Maintenance and Modifications To Structural Systems
Maintenance and Modifications To Structural Systems
David A. Fanella
Arnaldo T. Derecho
S. K. Ghosh
NIST NCSTAR 1-1C
David A. Fanella
Arnaldo T. Derecho
S. K. Ghosh
S. K. Ghosh Associates, Inc.
September 2005
Technology Administration
Michelle O’Neill, Acting Under Secretary for Technology
Disclaimer No. 2
The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all publications. In this document,
however, units are presented in metric units or the inch-pound system, whichever is prevalent in the discipline.
Disclaimer No. 3
Pursuant to section 7 of the National Construction Safety Team Act, the NIST Director has determined that certain
evidence received by NIST in the course of this Investigation is “voluntarily provided safety-related information” that is
“not directly related to the building failure being investigated” and that “disclosure of that information would inhibit the
voluntary provision of that type of information” (15 USC 7306c).
In addition, a substantial portion of the evidence collected by NIST in the course of the Investigation has been
provided to NIST under nondisclosure agreements.
Disclaimer No. 4
NIST takes no position as to whether the design or construction of a WTC building was compliant with any code
since, due to the destruction of the WTC buildings, NIST could not verify the actual (or as-built) construction, the
properties and condition of the materials used, or changes to the original construction made over the life of the
buildings. In addition, NIST could not verify the interpretations of codes used by applicable authorities in determining
compliance when implementing building codes. Where an Investigation report states whether a system was
designed or installed as required by a code provision, NIST has documentary or anecdotal evidence indicating
whether the requirement was met, or NIST has independently conducted tests or analyses indicating whether the
requirement was met.
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Construction Safety Team Act Report 1-1C
Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Natl. Constr. Sfty. Tm. Act Rpt. 1-1C, 392 pages (September 2005)
CODEN: NSPUE2
This report documents maintenance and modifications that were made to the structural systems of World
Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7. Included are the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(PANYNJ or Port Authority) guidelines for inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems
of WTC 1, 2, and 7. Discussed are the guidelines that governed the inspection and strengthening of
existing structural members.
Also contained in this report is a summary of the structural inspection programs that were undertaken
during the occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7. Included are summaries of the facility condition survey reports
that were produced for WTC 1, 2, and 7 and descriptions of the structural integrity inspection programs
that were undertaken for WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The significant modifications and repairs that were made to the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7
from initial occupancy to September 11, 2001, are also documented. A discussion on the repairs that
were made after the February 1993 bombing of WTC 1 is also included.
Appendixes to this report include copies of referenced documents, including the Tenant Construction
Review Manuals; the Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the WTC towers; and the
Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details, which were all
issued by the Port Authority regarding inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems of
WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Keywords: Bombing, construction, facility condition survey report, guidelines, inspection, modifications,
repair, strengthening, structural integrity inspection program, structural systems, World Trade Center.
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................iii
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................... v
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................. ix
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................... xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .........................................................................................................xiii
Metric Conversion Table ............................................................................................................................ xv
Preface ....................................................................................................................................................... xix
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. xxix
Chapter 2 Guidelines for Inspection, Repair, and Modifications to Structural Systems ........ 3
2.1 Tenant Construction Review Manuals............................................................................................. 3
2.1.1 1971 Edition ......................................................................................................................... 4
2.1.2 1979 Edition ......................................................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 March 1984 Edition, Revised March 1990......................................................................... 14
2.1.4 March 1997 Edition............................................................................................................ 17
2.2 Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers A & B ............. 18
2.2.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................ 18
2.2.2 Inspection Program............................................................................................................. 20
2.2.3 In-House Inspection Personnel........................................................................................... 24
2.2.4 Outside Consultants and Suppliers of Special Services ..................................................... 25
2.2.5 Record Keeping and Follow-up Procedure ........................................................................ 26
2.2.6 Excluded Work................................................................................................................... 28
2.3 Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications and Standard Details.................. 28
2.3.1 Structural Design Guidelines.............................................................................................. 28
2.3.2 Structural Specifications..................................................................................................... 30
2.4 References...................................................................................................................................... 31
Chapter 3 Structural Inspection Programs During the Occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7 ........ 33
3.1 Facility Condition Survey Reports................................................................................................. 33
3.1.1 Port Authority Facility Condition Survey Program – WTC 2............................................ 33
Appendix A
Tenant Construction Review Manual – 1971 ........................................................................ 123
Appendix B
Tenant Construction Review Manual – 1979 ........................................................................ 139
Appendix C
Tenant Construction Review Manual – 1990 ........................................................................ 157
Appendix D
Tenant Construction Review Manual – 1997 ........................................................................ 177
Appendix E
Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of WTC Towers A & B................................. 199
Appendix F
Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and
Standard Details...................................................................................................................... 255
Appendix G
Supporting Documents .......................................................................................................... 299
Figure P–1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC
disaster. ................................................................................................................................. xxi
Figure 3–1. Typical inspection locations of exterior wall per 1990 Condition Survey Report of
WTC 2.................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 3–2. Splice details at typical inspection locations of exterior wall per the 1990 Condition
Survey Report of WTC 2. ...................................................................................................... 38
Figure 3–3. Typical inspection locations of floor framing per the 1990 Condition Survey Report of
WTC 2.................................................................................................................................... 41
Figure 3–4. Recommendations made in the 1997 Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 7. ............ 57
Figure 3–5. Estimated manpower and cost estimates for structural integrity inspections for WTC 1
and WTC 2. ............................................................................................................................ 63
Table P–1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster....................................... xx
Table P–2. Public meetings and briefings of the WTC Investigation. ..................................................xxiii
Table 2–1. Checklist for Structural Review in the 1971 Edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual................................................................................................................ 5
Table 2–2. Inspection requirements in the 1971 edition of the Tenant Construction Manual. .................. 8
Table 2–3. Checklist for structural review in the 1979 edition of the Tenant Construction Manual. ...... 11
Table 2–4. Checklist for items subject to controlled inspection in the 1979 edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual.............................................................................................................. 13
Table 2–5. Details of structural review in the 1990 edition of the Tenant Construction Manual. ........... 16
Table 2–6. Checklist for items subject to controlled inspection in the 1990 edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual.............................................................................................................. 17
Table 2–7. Checklist for items subject to controlled inspection in the 1997 edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual.............................................................................................................. 19
Table 2–8. Defects and signs of distress to be recorded during inspection of WTC 1 and WTC 2......... 26
Table 2–9. Minimum loads specified for tenant alterations in PANYNJ Architectural and
Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details...................................... 29
Table 3–1. Percentage of structural elements inspected per office floor and for the entire tower per
the 1990 Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 2. ........................................................ 35
Table 3–2. Number of structural elements inspected per office floor per the 1991 Facility
Condition Survey Report for WTC 1. .................................................................................... 44
Table 3–3. Findings from inspection of exterior wall column splices in WTC 1. ................................... 46
Table 3–4. Visual inspection of elevator core framing in WTC 1. .......................................................... 47
Table 3–5. Locations of holes in gypsum wallboard around elevators in WTC 1. .................................. 48
Table 3–6. Core column connection inspection in WTC 1. ..................................................................... 49
Table 3–7. Floor framing and slab inspection results for WTC 1............................................................ 51
Table 3–8. Core framing inspection results for WTC 1. .......................................................................... 52
Table 3–9. Column splice inspection points in WTC 7. .......................................................................... 54
Table 3–10. Wind inspection points, columns, in WTC 7. ........................................................................ 55
Table 3–11. Wind inspection points, girders, in WTC 7............................................................................ 55
Table 3–12. Interior beam connection inspection points in WTC 7. ......................................................... 56
Table 3–13. Summary of findings from space usage reports. .................................................................... 65
Table 3–14. Summary of findings from accessible columns reports. ........................................................ 66
Table 3–15. Summary of findings from Plaza Level box column report................................................... 68
Table 3–16. Summary of findings from bracing reports. ........................................................................... 69
Table 3–17. Summary of findings from hat truss reports. ......................................................................... 70
Table 3–18. Summary of findings from reports on floor framing over mechanical areas. ........................ 72
Table 3–19. Summary of findings from reports on floor framing over tenant areas.................................. 75
Table 3–20. Reports on natural frequency measurements. ........................................................................ 76
Table 3–21. Measured first mode natural frequencies for WTC 1............................................................. 76
Table 3–22. Summary of natural frequency test results for floors of WTC 1, March 1971. ..................... 77
Table 3–23. Summary of natural frequency test results for floors of WTC 1 and WTC 2,
March 1995. ........................................................................................................................... 77
Table 3–24. Summary of inspections performed on WTC 1 after the terrorist bombing on
February 16, 1993. ................................................................................................................. 79
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during structural
inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7.............................................................................................. 82
Acronyms
Abbreviations
ft feet
g acceleration due to gravity = 32.2 ft/s2
Hz Hertz
in. inch
lb pounds
milli 1/1000
min minute
mph miles per hour
pcf pounds per cubic foot
psf pounds per square foot
s second
sq ft square foot
FORCE
dyne (dyn) newton (N) 1.0 E-05
kilogram-force (kgf) newton (N) 9.806 65 E+00
kilopond (kilogram-force) (kp) newton (N) 9.806 65 E+00
kip (1 kip=1,000 lbf) newton (N) 4.448 222 E+03
kip (1 kip=1,000 lbf) kilonewton (kN) 4.448 222 E+00
pound-force (lbf) newton (N) 4.448 222 E+00
LENGTH
foot (ft) meter (m) 3.048 E-01
inch (in) meter (m) 2.54 E-02
inch (in.) centimeter (cm) 2.54 E+00
micron (m) meter (m) 1.0 E-06
yard (yd) meter (m) 9.144 E-01
TEMPERATURE
degree Celsius (°C) kelvin (K) T/K = t/°C + 273.15
degree centigrade degree Celsius (°C) t/°C ≈ t /deg. cent.
degree Fahrenheit (°F) degree Celsius (°C) t/°C = (t/°F - 32)/1.8
degree Fahrenheit (°F) kelvin (K) T/K = (t/°F + 459.67)/1.8
kelvin (K) degree Celsius (°C) t/°C = T/K 2 273.15
TEMPERATURE INTERVAL
degree Celsius (°C) kelvin (K) 1.0 E+00
degree centigrade degree Celsius (°C) 1.0 E+00
degree Fahrenheit (°F) degree Celsius (°C) 5.555 556 E-01
degree Fahrenheit (°F) kelvin (K) 5.555 556 E-01
degree Rankine (°R) kelvin (K) 5.555 556 E-01
Immediately following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers began
planning a building performance study of the disaster. The week of October 7, as soon as the rescue and
search efforts ceased, the Building Performance Study Team went to the site and began its assessment.
This was to be a brief effort, as the study team consisted of experts who largely volunteered their time
away from their other professional commitments. The Building Performance Study Team issued its
report in May 2002, fulfilling its goal “to determine probable failure mechanisms and to identify areas of
future investigation that could lead to practical measures for improving the damage resistance of buildings
against such unforeseen events.”
On August 21, 2002, with funding from the U.S. Congress through FEMA, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) announced its building and fire safety investigation of the WTC
disaster. On October 1, 2002, the National Construction Safety Team Act (Public Law 107-231), was
signed into law. The NIST WTC Investigation was conducted under the authority of the National
Construction Safety Team Act.
• To investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that
contributed to the outcome of the WTC disaster.
• To serve as the basis for:
− Improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used;
− Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials;
− Recommended revisions to current codes, standards, and practices; and
− Improved public safety.
1. Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following the initial impacts of the
aircraft and why and how WTC 7 collapsed;
2. Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or low depending on location,
including all technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and
emergency response;
3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of WTC 1, 2, and 7; and
4. Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and
practices that warrant revision.
NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Technology Administration. The
purpose of NIST investigations is to improve the safety and structural integrity of buildings in the United
States, and the focus is on fact finding. NIST investigative teams are authorized to assess building
performance and emergency response and evacuation procedures in the wake of any building failure that
has resulted in substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of substantial loss of life. NIST
does not have the statutory authority to make findings of fault nor negligence by individuals or
organizations. Further, no part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into a building failure or
from an investigation under the National Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action
for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report (15 USC 281a, as amended by Public
Law 107-231).
The National Construction Safety Team for this Investigation, appointed by the then NIST Director,
Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr., was led by Dr. S. Shyam Sunder. Dr. William L. Grosshandler served as
Associate Lead Investigator, Mr. Stephen A. Cauffman served as Program Manager for Administration,
and Mr. Harold E. Nelson served on the team as a private sector expert. The Investigation included eight
interdependent projects whose leaders comprised the remainder of the team. A detailed description of
each of these eight projects is available at http://wtc.nist.gov. The purpose of each project is summarized
in Table P–1, and the key interdependencies among the projects are illustrated in Fig. P–1.
Table P–1. Federal building and fire safety investigation of the WTC disaster.
Technical Area and Project Leader Project Purpose
Analysis of Building and Fire Codes and Document and analyze the code provisions, procedures, and
Practices; Project Leaders: Dr. H. S. Lew practices used in the design, construction, operation, and
and Mr. Richard W. Bukowski maintenance of the structural, passive fire protection, and
emergency access and evacuation systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Baseline Structural Performance and Analyze the baseline performance of WTC 1 and WTC 2 under
Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis; Project design, service, and abnormal loads, and aircraft impact damage on
Leader: Dr. Fahim H. Sadek the structural, fire protection, and egress systems.
Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Determine and analyze the mechanical and metallurgical properties
Structural Steel; Project Leader: Dr. Frank and quality of steel, weldments, and connections from steel
W. Gayle recovered from WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Investigation of Active Fire Protection Investigate the performance of the active fire protection systems in
Systems; Project Leader: Dr. David WTC 1, 2, and 7 and their role in fire control, emergency response,
D. Evans; Dr. William Grosshandler and fate of occupants and responders.
Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability Reconstruct the time-evolving temperature, thermal environment,
Environment; Project Leader: Dr. Richard and smoke movement in WTC 1, 2, and 7 for use in evaluating the
G. Gann structural performance of the buildings and behavior and fate of
occupants and responders.
Structural Fire Response and Collapse Analyze the response of the WTC towers to fires with and without
Analysis; Project Leaders: Dr. John aircraft damage, the response of WTC 7 in fires, the performance
L. Gross and Dr. Therese P. McAllister of composite steel-trussed floor systems, and determine the most
probable structural collapse sequence for WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Analyze the behavior and fate of occupants and responders, both
Communications; Project Leader: Mr. Jason those who survived and those who did not, and the performance of
D. Averill the evacuation system.
Emergency Response Technologies and Document the activities of the emergency responders from the time
Guidelines; Project Leader: Mr. J. Randall of the terrorist attacks on WTC 1 and WTC 2 until the collapse of
Lawson WTC 7, including practices followed and technologies used.
Emergency Emergency
Response Response
Records
Recovered
Structural Steel Evacuation
Figure P–1. The eight projects in the federal building and fire safety
investigation of the WTC disaster.
The NIST Director also established an advisory committee as mandated under the National Construction
Safety Team Act. The initial members of the committee were appointed following a public solicitation.
These were:
• Paul Fitzgerald, Executive Vice President (retired) FM Global, National Construction Safety
Team Advisory Committee Chair
• Kathleen Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
University of Colorado at Boulder
• Forman Williams, Director, Center for Energy Research, University of California at San
Diego
This National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee provided technical advice during the
Investigation and commentary on drafts of the Investigation reports prior to their public release. NIST
has benefited from the work of many people in the preparation of these reports, including the National
Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee. The content of the reports and recommendations,
however, are solely the responsibility of NIST.
Public Outreach
During the course of this Investigation, NIST held public briefings and meetings (listed in Table P–2) to
solicit input from the public, present preliminary findings, and obtain comments on the direction and
progress of the Investigation from the public and the Advisory Committee.
NIST maintained a publicly accessible Web site during this Investigation at http://wtc.nist.gov. The site
contained extensive information on the background and progress of the Investigation.
The collapse of the WTC buildings has led to broad reexamination of how tall buildings are designed,
constructed, maintained, and used, especially with regard to major events such as fires, natural disasters,
and terrorist attacks. Reflecting the enhanced interest in effecting necessary change, NIST, with support
from Congress and the Administration, has put in place a program, the goal of which is to develop and
implement the standards, technology, and practices needed for cost-effective improvements to the safety
and security of buildings and building occupants, including evacuation, emergency response procedures,
and threat mitigation.
The strategy to meet this goal is a three-part NIST-led public-private response program that includes:
• A federal building and fire safety investigation to study the most probable factors that
contributed to post-aircraft impact collapse of the WTC towers and the 47-story WTC 7
building, and the associated evacuation and emergency response experience.
• A research and development (R&D) program to (a) facilitate the implementation of
recommendations resulting from the WTC Investigation, and (b) provide the technical basis
for cost-effective improvements to national building and fire codes, standards, and practices
that enhance the safety of buildings, their occupants, and emergency responders.
• A dissemination and technical assistance program (DTAP) to (a) engage leaders of the
construction and building community in ensuring timely adoption and widespread use of
proposed changes to practices, standards, and codes resulting from the WTC Investigation
and the R&D program, and (b) provide practical guidance and tools to better prepare facility
owners, contractors, architects, engineers, emergency responders, and regulatory authorities
to respond to future disasters.
The desired outcomes are to make buildings, occupants, and first responders safer in future disaster
events.
A final report on the collapse of the WTC towers is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1. A companion
report on the collapse of WTC 7 is being issued as NIST NCSTAR 1A. The present report is one of a set
that provides more detailed documentation of the Investigation findings and the means by which these
technical results were achieved. As such, it is part of the archival record of this Investigation. The titles
of the full set of Investigation publications are:
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center 7.
NIST NCSTAR 1A. Gaithersburg, MD.
Lew, H. S., R. W. Bukowski, and N. J. Carino. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of
the World Trade Center Disaster: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Design and Construction of Structural Systems.
NIST NCSTAR 1-1A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Ghosh, S. K., and X. Liang. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Building Code Structural Requirements. NIST
NCSTAR 1-1B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Fanella, D. A., A. T. Derecho, and S. K. Ghosh. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Maintenance and Modifications to Structural
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-1C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions Applied to the Design and
Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions Applied after
Occupancy. NIST NCSTAR 1-1D. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Razza, J. C., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of Codes, Standards, and Practices in Use at the Time of the
Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1E. National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Grill, R. A., D. A. Johnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Comparison of the 1968 and Current (2003) New
York City Building Code Provisions. NIST NCSTAR 1-1F. National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Amendments to the Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions of the New
York City Building Code by Local Laws Adopted While World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 Were in
Use. NIST NCSTAR 1-1G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems
of World Trade Center 1 and 2. NIST NCSTAR 1-1H. National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Grill, R. A., D. A. Johnson, and D. A. Fanella. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation
of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection, Life
Safety, and Structural Systems of World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1I. National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Grill, R. A., and D. A. Johnson. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Design, Installation, and Operation of Fuel System for Emergency Power in
World Trade Center 7. NIST NCSTAR 1-1J. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Sadek, F. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster:
Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Faschan, W. J., and R. B. Garlock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center Disaster: Reference Structural Models and Baseline Performance Analysis of
the World Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-2A. National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Luecke, W. E., T. A. Siewert, and F. W. Gayle. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Contemporaneous Structural Steel
Specifications. NIST Special Publication 1-3A. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Banovic, S. W. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Steel Inventory and Identification. NIST NCSTAR 1-3B. National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Banovic, S. W., and T. Foecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Damage and Failure Modes of Structural Steel Components. NIST
NCSTAR 1-3C. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Banovic, S. W., C. N. McCowan, and W. E. Luecke. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Physical Properties of Structural Steels. NIST
NCSTAR 1-3E. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Kuligowski, E. D., D. D. Evans, and R. D. Peacock. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Post-Construction Fires Prior to September 11,
2001. NIST NCSTAR 1-4A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Hopkins, M., J. Schoenrock, and E. Budnick. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation
of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Suppression Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4B. National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Keough, R. J., and R. A. Grill. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Alarm Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4C. National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Ferreira, M. J., and S. M. Strege. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the
World Trade Center Disaster: Smoke Management Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-4D. National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Pitts, W. M., K. M. Butler, and V. Junker. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of
the World Trade Center Disaster: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis.
NIST NCSTAR 1-5A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
McGrattan, K. B., C. Bouldin, and G. Forney. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety
Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the World
Trade Center Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5F. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Prasad, K. R., and H. R. Baum. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: Fire Structure Interface and Thermal Response of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-5G. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
Gross, J. L., and T. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center
Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-6. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD,
September.
Gross, J., F. Hervey, M. Izydorek, J. Mammoser, and J. Treadway. 2005. Federal Building and
Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Fire Resistance Tests of Floor Truss
Systems. NIST NCSTAR 1-6B. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg,
MD, September.
T. P. McAllister. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis. NIST NCSTAR 1-6C.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Kim, W. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Analysis of September 11, 2001, Seismogram Data. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6G.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Nelson, K. 2006. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: The Con Ed Substation in World Trade Center 7. (Provisional). NIST NCSTAR 1-6H.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD.
Fahy, R., and G. Proulx. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster: Analysis of Published Accounts of the World Trade Center Evacuation. NIST
NCSTAR 1-7A. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Zmud, J. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center
Disaster: Technical Documentation for Survey Administration. NIST NCSTAR 1-7B. National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
Lawson, J. R., and R. L. Vettori. 2005. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World
Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations. NIST NCSTAR 1-8. National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Gaithersburg, MD, September.
E.1 OVERVIEW
This report contains a summary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port
Authority) guidelines for inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems of World Trade
Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7. Included are the guidelines governing the inspection and strengthening of
existing structural members and systems for modifications made by tenants of the buildings.
