against the formerly
robust dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and then Libya and Syria, the structural drivers had long been in place.
Finally, in the face of extended street protests Quandt’s fourth pillar of regime stability, elite solidarity cracked.
In Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered Rachid Ammar, the head of the army to fire on protestors. With a strategic eye on
the president’s increasing unpopularity and his own place in any future post-regime change Tunisia Anwar
refused, and sealed the fate of Ben Ali’s rule. A similar dynamic was soon at work in Egypt, where Field
Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi refused to order the army to fire on demonstrators, thus guaranteeing
his survival after the regime change that inevitably followed his refusal to sanction violence.

Unlike the arrival in the Middle East of the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s or the demonstration effect
of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of Kuwait in 1989 and 1991, the Arab Spring of 2011 was
a wholly indigenous movement driven forward by the brave agency of young people in Cairo and Tunisia.
The contrast between the hesitant, contradictory and reactive approach of the Obama administration and
the dynamic behaviour of the Arab Street only served to highlight that it was Arabs once again making their
own history, in spite and not because of the international dynamics that had long been predicted to bring
change to the region. ■

11
 The Arab Uprisings:
Revolution or Protests?
George Lawson

R ecent years have seen a surge in radical protest, from Occupy Wall Street to Indian
Naxalites, from North African youth to Chilean teachers, and from Muslims in Xinjiang
to indigenous peoples in the Pacific. The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa
during 2011 provide the most potent articulation of these multiple sites of protest.

In carrying out an assessment of the Arab uprisings, it is worth recalling that very few such movements
lead to successful revolutions. Crucial to revolutionary success are three factors: first, levels of state
effectiveness (in particular, the resilience of intermediary institutions which can channel grievances
between state and society); second, the degree of elite fracture (particularly its hold over the coercive
apparatus); and third, the commitment of the opposition (both in terms of its ideological unity and its
organisational capacity). Although the first two of these factors have remained consistent features of
revolutionary movements over time, the third has changed markedly. In particular, there appears to be
little adhesive within contemporary revolutionary ideologies that can act as the binding agent of a new
social order. This means that, for all the amendable conditions for revolution today, and for all the willing
capacity of many movements to demand radical change, there is little sense of what an alternative order
would look like once such processes have taken place. This too is the case with the 2011 uprisings.

On the one hand, therefore, there is considerable scope in the contemporary world for revolutionary
challenges to occur. On the other hand, many of the movements that promote radical change lack a
sense of how social relations could – and should – be re-ordered. These issues form the background
to any assessment of how the 2011 Arab uprisings emerged, how they are developing, and what their
outcomes are likely to be.

NEGOTIATED REVOLUTIONS 2.0?

The Arab uprisings sit downwind from the ‘negotiated revolutions’ that accompanied the end of the Cold
War in 1989. Negotiated revolutions shifted the meaning and character of revolution in two main ways:
first, because negotiated revolutions were rooted in movements for political justice rather than driven
by programmes of economic and social transformation, they sought to limit rather than extend state
power; second, because both sides of the struggle sought recourse via negotiation rather than armed
conflict, non-violence became their dominant trope. The result of these dynamics was that negotiated
revolutions strengthened rather than challenged liberal international order.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, it was easy to see the appeal of negotiated revolutions. Uprisings in
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere chimed with the spread of liberal international order. It was,
therefore, little surprise that the 2011 Arab uprisings shared considerable overlaps with negotiated
revolutions, including the promotion of non-violent protest, an ethos of democratisation, and a
transformation rooted in negotiation rather than military victory.

12
However, the Arab uprisings also led to discussions This served to ‘hollow out’ state-society relations,
over whether a further amendment to revolutionary making regimes vulnerable to surges of discontent.
anatomies was being constructed, particularly when States in the region could subjugate their people, but
it came to the use of information and communication they lacked the institutional depth to regulate society
technologies (ICTs) such as Twitter, Facebook and efficiently. It was just these weaknesses which enabled
YouTube. Do the Arab uprisings represent a shift in revolutionary pressures to emerge during 2011.
the anatomies of revolution, perhaps marking the
Egypt serves as a useful illustration of these dynamics.
advent of negotiated revolutions 2.0?
Before the 2011 revolution, the legitimacy of the
Egyptian state rested on three main pillars: the
1952 revolution; the role of the military in freeing
REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS Egypt from Western hegemony (the nationalisation
and subsequent conflict over Suez being the most
Before examining the role played by ICTs in the Arab
pertinent example); and the ‘socialist development’
uprisings, it is worth exploring the basic causes of the
policies pursued by Nasser, during which the state
uprisings themselves. Although the uprisings were
took over the planning, coordination, investment,
surprising, they were not out of keeping with the
and management of production.
revolutionary pathways associated with negotiated
revolutions. First, there was a weakening of state As Toby Dodge points out in his Introduction to this
effectiveness. For example, in Egypt, the strong links report, these policies had the effect of demobilising
between the elite, the United States and Israel were social forces, including private landholders and the
deeply unpopular amongst the general public. In the bourgeoisie, by using land reform and industrialisation
years leading up to the Arab uprisings, Egypt was the as tools for exerting state authority over economic
second largest recipient of US aid (worth around $1 activities. They also led to reasonable levels of state-
billion dollars each year in military aid alone), one of the led growth, fortified by price subsidies which made
main sites for the torture and rendition of suspected basic commodities affordable to the majority of the
Al-Qaeda suspects, and a supporter of Israeli policies population. State income was further generated
in the region, including the blockade of Gaza. Such through petrodollars and aid, particularly from the
policies generated a sense of distance between the US, which paid handsomely in exchange for Egypt’s
regime and the people. recognition of Israel following the 1978 Camp David
Accords, its opposition to Iran, the suppression of
Most important, however, in the weakening of
Islamists (including the execution of Sayyid Qutb –
state effectiveness was the legacy and evolution
the ‘Islamist Lenin’), and the regular passage of US
of the ‘revolutions from above’ which these states
warships through the Suez Canal.
experienced during the 1950s and 1960s. During the
‘revolutions from above’, an ‘independent force’ of The Egyptian state was, therefore, secured through an
high ranking military officials and civilian bureaucrats amalgam of state-led development and redistributive
seized power, using the state as a means by which to mechanisms. However, under Sadat and Mubarak,
carry out projects of social transformation. For many this legitimacy was eroded as the state came to be
years, these regimes appeared stable, so much so that characterised more by repression than by popular
much academic debate revolved around the resilience mandate. Both Sadat (in 1977) and Mubarak (in 1986)
of authoritarianism in the Middle East. deployed the army against domestic protestors. And
after the assassination of Sadat by members of al-
However, Middle Eastern states proved as vulnerable Jihad in 1981, emergency laws made the state an
to revolution from below as the regimes they replaced everyday presence in people’s lives. A vast security
were vulnerable to revolution from above. The lack of establishment was constructed on the back of two
intermediate associations between state and society million informants, who underpinned an extensive
meant that there were few effective channels by which system of policing, state security, and state-sponsored
to meet grievances and institutionalise contestation. gangs (baltagiya).
13
 Even as Mubarak increased the despotic power of the protests in Tunisia. Already under pressure following
state, he reduced its infrastructural reach through a allegations of vote-rigging in the November 2010
range of neoliberal reforms. During the 1980s and parliamentary elections, Mubarak did not react to
1990s, Egypt reduced tariffs, abandoned interest rate the escalation of protests in the early part of 2011,
controls, and removed import quotas. This served to even after Tunisian President Ben Ali resigned in mid-
intensify state dependence on oil rents and foreign January. As protests intensified, Mubarak’s hold on
aid, making the Egyptian economy more susceptible to power weakened. The President promised to resign
external dynamics. A dip in oil prices during the mid- at the end of his term of office, while simultaneously
1990s forced the state to further leverage its debt and ordering an escalation of violence against protestors.
reduce public expenditure. The subsequent austerity This combination of carrot and stick backfired, sapping
measures prompted a decline in living standards for Mubarak’s support within the police, his party, and the
many people, even as a ‘network of privilege’ (many military. Large numbers of police failed to show up
of whom were associated with Gamal Mubarak, for work, took off their badges, or went over to the
the President’s son), used personal connections with protestors. On February 5, the executive committee
state brokers in order to secure lucrative contracts. of the National Democratic Party resigned en masse.
Increasingly, this elite came to be seen as a minority And as the protests escalated, the military, which
caste operating outside, or on top of, civil society. had previously been cautiously neutral, first moved
in to protect the protestors from state-sponsored
Concurrent with these dynamics, demographic changes violence and then, on February 10, publicly endorsed
(particularly population growth) placed additional the people’s ‘legitimate demands’. Mubarak resigned
burdens on the state. By 2011, over one-third of the the next day.
Egyptian population was aged 15-29. This exerted
considerable pressures on job markets, just as the state The events leading up to the formation of a
revolutionary situation in Egypt sit well within existing
was becoming more neoliberal, more personalistic,
understandings of revolution:
and more repressive. In 2009, unemployment in the
region reached nearly 25 percent, twice the global  First, state effectiveness was weakened both
average. It was much higher than this amongst young through long-term dynamics (the closeness of elite ties
people and disproportionately felt within the middle to the United States and Israel, deepening inequalities
class – college graduates in Egypt were ten times between rich and poor, and the everyday brutality of
more likely to have no job as those with a primary the security apparatus) and short-term pressures (the
school education. spike in food prices, the 2010 rigged elections, and
the protests in Tunisia).
Short-term triggers added to the sense of state failure.
Between 2008 and 2010, food prices increased by  Second, Mubarak’s position was damaged by elite
over a third. The removal of food subsidies by the fracture, particularly within the coercive apparatus.
state (the bread subsidy alone cost $3 billion per year The most important source of defection was the
to maintain) fuelled resentment against the regime. military – without their support, Mubarak’s position
Despite the decline in its economic sovereignty after was untenable.
two decades or more of neoliberal reforms, the
legitimacy of the Egyptian state was tightly bound  Third, the state was undermined by the
with its capacity to deliver a basic standard of living. resourcefulness of the opposition. The coalition that
It was, therefore, particularly susceptible to such a formed against Mubarak was made up of disparate
crisis, particularly when it seemed to many Egyptians forces: labour groups, urban youths, mosques,
that the state had abandoned the poor for the sake professionals, and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the
of the rich. same time, ‘revolutionary entrepreneurs’ connected
opposition networks into a coherent coalition. These
Despite this vulnerability, the Egyptian regime was slow ‘wired cosmopolitans’, mostly young, well-travelled,
to respond to the threat posed by the December 2010 technologically-savvy professionals, ‘translated’ local
14
events for foreign media, establishing media centres In other words, more people came onto the streets
which spread the revolutionary message through cell once the Internet had been disabled. This is a puzzling
phones, YouTube, and Twitter. They also used ICTs to outcome given claims about the necessity of ICTs in
establish safety committees and other such bodies. mobilising protest. Protestors are supposed to have
Did the use of such technologies denote a shift in required ICTs in order to connect disparate networks
how revolutions unfold? and coordinate activities. Yet protests in Egypt
intensified during the period in which the Internet
was disabled.

REVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORIES Perhaps, though, this is not such a puzzle. As

even the most enthusiastic cyber-utopians accept,
One of the central features of revolutions is the
digital data leaves an audit trail, one which can be
formation of a close-knit oppositional identity centred
used for surveillance and censorship as well as for
on shared ‘stories’ which unite disparate groups behind
decentralisation and transparency. Social media is a
a common cause. Eric Selbin describes the function of
tool which has been appropriated by authoritarian
these stories as ‘tools of connection’ between everyday
governments in order to trace protestors, spread
life and collective protest. During the Arab Spring, it
propaganda, and monitor the activities of protest
is argued, ICTs served as these ‘tools of connection’,
groups. Indeed, this is something which many activists
providing a means by which protest was organised
themselves appear to recognise. For example, in
and resistance was mobilised. Because ICT networks
January 2011, a pamphlet, entitled ‘How to Protest
are meritocratic, informal, horizontal, and transparent,
Intelligently’, was circulated widely amongst protest
they are, it is argued, necessarily anti-authoritarian.
groups in Egypt. The pamphlet explicitly asked
And by sharing information both immediately and protestors not to use Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or
without official sanction, ICTs are said to foster a new other websites because, ‘they are all monitored by
type of politics, one which was indispensable to the the Ministry of the Interior’.
Arab uprisings.
Examples elsewhere bolster this point. After the 2009
When and how do ICTs influence revolutions? Once uprising, the Iranian government formed a cybercrime
again, it is worth examining the case of Egypt. There unit charged with countering the ‘American led cyber-
is little doubt that Facebook played some role in war’ and arresting those guilty of spreading ‘insults
organising protests in Egypt. The Facebook group (‘We and lies’ about the regime through the Internet. The
Are All Khaled Said’), established in commemoration Chinese government regularly interferes with the
of a blogger who was murdered by Egyptian police working of the Internet and email accounts, and
in 2010, gathered hundreds of thousands of has become adept at initiating ‘online blockades’,
members, many of whom took part in anti-regime particularly around the unrest in Xinjiang. At the same
demonstrations. This group also acted as a connecting time, the Internet has proved to be a valuable source
node between domestic and transnational networks, of authoritarian propaganda. Vladimir Putin’s United
helping to ratchet up pressure on elites around the Russia party, for example, enjoys an extensive online
world to ‘do something’. presence, while Hugo Chavez is an accomplished user
of Twitter, sending out regular missives to his two
Such dynamics worried Arab states. At the end
million plus followers. In short, authoritarian regimes
of January, the Egyptian government required the
are skilled practitioners when it comes to adopting
country’s four main Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
‘networked’ techniques of surveillance and control.
to disable their networks. All four ISPs, with the
exception of Noor, the provider for the Egyptian Stock On the one hand, then, ICTs can help to coordinate
Exchange, complied. After five days, however, the revolutionary protests. On the other, they can
government lifted its blockade, as it came to regard equally well be used to disrupt these protests. In
the ban as igniting rather than suppressing dissent. short, ICTs have no independent agency – they are

15
 tools which operate within broader circuits of power. BACK TO THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION
As Malcolm Gladwell has pointed out, ICTs are good
at generating ‘weak ties’ – networks of acquaintances As noted above, the lack of systemic transformation
which ‘like’ or ‘share’ the same tastes. But they are wrought by the Arab uprisings is something common
poor at fostering ‘strong ties’ – the deep connections of to many contemporary revolutions. This is because
solidarity and commitment which undergird collective the meaning and character of revolution itself has
protest. This latter form of connection, best rooted in changed, becoming increasingly oriented around
personal ties of family and friendship, or in the midst of political representation rather than the reordering of
struggle, is not easily forged. To the contrary, it costs. society. As such, revolutions have become deliberately
And it is not something that ICTs do well. self-limiting, seeking to restrain revolutionary excess
within constitutional limits.

REVOLUTIONARY OUTCOMES This shift away from revolutions as processes of

social transformation is not wholly new. It speaks
What, then, are the likely outcomes of the Arab to a genealogy which runs through America in
uprisings? In many ways, it is too early to tell. If the 1776, the Springtime of Nations in 1848, and the
minimum condition of revolutionary outcomes is the negotiated revolutions in 1989. These self-limiting
period in which a revolutionary regime takes control of revolutions centre on individual rather than collective
the principal means of production, means of violence, emancipation, seeing the latter as a cloak for
and means of information in a society, only one state revolutionary despotism. The 2011 Arab uprisings
has reached this point. Tunisia has overthrown its sit within this alternative tradition of revolution.
former regime, held free and fair elections, and handed
power over to a new civilian authority. However, as Mike Davis makes an arresting comparison in this
detailed elsewhere in this report, Tunisia’s revolution regard, examining parallels between the protagonists in
is by no means complete. 2011 and 1848: Egypt and France as the ‘revolutionary
vanguards’; Saudi Arabia and Russia as the ‘counter-
Nonetheless, Tunisia is an island of relative tranquillity in revolutionary powers’; Turkey and England as the
an otherwise turbulent sea. In Egypt, the SCAF remains ‘models of success’; Palestine and Poland as the
in charge, albeit in uneasy truce with Islamist forces. ‘romantic lost causes’; and Serbia and Shia groups
Bahrain’s uprising was crushed by a combination of as the ‘angry outsiders’. As Davis, following Marx,
monarchical obduracy and Saudi force. The Saudi’s also notes, no revolution in Europe, whether liberal
themselves only mollified domestic unrest through a or socialist, could succeed until Russia was either
reform package worth over $150 billion. This strategy, defeated or revolutionised. The same may be true
on a lesser scale, was also initiated in Kuwait, Morocco, of Saudi Arabia in its region. It is also worth noting
and Jordan, with similar results: the decompression of that, although the revolutions of 1848 were defeated
protest. In other states, instability remains the main in the short-term, their main rationale of political
consequence of the uprisings – varying degrees of liberalisation was successful in the long run. That
civil strife besets Syria, Libya, and Yemen. too may be the case with the 2011 Arab uprisings.■

Overall, therefore, none of the states in the region bar

Tunisia meet even the minimum criteria of revolutionary
success, let alone their ‘maximum condition’ – the
institutionalisation of a new political, economic, and
symbolic order. Although there is increasing talk of
a ‘Turkish’ or ‘Indonesian model’ which combines ‘a
pious society within a democratic state’, the region
as a whole is stuck between fragile pacts, illiberal
renewal, and unmet grievances.

16
The
Uprisings

17
 The Tunisian Transition:
The Evolving Face of the
Second Republic
Fatima El-Issawi

The swift victory of moderate Islamists at the first free elections in the historically secular
Tunisia left a bitter taste for the losers. After three interim governments and amid a vast on-
going legal and institutional reform process, Tunisia can be considered as a positive example
of a non-violent and functional transitional phase from dictatorship towards democracy.
Although peaceful, the Tunisian transition is characterised by a fierce debate between the
secular (‘leftist’ to its opponents) and the religious camps (satirically dubbed the Long Bearded
by the secular discourse). This unfolding confrontation forms the backdrop to the process of
drafting a new constitution, amid anxiety surrounding the place of Islam in the new political
system. However, fears of the resurrection of a new theocratic dictatorship are mitigated by
a dynamic civil society in which voices that were silenced or misused by the former regime of
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali are becoming distinctly vocal. Yet despite the role of religion in society
dominating discussion both in Tunisia and internationally, for all sides in the debate it will be
the economic recovery that forms the major challenge of the post-Ben Ali era.

THE JASMINE REVOLUTION ONE YEAR ON

Three interim governments have held office since the departure of Ben Ali, with each facing angry
demonstrations calling for a total departure from the old regime. The election of a National Constituent
Assembly tasked with reforming Tunisia’s constitution was delayed from July to October 2011, with the
need for more time cited in order to prepare for a ‘credible vote’. The implicit logic behind this delay
was the fear of an overwhelming victory for Islamists in early elections, and indeed the Islamist Ennahda
party secured 40 per cent of the vote, winning 90 seats in the 217-member parliament. This victory is
continuously downplayed by secular parties, which describe it as not reflective of Tunisian society, on
the basis of the relatively disappointing 50 percent turnout and the Ennahda’s inability to secure an
absolute majority.

Following the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia embarked upon a complex reform process led by
consultative bodies formed of technocrats and well-known Tunisian figures. This process began with the
constitution of the ‘High Council for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and
Democratic Transition’, tasked with reforming the Tunisian State through a process of legislative change.
Under this remit, different committees were formed to tackle diverse reforms. An Electoral Commission
with an independent statute set the practical framework for elections with great efficiency, implementing
provisions such as the parity of men and women as candidates, a proportional voting system and the
prohibition of certain candidates with ties to the old regime. The parity between men and women led
to the election of 49 women in the Constituent Assembly, most of them from the Ennahda party.

18
The aftermath of the Ben Ali era witnessed the THE NEW POLITICAL ARENA
legalisation of more than 106 political parties, most of
them unknown to the Tunisian voters, with the media The results achieved by the moderate Islamist Ennahda
and political spheres opened up to the previously party exceeded both expectations and fears. The party
outlawed opposition. The general amnesty law for led by Rachid Ghannouchi, who returned to Tunisia
political prisoners allowed the release of more than in January 2011 following the interim government’s
500 political prisoners, most of whom were facing announcement of a general amnesty, was granted
charges under counterterrorism laws. New decree- legal status as a political party in March. Initially formed
laws on associations and political parties eliminate as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981,
important restrictions on political activity, including the party’s relationship with the regime deteriorated
dramatically, leading to the imprisonment of most of
the crime of ‘membership in’ or ‘providing services
its senior figures. The surprising popular support the
to’ an unrecognised organisation, a provision that had
party secured in the 1989 parliamentary elections
been used to imprison thousands of opposition party
– despite its members running as independent
activists. At the same time, an article was abrogated
candidates – precipitated a harsh crackdown by the
that had stated that a party may not base its principles,
regime that culminated in Ben Ali accusing Ennahda of
activities or programmes on a religion, language, race,
orchestrating an attack on a ruling party office in 1991.
sex or region; a provision that had been aimed at
Tunisian military courts subsequently convicted 265 of
restricting the access of Islamists to the political sphere.
the party’s members on charges of planning a coup.
The media sector was one of the major objects of
The results of the first free elections in the post-Ben
reform as Tunisia had previously operated one the
Ali era confirmed Ennahda’s popularity. The party
most repressive media systems in the Arab world in
capitalised upon its long-running grassroots policies
terms of both freedom of expression and political as well as its organisational ability to run a successful
independence. A new press code eliminated prison electoral campaign, in contrast to its inexperienced,
terms for nearly all speech offences except incitement divided and mostly unknown opponents. As the
to robbery and racial or religious hatred. The draft Economist noted, Ennahda’s ‘identification with
code preserves defamation as a criminal offence, working-class authenticity in contrast to Tunisia’s
although it replaces prison terms with fines. It also traditional Francophone elite’ was crucial to its success.
retains the offence of distributing ‘false information’, a
concept that the Ben Ali government used to prosecute However, this is far from a comfortable victory.
numerous dissidents and human rights activists. Yet the Ennahda’s cohabitation with two political parties –
most problematic element of the new code surrounds the Congress for the Republic (30 seats) and Ettakatol
criminal restrictions on content which were frequently party (21 seats) – of secular background is a challenge
used under the former regime to oppress journalists. in itself. Moreover, the Islamist party is coming under
The arrest of Nasreddine Ben Saida, the publisher tight scrutiny, with secular groups regaining their voice
of the Arabic-language daily Attounissia, as well as following their humiliating electoral defeat. A new
the newspaper’s editor and one of its journalists, for secular coalition was recently announced that brings
together two leftist parties (Attajdid and Renewal)
printing a photo of a German-Tunisian football player
with the Tunisian labour party and some independent
embracing a naked model on the front-page sparked
candidates, yet without a clear program or popular
an outrage in the media community.
base. The constituent assembly led by the tri-partite
coalition is embarking on the difficult challenge of
drafting Tunisia’s new constitution. In terms of the
model for the new political system, Ennahda, the
largest single party, is advocating a parliamentary
system along the lines of the UK, in which the Prime
Minister would be appointed by the party securing
the largest number of seats in Parliament.
19
 For the fragmented secularists, united in support of constitution, giving assurances to Reuters that there
a mixte system copying France, this would deprive will be no religion in Tunisia’s planned changes to the
minority parties of the opportunity to form a majority constitution, and that the party will instead focus on
coalition and therefore lead the government. democracy, human rights and a free-market economy.

