Coverage for our recitation tomorrow:

Title 2 - Ownership
Chapter 1 - Ownership in General
Cases:
1. Javier v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994
G.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994 (Case Brief / Digest)
### Title: Felicidad Javier vs. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II, et al.
### Facts: This case revolves around a dispute over possession and ownership of a
parcel of land in Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, Philippines. The series of legal
contests began on 25 January 1963 when Felicidad Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 with the District Land Officer of the Bureau of
Lands. By December 1970, Javier, alleging forcible dispossession by Ben Babol,
instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, which
was dismissed in November 1972 on the ground that the area in question was
considered outside Javier’s claimed lot. This dismissal became final and executory in
April 1973.
Despite being granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3259 for the lot in December 1973, Javier encountered further possession
issues when the area was sold by Babol to Reino Rosete. After failed demands for the
area’s surrender, Javier filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession
with damages against Babol and Rosete in June 1977. Rosete moved to dismiss on
grounds of res judicata, which the Court of First Instance of Zambales granted in
January 1978. Javier’s motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to a petition for
review on certiorari.
### Issues: 1. Whether res judicata bars the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0,
considering the previous final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 926. 2. The
presence of identity of parties and causes of action between the two cases.
### Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court granted Javier’s petition, reversing and
setting aside the dismissal orders of the then Court of First Instance of Zambales. The
Court ruled that there was no identity of causes of action between the two cases: the
earlier being a complaint for forcible entry focused on possession, and the latter being
effectively an accion reivindicatoria focused on ownership and recovery of possession.
Therefore, the dismissal on grounds of res judicata was erroneous.
### Doctrine: The Supreme Court clarified that for res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action, four requisites must concur: final judgment or order, jurisdiction over
the subject matter by the court rendering judgment, the former judgment being on the
merits, and identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and
second actions. Moreover, the Court distinguished between accion interdictal (forcible
entry or unlawful detainer), accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria, underscoring
that judgments in cases of forcible entry or detainer only resolve the issue of
possession, not ownership.
### Class Notes: – **Res judicata**: Requires four requisites; specifically focuses on
the importance of identity of causes of action, which was not present in this case. –
**Accion interdictal vs. Accion reivindicatoria**: Distinguishes between cases focused on
possession (accion interdictal) versus those focused on ownership (accion
reivindicatoria). – **Substantial identity of parties**: For res judicata to apply, absolute
identity of parties is not required but substantial identity, involving successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.
### Historical Background: The context of this legal battle highlights the intricacies of
Philippine land dispute resolution, particularly when it involves succession of interests
and the procedural posture concerning the utilization of different remedies for recovery
of possession and ownership. This case exemplifies the judicial process in determining
the appropriate action for resolving disputes over real property, reflecting the evolution
of property law in Philippines jurisprudence
 2. Bustos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001
BUSTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120784-85 January 24, 2001
FACTS:
Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. He had four (4) children, namely:
Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964,
the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the
same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed
of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol,
Pampanga. Later, the cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition
case was specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela,
which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was
subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possession of the land.
She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite
several demands. On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance,
Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela
which was sold to him. During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo
died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate
of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold
Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray. On February 8, 1989,
the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor
of Moses G. Mendoza. In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray
and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful
detainer against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual
possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject
land. The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray.
Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but stayed when
spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On December 18, 1992, the regional
trial court rendered a decision dismissing the case. On September 9, 1994, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
HELD:
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to
possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This
means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court
declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. In the present case, the stay of
execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in
question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners
from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the
issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the
spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the
land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring
them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject
property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner who cannot
exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use and
enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or
vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner.
 3. Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128177, August 15,
2001
G.R. No. 128177. August 15, 2001 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - [Link] |

1 **Title: Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Abalos, G.R. No.
115073** **
Facts:**
1. The property in controversy, a 24,550 square meter parcel of land in Lingayen,
Pangasinan, was originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947. The
property subsequently passed to his heirs, who leased it to spouses David de Vera and
Consuelo Villasista for 15 years from July 1, 1967. Roman Soriano acted as the
caretaker.
2. The heirs of Adriano divided the property into two lots: Lot No. 60052 and Lot No.
8459. The former was sold to the spouses Abalos, who eventually acquired the three-
fourths share of Lot No. 8459.
3. In 1968, Roman Soriano was replaced as caretaker by Isidro and Vidal Verzosa,
prompting him to file for reinstatement resulting in a favorable decision by the Court of
Appeals.
4. The lease allowed Soriano to sub-lease the property until 1982 under a post-
decisional agreement approved by the agrarian court.
5. In 1976, the spouses Abalos filed for land registration of Lot No. 60052 and part of
Lot No. 8459. The trial court granted this in 1983, and subsequent appeals affirmed this,
culminating in a Supreme Court denial of Soriano’s petition in 1985.
6. Before this, in 1983, Soriano filed a separate action for annulment of document
and/or redemption against the Abalos spouses in RTC Lingayen. This was met with
procedural challenges, yet moved forward.
7. By 1984, petitioners applied for execution of the agrarian court’s earlier agreement,
which Soriano resisted, leading to certiorari petitions.
8. Soriano passed away in 1985, and his heirs (petitioners) continued the case.
9. Notably, the Supreme Court remanded a prior decision back to ensure resolution
before DARAB regarding Soriano’s security of tenure, freezing execution motions in the
lower land registration case until DARAB resolution.
10. Petitioners further pursued claims of tenancy rights in DARAB proceedings. While a
partial partition of the land was done, this was challenged on different grounds.
11. Following the DARAB filing, the land registration court hesitated to grant execution
motions, citing ongoing DARAB determinations.
12. Appeals to the Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court were filed after the
land
registration court withheld execution pending DARAB resolution.
**Issues:**
1. Whether the prevailing party in a land registration case can effectively eject a
possessor
whose tenancy claim is pending before the DARAB.
2. Whether the land registration court erred in withholding execution pending DARAB
determination.
**Court’s Decision:**
1. **Tenancy and Ejection:** The Supreme Court observed ownership does not
automatically
equate to the right to possession, particularly where a claim of tenancy is present. It
underscored the significance of security of tenure for tenants, warranting protection
against
ejection even as ownership disputes are settled.
2. **Resolution on Writ of Possession:** The Court found the Court of Appeals erred by
prioritizing land registration decisions over unaddressed tenancy claims. A judgment of
ownership alone cannot be grounds for immediate writ of possession without resolution
of
DARAB disputes.
3. **Abuse of Discretion:** Petitioners’ claims of due process deprivation and untenable
procedural rulings by the Court of Appeals were acknowledged, moving to restore initial
beneficial rulings from lower courts, emphasizing that tenant rights merit careful
consideration until DARAB finds otherwise.
**Doctrine:**
The ruling affirmed that a land registration judgment, although final, does not pre-empt
tenancy rights under agrarian reform laws, emphasizing statutory protection over
immediate dispossession pending DARAB determinations.
**Class Notes:**
– **Key Principles:** Ownership vs. Possession, Security of Tenure, Tenancy Acts,
Jurisdiction of DARAB.
– **Legal Provisions:**
– Agrarian Reform protections prioritize tenants’ rights.
– Writs of possession in land disputes require third-party claims resolution.