A summary of the (1) structural inspection programs, (2) significant observations, (3) procedures for
implementation, and (4) actions taken during the occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7 is also documented. In
addition to having established guidelines for any type of modifications that were to be made to any of
their facilities, including the WTC, the PANYNJ established programs for inspection and repair. Facility
condition surveys were commissioned for WTC 1, 2, and 7. These surveys reported on the condition of
the buildings, including the structural systems, and contained recommendations for any necessary repairs
or upgrading. Periodic inspections of the structural systems were also performed under the Structural
Integrity Inspection (SII) Program for WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Also contained in this report is a summary of the significant modifications and repairs that were made to
the structural framing systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7 from initial occupancy to September 11, 2001. A
discussion is also included on the repairs that were made after the February 1993 bombing of WTC 1.
Apart from the repairs following the 1993 bombing of WTC 1, most of the structural modifications in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 were performed to accommodate tenant requirements. Openings were cut in existing
floors to construct new stairways linking two or more floors, and floor systems were reconstructed over
previously cut openings. In a number of cases, floor trusses outside of the core area and steel beams in the
core area had to be reinforced due to heavy loads imposed by tenant requirements.
Similar to WTC 1 and WTC 2, most of the structural modifications in WTC 7 were done to accommodate
tenant requirements. Horizontal members of the floor framing system were strengthened due to increased
loading from high-density files. Strengthening of these beams and girders was achieved by welding cover
plates to the bottom flanges, the underside of the top flanges, or both. In some cases new beams were
introduced to carry a portion of the new load. Floor slabs were completely removed on the east side of the
building to accommodate trading floors for Salomon Brothers Inc., one of the major tenants of the
building. Columns in this area, which had twice the unsupported length after the slab removal, were
reinforced. Other openings were cut into a few floor levels to accommodate new stairways connecting
adjoining floors. Web openings were cut through some beams and girders to allow passage of ductwork.
In some cases, the beams or girders had to be reinforced in order to increase their capacity.
The information contained in this report is based on documents and structural drawings that were
primarily acquired from the the offices of the PANYNJ in Newark, New Jersey, and New York City, New
York. Paper, microfilm, and electronic versions of these documents were obtained from these sources.
Appendixes to this report include copies of referenced documents, including the Tenant Construction
Review Manuals, the Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the WTC towers, and the
Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details, which were all
issued by the Port Authority regarding inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems of
WTC 1, 2, and 7.
The first edition of the Tenant Construction Review Manual was issued by Port of New York Authority
(PONYA or Port Authority) in 1971. Subsequent editions appeared in 1979, 1984, 1990, and 1997.
The purpose of these manuals was to present the technical criteria, standards, and requirements that were
to be followed by tenants that were planning construction work in any Port Authority facility. Included in
the manuals were the criteria that were used by the Engineering Department of the Port Authority when
reviewing proposed construction or alterations. Requirements were given for alterations and
modifications to architectural, structural, geotechnical, civil, mechanical, plumbing, and fire protection
systems.
The General Requirements section of the manual required that all tenants submit an application form to
the Port Authority outlining the scope of work, the design criteria, and the plans prior to construction. The
design was to be performed by a registered architect or licensed professional engineer. Contractors were
required to comply with all applicable provisions of federal, state, municipal, local and departmental laws,
ordinances, rules, regulations, and orders, except where stricter requirements were contained in the
project specifications. Except for some editorial changes, the requirements in this section remained
virtually the same in all editions of the manual. In the revised March 1990 edition, requirements were
added concerning the role of consultants working on the project who were not the architect or engineer of
record.
The scope of structural review of the alterations and/or modifications consisted of compliance with the
applicable codes, standards, and design criteria given in the Structural Review section of the manual.
In particular, the provisions of the then applicable New York City Building Code were to be satisfied for
work performed in New York City. Structural calculations were to be submitted by the registered design
professional for review by the Port Authority. The checklist for structural review included provisions for
loads, structural work, various structural materials, and foundations. The requirements in this section of
the manual were modified and expanded over the years, most notably the section containing Port
Authority design criteria, which was significantly expanded in the revised March 1990 edition of the
manual. Included in that edition was a requirement that all structures were to be designed for earthquake
zone 2 forces in accordance with the Building Officials Conference of America Basic Building Code.
The Materials, Operations, and Equipment Subject to Controlled Inspection section of the manual
contained a comprehensive inspection program that was to be implemented for all construction. The
inspection that was required during various phases of construction was mainly to be performed in
accordance with the applicable sections of the New York City Building Code that governed at the time.
Specific inspection requirements were outlined for concrete and steel. The inspection requirements were
significantly reorganized and modified in the revised March 1990 edition of the manual. Requirements for
approval/acceptance of materials and controlled inspections were abstracted from the applicable sections
of the New York City Building Code.
E.2.2 Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the WTC Towers A & B
The Infrastructure Engineering Design Division of the Engineering Department of PANYNJ issued the
Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers A & B in March of 1986.
These standards were to assist the PANYNJ in the evaluation of the structural integrity of WTC 1 and
WTC 2.
Three methods were used to evaluate the structural integrity of the towers: (1) statistical inspections, (2)
reports, and (3) continued measurements. In the first method, periodic visual inspection of selected
structural components in “higher-potential trouble areas” was to be made initially by qualified outside
consultants under PANYNJ management. It was anticipated in the future that PANYNJ in-house
personnel could perform such inspections. Periodic inspection of the following components was to be
performed:
5. Fireproofing and masonry partitions enclosing the diagonal bracing on exterior column lines
in both towers below the Service Level Floor and the transfer trusses below floor 1 in WTC 2
under exterior and core columns (every second year);
6. Hat truss members between floor 107 and the roof (every second year);
7. Exterior box columns and spandrel plates under column trees below Floor 7 (every fourth
year);
8. Steel floor framing over mechanical spaces (every fourth year); and,
Inspections were also to be made when general repair or remodeling was done that involved removing
ceilings, partitions, finishes, or other coverings. Tools and procedures that were to be used to perform the
inspections were also included in this method. After inspection was complete, it was required that any
spray-on fireproofing that was removed for inspection purposes be properly replaced.
In the second method, various reports were to be examined, which could possibly shed light on
underlying structural problems. Maintenance reports of non-structural repairs, water leakage, and tenant
complaints about unusual building movements, vibration, or noise are examples of such reports.
In the third method, the performance of systems within the buildings was to be evaluated through
measurement of movement or deformation. Measurements of the following were to be performed on a
periodic basis:
This document also contained a list of duties, responsibilities, and minimum qualifications of the
inspection supervisor, inspection crew leader, and inspection crewmembers from the PANYNJ. Other
requirements were given for outside consultants and suppliers who were to carry out periodic inspections
and other special tasks.
During inspections, defects and signs of distress were to be noted and recorded for:
1. Structural steel (rust; cracks; buckles and kinks; connection and joint defects; alignment,
excessive deflection, or bowing; and paint); and,
General requirements were given on how to identify an inspected member, how to describe the defect or
distress, and how to categorize the urgency of the required repair.
It was noted in the last section of the document that these standards were applicable to only structural
steel and reinforced concrete members in WTC 1 and WTC 2. Glass and glazing, facade panels, ceilings,
partitions, elevators, stairs, and mechanical equipment were listed as components outside the scope of the
document.
Issued by the Port Authority in February of 1998, this document contained architectural and structural
design requirements for tenant alterations that were to be made specifically at WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Prior to any design work, the tenant’s consultants were required to perform a field inspection of the area
where alterations/modifications were to take place. It was required that all calculations and construction
drawings be submitted to the Port Authority for review and approval, and that all documents be sealed by
a professional engineer or registered architect licensed to practice in the state of New York.
Proposed floor loads were to be compared with the allowable floor design loads contained in the
Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications and Standard Details document. Existing
structural members that would be overstressed by the proposed loads were required to be reinforced to
carry the additional loads. It was required that the weight of any equipment exceeding 500 lbs and the
weight of all files and shelves be shown on the construction drawings. Minimum loads to be used in the
designs were also specified in the document.
All proposed penetrations or drilling of cores in tower slabs were required to meet the criteria for location,
spacing, and repair that were specified in this document. Some areas were denoted as “prohibited” (no
penetrations or cores were allowed) and some were denoted as “restricted” (advisable not to locate
penetrations or cores).
Additional criteria were provided for (1) supports for hung ceilings in the two-way truss areas of the
towers, (2) weight, dimensions, and location of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment, (3)
walls over an opening, (4) holes in existing steel, (5) coring at power/telephone cells and under induction
units, and (5) concrete anchors that were to be used for any connections made to concrete.
The Engineering Quality Assurance Division of PANYNJ performed a facility condition survey for
WTC 2 in 1990. The scope of the survey was based on Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of
World Trade Center Towers A & B, which was published by PANYNJ in 1986. This document contained
the minimum requirements of periodic and occasional inspection programs that were implemented for
WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The scope of work, which was designed to minimize impact on tenant and facility operations, included
inspection of the (1) exterior wall system (columns, spandrel plates, and splices), (2) core columns
(including column splices and lateral bracing below the 7th floor), (3) space frame (hat truss), (4) floor
systems (floor slabs and decks, trusses, rolled beams, bridging, and connections), and (5) damping
system. Thirty floors throughout WTC 2 were selected for inspection, including all four of the two-story
mechanical equipment rooms (MER).
Exterior columns and spandrels were inspected at (1) column field splice connections, (2) spandrel field
splice connections, and (3) the inside of the spandrel plate face at the column/floor truss seat connections.
According to the report, a total of 59 column splices were inspected and all were found to be in good
condition. On two of the floor levels, the columns had only three bolts at the splice location, although the
design called for four. According to the report, this had no effect on structural integrity.
Spandrel plates, splice plates, and spandrel bolted connections were also found to be in good condition.
Scattered rust stains were observed on the spandrel fireproofing as well as on the inside of some of the
steel box columns.
No priority recommendations were made in the report. It was recommended, however, that a long-term
maintenance program be developed and implemented to clean and paint the inside surfaces of the exterior
box columns to prevent further corrosion of the structural steel.
Core Columns
Core columns were inspected from elevator shafts and from office area floors. Twenty-five elevator shafts
were randomly selected for inspection, and the elevator core framing was primarily inspected with
fireproofing materials in place. In general, some defects were found in the fireproofing material. In most
of the shafts, several small regions and a few large areas of fireproofing were found to be missing from
core framing members. In the worst case, 100 percent of the fireproofing was found to be missing from
the south face of column 908 between floors 27 and 29 in elevator shaft number 1. Exposed steel
members exhibited only isolated locations of light surface corrosion.
Gypsum wallboards surrounding the elevator shafts were also found to be in good condition, although
isolated holes were detected at various locations.
Inspection of column splices and eccentric-braced column connections with fireproofing removed showed
that all bolts, welds, and structural steel were in good condition.
No priority recommendations for repair were made in the 1990 report. It was recommended that the
fireproofing that was missing from the framing members in the elevator shaft be replaced, including those
regions where the fireproofing was removed for inspection. It was also recommended that the holes in the
gypsum wallboards surrounding the elevators be repaired.
Floor Framing
In the main lobby, beams and connections that were inspected within the core area were found to be in
good condition. Fireproofing was missing at various locations, exposing light surface corrosion on these
elements.
On floors 9 through 41, the floor framing that was inspected was also found to be in good condition.
Light corrosion was observed on all core beams and beam connections, and on floor truss connections.
The most significant deficiencies were found at the damping units, where a number of such units were
missing from one to four fasteners in the connections to the framing members.
Floor framing on floors 43 though 75 was found to be in good condition. The most significant
deficiencies were found on floors 64 and 75. A deformed bottom chord was found on the main truss along
column 343 on floor 64; no signs of distress were observed. On the 75th floor, untightened bolts were
found at truss seat connections at several locations, which, according to the report, had no significant
affect on the structural integrity of the framing, since they served erection purposes.
The floor framing on floors 77 through 107 was found to be in good condition with light surface
corrosion observed on all core framing beams and connections. The most significant deficiencies were
concrete slabs that had separated from the metal deck at floors 93 and 108. According to the report,
structural integrity was not comprised, since the metal deck served as only formwork for the concrete.
Hairline cracks were found in concrete beam encasement at various locations on all four mechanical
equipment room levels. Other than that, floor framing and slabs were found to be in good condition.
Selected elements of the hat truss were also found to be in good condition, with light surface corrosion on
exposed truss elements and connections.
No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. All of the deficiencies noted above were
considered to have no significant effect on structural integrity.
The Office of Irwin G. Cantor, Consulting Engineers, performed a condition survey of WTC 1 in 1991 for
the Engineering Quality Assurance Division of PANYNJ. The scope of the survey was based on
experience gained from the survey of WTC 2 in 1990. As in the case of WTC 2, the scope of work was
designed to minimize impact on tenant and facility operations. The floor framing, damping system,
exterior wall system, core columns, space frame (hat truss), MER, and roof were inspected.
A total of 28 exterior column splices were inspected throughout 14 office floors on floors 9 through 106.
Nondestructive testing was performed on the plate splice welds, and ultrasonic testing was performed to
verify plate thickness at 26 of these locations. All inspected columns splices were found to be in good
condition.
The inside faces of the steel box column plates exhibited scattered areas of light to moderate corrosion
and peeling paint. Ultrasonic thickness testing on these outer column plates above and below the splice
location indicated no cross-section loss.
Spandrel plates, splice plates, and bolted connections were also found to be in good condition. Scattered
rust stains were observed on the spandrel fireproofing.
In the floors above 106, only the joints at floor 108 were inspected. No structurally significant
deterioration was found.
No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. It was noted that missing fireproofing
should be replaced on the spandrel plates and splices.
Core Columns
Core columns were inspected from 13 elevator shafts with fireproofing left in place. Corner core column
splices were inspected from two office area floors. Core floor beam to column connections were also
inspected at 25 of 56 locations on 14 floors.
The exterior wall column splices were found to be in good condition. Results from nondestructive testing
of the splice plate welds were acceptable, and results from ultrasonic thickness testing showed no
significant loss in member thickness.
Several small areas and a few large areas of fireproofing were missing from some of the steel beams and
columns in the express elevator shafts. According to the report, the probable cause of missing fireproofing
on the columns was the high speed of the elevators moving up and down the shafts. All exposed steel was
found to be in good condition with light to medium surface rust.
Gypsum wallboards were found to be in good condition, except for two isolated holes in two elevator
shafts at the 58th and 69th floors.
Similar to the case of the express elevator shafts, fireproofing was found to be missing on some of the
steel columns and beams, and some isolated holes were found in some of the gypsum wallboards in the
local elevator shafts.
Inspection of core corner column splices and floor beam to column connections showed all of the
elements to be in good condition.
No priority recommendations were made in the report. It was recommended that missing fireproofing
from the framing members in the elevator shafts be replaced, including those regions where the
fireproofing was removed for inspection during the condition survey. It was also recommended that the
holes in the gypsum wallboards be repaired.
Floor Framing
Two typical conditions were observed during inspection of the floor trusses: (1) small areas of
fireproofing were missing at scattered locations throughout the floor framing and (2) the underside of the
floor trusses exhibited light rust. Welds were tested at various connections and were found to be in good
condition. In some cases, the connection of the truss to the exterior spandrel plate had one bolt and a weld
instead of the typical two-bolt connection. These field welds were also tested and were found to be in
good condition.
At all of the locations that were inspected, the damping units did not have fireproofing covering them.
Light rust was observed on the surfaces of the units. A non-structural bolt was missing on one of the
damping units under the 30th floor.
The metal deck and concrete slabs that were inspected were also found to be in good condition, except for
the slab in the southeast corner of the 60th floor where cracks were found on the top surface.
No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. Routine recommendations were made to
patch spalls and cracks in the concrete slab.
All four mechanical equipment room floor levels (floors 7–8, 41–42, 75–76, and 108–109) were
inspected. Floor slabs at these levels were found to be in good condition with scattered cracks found on
the slab surfaces. Scattered patches of fireproofing were found missing from the underside of the metal
decks outside the core area.
A concrete encased beam on the 110th floor was subjected to steam from a leaking steam valve. Moderate
rusting was found on the member, but no significant section loss was found.
Hangers supporting ducts, piping, etc. were visually inspected, and some were found to be subject to
excessive vibration. Loose hanger rods and fatigue of pipe supports were also found at various locations.
Beams that supported the duct hangers had fireproofing missing where the hangers were mounted.
A total of 199 members were inspected in the space frame (hat truss). Light rust was found on diagonal
braces, beams, and connections where fireproofing was missing.
A priority recommendation was made in the report to replace the leaking valve under the 110th floor that
caused the floor beam to rust. Routine recommendations were made to repair cracks in the concrete slabs
and to repair hangers that were found to be vibrating, bowed, sagged, and/or deformed.
Roof
No significant structural deficiencies were found at the roof level. Cracking and spalling of the concrete
slab was found in localized areas of the roof.
No priority recommendations were made in the report. Routine recommendations included removing and
replacing existing patches in the roof slab and patching spalled areas in the concrete slabs.
Ammann & Whitney performed a condition survey of WTC 7 in 1997 for the Engineering Quality
Assurance Division of PANYNJ. The scope of work was designed to minimize impact on tenant and
facility operations and was limited to unoccupied floors and floors which had vacant space. The
foundation, column splices, wind bracing system, interior beam connections, floor slabs, and the Con
Edison Substation were all inspected.
According to the report, no problems or deterioration were found on the column splices, wind bracing, or
the interior beam connections at any of the locations that were inspected. Rust buildup was found between
the flanges of members that rested on top of one another at the main roof level where the steel framing
was exposed. It was recommended that the steel be cleaned and painted to prevent further deterioration,
even though this was not considered to be a structural problem.
Fireproofing was found to be missing from the steel framing at various locations where utility supports
were installed on all of the floors that were inspected. Missing fireproofing was most prominent on the
5th floor framing above the main lobby and the 2nd floor framing above the loading dock area. It was
recommended in the report that the fireproofing be replaced.
Loose concrete was found on the north face of column 51 on the 46th floor of the cooling tower area.
Silverstein Properties personnel immediately removed the loose concrete.
Floor slabs were found to be in good condition. No deficiencies were found, except for some shrinkage
cracks on the top of some of the exposed slabs and some damage to the metal deck.
The Con Edison station was found to be in very good condition, and no action was required at that time.
Merritt & Harris, Inc., performed a condition survey for WTC 1 and WTC 2 in 2000 for PANYNJ. The
on-site evaluations were carried out to assess the general physical condition of the property at that time.
WTC 4, WTC 5, the retail mall and plaza, central services, and the subgrade were inspected in addition to
WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Observations were limited to those portions of the buildings that were visible during walk-through. No
material samples were taken, and no tests were performed on the building materials or systems.
According to the report, the building structure appeared to be in good overall condition, based on
observations of the structural members that were not concealed by building finishes. The interior slabs
were reported to be in good condition, and no apparent movement or settlement of foundations was
observed.
The report notes that Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA) and other engineering firms had performed
Structural Integrity Inspections of various structural systems and had pointed out the following
deficiencies: (1) rusting of steel columns in the elevator shafts, (2) missing fireproofing on structural
members, and (3) floor coring damage. The report goes on to discuss the damping units, including
LERA’s strong recommendation to continue wind acceleration measurements.
In 1986, PANYNJ implemented an inspection program to detect, record, and correct any signs of distress,
deterioration, or deformation that could signal structural problems. This structural integrity inspection
program, which was based on an inspection and testing plan prepared by LERA, contained detailed
guidelines on inspection, record-keeping, and follow-up procedures.
In regard to the follow-up procedure, a description was to be provided of the defect or indication of
distress. Measurements, sketches, and photographs were to be provided in those cases where a written
description was not adequate. The use of a tape recorder was also permitted.
If the Supervisor or the inspection team uncovered defects or indications of distress that appeared to
require more than routine attention, a separate report of such findings was to be submitted to the Port
Authority’s Engineer of Design, Infrastructure. For conditions of a serious nature, immediate notification
was to be made to the Engineer of Design, Infrastructure in person.
Inspection findings under this program were to be categorized as “Immediate,” “Priority,” or “Routine.”
Repairs falling into the “immediate” category included possible closure of the area and/or structure
affected until interim remedial action (such as shoring or removal of a potentially unsafe element or
structure) could be implemented. Such action was to be undertaken immediately after discovery, and a
description of the action taken and recommendations for permanent repair were to be included in the
inspection report. The “priority” category was for those conditions where no immediate action was
required, or for which immediate action had been completed, but for which further investigation, design,
and implementation of interim or long-term repairs should be undertaken on a priority basis (i.e., taking
precedence over all other scheduled work). Repairs falling into the “routine” or “non-priority” category
could be undertaken as part of a scheduled major work program or other scheduled project, or when
routine facility maintenance was to be performed, depending on the type of repair that was required.
An important requirement in the inspection program was that where inspection procedures involved the
removal of fireproofing, such fireproofing was to be properly replaced on completion of inspection.
LERA submitted a proposal to PANYNJ in 1990 to monitor the structural integrity of the WTC Complex,
which included WTC 1, WTC 2, WTC 4, WTC 5, WTC 6, the Vista Hotel, and the subgrade. The
proposal called for inspection/monitoring of the following items in WTC 1 and WTC 2:
• Space usage
• Accessible columns, including exterior box columns at locations of spandrel intersections and
“tree’ junctions below floor 7 and above floor 1 (Plaza Level)
• Bracing at exterior column line below elevation 294 ft-0 in., and in WTC 2 only, the transfer
trusses below floor 1 under exterior columns
• Steel framing, slabs, and the like where exposed for general repairs or tenant remodeling
• Damping units
• Fire stairs
Inspection and monitoring of these items were to occur at regular intervals, which were proposed by
LERA.