Alongside these divisions over democratic models, the Nevertheless, the support of the radical Islamist Salafi
main debate is centred on how Islam law or values in the coming crucial parliamentary and presidential
will be understood within the new political system. elections is highly precious for Ennahda. It is not clear
While the place of Islam was always recognised in how this small vocal group voted in the October 2011
the Tunisian constitution implemented by President elections, given the ambiguous relationship between
Bourguiba in 1959, it was expressed in an ambiguous the radical movement and Ennahda, considered by
way, which served to facilitate its marginalisation. some Salafi as no less secular than the secular camp. Up
The first article of the old constitution stipulates that to now, Ennahda leaders have adopted a conciliatory
‘Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign, its tone in addressing their violent actions, sometimes
religion is Islam, its language Arabic and its regime acting as an intermediary between the Salafi and their
a republic’. However, does this mean that Islam is opponents to diffuse tensions. While avoiding tough
the religion of the Tunisian society or that of the action against the radical and mostly youth movement,
State itself? This confusion is best reflected by the Ennahda is not hiding its effort to provide them with a
divide between two Tunisias: the traditional Tunisia of ‘framework’. In statements to the press, Ourimi Ajmi,
conservative Islam and the Francophile Tunisia inspired a member of the executive bureau of Ennahda, has
by the secular colonial regime and from which the confirmed the existence of a dialogue between the
new Tunisian technocrats are drawn. youth of Ennahda and that of Salafi, claiming that his
party would represent ‘a good school’ for integrating
Views about the implementation of Sharia law range young Salafi into the democratic norms of peaceful
between direct calls for Sharia as the main source of political engagement. In his latest statement, Rached
legislation and proposals to discuss the constitution Ghannoushi has remained conciliatory, characterising
in the Arab-Islamic heritage of Tunisia. Ennahda Salafi violence as ‘a reaction to the oppression’ they
finally stepped into the ongoing struggle between experienced under the former regime, and calling
the two camps by declaring that it will not back calls them ‘our sons’. Talking to Le Monde, Ghannoushi
by ultra-conservatives to impose Sharia as the main confirmed his willingness to bring Salafi under the
source of legislation in the new constitution, instead umbrella of moderate Islam, and raised the possibility
retaining the first article of the old constitution. The of starting negotiations with their sheikhs.
leader of the party Rached Ghannoushi explained
the decision in terms of giving priority to preserving
the unity of Tunisian society and an understanding of
the Constitution as the fruit of broad consensus. This RELIGION VERSUS SECULARISM
stance simultaneously angered Salafi, who considered
The divide over the role of religion in the new state was
it treason to Ennahda’s religious commitments, and
reflected in the commemoration of the first anniversary
failed to allay the concerns of secularists, who remain
of the revolution when two separate crowds clashed
sceptical of the nature of the long-term project of
in the streets, with the secular camp claiming the
the Islamists.
revolution had been hijacked by Islamists. Social media
Ennahda’ decision to renounce Sharia came after is the platform for the contest between the two camps,
the leader of the party for the first time admitted which use Facebook to spread accusations, rumours
the difference between secularism and atheism, and libel. However, this struggle has frequently escaped
thereby legitimating the role of secular parties in cyber-space, with continuous clashes between Salafi
Tunisian politics. The Ennahda leader had tried on groups and secularist demonstrators led mainly by the
several occasions to appease fears that a radical Tunisian union of labour, which is becoming the most
version of Sharia could be embedded in the new vocal critic of the government’s policies.
20
The phobia of an Islamist state exhibited by the secular Tunisia’s code of secular protections should Sharia
camp manifests itself in conspiratorial notions of secret be adopted as a basis of the new constitution, but
plots aimed at the radicalisation of the country, and in Ennahda continues to try to allay these fears, with
which a hidden Qatari and Saudi role is overwhelmingly senior officials being quoted as saying that ‘Ennahda
identified. The victory of Ennahda is not in itself a is attached to the gains of the modern state and the
source of anxiety so much as what is perceived rules established by the (code)’. The party previously
as a lax position towards the rise of radical Salafi supported the Code of Personal Status introduced in
groups. For Ennahda’s opponents, there is an implicit 1956 that abolished polygamy and repudiation instead
alliance between the two Islamist parties, allowing the of formal divorce. It is important to note again that
empowerment of radical voices while the moderate Ennahda confirmed its will not to impose Sharia as a
governing party is appeasing international fears by main source for legislation in the new constitution.
adopting a low-profile discourse. Unconfirmed reports
suggest Salafi control more than 500 mosques and
religious schools, spreading a radical interpretation OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF THE BEN-ALI ERA
of Islam that challenges the authority of formal
religious institutions and of Ennahda itself. In one The reconciliation between the two clearly divided
instance, the town of Sejnane, north-west of Tunis, Tunisian societies and its ramifications will require a
was briefly declared an ‘Islamic emirate’ when around consensus about the place of religion and the political
200 Salafists took control and enforced the Islamic representation of different groups. However, the
Sharia in its most radical interpretations. Ennahda-led coalition will ultimately be judged upon
its ability to lead the country towards its recovery amid
The continuous arm wrestling between Salafi and a deteriorated socio-economic condition.
secularists over allowing veiled women into academic
campuses is putting Ennahda in an embarrassing Tunisia has cut its economic growth forecast for this
situation of having to avoid criticising both of the two year to 3.5 percent, down from a previous forecast
opposing parties directly. The wearing of the niqab of 4.5 percent, primarily as a result of the decline
became a notable feature of Tunisian society after in foreign investment and tourism following the
the Jasmine revolution. In 1981, President Bourguiba revolution. According to figures of the National
ratified a law banning women from wearing the Institute of Statistics (INS), unemployment in the
hijab in state offices, and Ben Ali’s government in the country reached 18.9 percent between the 2nd and
1980s and 1990s issued more restrictive enactments, 4th quarter in 2011, a period during which the number
including the notorious 102 law, which considers of unemployed rose to 738,400, of which 60 percent
the hijab a ‘sign of extremism’ and banned it. The are women. The continuous popular protest organized
increasingly heated debate over niqab-wearing in by the secular camp and led by the unions is widely
public institutions is seen by some as a deviation from considered to be an obstacle to the resumption of
the crucial issue of drafting the new constitution. economic activity. The government has warned that
Ennahda is attempting to maintain a low profile and the unions risk aggravating the economic situation,
avoid direct involvement, arguing that while the and are keenly aware that the continuing protests
movement does not encourage women to wear the may cut into Islamist electoral success. According
niqab, they support the principle of the freedom of to the government, Tunisia’s Phosphate Mine and
the individual who chooses to wear it. Chemical Group has lost up to 1.2 billion dinars
(around $790 million), with the prime minister
Preserving the rights gained under the secular state, Hamadi Jbali blaming strikes and protests which
particularly with regard to the personal status law, is have blocked critical access roads leading in and
another important struggle. Tunisia is considered the out of Tunisia’s marginalized interior regions. The
most advanced in the Arab world in terms of granting tourism industry, Tunisia’s biggest source of foreign
equal rights and status for women and men. Anxiety currency, remains depressed. Foreign tourist numbers
is mounting over the possibility of amendments to in 2011 were down by about 2 million to 4.4 million.
21
 Earnings from tourism fell to 2.1 billion dinars ($1.4 However, the activity of the commission ended with
billion) last year from 3.2 billion dinars ($2.1 billion) in the death of its president, and there remains a firm
2010. 170 foreign enterprises have shut down their belief among secularists that the Ennahda party is
operations since 2010, although 3000 foreign firms not really working for the ‘purification’ of public
continue to operate in the country. institutions from Ben Ali technocrats. At the same time,
it is in the best interests of the new administration to
Ennahda’s economic strategy, focused on regenerating try and bring on board these experienced civil servants
impoverished regions, is not achieving its targets, and in order to assert its control over public administration.
as a result these areas are becoming the main reservoir
of socio-economic dissent. For instant, in Gafsa, west Success in organising trustworthy elections is not
central Tunisia, a large number of young unemployed sufficient to lay solid foundations for the democratic
people blocked the carriage of phosphate destined Tunisian Republic. Tunisia needs to bring about
for export. Protests demanding jobs and dignity a radical change of practice that will prevent the
have disrupted also the towns of Ghar Dimaou, Beja, development of new client networks serving new
Jendouba, Kairouan, Nabeul, Tataouine and Gafsa. rulers but following the corrupt model of Ben Ali’s
In Sidi Makhlouf, 350km south of Tunis, protesters regime. There are fears that new networks will be
detained the provincial governor for several hours to nurtured by the Ennahda party in its bid to assert
press their demands for jobs. control over the State. Tunisians are prone to repeat
that the autocratic regime did not flee the country in
The tendency of the new government to focus on the same plane that took Ben Ali and his wife away
financial aid has been severely criticized as an inefficient to Saudi Arabia. That system is deeply entrenched
means of reviving the economy and correcting the in Tunisian public administration, where a culture of
legacy of decades of entrenched corruption. It is also privilege still flourishes. There are few signs that the
viewed by the secular camp as a threat to Tunisia’s new ruling elite is departing from these practices.
integrity, with the close relationship between the
new government and the emirate of Qatar fuelling As for the secular camp, its failure to bring together
accusations that Tunisia is becoming a puppet of the efforts to counter the Islamists’ rise during the elections
wealthy Gulf state. of the Constituent Assembly has apparently not acted
as a wake-up call. The political negativity of the
Whilst the economic situation remains key, the heavy secularists, who in the absence of a clear programme
legacy of the old dictatorship leaves several other for the transition are united only by their criticism of
challenges that are still to be met by the provisional Ennahda, is in itself an indicator of a possible failure
government. In June 2011, Ben Ali and his wife were in the coming general elections. The continuous focus
convicted in absentia of theft and unlawful possession on relatively trivial battles such as niqab wearing for
of cash and jewellery. They were sentenced to 35 years women or Salafi violence is a distraction from the main
in prison and given a $65 million fine. Although the issue of preserving the gains of the secular Republic
former ruling party has been dismantled, there is a while regaining the trust of the Tunisian public. The
solid institutional structure that is still in control of much-needed reconciliation between the two divided
administrative institutions. Not much has been done Tunisian societies, Islamist and secular, requires a
in implementing transitional justice, which remains a recognition of each camp by the other. This cannot
major challenge for the post-Ben Ali phase. The fact be achieved without a serious and exhaustive revision
finding commission that was formed directly after of the legacy of the Ben Ali regime. ■
the revolution to investigate the corruption under the
former regime reported more than 10,000 submissions,
over half of which were investigated and some 320 files
were transferred to the public prosecutor, although
according to its final report many of the important
files require more time and effort to be investigated.

22
Revolutionary Egypt:
Promises and Perils
Ewan Stein

W hen the Egyptian people forced their leader from power on February 11, 2011, hopes
for an ‘Arab Spring’ ran high. The ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia just 11 days earlier was
earth-shattering in itself, but regime collapse in the Arab world’s most populous country after
just 18 days of protest was an event of far greater magnitude. Memories of the Egyptian
Revolution of 1952, whose ripples would define regional politics for more than a decade,
were fresh enough to give even the most ‘stable’ of Arab monarchies and republics pause
for thought. The impact of this latest Egyptian ‘revolution’ is, however, conditioned by the
extent to which genuine regime change and democratic transformation are achieved. More
than a year later, neither prospect is assured.

THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION

The revolution of January 25, 2011 was triggered by the uprising in Tunisia. But it was the fruit of
more than a decade of a growing culture of protest in Egypt that encompassed the labour movement,
pro-democracy activism, and newer internet campaigns against the brutality of Mubarak’s police state.

The January Revolution brought these protest sectors together around the unifying symbol of Tahrir
[Liberation] Square. In the heady days of January and February 2011, the movement appeared to turn
Egypt on its head. In a country known for political stagnation, new forms of leadership and organisation
evolved, both within Tahrir Square and around the country as citizens formed ‘popular committees’ to
fill the security void left by the collapsing security forces. Instead of chaos, anarchy and sectarianism,
the regime’s abdication of responsibility produced cooperation and tolerance, unity between Muslims
and Coptic Christians, and a reinvigorated sense of civic pride. The ouster of Mubarak on February 11
unleashed a palpable feeling of collective euphoria and unity.

Although the protests came to be identified with Facebook and Egypt’s tech-savvy middle classes
(epitomised by the figure of Google executive Wael Ghoneim), they transcended class barriers and
involved significant participation by the urban poor. Meeting points and times announced on Facebook
were often decoys to enable the real demonstrations organised via word-of-mouth, a reality underscored
by the inefficacy of the regime’s knee-jerk suspension of internet and mobile phone access.

Yet the utopian vision of Tahrir was soon tarnished. Female demonstrators were mocked and hounded
out of the square during a march on International Women’s Day. Sectarian violence re-emerged, blamed
by many on agents provocateurs, ‘remnants’ of the old regime. And as the numbers in Tahrir Square
dwindled, the police returned to clear the stalwarts by force. Nevertheless, although the optimism of
these early experiments in revolutionary leadership inexorably faded, the memory and symbolism of
Tahrir Square – code now for revolutionary activism around the country – remains a powerful force
in Egyptian politics, and the breaking of the ‘barrier of fear’ stands as perhaps the revolution’s most
momentous achievement.

23
 ACTORS AND INTERESTS Mubarak himself dismissed Nazif and his cabinet on
January 29, a move that pleased the army but did
Egypt’s official opposition parties, as well as the most little to placate the protesters. With Gamal’s faction
powerful ‘unofficial’ opposition movement, the Muslim gone, the army’s economic interests were safe from
Brotherhood, were initially absent from the revolution. an increasingly confident new business elite who saw
Elements of the conservative Salafi trend went so far as this ‘new guard’ as their main ally within the regime.
to condemn the protests as haram. The Coptic Church
declared its opposition to the demonstrations as did, The army thus had an interest in exploiting popular
initially at least, the Islamic institution of al-Azhar. In protest, but also in containing and ultimately controlling
its early days, some saw the abstention of these actors the revolutionary movement. It played a double game.
as evidence of the revolution’s secular character, but Having won a prized concession from Mubarak, the
Copts and Islamists of all stripes had participated as military allowed camel-riding thugs wielding swords
individuals from the beginning. It was in large part into the square on February 2, producing one of
a revolt against patriarchal authority, a category in the revolution’s bloodiest confrontations. While
which all established political and religious leaderships apparently protecting protesters against interior
risked being included if they remained opposed or minister Habib al-Adly’s police, it was arresting
uncommitted to the revolution. and torturing activists itself.

The Brotherhood and Salafi leaderships arguably felt But the fact that the military did not turn its full force
they had the most to lose in supporting an uprising against the protesters was crucial to the revolution’s
that may have been doomed to fail. But as middle initial successes. More positively, the high degree of
class professionals deserted the regime in their droves, popular prestige that the army has long enjoyed as
and masses of urban poor swarmed into the streets a bulwark of order in Egypt gave the revolution an
of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and elsewhere, the cost- unassailably patriotic and nationalistic flavour that
benefit calculations of these leaders changed. By broadened the movement’s support among more
the ‘Day of Rage’ on Friday, January 28, the Muslim risk-averse Egyptians.
Brotherhood had stepped off the fence and was
mobilising its members.

If Islamist organisational involvement boosted the THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION

strength of the protests – and ultimately helped direct
Mubarak’s position as leader was filled by his former
them – the most important part in the uprising’s
defence minister, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein
success in ousting Mubarak was played by the military.
Tantawi. As head of the Supreme Council of the
The protesters singled out Mubarak, his ministers
Armed Forces (SCAF) Tantawi assumed control during
and the clientalistic network surrounding his son
the transitional phase. SCAF moved rapidly to hold a
Gamal – and not the military regime in toto – as the
referendum on amending the constitution on March
target. They invited the army to join them. Images
19, 2011. The referendum, which was approved
of soldiers carried aloft in Tahrir Square, and tanks
with 77 percent of the vote, paved the way for
daubed with revolutionary slogans, cemented the view
parliamentary and presidential elections.
of the people and the army as ‘one hand’ against the
Mubarak regime.
Soon after Mubarak’s ouster, numerous new political
The military leadership, for its part, saw an opportunity parties were formed, both secular and Islamist. The
to settle scores in a long-festering intra-regime feud. Muslim Brotherhood established the Freedom and
From the army’s perspective, the revolution’s most Justice Party (FJP), a vehicle consciously modelled
important dividend was to see off the potential threat after the Turkish Justice and Development Party
to its economic and political prerogatives posed by (AKP). The largest Salafi grouping, Alexandria-based
the aggressive privatisation agenda of the Nazif al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, established the Nur (Light)
government and Mubarak’s would-be heir, Gamal. Party. Islamist groups campaigned intensively for a

24
‘yes’ vote in the referendum, believing – accurately The Tahrir forces include, significantly, new Islamist
as it turned out – that their name recognition and parties such as the Egyptian Current (al-Tiyar al-
organisational experience would serve them well in Misri), formed by young Brotherhood dissidents.
early elections. In elections held from November 2011 Support for the revolution is not a uniformly, or even
until January 2012, these parties gained a substantial predominantly, ‘secular’ vocation, which makes it
parliamentary majority. problematic to put ‘Islamists’ and ‘revolutionaries’
in opposing camps. The unifying commitment to
That said, it is SCAF that commands the predominance January 25 and Tahrir as a symbol continues to provide
of hard power in Egypt. It appointed and controls the alternative avenues of political expression for Islamist-
government of Kamal Ganzouri, as it did that of his inclined Egyptians, particularly as the ‘official’ Islamist
predecessor Essam Sharaf. The government cannot act vehicles appear too close to SCAF and trapped within
in any substantive way without SCAF approval. SCAF the old ways of doing things. Even the conservative
continues to set foreign and economic policy during Salafi movement – persistently averse to extra-Islamist
the transitional phase, and controls the domestic alliances – is losing adherents to parties and groups
security forces. within the revolutionary current.

At the same time, SCAF’s power is limited by its These extra-parliamentary Tahrir forces reserve the
‘despotic’ as opposed to ‘infrastructural’ nature. option of ‘returning to the square,’ and numerous
Although the military as an institution is held in high demonstrations have taken place since the fall of
esteem, as a governing authority SCAF has little Mubarak. Via the official media and with recurrent
popular legitimacy, and neither does it possess – nor
Islamist support, SCAF has been partially successful
is it likely to seek to develop – effective mechanisms
in discrediting protests and portraying protesters as
of governance at the grassroots. It is for this reason
agents of foreign powers. But the fact that people
that it has come to accept, if not depend upon, more
no longer fear taking their demands onto the streets
socially embedded Islamists as a link between state
means that the army and Islamist parties must work
and society.
harder to ensure popular support for their policies.
The revolution has allowed Islamists to formalise their
Regardless of the sociological reality, the process set
position within the structure of power. With the ear
in train on January 25, 2011 is almost unanimously
of the SCAF, an electoral mandate, and an established
referred to as a ‘revolution’ in Egypt. The military
local presence throughout the country, Islamist parties
rulers celebrate the achievements of the revolution of
occupy an intermediary space between SCAF and the
the army and the people. Yet for the Tahrir forces the
revolutionary forces. This is a precarious role to play. If
revolution remains a work in progress. Though there
the Brotherhood and Salafis appear too close to SCAF
is little agreement on what completing the revolution
they jeopardise their popular standing. But if they are
would entail, some consensus exists on the importance
over-eager to flex their ‘revolutionary’ muscles they
of prosecuting Mubarak and others accused of killing
may alarm SCAF and its international supporters,
protesters, and on sending the military back to barracks
and precipitate repression. An intra-Islamist rivalry
to allow civilians to take charge. Collectively, they
between the Salafis and the Brotherhood also plays
channel the grievances of labour, the poor and other
out in the context of these tensions.
‘losers’ in Egypt’s neoliberal experiment, and push for
It is in disrupting this marriage of convenience that a more complete break with the past.
the revolutionary coalition becomes most significant.
Unlike the major Islamist parties, the Tahrir forces
lack significant parliamentary representation. They
comprise a heterogeneous patchwork of movements
with quite diverse political agendas. These forces are
predominantly found within the January 25 Revolution
Youth Coalition (I’tilaf Shabab al-Thawra).