**Historical Background:**
In post-independence Philippines, agrarian reform efforts sought to balance conflicting
rights between landowners and tenants as land registration frameworks grappled with
broader social justice goals, marking the legal landscape against historically inequitable
land distributions.
 4. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999
G.R. No. 133140. August 10, 1999 (Case Brief / Digest)
© 2024 - [Link] | 1
### Title:
**Garcia vs. Court of Appeals and Others: A Case on Ownership, Possession, and
Validity of
Mortgage**
### Facts:
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, registered owner of a parcel of land in Bel Air II Village, Makati,
sells
it to his daughter, Ma. Luisa Magpayo, and her husband, Luisito Magpayo (the
Magpayos),
with his wife Remedios T. Garcia’s consent. The Magpayos mortgage the land to
Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCom) on March 5, 1981, to secure a loan, with
discrepancies
over the loan amount between parties. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-
108412/545
was issued in the Magpayos’ name on March 9, 1981, post-mortgage agreement.
The Magpayos default on the loan, leading to a foreclosure and PBCom’s acquisition of
the
property after the redemption period lapsed. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed a
complaint to nullify the foreclosure, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Subsequently, PBCom secured a writ of possession, which Jose Ma. T. Garcia
contested,
claiming he inherited the land from his mother. The trial court issued a summary
judgment
in Garcia’s favor, finding the mortgage void as the Magpayos weren’t the property’s
owners
at the time of mortgage execution. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this
decision,
citing flaws in the lower court’s findings.
### Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in addressing issues of “ownership” and
“possession”
not raised by PBCom in its brief.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by disregarding alleged factual admissions by the
litigants in deciding the appeal.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals contradicted itself regarding the propriety of the
Summary
Judgment.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner’s arguments.
1. The Court clarified that PBCom addressed “ownership” and “possession” in its
appellate
brief, refuting the petitioner’s claim of error.
2. As to factual admissions, the Court indicated that these were petitioner’s paraphrased
interpretations, not direct admissions from the parties.

3. On the summary judgment issue, the Court explained both parties requested
summary
judgments, allowing the appellate court to issue such a judgment.
The Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between possession and ownership,
noting
that registration of land does not confer ownership but merely confirms it. Consequently,
the Court upheld the validity of the mortgage made by the Magpayos to PBCom despite
the
timing of the TCT issuance and affirmed the appellate court’s decision.
### Doctrine:
1. Ownership vs. Possession: Ownership and possession are distinct concepts.
Ownership
confers rights including dispossession, while possession pertains to the physical holding
or
enjoyment of a thing.
2. Validity of Mortgage Prior to Title Issuance: A mortgage can be valid even if the
transfer
certificate of title is issued after the mortgage agreement, as registration does not confer
but merely confirms ownership.
### Class Notes:
– **Ownership vs. Possession**: Understand that ownership confers the right to
dispose,
use, and exclude others from a thing owned. Possession, on the other hand, is the
physical
holding or enjoyment of a thing, which may or may not coincide with ownership rights.
– **Role of Title Registration**: Registration of property under the Torrens system
confirms
and registers ownership but is not the origin of ownership rights. Ownership is
transferred
through valid transactions such as sales, not merely by registration.
– **Mortgage Validity**: A mortgage executed by parties holding ownership rights at the
time of the mortgage, even if the title is issued later, is valid. Essential requirements
include
the mortgagor being the absolute owner (Civil Code, Art. 2085).
### Historical Background:
The case illustrates the evolving interpretation of property rights, ownership, and
mortgage
law in the Philippines. It underscores the importance of distinguishing between
ownership
and possession in property transactions and clarifies the effect of property registration
and
mortgage validity within the context of the Philippine legal system.
 5. Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129609 and 135537,
Nov. 29, 2001
Title: **Rodil Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Others**
**Facts:**
Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL), engaged in a series of legal confrontations regarding
the
lease and eventual purchase of the Ides O’Racca Building, a property over which the
Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership via RA 477, as amended. RODIL had
been
the lessee since 1959 and had subleased parts of the property to various tenants
starting in
1980. Following a renewed interest in acquiring the property in conformity with BP 233,
RODIL found itself in conflict with the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association Inc.
(ASSOCIATION), which also expressed an interest in leasing the building. The series of
events escalated to the courts, involving actions for specific performance, damages,
injunctions, and unlawful detainer, with procedural maneuvers including suspension of
lease
renewal approvals, issuance of temporary occupancy permits by government
departments,
and eventually, conflicting decisions by the lower courts and the Court of Appeals.
**Issues:**
1. Whether the renewal contracts between RODIL and the Republic were valid.
2. Whether RODIL had the right to file actions for unlawful detainer against its lessees.
3. Whether the counterclaim filed by the ASSOCIATION should have been dismissed.
4. The impact of the Office of the President’s decision declaring the lease contracts null
and
void on the ASSOCIATION’s counterclaims.
**Court’s Decision:**
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of RODIL, reinstating and affirming the decisions of
the
Regional Trial Court. It held that:
1. The owner of a property has the right to dispose of it without limitations other than
those
established by law. The contracts entered into on 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 were
considered valid, as no law prohibited their execution nor were they entered into in
violation
of any temporary restraining order.
2. RODIL had the right to file for unlawful detainer against respondents as it had the
legal
right over the property owing to the valid lease contracts.
3. The Court agreed that the counterclaim by the ASSOCIATION should not have been
dismissed outright, as the requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure were met. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court chose to finalize the
adjudication,
denying the ASSOCIATION’s claims.
4. The decision of the Office of the President declaring the lease contracts null and void
did not adversely affect RODIL, as judgments in a case shall not negatively impact
persons who were not parties thereto. **Doctrine:** The case reiterated the principle
that the ownership rights over a property allow the owner the freedom of disposition,
including entering into a lease contract, as an attribute of ownership without exceptions
other than legal limitations. **Class Notes:** 1. **Validity of Contracts:** The validity of a
contract is determined by its conformity with the law, moral, good customs, public policy,
or public order. In cases of ambiguity, the interpretation that renders it valid is favored.
2. **Unlawful Detainer:** A property owner or their lessee has the right to file an action
for unlawful detainer against occupants whose possession is merely tolerated once that
tolerance is withdrawn. 3. **Counterclaims:** The dismissal of counterclaims requires
careful examination of their linkage to the main cause of action and whether the
requirements of the procedural rules are satisfied. 4. **Impact of Administrative
Decisions on Judicial Cases:** Administrative decisions, such as those by the Office of
the President, do not adversely affect parties not involved in those proceedings. 5.
**Relaxation of Procedural Rules:** Procedural rules can be relaxed to prevent injustice,
especially when strictly adhering to them would subvert the objectives of achieving
substantial justice. **Historical Background:** This case exemplifies the complexities
arising from transactions involving government property and the intricacies of lease
agreements, subleases, and the eventual goal of acquisition in the Philippine legal
context. It highlights the competing interests between lessees and occupants, the
discretionary powers of government departments, and the legal challenges in
reconciling such interests within the bounds of property law and contractual obligations.
 6. Isaguirre v. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000
## **Title**:
**Cornelio M. Isaguirre v. Felicitas de Lara**
## **Facts**:
1. **Initial Application and Subsequent Amendments**:
– Alejandro de Lara, the original applicant, filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over
Lot
502, Guianga Cadastre (2,342 sqm) on January 17, 1942.
– Upon Alejandro’s death, his wife, Felicitas de Lara (respondent), succeeded him as
the
claimant.
– The application was amended to 1,600 sqm on November 19, 1954, by the
Undersecretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and further reduced to 1,000 sqm on November
3,
1961.
2. **Financial Troubles and Execution of Deed**:
– In 1953, respondent approached Cornelio M. Isaguirre (petitioner) for financial
assistance,
leading to a “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” on February 10,
1960. The document transferred a 250 sqm portion of Lot 502 to petitioner for P5,000.
3. **Conflict Over Property**:
– Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of the
twostory building but were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in May 1968.
– On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the property and was
approved on January 17, 1984, leading to Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 being
issued in his name on February 13, 1984.
– Respondent’s sales application for the entire 1,000 sqm also resulted in the issuance
of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 in her name on June 19, 1989.
4. **Legal Actions and Decisions**:
– Petitioner filed a quieting of title and damages against respondent on May 17, 1990.
The
Regional Trial Court of Davao City (Civil Case No. 20124-90) ruled in favor of petitioner.
– The Court of Appeals overturned this decision, deeming the transaction an equitable
mortgage due to inadequate consideration and payment structure. It declared OCT No.
P-11566 void.
5. **Subsequent Proceedings**:
– The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision on July 8, 1996, and
denied the
motion for reconsideration on September 11, 1996 (G.R. No. 120832).