LERA and other engineering firms conducted periodic inspections of the towers under the WTC
Structural Integrity Inspection Program, which was based on the proposal originally submitted to
PANYNJ by LERA in 1990. A summary of the structural integrity inspection programs and their
corresponding dates is given in Table E–1.
The purpose of the space usage surveys was to identify possible structural overloading of the slabs and
floor framing due to changes in occupancies and uses and/or due to additions of heavy equipment or
furniture. Surveys were conducted annually over a 5 year period starting in 1995, with two surveys
conducted in 1996. The only priority recommendation was made in the 1995 report, which advised
PANYNJ to distribute the load of the granite slabs on floor 106 of WTC 1 over a larger area. A summary
of the findings from the space usage reports can be found in Table 3–13 of this report.
Accessible Columns
Surveys of the accessible columns (columns in the core area that were not enclosed by an architectural
finish, which can be visually inspected) in the elevator shafts of WTC 1 and WTC 2 were performed to:
• Ascertain the condition of the accessible columns with respect to rusting, cracking, bowing,
and deviation from plumb;
• Identify lateral displacement or rotation of the column about a vertical axis where the column
was directly braced on only one axis by connecting beams or concrete slabs; and
Accessible column surveys were performed approximately every 2 years, starting in 1993 and ending in
1998. Priority recommendations were made in the 1996 report and the second report in 1998. The later
report recommended that missing fireproofing be replaced on columns at various locations in WTC 1 and
WTC 2. A summary of the findings from the accessible columns reports can be found in Table 3–14 of
this report.
The purpose of the inspection of the Plaza Level box columns was to assess their overall structural
integrity, including the condition of the fireproofing. The proposed inspection interval was 4 years.
Fireproofing was found to be missing from approximately 2 to 3 percent of the Plaza Level box columns
and seated beam connections in WTC 1 and about 1 to 2 percent in WTC 2. A summary of the findings
from the Plaza Level box columns report is given in Table 3–15 of this report.
Below Elevation 294 ft 0 in. (Sublevel 1) in both WTC 1 and WTC 2, diagonal bracing was used in place
of deep spandrels between the exterior columns to resist lateral loads from the towers above.
The purpose of the inspection of the bracing system below elevation 294 ft 0 in. in the perimeter walls of
the towers was to:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the bracing (and, in 1991 only, the
transfer trusses below elevation 310 ft 0 in. in WTC 2);
• Provide recommendations for remedial work for both structural and fireproofing damage.
Bracing surveys were performed in 1991 and 1995, and a summary of the findings from these reports can
be found in Table 3–16 of this report. No priority recommendations were made in these reports.
It is evident from Table 3–16 that the PANYNJ did not act on a number of recommendations priority and
routine repairs from earlier reports. In particular, draining of flooded areas due to water leaks was not
fully accomplished, and repairs to the connections between the braces and the columns were not made.
Fireproofing was not applied to the transfer truss between columns 242 and 248 at the B1 Level in
WTC 2. Also, fireproofing was not repaired on some of the bracing members at Level B6 and at other
levels. It appears that all of the damaged concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls acting as fireproofing,
which were identified in the 1991 Structural Integrity Inspection report, were repaired; many additional
CMU walls were noted for repair in the 1995 Structural Integrity Inspection report.
Hat Trusses
The purpose of the inspection of the hat trusses between floor 107 and the roof was to:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the hat trusses;
• Provide recommendations for remedial work for both structural and fireproofing damage.
Hat truss surveys were performed in 1992 and 1995. A summary of the findings from these reports can be
found in Table 3–17 of this report. Although no priority recommendations were made in these reports,
routine recommendations were made to repair fireproofing and gypsum wallboard at various locations in
WTC 1 and WTC 2. No follow-up actions were stated in the report.
The inspection program for the floor framing supporting the MER consisted of the following:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the steel and concrete framing.
• Identify locations of defects and signs of distress in slabs, partitions, column enclosures, and
concrete supports for mechanical equipment.
• Provide recommendations and procedures for remedial work for both structural and
fireproofing damages and/or inadequacies.
Surveys were conducted in 1992, 1996, and 1999. Priority recommendations were made in the 1996 and
1999 reports. The 1996 recommendation called for reapplication of fireproofing at various locations in
WTC 1 and WTC 2. The 1999 recommendation called for repair of a water leak in an overhead pipe on
floor 75 of WTC 1. A summary of the findings from these reports can be found in Table 3–18 of this
report.
The inspection program for the floor framing supporting the tenant areas consisted of the following:
• Assess the overall performance and integrity of the steel and concrete framing.
• Identify locations and signs of distress in slabs, partitions, column enclosures, and steel
framing.
• Provide recommendations and procedures for remedial work for both structural and
fireproofing damages and/or inadequacies.
Surveys for floor framing supporting tenant areas occurred in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999. Priority
recommendations were made in the 1999 report concerning restoration of fireproofing on a truss on
floor 89 in WTC 2, repair of spalled concrete on floor 89 of WTC 2 and floors 33 and 91 in WTC 1, and
repair of damaged reinforcement on floor 91 of WTC 1. A summary of the findings from these reports
can be found in Table 3–19 of this report.
The purpose of this inspection program was to determine the natural frequencies of oscillation of WTC 1
due to wind excitation. Only WTC 1 was instrumented with accelerometers at six locations on floor 108,
which measured the accelerations in both principal directions of the building with respect to time due to
wind. These natural frequencies were to be compared with corresponding values that were determined in
the past. A significant change in the tower’s dynamic behavior was considered to be a possible indication
of diminishing structural integrity. According to the reports, characteristics that may have been observed
or inferred by review of the recorded acceleration data were:
Reports were prepared by LERA in 1993, 1995, and 2000. The main conclusion from the 1993 and 1995
reports was that the measured and computed first mode frequencies compared well, especially for the
large wind speeds. The 1995 report also concluded that the February 1993 bombing had no permanent
measurable effect on the dynamic response of WTC 1. Both reports recommended that WTC 2 be
instrumented similarly to WTC 1.
The 2000 report pointed out that data acquired since 1998 could not be analyzed due to the dismantling of
the PANYNJ facilities that performed the analysis. The report recommended that the capability to assess
the data be re-established as soon as possible.
The purpose of this inspection program was to determine the natural frequencies of the floor systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2. These natural frequencies were to be compared with corresponding values that were
determined in the past. A significant change in the vibration characteristics of the floor system was
considered to be a possible indication of diminishing structural integrity. Summaries of the natural
frequencies of the floors in WTC 1 and WTC 2 are given in Tables 3–22 and 3–23 of this report.
The report produced by LERA in 1995 summarized the analytical and experimental results to date. The
report concluded that there was no significant measurable change in the performance of the typical floors
systems of WTC 1 and WTC 2.
A summary of the integrity of the viscoelastic damping units in WTC 1 and WTC 2 was given in a report
by LERA in 1996. Also given in the report is a historical review related to the performance of the
damping units.
The report concluded that based on the then available studies, the integrity of the damping units was
good, and that no action was required at that time beyond the routine testing of the damping units.
Six different inspections were performed before and after repairs were made to WTC 1 in the aftermath of
the terrorist attack in February of 1993. A summary of these inspections can be found in Table 3–24 of
this report. No anomalies were detected in the welds used to repair structural members.
In general, the structural integrity inspections found that the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7 were
in good condition. The inspection consultants made numerous routine and some priority
recommendations for repairs to the PANYNJ, as outlined in the appropriate sections of this report. Unless
there were scheduled maintenance programs, the PANYNJ did not act expeditiously on some of these
repair recommendations, including not replacing or repairing fireproofing on structural steel members that
was found to be missing from the inspections. According to the PANYNJ, all of the construction records
on repairs following the inspections were lost on September 11, 2001. Thus, it cannot be determined
whether all of the recommended repairs were performed.
Table 3–25 of this report gives a chronological summary of the locations where fireproofing was reported
to be missing, based on the findings from the applicable inspection programs.
Most of the modifications to the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7 were done to accommodate tenant
requirements. These generally involved cutting holes in existing floor slabs to construct new stairways
linking two or more floors or reconstructing the floor system over previously cut openings. In other cases
floor or column members were reinforced to accommodate new floor loadings imposed by tenant
requirements.
Modifications to the structural systems were to follow the guidelines set forth by the PANYNJ, which are
summarized in Sec. E.2 and Chapter 2 of this report.
Slab openings were made in the floor slabs on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floors 93-95, 1978 (openings were made in floors 93, 94 and 95 between columns 901, 902,
1001, and 1002 in core)
2. Floors 99-101, 1979 (openings were made in floors 100 and 101 between columns 707, 708,
806, and 807 in core, and in floor 99 between columns 701, 702, 801, and 802)
3. Floors 89 and 90, 1985 (opening was made in floors 89 and 90 between columns 901, 902,
1001, and 1002)
4. Floor 107, 1995 (opening was made in floor 107; location could not be determined)
5. Floors 105-roof, 1997 (opening was made in floor 105 near columns 704 and 804A in the
core)
6. Floors 93-100, 1999 (openings were made on all floors; location could not be determined)
Openings that had been cut primarily for stairways were subsequently closed on the following floors
during the following years:
1. Floor 95, 1972 and 1985 (new beams and floor deck were added near column lines 124 and
239)
2. Floors 91 and 92, 1987 (new beams and floor deck were added between columns 901, 902,
1001, and 1002 in the core)
3. Floors 96 and 100, 1998 (new beams and floor deck were added between columns 119 and
123 on floor 96 outside of the core and near columns 707, 708, 806, and 807 on floor 100)
Various floor members were reinforced to accommodate floor loads that were greater than the original
design loads. Members were reinforced on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floors 98 and 99, 1979 (cover plates were added on existing beams on floor 98 between
columns 601 and 602 and between 701 and 702; on floor 98, diagonals were added to existing
floor trusses on the east side of the core between columns 218 and 221; on floor 99, floor
trusses along lines 309, 311, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 325, 327, and 329 were reinforced;
and, on floor 99, core perimeter columns were reinforced)
2. Floor 86, 1996 (floor trusses were reinforced in the northwest corner of the building)
3. Floor 85, 1998 (cover plates were added to existing beams and existing floor trusses were
reinforced)
The explosion of February 26, 1993, occurred on Level B2 near the center of the south wall of WTC 1
and adjacent to the Vista Hotel. Structural steel columns, diagonal braces, and spandrel beams in the
vicinity of the blast were damaged. Concrete floor slabs at Levels B1 and B2 and unreinforced masonry
walls were also damaged over a large area.
The explosion tore out the diagonal brace between column 324 at Level B2 and column 327 at Level B1
and severely bent the diagonal brace between column 324 at Level B2 and column 321 at Level B1.
Spandrel beams at Level B1 from column 321 to column 324 and from column 324 to column 327 were
also damaged by the blast. Spandrels were bowed and cracked, and some had missing bolts.
The inspection teams observed a crack along the field splice in column 324. Ultrasonic testing determined
that the crack extended across the full width of the weld on the south face of the column and at each end
of the weld on the north face. Magnetic-particle testing procedures determined that the crack extended
across the east face of the column and the majority of the weld on the west face as well.
The explosion also damaged floor beams framing into the tower side of column 324 at Levels B1 and B2.
Concrete spandrel beams at Level B3 between columns 318 and 330 also sustained damage. Masonry
walls in WTC 1 were breached over distances of approximately 50 ft to the east and 120 ft to the west of
the blast origin.
Repair Work
The diagonal bracing members between levels B1 and B2 that were damaged by the explosion were
removed and replaced with new members.
New plates were added to the damaged spandrel beam at level B1 between columns 324 and 327 and
between columns 321 and 324. Also, the cracked weld on the south face of the spandrel beam at level B1
near column 324 was removed and replaced.
An eight-step procedure was prescribed for repair of the crack in column 324 immediately adjacent to the
field weld at the column splice above level B2. No documentation was found to confirm that this crack
was repaired according to that procedure.
Repairs were made to the floor beams framing into columns 321, 324, and 327. Repairs were also made to
connections between floor beams and columns on Levels B3 and B4. Along the south face of WTC 1, the
damaged concrete spandrel beams were demolished and replaced.
Other Modifications
An FM transmitter was installed on the 110th floor in 1997. In June of 2000, structural calculations were
submitted by LERA for the WABC Control Room on floor 110. A new transmitter and ductwork were
suspended from the existing floor system at this level.
Slab openings were made in the floor slabs on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floor 77, 1979 (openings were made at nine locations in the northeast quadrant of the
building)
2. Floor 96, 1987 (opening was made near columns 901 and 902 in the southeast quadrant of the
building)
3. Floors 94 and 95, 1993 (opening was made between columns 507, 508, 607 and 608)
4. Floors 99-101, 1997 (openings were made; locations could not be determined)
5. Floor 99, 1998 (opening was made between columns 601, 602, 701, and 702 in the core on
Floor 99)
6. Floors 25 and 26, 1999 (opening was made near column 901 in the core)
7. Floors 88 and 89, 1999 (openings were made; locations could not be determined)
Openings that had been cut were subsequently closed on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floors 37 and 38, 1997 (new framing and floor deck was added near column 608)
2. Floors 95 and 96, 2000 (new beams and floor deck were added between columns 901, 902,
1001, and 1002)
Members were reinforced on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floor 96, 1993 (a number of floor trusses and their connections were reinforced in the
northeast quadrant of the building)
2. Floor 81, 1991 (two-way floor trusses were reinforced in area occupied by UPS)
Other Modifications
In 1994, the slab in the elevator lobby on floor 90 (bounded by columns 702, 703, 902, and 903) was
repaired for Fiduciary Trust for an unknown reason. The existing slab was demolished and was replaced
with a 5 in. thick lightweight aggregate concrete slab.
Members were reinforced primarily to accommodate floor loads that were greater than the loads for
which these members were originally designed. Members were reinforced on the following floors during
the following years:
1. Floor 38, 1988 (cover plates were added to existing beams along column lines 30, 35, 37 and
40)
2. Floor 24, 1989 (cover plates were added to existing beam on column line 45 and to two
adjacent beams)
3. Floor 47, 1989 (cover plates were added to existing beams on column line 25 and to the
existing girder on column line 56)
4. Floors 11 and 12, 1990 (cover plates were added to eight existing beams and girders in the
northwest corner of the building on floor 11, and to three existing beams between lines 48
and 49 and to the girder between columns 70 and 73 on floor 12)
5. Floor 19, 1991 (cover plates were added to existing beams; location could not be determined)
6. Floor 12, 1992 (cover plates were added to eleven existing beams in the northwest corner of
the building and a new beam was added between existing beams)
7. Floors 18 and 19, 1992 (cover plates were added to existing beams on lines 31, 32, and 33)
8. Floor 28, 1993 (additional shear studs were added to existing beams located in the
mechanical/electrical room)
9. Floors 7 and 8, 1993 (a new beam was added between column lines 7 and 8)
10. Floors 7-29, 1994 (cover plates were added to 22 existing beams between lines 5 and 25 on
the south side of the building and on each floor between levels 7 and 29, and to 8 existing
beams on the east side of the building between lines 31 and 37)
11. Floor 20, 1995 (cover plates were added to existing beams along lines 23 and 25, and WT
sections and cover plates were added to existing beams east of column line 19)
12. Floor 37, 1999 (a new beam was added between two existing beams along column lines 76
and 77)
13. Floor 13, 1999 (additional shear studs were added to an existing beam; location could not be
determined)
14. Floor 40, 1999 (four new beams were added near column 76, and WT sections were welded
to the bottom of two existing beams)
15. Floor 31, 2000 (cover plates were added to an existing beam between columns 77 and 80)
16. Floor 38, 2000 (cover plates were added on existing beams between columns 76 and 77 and
between columns 77 and 78, and to existing girders between columns 76 and 79, 77 and 80,
and 78 and 81)
17. Floor 39, 2000 (new beams were added between columns 76 and 77)
The floor slabs on floors 41 and 43 were completely removed on the east side of the building to
accommodate the trading floors for Salomon Brothers Inc. Also, columns 76, 78, 79, 80, and 81 were
reinforced with plates that ran from the top of the 39th floor to the underside of the 49th floor due to the
removal of the floor slab at the 39th floor. Similarly, column 74 was reinforced with plates that ran from
the top of the 43rd floor to the underside of the of the 44th floor due to the removal of the floor slab at the
43rd floor.
Other slab openings were made in the floor slabs on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floors 3 and 4, 1989 (openings were made on the 3rd floor on the west, north, and east sides
of the building; on the 4th floor, openings were made on the north side of the building)
3. Floor 11, 1990 (opening was made between columns 77, 78, 80, and 81)
4. Floor 43, 1994 (opening was made near column 71 in the core area)
Modifications were made to beam webs and flanges on the following floors during the following years:
1. Floor 28, 1993 (openings were cut in the web of an existing beam; location could not be
determined)
2. Floors 4-7, 16, 21, 29, 38, and 45, 1993 (notches were cut in the bottom flanges of various
beams, and plates were welded to the upper side of the bottom flanges)
3. Floor 1, 1998 (notch was cut into the top flange of an existing beam, and two plates were
welded under the top flange; location could not be determined)
4. Floors 36-44, 1999 (openings were cut in the web of existing beams framing into column 75
on all floor levels; the beams were reinforced with web plates and a WT section welded to its
bottom flange)
5. Floors 42 and 44, 1999 (openings were cut in the webs of numerous beams along the north
and east sides of the building)
Other Modifications
A list of structural modifications that were made to WTC 7 prior to April of 1997 is given in Chapter IV,
Section A(5) of the Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 7. The following is a summary of the
modifications that are noted in that report:
1. In the Convention Area on the 3rd floor between column numbers 45 and 48A, steel plates
were installed around the perimeter of the room between the slab and the floor surface
(behind the wall coverings and above the suspended ceiling). According to the PANYNJ
report, these plates were installed to protect attendees of the Convention Center from the
magnetic field generated from the ConEd Substation beneath the conference rooms. No
documentation was located that provides any additional details on this modification.
2. On the north side of the 5th floor generator room, masonry block walls were added to
partition the eight transformer vaults installed for Salomon Brothers. The vaults were
between columns 46 and 53. No documentation was located that provides any additional
details on this modification.
3. A penthouse was constructed on the 47th floor roof to house the chiller plant and the cooling
towers for Salomon Brothers. The chiller plant was an enclosed steel-framed structure with
corrugated steel walls. It was approximately 25 ft in height and took up about one-third of the
square footage of the 47th floor roof. The cooling towers were supported on a steel frame and
were enclosed by louvered walls on the north and south sides and by the chiller plant and the
bulkhouse on the east and west sides, respectively. No documentation was located that
provides any additional details on this modification.
The list of modifications in the PANYNJ report also include the removal of the floor slabs on floors 41
and 43 to accommodate the trading floors for Salomon Brothers, as noted above.
This report contains a summary of the maintenance and modifications that were made to the structural
systems of World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7. Documented in Chapter 2 of this report are the
guidelines that were established by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port
Authority) for inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7. Included
are the guidelines governing the inspection and strengthening of the existing structural systems for
modifications made by tenants of the buildings.
Chapter 3 of this report contains a summary of the structural inspection programs that were undertaken
during the occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7. Included are summaries of the facility condition survey reports
that were produced for WTC 1, 2, and 7. These surveys reported on the condition of the buildings,
including the structural systems, and contained recommendations for any necessary repairs or upgrading.
This chapter of the report also contains a description of the structural integrity inspection program that
was undertaken for WTC 1 and WTC 2. In addition to the structural integrity inspection programs,
significant observations, procedures for implementation, and actions taken are summarized.
The significant modifications and repairs that were made to the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7
from initial occupancy to September 11, 2001 are documented in Chapter 4 of this report. A discussion on
the repairs that were made after the February 1993 bombing of WTC 1 is also included. Other than the
repairs following the 1993 bombing of WTC 1, most of the structural modifications in WTC 1 and
WTC 2 were performed to accommodate tenant requirements. Openings were cut in existing floors to
construct new stairways linking two or more floors, and floor systems were reconstructed over previously
cut openings. In a number of cases, floor trusses outside of the core area and steel beams in the core area
had to be reinforced due to heavy loads imposed by tenant requirements.
As in WTC 1 and WTC 2, most of the structural modifications in WTC 7 were made to accommodate
tenant requirements. Horizontal members of the floor framing system were strengthened due to increased
loading from high-density files. Strengthening of these beams and girders was achieved by welding cover
plates to the bottom flanges, the underside of the top flanges, or both. In some cases new beams were
introduced to carry a portion of the new load. Floor slabs were completely removed on the east side of the
building to accommodate trading floors for Salomon Brothers Inc., one of the major tenants of the
building. Columns in this area, which had twice the unsupported length after the slab removal, were
reinforced. Other openings were cut into a few floor levels to accommodate new stairways connecting
adjoining floors. Web openings were cut through some beams and girders to allow passage of ductility
work. In some cases, the beams or girders had to be reinforced in order to increase their capacity.
The information contained in this report is based on documents and structural drawings that were
primarily acquired from the following locations: (1) the offices of the PANYNJ in Newark, New Jersey,
and New York City, New York, and (2) the National Institute of Standards and Technology in
Gaithersburg, Maryland, where Port Authority documents were sent. Paper, microfilm, and electronic
versions of these documents were obtained from these sources.
Appendixes to this report include copies of referenced documents, including the Tenant Construction
Review Manuals; the Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers; and
the Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details, which were all
issued by the Port Authority regarding inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural systems of
WTC 1, 2, and 7.
In 1971, the Port of New York Authority (PONYA or Port Authority), which was later renamed The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port Authority), established guidelines for all types
of modifications that were to be made to any of their facilities, including the World Trade Center (WTC).