25
 THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT National Democratic Party, but the FJP shares some
of the NDP’s features and functions. The current head
Meaningful democracy in Egypt is still a way off.
of the parliamentary Defence and National Security
Whilst the elections were generally accepted as free
Committee, for example, ran on the Freedom and
and fair for the first time since 1952, many vestiges
Justice Party’s list, but he is also a general and the
of the old Egypt remain in place under SCAF. The
former head of internal investigations within military
state of emergency that has prevailed since Sadat’s
intelligence. The dissolution of the NDP, in other
assassination in 1981 is set to continue until at
words, does not necessarily mean the military regime
least June 2012. This enables SCAF to bypass legal
cannot place its people in influential and sensitive
safeguards in much the same way as did Mubarak.
parliamentary roles.
Censorship and manipulation of the media remain
routine, and pro-democracy NGOs are vilified and
persecuted with much the same caprice as they were
during the Mubarak era. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION AND
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
SCAF remains wedded to the idea of a strong executive
(with a compliant president) and will seek a new Stability, and hence democracy, in Egypt depends
constitution that guarantees that. It is supported in largely on how the economy develops in the years
this aim by ostensibly ‘liberal’ parties that fear Islamist to come. Tourism and investment are in decline and
domination in parliament. The FJP and Nur Party each youth unemployment hovers at around 25 percent.
favour a stronger parliament, understandably given The socioeconomic drivers of protest have not been
their high representation in that body. It remains to be alleviated. Some, but by no means all, of the January
seen whether the committee charged with drafting the 25 protesters opposed neoliberal economics in Egypt
constitution (which is to be composed of 50 percent and viewed themselves as part of the broader global
MPs) will deliver a constitution to the Islamists’ liking, movement against capitalism and globalisation. It was
but the issue is sure to constitute an important axis partially under pressure from the protest movement
of friction between SCAF and the Islamist parties. that SCAF refused a package of IMF loans in 2011,
and although the protest movement has since been
A powerful parliament is not in itself, however, a
weakened, it is far from being broken.
guarantee that the military’s influence on politics will
be curbed. As in the past, procedural trappings of In December 2011 SCAF felt able to accept a $3.2
democracy mask a resilient system of patron-client billion loan facility from the IMF. This reflected the
relations that has long underwritten political power in political consolidation of the transitional phase.
the Egypt. The electoral system, for example, does not Although both the military and the Islamist movement
reflect informed popular support for particular parties gained from the removal of Gamal Mubarak and his
or political programmes. A third of seats in parliament neoliberal ‘change team’, neither actor promotes a
continue to be allocated according to single-member qualitatively new economic path. The current finance
districts, thus favouring local strongmen dependent minister, Hazem Beblawi, is known for his neoliberal
on regime patronage. The retention of a quota for proclivities. The FJP considers access to IMF loans to be
workers and peasants (opposed by Islamist parties) an Egyptian ‘right’. Islamists, like the military, fiercely
similarly facilitates the ascent of regime-favoured protect continued private investment in the economy.
candidates, including retired soldiers and police
officials. Such ‘safe’ seats militate against parliament’s If SCAF and Islamists have come together to pursue
independent role as part of a broader system of checks their own interests and neutralise further protest,
and balances in the Egyptian political system. their relationship is not without its own challenges.
Friction between SCAF and the Brotherhood reflects
The current parliament certainly represents an particularistic economic as well as political interests.
improvement on Mubarak-era legislatures, which The military has to date focussed economically on
were toothless bodies dominated by the President’s resource-intensive sectors such as transportation,
26
heavy industry, oil and gas, wastewater treatment, and PROSPECTS FOR EGYPT’S POLITICAL FUTURE
food production. Egypt has seen a doubling of proven
gas reserves, and the military now controls almost as Barring a major rupture, the nature of Egypt’s political
much of this sector as does the Ministry of Petroleum. evolution following June’s presidential elections may
The army remains engaged in joint ventures with hinge on the complementarities of the military and
national and international firms in many enterprises. Brotherhood economic portfolios, and the extent to
which each side is willing to bargain economic for
The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, includes wealthy political privileges. For the military, this will not be
businessmen with significant interests in consumer a simple repeat of its rivalry with Gamal Mubarak’s
goods and services, as well as in the financial sector. ‘reformists’ prior to January 2011. For one thing,
It too is actively seeking foreign investment and the army will not be able to rely on another popular
partnership, and has recently set up the Egyptian revolution to tip the balance in its favour. Gamal and
Business and Investment Association to help facilitate his team had very little legitimacy within civil society
such ventures. and were reviled among the population at large. The
Brotherhood, for its part, has an electoral mandate and
Regional political and economic dynamics can satisfy considerably more strings to its social and political bow.
the economic interests of both the Brotherhood and
the military, but come with ‘counterrevolutionary’ This may help protect the Brothers from the hard
strings attached. Saudi Arabia has a clear interest in power of SCAF as well as enable it to secure its own
the ‘non-exportability’ of the Egyptian revolution, and spheres of economic and political influence. It will
GCC states implicitly condition their financial support struggle to wrest control over foreign and defence
for both SCAF and the FJP on a commitment not to policy from the military. But the opportunity to put
promote revolution elsewhere or to cave in to further foreign policy principles, particularly toward Israel,
revolutionary demands at home. The Saudis also retain into practice is one that Islamists in power may gladly
ideological soulmates in the Egyptian Salafi movement. pass up.
Salafism has long been nurtured as a counterweight to
the Brotherhood, with widely asserted Saudi support, The Brotherhood nevertheless has its popular standing
and remains as a second option if the Brotherhood to consider, and it is in this area that the revolution has
disappoints – although the Salafi movement is also changed the landscape. Whereas the crony capitalists
far from monolithic and may not remain as pliant an of Mubarak’s time could ride roughshod over popular
ally as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies sentiment, being able to call on an increasingly feral
would like. security apparatus when needed, the Brotherhood
faces a newly mobilised public that expects change
The political concerns of the Gulf monarchies are also and is not afraid to take to the streets to demand it.
related to ongoing economic interests in Egypt. Moves Islamist failure to deliver on the political and economic
that appeal to the forces of Tahrir and Egyptian society fronts will open opportunities for newer political actors
more broadly, such as the invalidation of Mubarak-era to exploit. Though a thoroughgoing revolutionary
privatisation deals, disadvantage not only the crony outcome remains out of reach in Egypt, with key
capitalists of the old regime, but also their international elements of Mubarak’s regime either still in place or
partners. Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris and others are staging comebacks, this pressure from below is a new
naturally concerned that their existing investments and significant factor that will shape Egyptian politics
in the Egyptian economy not be jeopardised by such in the years to come. ■
populism. Some 700,000 Saudis live in Egypt and
current investment in the country stands at around
$12 billion. If cancelled deals are snapped up by the
military or Brotherhood investors, foreign partners
will expect to keep their share of the pie.

27
 Bahrain’s Aborted Revolution
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

T he uprising in Bahrain that began on February 14, 2011 has been contained but not resolved.
While the immediate danger to the position of the ruling Al-Khalifa family has passed, the
demands of the protestors have hardened with the failure of the regime to offer meaningful
concessions to political reform. Caught in the crosshairs of regional and international geopolitics,
the aborted Bahraini revolution and the crushing of the pro-democracy movement holds significant
lessons for the prospects for peaceful political reform in any of the other Gulf monarchies
predicated on a genuine sharing of power and control. ver the last decade, many scholars and
analysts have tried to assess India’s emergence as a major actor in the global arena by looking
at such material indicators as economic growth, military expansion or demographic evolution.

REVOLUTION AT THE PEARL ROUNDABOUT

Bahrain has a long history of popular opposition to the Al-Khalifa dynasty rooted in policies of unequal
and selective development. Periodic outbreaks of major social unrest have alternated with periods of
détente in cycles dating back to the 1920s. The 2000s witnessed a continuation of this cyclical process
as King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa unveiled constitutional reforms that promised much but ultimately
delivered little of substance. In 2001, the draconian 1974 State Security Law that had provided cover for
the suppression of political opposition and massive human rights violations was scrapped. Constitutional
changes were laid out in a National Action Charter that was approved by an overwhelming 98 percent
of Bahrainis in a referendum on February 14, 2001, paving the way for the return of an elected assembly
in 2002, 27 years after its suspension in 1975.

However, the promise of a unicameral elected legislature was immediately diluted by the addition of
an upper house of royal appointees. Low confidence in the sincerity of the political opening led to
a range of political societies, spanning the ideological and religious spectrum, boycotting the 2002
election. Although most societies participated in the 2006 and 2010 elections, the former was marred
by allegations of systematic fraud and gerrymandering, while the latter followed a heavy-handed
clampdown on opposition and human rights activists. Widespread accounts of arbitrary detention
and allegations of torture signified a return to the repressive ways of the regime’s past. Meanwhile,
socio-economic discontent was bubbling up, propelled by high levels of unemployment, the inability of
economic diversification to generate sufficient jobs or economic opportunities for Bahraini youth, and
popular anger at perceived corruption at the heart of government.

It was in this context of rising tension that Bahraini organisers planned a day of protest on February
14, 2011. The date was symbolic, as it marked the tenth anniversary of the referendum that approved
the National Action Charter. It also followed in the wake of the popular uprisings that swept away
the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. The inspirational sight of largely non-violent
demonstrations defying political suppression and refusing to submit to the security regimes that had kept
authoritarian leaders in power for decades was transformative. Emboldened protestors voiced demands
ahead of the February 14 day of protest for greater political freedom and equality for all Bahrainis.
28
These targeted the regime’s policies of fomenting in Bahrain. In reality, this consisted of 1000 men of
sectarian division to inhibit the emergence of any the Saudi Arabian National Guard and a contingent
popular cross-community opposition movement. of military police from the United Arab Emirates. They
provided the essential backbone while the Bahrain
Although initially small in scale and predominantly Defence Force pursued and arrested thousands of
confined to Shia villages outside Manama, the people across the country.
demonstrations gathered momentum after Bahraini
police killed two protestors. They also migrated to A state of national emergency was declared
the heart of the capital’s Pearl Roundabout, close to the following day, which lasted until June 1, and
the flagship Bahrain Financial Harbour. Ominously there followed a brutal crackdown as the Bahraini
for the regime, the demonstrations quickly assumed government mercilessly pursued all forms of dissent;
detaining doctors and lawyers merely for treating or
popular overtones as Sunnis and Shias alike gathered
representing detainees, suspending opposition political
in unprecedented numbers and chanted slogans such
societies and arresting their leaders, and detaining a
as ‘No Shias, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis.’ By the evening
founder of Bahrain’s major independent newspaper
of February 16, tens of thousands of overwhelmingly
Al-Wasat, who subsequently died in custody. Hundreds
young Bahrainis were camped in Pearl Roundabout
of mostly Shia workers were dismissed from public and
and shouting ‘Down, down Khalifa!’ This dramatic
private sector positions for ‘absenteeism’ during the
escalation directly threatened the domestic legitimacy
demonstrations. Widespread tactics of intimidation
of the Al-Khalifa, and panicked the regime into a also included the destruction of Shia shrines and
brutal response as forces stormed the roundabout in posters showing prominent Shia leaders with nooses
the middle of the night and opened fire on sleeping around their necks.
demonstrators.
Simultaneously, the Bahrain National Guard embarked
As the protests moved into a new post-clampdown on a hasty recruitment drive in Pakistan to augment
phase, the regime reacted by sponsoring counter- its limited manpower with non-Bahraini personnel
demonstrations to try to fracture the social movement who had fewer qualms about opening fire on civilian
confronting them. Thousands of pro-government protesters. Meanwhile, the bulldozing of the Pearl
supporters gathered at the Al-Fateh Mosque in Juffair Roundabout, with its iconic monument to Gulf unity,
on February 21 to declare their support for the regime. represented a crude attempt to destroy the symbolic
Notably, they included large numbers of non-Bahraini heart of the protest movement. With this act, the
expatriate workers and naturalised citizens whose authorities hoped to prevent it from becoming an
livelihoods depended upon regime goodwill. In anti-regime equivalent of Cairo’s Tahrir Square, but it
response, an estimated 200,000 people (one in six noticeably failed to quell the sense of defiance among
of all Bahraini citizens) participated in a pro-democracy marginalised communities.
march to the Pearl Roundabout on February 25, as
two massive columns of protestors converged on the
roundabout to demand the resignation of the Prime THE POLITICAL INQUEST
Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa.
Following the lifting of martial law in June 2011,
With the position of the ruling family clearly King Hamad convened a National Dialogue and
jeopardised, negotiations between the regime’s created an ostensibly independent investigation
leading modernising force, Crown Prince Salman bin into the springtime unrest. Through these initiatives,
Hamad Al-Khalifa, and the largest opposition political the government hoped to begin a process of
society, Al-Wefaq, commenced in March. Despite reconciliation with the opposition. However, their
coming close to an agreement based around a set of flawed implementation widened the chasm between
agreed political reforms, the talks broke down, and on the Al-Khalifa and their opponents by casting serious
March 14 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sent doubt on the credibility of the regime’s commitment
in its Peninsula Shield Force to help restore stability to reform.

29
 Bahrain’s National Dialogue convened on July 2 and ran Bassiouni, who led the UN Security Council commission
until July 30, 2011. It began under a cloud, following that investigated war crimes in the former Yugoslavia
the June 22 decision of the National Safety Court to in the 1990s. Similar to the National Dialogue, the
sentence 13 prominent opposition figures to varying Commission quickly ran into difficulty, as a series of
terms of imprisonment. The majority were committed interviews given by Bassiouni appeared to prejudge its
to non-violent protest and many had participated in outcome and exonerate officials of any responsibility
the political opening that followed the ending of for human rights violations. His comments drew a
the previous bout of internal unrest in 1999. Their furious reaction from Bahraini human rights groups
imprisonment illustrated the gloved-fist nature of the and opposition figures, who pointed to statements
regime’s approach, jailing some of its opponents while made by members of the Al-Khalifa praising and (in
simultaneously reaching out to others. some cases) inciting the security forces.

The National Dialogue suffered a credibility gap from Doubtless chastened by the hostility to his remarks,
the beginning. Despite winning up to 45 percent of the Bassiouni surprised almost everyone with the hard-
vote in the October 2010 parliamentary election, the hitting content of his report when it was published
major opposition group Al-Wefaq was only granted on November 23. In a televised speech in front of the
five out of 300 delegates. This was consistent with the King, Bassiouni stated that the authorities had used
overall composition of the dialogue, in which delegates torture and excessive force during its crackdown on
representing all Bahraini opposition societies only protestors. He pinpointed a culture of unaccountability
constituted 11.67 percent of the total. The remaining among the security services operating during the
participants overwhelmingly favoured keeping the state of emergency, and accused unnamed officials
regime in its current shape. Core opposition demands of disobeying laws designed to safeguard human
including redrawing electoral boundaries for greater rights. Most notably of all, he argued that many of
proportional representation and creating an elected the protests did not fall outside of the participatory
government were not on the agenda; nor was any rights of citizens, and that he had not found evidence
discussion permitted of the nature or extent of the of any link to Iranian involvement, contradicting
ruling family’s power. regime narratives that ascribed the protests to external
intervention rather than domestic grievances.
Al-Wefaq withdrew from the National Dialogue halfway
through, with its own judgement to participate being
called into question by critics. The Dialogue continued,
and concluded with a series of recommendations, BETWEEN REFORM AND REPRESSION
including one that the Prime Minister (rather than
In response, the King pledged to initiate reforms,
the King) would appoint the government. As the
and established a National Commission to oversee
long-serving Prime Minister (in office since 1971)
their implementation. Yet the measures taken to
represented one of the key obstacles to reform, this
date have left many of the roots of Bahrain’s political
hardly constituted a political concession. Nor did the
and economic inequalities unaddressed, and ongoing
Dialogue come to an agreement over the electoral
clashes between protesters and security forces have
boundaries, another major opposition grievance. Far
continued unabated, with more than ten protestors’
from drawing a line under the unrest, the flawed
deaths since November. The result has been the
process reinforced existing divisions and demonstrated
empowerment of radical voices across the political
very clearly that critical issues of political contention
were simply not up for debate. spectrum and the marginalisation of Bahrain’s political
middle ground. The emergence of radicalised splinter
The National Dialogue partially overlapped with the groups means that it is no longer possible to speak
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). This of a ‘regime-opposition’ dichotomy. Elements of the
was established by King Hamad on June 29 to ‘inquire opposition are growing more violent, and calls have
into the incidents’ in February and March and their intensified from extremist groups urging the regime
consequences. Its chair was Egyptian Professor Cherif to crush the opposition once and for all.
30
Measures that have been taken since November Accountability cannot be narrowly limited to those
include revoking the arrest powers of the National who actively carried out abuses. It must include those
Security Apparatus after the Bassiouni report detailed who ordered and orchestrated the crackdown, and
its ‘systematic practice of physical and psychological follow the chain of command upward.
mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to
torture’; legislative amendments that expand the
definition of torture and lift time-limits for the
WHAT NEXT FOR BAHRAIN?
prosecution of cases, pledges to rebuild Shia houses
of worship destroyed by the regime during the Prospects for building a national consensus around
crackdown; and the announcement of the construction reform are further dampened by evidence of growing
of more than 3000 social housing units. Workers radicalisation of extremist pro-government groups. A
dismissed on grounds of political expression have radical offshoot called the Al-Fateh movement has
been reinstated and charges against 343 individuals formed out of the pro-government National Unity
similarly accused have been dismissed. Gathering, which they accused of being too lenient
toward the protesting opposition. Angry supporters of
While these gestures have opened up new pathways
the regime increasingly question why it does not crush
of redress for individual victims of abuse, they also
the revolt, and instead ‘allows’ unrest to simmer and
highlight one of the major shortcomings dampening
damage the Bahraini economy and national image.
expectations of (and prospects for) deeper reform.
This is that the changes rectify specific (or high- As regime support radicalises, the opposition appears
profile) instances of abuse, rather than making deep to be fragmenting, although there always has been a
reforms to the structures of political and economic divide between the ‘official opposition’ societies and
power. Recruiting foreign police leaders (ex-assistant the shadowy ‘February 14’ youth movement. Little is
commissioner of the Metropolitan Police John Yates known about ‘February 14’; a recent article by Ala’a
and former chief of the Miami police John Timoney) Shehabi and Toby Jones for Foreign Policy described
to re-train Bahrain’s security services may play well them as ‘a confederation of loosely organised
in London and Washington, but it leaves unresolved networks…faceless, secretive, and anonymous,’
the structural exclusion of large numbers of Bahraini consisting of ‘thousands of supporters [who] have
citizens from an organisation many perceive as abandoned the failed leadership of the country’s
exclusionary and deeply-partial. better established, but listless, political opposition.’ It
appears they are the vanguard of the protestors who
These measures also do little in the way of empowering confront the regime security services on a daily basis.
moderates among the opposition or in government, It is unclear if those who subscribe to its ideology are
whose leadership is vital to building support for necessarily organised through coordinated networks,
any future political reforms. Tentative moves to re- indeed a great deal of their effectiveness derives
engage the political opposition lack real meaning from the sporadic, uncoordinated and unpredictable
while many of its leaders remain imprisoned. Perhaps nature of their tactics against security forces. They
most damagingly, the culture of impunity within the retain a capacity to mobilise and coordinate larger
security services means there is yet to be evidence of demonstrations, as they organised a march of over
any high-level accountability. A trial recently began of 100,000 people on March 9, 2012 in response to a
five police officers – none of them Bahrainis – charged remark by the King that the protestors only represented
with involvement in the death in custody of a blogger a tiny minority of Bahraini citizens.
on April 9, 2011, which was attributed (implausibly) at
the time to ‘complications from sickle cell anaemia.’ Given that Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al-Saud will simply
It stretches credibility to suggest that the scale and not allow a fellow ruling family in the Gulf to fall,
ferocity of the crackdown may solely be ascribed to realpolitik suggests that a political solution will have
the actions of (ostensibly renegade) junior personnel. to emerge from within the existing system. American

31
 and British support for the Al-Khalifa as a longstanding This has implications for the other Gulf States should
regional ally is a powerful factor insulating the ruling they experience an upsurge in protest in the future.
family from the participatory pressures of the Arab Their commercial and geo-strategic importance means
uprisings. Put bluntly, pressures for revolutionary the West will neither abandon any of its Gulf partners
change in Bahrain will not be allowed to succeed, nor make a stand on humanitarian grounds. And
short of an (unlikely) game-changing development while this places Western commercial and institutional
either in Saudi Arabia or in the current US posture in partners in a difficult position, caught between their
the Gulf For the Al-Saud, the Al-Khalifa represent the core regional allies and mounting concern at the
weakest link in the chain of authoritarian monarchies erosion of human rights and political space, the
in the Gulf, while its own Shia communities in its oil- consequences for Gulf polities are momentous.
rich Eastern Province are similarly subjected to political Officials throughout the region will be observing how
marginalisation and sectarian discrimination. Saudi cracking down so hard has saved the Al-Khalifa, at
policy is therefore predicated on propping up the least for now. But their survival has come at a very high
Bahraini regime and ascribing its troubles to external price economically and politically, and has shattered
(Iranian) manipulation, as this plays well in Washington social cohesion in a country polarised as never before.
D.C. Thus, escalating tensions with Iran could not have With a ruling family determined to swim against the
come at a better time for opponents of reform, as tide of the Arab Spring, uninterested in meaningful
the Americans are not going to abandon an ally (and political compromise and reliant on foreign protection
host of the US Fifth Fleet) at this moment in time. as the guarantor of regime security, ruling elites will
be absorbing lessons from the Al-Khalifa’s crushing
Yet Bahrain finds itself poised at a profound juncture. of opposition at the expense of their domestic and
It can either move toward deep and lasting changes international credibility. ■
to the balance of power between state and society,
or the regime will have to rely on the use of force
against an increasingly determined opposition. The
challenge for the government is overcoming memories
of the previous cycle of repression (during the 1994-
99 uprising) and the subsequent partial promises of
reform (2001-10). The longer the old elite remains
unaccountable at high levels for the abuses of power
over the past year, the harder it will be to convince
sceptics of the government’s good faith. Calls to
violence by opposition and regime hardliners alike
make any solution more difficult without a decisive
power-shift towards moderate elements.