– Respondent’s motion for execution was granted on August 18, 1997, and her motion
for a
writ of possession on February 3, 1998.
– Petitioner opposed the motion on claims of retention rights; however, on March 12,
1998,
the trial court granted respondent’s motion, and his motion for reconsideration was
denied.
6. **Final Appeal to Supreme Court**:
– Petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to annul the trial
court’s orders and writ of possession.
– The appellate court dismissed the petition on October 5, 1998, while denying his
motion
for reconsideration on March 5, 1999, leading to the current petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.
## **Issues**:
1. **Right of Possession**:
– Whether petitioner, as mortgagee in an equitable mortgage, retains possession until
full
payment of the loan.
2. **Builder in Good Faith**:
– Whether petitioner is considered a builder in good faith regarding the improvements
made
on the property.
3. **Reimbursement and Mortgage Interest**:
– Whether petitioner is entitled to interest on the loan amount and reimbursement for
necessary expenses incurred.
## **Court’s Decision**:
1. **Right of Possession**:
– The Supreme Court affirmed that the general rule is that a mortgagee does not retain
possession of the mortgaged property unless explicitly provided. The mortgagor should
annotate the mortgage to protect their rights. The issuance of the writ of possession to
respondent was upheld, asserting her rights as a titleholder.
2. **Builder in Good Faith**:
– The Court concluded that the petitioner was not a builder in good faith, recognizing
that
he was aware of the mortgage nature of the contract. Hence, he is only entitled to
reimbursement for necessary expenses, not for useful ones.
3. **Reimbursement and Mortgage Interest**:
– The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision which directed the trial court
to
determine the total loan, necessary expenses, and repayment period. Interest on the
loan
was not due, as there was no written stipulation.
## **Doctrine**:
– **Equitable Mortgage**:
– A transaction perceived as a sale but substantially a mortgage due to factors such as
inadequacy of consideration and prolonged non-acquisition of title.
– **Possession in Mortgage**:
– Simply mortgaging a property does not transfer possession unless explicitly included
in
the contract.
– **Builder in Bad Faith**:
– A party aware of inherent flaws in their claim or acquisition cannot be deemed a
builder in
good faith and is limited to reimbursement for necessary expenses only.
## **Class Notes**:
1. **Equitable Mortgage**:
– **Elements**: Appearance of sale (e.g., deed of sale), but acts indicating a mortgage.
Factors include inadequate consideration, installment payments, prolonged non-
assertion of
title.
2. **Mortgage Possession**:
– **General Rule**: Mortgagee does not acquire possession. Must protect rights
through
registration.
– **Civil Code**:
– Art. 2125: Rights of a mortgagee regarding registration.
– Art. 2085: Constitutive requirements of a mortgage.
– Art. 428 & 429: Owner’s rights to property enjoyment and possession.
3. **Good Faith in Improvements**:
– **Criteria**: Awareness of defects in acquisition negates good faith status.
– **Reimbursements**:
– Art. 526 & 452: Rights to necessary and useful expenses; the latter only if possessor
was
in good faith.
## **Historical Background**:
– The case arose during a period emphasizing landownership disputes and
reclarification of property rights under Philippine law. The court decisions reinforce the
necessity of clear contractual terms and uphold legal doctrines distinguishing between
sales and mortgages, adapting traditional principles to modern applications.
 7. Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004
### Title:
**Custodio v. Corrado: A Case of Recovery of Possession and Ownership**
### Facts:
The case revolves around Rosendo F. Corrado (respondent) filing Complaints against
Melchor Custodio (petitioner) for recovery of possession and damages concerning a
residential lot in Calatagan, Batangas. The lot, registered under Corrado’s name, is
allegedly occupied by Custodio under dubious claims of a tenancy relationship with
Corrado’s father.
Initially, in 1993, Corrado filed an ejectment case against Custodio, which was
dismissed
due to jurisdictional issues, lack of barangay conciliation, and failure to prove by
preponderance of evidence. Following this, in 1995, Corrado filed another Complaint
(the
core of this petition), which after going through the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
Regional Trial Court (RTC), ended up in the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision to reverse the MTC’s dismissal, recognizing Corrado as the lot’s true
owner
and ordering Custodio to vacate.
### Issues:
1. Application of the principle of res judicata: Whether the prior ejectment case’s
dismissal
affects the current action for recovery of possession and ownership.
2. Determination of cause of action: Whether there’s an identity of causes of action
between
the ejectment case and the recovery case.
3. Existence of tenancy relationship: Whether evidence supports Custodio’s claim of a
tenancy relationship with Corrado’s father.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court denied Custodio’s petition, affirming the CA and RTC decisions. It
ruled:
– **Res Judicata**: The principle is inapplicable as the ejectment case (Civil Case No.
116)
was not decided on merits and has a different cause of action from the recovery case
(Civil
Case No. 120).
– **Cause of Action**: There is no identity of causes of action between the two cases,
as the
ejectment case focused on de facto possession, whereas the current case involves
recovery
of ownership and possession.

– **Tenancy Relationship**: The claim was not established by preponderance of

evidence.
Moreover, stipulations during the pre-trial (e.g., Custodio was never Corrado’s tenant)
cannot be contested.
### Doctrine:
– **Res Judicata**: For the principle to bar a subsequent action, the judgment must be
final,
on merits, by a court with jurisdiction, and there must be identity in parties, subject
matter,
and causes of action.
– **Cause of Action**: Differentiation between ejectment (possession de facto) and
recovery
cases (ownership and possession) underlines that an ejectment judgment does not
preclude
recovery actions.
### Class Notes:
– **Res Judicata Elements**: (1) Final judgment (2) Court jurisdiction (3) Judgment on
the
merits (4) Identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action.
– **Action Differentiation**: Ejectment cases address possession de facto, while
recovery
cases concern ownership and the right of possession.
### Historical Background:
This case illustrates the Philippine legal system’s procedural and substantive
mechanisms in
handling disputes of possession and ownership, showcasing the distinct treatments and
repercussions between ejectment cases and recovery of possession/ownership actions,
underlining principles like res judicata’s application
 8. Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001