As shown in Sec. 2.1 of this chapter, these guidelines evolved through the years. Standards for structural
integrity inspection and architectural and structural design guidelines and specifications were also issued
by PANYNJ and are discussed in Secs. 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. In addition, the PANYNJ
commissioned facility condition surveys at regular intervals for WTC 1, 2, and 7. These surveys reported
on the condition of the buildings, including the structural systems, and included recommendations for any
necessary repairs or upgrading. Discussion on these reports can be found in Chapter 3 of this report.
Periodic inspections of the structural systems were also performed under the Structural Integrity
Inspection (SII) Program for WTC 1 and WTC 2, the details of which can also be found in Chapter 3. The
following discussion focuses on the guidelines for inspection, repair, and modifications to the structural
systems for WTC 1, 2, and 7.
PONYA issued the first edition of the Tenant Construction Review Manual in 1971, shortly after the first
tenants occupied WTC 1 in December of 1970 and prior to initial occupancy of WTC 2 in January 1972.
Other editions of the manual followed. As stated in its Introduction, the manual was published to present
the technical criteria to be used by tenants of Port Authority facilities who were planning construction
work in such facilities. In particular, the manuals set forth the applicable standards and requirements to be
used by tenants and their agents. The manuals also included the review criteria of the design documents
that were used by the Engineering Department of the Port Authority in connection with proposed
construction or alterations. Also covered in the manuals were requirements for alterations and
modifications to architectural, structural, geotechnical, civil, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and fire
protection systems in any Port Authority facility, including the WTC.
General requirements and specifications evolved over the years. The following discussion summarizes the
structural provisions contained in the Tenant Construction Review Manual from the 1971 edition through
the 1997 edition.
General Requirements
Prior to construction, all applicants were required to submit a completed application form to PONYA that
included, among other things, the scope of work to be performed, design criteria, and plans. It was
required that design was performed by a registered architect or licensed professional engineer and that the
drawings produced by the design professionals were consistent with criteria set forth in the manual. At the
termination of construction, a complete set of as-built drawings, sealed and signed by the design
professional, was to be submitted to PONYA.
Contractors were required to comply with all applicable provisions of federal, state, municipal, local, and
departmental laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and orders, except where stricter requirements were
contained in the project specifications based on the criteria in the manual. In such cases, the latter
requirements would govern. It was also necessary for contractors to obtain PONYA permits for any
welding or hot work, in addition to being licensed by the state or municipality. Finally, contractors were
not permitted to apply for any variance, license, waiver, or permit of any kind in the name of or on behalf
of the Port Authority.
Structural Requirements
The scope of structural review of the alterations and/or modifications consisted of compliance with the
applicable codes, standards, and design criteria set forth in the Structural Requirements section of the
manual.
For work performed in New York City, the New York City (NYC) Building Code was to be used. Both
the 1938 edition and the December 6, 1968 edition were listed. Also, the laws, rules, and regulations
adopted by federal, state, and local municipal agencies were to be satisfied, where applicable.
Structural calculations were to be submitted by the registered design professional for review by PONYA.
The PONYA structural reviewer was responsible for the structural integrity of all walls and partitions.
Building frames were checked for stability and sidesway, including the effects of these on the columns.
Once the review of the superstructure was complete, the structural reviewer was to submit all applicable
materials to the Chief Structural Engineer of PONYA for review and comment.
All structural modifications were required to conform to the provisions contained in Table 2–1. This
checklist, which was utilized during the review process by PONYA, is based on the 1968 edition of the
NYC Building Code.
A comprehensive inspection program was implemented for all construction. Inspection was required
during various phases of construction, and was mainly to be performed in accordance with NYC Building
Code Section C26-106.3 (Materials, Assemblies, Forms and Methods of Construction; Inspection
1
See Appendix A for the general and structural requirements in the 1971 edition of the Tenant Construction Review Manual
(PONYA 1971).
Requirements) and Section C26-107.3 (Service Equipment; Inspection Requirements). Table 2–2 contains
a summary of these requirements as they appeared in the 1971 edition of the manual. For brevity, only
general requirements and items related to concrete and steel are contained in the table.
According to Chapter 5, Section VIII of the Tenant Construction Review Manual, tests prescribed by the
NYC Building Code were to be made under the supervision of an architect, engineer, or testing service
acceptable to the PONYA Resident Engineer. Also, inspections during the progress of work could be
performed without verification by PONYA department inspectors. The architect, engineer, or other
person who supervised the work was required to be present at final inspection by PONYA.
Table 2–1. Checklist for Structural Review in the 1971 Edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual.
Provision Code Referencea
General
Materials, Assemblies, Forms & Methods of Construction C26-106.0
General Requirements C26-106.1
Acceptance Requirements C26-106.2
Inspection Requirements C26-106.3
Plan Required C26-110.2
Structural Plans C26-110.2(b)
Loads
Dead Loads 901.0
Floor Live Loads C26-902.2 & RS9-2
Live Loads for Sidewalks, Driveways, and Railings C26-902.3
Roof Loads C26-902.6
Moving Loads C26-902.7
Partial Loading Conditions C26-902.8
Floor Live Load Reduction C26-903.2
Contributory Floor Areas C26-903.3
Wind Loads 904.0 & RS 9-5
Thermal Forces C26-905.7
Shrinkage C26-905.8
Distribution of Loads 906.0
Structural Work
General Requirements C26-1000.6
Materials and Methods of Construction C26-1000.7
Inspection of Materials and Assemblies Table 10-1
Inspection of Methods of Construction C26-1000.9
Use of Used and Unidentified Materials C26-1000.10
Equivalent Systems of Design C26-1000.1
Deferred Detailing C26-1001.4
Table 2–1. Checklist for Structural Review in the 1971 Edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual (continued).
Provision Code Referencea
Structural Work (continued)
Combination of Loads C26-1001.4
Load Tests C26-1002.4
Masonry 1003.0
Unreinforced Masonry RS 10-1
General Section 1
Definitions Section 2
Materials Section 3
Design Section 4
Lateral Support Section 5
Thickness and Height of Masonry Empirical Provisions Section 6
Bonding Section 7
Grouted and Filled Cell Masonry Section 8
Anchorage Section 9
Miscellaneous Requirements Section 10
Veneer Section 11
Miscellaneous Structures and Systems Section 12
Reinforced Masonry RS 10-2
Concrete 1004.0
Concrete Mixes C26-1004.3
Short Span Concrete Floor and Roof Construction
C26-1004.8
Supported on Steel Beams
Reinforced Concrete RS 10-3
ACI 318-63, Building Code Requirement; modified as
specified in RS 10-3
Structural Steel RS 10-5
AISC 1969 Specifications for the Design, Fabrication, and
Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings; modified as
specified in RS 10-5
Light Gauge Cold Formed Steel RS 10-6
AISI Specification or the Design of Light Gauge Cold
Formed Steel; modified as specified in RS 10-6
Open Web Steel Joists RS 10-7
1004.0, Table RS 10-8 and
Wood
RS 10-9
1007.0, Table RS 10-10
Aluminum
and RS 10-11
Glass 1011.0
Table 2–1. Checklist for Structural Review in the 1971 Edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual (continued).
Provision Code Referencea
Soil and Foundations
Depths of Foundations C26-1100.7
Foundations at Different Levels C26-1100.8
Borings C26-1101.2
Probings and Geophysical Explorations C26-1101.5
Foundation Loads 1102.0
Classification of Soil Materials C26-1103.1
Allowable Soil Bearing Pressures C26-1103.4
Bearing Capacity of Nominally Unsatisfactory Bearing
C26-1103.5
Materials
Soil Load Bearing Tests 1104.0
Footings C26-1105.2
Foundation Piers C26-1105.3
Foundation Walls C26-1105.4
Pile Foundations
Administrative Requirements C26-1106.1
Minimum Pile Penetrations C26-1106.2
Minimum Spacing of Piles C26-1106.5
Capping and Bracing of Piles C26-1106.7
General Requirements for Installation of Piles C26-1106.9
Allowable Axial Loads on Piles C26-1107.1
Allowable Lateral Load C26-1107.2
Pile Driving Operations
Equipment C26-1108.1
Procedures C26-1108.2
Pile Types
Timber Piles C26-1109.2
Precast Concrete Piles C26-1109.3
Cast-in-place Concrete Piles C26-1109.4
Compacted Concrete Piles C26-1109.5
Steel “H” Sections C26-1109.6
Concrete Filled Pipe Piles C26-1109.7
Caisson Piles C26-1109.8
Composite Piles C26-1109.9
Underpinning 1110.0
Stability 1111.0
Table 2–1. Checklist for Structural Review in the 1971 Edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual (continued).
Provision Code Referencea
Inspection
Boring Operations C26-1112.2
Piling C26-1112.3
Subgrade for Footings, Foundation Piers, and Walls C26-1112.5
Support of Adjacent Properties or Building C26-1112.6
a. 1968 NYC Building Code.
General Requirements
Except for some minor editorial changes, the general structural requirements in Section 2 of the 1979
edition of the manual were essentially the same as those outlined in the 1971 edition.
Structural Requirements
As was required in the 1971 edition of the manual, the NYC Building Code was to be used for work
performed in New York City. As before, both the 1938 edition and the December 6, 1968 edition of the
code were referenced.
Structural requirements were modified and expanded in Section 5 of the 1979 edition of the manual. A list
of notable differences between the 1971 and 1979 editions follows.
1. New Section A, Plans Notes, Schedules. This section contained the same requirements as in
the 1971 edition, except for the following:
a. Requirements for signing and sealing the structural plans and the information required on
the structural plans were directly referenced to code sections C26-110.2 and C26-
110.2(b), respectively.
b. The requirement that the structural reviewer be responsible for the structural integrity of
all walls and partitions was deleted.
c. New rules and regulations listed in Section C of the Structural chapter that were
applicable to construction in New York City were to be considered. The list is as follows:
2
See Appendix B for the general and structural requirements in the 1979 edition of the Tenant Construction Review Manual
(PANYNJ 1979).
(2) Rules and Regulations for the Design of Composite Construction with Metal Decks
or Lightweight Concrete (Building Department)
(4) Rules and Regulations Relating to the Design and Installation of Curtain Wall
Systems (Building Department)
(6) Rules and Regulations for Masonry Parapet Walls (Building Department)
(7) Rules for Arc and Gas Welding and Oxygen Cutting of Steel Covering the
Specifications for Design, Fabrication, and Inspection of Arc and Gas Welded Steel
Structures and the Qualification of Welders and Supervisors (BSA Cal. #1-38-SR)
(8) Rules for Governing the Marking of Transparent Glass Doors and Fixed Adjacent
Glass Sidelights (BSA Cal. #501-68-SR)
(9) Rules for the Manufacture, Testing, and Use of Concrete Masonry Units (BSA
Cal. #639-40-SR)
d. A new section was introduced requiring that all required schedules for structural and
foundation elements be on the plans.
2. Checklist for structural review (Section B in the 1979 manual). Some items in the checklist
were modified and some were deleted. Table 2–3 contains the items in the 1979 checklist.
References to code sections were no longer provided.
3. New Section C, Additional Port Authority Criteria. This section required that buildings
designed and/or constructed by PANYNJ that were being altered needed to be coordinated
with the particular PANYNJ facility design group, especially for foundation requirements.
3
Denotes number of the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA) document.
The revised introduction to the section on controlled inspection of materials, operations, and equipment in
the 1979 manual provided a better explanation of the relevance of this section. The purpose of this section
was to list some of the materials, operations, and equipment that normally required the services of a
licensed professional engineer in order to assure compliance with the inspection procedures contained in
106.0 and 107.0 of the 1968 NYC Building Code.
The inspection requirements for concrete and steel in the 1979 manual are essentially the same as those in
the 1971 manual, with some minor editorial changes (see Table 2–2). For concrete, an inspection
requirement for proper use of admixtures was added. For steel, the requirement for checking welders’
licenses or qualifications was dropped, as this item was covered in the new rules and regulations relating
to structural items given in Section 5 of the manual.
In lieu of the general inspection requirements related to (1) materials, assemblies, forms and methods of
construction, and (2) inspections during progress of work, and (3) final inspection, requirements were
given for structural materials and assemblies subject to and not subject to controlled inspection, which are
defined in C26-106.3 of the 1968 NYC Building Code. The checklist for items subject to controlled
inspections is given in Table 2–4. Mill, manufacturers’, and suppliers’ inspection and test reports were
accepted as evidence of compliance with the provisions of the code for all structural materials and
assemblies not subject to controlled inspection. Spray-on fireproofing was added to the list of items
requiring controlled inspection in this edition of the manual, since such inspection was added for the first
time in C26-502.2(f) of the 1968 NYC Building Code in 1976 (Local Law 55). This new paragraph
required that the installation of all sprayed-on fire protection of structural members, except those encased
in concrete, be subject to the controlled inspection requirements of C26-106.3. According to C26-106.3,
all materials designated for controlled inspection were to be inspected and/or tested to verify compliance
with code requirements. All required inspections and tests were to be made and witnessed by or under the
direct supervision of an architect or engineer who the owner retained and who was acceptable to the
architect or engineer who prepared the plans. The architect or engineer was to file with the NYC Building
Department signed copies of all inspection and test reports, together with a signed statement that the
material and its use or incorporation into the building complied with code requirements.
General Requirements
The general requirements were moved from Section 2 to Section 3 of the 1990 edition of the manual and
contained essentially the same requirements as those in previous editions. Additional requirements were
included concerning the role of consultants working on the project who are not the architect or engineer
of record. The requirement that the tenant comply with the provisions of all federal, state, municipal,
local, and departmental laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and orders was moved to a more prominent
location in this section. This requirement was in accordance with the policy of the PANYNJ at that time.
Structural Requirements
The structural requirements section was moved from Section 5 to Section 6 in the 1990 edition. As in
previous editions of the manual, the NYC Building Code was to be used for work performed in New York
City. However, unlike the previous editions, no specific editions of the code were listed.
In regard to the rules and regulations of the New York City Department of Buildings, the section title in
the 1990 edition of the manual reads as follows: “Rules and Regulations of the Department of Buildings,
such as:” This implies that the list of rules and regulations listed in the 1990 edition is not necessarily
exhaustive. As noted in the previous section, nine rules and regulations first appeared in the 1979 edition
of the manual. In the 1990 edition, only five rules are listed. The following rules and regulations, which
appeared in the 1979 edition, are not explicitly listed in the 1990 edition: (1) application of spray-on
fireproofing, (2) arc and gas welding, (3) transparent glass doors and fixed adjacent glass sidelights, and
(4) manufacture, testing, and use of concrete masonry units.
4
See Appendix C for the general and structural requirements in the March 1984, Revised March 1990 edition of the Tenant
Construction Review Manual (PANYNJ 1990). Also included is Amendment #1 to the manual, dated October 23, 1990.
A new subsection on Standards was added to the 1990 edition. The organizations whose standards are
cited are: (1) American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials and (2) American
Railway Engineering Association.
The section containing Port Authority design criteria was significantly expanded. Most notably, all
structures were required to be designed for earthquake zone 2 forces in accordance with the Building
Officials Conference of America (BOCA) code. Local laws that contained seismic provisions more
stringent than those in the BOCA code were to take precedence. Also, reference was made to American
Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) E 580, Standard Practice for Application of Ceiling Suspension
Systems for Acoustical Tile and Lay-in Panels in Areas Requiring Moderate Seismic Restraint for
lightweight ceilings to resist seismic forces.
The checklist for structural review that appeared in earlier editions of the manual (see Table 2–1 and
Table 2–3) was replaced; the 1990 edition of this list is summarized in Table 2–5.
The inspection requirements, in Section 14 of the 1990 edition of the manual, were significantly
reorganized and modified compared with those in the earlier editions of the manual. Like earlier editions
of the manual, the NYC Building Code and its referenced standards were specifically referenced for the
following requirements: (1) acceptance (approval) of materials, assemblies, forms, methods of
construction, and (2) inspection of materials, assemblies, and construction.
Requirements for approval/acceptance of materials were abstracted directly from NYC Building Code
Sections C26-106.1, 106.2, 107.1, and 107.2. No materials, assemblies, forms, method of construction,
equipment, machinery, or devices were acceptable unless approved by the Code Test Method of the
Materials and Equipment Acceptance (MEA) Division of the Office of the Commissioner of the Buildings
Department of New York City or approved by the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals
(BSA).
Controlled inspections requirements were abstracted from NYC Building Code Sections C26-106.3 and
107.3. All materials, equipment, and construction designated by the Code for controlled inspection were
required to be inspected and/or tested to verify compliance with the Code. Controlled inspection was
required to be made and witnessed by or under the direct supervision of a registered architect or
professional engineer retained by the tenant and acceptable to the architect or engineer responsible for the
plans. The inspecting design professional was to be independent of the design professional responsible for
the work. The list of items subject to controlled inspection was essentially the same as the list in the 1979
edition (see Table 2–4), with the following exceptions: (1) steel (welding, high-strength bolts, and cable
fittings) and formwork were added, (2) structural integrity during construction operations was added, and
(3) Code section numbers and references to other resource documents were added for all items. Table 2–6
contains the list as it appeared in the 1990 edition of the manual.
Table 2–5. Details of structural review in the 1990 edition of the Tenant
Construction Manual.
Provision
Design Calculations
Design criteria and applicable codes
Reference standards
Materials
Type of construction and foundation
Design loads, including wind and other existing forces
Machinery and equipment loads in excess of 1000 lbs., including an evaluation of any potential vibration
Allowable soil bearing capacity
Design analysis and drawings of all connections other than AISC standard framed or seated beam connections
Analysis and sketches of expansion joints
Design of bracing systems and rigid joints
Wind drift and deflections
Ponding
Computer printouts and users’ manuals
Investigation of superimposed loads from adjacent construction on structure and foundation
Investigation of existing structural system and foundation under additional loads due to alterations
Where it has been established that post-construction settlements of foundations are to be monitored, the
monitoring program, the limits of such settlement that the structure can tolerate, and the necessary adjustments
shall be submitted for review
Drawings
Design code and reference standards
Materials
Design live loads, wind, and other forces
Machinery and equipment loads in excess of 1000 lbs., including footprints or support layout(s) plus technical
details of vibration isolators
Allowable soil bearing capacity
Pile type, capacity, and minimum tip elevation
Column schedule showing accumulated design load at each level for dead and live loads
Stress diagram(s) for trusses
Datum and ground water elevations
Typical moment connection details
Details of non-standard connections
Lists of materials subject to controlled inspection
Construction sequence
Specifications
Shall clearly define the scope of work and materials required for the contract
Shall include limitations, restrictions, or conditions due to existing environs and/or requirements for the
methods of construction or staging
Table 2–6. Checklist for items subject to controlled inspection in the 1990 edition of the
Tenant Construction Manual.
Item Code Section or Resource Document
Borings or Test Pits C26-1112.2
Piles C26-1112.3
Soil –
Subgrade for foundation C26-1112.5
Controlled Fill –
Underpinning C26-1112.6
Concrete Tables 10-1 and 10-2
Prestressed concrete –
Precast concrete –
Formwork C26-1904.3(b)
Steel – welding, high strength Table 10-2
bolts, and cable fittings
Aluminum – welding Table 10-2
Laminated wood Table 10-2
Firestops C26-504.7(g)
Spray-on fireproofing C26-502.2(f)
Heating systems C26-1401.1(a) and 1401.2(b)
Ventilation System C26-1301.2 and 1301.3
Refrigeration System C26-1301.4
High Pressure System –
Chimney Smoke Vent C26-1501.1(e) and 1504.1(b)
Exterior walls C26-150.1
Structural integrity during Department of Buildings, Rules
construction operations
General Requirements
The general requirements are essentially the same as those in previous editions of the manual.
Structural Requirements
The most notable change was made to the Port Authority design criteria section. The NYC Building Code
was mandated to be used for earthquake design, subject to the modifications contained in Attachment S3.
The modifications contained in this section pertain to Table 23-P, Horizontal Force Factor Cp of
referenced standard RS 9-6, Earthquake Loads. The manual added horizontal force factors for overhead
5
See Appendix D for the general and structural requirements in the March 1997 edition of the Tenant Construction Review
Manual (PANYNJ 1997).
signs, anchorage for suspended ceilings weighing more than 4 psf without the weight of light fixtures,
elevator and counterweight guardrails and supports, sprinkler piping, gas and high hazard piping, other
piping, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts, along with new notes pertaining to
sprinkler piping, other piping, and HVAC ducts. These requirements, which were originally outlined in a
Port Authority Memorandum6 and which were included with other such requirements in the document
Port Authority Standards Exceeding Code – Quality Assurance dated April 26, 1999 (PANYNJ 1999),
were added to the manual to ensure that potential overhead hazards would not fall on building occupants
during a seismic event.
The details of structural review in the 1997 edition were the same as those in the 1990 edition (see
Table 2–5), except that the list of materials subject to controlled inspections was deleted.
Some additions and modifications were made to the inspection requirements in the 1990 edition of the
manual. The checklist for items subject to controlled inspection was also updated to include the updated
NYC Building Code section numbers (see Table 2–7).
2.2.1 Overview
In March of 1986, the Infrastructure Engineering Design Division of the Engineering Department of
PANYNJ issued the Standards for Structural Integrity Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers A &
B (PANYNJ 1986).7 These standards were to assist the PANYNJ in the evaluation of the structural
integrity of WTC 1 and WTC 2 and were designed to anticipate structural degradation. If such
degradation were to occur, the standards also contained provisions for repair.