These depressing developments portend a bleak future

for Bahrain. American pressure to halt the banning
of Al-Wefaq last spring demonstrates that Western
partners can use their leverage to mitigate the worst of
the abuses of power. However, the prevailing reaction
among US and UK policy makers was epitomised by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s blunt assertion in
November 2011 that ‘there will be times when not
all of our interests align. We work to align them, but
that is just reality.’ Regime change in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Libya will not be repeated on the placid shores
of the Gulf.

32
Libya: Defining its Future
Ranj Alaaldin

T he international community is approaching the anniversary of its intervention in Libya last

year. What started as a protest for greater rights and democracy quickly transformed into
a military uprising against a vicious dictator intent on suppressing a revolution with every
brutal means at his disposal. The conflict was distinct from other uprisings elsewhere in the
region for three principal reasons: first, the brutality with which Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s
regime responded; second, the audacity, tenacity and speed with which the Libyan people
became militarily organised and capable of exploiting Gaddafi’s disintegrating military; and
third, the involvement of the international community, in the form of the NATO alliance that
was backed up by Arab support, particularly from the Gulf state of Qatar.

This set of multi-faceted dynamics makes the Libyan case particularly special since they also reflect the
existing political and security environment in the country; in other words, the host of different external
actors, political and ideological factions at play in the overthrow of the former regime could reflect the
post-conflict power-structures that will determine the shape of the new Libya.

THE UPRISING

The Libyan revolution erupted after protestors took to the streets following the arrest on February 14
of human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil, who represented relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners allegedly
massacred by security forces in Tripoli’s infamous Abu Salim jail in 1996. According to reports, close to
2,000 people gathered outside regime offices to demand his release. A ‘day of rage’ was then announced
for February 17, at which point protests erupted across the country, but especially in the eastern towns
and cities, which had a history of rebelling against Gaddafi’s regime.

In Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city after Tripoli, tens of thousands took to the streets, torching police
stations and besieging army barracks and the city’s airport. Regime loyalists were forced out of eastern
towns including Bayda and the port town of Tobruk. In Zintan, south of Tripoli, hundreds of people
marched through the streets; a police station and security forces premises were set on fire.

By early March, the Libyan protest movement transformed into a full-fledged armed conflict with
the regime, which escalated as significant military and political defections took place and when it
became clear that Gaddafi had no intention of accepting the protestors’ earlier demands or enter into
negotiations with them. This led to the gradual creation of an enclave in Benghazi, with several other
cities and towns in both the east and the west cleared of regime loyalists, though reports of regime
snipers operating still persisted.

In the run up to the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 14,
which sought to protect the population of Benghazi from being massacred after Gaddafi
declared his intention to chase down the dissenters house to house, regime and revolutionary
forces engaged in a tit-for-tat battle; both sides gained and lost territory as the battle continued.

33
 This was in fact a process that favoured the regime. The Despite this apparently smooth transition from
rebels, poorly armed and unorganised, were unable opposition to interim administration, the NTC has
to keep hold of territory, consolidate and build on been plagued by a series of deficiencies. Divisions
their gains. The regime, on the other hand, had the have been rife along Islamist-secularist lines. The
benefit of superior weaponry, organised forces and NTC was also thrown into disarray after the murder
training, thus having the advantage over the rag-tag last year by an opposition Islamist brigade of former
army it was facing. regime interior minister Abdul Fatah Younes, who
had become the NTC’s defence minister.
The March 14 intervention started a process of military
engagement that begun to shift the balance of power More pressing during and after the conflict has been
and the conflict in the opposition’s favour. Slow at first, a failure to remedy the NTC’s democratic deficit to
and wary of becoming engaged in yet another foreign the satisfaction of the Libyan people, who in recent
conflict after Afghanistan and Iraq, the international months have voiced their discontent by protesting
community gradually increased and intensified its against their interim government’s lack of transparency
military support for the opposition, which entered and slow progress. The January 2012 NTC appointed
Tripoli in September 2011 after nine months of conflict cabinet, for example, failed to release the names of
and forced the end of the regime. all its members. Currently, the discontent centres
around a lack of transparency – especially vis-à-vis
NTC meetings and decision-making processes – NTC
members and aspects of public expenditure.
THE OPPOSITION

Self-defined, and established a week after the initial

uprising began, the official opposition movement
WHY AUTHORITY MATTERS
in Libya was the National Transitional Council
(NTC), which now constitutes the country’s interim GivAs it stands, the NTC has made slow progress since
government until elections are held. The NTC is Gaddafi was toppled, as indicated by recent events
headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the former regime’s including the desecration of British war graves, the
justice minister, and its underlying purpose was to declaration of autonomy by the Eastern regions, and
give the armed uprising an organisational structure clashes between armed groups, as well as the abuse
that allowed it to effectively defeat the former regime of prisoners.
– thus rendering the establishment of the entity a
necessity. The importance of authority ultimately comes from
a need to stabilise Libya, steer it towards democratic
Initially comprised of a 30-member leadership council
elections and, ultimately, exploit the country’s
and an executive committee that took charge of daily
enormous potential. It has a $65 billion sovereign
responsibilities, the NTC was and still is composed
wealth fund, whilst oil production will soon reach
of individuals that come from different ideological,
pre-conflict levels of 1.6 million barrels a day. The
political and professional backgrounds: secularist,
hydrocarbons sector can therefore drive economic
Islamist and technocratic. According to the NTC,
growth in the short term while the private sector is
they were co-opted on the basis of their expertise
developed and a legal framework is constructed. Libya
and the extent to which they were linked with the
should attract foreign investment: it has a young and
former regime, in that any individuals with “blood
on their hands” were prevented from joining. Since well-educated population that boasts the highest
the downfall of Gaddafi, the NTC has grown into a literacy rate in Africa.
50-member council with a cabinet of ministers that
But the NTC has little authority and was, in truth,
take charge of the country’s affairs, including the
little more than a mouthpiece for the loose and
provisioning of basic services, public expenditure and
decentralised structure of the uprising throughout
preparing the country for elections.
the conflict. Since the downfall of the former regime,

34
it is still to centralise authority and has faced difficulties The militias’ power reflects that of the Islamists
managing the logistical and organisational demands advantage, since the most powerful of militia brigades
that come with paying salaries and providing basic are comprised of and have close links to Islamist groups
services and humanitarian assistance. and individuals. The Islamists were described as being
the most organised, effective, heavily armed and
Within Libya, power is currently concentrated in
audacious of the ‘Free Libya’ revolutionaries. Militias
disparate military circles that dominate their respective
in the east for example boast the Sallabi brothers,
areas of influence in the east and the west. These
including leading cleric Ali al-Sallabi and his brother
fighters were the ‘Free Libya’ fighting groups that
Ismael al-Sallabi, whose role during the uprising was
developed from the bottom up, independently of one
to lead an umbrella group of fighters in the east.
another. The most prominent revolutionary brigades
come from the previously besieged city of Misrata in The Sallabi brothers’ prominence is further amplified
the east and Zintan in the west, which in the weeks because of their existing networks and formidable
leading up to Gaddafi’s downfall made a decisive resources that stem from the Gulf, especially from
contribution to the uprising by tightening the noose Qatar, which provided Islamist brigades with aid and
around Tripoli. arms. Significantly, this was done independently of
the NTC and despite NTC objections.
The NTC has almost no control over these forces,
comprised of fighters who, rather than operating In post-Gaddafi Libya, Islamists have gained further
as some homogenous combat entity, actually recognition in the country’s interim constitution,
operate as per a social contract between an array which regards Islamic jurisprudence (sharia) as ‘the
of individuals, technocrats, prominent tribes and principal source of legislation’ – clearly a measure
families and businesses, within any given major city of appeasement since there were no widespread
that they control and derive their authority from demands for this among the population. Senior NTC
(like Misrata for example which, in addition to its sources themselves acknowledge that the Islamists
famous revolutionaries, boasts a series of prominent
are recognised as the ‘do’ers’; that is, they have the
technocrats and businesspeople). The Misrata and
capacity and ability to deliver, whilst the NTC has
Zintan brigades have both refused to recognise the
been derided for its inability to take command and
authority of the NTC.
take decisions. The forthcoming elections in June,
There has been some co-ordination between militias which will elect a 200-member national assembly to
and the NTC but a unified command structure draft Libya’s new constitution, may remedy the NTC’s
integrating them both does not exist. Herein lies the democratic deficit. In truth, however, elections could
problem. Independent or semi-independent fighting essentially transplant the existing circles of power and
forces could be acceptable but only if integrated into influence, in particular those of the Islamists.
a proper power-sharing mechanism. As of now, the
NTC’s lack of authority combined with the absence
of a respected national army and police force is likely
to be conducive to an environment in which violent
clashes take place between militias and NTC forces
(and between rival militia groups themselves); as
well as further compound problems of transparency,
accountability and human rights abuses.

More broadly, these deficiencies have profound

consequences for the future of the region as well as
the interests of the international community, largely
because of the proliferation of arms and the open
borders that cannot be properly policed without
organised security forces.
35
 THE FUTURE It is, however, important to have a capable and
somewhat centralised security apparatus, so that any
The new Libya is still in a transitional phase and it has gains in the new Libya are not reversed. Regardless of
been little over six months since Gaddafi was toppled whether decentralisation is embraced, Libya still needs
and the country liberated in its entirety. It is, therefore, a respected and organised security apparatus that can
important to maintain perspective; whilst there are enforce law and order. The existing gaps in security
many problems, there is little to suggest that they will provide for lawlessness, disorder, and clashes between
take the country to the brink. armed groups and militias; as well as weakening
Libya’s ability to defend itself against outside forces.
Much will depend on the extent to which the country
is stabilised before the elections take place in June, If, on the other hand, the existing model of
for the fear is that failure to remedy the problems decentralised authority with a weak government
of authority and accountability will compromise in Tripoli is the preferred model, then Libyans must
the prospects for stability, representative governance find a way to turn this into a proper power-sharing
and, as things stand, enable militia leaders to translate mechanism. Whilst embracing federalism or any
their military clout and revolutionary status into decentralised system of governance will, for some
political status, to the detriment of any genuine Libyans, be tantamount to partition, it will also be
democratic process. seen by many as a means of preventing power from
becoming too centralised in Tripoli (that is, centralised
The possibility of civil war is often raised among a
to such an extent that it produces another dictatorial
minority of skeptics, most of whom were opposed to
regime) and as a means of reversing the neglect that
the international community’s intervention last year.
the periphery suffered under the former regime’s
Clashes have indeed already taken place between rival
rule. Partition itself is unlikely if not impossible,
militias, as well as between NTC forces and militia
given that there exists no support for it among the
brigades. They are also likely to continue, especially
broader Libyan population. The threat of partition,
given the prevalence of weapons in the country.
however, could be used to garner concessions in
However, they will be localised, unorganised and not
future political negotiations.
between entire regions or organised groups with large
armies and sophisticated weaponry, variables which What will be key before any elections take place, or
are necessary if a devastating civil war is to take place. indeed before any constitutional process is started,
is the reconciling of differences between different
Similarly, Libya has the benefit of being a largely
political and ideological factions, between new and
homogenous and small country, with a population
old power bases, tribes and regions; these are elements
of Sunni Muslims, most of whom live in the cities
which have either experienced neglect under the
of the Mediterranean seaboard. As a result of its
Gaddafi regime or who now fear for their future
homogenous characteristics, post-conflict Libya also
under Libya’s new rulers. In other words, Libya needs
has an advantage over post-conflict Iraq since no
stabilisation, which can be achieved provided Libyans
major segment of its population is agitated at its loss
are given a stake in the future of their country. Interests
of power to the extent that it resorts to mounting an
must, therefore, be merged and differences must be
insurgency or engaging in terrorist atrocities. Iraq’s
remedied to create a post-conflict environment of
Sunni population, on the other hand, bemoaned
stability, and create an inclusive and representative
their loss of power and feared a future in which its
government that defines the country through genuine
rights would not be protected – despite a written
democratic elections. ■
constitution guaranteeing these rights – creating
resentment and inflaming sectarian tensions with the
country’s majority Shia population.

36
Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring
Christopher Phillips

When the dictatorial regimes of Tunisia and Egypt were toppled by popular unrest few expected
Syria to follow. Despite suffering under dictatorship for over 40 years and facing similar
economic and social challenges that had prompted rebellion elsewhere, Syrians appeared to
support their young president, Bashar al-Assad, who had cultivated an image as a populist
anti-western moderniser. When protests did eventually reach Syria in March 2011, in the
southern town of Deraa, they called on Assad to reform not resign. Yet any faith in Assad
as a reformer soon evaporated. His security forces responded with live fire, killing hundreds
in Deraa and elsewhere, while the president offered only piecemeal reforms. The regime
fashioned a narrative that protests were led by criminal armed gangs, intent on stirring up
sectarian divisions within Syria’s heterogeneous population. Yet in these early stages it was
mostly regime-backed Shabiha militia from Assad’s own Alawi sect that were responsible for
any violence, while most protestors remained peaceful and inclusive. Tragically, as regime
violence continued and protests spread, with over 9,000 deaths in the first year, that narrative
became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not only have some taken up arms against Assad, but
sectarianism is increasing, with the Alawi community as a whole blamed for Assad’s excesses.

Yet the regime still appears far from collapse. The opposition, both within Syria and exiles abroad,
has proved unable to win over key segments of Syrian society. The international community remains
divided on what action to take, with western and Arab economic sanctions only frustrating rather
than disabling the regime, while Russia, China and Iran continue to explicitly or implicitly back Assad.
After a year of violence Syria looks headed for a civil war between the regime and the poorly armed
but determined opposition, with the potential to transform one of the Middle East’s most stable states
into a sectarian bloodbath.

THE CAUSES OF THE UPRISING

The uprising can be partly explained by examining who has and hasn’t been willing to rebel against
Assad. Opposition activity has been concentrated in certain areas, suggesting that certain ethnic,
economic, demographic and geographical groups harbour more anti-regime feeling than others. For
decades, the security state established by Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, encouraged certain social
and economic inequalities as a means of divide and rule. Hafez won the support of Syria’s working
class and peasantry, largely from Syria’s Sunni Arabs who make up 60 percent of the population, by
building a large socialist state that provided employment and subsidies. He won the backing of Syria’s
non Sunni Arab minorities – the Christians (10 percent of the population), Druze (3 percent) and his own
Alawi sect (10 percent). These groups welcomed Hafez’s secular Arab nationalist identity discourse as
a means to integration, an identity that he promoted through expanded state institutions, notably the
army and the ruling Ba’ath party. While this coalition of support was sufficient to build a popular base,
Hafez deliberately excluded some groups: Syria’s Kurds (15 percent of the population) and the former
Sunni Arab ruling elite, as well as landowners and larger merchants that opposed his socialist policies.

37
 When Bashar inherited power on his father’s death that city’s relative disengagement from the uprising.
in 2000, he inherited a system that was stable but In general, the most persistent sources of opposition
had fostered divisions. Although he enjoyed personal activity since 2011 have been in poorer religious Sunni
popularity, his reforms exacerbated and increased Arab areas such as Deraa, Jisr al-Shughour, Homs, Idleb,
resentment towards the regime as a whole. Economic Douma and Hama, and frustrated youth have taken
reforms alienated the Sunni Arab workers and the lead. In contrast, the areas that have remained
peasantry, as Bashar moved to open up the economy relatively quiet are those benefitting from economic
more rapidly. Syria’s GDP grew, but subsidies to Syria’s changes or co-opted, such as central Damascus and
poorest were cut and public sector employment Aleppo, or areas dominated by traditionally supportive
decreased. Rather than genuine liberalisation, those ethnic groups, notably the Alawi-dominated cities of
close to power amassed huge fortunes through Tartous and Lattakia.
government contracts and monopolies. This new
generation of crony capitalists were visibly excessive, Despite these long-term structural resentments, the
and a disproportionately high number of this elite outbreak of the uprising was not inevitable, and
were Alawis, with Bashar making far less effort than several short-term factors played a key role. The most
Hafez had to balance the sect’s privileged position by obvious trigger was the toppling of dictatorial regimes
promoting prominent Sunni Arab families, fuelling in Tunisia and Egypt. Prior to 2011, unauthorised public
resentment among the formerly supportive Sunni demonstrations of any sort in Syria were extremely
Arab poor. rare. With the exception of the short-lived Kurdish
Serhildan (uprising) in eastern Syria in 2004, opponents
Some trends, of course, were beyond the regime’s of Assad’s rule had largely restricted themselves to
control. Rural Syria was hit by a major drought from timid declarations. The empowering effect of the
2007-10, hitting the peasantry hard, with Assad’s Arab Spring on Syria’s protestors was seen in their
inept government exacerbating matters through mimicking of techniques and slogans from elsewhere.
mismanagement of agricultural resources and The use of Facebook (only formally legalised by Assad
corruption. This prompted a wave of migration from in January 2011), YouTube and Twitter to organise
the countryside to the over-crowded cities. Syria, like demonstrations, as well as slogans such as ‘the people
many Arab states, had witnessed a demographic boom demand the end of the regime’ and preparing a
in the 1980s that brought a glut of youth to the labour different name for each Friday of protest were all
market that the economy could not accommodate. borrowed from other Arab revolts. The success of
Just when more jobs were needed, Assad’s reforms Libya’s rebels in defeating Colonel Gaddafi militarily
actually shrank the labour market further. Alongside further inspired some of Syria’s protestors, this time to
the shrinking of the state in the economy, its take up arms and to revert to a pre-Ba’athist national
role in society decreased, with the influence and flag, mimicking Libya’s reversion to a pre-Gaddafi
funding of the army and Ba’ath party heavily cut, banner. Having spent decades telling Syrians to be
meaning young Syrians received less government proud Arabs, the regime was taken aback when its
indoctrination. On top of this, Bashar encouraged a people suddenly demanded the same karama (dignity)
more conservative form of Islam to be preached among won by their ‘cousins’ elsewhere.
Sunni communities, hoping to restrict the growing
regional trend of Islamic conservatism to society rather The other key trigger was the regime’s violent reaction.
than politics. However, while he successfully co-opted Arguably, even after the first protests, Bashar enjoyed
some, notably Aleppo’s ulema (clergy) from whom he enough personal support that he could have rescued
appointed Syria’s new Grand Mufti in 2004, in other the situation. Soon after the Deraa killings, Bashar
areas this revived a sense of Sunni superiority and gave a much anticipated speech before Parliament
activism. It is not surprising that mosques and Friday on March 30, 2011, yet he neither apologised
prayers became the focal point for demonstrations, nor offered any reforms. Subsequent speeches on
while the quiet of Aleppo’s mosques helps explain April 16 and June 20 were equally uninspiring.