### Title:
Abejaron v. Nabasa and the Court of Appeals (2000)
### Facts:
Pacencio Abejaron, represented by his attorney-in-fact Alejandro Abejaron, filed a
petition
for review on certiorari against Felix Nabasa and the Court of Appeals. The dispute
arose
from a 118-square meter portion of land in General Santos City, where Abejaron’s family
had lived since 1945. Nabasa was issued a title for the entire lot, including Abejaron’s
portion, in 1974, which led to a series of legal battles. After being consumed by
procedural
tangles across various legal fora, the case reached the Supreme Court.
Abejaron’s claim was based on his and his family’s long-standing possession and
improvements made on the land since 1945. On the other hand, Nabasa claimed
residence
since 1945 and secured free patent in 1974. The trial court decided in favor of Abejaron,
ordering Nabasa to reconvey the disputed portion. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed
this decision, highlighting that reconveyance requires proof of actual fraud; a matter
Abejaron failed to substantiate.
### Issues:
1. Whether actual fraud was committed by Nabasa in procuring the title in his name.
2. Whether Abejaron forcibly entered Lot 1 from Lot 2 and transferred his house as
alleged
by Nabasa.
3. Whether Abejaron has a clear right over the property due to long-term possession
under a
claim of ownership.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, denying Abejaron’s petition
for
review on certiorari. The Court held that an action for reconveyance based on fraud
requires clear and convincing evidence of both the petitioner’s title to the property and
the
fact of fraud. Abejaron did not claim ownership of the disputed land but asserted a right
stemming from long-term possession. The Court reiterated that the possession of public
land does not automatically confer ownership or the right to seek reconveyance without
substantive proof of possession and occupation under the requirements of the Public
Land
Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, and further by P.D. No. 1073.
### Doctrine:
The Court reiterated the doctrine that for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, clear and convincing evidence of the petitioner’s title to the property and the
fact
of fraud are essential. Moreover, it reaffirmed that actual physical possession and claim
of
ownership over public land do not automatically convert public land to private ownership
without meeting the conditions prescribed by law.
### Class Notes:
– **Legal Basis for Reconveyance**: An action for reconveyance requires proving actual
fraud and legal ownership of the disputed property. Without ownership, a petitioner
cannot
maintain an action for reconveyance.
– **Possession of Public Lands**: Simply possessing or improving public land does not
confer ownership rights or legal standing for reconveyance actions. Legal acquisition
processes and compliance with the Public Land Act conditions are crucial.
– **Public Land Act & Amendments**: Comprehend the requirements under Sec. 48(b)
of
the Public Land Act, especially the amendments introduced by R.A. 1942 and P.D. No.
1073,
delineating the cut-off for possession starting June 12, 1945, or earlier, to claim
ownership
over public land.
### Historical Background:
The case underlines the complexities surrounding land ownership disputes in the
Philippines, especially involving lands initially considered part of the public domain. The
resolution of such disputes has evolved through various legal amendments to the Public
Land Act, reflecting the government’s efforts to regulate land distribution and recognize
rightful ownership claims based on long-term possession and improvement.
 9. Javier v. Lumontad, G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014

### Title:
**Javier vs. Lumontad: A Case of Forcible Entry and Accion Reivindicatoria**
### Facts:
The chain of events began when Homer C. Javier, through his mother and natural
guardian,
Susan G. Canencia, filed a complaint for forcible entry against Susan Lumontad with the
Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal (MTC), alleging unauthorized entry and
construction
on a portion of land previously owned by Javier’s late father. Lumontad countered,
claiming
ownership of the contested portion via a tax declaration in her name, asserting her
possession was lawful.
The MTC dismissed the complaint, suggesting a lack of jurisdiction and cause of action,
foreseeing the matter as one of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Javier
appealed
to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City (RTC), which reversed the MTC’s decision,
ruling in his favor and mandating Lumontad’s vacation of the property and payment for
its
usage.
Lumontad appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which overturned the RTC’s decision,
remanding the case for trial on the merits of ownership and possession recovery,
underlining that the issues of possession and ownership were interlinked essentially,
requiring a comprehensive adjudication by the RTC.
Javier challenged the CA’s decision at the Supreme Court, arguing against the remand
and
for the upholding of the RTC’s decision favoring forcible entry.
### Issues:
1. Whether the case constitutes forcible entry or necessitates action for recovery of
ownership and possession (accion reivindicatoria).
2. If the adjudication of forcible entry was properly conducted across judicial instances.
3. Whether the Supreme Court should uphold the CA’s decision to remand the case to
the
RTC for trial on ownership and possession merits.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA’s and MTC’s interpretation, affirming that the
complaint was adequately framed as a matter of forcible entry, supported by the
allegations
of unlawful and forceful dispossession by Lumontad. The Supreme Court elaborated on
jurisdictions of forcible entry cases, clarifying that when ownership issues are raised,
MTCs
can provisionally resolve these to address possession disputes. Yet, on merits, the
Court sided with the CA in dismissing Javier’s complaint, noting failures in substantiating
his de
facto possession of the contested land portion, leading to the dismissal of his forcible
entry
claims.
### Doctrine:
This case reaffirmed that in forcible entry actions, the nature and court jurisdiction are
determined by the complaint’s allegations, emphasizing that the dispossession’s
manner
(force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth) needs to be sufficiently alleged. Also, it
reiterated that first-level courts (MTCs) hold exclusive and original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases, even when intertwined with ownership questions, their determinations
on
ownership being provisional for possession’s sake.
### Class Notes:
– **Forcible Entry**: Requires previous physical possession by the claimant and
dispossession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
– **Jurisdiction**: Determined by complaint allegations. Forcible entry falls under MTC
exclusive and original jurisdiction.
– **Ownership vs. Possession**: In ejectment cases, provisional determinations on
ownership can be made solely for resolving possession disputes.
– **Accion Reivindicatoria**: An action aimed at recovery of ownership, beyond mere
possession, falling within RTC’s jurisdiction.
### Historical Background:
The case underscores the critical distinction between forcible entry (focused on de
facto, or
physical possession) and actions for recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria),
reflecting on the procedural journey through the Philippine legal system’s various tiers –
from MTCs through RTCs and ultimately the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
emphasizing the judiciary’s tiered approach to resolving complex interlinked issues of
possession and ownership.
 10. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando, G.R. No. 195669, May 30,
2016
### Title: Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. vs. Dante Ando et al.
### Facts:
The case emerged from a legal dispute involving the possession and ownership of
parcels of
land, specifically Lot 3-F, by the Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) against
members of the Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church
(MBC),
and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). BUCCI initiated a
Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against the respondents in the Municipal
Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Mandaue City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4936. This action
sought to address material possession of Lot 3-F but came under scrutiny for the failure
to
comply with the certification against forum shopping, given an earlier case (Civil Case
No.
MAN-1669) filed by UCCPI and MBC against BUCCI for recovery of ownership of the
same
lot and another, Lot 3-C, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The MTCC dismissed
BUCCI’s complaint for this non-compliance. On appeal, the RTC upheld this dismissal,
leading BUCCI to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which also sided
against
BUCCI for similar reasons. BUCCI then took the case to the Supreme Court via a
Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
### Issues:
1. Whether the filing of an unlawful detainer case by BUCCI during the pendency of a
recovery of ownership case constituted forum shopping.
2. Whether the principles of litis pendentia or res judicata apply, given the concurrent
and
successive actions regarding the same parcels of land (Lot 3-F).
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of BUCCI, finding merit in the petition. It clarified that
forum shopping involves the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties and cause
of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. The Court determined there was only an identity of parties between the two
cases
but not an identity of cause of action. The unlawful detainer case concerned material
possession (possession de facto) of Lot 3-F, distinct from the recovery of ownership
case
which argued for legal ownership. It underscored that a decision in one does not bar the
decision or constitute res judicata in another due to the lack of identity in cause of
action,
subject matter, and relief sought. Consequently, the judgment of the MTCC dismissing
the
unlawful detainer case was reversed, and the court was directed to proceed with
BUCCI’s
complaint.
### Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reiterated the principles surrounding forum shopping and the
distinct
nature between actions for recovery of ownership and unlawful detainer. It highlighted
that
identity of parties alone does not constitute forum shopping and emphasized the
importance
of distinguishing between the cause of action and the relief sought in determining the
applicability of litis pendentia and res judicata.
### Class Notes:
1. **Forum Shopping**: Filing of similar suits to obtain a favorable judgment; requires
identity of parties, cause of action, and relief sought.
2. **Litis Pendentia**: Calls for dismissal due to the pendency of another case with the
same
parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for.
3. **Res Judicata**: Bars the re-litigation of a case that has been conclusively decided,
requiring a final judgment, jurisdiction over the matter and parties, a judgment on the
merits, and identity in parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and
second actions.
4. **Certification Against Forum Shopping (Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court)**: A
mandatory compliance to declare non-commencement or pendency of similar actions or
claims in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency.
### Historical Background:
This decision delves into the complexities surrounding property disputes within religious
institutions in the Philippines, specifically addressing procedural nuances in the
approach to
litigatory strategy such as the certifications required to avoid forum shopping, along with
the pivotal distinctions between possession de facto versus ownership disputes. This
case
clarifies the non-applicability of res judicata in separate actions for possession and
ownership, showcasing the judiciary’s stance on ensuring precise adherence to
procedural
requirements in the context of overlapping legal suits on property disputes.
11. Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019