Three methods were used to evaluate the structural integrity of the towers: (1) statistical inspections,
(2) reports, and (3) continued measurements. In the first method, qualified outside consultants under
PANYNJ management were to perform periodic visual inspection of selected structural components in
“higher-potential trouble areas.” It was anticipated that PANYNJ in-house personnel would be able to
perform such inspections in the future. The periodic inspections were to be supplemented by occasional
visual inspections when the structure was exposed during tenant remodeling or general maintenance
work.
In the second method, the evaluation would be based on problems identified in various reports. These
reports may include maintenance reports of non-structural repairs, water leakage, and tenant complaints
about unusual building movements, vibration, or noise.
6
PANYNJ Memorandum dated August 8, 1995 from Oscar Suros, Manager of the Engineering Department Quality Assurance
Division to Eugene J. Fasullo, Director and Chief Engineer (see Appendix G of this report).
7
See Appendix E for the complete document.
In the third method, the evaluation would be based on measurements of building movements or
deformation using appropriate tests and instruments. Measurements were to be performed on individual
components in the towers as well as on the entire towers themselves.
The periodic inspection program outlined in PANYNJ (1986) is adapted from “Standards for In-depth
Structural Integrity Inspection of Buildings,” which was issued by the Engineering Department of
PANYNJ in October of 1984 and which was relevant to any building owned and operated by the
PANYNJ. The other sections in PANYNJ (1986) pertain exclusively to WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Table 2–7. Checklist for items subject to controlled inspection in the 1997
edition of the Tenant Construction Manual.
Item Code Section or Resource Document
Borings or Test Pits 27-720
Piles 27-721
Subgrade for foundation 27-723
Controlled Fill 27-679(a)
Underpinning 27-724
Concrete Tables 10-1 and 10-2
Formwork 27-1035(b)
Steel – welding, high strength Table 10-2
bolts, and cable fittings
Aluminum – welding Table 10-2
Laminated wood Table 10-2
Firestopping 27-345(h)
Masonry Table 10-2
Exterior Wall Insulation and 27-335.1(c)13
Finish Systems
Spray-on fireproofing 27-324(f)
Heating and combustion 27-793(a), 27-794(b)
equipment
Ventilation System 27-779, 27-780
Refrigeration System 27-781
High Pressure System Department of Buildings, Rules Section 20-
02(b)(2)(i)
Welding of gas distribution RS-16, P115.8(h)
piping
Chimney Smoke Vent 27-856(e), 27-879(b)
Curtain/Panel Wall Rules of the City of New York, Title 1,
Department of Buildings, Chapter 32
Structural integrity during Rules of the City of New York, Title 1,
construction operations Department of Buildings, Chapter 16
Visual Inspections
The PANYNJ recognized that the visual inspection of the entire structure, or even a major portion of it, in
WTC 1 or WTC 2 was not practical, as stated in PANYNJ (1986). Thus, a statistical inspection program
was implemented. This approach involved sampling those components and systems that were important
to structural integrity at locations with “a relatively higher potential for occurrence of defects or
problems.”
The inspection team was required to carry with them the following items: (1) a set of reduced drawings of
the building(s), (2) field notebooks, (3) a camera, and (4) a tape recorder. Equipment, clothing, methods,
and procedures were to conform strictly to PANYNJ safety regulations and to any applicable federal,
state, or local regulations.
Visual inspection was to be supplemented by the use of simple hand tools, measurements, and recording
techniques, as required. Loose, cracked, or rust-stained spray-on fireproofing and concrete or masonry
encasement covering structural steel members and connections was to be removed prior to examining the
steel. After inspection, any removed fire proofing was required to be properly replaced. Also, where it
was necessary to drill a hole through a structural steel element to provide access for a borescope or any
other device for inspection, the access hole was to be sealed with weld metal, body putty, or caulking, as
appropriate.
Periodic inspection in WTC 1 and WTC 2 was to be performed by PANYNJ or its consultants on the
following components at various time intervals, as noted below:
This program, the details of which are given in Appendix A of PANYNJ (1986), consisted of
four parts: (a) inspection of the structural steel elements in the antenna, (b) inspection of the
high tensile bolts and studs, (c) inspection of the weatherproof enclosure, and (4) inspection
of the radomes. Inspection of these components was to be performed on a “continuing basis,”
as weather and operational restrictions permitted. A complete inspection of the mast structure
within the weatherproof enclosure was to be performed at least once a year; the other
components were to be inspected at least once every 3 years.
The elements of the inspection program for the antenna mast, the high tensile bolts and studs,
the weatherproof enclosure, and the radomes are given in Chapters II, III, IV, and V,
respectively, of Appendix A (see Appendix E of this report).
Every year, the exterior roof and wall elements were to be inspected for signs of water
intrusion. Roof leakage was to be ascertained from an examination of the spaces immediately
below the roof areas. Wall leakage was to be determined from signs of water staining of
interior finishes.
3. Room occupancies.
An inspection of room occupancies and uses throughout both towers was to be performed on
an annual basis to verify that design live load was not exceeded. A schedule of allowable live
loads was to be maintained and updated as structural modifications were made. According to
PANYNJ (1986), no such schedule existed at that time.
Every second year, accessible columns were to be inspected for bowing or deviation from
plumb. Also, fireproofing was to be examined for signs of rust or cracking. Inspection for
lateral displacement or rotation of columns in elevator shafts where the columns were braced
on only one axis by connecting beams or concrete slabs was required. The location of these
columns is given in Appendix C of PANYNJ (1986).
At Sublevel 5, the slabs on ground surrounding each column were to be examined for signs of
rust or deformation.
Fireproofing and masonry partitions enclosing the diagonal bracing on exterior column lines
in both towers below the Service Level Floor and the transfer trusses below floor 1 in WTC 2
under exterior and core columns were to be inspected every second year for cracking, stains,
and other possible signs of structural distress.
Every second year, the hat truss members between floor 107 and the roof in the core area
were to be inspected. Locations of these members are given in Appendix C of PANYNJ
(1986).
Exterior box columns and spandrel plates under column trees below floor 7 were to be
inspected every fourth year. Exterior aluminum covers and spray-on fireproofing were to be
removed to gain access to the exterior surfaces of the box columns and spandrel plates. Both
the columns and plates were to be visually inspected for bowing or distortion, cracking, and
corrosion. Visual inspection was also required for accessible welds. Ultrasonic testing of full
or partial penetration welds and adjacent base metal was to be performed where base metal
thickness exceeded 1.5 in.
The interior of the box columns was to be examined by a borescope for the presence of water
and the existence of rust on the interior plate surface. This was to be accomplished by drilling
an access hole in the column or the spandrel plate at the locations noted in PANYNJ (1986).
The “tree” junction where the three superstructure columns merged was also to be inspected.
The top surface of the horizontal diaphragm plate that capped the tapered box column just
below the point where the three separate columns merged was to be examined, as was the
exterior column plate between this location and the column splice at elevation +372 ft 4 in.
Every fourth year, the steel floor framing over mechanical spaces and other areas without
suspended ceilings was to be inspected. No other details are given in the document.
Concrete slabs, partitions, and finishes were to be inspected every fourth year for signs of
distress, which could indicate excessive structural deformation.
Occasional inspections were also to be made of the structural steel framing, connections, and the concrete
slabs when general repairs or remodeling was done that involved removing ceilings, partitions, finishes,
or other coverings. In particular, the top of the concrete slab was to be examined for cracking, spalling,
and exposed or corroded top reinforcement. Where reinforcing bars were corroded and where concrete
had spalled, repairs were to be made as tenant relocation permitted.
General maintenance reports and complaints from tenants were to be used to search for possible problems
related to underlying structural defects. Water damage caused by leaks at the roof level or at the exterior
walls, broken plumbing, and cracks in partitions or the concrete floor slab were to be reviewed to
determine whether such events were caused by structural deformations. Records were to be kept of tenant
complaints of building sway, floor vibration, sagging ceilings, unusual noise, and other items. Visual
inspection of the appropriate area of the building was to be performed where a reasonable assessment of
the data in the reports or logs was tied to a specific structural element or system. Reports and log data
were to be correlated with testing and measurements described in Section B of Chapter IV in PANYNJ
(1986), which is discussed in the next section of this report.
Periodic Measurements
Periodic measurements of various types of deformation and vibration were to be made for the purposes of
monitoring changes in certain important characteristics of the buildings. Adverse changes in such
measurements were assumed to reflect possible structural deterioration.
The accelerometers in WTC 2, along with those already installed in WTC 1, were to be used
to measure natural frequencies of the towers on a monthly basis. Wind speed and direction
were also to be recorded at that time.
Accelerometers and amplifiers were to be installed within the heated enclosure of the TV
mast on the top of WTC 1 at a level of about two-thirds of the height of the mast above its
base. One accelerometer was to be oriented to measure N-S displacements, and one was to be
oriented to measure E-W displacements. Displacement measurements, as well as wind speed
and direction, were to be recorded once a month.
The natural frequency of the floor construction was to be measured when floor space had
been emptied due to tenant change or remodeling. Figure 2 in Appendix C of PANYNJ
(1986) shows the three zones outside of the core area on a typical floor (see Appendix E of
this report): (1) corner zone (two-way floor trusses), (2) short-span zone (short-span floor
trusses), and (3) long-span zone (long-span floor trusses).
In each tower, Mechanical floors 7, 41, and 75, and Tenant floors 9, 43, and 77, directly
above the Mechanical Floors, were not included in the floor frequency measurement
program, because they were framed with wide-flange steel beams and not trusses. However,
these floors were to be inspected visually. It was also noted that Telephone Equipment Floors
10 through 13 in WTC 2, which were framed with floor trusses similar to typical tenant floors
but were more heavily loaded than such floors, would have different dynamic characteristics
in the three zones than would the corresponding zones in the tenant floors.
The natural frequency and damping values of the floor structure within a zone was to be
measured by performing a “heel drop” test. In such tests, vibrations induced in the floor
structure by a vertical impact are recorded using an accelerometer attached to the floor.
Measurements were taken for an impact load of 100 lbs dropped from approximately 6 in.
above the floor slab on to a 1 in. thick neoprene pad.
4. Viscoelastic dampers.
It was noted in PANYNJ (1986) that the testing program for the viscoelastic dampers should
continue. This program consisted of continuously measuring and recording the movements of
WTC 1 that were 3 in. or more. Wind speed and direction were also to be measured. It was
anticipated that such measurements would continue until the end of 1985 or longer,
depending on available funds.
Twelve viscoelastic damping units (four units from each of three floors) were to be removed
from WTC 1 annually and were to be tested by the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company, who were the manufacturers of the damping units. Temperature effects and shear
strength were to be tested. See Chapter 3 of this report and the report titled Design and
Construction of Structural Systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (NIST Special Publication 1000-6A)
for more information on these tests.
A log of tenant complaints on noise and building sway was to be maintained on a continuous
basis.
Building plumbness and floor level checks were to be performed semiannually for each
tower, preferably in the early morning hours in August when wind velocity was low and
outside air temperatures were moderate.
Building plumbness was to be determined by measuring the offsets from a vertical laser
beam, which was to be projected up from the bottom of freight elevator shaft 50, to the shaft
walls. Offset measurements were to be taken at 20-story intervals.
A list of duties, responsibilities, and minimum qualifications of the inspection supervisor, inspection crew
leader, and inspection crew members from the PANYNJ is given in Chapter V of PANYNJ (1986).
The Supervisor of the Structural Integrity Inspection of the Buildings, who reported to the Engineer of
Design, Infrastructure, was responsible for planning and directing the inspection, as well as preparing the
inspection report. The Supervisor was required to have the following minimum qualifications:
• Five years of experience in responsible charge in structural design of buildings and 5 years
experience in responsible charge in inspection of building construction, inspection of existing
buildings, or maintenance of building structures.
The Supervisor did not have to conduct the inspection nor be present at the site at all times during the
inspection. Rather, the Supervisor was to be familiar with the scope of the project and was expected to
provide leadership and guidance. That person was also responsible for setting up and supervising any
required training programs for inspection team members.
In addition to the general qualifications listed below for team members, crew leaders of the Inspection
Team were required to have three years experience in responsible charge in inspection of building
construction, inspection of existing buildings, or maintenance of building structures.
Field inspection crew members were expected to perform the required inspections without continuous
supervision after initially receiving “moderate” guidance from the crew leader. The following
qualifications were listed:
• Common sense
• Strong motivation and persistence in carrying out any necessary follow-up procedures
• Be able to climb steel and function comfortably at great heights and in difficult positions;
• Be a high school graduate or equivalent, with commensurate reading, verbal, and written
communication skills;
• Have a working knowledge of the use of measuring devices, such as rulers, tapes, gauges,
protractors, and calipers; and
PANYNJ (1986) also states that it was desirable, but not mandatory, that inspectors have some prior
experience in related work, such as high steel construction, structural maintenance or inspection, or
surveying.
This section contains the requirements for outside consulting firms hired by the PANYNJ to perform
periodic visual inspections or to accomplish tasks requiring special skills. The consulting firm was to
assign a Supervisor who was a Professional Engineer licensed in New York or New Jersey and who
possessed at least 5 years of experience in the design and field supervision of projects of comparable size
and complexity. Field inspectors from the consulting firm were to have as a minimum the qualifications
that were required for in-house inspectors, as outlined in Sec. 2.2.3 of this report.
The consulting firm was required to submit to the PANYNJ a list and description of comparable projects
that were previously undertaken, and a list of the personnel, along with their qualifications and
experience, who would be assigned to the inspection project.
Chapter VII of PANYNJ (1986) lists the defects and signs of distress that were to be noted and recorded
during inspection of the structural steel and the reinforced concrete. A summary is provided in Table 2–8.
Table 2–8. Defects and signs of distress to be recorded during inspection of WTC 1
and WTC 2.
Defect/Sign
Material of Distress Description
Structural Steel Rust Rust was to be classified as follows:
• Light – light, loose formation pitting the paint surface
• Moderate – a looser formation with scales or flakes that have
formed
• Severe – heavy, stratified rust or scale with pitting of the metal
surface.
Net metal thickness and size of penetration, if any, was to be
measured where pitting had occurred.
Cracks Cracks were to be classified as follows:
• Fine
• Medium
• Open
The length, size, and location of any crack were to be recorded. Any
crack was deemed to be potentially serious, and was required to be
reported immediately.
Buckles and The type, location, and extent, and amount of deformation were to be
kinks recorded.
Connection Fine cracks in the paint at joints were deemed an indication of large
and joint strains due to stress concentrations. Records were to be made of the
following:
• Sheared, missing, deformed, or loose bolts
• Gusset plate deformations
• Cracks in welds or in adjacent base metal
Alignment, Records were to be made of any floor truss, beam, or column that
excessive was misaligned, deflected, or bowing.
deflection,
or bowing
Paint Paint was to be examined for cracking, chipping, rust pitting, and
chalking.
Reinforced Concretea Scaling Scaling was to be classified as light, medium, heavy, or severe.
Records were to be made of the depth, extent, and location of the
scaling.
Cracking Cracks were to be classified as follows:
• Partial or through the member
• Direction relative to framing or column lines
• Horizontal, vertical, or diagonal
• D-, map, or random
Records were to be made of the location, width, depth, and length of
the cracking.
Spalling Spalls were to be classified as small, large, hollow area, joint spall,
pop-out, or mudball.
Records were to be made of the depth, size or extent, and location of
the spalling.
a. Definitions of the defects and classifications as to degree of severity are referenced for reinforced concrete in the PANYNJ
document Standards for In-depth Structural Integrity Inspection of Buildings, October 1984.
Source: PANYNJ 1986.
Inspection Records
• Description label – column, beam, floor truss, viscoelastic damper, slab, etc.
The inspection record should include the description of the defect or distress. Measurements, sketches,
and photographs were to be included in the record in those cases where a written description was not
adequate. A tape recorder may also be used in addition to the written record.
If the Supervisor or the inspection team uncovered defects or indications of distress that appeared to
require more than routine attention, a separate report of such findings was to be submitted to the Engineer
of Design was to be immediately notified in person.
Three categories of urgency were established for repairs. Repairs falling into the “immediate” category
included possible closure of the area and/or structure affected until interim remedial action (such as
shoring or removal of a potentially unsafe element or structure) could be implemented. Such action was to
be undertaken immediately after discovery, and a description of the action taken and recommendations
for permanent repair were to be included in the inspection report.
The “priority” category was for those conditions where no immediate action was required, or for which
immediate action had been completed, but for which further investigation, design, and implementation of
interim or long-term repairs should be undertaken on a priority basis (i.e., taking precedence over all other
scheduled work).
Repairs falling into the “routine” or “non-priority” category could be undertaken as part of a scheduled
major work program or other scheduled project, or when routine facility maintenance was to be
performed, depending on the type of repair that was required.
The measurements and test records section of PANYNJ (1986) outlines the various measurements and
test data that were to be recorded during the inspection process for the items listed in Sec. 2.2.2 of this
report. Also given are the criteria that determine whether a possible problem may exist, based on the
recorded measurements.
In the last chapter of PANYNJ (1986) it was noted that the standards for structural inspection were
applicable to only structural steel and reinforced concrete members in WTC 1 and WTC 2. Glass and
glazing, facade panels, ceilings, partitions, elevators, stairs, and mechanical equipment were listed as
components outside the scope of the document.
The document entitled Architectural and Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications and Standard
Details was issued on February 27, 1998 by PANYNJ and contained architectural and structural design
requirements for tenant alterations that were to be made specifically at WTC 1 and WTC 2
(PANYNJ 1998).8 The following discussion focuses on the structural requirements contained in this
document.
General
Prior to any design work, the tenant’s consultants were required to perform a field inspection of all areas
that would be affected by the alterations so that the latest information was available for all structural
elements, including, but not limited to truss reinforcement, stair openings in slabs, and core-hole
locations.
The tenant’s consultants were required to submit calculations and construction drawings to PANYNJ for
review and approval. All construction documents were required to be signed and sealed by a professional
engineer or registered architect licensed to practice in the state of New York.
For tenant alteration project, proposed floor loads were to be compared with the allowable design loads
contained in Drawing STR-01 (see Appendix E). If the proposed floor loads would overstress the existing
structural members, the floor system was allowed to be reinforced to carry the additional loads.
Calculations to compare the proposed loading with the allowable loads were required to conform to the
latest edition of the NYC Building Code. Both allowable stress design and load-and-resistance-factor
design were acceptable design methods.
The document recognized that portions of the corner floor areas would be able to carry greater loads than
those shown in Drawing STR-01, due to the existing two-way truss system. Higher loads were allowed in
8
This document is contained in Appendix F of this report.
non-critical corner areas if it could be shown by analysis that such loads could be safely carried by the
floor system.
The document required to show and locate on the construction drawings the weight of any equipment or
cluster of equipment exceeding 500 lb and all files and shelves. In the latter case, a legend was to be
shown on the drawings to indicate each type of file or shelving unit and the size and number of tiers for
files and the height for shelves. Examples that show such weights on the construction documents can be
found in Chapter 4 of this report.
Minimum loads to be used in the calculations were also specified. These loads are summarized in
Table 2–9.
Table 2–9. Minimum loads specified for tenant alterations in PANYNJ Architectural and
Structural Design Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details.
Item or Use Minimum Load
File cabinets 33 psf per tier, including the weight of the cabinet
Open shelves for paper storage 46 pcf of the net volume plus the weight of the
shelves
Mechanized file storage Use manufacturer’s indicated fully loaded weight,
or the net weight of the storage unit plus 46 pcf
for contents
Libraries Aisle loading for aisle 30 psf
width less than or
equal to 30 in.
Aisle loading for aisle 60 psf
width greater than
30 in.
Reading areas 60 psf
Open shelves 46 pcf of the net volume plus the weight of the
shelves
File rooms aisle Aisle width less than 30 psf
loading or equal to 30 in.
Aisle width greater 50 psf
than 30 in.
All proposed penetrations or drilling of cores in tower slabs were required to meet the criteria for location,
spacing, and repair as specified in Drawings STR-02 through STR-08 (see Appendix F), and the section
titled Structural Design Specifications, which is discussed below. As shown in the figures, there were
some areas that were denoted as “prohibited” where no penetrations or cores were allowed, and there
were some areas denoted as “restricted” where it was advisable not to locate penetrations or cores.
Hung Ceilings
For ceilings in the two-way truss areas of the towers, the size of the carrying channels and caddy clips
were required to be larger than those required by the NYC Building Code, due to the long spans between
the trusses. The details in Drawings STR-09 through STR-14 (see Appendix F) were required to be
provided on the construction drawings.
HVAC Equipment
The weight, dimensions, and location of all HVAC equipment were required on the drawings, including
whether such units were floor mounted or hung from the framing above. Details for hanging ducts are in
drawings HVAC-21 through HVAC-28. Calculations were required for all floor-mounted units showing
that the existing framing would not be overstressed due to the weight of the equipment.
Walls
For walls over an opening, such as a door or other non-supportive materials, a lintel was required, or the
wall was allowed to be suspended by studs from the framing above. In such cases, all connections were to
be adequately designed for the loads.
Existing Steel
Holes were not allowed to be made in existing steel (beams, floor trusses, and columns) for hanging
purposes, and welds were not allowed to be made to the trusses. Clamps approved by either the MEA
Division of the Office of the Commissioner of the Buildings Department of New York City or by the
New York City BSA were allowed.
The specifications given in the section on coring criteria were meant to supplement those given in the
guidelines section, and were applicable to only those holes cored into the power/telephone cells and under
induction units and only in the following typical tenant floors: (1) in WTC 1: floors 10 to 40, 45 to 74,
and 78 to 105, and (2) in WTC 2: floors 14 to 40, 45 to 74, and 78 to 106.