38
In the meantime, the regime’s forces, supported by Another key pillar has been the continued support
the mysterious Shabiha militia, cracked down violently the regime enjoys from parts of society. While Assad’s
on the growing number protests across the country. economic reforms shrank his social base he retained
The funerals of murdered demonstrators became a the support of some groups: minorities that were
focal point for further protests and, when people sceptical of majoritarian Sunni Arab rule - the Alawis,
were killed on those demonstrations, a snowball effect Christians and Druze - and some members of the
took place. While the inner workings of the regime Sunni Middle classes, particularly in commercially-
remain opaque, Bashar’s inner circle apparently clashed successful Aleppo. In the early days of the uprising
over the best response to the crisis. Hardliners led huge regime-orchestrated pro-Assad displays attracted
by Bashar’s younger brother Maher, commander of hundreds of thousands. Some loyalists genuinely
the elite 4th Armoured Division that has been at the support the regime, buying the narrative of ‘armed
vanguard of the suppression, reportedly triumphed groups’ backed by foreign powers, or believing in
over those in favour of a negotiated solution. The Assad’s hollow reforms. More likely is that many fear
violent response that was settled upon clearly sought for their fate if the regime collapses. Christians are
to repeat the ‘success’ that Hafez had in brutally wary of the experiences of their Iraqi brethren after
crushing a rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood in Saddam Hussein’s demise, with over a quarter fleeing
the late 1970s and 80s, that eventually led to the targeted sectarian killings. The Alawis, many of whom
massacre of over 10,000 fighters and civilians in contrary to popular belief did not benefit greatly from
Hama in 1982. Although regime hardliners viewed the Assad regime, also fear for their future, concerned
the challenge as a repeat of the 1980s - fighting that they will be blamed for Assad’s violence. Fear of
‘terrorists’ - this approach finally shattered any hopes the security forces may still cow people, with middle
from the opposition that Bashar would be different class Sunni Arabs aware that they have much more
form his father. While past resentments placed some to lose by opposing the regime than the poor of
distance between the president as an individual and Deraa and Homs. Some businessmen are reportedly
his corrupt, tortuous security officials and cronies, playing a double game, declaring their support for
his willingness to repeatedly use violence prompted Assad, while secretly funding the opposition to avoid
the radicalisation of the opposition, from peacefully any post-regime recrimination. Though this may help
wanting reform to demanding regime change. individuals in the future, it does little to persuade the
‘undecided middle’ or the arch-loyalists to switch
sides, and the relative neutrality of these key groups
WHY THE REGIME HAS SURVIVED SO FAR has kept protests out of the two major city centres
and denied the opposition the visible support of the
Parts of Syria have been in open rebellion for over a majority of the population.
year and yet, unlike the dictators of Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen and Libya, Assad remains in place. The reasons The opposition’s weakness has also aided the
for his survival thus far are multi-fold. Firstly, key pillars regime. Assad’s opponents initially organised
of the regime remain in place. Multiple coups following Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) to arrange
independence in 1946 led Hafez to design his regime demonstrations in centres of rebellion. These proved
to be ‘coup-proof’, with four over-lapping intelligence effective as they were largely leaderless, meaning that
agencies to spy on the population, the army and one the regime had no ringleaders to arrest or kill. Despite
another. This has thus far prevented the kind of internal thousands of arrests, these committees continue to
moves by the military that toppled the Egyptian and be the leading organisers of peaceful protest on the
Tunisian presidents. On the contrary, Syria’s military ground even after a year. However, the desire for
and security forces, packed at the higher echelons with international backing prompted the formation of an
arch loyalists, many from the Alawi sect, have proven opposition in exile, the Syrian National Council (SNC),
fiercely loyal to the regime: willing to slaughter their in Istanbul in August 2011. Yet the SNC has has not
countrymen in a manner that Egypt’s army refused. won enough internal support. Syria’s leading Kurdish

39
 grouping for example, the newly formed Kurdish most fighters are pious rather than overtly Islamist,
National Council (KNC), has declined to join the SNC there remains the possibility of increased radicalisation
because of the dominant position given to the exiled as the conflict becomes more violent.
Muslim Brotherhood, largely opposed by secular Kurds,
and the council’s base in Turkey, a long-time opponent The potential for sectarian conflict has been another
of Kurdish rights. The SNC is seen as out of touch with tool used by the regime to cling onto power. For decades
events on the ground compared to the LCCs, while the regime promoted itself as a bastion of stability for
older opponents of the regime that have remained in Syria’s heterogeneous population compared to the
Syria rather than spent decades in exile, such as Louay sectarian chaos in neighbouring Iraq and Lebanon.
Hussein or Michel Kilo, have complained of the bullish At the same time it subtly ensured that sectarian
stance taken by the SNC abroad. Even within the differences between Syria’s different communities were
SNC there have been clear divisions, with key activists not forgotten. It privileged the Alawis, discriminated
such as former judge, Haitham al-Maleh, walking out against the Kurds, and maintained legal barriers
of the council complaining of poor leadership. The between Muslims and Christians. Although Baathist
issue of whether to seek western military intervention rhetoric spoke of a united Arab Syrian identity, the
has been particularly divisive. Given the decades of reality was a more complex manipulation of different
systematic repression meted out by the Baath regime identities at different times. The regime tapped into
on all opposition, this inability to organise and unite is these identities by raising the spectre of a sectarian
perhaps not surprising, but it has meant that, despite civil war as soon as the uprising began, accusing the
much goodwill and support from the western powers opposition of fostering sectarianism. Yet it was the
and several Arab states, the SNC has been unable to regime’s Shabiha that were deliberately stirring up
secure the kind of armed backing afforded the National ethnic violence to scare the minorities and those that
Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya. feared civil war into backing the regime, for example
by delivering sandbags to Alawi areas and warning
Also seemingly inspired by events in Libya was the of Sunni attacks. The protestors emphasised their
formation of the Free Syria Army (FSA), in July 2011 inclusiveness early on, shouting slogans such as ‘all
by defecting Syrian army officers that had fled to the Syrians are one’, but as regime violence continued
Turkey. Its leader, Colonel Riad al-Asaad, stated that and non-Sunnis largely backed the regime, sectarian
the security forces willingness to kill civilians made
attacks increased, especially in war-torn Homs, and
them a legitimate target and called on soldiers to
sectarian chants emerged such as, ‘we didn’t used to
defect, eventually swelling their ranks to approximately
hate the Alawis, now we do’, or ‘Sunni blood is one’.
20-25,000 largely low-ranking officers and soldiers,
While the majority of the opposition still insist that
mostly Sunni Arabs. The bulk of the 400,000-strong
they are not motivated by sectarianism, the potential
regime military has remained intact however, and no
for an ethnic civil war increases as violence continues,
whole units or heavy weaponry has switched sides. The
apparently the regime’s cynical survival strategy in
West steadfastly refuses to arm the rebels and, despite
the first place.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s enthusiasm, their supplies
are limited. Attempts to take and hold territory that Further aiding the regime have been the divisions
could form the base for opposition military operations within the international community. Unlike in Libya,
have failed, leading the regime to brutally crush rebel military options don’t appeal to western powers,
strongholds such as the Baba Amr district of Homs. It Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who have rallied
remains unclear how much control Colonel al-Asaad
most of the Arab League against Assad. Airstrikes
actually has over the various militia nominally under
and a no-fly zone, or even just establishing protective
his banner. US fears that Al-Qaeda may be operating
‘humanitarian corridors’ around border areas, could
within the FSA are probably embellished, but some
be launched from Turkey or Cyprus, but Assad has
fighters are certainly inspired by political Islam, as seen
far better air defences than Gaddafi making foreign
by the naming of some militias after Sunni historical
casualties likely. Moreover, the FSA are not in a position
figures. While journalists such as Al-Jazeera’s Nir Rosen
to make significant gains on the ground as did the
that have been embedded with the FSA highlight that
40
rebels in Libya, and any military strikes could increase SCENARIOS FOR SYRIA’S FUTURE
instability and catalyse the descent into chaos. Arming
the FSA directly, without the major military defections Syria is therefore in stalemate. The regime is far from
thus far not seen, is unlikely to allow them to pose finished but the opposition seems unlikely to give up.
a genuine threat anytime soon. Moreover, after Libya The violence looks set only to increase as each side
most of the anti-Assad camp, especially Turkey, which radicalises: the regime believing that the international
would likely take a leading role in any military action, community’s punishments can be withstood, while
recognise the need for UN approval of any moves, parts of the opposition slide towards Islamism and
and that is unlikely to happen. sectarianism. With direct external intervention
seemingly ruled out, all scenarios for the future appear
Russia and China have blocked far more modest moves grim. Most unlikely is that the opposition will break
against Syria in the UN Security Council. Both generally through and topple the regime through popular
oppose international interference in states’ internal protest or military success. The FSA is too weak and,
matters, and Russia in particular has a long-standing even with Western or Gulf arms, will take years to
strategic relationship with Syria, which hosts Moscow’s reach parity with the military. Similarly, the opposition
only Mediterranean naval base. Additionally, Russia seems unable to win enough support to prompt the
felt that NATO overstepped its UN-mandated remit in mass demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo that
Libya and is determined that the same will not happen worked in Tunisia. The decline of the economy under
in Syria. Putin also may also have a personal loyalty sanctions might prompt a coalition of merchants and
to Bashar, who was one of the few heads of state the military to mount a coup against Assad to preserve
to publically support the Russian leader’s invasion of their status, but the military is constructed to be loyal
Georgia in 2008. Although Russia and China both and have remained so, and they now have blood
endorsed the ceasefire plan of former UN Secretary on their own hands after the crackdown. Similarly,
General Kofi Annan in Spring 2012, which importantly the merchant class have stayed quiet and sanctions
dropped the demand that Assad step down, few elsewhere suggest that the middle classes are more
expect the regime to permanently halt its violence likely to emigrate than turn on the regime – a trend
and it is questionable whether Russia would abandon that has already begun in Syria.
the regime even if it did not. Despite opposition from
the west and the Arab League, who have initiated What looks more likely is that, to the chagrin of
economic sanctions on Syria, Assad retains important Western and Gulf leaders, Assad holds on, as did
friends that allow him to avoid total isolation. As well Saddam Hussein after 1991. Assad clearly believes
as Chinese and Russian diplomatic cover at the UN, he can contain the threat of the FSA and cow his
with Moscow still supplying Damascus weaponry, long- population back into submission. However, it is
term ally Iran is offering advice on sanctions-busting doubtful that the FSA would ever surrender, and so
and defeating the opposition, as well as purchasing the conflict could evolve into a long-running guerrilla
Syrian oil to replace European demand and ensuring insurgency. Moreover, Assad’s ability to rule as an
its other Arab allies, Iraq and Lebanon, defy the Arab army of occupation indefinitely is unsustainable both
League’s trade embargo on Syria. Syria’s importance militarily and economically. Thus the final scenario
on the fault lines of so many conflicts in the region – is some form of civil war, which already appears
the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iraq, Kurdish issues to be breaking out. The regime would probably
and Saudi Arabia and the West’s battle with Iran – has prefer a repetition of the Algerian civil war when
ensured interest and interference from many regional the radicalisation and violence of the opposition
and international powers, but also a degree of caution eventually won the military government more support
to avoid pushing the country into chaos. than it initially had, enabling it to re-impose control.

41
 Alternatively, incremental opposition gains might erode
the authority of the state, leading to a weak central
state in Damascus and Aleppo, but militia rule in the
countryside, as happened in parts of Lebanon during
its civil war. Moreover, with the FSA already looking
like it could fragment into different militia, there is
a prospect of Syria becoming a failed state. While
there remains a slither of hope that an internationally
brokered negotiated solution could be found, nothing
the regime has done so far suggests it is willing to
compromise. With the Assad regime seemingly willing
to destroy Syria rather than give up power, the future
looks bleak. ■

42
Yemen’s Arab Spring: From Youth
Revolution to Fragile Political
Transition
Tobias Thiel

In February 2012, Yemen’s revolutionary movement achieved its first victory: the removal
of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the co-option of the movement by Yemen’s key
powerbrokers, regional insurgencies and daunting economic challenges threaten to squander the
opportunity to repair Yemen’s failing social contract. Stabilisation efforts, though indispensible,
must not come at the expense of a democratic and civic state.

2011 became a year of revolt for the Arab Middle East and North Africa. Driven by the desire for
freedom, dignity and social justice, millions of Arabs took to the streets to expel veteran strongmen and
their sycophantic advisors from their palaces and remove the quasi-feudal structures constituting the
backbone of their regimes. Struck by the resemblance of the uprisings, commentators quickly hailed
this transnational wave of protest as an ‘Arab 1989’, spearheaded by Facebook-wielding youth. The
spontaneous mobilisation seemingly repudiated political scientists’ explanations for the resilience of
Arab autocracy: rentierism, overblown security apparatuses, sophisticated regime strategies of division
and co-option, and political culture.

REGIME RESPONSES AND ELITE FRAGMENTATION

Having survived in Yemen’s notoriously ungovernable political landscape for over 33 years, Mr Saleh
recalcitrantly clung on to power in the face of the burgeoning protest movement. His power has been
founded on two pillars: the rentier state and the military. Unable to govern the country single-handedly,
Saleh has distributed political rents from Yemen’s largely oil-driven economy through an inclusive
patronage network of tribal, religious, military and party elites to secure their allegiance. Through
his family, he dominates the state’s security apparatus. Saleh’s son Ahmad Ali heads the Republican
Guards, his nephews Yahya and Ammar command the Central Security Forces and the National Security
Organisation, while – until recently – his half-brother Mohammed was in charge of the Air Force and
his nephew Tariq of the Presidential Guard.

As the protests gained momentum, Mr Saleh responded with a mix of political manoeuvring: patronage
and bribery, co-option, repression and propaganda. He mobilised a large countermovement at Tahrir
Square, bought the loyalty of tribal sheikhs, lowered the income tax, and raised the wages of civil servants
and security forces. In an attempt to co-opt reformists, Mr Saleh pledged to discard a constitutional
amendment to prolong the presidential term and reform the electoral system. Simultaneously, many
activists came under attack by plain-clothed thugs or were arrested by security forces. Saleh framed
the uprising as an affront against unity, freedom and democracy and claimed that the demonstrations
were orchestrated from ‘a control room in Tel Aviv for destabilising the Arab world [… that is] managed
by the White House.’

43
 When traditional strategies proved unable to contain THE MILITARY, THE TRIBE AND ISLAMISM STRIKE
the spread of the movement, the regime response BACK
became heavy-handed. March 18 – the ‘Friday of
Dignity’ – became a watershed moment as pro- Mr Saleh skilfully stalled and sabotaged various
government rooftop snipers massacred around 50 mediation efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council
peaceful demonstrators and wounded more than 200. (GCC), hoping to outlast the revolutionary fervour.
Whether authorised by Mr Saleh or not, the killings After the third failed attempt to sign a GCC-brokered
exposed the moral bankruptcy of the regime and its initiative, hostilities erupted in Sana‘a on May 23.
support haemorrhaged virtually overnight. A similar Ahmed Ali’s Republican Guards faced Sadiq al-Ahmar’s
event occurred in Ta‘izz on May 29: pro-Saleh forces Hashid tribal fighters and 25,000-30,000 troops of the
killed several dozen protesters when they raided the First Armoured Division. On June 3, Ali Abdullah Saleh
protest square with tanks and bulldozers, storming a was severely injured in an attack on the president’s
makeshift hospital and burning people alive in their compound and was flown out to Saudi Arabia for
tents. Faced with increasingly brutal repression, the medical treatment. Saleh blames Ali Muhsin and the
youth movement expanded into a mass uprising. Al-Ahmars for the assassination attempt, which is
plausible but unconfirmed.
The March 18 massacre accelerated the fragmentation
of Mr Saleh’s traditional support base. Earlier, Sheikh Although a ceasefire temporarily ended the hostilities
Abdulmajid al-Zindani, an influential, incendiary cleric in Sana‘a on June 7, fighting continued along other
with a flaring red beard, had sided with the youth conflict lines across Yemen. Tribes in Arhab and
movement. Sadiq al-Ahmar, head of the powerful Nihm became entangled in a protracted war with
Hashid Tribal Confederation, and his brothers Hamid, the Republican Guards. Tribal fighters damaged several
Hussein and Himyar, publicly turned against the tanks, shot down a Yemeni warplane and captured
president. Now, long-time ally Major General Ali military equipment from a Republican Guards base.
Muhsin al-Ahmar, the powerful commander of the First Driven by the fear of an Ali Muhsin or al-Ahmar-
Armoured Division, moved troops into Sana‘a vowing dominated post-Saleh regime, the Houthi rebels
to protect the protestors. His move precipitated dozens expanded their sphere of influence to Amran, Hajjah
of resignations by prominent diplomats, ruling party and Mahwit. The radical Shi‘a movement clashed
members, government officials and military officers. with Sunni tribesmen and Salafist fighters, leading
to a calamitous humanitarian situation in the north.
Ironically, the most powerful supporters of the
democracy movement are veteran regime insiders. Meanwhile, several hundred Islamist militants took
The defections did not result from a democratic control of the provincial capital of Zinjibar in May
enlightenment within the elite, but are emblematic 2011. Although some Yemeni military units engaged
of Saleh’s failed alliance policy. The increasing in heavy fighting with the militants, the opposition
concentration of power around his immediate family alleges that Saleh’s regime secretly colluded with
breached unwritten power-sharing agreements within Al-Qaeda. During the clashes, the Yemeni Air Force
the regime’s inner circle. Especially Ali Muhsin had ‘mistakenly’ bombed soldiers from the renegade 119th
many reasons to settle old scores: Saleh had entangled brigade, which had defected to Ali Muhsin. The US
him in an unwinnable war against the Houthis and intensified drone attacks against Al-Qaeda, killing the
launched a failed plot to have the Saudi Air Force radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki and other high-profile
‘accidentally’ bombard his headquarters. leaders. In Al-Baydha’, Tariq al-Dhahab took over the
town of Rada’a to extort the release of his brother and
14 other Islamists from government prison.

44
The economic impact of the crisis has been devastating. and a bipartisan government, dividing ministerial posts
With already 45 percent of Yemen’s population living equally between the ruling and opposition parties,
below the poverty line in 2010, the deteriorating was sworn in. The Committee on Military Affairs for
security situation across the country crippled the Achieving Security and Stability was founded and
Yemeni economy. Many Yemenis face shortages of elections were scheduled for February 21, 2012. The
fuel, water, electricity and basic foodstuffs. Real GDP parliament passed a controversial immunity law for
contracted by 7.8 percent in 2011 and oil output Mr Saleh and 500 of his aides in January, but UN
stagnated at 180,000 barrels/day, compared with human rights chief Navanethem Pillay rejected the
260,000 b/d before the crisis. Conservative inflation law as inconsistent with international law.
estimates for 2011 range from 20 to 30 percent.
Despite some black market variation, the foreign Conceived with stabilisation rather than retribution
exchange rate of the Yemeni rial remained largely in mind, independent youth, the Houthis and Hirak
constant thanks to fund streams from Saudi Arabia remained unconvinced that the GCC deal marked the
and at the cost of the depletion of a fourth of the beginning of a democratic transition. The revolution
Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves. continued unabated, but with crucial tactical changes.
Protestors went on a more than 250km long ‘life
The violence between heavily armed factions
march’ from Ta‘izz to Sana‘a in December to protest
transformed what started as a peaceful youth
the GCC agreement’s immunity clause. The march
movement into an elite power struggle. Fully aware
sought to address the failure of the largely urban
that a new regime dominated by old elites would be
middle-class-based movement to appeal to the 70
all too similar to the one they seek to oust, the youth
percent of Yemenis living in rural areas. Simultaneously,
movement struck a Faustian bargain with Yemen’s
disgruntled public employees initiated the ‘revolution
key powerbrokers for Saleh’s removal: the military
of institutions’; they purged corrupt officials from more
(Ali Muhsin), the tribe (the al-Ahmars) and Islamism
than 19 public institutions, such as the national airline,
(Abdulmajid al-Zindani). These powerbrokers began
state television, the Sana‘a police headquarters, the
using the protestors to further their own political
Coast Guard and some military units.
ends. Political parties, particularly Islah, increasingly
gained control over the change squares. Well-funded On February 21, Yemen held a referendum that
and organised, they outdid independent youth, who confirmed acting president Hadi as Yemen’s new
lack organisational capacity, funding and political president with a considerable majority. JMP loyalists
experience. Intimidation, threats, beating and a went to the polls to vote out Mr Saleh, while most
takfirism campaign (denouncing fellow Muslims as independents, the Houthis and Hirak boycotted the
infidels) moreover led many centrists and independents referendum. Many activists perceived a power-sharing
to retire from the squares in June. agreement with Saleh’s General People’s Congress
Party as a betrayal to ‘the blood spilled by the martyrs
of the revolution’. Hirak launched a few attacks
A FRAGILE POLITICAL TRANSITION against polling stations in southern governorates.
Mr Hadi’s inauguration initiated the second phase of
After months of deadlock, Ali Saleh unexpectedly the GCC initiative; the ambitious project envisages a
returned from Saudi Arabia in late September. The comprehensive national dialogue, the amendment of
Security Council issued resolution 2014 urging Saleh to the constitution, and new elections within two years.
sign the GCC initiative and, on November 23, he finally
bowed to international pressure. The GCC initiative, Backed by foreign powers, President Hadi initiated
monitored by UN special envoy Jamal Benomar, some bold moves. The new Sana‘a Protective
transferred presidential authority to vice-president Security Force, which consists of units from rivalling
Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. In the initial 90-day factions under the command of the Committee
phase of the initiative’s implementation mechanism, on Military Affairs, has removed several military
Mohammed Basindwa was appointed prime minister installations in Sana‘a.
45
 Amid growing concerns that Saleh’s cronies were THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
further destabilising the country, Hadi dismissed four
governors and 19 high-ranking military commanders, Yemen’s new government faces daunting challenges
including Mohammed and Tariq Saleh. The Air Force from all sides: the old regime, the protestors and
commander Mohammed Saleh refused to step down regional insurgencies. Unless the new president fills the
and threatened to shoot down commercial airplanes power vacuum, Saleh will continue to interfere in the
at Sana‘a International Airport, but Hadi remained transition process. In a Medvedev/Putin-style scenario,
determined. his re-election in 2014, or that of his son Ahmed,
cannot be discounted. Protestors are frustrated that
The fragile achievements in the north are matched their movement has been co-opted by elites who
by chaos in the South. Aden is witnessing an play according to the same old highly personalised
unprecedented security vacuum, as the absence of the ‘rules of the game’ outside of Yemen’s weak formal
state allows Ansar al-Sharia, the Southern Movement, institutions. As the wounds inflicted by the 1994 civil
former regime loyalists, armed gangs and Salafists to war and other regional divisions run deep, the spectre
wreak havoc. The recent upsurge in Islamist violence of state fragmentation hovers over the transition
by Al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan, Shabwah, process. The secession of the south – and, perhaps,
Al-Baydha’ and Lahj has developed into a full-blown that of the Houthis – is a distinct possibility if the
insurgency, which suggests at least some links with Sana‘a-based government fails to put an inclusive
Saleh’s associates. power-sharing agreement on the table. Although a
southerner himself, Mr Hadi has no political capital
The US counter-terrorism strategy – a combination in the south because he helped crush the southern
of empowering boutique military units under Saleh’s rebellion during the 1994 civil war.
family command and drone warfare – exacerbates the
very security challenges it seeks to resolve. The regime The new government must focus on quick-wins for the
is known to divert counter-terrorism capacities for transition period, while keeping an eye to long-term
other purposes: when Islamists gained ground in the strategy. The national dialogue, transitional justice and
south during 2011, Yahya Saleh’s counter-terrorism a new constitution are key priorities. There has to be
unit remained in Sana‘a as a de facto regime protection a trade-off between inclusiveness and efficiency, but
force. The Pentagon’s plan to spend $75 million in youth, civil society and women, Hirak, the Houthis and
military aid in 2012 will ensure that Al-Qaeda remains reform-oriented members of the ancien régime must
a cash cow for the government. While disgruntled all be part of the process. Much rests on whether he
tribesmen often steal American weapons from the can effectively bring the armed forces under a unified,
Yemeni military, militants often draw their raison d’être technocratic leadership, but Hadi must not repeat the
from American drone attacks, which have led to a high mistakes of the Iraqi de-ba’athification, as short-term
number of civilian deaths. Any security strategy in stability depends on maintaining a precarious balance
Yemen should therefore centre on providing incentives of power between the old and new regimes. The
for the disarmament of non-state actors, rather than transition period must provide tangible (economic)
promoting the further militarisation of the state. improvements for the Yemeni population, such as
improved access to water and electricity, reconstructing
Sa‘dah or revitalising the Aden port.