Title: **The Heirs of Alfredo Cullado v. Dominic V. Gutierrez**

Facts:
In May 1995, Dominic V. Gutierrez was granted a parcel of land in Isabela via a
Katibayan
ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-61499. By 1997, an action for recovery of ownership
and
possession was filed by Gutierrez’s father, acting for minor Dominic, against
Alfredo
Cullado, who had allegedly been squatting on the property since 1977. Cullado
defended
himself by claiming adverse possession and seeking reconveyance, alleging
fraudulent
acquisition of the title by Gutierrez. After Cullado’s death, his heirs continued the
litigation.
Despite multiple failures of Gutierrez’s counsel to attend hearings, the Trial Court
(RTC)
eventually ruled in favor of the heirs of Cullado, ordering reconveyance of the
land to them.
Dominic then unsuccessfully sought relief from judgment, claiming his counsel’s
negligence.
Subsequently, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals (CA),
asserting extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, which the CA granted, reversing
the RTC’s
decision.
Issues:
1. Was Dominic’s availment of the remedy of annulment of judgment proper?
2. Did the RTC err in ordering the reconveyance of the land to the heirs of
Cullado based on
a ruling of ownership in an accion publiciana?
3. Can a Torrens title be subject to a collateral attack in an action for recovery of
possession?
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court held that Dominic’s use of annulment of judgment was
proper due to
the exceptional circumstances of his case, notably that other remedies were no
longer
available. The Court further ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to decree
ownership and order reconveyance of the land in an accion publiciana, as it only
had the
purview to provisionally determine ownership for resolving possession. The Court
also
emphasized that a Torrens title cannot be subjected to a collateral attack,
aligning with the
CA’s decision to reverse the RTC ruling and reiterating the indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of Dominic’s title.

Doctrine:
1. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
reserved for
exceptional circumstances when ordinary remedies are no longer available.
2. An accion publiciana does not empower a court to resolve issues of ownership
with finality or to order reconveyance of property titled under the Torrens system,
as such an
action involves only the determination of a better right of possession.
3. A Torrens title cannot be subjected to a collateral attack outside of a direct
proceeding
intended for such purpose.
Class Notes:
– Annulment of Judgment: A special remedy used only when other legal
remedies are not
available, based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
– Accion Publiciana: A plenary action to determine the better right of possession,
not
ownership, of real property.
– Torrens System Principles: Titles under this system are indefeasible and
incontrovertible,
not subject to prescription, and cannot be collaterally attacked.
– Extrinsic Fraud: A valid ground for annulment if not used in other remedies,
must be filed
within four years from its discovery.
– Lack of Jurisdiction: Refers to the court’s lack of authority to decide a case or
issue with
finality which can be a basis for annulment at any time before it is barred by
laches or
estoppel.

Historical Background:
This case further underscores the principles underpinning the Torrens system of
land
registration in the Philippines, emphasizing the protection and confidence it
affords to
registered landowners against improper claims and attacks on ownership. The
doctrine of
indefeasibility and the prohibition against collateral attacks on a registered title
serve as critical components for ensuring stability and integrity in land ownership
and transactions.
 12. German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 177 SCRA 495

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land
situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the
case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already
acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by
the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s
Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years
prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the
property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their
crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their
property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their
crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the
decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner?
RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in
actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner,
private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of
the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process
and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual
possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property
and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim
over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible entry.‖ It must be
stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner [Link] may be the character of his possession, if he has in
his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to
justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at
the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact
they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.)
Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the
land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who
possesses the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- ―In no case may possession
be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding
of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver
the thing

177 SCRA 495 – Civil Law – Property – Doctrine of Self-Help

In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted with German
Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their landholdings into a
residential subdivision. The spouses also executed a special power of attorney to that
effect.
German Management started the project in February 1983, however, German
Management discovered that the land was being possessed by Ernest0 Villeza et al
who were the farmers tilling the said land at that time. German Management spoke with
Villeza et al but the farmers refused to vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they
have been occupying the land for twelve years.
Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and demolished
the properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order. In turn, Villeza et al filed a
case of forcible entry against German Management. In its defense, German
Management invoked the Doctrine of Self-help which provides that:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. (Article 429, Civil Code)
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when
German Management excluded the farmers, there’s no longer an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion by the farmers have already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying
the said land. In fact, they were already peaceably farming the land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a lawful title
over the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further,
there is now a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones
occupying the said property. They can only be ejected either by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoriathrough which the spouses Jose’s better right may
be proven.
 13. Caisip v. People 36 SCRA 17

1. Caisip v. People 36 SCRA 17

Facts:

(Note: this is mainly a criminal case.)

This case is upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and
Federico Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
convicting them of the crime of Grave Coercion.

The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who

cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in
sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. Felix Caisip, accused, is
the overseer of Hacienda Palico. It is worthy to note that even before the
occurrence of the incident presently involved, there had been a series of
misunderstandings and litigations involving the complainant and her
husband, on one hand, and the men of Hacienda Palico on the other.
Marcelino Guevarra filed an action with the Court of Agrarian Relations
seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas Cia but was dismissed.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas Cia filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra in the
justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry. The said
Court, in its decision, ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages
and accrued rentals.

A writ of execution was issued and was served on Guevarra on June 6, 1959,
and the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of
this Court on June 23, 1959. The writ recites among other things that the
possession of the land was delivered to Roxas Cia thru Felix Caisip, the
overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within
which to leave the premises.

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the
portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her
and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so, alleging that she and her
husband had the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong to
them. Due to her refusal to leave, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt.
Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some distance
away, and brought them with him.

As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right
hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding.
She was then forcibly dragged and Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.

The accused now claims, among others, that their acts were justified under
Art. 429 of Civil Code and that the CA erred in holding that the 20-day period
of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the
sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful.