The maximum core size allowed was 4 in. in diameter. The minimum average center-to-center spacing
along a power/telephone cell for any 4 consecutive cored holes (including abandoned and filled holes)
was 1 ft 4 in. Spacing criteria along power/telephone cells adjacent to holes offset from cells was
provided in Drawing STR-05 (see Appendix F).
This section recommended avoiding cutting No. 4, No. 5, and No. 6 reinforcing bars in restricted zones. If
such bars were to be cut, the bar repair details in Drawings STR-06 through STR-08 were to be followed
(see Appendix F). As noted previously, coring was not allowed in prohibited zones, except within the
induction units at the power/telephone cells only, which was considered a restricted area.
Rust, grease, and other contaminants were to be removed from structural steel and reinforcing bars prior
to welding. All welders were to be qualified in accordance with the NYC Building Code and with other
applicable laws and requirements.
This section required that all work conform to the latest edition of the NYC Building Code, including any
revisions. Provisions in the latest editions of the following codes took precedence over those in the NYC
Building Code whenever they were more stringent:
• American Institute of Steel Construction, Specification for the Design, Fabrication and
Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings. Supplement 1 is specifically excluded.
• American Concrete Institute, Standard Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete,
ACI 318.
• American Welding Society (AWS), Structural Welding Code – Structural Steel (AWS D1.1)
and Reinforcing Steel (AWS D1.4).
Any steel plates that were added to reinforce existing framing or for other reasons were required to
conform to ASTM A36, and any reinforcing bars that were added were required to conform to
ASTM A 615 Grade 60.
Welding materials for structural steel and reinforcing steel were required to be E7018 conforming to
AWS A5.1 Specifications for Covered Carbon Steel Arc Welding Electrodes. Specifications for non-
shrink grout were also specified.
Specific proprietary concrete anchors were specified for any connections made to concrete. Other
requirements were given for the type and sizes for clip angles, hangers, channels, and clamps. The
contractor was to keep removal of fireproofing to a minimum and was to replaced removed fireproofing
as “directed” by the Port Authority.
2.4 REFERENCES
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1979. Tenant Construction Review
Manual. (WTCI-134-P).
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1986. Standards for Structural Integrity
Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers A & B. Infrastructure Engineering Design Division,
Engineering Department, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. (part of WTCI-66-P).
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1990. Tenant Construction Review
Manual. Engineering Quality Assurance Division, Engineering Department, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey. (WTCI-132-P).
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1997. Tenant Construction Review
Manual. Engineering Quality Assurance Division, Engineering Department, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey. (WTCI-131-P).
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1998. Architectural and Structural Design
Guidelines, Specifications, and Standard Details – Architectural, Structural. February.
(WTCI-125-P).
PANYNJ (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1999. Port Authority Standards Exceeding
Code – Quality Assurance. April. (WTCI-163-P).
PONYA (The Port of New York Authority). 1971. Tenant Construction Review. (WTCI-135-P).
The following facility condition survey reports, which include summaries on the condition of the
structural systems in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7, were issued from 1990 to 2000 and are
presented in chronological order.
This section contains the findings of the condition survey of WTC 2 (Tower B), which was performed by
the Engineering Quality Assurance Division (EQAD) of PANYNJ in 1990 (PANYNJ 1990).
Scope
The scope of the survey was based on recommendations made in Standards for Structural Integrity
Inspection of World Trade Center Towers A & B (PANYNJ 1986). This document contains the minimum
requirements of the periodic and occasional inspection programs that were to be implemented for WTC 1
and WTC 2. See Sec. 2.2 of this report for details on this document.
According to the facility condition survey report, the scope of work was designed to minimize impact on
tenant and facility operations. Upon determination of minimum sampling sizes and inspection methods,
EQAD performed a condition survey of structural and architectural elements. The following is a list of the
structural elements that were inspected:
• Core columns (including column splices and lateral bracing below the 7th floor; this part of
the condition survey was primarily performed by the consulting firm Corddry, Carpenter,
Dietz and Zack)
• Space frame (i.e., hat truss, including framing members and connections)
• Floor systems (including floor slabs and decks, trusses, rolled beams, bridging, and
connections)
To assess the condition of the structural system in the tower, EQAD performed both visual inspection and
nondestructive testing methods. The thickness of steel members was checked using an ultrasonic
thickness gauge. Fillet welds were tested for cracks and discontinuities using magnetic particle or dye
penetration test methods, and groove welds were tested using the ultrasonic method.
The EQAD selected 30 office floors throughout the tower for inspection: 17, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34,
36, 37, 44, 45, 50, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 74, 77, 82, 83, 90, 91, 92, 98, 100, 101, and 107. The following
steps were taken when inspecting the structural elements at these levels:
1. Walk-through inspection with tenant representatives was performed to assess floor layout,
determine operational areas that were important to the tenant, and select inspection locations.
2. A ceiling tile removal location plan was prepared for concealed spline ceilings.
3. Ceiling tiles were removed (performed by World Trade Department’s structural contractor).
4. Floor framing and steel decking, inside faces of steel spandrel plates, spandrel splices, ceiling
components, utility supports, and window seals were visually inspected. Structural steel
members covered with fireproofing were examined for signs of deformation or corrosion.
5. Approximately seven floor framing locations were selected for fireproofing removal and a
removal location plan was prepared. In order to inspect column splices, two exterior columns
were selected for plaster removal, both above and below the splice.
7. An up-close inspection of exposed floor framing and column splices was performed for signs
of cracking, deformation, or corrosion. Scrapers, wire brushes, and mirrors were used to
accomplish this task.
8. Nondestructive testing was performed on column splice welds and welded floor framing
connections (performed by the Materials and Research Division of PANYNJ, as directed by
the Quality Assurance Division of PANYNJ).
9. Fireproofing and ceiling tiles were replaced, and plaster openings were repaired (performed
by World Trade Department’s structural contractor).
Table 3–1 contains the percentage of structural elements inspected per office floor and for the entire
tower.
Table 3–1. Percentage of structural elements inspected per office floor and for the entire
tower per the 1990 Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 2.
Percentage per Percentage
Element Type of Inspection Floor Total Tower
Floor framing trusses Visual 10 3
Fireproofing removal 4 1
Nondestructive testing 2 0.5
Exterior column spandrel Visual 8 3
plate splices Fireproofing removal 3 1
Exterior column splices Visual and nondestructive
8 2
testing
All four two-story MERs were visually inspected from the lower floor, which included inspection of floor
framing and slab, interior columns, utility hangers and pads, and exterior setbacks. Concrete fireproofing
for covering the steel floor framing was examined for delaminations and underlying corrosion.
Inspection of the space frame (hat truss) coincided with the 108th floor MER inspection. Fireproofing was
removed from structural steel members and connections at several locations.
Core Columns
Core columns were inspected from the elevator shafts. This included visual inspection of (1) floor
framing, columns, connections, and splices in 25 elevator shafts with fireproofing in place,
(2) 10 eccentrically-braced column connections with fireproofing removed, and (3) 15 column splices
with fireproofing removed.
Also, the core column lateral bracing at the first six floors was examined at two connection locations by
removing the gypsum board firewall from the floor side. Nondestructive testing was also performed at
some of the column splices.
Roof
The roof and appurtenant structures along with the Observation Deck were visually inspected. The roof
framing and underside of the concrete roof slab were visually inspected from the 110th floor, and the top
surface of the concrete roof slab and the roof parapet were visually inspected at random locations.
Findings of Inspection
The following sections summarize the findings and recommendations from the 1990 survey report.
Inspection of the exterior walls was made from inside the building. Inspection locations are indicated in
Fig. 3–1, which is Drawing 5 from the report (PANYNJ 1990).
Chapter 3
NIST NCSTAR 1-1C, WTC Investigation
Source: PANYNJ 1990. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 3–1. Typical inspection locations of exterior wall per 1990 Condition Survey Report of WTC 2.
Structural Insp. Prog. During the Occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7
Floors 9 through 106—The exterior columns and spandrels were inspected on 30 floors at three areas of
the wall panel: (1) column field splice connections, (2) spandrel field splice connections, and (3) inside
spandrel plate face at the column/floor truss seat connections. Details of the splices at these locations are
provided in Drawing 4 in the report, which is reproduced here in Fig. 3–2.
According to the report, exterior column splices were found to be in good condition.1 A total of 59
splices were inspected throughout 30 floors. At 49 of these locations, nondestructive testing was
performed on the plate splice welds (see Sections a–a and b–b in Fig. 3–2 for location of welds), and
ultrasonic testing was performed to verify plate thickness. Bolt tightness was also checked, and no loose
bolts were found. However, on floors 74 and 77 (above and below an MER floor), the column splices had
only three bolts, although the design detail called for four. According to the report, since the column
splices at MER floors are groove welded, the missing bolts have no structural significance.
The inside faces of the steel box column plates were found to have scattered areas of light corrosion and
peeling paint, as did splice bolts, welds, cap and base plates, and column stiffeners. Ultrasonic thickness
testing on these outer column plates above and below the splice location indicated no section loss.
Fillet shop welds connecting the cap and base plates to the interior of the box columns were visually
inspected at all open splice locations, and most of the welds were tested using the magnetic particle
method. No cracking or significant discontinuities were detected at any location. According to the
report, overlaps and undercuts were observed at several locations, but they were not significant enough to
affect the performance of the connection.
Groove weld splices were tested on the 74th floor using the dye penetrant method and on the 77th floor
using the magnetic particle method. No discontinuities or cracks were detected.
Spandrel plates, splice plates, and spandrel bolted connections were also found to be in good condition.
Scattered rust stains were observed on the spandrel fireproofing, typically at the splice plates. All splice
plate bolts were observed to be tight. Fillet welds at the truss seat connections to the spandrels were also
found to be in good condition.
Floors 107 through 110—Inspection was limited to the joints at the 108th floor. No structurally
significant deterioration was found.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. It was
recommended, however, that a long-term maintenance program be developed and implemented to clean
and paint the inside surfaces of the exterior box columns to prevent further corrosion of the structural
steel.
1
In this report, a structural member that receives a “good” condition rating requires no repairs. The structural member is
defined to be in “original condition” (see page 11 of PANYNJ (1990) for this and other definitions).
Source: PANYNJ 1990. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 3–2. Splice details at typical inspection locations of exterior wall per the 1990
Condition Survey Report of WTC 2.
Core Columns
Inspection of the core columns was performed in two phases. In one phase, staff from the consulting firm
of Corddry, Carpenter, Dietz and Zack inspected core columns from the elevator shafts. In the other
phase, PANYNJ Quality Assurance Division staff inspected selected core corner columns from office
area floors. They also inspected lateral core bracing at two locations from an elevator lobby on the
4th floor.
Core columns inspected from elevator shafts—The consultant randomly selected a total of 25 elevator
shafts for inspection. Table B1 in the survey report contains a list of the elevator shafts that were visually
inspected. Lateral bracing members, columns, and floor framing between the 2nd and 7th floors were
inspected from eight other express elevator shafts.
Elevator core framing was inspected primarily with fireproofing materials in place. Only in elevator shaft
number 52 between the 44th and 55th floors was the fireproofing removed at the column splices.
According to the report, no defects were found in the existing fireproofing material. In most of the shafts,
several small regions and a few large areas of fireproofing were found to be missing from core framing
members, which, according to the report, was probably due to the high-speed elevators moving up and
down the shafts. In particular, an 8 in. wide by 1 ft 6 in. long area of fireproofing was found to be missing
on the top flange of the beam between shaft numbers 30 and 31 on floor 22. Also, 100 percent of the
fireproofing was found to be missing from the south face of column 908 between floors 27 and 29 in shaft
number 1. All exposed steel members were found to be in good condition with only isolated locations of
light surface corrosion on the steel. Some minor shrinkage cracks were reported in the troweled-on
fireproofing materials on the columns.
Gypsum wallboards surrounding the elevator shafts were also found to be in good condition, although
isolated holes were detected at various locations as outlined in Table B2 of the survey report. At shaft
number 4, a piece of wallboard was found to be loose in the southeast corner of the shaft; facility
personnel repaired this piece.
Close-up inspection of column splices and eccentric-braced column connections with fireproofing
removed at the locations designated in Tables B3 and B4 showed that all bolts, welds, and structural steel
were in good condition. No defects in the welds were found after EQAD personnel performed ultrasonic
tests on the butt welds at the column splices and magnetic particle tests on the fillet welds at the
eccentrically-braced column connections.
Column splices and eccentrically-braced column connections in the express elevator shafts were not
tested due to restricted access.
Quality Assurance personnel inspected the lateral bracing of the core columns at two locations (one
between columns 606 and 607 and one between columns 907 and 908) on the 4th floor. Light surface
corrosion was found on the bracing, splice plates, and bolts. The welds were tested using the magnetic
particle method and were found to be in good condition, and no cracks were observed.
Core columns inspected from office area floors—Quality Assurance personnel inspected core corner
columns at eight splice locations (see Table B6 in the survey report for locations). Seven of the splices
were welded, and the welds were tested using the ultrasonic and magnetic particle methods. The eighth
location was a bolted splice connection. No defects were found in any of the welded splices. Steel
columns exhibited light surface corrosion, as did the bolted splice on the bolts and splice plates.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. It was
recommended that the fireproofing that was missing from the elevator shaft framing members be
replaced, including those regions where the fireproofing was removed for up-close inspection during the
condition survey. This report also recommended that the holes in the gypsum wallboards surrounding the
elevators, which are listed in Table B2 of the survey report, be repaired.
Floor Framing
Inspection locations for the floor framing at typical floors are shown in Drawing 9 of the report, which is
reproduced here as Fig. 3–3. Findings for specific zones are reported below.
Main Lobby (floors 1 through 6)—Beams and connections that were inspected within the core in this
zone were found to be in good condition. At various locations, fireproofing was missing, exposing light
surface corrosion on the beams and connections.
Floors 9 through 41—Floor framing inspected in this zone was found to be in good condition. Light
corrosion was observed on all core beams and beam connections, and on main truss connections on
floors 28 and 37.
According to the report, the most significant deficiencies in this zone were found at the damping units
(see Table C-1 in the survey report). Damping units on floors 18 and 37 were observed to be missing one
fastener at each unit. Two fasteners were found to be missing in one damping unit on floor 29, as well as
on floor 38. Also, at floor 38, a damping unit was observed to be missing four fasteners. According to the
structural drawings (WSHJ 1967a), four fasteners were required to connect the damping unit to the
member attached to the bottom chord of the floor truss, and two fasteners were required to connect the
damping unit to the exterior column.
Figure 3–3. Typical inspection locations of floor framing per the 1990 Condition Survey Report of WTC 2.
41
Chapter 3
Floors 43 through 75—The floor framing in this zone was also found to be in good condition. Light
corrosion was observed on the same members as in the previous zone.
Minor deficiencies were found at floor 64 and floor 75. A deformed bottom chord was found on the main
truss along column 343 on the 64th floor. According to the report, “No signs of distress were observed.”
The entire floor framing was visually inspected on the 75th floor, since the fireproofing was being
replaced on this level. Most of the exposed structural components and connections were found to be in
good condition. Untightened bolts were found at truss seat connections at several locations, which,
according to the report, did not significantly affect the structural integrity of the framing.
Hairline cracks were observed in the 2 in. thick concrete topping slab near the south exterior wall on the
44th floor. According to the report, these cracks were due to shrinkage and did not affect the structural
integrity of the floor slab.
Floors 77 through 107—The floor framing in this zone was found to be in good condition, with light
surface corrosion observed on all core framing beams and connections.
Minor deficiencies were found in floor slabs, where separation of the concrete slab from the metal deck
forms was found at floors 93 and 108. According to the report, this condition did not affect the structural
integrity of the slab, since decking served as formwork for the concrete and had no structural function.
Mechanical Equipment Rooms (Floors 7–8, 41–42, 75–76, 108–109)—The floor framing and slab
inspected on the MER floors were found to be in good condition. On all MER floors, most of the
structural framing was inaccessible due to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ducts, fans,
electrical equipment, or plumbing. No nondestructive testing was performed on these levels.
Hairline cracks were found in concrete beam encasement at various locations on all four MER floors.
Exposed steel exhibited light surface corrosion, and no deterioration was found at the underside of floor
slabs.
Selected elements of the space frame at various locations on the 107th through 110th floors were
inspected and were found to be in good condition. Exposed truss elements and connections both
exhibited light surface corrosion. Bolted and welded connections were also found to be in good condition.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. As mentioned
above, all the deficiencies found were considered to have no significant effect on structural integrity. It
was recommended that utility supports found to be bowed or vibrating be replaced as part of the facility’s
regular maintenance program.
Roof
Roof framing, which consisted of rolled steel wide flange beams supporting a structural concrete slab,
was found to be in good condition. Hairline cracks in the fireproofing and in the underside of the
concrete slab were found at various locations.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. Recommendations
that were made were not structural in nature.
This section contains the findings of the condition survey of WTC 1 (Tower A), which was performed in
1991 by the Office of Irwin G. Cantor, Consulting Engineers, for the EQAD of PANYNJ
(PANYNJ 1991).
Scope
The scope of the survey was determined based on experience gained from the condition survey of WTC 2
in 1990, which was discussed in Sec. 3.1.1 of this report.
The scope of work was designed to minimize impact on tenant and facility operations, and was limited to
vacant floors and tenant areas and partially occupied floors. The following is a list of the structural
elements that were inspected:
1. Floor framing (long, short, and transverse trusses, rolled beams, concrete encased beams,
bridging, and connections)
2. Damping system (damping units from bottom of trusses to exterior walls and connections)
3. Exterior wall system (columns, column splices, spandrel plates, splices, and bolted
connections of spandrel beams)
4. Core columns (columns within elevator shafts, including visible floor beams)
6. Mechanical equipment room (framing, machinery bases and utility supports, and exterior
offsets)
7. Roof (slab, window washer rails, top façade, antenna bases, and window wash concrete
walls)
To assess the condition of the structural system in the tower, both visual inspection and nondestructive
testing methods were employed. The thickness of steel members was checked using an ultrasonic
thickness gauge. Welds were tested using magnetic particle and/or dye penetration test methods.
Fourteen office floors (11, 13, 22, 30, 35, 52, 54, 61, 65, 78, 84, 86, 90, and 93) throughout WTC 1 were
selected for inspection. Inspection of the structural elements at these levels followed the following
sequence:
1. Six long-span trusses and two short-span trusses were selected from the plans for even,
random distribution of inspection locations throughout the floor area.
2. Floor framing, damping unit, utility supports, steel decking, inside faces of steel spandrel
plates, spandrel splices, and core concrete or rolled steel members were visually inspected.
Structural steel members were examined for signs of deformation or corrosion with
fireproofing still in place.
3. The following locations for fireproof removal were selected and submitted: (a) six truss
locations, (b) one core floor beam, (c) two spandrel plate splices, and (d) two exterior
columns (plaster removal).
4. The 11 locations listed above were inspected up close, using lights, scrapers, wire brushes,
and mirrors for signs of cracking, deformation, or corrosion. Photographs were taken of
typical conditions and “Remarks” were documented.
5. Nondestructive testing was performed on column splice welds and welded floor framing
connections. Testing was performed by either the Port Authority’s Materials and Research
Division or by Lucius Pitkin, Inc.
On 2 of the 14 floors inspected, column splices on seven core columns were inspected after removal of
the gypsum board firewalls. Top sides of exposed concrete floor slabs were also inspected where
carpeting or floor tiles had previously been removed.
Table 3–2 contains the number of structural elements inspected per office floor.
All four two-story MERs were visually inspected from the lower floor and accessible upper floor levels.
Floor framing, slabs, interior columns, and utility hangers and pads were inspected. Concrete fireproofing
for covering the steel floor framing was examined for delaminations and underlying corrosion.
At the 107th and 108th floors, fireproofing was removed at nine locations. Of these, seven were welded
connections that were tested by the magnetic particle method.
Core Columns
Core columns were inspected from the elevator shafts in addition to the corner core column splices that
were inspected from the two office area floors. The elevator shaft inspections included visual inspection
of floor framing, columns, connections, and splices in 13 elevator shafts with fireproofing in place. Core
column connections to floor beams in the core were also examined.
Roof
The roof concrete slab top surface and parapet were visually inspected, along with the roof framing and
underside of the concrete roof slab.
Findings of Inspection
The following sections summarize the findings and recommendations from the WTC 1 survey report.
Floors 9 through 106—Exterior column splices were found to be in good condition.2 A total of
28 column splices were inspected throughout the 14 office floors. At 26 of these locations,
nondestructive testing was performed on all of the splice welds and the box column plates; each test
showed that the welds were in good condition. Ultrasonic testing was performed to verify thickness of
the spandrel plates. These tests showed no loss of thickness. Tightness of the bolts in the spandrel beam
splices was also checked, and no loose or missing bolts were found.
The inside faces of the steel box column plates exhibited scattered areas of light to moderate corrosion3
and peeling paint. Light corrosion was also found at splice bolts, welds, cap and base plates, and
diaphragms. Ultrasonic thickness testing on these outer column plates above and below the splice
location indicated no section loss.
Fillet shop welds connecting the cap and base plates to the interior of the box columns were visually
inspected at all open splice locations. No cracking or significant discontinuities were detected at any
location.
Spandrel plates, splice plates, and bolted connections were also found to be in good condition. Scattered
corrosion stains were observed on the spandrel fireproofing, typically at the splice plates and along the
lower edges of the floor slabs. All splice plate bolts were observed to be tight. Fillet welds at the truss
seat connections to the spandrels were also found to be in good condition.
A summary of the findings is contained in Table A-2 in the survey report, which is reproduced here as
Table 3–3.