46
Long-term stability, on the other hand, requires that the
failing social contract gives way to a more democratic
and inclusive power-sharing arrangement, which
provides enough space for Yemen’s extensive pluralism.
Given the regional dispersion of power, effective state
management necessitates core-periphery cooperation,
not coercion. Hirak and the Houthis must be persuaded
that a united Yemen is not based on occupation, but
an equal partnership. Only a federal, decentralised
system with a large degree of local self-rule can provide
effective mechanisms to defuse these internal conflicts.

The litmus test for the new government will be Yemen’s

transformation from a rentier state to a productive,
post-hydrocarbon economy. Civil service reform, and
particularly the elimination of ‘ghost workers’, is
essential to create responsive and transparent public
institutions that can address widespread poverty and
unemployment. Developing the ability to tax as well as
ending the squandering of public money and endemic
corruption are necessary to fund state expenditures.
Development aid is much needed, but donor funds
can be a doubled edged sword. Their massive influx
into a resource-poor environment can reinforce rent-
seeking behaviour; competition over Yemen’s scarce
resources has exacerbated conflicts for decades. The
donor community should therefore provide technical
assistance for the transition process with conditional
aid, while persuading the government through political
dialogue to enact reforms in keys sectors.

Diagnosed as being ‘on the brink’ of a failed state for

almost a decade, Yemen has continued to function
– albeit poorly – and its history reveals that political
pragmatism trumps ideology. The protest movement
has opened a window of opportunity to foster
structural change: it has challenged the hegemony
of identity politics and engrained democratic ideas
into mainstream political culture. Power shifts
inevitably generate resistance among those who lose
their privileges. This is why Yemen will continue to
experience violence and remain an unconsolidated
democracy in the foreseeable future. Although the
transition will not be orderly, it has afforded Yemenis
a chance to rebuild their flawed national union – an
opportunity that must not be squandered. ■

47
 Power Shift?

48
Iran and the Arab Spring
Naysan Rafati

T he events of the Arab Spring, it has been argued, have their precursors in Iran. Yet the
proponents of such a view are split over which Iran it is that serves as the inspiration for
events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere: is it, as some officials from the Islamic Republic
claim, their own 1979 revolution, which unseated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from the Peacock
Throne, or the Twittering, YouTubing mass protests against that vision of a Republic which
spilled into the streets of Tehran and other cities around the country three decades later?

The first point, which relates to Iran’s domestic situation, is that despite the precedent for public protest
in Iran, most notably in the form of the Green Movement which emerged after the contested reelection
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, a resurgence of anti-government activism galvanised by
the Arab Spring does not seem forthcoming, at least in the short-term. Secondly, while analyses of Iran’s
role in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East may diverge in their conclusions, they acknowledge,
implicitly or outright, that Iran matters. This would inevitably have been the case given the country’s
position as a regional power based on indicators such as population and geography, economic strength,
and military capability, but the religious ideology which underpins the regime, coupled with the policy
stances it maintains on issues such as nuclear proliferation and the Arab-Israeli conflict, have failed to
endear it to the West and some other influential Middle Eastern powers. Indeed, the argument could be
made that, from Washington to Brussels to Riyadh, ongoing concern particularly over Iranian enrichment
and a potential weapons capability contribute to the fact that Iranian engagement with countries in the
Arab world is rarely viewed in isolation, and that this apprehension predates the transformative events
of recent months. Thus in terms of shifting regional politics and Iran’s role within the context of these
changes, the Arab Spring has served to highlight the extent to which relations between actors can not
be confined to a bilateral context. Finally, the still-uncertain fate of the protests in Syria, Iran’s closest ally
in the Middle East, underscores both the tension between rhetoric and interest facing Tehran, as well
as representing perhaps the single most important strategic challenge that Iran will need to deal with
as a result of the ongoing turmoil, with potentially far-reaching implications for its regional influence.

INTERNAL POLITICS AND IRAN’S VIEWS OF THE ARAB SPRING

If the Arab Spring has shown that regimes which appear stable can prove surprisingly weak, Iran might
be considered weak yet surprisingly stable thus far when it comes to its domestic politics. Whatever
the nature of the link between Iran’s 2009 protests and the eruption of demonstrations throughout
the Arab world over the course of 2011 and 2012, the primary areas of contestation within the Iranian
political scene, as witnessed during the parliamentary elections held in March of this year, are no longer
taking place between reformists and conservatives. Rather, they are increasingly taking place within
and between conservative factions who pledge fidelity to the existing system even while promoting
different visions for it. Iran’s protesters, with their use of mass demonstrations and social media, may
have foreshadowed what would take place in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but a combination of internal
weaknesses within the movement compounded by a robust and uncompromising response from the
government against the opposition and its leadership has seemingly quieted the voices of dissent.

49
 Nevertheless, as the rapidity and unpredictability of sectarian beliefs are no guarantor of harmonious
the protests elsewhere have shown, the potential for relations, any more than a seeming incompatibility
a rekindling of Iran’s internal divisions can certainly precludes them. Syrian-Iranian ties, bringing together
not be ruled out, particularly as sanctions against the a Persian, Shia theocracy with an Arab nationalist
country chip away at the already fractured economic state, offer a case in point.
and commercial foundations of the Iranian state.

If the domestic political situation within Iran is one

of relative stability though not assured strength, for THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
the time being, the question then becomes how the
One of the striking features of the Arab Spring in
Iranian regime views developments across the region:
relation to Iran has been the difficulty of isolating any
where it may sense opportunity, and where it may
single bilateral relationship from a broader matrix of
perceive threat. In other words, how will changes
regional and international dynamics within which the
taking place within countries impact relations between
events of 2011-2012 must be examined. Regional
countries, not only within a particular bilateral context
divisions and competition for influence and power
but in a broader regional framework? The narrative
are, of course, a longstanding feature of Middle
expounded by Tehran has been broadly welcoming and
Eastern politics, but of greatest relevance to present
supportive, but coloured by a specific interpretation of
developments may be the emerging ‘Cold War’
what has given cause to the uprisings; Iran’s Supreme
between the two Gulf powers, Iran and the Kingdom
Leader, Ali Khamenei, has described developments
of Saudi Arabia, which has become increasingly chilly
as a ‘widespread awakening of nations, which is
since the fall of the Ba’ath in Iraq in 2003 and the
directed towards Islamic goals.’ Using the language
of ‘Islamic Awakening’ (Bidari-ye Eslami) seeks to find consequently weakened geopolitical role of Baghdad. F.
and develop commonalities between the raison d’être Gregory Gause III notes that in recent years ‘the Saudis
of the Iranian state and the protests, not only as a have pursued a policy of balancing against, rolling back
correlation to be drawn upon and exploited but as where possible, Iranian influence in the Arab world.’
causation as well: ‘the wave of the Islamic awakening If the Cold War analogy can be pushed, Bahrain may
resonated through the Islamic world as an export of increasingly be seen as one of several potential Berlins
the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ one senior Iranian official – places where the two camps play out their rivalries,
has maintained. This interpretation, however, is at and whereby an integral aspect of Tehran-Manama
best little more than a partial explanation. While the relations cannot fail to take into consideration the
increasing visibility of Salafist groups and organisations position and interests of Riyadh. On the one hand, the
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would seem grievances of the Kingdom’s majority Shia population
to proffer fertile grounds for growing influence, the give a sectarian basis around which Iran can frame its
reality of developments is not so straightforward. concerns; ‘the Bahraini nation is an oppressed nation,’
Khamenei has opined. On the other hand the specter
Religion and religiously-oriented groups have clearly of Iranian interference unquestionably helped provoke
played a part throughout the course of the Arab the Saudi show of force that has buttressed the rule
Spring, but how that will translate over the course of of the Al-Khalifa family.
political transitions remains unclear. Moreover, even
if Islamist parties consolidate themselves in positions This competition for influence between regional actors
of power, there are certainly no assurances that the is compounded by the international, or perhaps more
model of the Islamic Republic offers any blueprint or specifically Western, view of Iran as a destablising
idealised form for their mode of governance, or that force in a volatile region. This outlook has been
a shared commitment to religion in political life will held by Washington since the hostage crisis that
necessarily entail a closer strategic relationship to accompanied the birth of the Islamic Republic, and
Tehran. Indeed, the politics of the Middle East have has been solidified over subsequent years as a result of
demonstrated that the compatible of ideologies or Iranian support for terrorism and the country’s human

50
rights record. Over the last decade, however, and THE UNCERTAINTIES OF UPHEAVAL
in the past few years in particular, it is the controversy
over Iran’s nuclear programme which has galvanised The preceding paragraphs have highlighted two points,
international cooperation against Iran. Sanctions namely that Iran’s interpretive framework of the Arab
are being regularly deepened and broadened by Spring explains what is taking place as favourable
international, regional, and national actors, and to its values and compatible with its interests, and
represent one of several means through which Iran that the regional and international context is broadly
is being penalised for the irreconcilability of its nuclear unsympathetic to seeing Tehran reap dividends from
project with foreign concerns. Iran has, of course, the changes taking place. Developments in the Levant
consistently argued that its enrichment activities are give reason to question the first and underscore the
aimed to serve the exclusively peaceful ends of medical second. While the uprising in Syria can be seen as
research and power generation rather than a weapons a continuation of changes taking place elsewhere,
capability. And while the argument could be made bringing various forces together in opposition to
that it is the legalistic nuances of proliferation and a repressive and unrepresentative government, the
the agreements that govern it which motivate the narrative of religiously-inspired regional awakening
sanctioning of Iran, the case could also be that it is proffered by the Islamic Republic can only be
the particular characteristics of Iranian policy which maintained by distinguishing the opposition to the
exacerbate the perception of threat. In other words, rule of Bashar Al-Assad and his coterie from protests
Iran’s proliferation is a danger because of Iran’s policies elsewhere. Thus, while Egypt, Libya, Tunisia et. al.
in other areas, while its proliferation in turn makes reflect a nation’s resistance to oppression and a growing
it more of a threat. The resumption of negotiations popular religious consciousness, the repression of
between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, demonstrators in Hama, Homs, and elsewhere in Syria
and Germany) and Iran in mid-April after more than is, in Tehran’s telling, a byproduct of foreign schemes
a year, with a pledge to follow up with further talks, rather than any reflection of legitimate indigenous
gives some cause to be optimistic about the prospects grievances. Accounts in the Iranian press accordingly
for an eventual diplomatic settlement, though the road reel off a long list of countries in their reports on the
to a major breakthrough remains long and potholed. Arab Spring – Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen will inevitably make
The promises and pitfalls of the Arab Spring can
their appearances – whilst Syria’s unrest is conspicuous
therefore be seen as part of a larger picture in which
by its absence. ‘The Americans and certain Western
Iran’s advances and setbacks are linked to efforts
countries want to take revenge on Syria for their
to curtail its influence and ambitions. This is the
recent defeats in the region,’ Khamenei has explained.
fundamental issue preoccupying Western policy
‘The main purpose of the United States’ plot in Syria
makers: how to stymie Iranian advances into the
vacuums that have emerged in the wake of the Arab is to deal a blow to the resistance front in the region
Spring at a time when the perceived need to limit its because Syria is supporting the resistance of Palestine
influence, limit its trade, and limit its ambitions has and the Islamic Resistance of Lebanon.’ Shortly after
been greatly heightened. the Friends of Syria announced that it would bankroll
the Free Syrian Army, Iran’s Defence Minister asked
‘why do some countries promote civil war in Syria
and support terrorist groups? If they want to help
Syria why do not they support the trend of reforms
and referendum which has begun in the country?’ In
Tehran’s telling, then, while other regimes crumbled
because they did not adhere to its own worldview
and values, Damascus’s burden has been shouldered
because it has. The Iranian opposition, by contrast,
has come out in favour of the uprising, deeming it

51
 ‘an anti-dictatorial movement seeking freedom,’ and CONCLUSION
viewing their own country’s role with ‘deep regret.’ The
image of two hands, one in Iranian colours bearing the The opportunities and challenges that the Arab Spring
has brought for Iran’s leadership are complex and
slogan ‘where is my vote?’ and the other painted in
multifaceted. While the Islamic Republic seeks to
the green, white, black and red standard of the Syrian
stamp its imprimatur on regional events and situate
opposition, form the image of a dove to illustrate
them within a narrative resonant of its own, as
their sympathies.
successor regimes eventually emerge in Arab states
To be sure, the fall of the House of Assad is without such as Egypt and Libya, and the uprisings in Syria and
question be the single most significant geostrategic Bahrain reach some sort of resolution, their specific
setback Iran could end up facing as a result of the dyadic relationships with Iran will undoubtedly witness
Arab Spring, depriving Iran of a stalwart regional varying degrees of reassessment based on perceptions
partner as well as its collaborator in the support of of interests and ideological compatibility. Will Cairo-
groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. And while Tehran relations flourish in the wake of Mubarak,
the dissolution of a three decade-long Syrian-Iranian abetted by the Islamists, or will other factors rule
relationship would certainly be a blow in and of itself, out such reconciliation? To what extent will the
Al-Khalifa family be able to satisfy the demands
the growing internationalisation of the conflict raises
of the Bahraini opposition, and, having already
the stakes further, given that the increasingly assertive
received the assistance of their neighbours to the west,
role of the Gulf States as well as Turkey in supporting
address relations with the neighbour to the north?
and bankrolling the opposition undoubtedly adds
Speculating on the exact contours that will emerge
to Iran’s concerns. Reports are legion about active
remains, of course, impossible – the region’s capacity
Iranian assistance to the Syrian regime to counter
to upend expectations and confound conventional
this possibility, and Western officials believe that
thinking has already been amply demonstrated. Taking
training, weapons, and means to observe and disrupt
a broader view suggests that developments at the
the technological tools utilised by protesters have all
bilateral, regional, and international levels give more
been making their way to Damascus courtesy of the
reasons to question Iran’s ability to project its influence
Iranian government. Iran is likely to continue standing
and power across the changing face of the region
shoulder to shoulder with Assad, supporting reforms
than there are to anticipate it. ■
by the regime instead of changes in regime, for as
long as it can.

52
The Contradictions of Hegemony:
The United States and
the Arab Spring
Nicholas Kitchen

I n the United State’s response to the events of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration
has been consistently careful not to get ahead of fast-moving developments. Critics have
decried the administration’s apparent lack of a coherent approach, and its willingness
to talk the language of democratic ideals whilst acting to protect national interests.
Supporters, on the other hand, have praised the blending of pragmatism and principle as
evidence of a smarter approach to international affairs than that of Obama’s predecessor.
The United States’ cautious and contradictory approach, which has at times amounted to
the endorsement of the inevitable, reflects wider strategic tensions in the United States’
approach to the Middle East, and the reality that whilst the US may be the most important
external power in the region, its ability to dictate outcomes is limited. Yet by ‘muddling
through’ and insisting on keeping the United States on the right side of history throughout
the course of the Arab revolutions, the Obama administration has ensured that the new
regimes in the region will have to continue to work with the United States, and ensured that
the US is not diverted from its overriding strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States’ strategic involvement in the Middle East is rooted in two sources: a hegemonic interest
in secure and stable oil markets, and an overarching ideological commitment to the state of Israel that
is reinforced by significant domestic pressures. The consequence of these core interests has been that
since the early part of Cold War the United States has maintained a strategy of preventing any one
regional or extra-regional power from gaining regional hegemony, largely by maintaining a deterrent
force ‘over the horizon’, and on occasion intervening to uphold a regional balance. Thus in 1990, the
United States went to war in the Persian Gulf to prevent Iraq using its occupation of Kuwait as a launching
pad to control Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and threaten Israel’s security. Throughout the Cold War, whilst
becoming increasingly committed to Israel as the sole democracy in the region, the United States had
built alliance relationships with autocracies as part of the wider cause of anti-communist containment,
to ensure that oil supplies would not be disrupted for political ends, threatening not only the American
economy but the system of industrial capitalism itself. Those relationships were maintained throughout
the 1990s both to derive support for the continuing isolation of Iran and Iraq under the policy of ‘dual
containment’, and as the price for the maintenance of peace agreements with Israel.

53
 Yet if following the Cold War most of the regimes in and accommodating’ in the Middle East, asserting that
the region were pro-American, their publics certainly ‘in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the
were not. The United States’ commitment to stability expense of liberty.’ Bush emphasised that democracy
and the status quo in part sustained the stagnant promotion was not just a case of promoting American
economic, political and social systems of the region and values, but was emphatically in the American national
drove the rise of Islamism and Salafism. Having failed interest, since regimes that oppressed their populations
to successfully overthrow the authoritarian regimes of created the conditions for radicalisation and terrorism.
the region, from the 1990s, terrorism came to focus
on the ‘far enemy’ that sustained them, the United Whilst Iraq headlined the Freedom Agenda in
States. Of particular concern for Osama Bin Laden and the region, there was significant development of
Al-Qaeda was the presence of ‘infidel’ American troops institutional capacity for democratisation, and by the
in Saudi Arabia, which hosts two of Islam’s holiest end of Bush’s presidency hundreds of millions had
sites in Mecca and Medina, the United States having been spent on democracy promotion in the Middle
abandoned ‘over the horizon’ hegemony following the East and North Africa. Initiatives such as the Middle
Gulf War in order to actively contain Iraq. Supporting East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Middle East
the Saudi monarchy had become central to American Free Trade Area (MEFTA) were regional expressions
strategy in the region, since as the world’s largest of a clear policy shift, and caused significant concern
oil producer any disruption in Saudi supply would among Washington’s regional allies, most notably in
prove difficult for other producers to replace, yet this Cairo and Riyadh, who had to be reassured by senior
hegemonic interest increasingly came into conflict administration officials that they were to be ‘partners’
with American national security priorities, particularly in this policy rather than targets.
after it emerged that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers
Nonetheless, the contradictions of the Freedom
that were responsible for the attacks of September
Agenda as part of the wider ‘war on terror’ were
11, 2001 were citizens of Saudi Arabia.
clear. Did the United States seek short-term counter-
Indeed, following 9-11, some argued that the major terrorism measures enacted through the security
benefit of regime change in Iraq would be that apparatus of allied authoritarian regimes, or was it
it would allow the United States to withdraw its prioritising the long-term emancipation of societies in
troops from Saudi Arabia. In reality of course the the Middle East in an attempt to address the deeper
invasion and occupation of Iraq did more to catalyse roots of marginalisation and underdevelopment from
anti-Americanism across the region than America’s which violent extremism grew? The administration’s
enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones from Saudi soil ever reaction to Hamas’ victory in elections in Gaza in
did. Moreover, the imperatives of the ‘war on terror’ 2006 highlighted the broader contradiction between
reinforced America’s relationships with authoritarian supporting democracy and the implications for Israel
regimes, and in particular their intelligence services, and the United States of what the popular will of
which were simultaneously legitimated in their tactics societies in the region expressed, and increasingly led
– used equally against political dissenters as against democracy promotion efforts to focus on economic
terrorist suspects. liberalisation over political reform. Officials in the State
Department and the Pentagon were well aware that
Yet for all the priority given to oil supplies, Israel’s the United States was pursuing policies in the broader
security and the regimes that sustained American Middle East that were fundamentally at odds with
hegemony over the Arab world, after 9-11 the United one another, driven by competing bureaucracies in
States diagnosed the region’s authoritarian regimes Washington and the region in the absence of genuine
as the root of the terrorist problem, and prescribed strategic coordination. Yet the tensions – long-term
democracy as the solution to the Middle East’s socio- versus short-term; hegemonic interest versus specific
economic woes. Launching the ‘Freedom Agenda’ security priorities; stability versus reform – were in
in 2003 at the National Endowment of Democracy, some ways insurmountable.
George W. Bush renounced sixty years of ‘excusing

54
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND State Department, who contacted Twitter to ask
THE ARAB SPRING the social network to postpone upgrade work that
would have shut down the service in Iran, exposed
There can be no doubt that these basic contradictions the divisions within Obama’s foreign policy team
formed the sclerotic backdrop to the United States’ that reflected the deeper issues in American policy.
response to the unfolding events of the Arab Spring. In part this was a deliberate decision to create a
Obama had come to office determined to reverse ‘team of rivals’, giving voice to both foreign policy
what one senior official called America’s ‘Middle realists such as Robert Gates and Tom Donilon, as
East detour over the course of the last ten years’ and well as hawkish liberal internationalists including
to refocus America’s strategic priorities on the Asia Anne-Marie Slaughter, Susan Rice and Samantha
Pacific region in which China had been allowed to Power. These divisions would be exposed later in the
rise unchecked. Yet the legacies of his predecessor’s debate over whether to intervene in Libya, in which
war on terror had first to be addressed, as Obama the latter two ‘interventionistas’ (Slaughter having
attempted to rebuild America’s reputation among left the administration complaining of a gender divide
Muslims within a region that in 2008, according to the within the national security architecture) teamed up
Pew Research Centre, had more confidence in Osama with Hilary Clinton to successfully make the case
Bin Laden than they did in George W. Bush. Obama’s for intervention, a position that saw them dubbed
speech in Cairo in June 2009, in which he proclaimed ‘Valkyries’ by The National Interest.
his intention ‘to seek a new beginning between the
United States and Muslims around the world’, did Gender stereotyping aside, Obama’s foreign policy
improve the United States’ credibility and standing, at team reflected the President’s eagerness to hear diverse
least initially, and the withdrawal of American troops voices, a process vividly demonstrated throughout the
from Iraq proceeded as per the Bush administration’s protracted review of the Afghan strategy, in which
schedule. Yet the administration’s failure to follow Obama’s confidence in his ability to play the role of
through on the hopeful rhetoric – particularly the honest broker between competing factions almost
failure to successfully pressurise Israel with regard amounted to a desire to be his own National Security
to the Palestinian question – if anything led to a Advisor. On no issue was the debate more fraught than
further deterioration in America’s standing with publics over the Arab Spring, as competing ideologies and
in the region. In Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian worldviews within the administration wrestled with
territories, as well as in Turkey, over three-quarters longstanding conflicts between American interests
held an unfavourable view of the United States at the in a region of vital strategic importance. It has been
time of the Arab Spring. Moreover, the pro-democracy suggested that a President inexperienced in foreign
movements haven’t themselves improved perceptions policy was ‘pushed and pulled’ in all directions by
of the United States, with views remaining profoundly this divided team, but on the evidence of the Afghan
negative, as they have been for a decade. strategy deliberations it seems more likely that open
debate is at the heart of Obama’s decision-making
If dealing with ‘legacy issues’ had at best mixed success, style, in which he seeks out all the options before
the more fundamental contradictions in American attempting to find the middle ground.
policy remained. Foreshadowing the Arab Spring,
protests in Iran in June 2009 represented the first test It has been regularly asserted that the events of the
for an administration committed to engagement with Arab Spring took the administration by surprise and
Iran in the hope of opening up diplomatic pathways found it uncertain and underprepared. Whilst the
on the Iranian nuclear programme. The White House White House was reportedly irritated – rather unfairly
was determined not to ‘interfere’ in Iranian domestic – that the CIA had failed to provide early warning of
politics, both to avoid the regime being able to present the explosions in Tunisia and Egypt, the administration
the protests as rooted in foreign conspiracy and to had been reconsidering the sustainability of the
keep open the possibility of engaging Ahmadinejad’s status quo in the Middle East since the protests
government. The actions of a junior staffer in the following Iran’s Presidential election in 2009.