ISSUE: WON Art. 429 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case.

RULING: No, it is not applicable.

Art. 429 of our Civil Code, states:

“The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”

In this case, the complainant was given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within
which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 — or within
said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its
co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened ...
physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of
which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that
the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June
26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom
on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.

On to the claim of the accused that the 20-day grace period granted by the
sheriff as invalid. The Court finds this contention manifestly untenable,
because: (1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda
owner's representative, appellant Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had
impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the sheriff; (2) Gloria
and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of
the hacienda or his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds
from the ricefield was beneficial to its owner and to whomsoever the crops
belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not constitute a
criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been
sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily
imply that they, as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no
rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing crops, inasmuch as
"necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," and the cost of
cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of
necessary expenses.

The Court convicted the accused guilty of grave coercion. By means of

violence, and without legal authority, the accused prevented the
complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and
being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong,"
thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code.
14. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012
### Title:
**Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative**
—
### Facts:
Diamond Farms, Inc. (petitioner) owned a 1,023.8574-hectare banana farm in Carmen,
Davao, with 958.8574 hectares initially deferred for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) acquisition. In 1995, the deferment order was lifted, placing the farm
under CARP coverage. Consequently, 698.8897 hectares were awarded to members of
Diamond Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO).
However, Diamond Farms retained control over 277.44 hectares, including 109.625
hectares.
On November 23, 1999, titles to the 109.625 hectares were canceled and new Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On
August 5, 2000, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) identified and distributed the
land to 278 CARP beneficiaries, issuing Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).
On July 2, 2002, Diamond Farms filed a complaint for unlawful occupation, damages,
and
attorney’s fees against the respondents, claiming continued lawful possession of
74.3393
hectares due to ongoing appeals and asserting losses of P1.46 million per week due to
respondents’ actions.
Respondents admitted possession but contended they had enforceable rights under
CARP
and claimed unpaid production shares. The Office of the Regional Adjudicator dismissed
Diamond Farms’ complaint, affirming respondents’ lawfulness as CARP beneficiaries
and
awarding them production shares. This decision was upheld by the DARAB and
subsequently the Court of Appeals (CA), albeit modifying awards.
### Issues:
1. **Unlawful Occupation and Damages:** Whether respondents were guilty of unlawful
occupation and liable for damages and attorney’s fees to Diamond Farms.
2. **Possession of Subject Land:** Whether Diamond Farms must turn over possession
of
the land to respondents and respect their possession.
3. **Production Share:** Whether the award of production share and interest to
respondents
was proper.
4. **Just Compensation:** Whether the issue of the non-payment of just compensation
invalidated respondents’ possession and the issuance of CLOAs.
### Court’s Decision:
1. **Unlawful Occupation and Damages:**
– The Court ruled that respondents, as CARP beneficiaries, were not in unlawful
occupation
of the land. Despite the ongoing appeals concerning distribution, the issuance of CLOAs
granted respondents lawful possession.
2. **Possession of Subject Land:**
– Diamond Farms had lost ownership of the land upon compliance with CARP
procedures,
including payment deposits. Thus, respondents’ possession was affirmed as lawful. The
CA’s
order for Diamond Farms to turn over possession to respondents was upheld,
emphasizing
CARP’s intent to place control of agricultural lands with farmers.
3. **Production Share:**
– The CA’s affirmation of the award of production and profit shares to respondents was
upheld. The CARL mandates a share based on gross sales from the production, which
was
evidenced by Diamond Farms’ own records.
4. **Just Compensation:**
– The claim of non-payment was dismissed. The proper process was followed under
CARL,
evidenced by the issuance of CLOAs and the Republic’s TCTs. Just compensation
would need
to be addressed in a separate action, not within the current proceedings.
### Doctrine:
– **Proper Possession under CARL:** The transfer of land ownership and awarding of
CLOAs under CARP are grounded on fulfilling statutory conditions such as deposits of
just
compensation, creating lawful possession for beneficiaries.
– **Production Share Calculation:** CARL mandates production shares based on gross
sales,
not net profits, ensuring farm workers receive statutory benefits irrespective of net
losses
claimed by landowners.
### Class Notes:
– **Key Concepts:**
– **CLOA Issuance:** Proof of ownership transfer under CARP.
– **Section 32 of CARL:** Mandates production-sharing based on gross sales.
– **Section 16 (e) of CARL:** Defines procedure for land acquisition, including
compensation deposit and TCT issuance.

– **Just Compensation:** Issues to be settled by Special Agrarian Courts, not in

collateral proceedings. ### Historical Background: The case emerges from the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) intended to
redistribute land to landless farmers in the Philippines. CARL, particularly controversial,
aimed to address disparities in land ownership and support agrarian reform
beneficiaries’ rights. This case encapsulates tensions between former landowners and
beneficiaries over compliance and just compensation mechanisms. The ruling reiterates
the court’s commitment to the agrarian reform’s constitutional and statutory framework,
emphasizing beneficiaries’ rights over procedural technicalities leveraged by former
landowners.