Floors 107 through 110—Inspection of the exterior walls was limited to the joints at the 108th floor. No
structurally significant deterioration was found. Joint sealer in the column cladding was missing at nearly
all of the 59 column seals.
2
In this survey report, a structural member that receives a “good” condition rating requires no repairs. The structural member is
in “original condition” (see page 14 of PANYNJ (1991) for this and other definitions).
3
In this survey report, “corrosion” and “rust” are used interchangeably. See page 15 of PANYNJ (1991) for a definition of
corrosion.
Table 3–3. Findings from inspection of exterior wall column splices in WTC 1.
Condition of Column Splice Plate Welds
NDT – Magnetic
Particle NDT – Dye Penetrant
Col.
Floor No. Upper Lower Bolts Upper Lower Upper Lower Remarks
10-11 403 M L T A A Ultrasonic
thickness
shows no
212 M L T A A significant
loss
12-13 215 L L T A A
324 L L T A A
21-22 115 N N T A A No NDT
454 L L T A A
29-30 233 L L T A A Ultrasonic
thickness
shows no
318 L L T A A significant
loss
34-35 121 L L T
112 M L T
51-52 227 L L T A A
308 L L T A A
53-54 203 L L T A A
329 L L T A A
60-61 327 L L T A A
251 L L T A A
64-65 324 L L T A A
236 L L T A A
77-78 332 L L T A A Ultrasonic
attempted;
123 L L T A A reading erratic
83-84 106 L L T A A
454 L L T A A
85-86 133 L L T A A Upper column
rotated
3/16 in. during
209 L L T A A
construction
89-90 315 L L T A A
136 L L T A A
92-93 124 L L T A A Ultrasonic
attempted;
336 L L T A A reading erratic
Key: A, acceptable (no loss of metal); L, light corrosion; M, moderate corrosion; N, no deterioration/defects; T, tight.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. It was noted,
however, that missing fireproofing should be replaced on the spandrel plates and splices, and that the
joints in the aluminum cladding should be resealed where the seals were removed.
Core Columns
• Seven core column splices were inspected from unoccupied office areas.
Core columns inspected from elevator shafts—Inspection of the core columns in an elevator shaft was
performed from the top of the elevator cab.
Thirteen elevator shafts (four express elevator shafts and nine local elevator shafts) were randomly
selected for inspection with the concurrence of Port Authority personnel. The shafts that were selected
for inspection can be found in Table B-1 of the report, which is reproduced here as Table 3–4.
12 1 – 78 501, 601
15 1 – 78 503, 603
26 9 – 16 708, 807
35 17 – 24 706, 805
43 33 – 40 702, 802
52 46 – 54 708, 807
62 55 – 61 706, 805
67 62 – 67 702, 802
77 80 – 87 708, 807
80 79 – 87 806, 907
90 93 – 101 703, 803
In the express elevator shafts, beams framing in the north-south direction were typically encased in
concrete. Steel in the other direction consisted of built-up welded box girders and columns with sprayed-
on fireproofing. According to the report, no defects were found in the fireproofing that would suggest a
problem with the steel columns, bracing, and floor framing. However, several small areas and a few large
areas of fireproofing were missing from the steel girders and columns. It was suggested in the report that
the small areas of exposure were caused by (1) the mounting of brackets and other hardware to support
conduit and guide cables and (2) the movement of hoist cables that were rubbing the shaft girder.
According to the report, the probable cause of missing fireproofing on box columns was thought to be the
forces induced by the high speed of the elevators moving up and down the shafts. All exposed steel was
found to be in good condition with light to medium surface rust. Gypsum closure wallboards were found
to be in good condition, except for isolated holes in two elevator shafts at the 58th and 69th floors (see
Table B-2 in the survey report, which is reproduced here as Table 3–5). The report states that these
openings represent a fire safety hazard that should be corrected.
Local elevator shafts typically had wide-flange columns and girders with sprayed-on fireproofing.
Fireproofing was found to be missing on some of the steel members where there was contact with hoist
cables and where the steel served as staging support for maintenance workers servicing electrical
conduits. The exposed steel was found to be in good condition with light surface rust. Steel beams
supporting the elevator door saddles were encased in concrete, except for a few beams that were found to
be partially encased (for example, in one case, concrete was missing from the bottom flange of one of the
steel beams). The report states that the fireproofing should be replaced in these cases. The gypsum
closure walls were also found to be in good condition except for a few isolated holes and/or projections
into the shaft (see Table 3–5).
Core corner columns inspected from office area floors—Core corner columns were inspected at all four
corners of the 92nd to 93rd floors and at three corners at the 77th to 78th floors. All seven locations were
inspected by removing the five or more layers of gypsum wallboard around the splice locations, which
were 3 ft 0 in. above the finished floor level.
On the 92nd to 93rd floors, all four splices were bolted connections. No defects were found at any of the
bolted splices. Welded splices were found at all three locations on the 77th to 78th floors, and were tested
using the dye penetrant method. Results from the tests showed that there were no surface cracks in the
welds. Steel plates, bolts, and welds that were visible were found to have only light surface corrosion.
Core column to floor beam connections inspected from office floors—Twenty-five floor beam to
column connections were visually inspected, and seven connections were inspected up-close throughout
the tower (see Table B-3 in the report for locations, which is reproduced here as Table 3–6). No
deformations were found in any of the connections that could be inspected. No inspection occurred
where firewalls obstructed vision or where heavy beams supported minor beams. Either no or light
corrosion was found on the exposed steel.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report. It was
recommended that the fireproofing that was missing from the elevator shaft framing members be
replaced, including those regions where the fireproofing was removed for up-close inspection during the
condition survey. It was also recommended that the holes in the gypsum wallboards surrounding the
elevators, which are listed in Table B-2 of the survey report be repaired.
Floor Framing
Inspection locations for the floor framing were divided into three elevator zones: (1) Zone 1 (floors 9
through 41), (2) Zone 2 (floors 43 through 75), and (3) Zone 3 (floors 77 through 107).
Office floors, trusses—Typical floor framing was inspected from below at five locations in Zone 1, four
locations in Zone 2, and five locations in Zone 3. Fireproofing was removed at various locations on each
floor that was inspected to provide up-close examination of the framing components and connections.
Welds were tested at most of these locations using either the magnetic particle method or dye penetrant.
Two typical conditions were observed during inspection. First, small areas of fireproofing were missing
at scattered locations throughout the floor framing. Second, the underside of the bottom plates of the
seated connections of the trusses exhibited light rust. According to the report, this was the result of the
welding process that had occurred above the plate, which heated the paint, causing it to fall off. No
structural deficiency was noted due to this condition.
At all locations that were examined, the damping units were not covered with fireproofing. Small
amounts of light rust were observed throughout. Also, the damping unit under the 30th floor was missing
a non-structural bolt.
In some cases, the connection of the truss to the exterior spandrel plate did not have the typical two-bolt
connection. Instead, the seat had one bolt and a weld. It is suggested in the report that the bolt holes may
not have lined up during erection, so welding was used instead. These field welds were tested by either
the magnetic particle or dye penetrant method, and were “found to be functioning properly.”
On the 10th and 61st floors, diagonal members of bridging trusses were removed in order to allow 2 ft
wide by 1 ft deep HVAC ducts to pass through parallel to the floor trusses. According to the report, the
bottom chords of the bridging trusses were attached to the adjacent trusses “so that there was no decrease
of structural integrity.” No details are provided in the report on how these connections were made.
Office floors, metal deck—The metal deck was inspected from below at 22 locations per floor. No
significant rust was observed because, according to the report, the metal deck was galvanized. However,
in an area of approximately 500 ft2 on the underside of the 84th floor, a scattering of light rust was
observed through the fireproofing.
Office floors, concrete slab—In the core areas, the underside of the cast-in-place concrete slab was
observed to be in good condition. A 4 in. by 4 in. area was spalled under the 11th floor, and a 6 in. by
6 in. by 2 in. deep spall was noted under the 54th floor. Also, a construction joint was found to be open
south of columns 505 and 504 under the 13th floor.
Concrete slabs were also inspected from above at locations where floor tiles or carpeting were previously
removed. In general, the slabs in the office floors were found to be in good condition, except for the slab
at the southeast corner of the 60th floor. In this area, cracks were found, which formed at a 45 degree
angle with the corner. Over a period of 4 months, the cracks did not open any further than originally
measured. It was also observed that concrete slabs in the office areas were damaged by construction and
removal of office partitions. Spalls resulting from nails being removed from the slab were noted on floors
without tile or carpeting.
Table C-1 and C-2 in the survey report, which are reproduced here as Table 3–7 and Table 3–8,
respectively, provide a summary of the locations and observations of the inspection for the trusses,
connections, welds, secondary members and connections, damping units, and metal deck.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations for repair were made in the report for any of the floor
framing members. Routine recommendations were made as follows: (1) patch elastomeric sealer at the
construction joint south of columns 504 and 505 under the 13th floor, (2) even though the modifications
made to the bridging trusses at the 10th and 61st floors did not meet the original design, no further
modifications were needed, (3) patch spalls that were created in concrete slabs when partition rails were
removed, and (4) patch cracks on the 60th floor with elastomeric sealer.
Table 3–7. Floor framing and slab inspection results for WTC 1.
Outer Weld Test
Framing
– Main Secondary Metal
Floor Trusses, Column Test Members and Damping Deck
Level Beams Connections Line Condition Connections Units Underside
ZONE 1
155, 303,
11 G G G G L G
443
305, 353,
13 G G G G L G
421
123, 131,
22 G G G G L G
331, 335
30 G G, L 141, 423 G G L G
35 G G, L 121, 133 G G L G
ZONE 2
52 G, L G, L G, L G
151, 351,
54 G, L G, L G G
353, 421
243, 331,
61 G, L G, L G G L G
305
157, 319,
65 G, L L G G L G
423
ZONE 3
78 G, L L 131, 243 G G, L L G
103, 107,
84 G, L G, L G G L G
113, 121
131, 151,
86 G, L G, L G G L G
217
135, 243,
90 G, L G, L G G L G
319
117, 307,
93 G, L G, L G G L G
443
Key: G, good condition; L, light corrosion.
A 100 percent visual inspection was performed on all four mechanical equipment rooms (floors 7–8,
41–42, 75–76, and 108–109). According to the report, most floor framing was inaccessible due to the
presence of HVAC ducts, fans, electrical piping, and plumbing equipment.
Mechanical Equipment Rooms—According to the report, the floor slabs at these levels were determined
to be in good condition. Scattered cracks ranging in width from 1/16 in. to 1/8 in. were found on the slab
surfaces. The report suggests that previously repaired cracks were found to be deteriorated due to load
and vibration. Cracks were also found in equipment pedestal supports and column encasement.
Scattered patches of spray-on fireproofing were found to be missing from the metal decks, which were
used in the perimeter areas (i.e., areas outside the core area). These areas had light rust visible on the
underside of the metal deck. Concrete encasement on the steel beams in the core area was found to be in
good condition with hairline cracks at scattered locations. In a few places, the encasement had spalled off
of the steel beams, which exposed the welded wire fabric in the encasement and portions of the steel
beams. The exposed steel was found to have a light coating of rust.
Visual inspection of the beam to column connections found them to be in good condition, according to
the report. Exposed steel members exhibited only light surface corrosion where fireproofing was removed
on floors 108 through 109.
A concrete encased beam at the 110th floor was subjected to steam from a leaking steam valve. Moderate
rusting was confirmed on the member, and, according to the report, no discernible section loss was found.
Hangers supporting ducts, piping, etc., were also visually inspected. Hangers subject to excessive
vibration, loose hanger rods, and the fatigue of pipe supports were found at various locations. According
to the report, beams that supported the duct hangers had fireproofing missing where the hangers were
mounted.
Detailed findings on the MER levels are shown in the four floor plans on pages 41 through 44 of the 1991
Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 1.
Space Frame—Selected elements of the space frame (hat truss) were inspected at various locations on the
107th to 110th floors. A total of 75 diagonal bracing members were visually inspected without removing
fireproofing. A total of 199 members were inspected in the space frame. Light rust was found on diagonal
braces, beams, and connections where fireproofing was missing.
Recommendations—A priority recommendation was made in the report to replace the leaking valve
under the 110th floor that rusted the floor beam. Routine recommendations were made as follows:
(1) Repair the surface cracks in the MER concrete floor slabs with a surface sealer, (2) Repair the cracks
in the concrete at the base of the columns, (3) Repair the cracks in the concrete pads supporting
mechanical equipment, (4) Patch and repair the spalled concrete encasement of all appropriate structural
members, and (5) Repair hangers that were found to be vibrating, bowed, sagged, and/or deformed.
Roof
A visual inspection of the top surface of the concrete roof deck and concrete wall at the inner perimeter of
window washing rails was performed, and no significant structural deficiencies were found. Cracking and
spalling was found at localized areas of the roof. Some of the spalled areas that had been previously
patched with grout were found to be in poor condition due to exposure to weather.
Horizontal cracks and efflorescence, spalled concrete, and exposed reinforcing bars with minor corrosion
were found at the exterior walls of the access stairway located at the roof. The report suggests that the
spalling of the concrete was due to inadequate concrete cover over the reinforcing bars.
The helicopter pad at the southeast corner of the roof was visually inspected and was found to be in good
condition. No deficiencies were found in the bases of the antennas, all of which were visually inspected.
Recommendations—No priority recommendations were made for the roof. Routine recommendations
were made as follows: (1) Remove and replace the existing patches in the roof slab using a bonding agent
and non-shrink grout as a replacement and (2) Patch spalled areas of exterior concrete curb of the access
stairway located at the roof. Other routine recommendations in the report were not structural in nature.
The Port Authority Facility Condition Survey Program – WTC 7 report contains the findings of the
condition survey of WTC 7, which was performed by Ammann & Whitney in 1997 for the EQAD of
PANYNJ (PANYNJ 1997).
Scope
The scope of work was designed to minimize impact on tenant and facility operations, and was limited to
(1) unoccupied floors, which were the mechanical/electrical and general service floors (floors 3
through 6), and (2) floors that had vacant space (floors 7, 10, 18, 23, and 25). The following is a list of the
structural elements that were inspected:
1. Foundation
2. Framing (column splices, wind bracing systems, and interior beam connections)
3. Floor slabs
The inspection was primarily a visual inspection, with “hands-on” inspection4 of approximately 5 percent
of the “critical connections.” A field inspection team visually inspected the structural elements noted in
the previous section. Inspections were performed from the floor level and from ladders. A manlift was
required to inspect the lobby and trading floor ceilings.
Column Splices
Table III-1 in the report, which is reproduced here as Table 3–9, contains the inspection point locations
for the column splices in interior and exterior columns.
Tables III-2 and III-3 in the report, which are reproduced here as Tables 3–10 and 3–11, respectively,
contain the inspection point locations for columns and girders that were part of the lateral-force-resisting
system.
Table III-4 in the report, which is reproduced here as Table 3–12, contains the inspection point locations
for the interior beam connections.
4
What constituted hands-on inspection is not described in the report (PANYNJ 1997).
Findings of Inspection
According to the report, the structural framing was found to be in good condition.5 No problems or
deterioration were found on the column splices, wind bracing, or the interior beam connections.
Rust buildup was found between the flanges of members that rested on top of one another at the main roof
level where the steel framing was exposed. Although this was not considered to be a structural problem, it
was recommended that the steel should be cleaned and painted to prevent further deterioration.
Throughout the building, fireproofing was found to be missing from the steel framing at locations where
utility supports were installed. This condition was found on all of the floors that were inspected, but it
was most prominent on the 5th floor framing above the main lobby and the 2nd floor framing above the
loading dock area. The report recommended in the report that the fireproofing be replaced.
Loose concrete was found on the north face of column number 51 on the 46th floor of the cooling tower
area.6 Due to the potential hazard immediate action was recommended. Silverstein Properties personnel
immediately removed the loose concrete.
Floor slabs were found to be in good condition. Some of the exposed floor slabs exhibited shrinkage
cracks on the top sides, and some had the composite metal deck damaged during construction. Neither of
these conditions was considered to pose a structural problem. The report also recommended that
delaminated concrete be removed at the concrete patch in the 6th floor slab.
A complete list of the recommendations made in the report for immediate action, safety items, and routine
repairs is reproduced in Fig. 3–4.
5
In this report (PANYNJ 1997), “good condition” means that the element is sound and performing its functions although it
shows signs of use and may require some minor repairs, mostly routine.
6
No information is given in PANYNJ (1997) on the size or exact location of this loose concrete.
The report also noted that the Con Edison station was in very good condition and that no action was
required at that time.
Source: PANYNJ 1997. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Source: PANYNJ 1997. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 3–4. Recommendations made in the 1997 Facility Condition Survey Report for
WTC 7 (continued).
The Due Dilligence Physical Condition Survey – WTC 1 and WTC 2 report contains the findings of the
condition survey of WTC 1 and WTC 2, which was performed by Merritt & Harris, Inc. in 2000 for
PANYNJ (Merritt & Harris 2000).
Scope
On-site evaluations were performed to assess the general physical condition of the property, as it existed
at that time. In particular, WTC 1, WTC 2, WTC 4, WTC 5, the retail mall and plaza, central services, and
the subgrade were inspected. The following discussion focuses on the findings for WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Observations were limited to those portions of the project that were visible during walk-through. In many
areas, building finishes concealed structural components from view. The consultant neither took material
samples nor performed tests on the building materials or systems.
Findings of Inspection
The following findings and recommendations were reported for both WTC 1 and WTC 2.
According to the report, the building structure appeared to be in good overall condition, based on
observations of portions of the structure that were not concealed by building finishes. No apparent
movement or settlement of foundations was observed, and interior slabs were reported to be in good
condition.
The report notes that Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA) and other engineering firms had performed,
on a regular basis, Structural Integrity Inspections (SII) of various structural systems and that those
studies have indicated the following deficiencies: (1) rusting of steel columns in the elevator shafts, (2)
missing fireproofing, and (3) floor coring damage. The due diligence condition survey report goes on to
note that the most recent SII recommended repairs were underway at the time the report was written.
Damping units had been tested every 5 years, most recently in 1996. The report notes that approximately
two-dozen damping units were kept in stock for replacement. The report also states that LERA strongly
recommended that the analysis of wind acceleration measurements be continued.
The report notes that an ongoing program of re-fireproofing structural steel members was in place at the
time of the inspection. Re-fireproofing the structural steel was supposed to provide a two-hour fire rating
for those members. Such work was performed on an entire floor when the space was being built-out for
new occupancy. At the time of inspection by Merritt & Harris, Inc., approximately 30 floors had been
completed in the two towers.
3.2.1 Overview
In 1986, the PANYNJ implemented an inspection program to detect, record, and correct any signs of
distress, deterioration, or deformation that could signal structural problems for WTC 1 and WTC 2
(PANYNJ 1986). This program for structural integrity, which was based on an inspection and testing plan
prepared by LERA, contained detailed guidelines on inspection, record-keeping, and follow-up
procedures. It included periodic inspection intervals for the TV antenna mast, exterior roof and wall
elements, room occupancies and uses, accessible columns, fireproofing envelopes, bracing truss members
between floor 107 and the roof (hat truss), steel floor framing, and concrete slabs. Details of the SII
program are presented in Sec. 2.2 of this report, including the required follow-up procedures, which are
outlined in Sec. 2.2.5.
Inspection findings under the SII program were to be categorized as “Immediate,” “Priority,” or
“Routine.” Findings requiring “immediate action” would include possible closure of the area and/or
structure until interim remedial measures (such as shoring or removal of a potentially unsafe element or
structural member or members) could be implemented. “Priority” findings addressed those conditions for
which no immediate action was required or for which immediate action has been completed, but for
which further investigation, design, or implementation of interim or long-term repairs should be
undertaken on a priority basis, i.e., taking precedence over all other scheduled work. For “routine” or non-
priority cases, further investigation and/or remedial work could be undertaken as part of a scheduled
major work program or routine facility maintenance. Where inspection procedures involved the removal
of fireproofing, such fireproofing was to be properly replaced on completion of inspection.
In January of 1990, LERA submitted a proposal to the PANYNJ for monitoring the structural integrity of
the World Trade Center Complex.7 The proposal contained the scope of testing and inspection services
for WTC 1, WTC 2, WTC 4, WTC 5, WTC 6, the Vista Hotel, and the subgrade and was based on a
modified and expanded version of the 1986 action plan that was previously submitted to PANYNJ.
The scope of services presented in the proposal included three separate approaches to identifying potential
component and/or system degradation:
The program called for inspection or monitoring of the following items, among other things, in WTC 1
and WTC 2:
3. Space usage
7
Letter dated January 12, 1990 from Saw-Teen See of Leslie E. Robertson Associates to Suren Batra of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey (WTCI-123-P; see Appendix G of this report).
4. Accessible columns, including exterior box columns at locations of spandrel intersections and
“tree” junctions below floor 7 and above floor 1 (Plaza Level)
5. Bracing at exterior column line below elevation 294 ft 0 in., and in WTC 2 only, the transfer
trusses below floor 1 under exterior columns
9. Steel framing, slabs, and the like where exposed for general repairs or tenant remodeling
Inspection and monitoring of these items were proposed to occur at regular intervals. Estimated
manpower and cost estimates based on proposed inspection intervals were also given, and are shown here
in Fig. 3–5. A detailed inspection program outlining the steps required for visual inspections and periodic
measurements was also contained in the proposal.
LERA and other engineering firms conducted periodic inspections of the towers under the WTC
Structural Integrity Inspection Program, which was based on the proposal originally submitted to
PANYNJ by LERA in 1990. The following sections of this report summarize the findings from the SII
Program reports related to the structural aspects of the towers.