55
 The President himself, in the aftermath of the failure Obama was reluctant to throw the weight of the
the ‘Green Revolution’, took the time to think through United States behind revolutions and in doing so
the potential for unrest in the region, and in August threaten those core interests. Moreover, the White
2010 wrote a five page memorandum entitled ‘ House was keenly aware of the hamfistedness of its
Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa’ predecessor’s Freedom Agenda, and worried that
which was circulated among senior members of his over-enthusiastic American support might actually
national security team. Documented by Ryan Lizza undermine the revolutions’ authenticity. Obama’s
in the New Yorker in May 2011, the memo observed rhetoric in public was therefore cautious, as he sought
that socio-economic trends were feeding into citizen to balance competing interests in the context of events
discontent, and that progress towards political that exhibited great contingency and whose outcome
openness had stalled at the same time as a number was fundamentally uncertain.
of countries, most notably Egypt, were facing the
challenge of upcoming political successions. America’s Yet whilst seeking to avoid getting ‘ahead of the
autocratic allies, the President noted, were likely to ‘opt game’ in public, the administration used its long-
for repression rather than reform’ when faced with developed relationships in the region to attempt to
domestic dissent. Such developments might leave the shape developments. This was most clear in Egypt,
United States ‘with fewer capable, credible partners’ where the United States’ decade of bankrolling
as well as undermining America’s credibility ‘if we are the Egyptian military had enriched its generals and
seen or perceived to be backing repressive regimes arguably made the Egyptian top brass more dependent
and ignoring the rights and aspirations of citizens.’ on Washington’s patronage than on their relationship
with Mubarak’s inner circle. Accounts of US diplomacy
Obama’s memo mandated a Presidential Study during the protests in Tahrir Square paint a picture of
Directive, a country-by-country review of strategies constant badgering of the Egyptian military through
for political reform. Led by Power, alongside Gayle contacts at all levels – from Joe Biden in the White
Smith, Senior Director for global development in House to the Pentagon top brass right down to
the National Security Council, and the roving Dennis mid-ranking officers – as America’s mil-mil relations
Ross, the review attempted to rethink the costs and were leveraged for diplomatic purposes to insist that
benefits of American support for its allies in the region under no circumstances should Egyptian forces fire
from first principles. The resulting report, finished ‘the on protestors. Communication with Mubarak was less
week that Tunisia exploded’ according to one official well coordinated, and the White House’s mixed signals
involved in the process, came down firmly on the almost certainly contributed to the Egyptian President’s
side of the liberals within the administration; political increasingly bizarre attempts to hold on to power by
reform was in the overarching interests of the United offering the protestors vague commitments of reform.
States, and was neither unsustainable in the region In Egypt then, America’s military relationship proved
nor incompatible with America’s other priorities. Such stronger than its political commitments, allowing the
conclusions tallied with the analysis of the ‘Egypt protestors to (initially at least) carry the day.
Working Group’, composed of neoconservatives,
liberal hawks and human rights activists outside the The United States had no such relationship with
administration, with which Ross had been overseeing Colonel Gaddafi’s forces, following more than a decade
the White Houses contacts. of international isolation before the Libyan leader’s
post-9/11 rapprochement with Western weapons
Yet the long-term indefensibility of the status quo inspectors. Here the White House allowed pressure
clashed with both America’s hegemonic interest in on the regime to be driven by the Europeans, and in
the stability of the world oil market and America’s the ill-judged words of one administration official,
unchallengeable commitment to Israel which generated sought to ‘lead from behind’. The phrasing may have
immediate interests in the survival of the Saudi regime politically difficult for the President, but it captured
and the containment of Iran; notwithstanding the both the administration’s concern that the United
ongoing campaign against Al-Qaeda in the region. States should not be seen to be dictating movements

56
for liberation, and the post-Bush awareness that PROSPECTS
American unilateralism often caused more difficulties
than it solved. The United States has had to tread a fine line between
support for its values – and what it conceives as its
If the administration’s publicly cautious but privately long-term interests – represented by political reform in
proactive management of the Egyptian crisis ultimately the region, and the protection of what it perceives as
led it to the conclusion that Mubarak could be its core regional interests. Doing so has however had
abandoned and Gaddafi overthrown, in other areas its own impact: whilst Israel expressed its concern at
of the Arab Spring the United States had either less the United States’ willingness to jettison its Egyptian
capacity to support change or less inclination to bring ally, the Saudi government reportedly threatened to
it about. In Yemen, where American counterterrorism prop up Mubarak rather than see him ‘humiliated’.
assistance had been directed at reinforcing Ali Abdullah Yet the irony is that the very channels of influence
Saleh’s ability to exert control over a failing state, the that allowed the United States to successfully prevent
dictator flatly refused direct American demands that the Egyptian regime from using mass violence against
he cede power. The Sunni monarchies in the Gulf were pro-democracy demonstrators now align the United
not questioned, even as Saudi Arabia led troops from States with a ruling military elite more interested in
the Gulf Cooperation Council to ‘maintain order’ in protecting its position than in transitioning to genuine
Bahrain, where the regime, responsible for some of democracy. King Abdullah’s friend Mubarak has gone,
the worst human rights violations of the Arab Spring, and the budgets of democracy promotion programmes
is the pliant host of America’s Fifth Fleet. on the ground in Egypt have been boosted, but the
United States remains wedded to a transition run by
In Syria, the Assad regime’s crackdown exposed the a military leadership that represents more continuity
limited range of options in the United States foreign than change.
policy toolkit. With no leverage to bring to bear over a
regime that the United States had sought to isolate as In essence the United States remains limited in the
a result of its alliance with Iran, and the administration’s impact it can have in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
commitment to UN routes stymied by Russia, and to The reality is that Washington no longer holds most
a lesser extent China, it was left to Kofi Annan to of the cards in the region, if it ever did. Its capacity to
attempt to broker a distinctly unconvincing ceasefire. cajole, co-opt and coerce varies immensely from place
The administration is now urgently seeking new policy to place, as does its willingness to do so.
options on Syria, having hardened its stance to insist
Moreover, the reality remains that in a region that
that Assad step down, and seems prepared to push
exhibits strong anti-American sentiment, coup-
for a Libyan-style escalation. Yet even with regional
proofing illegitimate regimes creates stronger ties
actors such as Turkey and the Gulf states committed
between patron and client than the United States
to anti-Assad positions, their demands for ‘American
could hope to forge with regimes that command broad
leadership’ in providing resources, legitimacy and societal support. Yet the paradox is that propping
political cover threaten to involve the United States up inherently weak regimes can never generate the
in precisely the kind of complex regional conflict that lasting domestic stability – and with it, a degree of
the administration had come to office seeking to constancy in international behaviour that the United
extricate itself from. States craves in the region – in the way that social
contracts based on consent can; indeed, it has been
America’s support for failing regimes that is the source
of much of the region’s anti-American opinion.

57
 If the United States is serious about turning off
its Middle detour and genuinely reorienting itself
strategically to focus on the challenges of the Asia-
Pacific, then in the Middle East and North Africa the
US needs to prioritise long-term trends over short-term
concerns. This may not always mean pushing for
revolutionary change in support of democratic values
in the region. But it would mean making it clear that
continued American support for those regimes that
have ridden out the storm of the Arab Spring will be
made dependent on their putting in place processes
of political reform.

Whether a long-term strategy for political reform in

the region can survive either the short-term pressures
presented primarily by Iran’s nuclear programme
remains to be seen. Moreover, the challenge to
America’s economic hegemony presented by the
rise of China, the source of Obama’s desire to become
‘the Pacific President’, cannot be disassociated from
the United States’ support for the House of Saud,
and its share of the world’s dollar-denominated oil
supply. The United States’ cautious and contradictory
approach to the Arab Spring thus reflects the fact that
the Arab world does not exist in a vacuum, and there
are wider issues at stake. ■

58
Turmoil and Uncertainty:
Israel and the New Middle East
Yaniv Voller

M any observers consider Israel the biggest loser of the recent political turmoil and dramatic
changes in Arab states. With the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Israel has now lost
a leader who shared with it a desire for maintaining the ‘stable’ status quo, and who was
willing to accept, if grudgingly, Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. Now Israel is facing the rise
of Islamist parties-led governments across the region, not only in Egypt and Tunisia, but also
in non-revolutionary states, such as Morocco and Kuwait. Although cautious in their rhetoric
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, these new governments could hardly be described as adhering
to the Israeli-inspired regional status quo. These geopolitical changes in the Middle East have
therefore forced Israel to reassess its current strategic arrangements amid its two immediate
security threats: the Iranian nuclear programme and the emerging cold war in the region over
that issue; and the risk of deterioration on the Palestinian front.

ISRAEL AND THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE ARAB WORLD

The popular commentary that argues that Israel was caught unprepared by the political turmoil in the
Middle East is rather inaccurate. The lessons of the Iranian Revolution, which resulted in Israel losing
one of its most important allies in the region, has been guiding the Israeli intelligence sector since 1979.
As early as 2006, two senior Israeli Defence Forces officers publicly declared that the regimes in both
Egypt and Jordan faced existential threats and might disappear from the regional political map. These
statements elicited harsh responses from Cairo and Amman, and were quickly censured by the Israeli
government. Yet they demonstrate Israel’s constant concern about the stability of its allies. Based on both
its past experience and its general perception of Middle Eastern politics, the Israeli intelligence community
assumed that educated and internet-savvy middle class protests will soon give way to Islamist politicians.
For this reason, the Likud government’s immediate response involved a very thinly veiled appeal to
Western governments to support the existing regimes. As a result, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu
and his cabinet, already viewed as the most hawkish in Israel’s history, now came to be portrayed as a
reactionary force in the region, disengaged from reality and embroiled in conspiracy with regional despots.

The rise of Islamist parties in the elections in Egypt, Tunisia and other states was hence something of a
relief for the Israeli government. These parties’ antipathy toward the existence of the Jewish state and
their hostility toward any signs of normalisation with it, buttressed by their leadership’s ambiguity with
regard to the future of existing cooperation agreements with Israel, allowed the Israeli government to
rebuke the international community for its initial enthusiasm and to once again underline the fragility
of prevailing peace agreements that involve territorial compromise. Instability in some of the post-
revolutionary regimes, and images from the near-civil war in Bahrain, and what is evolving into a civil
war in Syria, have further reinforced Israel’s sense of isolation and underpinned its justifications for
unilateralism in the region.

59
 This sense of relief, however, was short-lived. First, Iran failed to report the construction of two
Israel faces several major threats and the new nuclear sites to the International Atomic Energy
reality necessitated a reconsideration of existing Agency (IAEA), as required by the Non-Proliferation
security arrangements. Israel has faced, or at least Treaty. Second, in a visit by IAEA inspectors to these
perceived itself to be facing, existential threats since sites after their discovery, they revealed a significant
its inception. Therefore, Israeli foreign policy and number of centrifuges, as well as heavy water facilities.
security arrangements have always been relatively Moreover, in 2011 the Iranian government declared
flexible, oriented toward ad-hoc alliances against a the instalment of new sets of centrifuges, which would
major regional threat. Currently Israel is facing two allow 20 percent uranium enrichment, the threshold
major threats, sometimes overlapping and sometimes level for military uses. Finally, several reports by the
detached: the Iranian threat, which has dominated IAEA, as well as Israeli and other Western intelligence
Israel’s foreign policy-making since the 1990s; and agencies, have indicated that Iran has conducted
the risk of new escalation on the Palestinian front. experiments in the use of nuclear technology for
military purposes.

In addition to the evident Iranian enmity toward Israel,

ISRAEL’S OVERARCHING SECURITY CONCERN: the government in Jerusalem, as well as Israeli security
IRAN experts, have suggested several other justifications
for viewing Iran not only as an Israeli, but also a
The debate taking place in Israel’s public media
regional and global threat. First, Iran is known to
demonstrates that the Iranian threat is perceived
have ballistic missiles whose range reaches not only
as the most immediate issue facing the Israeli state.
Tel Aviv, but various European capitals. Moreover,
This threat carries two particular elements: the first is
the Iranian government, some argue, is an irrational
the Islamic Republic’s explicit and vocal objection to
actor driven by religious zeal; therefore, deterrence
Israel’s existence, which has been further enhanced by
cannot be reliably applied in the Iranian case. Even
the anti-Semitic discourse of its incumbent president,
if Iran might not launch nuclear missiles at Israel,
Mahmud Ahmedinejad. Iranian hostility toward Israel
its agents still might plant ‘dirty bombs’ in Israel,
has gone beyond mere rhetorical attacks against the
causing mass casualties and spreading panic. Finally,
‘Zionist entity,’ taking the form of military and financial
Israeli and other analysts have underlined the danger
support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the
of nuclearising the Middle East. Regardless of Iran’s
Gaza Strip. In addition, Iran is also held responsible by
intentions, its nuclear ambitions would push other
several security agencies for attacks against Jewish and
states in the region, and particularly the militarily
Israeli targets across the globe, for example the recent
vulnerable but financially capable Gulf monarchies,
attacks against Israeli diplomatic targets in New Delhi
to acquire nuclear capabilities as well. And again, due
and Bangkok, as well as the attacks against Jewish and
to the unpredictability of the regional regimes, from
Israeli targets in Buenos Aires during the early 1990s.
the Israeli perspective, and the inability to coordinate
The second element that turns Iran into a major security
relations between the different actors effectively, the
threat is its ongoing nuclear programme and alleged
logic of a multipolar Mutually Assured Destruction
aspiration for obtaining nuclear weapons technology.
(MAD) system of deterrence does not hold.
It is this second element that makes deterioration into
a full scale war a tangible proposition. Given Israel’s assumption that Iran is now seeking nuclear
weapons capability, the questions that remain are:
Although the Iranian government has denied it aspires how far is Iran from obtaining such capabilities;
to nuclear weapons capability, the Israeli, American, can Iranian nuclear proliferation be stopped; and,
British, German and French governments, among others, how can it be stopped?
suspect that Iran’s final goal is achieving such capability.
This assessment is based on several indications.

60
The Israeli government’s preferred solution to the been made in secret, with no direct reference to Israel
perceived Iranian threat is a direct Israeli attack on leading the attacks. Nevertheless, without American
Iranian nuclear facilities, a tactic very much inspired support, the prospects for a military rollback of Iran’s
by Israel’s successful attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear programme remain low.
Nuclear reactor in 1981. Such a plan encounters
several difficulties, the most important of which is The current situation, therefore, is best characterised
domestic opposition within Israel to such a move. as a cold war between Iran and its allies, on one
Several senior Israeli security figures, including former side, and Israel and the so-called moderate Arab
heads of Mossad Ephraim Halevi and Meir Dagan, have states, backed by the US, on the other. The summer
come out publicly against such military adventurism, 2006 confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah was
arguing that Israel does not have the capabilities to therefore perceived as a proxy-war within this wider
launch such an operation, and that any Iranian reprisal strategic context, not only by Israel but also by Egypt,
might be devastating. Rather, these individuals have Jordan and the Gulf states, which not only avoided
suggested that Israel should continue the existing condemning Israel, but in fact pointed to Hezbollah
line of operation, which includes (allegedly) the as the main culprit. Similarly, the 2008-9 Gaza War,
assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists; sabotaging
in which Israel invaded the Gaza Strip resulting in a
the Iranian nuclear facilities through cyber-attacks such
relatively high number of civilian casualties, elicited
as the Stuxnet worm; and sponsoring local proxies such
only mild Arab condemnation of Israel, and in the case
as the opposition movement Mujahedin-e Khalq and
of Egypt even an unprecedented mutual condemnation
Kurdish rebels. A further hindrance is American and
of Hamas along-side Israel. This has served Israeli and
European discomfort with regard to an Israeli attack
foreign commentators to believe that this regional cold
on Iran. Rather than a direct conflict, which is bound
war could actually serve as a platform for Israeli-Arab
to draw in the US and perhaps other Western states,
the Obama administration and its European allies reconciliation and as a catalyst for the continuation
have advocated tightening economic sanctions, with of the peace process.
the hope of crippling the government and instigating
public unrest. Russian and Chinese objections to
military intervention in Iran further deters the United THE UNDERLYING SORE: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
States and the European Union from going down the DISPUTE
military route, or alternatively, supporting Israel in the
aftermath of such an attack. The second strategic threat facing Israel is that of
the renewal of violence in the occupied territories.
Israel, however, is not the only regional actor to be
Negotiations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) have
worried about the implications of a nuclear Iran.
stagnated under the Likud government and levels of
Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council
distrust and mutual hostility are unprecedented. The
states have all been following the Iranian nuclear
Israeli government has largely failed to comply with
programme with great anxiety. King Abdullah II of
the international demands to freeze building in the
Jordan warned of the ‘Shia Crescent’ in the aftermath
of the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq in 2003, settlements in Eastern Jerusalem and is not likely to
referring to attempts to increase Iranian influence do so. The Hamas government in the Gaza Strip is still
both in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, namely under an IDF blockade, which whilst achieving some of
Lebanon and the Gaza strip. This alleged sphere of Israel’s main goals, namely a significant reduction in the
influence often also includes Syria, Iran’s traditional ally number of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip toward
in the region. Much like Israel, the above states, often Israeli towns and settlements on the border line,
defined collectively as the ‘moderate Arab states,’ have has also further increased hostility and consequently
pushed for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Fearing enhanced the popularity of Hamas and its ideological
domestic public opinion, however, such demands have objection to any recognition of Israel.