15. Spouses Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
### Title:
**Fuentes v. Roca: Invalidating a Property Sale for Lack of Spousal Consent**
### Facts:
The dispute arose over a 358-square-meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City, originally
owned
by Sabina Tarroza and sold to her son, Tarciano T. Roca. Tarciano later entered into an
agreement to sell this lot to the petitioners, Manuel and Leticia Fuentes, without
transferring the title to his name. The conditions included a down payment and
contingent
payments based on specific improvements and obtaining the consent of Tarciano’s
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca. Atty. Romulo D. Plagata, tasked with document
preparation, claimed to have acquired Rosario’s consent in Manila, although later he
notarized it in Zamboanga City. The Fuentes spouses took possession, built on the
property,
and Tarciano’s death followed by Rosario’s ensued shortly after.
Years later, the Roca children filed an annulment action for the sale, asserting forgery of
Rosario’s consent. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed their claim, citing
prescription
and lack of sufficient forgery evidence. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC’s decision, recognizing the forgery and declaring the sale void for lack of spousal
consent under the Civil Code, but this decision was further elevated to the Supreme
Court.
### Issues:
1. Was Rosario’s consent through her signature forged in the affidavit related to the sale
of
the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses?
2. Had the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of the sale already prescribed?
3. Could only Rosario, the wife whose consent was allegedly forged, nullify the sale?
### Court’s Decision:
**Forgery of Consent**: The Supreme Court agreed with the CA’s finding that Rosario’s
signature was forged, nullifying the other underlying issues due to its impact on the
validity
of consent for the sale.
**Prescriptive Period for Action**: Despite the CA’s application of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court determined the Family Code was applicable, as the sale occurred after
its
effectivity. The Family Code, having no prescribed period for challenging the nullity of a
sale for lack of spousal consent, meant the action did not prescribe.
**Right to Annul the Sale**: The Supreme Court clarified that upon Rosario’s death, her
heirs inherited the right to bring an action to declare the sale void, as the property
remained part of Tarciano and Rosario’s estate.
### Doctrine:
The Family Code governs over the Civil Code in cases of conjugal property sales
lacking
spousal consent post its enactment, voiding such transactions ab initio without a
prescriptive period for filing an action for its nullification.
### Class Notes:
– **Key Concepts**: Voidable vs. Void Contracts, Prescriptive Periods, Conjugal
Property
without Consent.
– **Relevant Statutes**:
– Family Code Articles 105 and 124, voiding sales of conjugal property without spousal
consent from the inception.
– Civil Code Article 1410, indicating actions for the declaration of nonexistence of a
contract
do not prescribe.
– **Application**: This case demonstrates the necessity of obtaining authentic spousal
consent for the sale of conjugal property and clarifies the inapplicability of prescriptive
periods to actions aimed at nullifying such sales under the Family Code.
### Historical Background:
This case reflects the transition from the Civil Code to the Family Code in regulating
marital
property relations in the Philippines, emphasizing the protective measures towards the
consent of both spouses in the sale of conjugal property, and indicating the evolving
legal
standards on family rights and property transactions.
16. Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018
### Title:
**Saluday v. People of the Philippines**
### Facts:
On May 5, 2009, at a checkpoint near Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City, Philippine
Army’s
Task Force Davao personnel intercepted Bus No. 66. All male passengers were
instructed to
disembark for a routine check for contraband, while females remained inside. During the
inspection, a small, heavy bag attracted attention. Petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday was
identified by the bus conductor and another passenger as the owner. The bag, when
opened
by Saluday upon the request of SCAA Junbert M. Buco, revealed an improvised
carbine,
ammunition, a grenade, and a hunting knife. Lacking authority to possess these items,
Saluday was arrested. Charged under PD 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition, and explosive, he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witnesses
confirming the lack of Saluday’s authority to possess such items, while Saluday’s
defense
was the denial of ownership, claiming the bag belonged to his late brother. His
conviction
by the Regional Trial Court was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals.
### Issues:
1. Was the conviction of Saluday for illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and
explosive
under PD 1866 legally sustained?
2. Was the warrantless search that led to Saluday’s conviction constitutional?
3. Did Saluday validly consent to the search of his belongings at the checkpoint?
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. It held that:
1. The elements for Saluday’s conviction were satisfied – existence of the items,
Saluday’s
possession, and his lack of license.
2. The search was reasonable given the reduced expectation of privacy in public
transport
and the security imperatives at checkpoints.
3. Saluday’s consent to the search was voluntary and informed, making the search
lawful
and the materials found admissible in court.
### Doctrine:
This case reiterates the principle that a warrantless search can be deemed reasonable
in
scenarios where there’s either reduced expectation of privacy, as in public
transportation,
or when consent to the search is unequivocally given by the person subject to search.
### Class Notes:
– Illegal possession under PD 1866 requires proof of (a) possession or ownership of the
prohibited items, and (b) lack of authority to possess.
– Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures doesn’t extend
to
scenarios where individuals have an impliedly reduced expectation of privacy or have
provided clear consent to the search.
– Voluntary consent to a search nullifies the requirement for a search warrant and
legitimizes the admissibility of evidence obtained from such a search.
### Historical Background:
This case sheds light on the legal scrutiny applicable to searches in areas of public
transport
within the Philippines, reflecting on the balance between individual rights and public
security. It adopts principles from both local jurisprudence and influences from
international legal standards, particularly the US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment,
applied
appropriately to the Philippine legal and social context.
17. Tan-Yap v. Patricio, A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925, June 3, 2019
Madeline Tan-Yap vs. Hon. Hannibal Patrick
A.M. MTJ-19-1925, 3 June 2019
Doctrine: The doctrine of “self-help” under Art 429 of the Civil Code applies only when the
person, who the owner of the property uses the right of force against (for protection of his
property), is really considered as an “aggressor”.

FACTS
The petitioner’s (Madeline Tan-Yap) father and respondent’s (Judge Patricio) father-in-law
entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the RTC. Pursuant to the
Compromise Agreement, a survey over the subject properties was conducted and a Writ of
Execution, together with a Demand for Compliance/Delivery of Possession was served. Sheriff
IV Romeo C. Alvarez, Jr., together with some officers, went to the premises of the subject lots to
implement the writ of execution. However they were met by respondent Judge Patricio, who was
not pleased with the outcome of the survey. He suggested to Sheriff Alvarez and his men that if
they were to push through with the implementation of the writ of execution, “something untoward
may happen.” In verbatim: “Kung padayonon nyo, basi maghinagamo.” Sheriff Alvarez would
later on mention in his report that upon their confrontation, motorcycle-riding men were already
encircling the premises. Because of these instances, Sheriff Alvarez and his men felt that their
security was at risk, therefore leaving them with no choice but to leave the place.

Given these facts, the petitioner contended that Judge Patricio violated the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Patricio denied the allegations and claimed that the intended fencing to be
implemented would prejudice him and his wife insofar as their lot is concerned. He used the
defense under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the owner or lawful possessor
of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”

ISSUE
Whether or not Article 429 or the Doctrine of “Self-Help” applies in this case.

RULING
No. Article 429 or the Doctrine of “Self-Help” does not apply.

HOLDING
Respondent Judge Patricio’s reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code is bereft of merit. The
doctrine of “self-help” under Art 429 of the Civil Code applies only when the person, who the
owner of the property uses the right of force against (for protection of his property), is really
considered as an “aggressor”. In the present case, Sheriff Alvarez cannot be considered as an
aggressor, because as an officer of the court, he was simply carrying out, under authority, his
official duty to implement the writ of execution over the subject lots. The OCA correctly ruled that
respondent judge effectively took the law into his own hands, by using threats and intimidation
which effectively prevented and stopped Sheriff Alvarez and his men in implementing the writ of
execution. Moreover, he failed to accord due respect to legal processes. These actions, as
noted by the Court, were considered to be unbecoming of a judge.

18. Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990
**Title:**
Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.
**Facts:**
Petitioners Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo owned land in Silang, Cavite, adjacent to
property owned by the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc. The respondents
constructed waterpaths, an artificial lake, and other contrivances on their land, which
allegedly caused several issues including the erosion of petitioners’ land, crop damage,
the
washing away of fences, and danger to the petitioners’ lives during storms. These
actions
allegedly led to the death of a young man by drowning.
In July 1982, the petitioners filed a criminal case (Criminal Case No. TG-907-82) against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay, and Rutillo Mallillin, officers of the respondent
corporation,
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code for destruction by means of inundation.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, they filed a civil case (Civil Case No. TG-748) for
damages and sought a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondents opposed the injunction, and after hearings with ocular inspections, the trial
court suspended the civil case proceedings until the criminal case was resolved. On
August
27, 1984, citing lack of jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the civil case because the
criminal case was filed first. The petitioners appealed this dismissal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s decision on February 17, 1986. A motion
for reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1986, leading the petitioners to elevate the
issue
to the Supreme Court.
**Issues:**
1. Whether a corporation causing damage to adjacent land due to construction within its
property can be held liable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code for quasi-
delicts.
2. Whether the civil action for damages can proceed independently of the unresolved
prior
criminal action.
**Court’s Decision:**
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil case for damages, arising from a quasi-delict,
can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
**Issue Analysis:**
1. **Liability under Articles 2176 and 2177:**
– **Ruling:** The Supreme Court found that the complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748
sufficiently alleged a cause of action based on quasi-delict, noting the construction of
water
pathways and contrivances by the respondent corporation resulted in damages to
petitioners’ property. The elements of quasi-delict (damage, fault or negligence, and
causal
connection) were present.
2. **Independence of Civil Action from Criminal Proceedings:**
– **Ruling:** The Court emphasized that a civil action based on quasi-delict is
independent
of a related criminal prosecution. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the civil
case
pending the outcome of the criminal case. Articles 2176 and 2177 elucidate that liability
for
quasi-delicts is separate from criminal liability, permitting concurrent civil and criminal
proceedings.
**Doctrine:**
1. **Quasi-delict Defined (Articles 2176 and 2177, Civil Code):** Actions based on
quasidelict are separate and independent from criminal actions.
2. **Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas:** Proprietors must use their property so as
not
to injure others’ property or rights.
3. **Interdependence of Civil and Criminal Liability:** Quasi-delict claims can proceed
independently of the resolution of criminal cases; acquittal in a criminal case does not
necessarily preclude civil liability unless the court specifically rules the fact behind the
civil
claim did not occur.
**Class Notes:**
– **Quasi-Delict (Culpa Aquiliana):** Damage caused by fault or negligence without
contractual relation.
– *Elements:* Damage, fault or negligence, causal connection.
– **Independence of Civil Action:** Under Articles 2176 and 2177, a civil action for
quasidelict is independent of criminal prosecution.
– **Sic Utere Tuo:** Article 431 emphasizes responsible use of property to avoid
causing
harm to others.
**Relevant Legal Statutes:**
– **Article 2176, Civil Code:** Imposes civil liability for damages from acts or omissions
constituting fault or negligence.
– **Article 2177, Civil Code:** Confirms the liability for quasi-delicts is distinct from
criminal
liability under the Penal Code.
– **Article 431, Civil Code:** Addresses the limitation on how property can be used to
prevent harming others.
**Historical Background:**
This case reflects ongoing judicial acknowledgment of the principle that civil liabilities in
quasi-delict cases are distinct and independent from criminal liabilities. This distinction
ensures that aggrieved parties have alternative legal remedies even when the criminal
prosecution is delayed or results in acquittal. The Court’s insistence on independent civil
action underscores the broader aim of ensuring timely access to justice and adequate
compensation for harm or damages suffered.
19. Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012 20.
Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corp. v. National Power Corp., G.R. Nos. 190207 &
190213, June 30, 2021

G.R. No. 185124

Title: Republic of the Philippines v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, et al.
Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA), representing the Republic of the
Philippines,
initiated a complaint for expropriation of portions of three parcels of land totaling
14,497.91
square meters intended for the Malitubog-Marigado Irrigation Project. This case,
designated
as Special Civil Case No. 61, involved lands owned by Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.,
and
individual owners Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa, Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa, Marcelino
Viernes,
among others. Following disputes over NIA’s authority, negotiations, valuations, and
damages, a committee was formed by the RTC to determine just compensation, leading
to
various reports and recommendations. Despite objections from NIA regarding the
valuation,
the RTC and CA affirmed the compensation, adjusting for improvements on the land but
excluding the value of excavated soil. NIA appealed these decisions, raising issues with
the
determination of just compensation and ownership of one of the parcels (Lot No. 3080).
Issues:
1. Was the determination of just compensation by the commissioners, as affirmed by the
CA,
proper and in accordance with legal standards?
2. Was the payment of just compensation for Lot No. 3080 to respondents Margarita
Tabaoda and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz justified?
Court’s Decision:
– The Supreme Court partially granted NIA’s petition. It affirmed the CA’s decision on
just
compensation for land and improvements but modified the decision regarding the
payment
for Lot No. 3080. The case was remanded to the trial court to establish the present
owner of
Lot No. 3080 for proper compensation.
Doctrine:
– Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner,
reflecting the owner’s loss rather than the taker’s gain. This is determined as the market
value of the property at the time of taking, considering reliable and actual data.
Class Notes:
– Just compensation in expropriation proceedings is assessed based on the market
value at
the time of taking, using reliable data (e.g., sworn declarations, tax declarations, zonal
valuations).
– In cases of uncertain ownership or conflicting claims, compensation can be paid to the
court for the benefit of the adjudged owner (Rule 67, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of
Court).
– The value of improvements (e.g., trees, plants) on expropriated land can be
separately
compensated, but the soil is not valued separately from the land.
Historical Background:
This case reflects the complexities encountered in expropriation proceedings, especially
regarding the determination of just compensation, the challenge of proving ownership,
and
the inclusion of land improvements and excavated materials in compensation
calculations. It
underscores the need for careful legal and factual analysis in ensuring just
compensation,
aligning with property rights protections under Philippine law.

Lloyds Richfield Industrial Corp. v. National Power Corp,

G.R. Nos. 190207 & 190213
30 June 2021

Topic: Fundamental Powers of the State; Eminent Domain; Police Power

Keywords:

Facts:

The Court resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari of both parties
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court Decision to condemn the 11 parcels of land of Lloyd Richfield in
favour of the National Power Corporation, the amount of the just compensation for
the parcels of land, and deleted the award of just compensation for the value of the
limestone deposits.

NPC’s project is to construct transmission lines, and the project will affect the parcel
of lands of Lloyds Richfield. Hence, the two parties entered into negotiations.

However, the negotiations did not succeed that prompted NPC to file a complaint for
expropriation and ex parte motion before RTC, which later the Trial Court issued a
Writ of Possession to take immediate possessions of Lloyds Richfield’s properties.

Lloyds Richfield demanded by way of compulsory claim that the National Power
Corporation Pay the fair market value of the parcel of lands affected by the project
of NPC. In addition, the same also demands the NPC to pay the fair market value of
the limestone deposits in the parcels of land.

On the other hand, the committee recommended an increase in the safety zone
from the original 20 metres to 200 metres on each side, totaling 400 metres. From 7
lots to be expropriated to 11 parcels of land, which was granted by the Regional
Trial Court with the amount of P450.00 per square metre as the just compensation
for land and P26.00 per ton as the fair market value of the limestone deposits in the
properties.

The NPC contends that it may only acquire an easement of right of way over the
parcels of land pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, and thus, may only pay an
easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the lands to be
expropriated.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Lloyds Richfield is entitled to just compensation equivalent to the

fair market value of the properties being expropriated, and not to easement of right
of way under RA 6395.
(YES)

Whether or not Lloyds Richfield is entitled to just compensation for the value of the
limestone deposits found in its lots. (NO)

Ruling:

Yes. Section 9 of the Bill of Rights provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. The said provision is not
limited to expropriations or taking the property with the corresponding transfer of
title from the landowner to the expropriator, but also for easement of right of way.
Easement of right is allowed if the restrictions on the landowner’s
property rights are not perpetual or indefinite. In the case at bar, it is clear
that constructing transmission lines over the expropriated properties placed an
indefinite and perpetual restriction on Lloyds Richfield’s proprietary rights because
the latter has been perpetually prohibited from conducting a dynamite
blasting and quarrying activities, or else the transmission lines will be
damaged or destroyed. Hence, the NPC has no choice but to expropriate the lots
and pay Lloyds Richfield the full fair market value of the properties as just
compensation. With respect to Section 3-A of RA 6395, only a right-of-way
easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which
such land is actually devoted will not be impaired. Applying in this case,
construction of transmission lines will impair the principal purpose of the properties,
namely: dynamite blasting and quarrying activities.
No. In Lloyds Richfield’s assertion, his claim under Article 437 of Civil Code, it
provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and
everything under it. However, Article 437 itself provides that it is “subject to special
laws and ordinances. Certainly, the Constitution can be considered a special law, if
not the fundamental law, to which all statutes must conform. Under Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution, the state owns all the minerals found in Philippine Soil.
In the case at bar, Lloyd Richfield is not entitled to just compensation for the
mineral deposits found underneath his property, as the state owns all the minerals
found in Philippine soil.