61
 In an attempt to resolve this impasse, the PA decided Yet Egypt’s willingness to play this role is sure to
to declare official Palestinian independence and seek come under severe scrutiny in future cases of clashes
recognition in the UN General Assembly and Security between Hamas and Israel.
Council in September 2011. Eventually, the Palestinian
leadership agreed to postpone its plan, following The events of the Arab Spring have also forced other
American pressure and guarantees from Israel to Arab governments, in particular the so-called moderate
renew negotiations. Yet this can hardly be considered axis, to reconsider their policies toward Israel, namely
a diplomatic victory for Israel. International support the secret but not so discreet de facto (and in some
for such unilateral Palestinian diplomacy, as well as cases such as Qatar and Oman, de jure) recognition of
domestic enthusiasm within the occupied territories, Israel, and collaboration with the Israeli government in
were a sharp reminder of the volatility of the situation. the fields of security and trade. More pressured than
Moreover, Israeli objections to such moves might ever to pacify their public, the conservative regimes
drive Hamas to conduct attacks against targets within in the region are in dire need of political causes to
Israel, as it chose to do in the past. The memories of demonstrate their attentiveness to public opinion.
the second intifada and its demoralising effects are Since the Palestinian cause is a key theme in Arab
still fresh in the minds of many Israelis and the fear political discourse, it would be safe to assume that in
of deterioration is still prevalent. the case of an escalation, those Arab regimes will be
less lenient toward Israel than in previous years. This
Since Iran is perceived as the preeminent security threat means further pressure on Israel to reconsider attacks
facing Israel, many within the Israeli security apparatus in the occupied territories in the near future. Such
have actually come to see a peace agreement with the pressure may also have an impact on the moderate
Palestinian Authority as a necessary step to further axis’ willingness to cooperate with Israel vis-à-vis the
consolidate a regional coalition against Iran. Others, Iranian threat. So far Israel has relied on silent Arab
nonetheless, maintain that as long as Hamas, Iran’s ally, acquiescence for military strikes against Iran, under
is still in power in the Gaza Strip, such reconciliation the assumption that such an attack would also serve
cannot take place. Egyptian, Jordanian and GCC interests. Yet, in light
of the current atmosphere in the Arab states and
the fear of unrest sparking new attempts at regime
ISRAEL AND THE ARAB SPRING
change, it is doubtful that Arab regimes will want
Due to the proximity of events and the rapid political to be associated with an attack on another Muslim
changes in surrounding countries, Israel has been country, even if Shia.
careful in its statements to date on the events of the
Perhaps the most salient impact the recent turmoil
Arab Spring. Yet the turmoil in the Arab world has had
in the Arab world will have on Israeli policy-making
a direct impact on Israeli foreign policy, in particular
is the unfolding civil war in Syria. Still a major actor
with regard to Israel’s security concerns.
in the front against normalisation with Israel, Syria
On the Palestinian front, notwithstanding its ambiguity plays a key-role in the region, mainly as a channel
about the prospects of the Israeli-Egyptian peace of weapons and funds from Iran to Hezbollah. It is
treaty, both the SCAF and the FJP-led government generally assumed that such policy is part of Syria’s
have made it clear that Mubarak’s tolerance of constant effort to put pressure on Israel to sign a
Israeli policies in the Gaza strip is to be revoked. peace agreement with Syria which would bring the
The first, and at the moment the only major, sign Golan Heights, occupied by Israel in 1967 under
for that has been the military’s decision to ease the Syrian control.
blockade and allow greater freedom of movement
between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. So far, Egypt Since the situation remains in flux at the time of
– whose influence over the Gaza strip has always writing these lines it is impossible to predict the
been immense – is still playing the role of a mediator fate of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Yet, there are
between Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. certain potential scenarios that can be discussed

62
with relation to Israel. If the Ba’ath regime survives (with or without Bashar al-Assad), one may assume that
the alliance with Iran and the Hezbollah would not change dramatically. However, in the case of the collapse
of the Assad regime, any new government may well abandon its support for Hezbollah, either on the basis
of ideological resentment toward the radical Shia movement, the need to concentrate on Syrian internal
affairs, or a desire to attract international aid.

Much to its frustration, there is not much Israel can actually do to affect the situation in Syria. Although it has
often been argued that the Israeli government prefers the survival of the ‘known evil’ of the Assad regime,
this is rather inaccurate. The constant description of the Syrian-Israeli border as Israel’s most tranquil border
region should be rejected based on Syria’s alliance with Iran and its use of Hezbollah as a proxy against
Israel. Even if its Ba’ath regime survives the current conflict, Syria has probably lost its legitimacy to make
any concessions to Israel and sign a peace-agreement in the near future. A new regime, even if inherently
hostile toward Israel, might at least be focused more on rebuilding Syria, rather than reasserting its nationalist
credentials by means of a military adventure against Israel. Moreover, dependence on international aid from
the Gulf States might drive any new regime to accept the ad-hoc arrangements between Israel and the other
regional actors. Much to its frustration, there is not much Israel can do, since any direct Israeli intervention
would necessarily delegitimise any incoming regime.

After nearly a decade of relative stability, then, Israel is once again facing a conundrum. The tendency in
such situations is to further entrench in unilateralism. Yet, the price of such unilateralism can be higher than
ever, a fact which Israeli government is becoming painfully aware of. Though no Israeli government has been
prepared to publicly acknowledge it, Israel still relies heavily on American material, and even more so moral,
support. Although Israel has acted unilaterally in the past, launching a war that could potentially destabilise
the entire region, and the global economy, in a presidential election year, would put the special relationship
between the two countries to an unprecedented test. ■

63
 Conclusion: the Middle East
After the Arab Spring
Toby Dodge

“After an evil reign, the fairest dawn is the first.” Cornelius Tacitus, 109.

“As the fates of previous journées révolutionnaires warn us, spring is the shortest of seasons,
especially when the communards fight in the name of a ‘different world’ for which
they have no real blueprint or even idealized image.” Mike Davis, 2011.

T he title of this report, ‘After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?’, deliberately
ends with a question mark. The events over the year and a half since the death of Mohamed
Bouazizi in Tunisia, have left the politics of the Middle East in tumult. The Arab Spring has
certainly resulted in a change of regime in Tunisia and then Egypt. The uprisings against Gaddafi’s
regime triggered a military intervention by NATO that drove the Libyan leader and his entourage
from power. Ali Abdullah Saleh finally relinquished his grip on power in Yemen. However, the
ramifications of regime change for state-society relations in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya are
still uncertain. Mubarak may be on trial, Gaddafi is dead and Ben Ali is currently enjoying the
dubious pleasures of exile in Saudi Arabia. But the ruling elites they created, the state structures
they built, the powerful secret services and crony capitalists they nurtured did not disappear
when the despots were deposed. The post-revolutionary transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen
and Libya are unlikely to deliver on the hopes that united the courageous protestors in their
struggle. As Ewan Stein argues in this report, ‘the utopian vision of Tahrir was soon tarnished’.

Across the broader region, beyond Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, the wave of protests emboldened by
North African success were driven by similar demographic realities, failures of state policies and demands
for greater representation. However, they failed to effect regime change. The Arab Spring was a historic
moment in the politics of the Middle East but its long-term impact remains unpredictable.

George Lawson, in his piece for this report, makes three powerful points about how to best understand
the ongoing dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring. The first concedes that ‘very few movements
lead to successful revolutions’. The region is currently divided between four states in some form
of post-revolutionary transition and the rest. Although some ruling regimes have faced systematic
challenges, they have been able to repress the protestors and for the moment at least, contain demands
for political change.

Central to the states now entering transition is Lawson’s second point, the comparatively modest
demands of most contemporary revolutionaries. With the decline in the popular influence of Marxism and
state-driven agendas for revolutions from above, there has been a shift away from political mobilisation
designed to push for social transformation. In their place revolutions have become ‘self-limiting’,
focused on individual liberal political emancipation rather than collective economic transformation. The
demands for full citizenship, for the recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying
theme across the Arab revolutions. However, now that four autocrats have been driven from power,
the crucial questions at the centre of these transitions are as much economic as they are political.

64
How do the new ruling elites set about reorganising A coalition of commercial interests, threatened by
the economy to meet the unfulfilled aspirations of meaningful economic change could bring together the
their populations? crony capitalists of the old regime with their allies and
business partners still embedded in the highest ranks of
This question is pressing. The ‘authoritarian upgrading’ the state’s bureaucracy. Alternatively, and more likely,
that Steven Hyderman identified as a key strategy as has already happened in Egypt, major indigenous
for regime survival across the Middle East during the economic interests may use their collaborators within
1980s and 1990s placed limited economic reforms the state to place clear limits on how transformatory
at its centre. Using the rhetoric of neoliberalism to the post-revolutionary governments can be. This issue
ingratiate themselves with the United States and the will overtly or covertly dominate the path regime
international community, Middle Eastern dictators transition takes, because the shock troops of those
sought to jettison the costly developmental promises revolutions, the young people of Egypt and Tunisia,
which had once been key to their legitimation. As the were motivated in large part by their own economic
state retreated from the economy, the indigenous exclusion. The flagrant corruption of the old ruling
bourgeoisie were brought back in; crony capitalists elite had publicly expanded the chasm between
became a crucial, if junior member, of the ruling elite. the haves and have-nots within society. The post-
This turn to neoliberal justifications for continued rule revolutionary regimes have not to date shown any
created an influential group of economic entrepreneurs clear idea, beyond the neoliberal orthodoxy parroted
who remain dominant in key sections of the Egyptian by their predecessors, about how they will deliver
and Tunisian economy. Authoritarian upgrading also meaningful growth. Mubarak and Ben Ali were
transformed the barriers between the public and partially successful in delivering economic growth,
the private, the state and the economy. This part- opening their economies to foreign direct investment
privatisation of powerful sections of the ruling elite and multi-national companies. However, the positive
became a region-wide phenomenon. However, post- results of such neoliberal expansion were not felt
regime change the legacy of this process is most across society.
problematic for the political transition in Egypt. For a
brief but crucial period of time, the Egyptian military The urban poor did not benefit from the infitah
were celebrated by protestors in Tahrir Square for and the state-employed middle class were directly
not unleashing their coercive power in support of targeted by it. Neoliberal reforms produced a politically
Mubarak’s continued rule. However, this act of connected but small nouveau riche, with the majority
omission was in part at least motivated by the threat of the population excluded and increasingly resentful.
the revolution posed to their economic interests. The transitional governments need to reformulate
Mubarak’s son Gamal was attempting to expand the economic policies in a way that delivers meaningful
grip of his own group of crony capitalists over the growth to this previously alienated majority. This
economy, thus encroaching on the military’s own is especially problematic in Egypt, which has
economic fiefdoms. The Janus-faced relationship that demographically passed the peak of its youth bulge,
Field Marshall Muhammed Hussein Tantawi and the placing increasing numbers of young people on the job
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces have had with market. If the government fails to deliver hope to this
the Tahrir protestors since the removal of Mubarak section of society, there will be the temptation to revert
has alternated between celebration and repression to the tried and tested mechanisms of blaming uneven
justified by sinister but hidden foreign conspiracies. economic growth on the vagaries of the market.
This political schizophrenia is shaped by the Supreme Coercion will then once again become the main tool
Council of the Armed Forces’ desire to protect their used to demobilise an alienated youth, exposed to but
control over up to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy. excluded from the benefits of transnational capitalism.

It is essential to understand the role and influence The problems surrounding the delivery of meaningful
of crony capitalists empowered by the old economic growth leads on to Lawson’s third point,
regimes because they may act as a counter- the lack of ‘contemporary revolutionary ideologies’
revolutionary force, as has been the case in Egypt. binding these movements together and the fact that
65
 they have ‘... little sense of what an alternative order newly empowered but largely inexperienced political
would look like once such processes have taken place’. parties will fight over secondary issues, such as dress
The internationally dominant cliché of an Arab Spring codes and the policing of morality, which they have
revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college- clear positions on but which of themselves do not
educated member of the middle class. As Stein points deliver hope for meaningful change or prosperity.
out, the role that Facebook and other new technology
played in the revolutions was much more complicated The final issue surrounding the outcomes of the Arab
and inconclusive. The ‘demonstration effect’ which Spring is the coherence of the old ruling elites and their
drove protest from Tunisia into Libya and Egypt and ability to suppress or buy off the challenges they faced.
then on into the Gulf was powered by an older form of In two of the four regime changes, the removals of Ben
technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded Ali and Mubarak were facilitated by the fracturing of
as revolutionary when it launched in 1996. However, the ruling elite. In Tunis, Rachid Ammar, the Army Chief
its long-terms effects may if anything have been more of Staff refused to open fire on the demonstrators in
influential. Broadly comparable to the Sawat al-Arab a similar way to Tantawi in Cairo. This left the armed
radio station under Nasser, Al Jazeera and other Arab forces in both countries intact and in a central position
satellite stations played a key role in recreating a to influence the shape of the transition. In Libya, the
region-wide Arab public sphere, which amplified the country’s armed forces were overcome through the
heavy and extended support of NATO. The nature of
demonstration effect of Ben Ali’s departure.
that support led to a fracturing of the state’s security
Furthermore, beyond a collective sense of endeavour forces but this was mirrored by the highly fractured
and empowerment, the movements of the Arab Spring nature of the militias fighting to remove Gaddafi. In
were not united by a concrete or programmatical Yemen, whilst the figurehead of the regime has been
agenda for post-regime change transformation. The removed, competition for power between tarnished
results of the Egyptian elections certainly proved that former elites dominates the political landscape.
Tahrir was not Egypt, but also went on to demonstrate
Without key defections from within the higher
that neither was Cairo. The dominance of Islamist
echelons of the ruling elite or extended external
Parties in the elections, taking 67 percent of the
military support, the youthful revolutionaries at the
vote, came as no surprise. The Muslim Brotherhood
centre of the Arab Spring have proved unable to
were able to protect and even foster their nationwide
remove any other ruling elites across the Middle East.
organisation under the rule of both Sadat and
A year and a half after the start of the Arab Spring,
Mubarak. The years of brutal suppression alternating
successful revolutions have proved comparatively rare,
with toleration and cooptation turned the Brotherhood
even at the centre of what Perry Anderson labelled a
into a cautious and, given its origins and early ideology,
‘new concatenation of political upheaval’; comparable
a comparatively moderate organisation. The size of its
to the Hispanic American wars of liberation that started
presence in parliament and its organisational ability has
in 1810, the European revolutions of 1848-9 and the
given it the capacity to counter-balance the Egyptian fall of the Soviet backed regimes in Eastern Europe
military and win early victories in the war of position during 1989-91.
that is now shaping the transition. That said, the
Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘auto-reform’, its transition Against this background, it is now possible to
under state repression from a militant revolutionary start a discussion about what the aftermath
organisation to one committed to democracy, has of the Arab Spring may look like, what the long
not given it a clear or insightful programme for the term effects of this movement could bring.
transformation of the Egyptian economy in a way As things stand, the Spring has given rise to three
that can meet the aspirations of its voters or the broad sets of outcomes. The first contains the majority
third of Egyptian society aged between 15 and 30. of states in the region, and represents little or no
There is a danger, as Fatima El-Issawi points out in change. From Saudi Arabia to Jordan, the ruling
her chapter on Tunisia, that the pressing demands for elites have managed through adjustments to their
economic transformation will be sidelined and the ruling strategies to stay in power and face down
66
the protestors. The second category of outcomes The balance of forces within the country, especially
indicates a more evenly balanced contest between in the wake of Saudi intervention in support of
those mobilising for change and the regime (or the Al-Khalifas, means the regime itself faces no
remnants of the regime) themselves. This has however direct threat to its continued rule. However, in the
caused the countries concerned to descend into civil aftermath of its extended and brutal crackdown, its
war. As things stand both Libya and Syria are in this carefully constructed decade-long attempt to portray
category with Yemen a clear contender to join. Finally, itself as an open, fairly liberal base for multinational
there are those countries which are in the midst of companies operating in the region lies in tatters. The
a largely peaceful transition after regime change, population has become increasingly divided as the
Egypt and Tunisia. regime pandered to sectarian division as part of its
survival strategy. This has solidified its base amongst
The first category of states, those where the regimes the minority Sunni section of the population but may
have survived the challenge of popular protest, well constrain the regime’s room for manoeuvre as
could be understood as embarking on a new round Bahraini society is further partitioned.
of ‘authoritarian upgrading’. As the Arab Spring
spread across North Africa and into the wider Middle The second category of states that have emerged
East, ruling elites set about a reassessment of their from the Arab Spring are those that have descended
formula for continued rule. This involved adjusting into civil war, Libya and Syria. In the case of Libya, it
the balance between William Quandt’s four pillars of is still not clear whether the highly precarious post-
authoritarianism, ‘ideology, repression, payoffs, and regime change situation will revert to civil war or
elite solidarity’. In Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa ruling elite stabilise into a potentially sustainable transition. The
faced the most serious and sustained challenge to their fact that Libya today has all the prerequisites of a
rule in the Gulf region. As Christian Coates-Ulrichsen failed state springs from the legacies of Gaddafi’s
demonstrates in this report, their response was to rule, the way regime change was realised, and the
unleash a sustained barrage of repression against those actions of politicians and militia leaders in its aftermath.
involved in the demonstrations. Thus ‘the Bahraini When he was murdered, Gaddafi bequeathed to
government mercilessly pursued all forms of dissent, the Libyan population a malfunctioning state, with
detaining doctors and lawyers merely for treating or weak governmental institutions and little or no civil
representing detainees, suspending opposition political society. Still traumatised by the extended quasi-imperial
societies and arresting their leaders’. Once the ruling occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, the leading
elite’s primacy had been secured, they embarked upon proponents of military support for regime change in
a post-facto attempt to downplay, justify and minimise Paris, London and later Washington, were determined
the brutal suppression they unleashed. A ‘National to limit involvement in terms of both ‘boots on the
Dialogue’ was set up but the main opposition parties ground’ and overt military assistance. The historical
were deliberately under-represented, which begs the legacy and the nature of NATO’s actions has left a
questions of who is allowed to be a member of the post-Gaddafi Libyan regime with spurious legitimacy
nation and what the dialogue was for? The regime then and little capacity to influence events on the ground.
set up the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Ranj Alaaldin, in this report, quite rightly describes
which to the surprise of many, turned out to be both the National Transition Council now seeking to run
independent and an inquiry! The report concluded that Libya as suffering from a ‘series of deficiencies’ a
the authorities had indeed used excessive force and ‘democratic deficit’ and a number of geographical
torture. It also undermined the ruling elite’s central as well as secular-Islamist divisions. To add to the
explanation for the protests, finding no evidence of country’s current woes, the International Crisis
Iranian involvement. The aftermath of the protests Group estimates that real military power lies with
in Bahrain has left the government desperately anything up to 100 militias containing 125,000 armed
trying to re-establish its international legitimacy but Libyans. This situation of a weak and under-legitimised
continuing to repress the majority of its population. government seeking to impose control over a myriad

67
 of militias, fighting to retain their military power and the temptations for some form of military intervention
geographic autonomy, does not bode well for the comparable to Libya are increasing. That said, one
transition of Libya. hopes that the lessons of intervention in Iraq, where
the aftermath of regime change was far more
The balance of military forces in Syria, the second murderous than the military action itself, have not
country in the region to enter civil war during the been completely forgotten.
Arab Spring, is not yet as fractured as Libya. Chris
Phillips details how Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, The final set of countries to emerge from the Arab
systematically undermined the political base that his Spring, those that have moved into what are currently
father Hafez had created during his thirty-seven years peaceful transitions away from dictatorial rule have
of rule. When faced with the beginnings of political been discussed in detail above. For all the troubles and
discontent at the start of the Arab Spring, the ruling uncertainties surrounding politics in Tunis and Cairo,
elite in Syria divided, with those favouring an all out when compared to the violence and instability in Syria
assault on the demonstrators winning. As a result and Libya and the ongoing post-Spring authoritarian
the extended military campaign by the Syrian army upgrading across the rest of the region, Egypt and
has been against largely urban-based protests across Tunisia continue to offer hope for the populations
the country. The violence meted out by the regime of the Arab world that sclerotic dictators can be
quickly forced militarisation on its opponents. Local overthrown and a better freer future is possible
Coordination Committees were formed in dissenting through political mobilisation.
communities to try and offer protection to the ongoing
The events of the Arab Spring have given hope
demonstrations, and consequently Syria descended
to millions of people across the Middle East and
into civil war. However, Phillips correctly designates
beyond that meaningful political change for the
the current situation as a stalemate. The regime is not
better is a distinct possibility. That said, of all the
militarily threatened by the revolt. The majority of the
Arab countries effected by this wave of political
armed forces have stayed loyal and defections have
protest, only two, Egypt and Tunisia, are now
not escalated to a point where the state’s coherence is
in what looks like political transitions to a more
in doubt. However, unlike the last extended revolt the
representative form of government. Two more, Syria
regime faced from 1979 to 1982, the regime does not
and Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen
have the coercive capacity to suppress the revolt. Its use
also showing some signs of following them. The
of sectarian ideology has solidified its base amongst
rest of the countries of the Middle East retain the
the Allawite community and fears of radical Islam
ruling elites they had before the Arab Spring started.
and uncontrolled violence have forced other minority
Successful revolutions are very rare indeed. ■
communities to offer their begrudging support.
However, as the violence has continued, it is clear
that an increasingly large section of the population
has withdrawn its support or even passive tolerance
from the regime. That said, the exiled organisation that
was formed to represent the opposition, the Syrian
National Council, has failed to establish coherent and
meaningful links with the revolt within Syria, which
remains highly localised and fractured.

Attempts at international mediation have so far failed

to break this bloody stalemate. With the government
showing no signs of compromise and the opposition
largely incoherent, neither able to overthrow the
regime nor enter into sustained negotiations,

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 SPECIALREPORTS

When Hillary Clinton visited India in 2009, the US Secretary

of State’s verdict was unequivocal: ‘I consider India not just a
regional power, but a global power.’ Following the success of
economic liberalisation in the 1990s, which generated growth
rates in excess of 8% and a rising middle class, expectations
have grown that India might become a superpower, particularly
in a West that sees in India’s democratic heritage the potential
for strategic partnership.

However, there remain deep and pervasive fault-lines within

Indian society. Crony capitalism, the collapse of public health
systems, a rising Maoist insurgency, and rampant environmental
degradation all call into doubt India’s superpower aspirations.
Rather than seek to expand its influence abroad, India would do
well to focus on the fissures within.

For the United States, the two decades after the end of Cold
War could not have been more different: the first, a holiday
from history amid a long boom; the second mired by conflict
and economic crisis. By the end of George W. Bush’s time in
office, the United States’ ‘unipolar moment’ was over, with
emerging powers taking more assertive international roles as the
United States looked to cut its budgets. Across a whole range
of challenges, this waning of American dominance has defined
Barack Obama’s foreign policy.

After nearly a decade in power, Turkey’s Justice and Development

Party (AKP) has grown increasingly confident in its foreign policy,
prompting observers to wondered aloud whether the country
might be leaving ‘the West’, forcing that group to confront the
question ‘who lost Turkey?’

This is to cast Turkey’s role, and its emerging global strategy,

in unhelpful binary terms. Turkey’s emerging role reflects the
changes in the world politics whereby power is becoming
decentred and more diffuse, with established blocs replaced by
more fluid arrangements that loosely bind states on the basis
shifting interests.
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