The PANYNJ has reported that the construction records on repairs following the SII reports were
destroyed when the towers collapsed on September 11, 2001. In addition, the PANYNJ has reported that
any missing fireproofing that was identified in the SII reports to be repaired was done so on a routine
basis.
The purpose of the space usage surveys was to identify possible structural overloading of the slabs and
floor framing due to changes in occupancies and uses and/or due to additions of heavy equipment or
furniture. The inspections were conducted by a walk-through by LERA personnel on predetermined floors
within WTC 1 and WTC 2. Such usage surveys were initially proposed to be conducted annually on an
ongoing basis (see Fig. 3–5). Surveys actually were conducted annually over a five-year period starting in
1995 (two surveys were conducted in 1996). A summary of the findings from the space usage reports is
contained in Table 3–13.
Accessible Columns
Surveys of the accessible columns (columns in the core area that were not enclosed by an architectural
finish, which can be visually inspected) in the elevator shafts of WTC 1 and WTC 2 were performed to:
• Ascertain the condition of the accessible columns with respect to rusting, cracking, bowing,
and deviation from plumb
• Identify lateral displacement or rotation of the column about a vertical axis where the column
was directly braced on only one axis by connecting beams or concrete slabs
Accessible column surveys were proposed to be performed every two years on an ongoing basis (see
Fig. 3–5). As seen in Table 3–14, which contains a summary of the findings from the accessible columns
reports, the proposed inspection schedule was not followed exactly. See Appendix G of this report for the
exact locations where the columns were inspected over the height of both towers in all of the SII reports.
Source: PANYNJ 1990. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 3–5. Estimated manpower and cost estimates for structural integrity inspections
for WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Source: PANYNJ 1990. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 3–5. Estimated manpower and cost estimates for structural integrity inspections
for WTC 1 and WTC 2 (continued).
The purpose of the inspection of the Plaza Level box columns was to assess their overall structural
integrity, including the condition of the fireproofing. As can be seen from Fig. 3–5, the proposed
inspection interval was four years. One such inspection was performed in April of 1998. The east face of
WTC 1 and the north face of WTC 2 were visually inspected between the Concourse Level ceiling and
the underside of the Plaza Level slab. The columns between the Concourse floor level and ceiling level
were inaccessible due to their enclosures.
A summary of the findings from the Plaza Level box columns report is given in Table 3–15. The report
notes that fireproofing was missing from approximately 2–3 percent of the Plaza Level box columns and
seated beam connections in WTC 1 and about 1–2 percent in WTC 2.
Table 3–15. Summary of findings from Plaza Level box column report.
Date of Recommendationsa LERA/WTCI
Report Immediate Priority Routine Reference Numbers
05/08/98 None None PANYNJ to clean all exposed steel 4002/66-L
on Plaza Level columns 236, 242,
and 248 in WTC 1 and repair
damaged fireproofing on columns
and seated beam connections in
both towers.
a. Immediate – Action includes possible closure of the area and/or structure affected until remedial actions are implemented.
Priority – This action takes precedence over all other scheduled work. This work should not wait for routine repair procedures since
waiting may make the damaged area less accessible or allow the damage to quickly worsen to an “immediate” category.
Routine – Further investigation and/or remedial work can be undertaken as a part of a scheduled work program or routine facility
maintenance. This action also refers to all non-priority items.
Below Elevation 294 ft 0 in. (Sublevel 1) in both WTC 1 and WTC 2, diagonal bracing was used in place
of deep spandrels between the exterior columns to resist lateral loads from the tower above. The purpose
of the inspection of the bracing system in the perimeter walls of the towers was to:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the bracing (and, in 1991 only, the
transfer trusses below elevation 310 ft 0 in. in WTC 2);
• Provide recommendations for remedial work for both structural and fireproofing damage.
As can be seen from Fig. 3–5, the proposed inspection interval was two years, which is less than the
actual inspection interval shown in Table 3–16. The 1995 SII report notes that the only prior inspection
of the bracing was done on October 31, 1991. Also, the 1995 SII report recommended that future
inspections should be performed every two years, with particular attention given to corrosion and
fireproofing. In both the 1991 and 1995 SII reports, it is noted that the observed thickness of the
fireproofing on the bracing members was between 0.25 in. and 1 in.
It is evident from Table 3–16 that the PANYNJ did not complete action on a number of “routine”
category recommendations from the 1991 report. Remedial work for these recommendations was to be
carried out as part of a scheduled maintenance program. Such recommendations include draining of
flooded areas due to water leaks was not fully accomplished, and repairs to the connections between the
braces and the columns were not made. Fireproofing was not applied to the transfer truss between
columns 242 and 248 at the B1 Level in WTC 2. Also, fireproofing was not repaired on some of the
bracing members at Level B6 and at other levels. It appears that all of the damaged concrete masonry
unit (CMU) walls acting as fireproofing, which were identified in the 1991 SII report, were repaired;
many additional CMU walls were noted for repair in the 1995 SII report.
The 1995 SII report notes that large areas of fireproofing on the structural steel members were removed or
damaged due to the February 1993 bombing of WTC 1. During reconstruction of this area, fireproofing
was reapplied to the structural steel members. LERA was asked by the PANYNJ to inspect this
fireproofing as part of the 1995 structural integrity inspection of the bracing members, and LERA
“…found no place where these refireproofing efforts were incomplete.”
Hat Trusses
The purpose of the inspection of the hat trusses between floor 107 and the roof was to:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the hat trusses;
• Provide recommendations for remedial work for both structural and fireproofing damage.
During the inspections, access to some of the bracing members was either not possible or not practical. A
summary of the findings from the hat truss reports is contained in Table 3–17. Note that the actual
inspection interval is greater than the proposed interval of two years (see Fig. 3–5). Fireproofing that was
intentionally removed during the Facility Condition Survey inspections performed by the PANYNJ in
1990 and 1991 for WTC1 and WTC 2, respectively, was found not to be repaired.
The purpose of the inspection program for the floor framing supporting the MER was to:
• Assess the overall performance and structural integrity of the steel and concrete framing;
• Identify locations of defects and signs of distress in slabs, partitions, column enclosures, and
concrete supports for mechanical equipment;
• Provide recommendations and procedures for remedial work for both structural and
fireproofing damages and/or inadequacies.
Table 3–18 contains a summary of the reports for the floor framing over mechanical areas and shows that
the proposed inspection interval of 4 years (see Fig. 3–5) was followed or exceeded.
The reports indicate that damaged CMU walls in Level B6 of WTC 1 and WTC 2 still existed in 1996.
Such damages were found initially during the structural integrity inspection of the diagonal bracing in
1991 and again in 1995 (see Table 3–16). Similarly, damaged fireproofing on the perimeter diagonal
bracing members at this level in WTC 1 and WTC 2, which was initially found in 1991 and 1995, still
existed in 1999. The 1999 SII floor framing over mechanical areas report lists the following items for
which repairs were not completed from previous inspections: (1) cracks in slabs on all MER floors in both
towers; (2) spalled concrete on Level B6 in WTC 1; (3) fireproofing hanging from the underside of the
metal deck on floor 107 in WTC 2; (4) Damaged fireproofing to the beam on floor 107 in WTC 1; (5) A
3 ft by 3 ft hole in the gypsum wallboard on floor 41 in WTC 1; and (6) damaged CMU walls at Level B6
in both towers.
The purpose of the inspection program for the floor framing supporting the tenant areas was to:
• Assess the overall performance and integrity of the steel and concrete framing;
• Identify locations and signs of distress in slabs, partitions, column enclosures, and steel
framing;
• Provide recommendations and procedures for remedial work for both structural and
fireproofing damage and/or inadequacies.
Table 3–19 contains a summary of the reports for the floor framing over tenant areas. The proposed
inspection interval of 2 years (see Fig. 3–5) was followed, with one deviation.
Table 3–18. Summary of findings from reports on floor framing over mechanical areas.
Date of Recommendationsa LERA/WTCI
Report Immediate Priority Routine Reference Numbers
11/03/92 None None PANYNJ to replace missing R2582/67-L
fireproofing.
04/12/96 None PANYNJ to re- PANYNJ to repair cracks throughout R2776/67-L
apply fireproofing to all MER floors.
deck on floor 108 in PANYNJ to repair spalled concrete at
WTC 2. 3 locations at level B6 in WTC 1
PANYNJ to patch using methods given in Appendix C
fireproofing on of the SII report.
beam supporting PANYNJ to repair damaged
floor 107 in WTC 1 fireproofing to framing supporting
in accordance with floor 74 in WTC 1 in accordance with
procedure in procedure in Appendix D of the SII
Appendix D of the report.
SII report. PANYNJ to replace damaged drywall
on floor 42 in WTC 1.
PANYNJ to patch fireproofing on
perimeter bracing at locations
indicated in the report on level B6 in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 in accordance
with procedure in Appendix D of the
SII report.
PANYNJ to replace damaged CMU
walls in level B6 in WTC 1 and
WTC 2 in accordance with procedure
in Appendix D of the SII report.
PANYNJ to patch damaged
fireproofing on hat trusses at floor
108 in WTC 2 in accordance with
procedure in Appendix D of the SII
report.
Table 3–18. Summary of findings from reports on floor framing over mechanical areas
(continued).
Recommendationsa LERA/WTCI
Date of Reference
Report Immediate Priority Routine Numbers
05/99 None PANYNJ to stop PANYNJ to repair spalled concrete at 4041/66-L
leak in overhead Level B6 in both towers in accordance
pipe on floor 75 in with procedure in Appendix C of the SII
WTC 1. report.
Condition of PANYNJ to patch cracking (new and
inadequate from previous repair) in slabs on all
fireproofing MERs in both towers in accordance
reported in 1996 with procedure in Appendix C of the SII
study could not be report.
verified since a drop PANYNJ to remove debris on perimeter
ceiling was areaways on all MERs in both towers.
subsequently PANYNJ to patch spalled concrete in
installed in the area perimeter areaways on floor 108 in
in question. WTC 1 towers in accordance with
procedure in Appendix C of the SII
report.
PANYNJ to repair spalled concrete at
parapet wall on floor 108 in WTC 1
towers in accordance with procedure in
Appendix C of the SII report.
PANYNJ to repair cracked column
pedestal on floor 41 in WTC 1 towers in
accordance with procedure in Appendix
C of the SII report.
PANYNJ to verify if newly constructed
cantilevered deck on all MERs in both
towers was engineered.
PANYNJ to verify if existing floor
framing was evaluated for additional
loads due to new construction of
enclosed mechanical rooms on all
MERs in both towers.
PANYNJ to patch fireproofing to
perimeter bracing at Level B6 in WTC
2 towers in accordance with procedure
in Appendix D of the SII report.
PANYNJ to replace damaged CMU
walls in level B6 in WTC 1 and WTC 2
in accordance with procedure in
Appendix D of the SII report.
PANYNJ to patch damaged
fireproofing on hat trusses at floor 108
in WTC 1 in accordance with procedure
in Appendix D of the SII report.
a. Immediate – Action includes possible closure of the area and/or structure affected until remedial actions are implemented.
Priority – This action takes precedence over all other scheduled work. This work should not wait for routine repair procedures since
waiting may make the damaged area less accessible or allow the damage to quickly worsen to an “immediate” category.
Routine – Further investigation and/or remedial work can be undertaken as a part of a scheduled work program or routine facility
maintenance. This action also refers to all non-priority items.
The purpose of the inspection program was to determine the natural frequencies of oscillation of WTC 1
due to wind excitation. Only WTC 1 was instrumented with accelerometers which were located at six
locations on floor 108. The accelerometers measured the accelerations in both principal directions of the
building with respect to time due to wind. Data were recorded on tape whenever the acceleration of
floor 108 exceeded approximately 0.003g. A spectral analysis of the recorded accelerations was made;
peaks on this spectrum corresponded to the natural frequencies of various modes of vibration of the
towers. The computed natural frequencies were to be compared with corresponding values that had been
determined in the past. A significant change in the tower’s dynamic behavior was considered to be a
possible indication of diminishing structural integrity. According to the reports, characteristics that may
be observed or inferred by review of the recorded acceleration data were:
Three reports were prepared by LERA. Dates and references for the reports are contained in Table 3–20.
The 1993 and 1995 reports compare the then available measured first mode natural frequencies of WTC 1
to those determined by the structural engineer in 1966, which were 0.084 Hz in the north-south direction
and 0.096 in the east-west direction (WSHJ 1966). A summary of the measured first mode natural
frequencies from the 1995 report, which contained the most current data, is given in Table 3–21.
Table 3–19. Summary of findings from reports on floor framing over tenant areas.
Date of Recommendationsa LERA/WTCI
Report Immediate Priority Routine Reference Numbers
11/03/92 None None PANYNJ to replace fireproofing on steel R2582/67-L
members and repair or replace damaged
CMU walls on floors noted in report.
PANYNJ to perform survey of core holes,
especially in prohibited areas.
04/01/95 None None PANYNJ to replace fireproofing on steel R2582/67-L
members and repair or replace damaged
CMU walls on floors noted in report.
PANYNJ to perform survey of core holes,
especially in prohibited areas.
PANYNJ to patch spalled concrete at
locations noted in report.
12/10/97 None None PANYNJ to replace fireproofing on steel 4012/66-L
members and repair or replace damaged
CMU walls on floors noted in report.
PANYNJ to perform survey of core holes,
especially in prohibited areas.
PANYNJ to patch spalled concrete with
exposed reinforcement at locations noted
in report.
PANYNJ to fill cores/holes in slab at
locations noted in report.
11/29/99 None PANYNJ to restore None 4023/66-L
fireproofing on truss at
floor 89 of WTC 2.
PANYNJ to repair
spalled concrete on
floor 89 of WTC 2 in
accordance with repair
procedures given in
Appendix D of the SII
report.
PANYNJ to repair
spalled concrete on
floors 33 and 91 of
WTC 1 in accordance
with repair procedures
given in Appendix D
of the SII report.
PANYNJ to fill in
cores with damaged
reinforcement on floor
91 of WTC 1.
a. Immediate – Action includes possible closure of the area and/or structure affected until remedial actions are implemented.
Priority – This action takes precedence over all other scheduled work. This work should not wait for routine repair procedures since
waiting may make the damaged area less accessible or allow the damage to quickly worsen to an “immediate” category.
Routine – Further investigation and/or remedial work can be undertaken as a part of a scheduled work program or routine facility
maintenance. This action also refers to all non-priority items.
Both the 1993 and 1995 reports conclude that the measured and computed first mode frequencies
compare well, especially for the greater wind speeds. The 1995 report also concluded that the
February 1993 bombing had no permanent measurable effect on the dynamic response of WTC 1. Both
reports recommended that WTC 2 be instrumented similarly to WTC 1.
The 2000 SII report pointed out that PANYNJ had not been able to analyze the data acquired from the
instrumentation of WTC 1 since 1998 because the PANYNJ laboratory that contained playback and
analytical equipment necessary to assess the recorded data was dismantled in the fall of 1998. The report
recommended that the capability to assess and analyze the accelerometer data be re-established promptly.
The report further recommended that WTC 1 be additionally instrumented at a mid-level floor, and that
WTC 2 be instrumented at its top floor and at a mid-level floor. The final recommendation from the
2000 report was that the responsibility for data collection and processing be transferred to a university or
a similar academic research institution. Note that the proposed inspection interval of one year (see
Fig. 3–5) was not followed.
The purpose of this inspection program was to determine the natural frequencies of the floor systems in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 and to compare them with corresponding values that were determined in the past. A
significant change in the vibration characteristics of the floor system was considered to be a possible
indication of diminishing structural integrity. The proposed inspection schedule (see Fig. 3–5) included
measurement of the natural frequencies of floors every year on an ongoing basis, the proposed inspection
schedule was not followed.
For purposes of determining the natural frequencies of the floor construction, a typical tower floor was
divided into three zones, which corresponded to the type of floor truss that was utilized in that zone:
short-span zone, long-span zone, and two-way zone.
Vibration characteristics of the floor systems were studied both analytically and experimentally. In 1971,
Teledyne Geotronics of Long Beach, CA made field measurements of vertical vibration on floors 13, 27,
and 32 of WTC 1 using seismometers. These field measurements were obtained under the direction of
Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, Robertson (SHCR). SHCR also made analytical estimates of the natural
frequencies of the floor systems at that time (SHCR 1971). They determined that the natural frequencies
of the long-span and short-span trusses, considering viscoelastic damping, were 4.6 Hz and 7.9 Hz,
respectively. A summary of the natural frequency test results for WTC 1 is contained in Table 3–22.
In March of 1995, Cerami and Associates, of New York, NY, made field measurements on floors 17, 22,
26, 38, and 88 of WTC 1 and floors 23, 24, an 58 of WTC 2 using the following equipment: piezo-electric
accelerometer, vibration meter, peak band pass filter, and strip chart recorder (Cerami 1996). The floors
were subjected to a standard heel-drop test or by jumping in place. All field work was performed under
the direction of LERA. A summary of the test results for WTC 1 and WTC 2 is given in Table 3–23.
The SII report produced by LERA in April of 1995 summarized the analytical and experimental results to
date (LERA 1995). Based on the available data, the report concluded that there had been no significant
measurable change in the performance of the typical floor systems in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
The report by LERA in May of 1996 provided a summary of the integrity of the viscoelastic damping
units in WTC 1 and WTC 2 (LERA 1996). The integrity assessment represented a continuation of the on-
going monitoring program for the damping units. A historical review related to the damping units is
given in Appendix A of the SII report, which can be found in Appendix G of this report.
• Laboratory testing of four in-service dampers taken from the towers (two per tower)
performed by the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (Appendix A in LERA
report)
• Analysis of measured dynamic response of WTC 1 to actual wind events conducted by the
University of Western Ontario (Appendix B in LERA report)
• Investigation of Aging Effects – World Trade Center Dampers, Robert Fowler & Associates
P.C., October 1, 1984 (Appendix C in LERA report).
Details of each study can be found in the applicable appendices cited above.
To assess the integrity of the damping units, the following characteristics were examined:
• The mechanical behavior of the viscoelastic material used in the damping units was modeled
by a linear viscoelastic law, where the stress-strain characteristics of the material are
dependent on time and on the temperature of the material (WSHJ 1967b). When subjected to
a uniform shear strain, which is a sinusoidal function of time, the stress-strain diagram of the
viscoelastic material is elliptical. The area within the ellipse represents the work done per
cycle of strain, which is dissipated as heat.
• The loss tangent, which is the ratio of the loss shear modulus of the viscoelastic material to
the storage (elastic) shear modulus of the viscoelastic material, is directly proportional to the
energy that can be dissipated per cycle of oscillation in the damping unit. Thus, to achieve
maximum damping for a given material, the loss tangent should be made as great as possible.
Over time, it was possible for the loss tangent to decrease.
• Average stiffness
• The stiffness of a damping unit was defined as the force it would take to produce a
deformation of 0.020 in. in the viscoelastic material. The loss tangent is also directly
proportional to the stiffness. Over time, it was possible for the stiffness to decrease.
• Damping of building sway motion in WTC 1 was achieved primarily from two sources:
(1) intrinsic damping by the building structure and (2) damping from the viscoelastic
damping units. In the design of the damping units, the intrinsic damping was assumed to be
approximately 2 percent of critical damping.
• In the design, the contribution of the damping units to the total damping was assumed to be
about 0.6 to 0.7 percent of critical damping.
The report concluded that based on the then available studies, the integrity of the damping units was
good, and that no action was required at that time beyond the routine testing of the damping units.
The inspections listed in Table 3–24 were performed on WTC 1 after the terrorist bombing on
February 16, 1993. The reports on each of these inspections can be found in WTCI-67-L.8
Table 3–24. Summary of inspections performed on WTC 1 after the terrorist bombing on
February 16, 1993.
Date Company Inspection
05/14/93 LERA Level B2 and surrounding area. Bowed column 324
above Level B2; missing and bowed diagonals
between Column 324 (Level B2) and Column 327
(Level B1); Crack at column 324 splice; bent
spandrels and damaged floor beam connections.
Sept. 1993 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Overall observation of damage due to explosion.
10/20/93 Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates Investigation of plaza level cracks.
11/22/93 Proto Mfg. Ltd. Stress measurements of Level B2 columns.
12/08/93 Lucius Pitkin Inc. Examination of box column and diagonal beam repair.
10/10/94 LERA Memo on repair of concrete masonry unit wall.
A summary of the damage observations and a detailed discussion of the repairs made due to damage from
the 1993 bombing is given in Chapter 4 of this report, which discusses the significant modifications and
repairs that were made to WTC 1, 2, and 7.
After the repairs were completed on WTC 1, Lucius Pitkin, Inc. was requested to perform an ultrasonic
thickness survey of box columns and an ultrasonic flaw detection survey of the diagonal and beam weld
repairs that were made (Lucius Pitkin 1993). On level B1, thickness measurements were made on
existing columns 345, 348, and 351 on a 2 in. grid pattern at areas along all four column faces and at
various elevations as specified by LERA. Ultrasonic flaw detection surveys were performed on full
penetration butt welds of newly erected diagonal bracing repairs at columns 321, 324, and 327 between
8
NIST WTC investigation catalog number.
levels B1 and B2 and on butt and fillet welds of beam repairs at columns 321 and 327 between levels B1
and B2. Ultrasonic flaw detection included scans of base metal on both sides of the weld for a distance of
1 ft for the full width of the plate. No indication of laminations was found on any of the new welds.
The PANYNJ commissioned various inspection programs during the occupancy of WTC 1, 2, and 7. The
goal of these programs was to determine the condition of the structural systems in these buildings.
Facility Condition Survey Programs were performed from 1990 through 2000 for WTC 1, 2, and 7. The
following is a list of the structural elements that were inspected in WTC 1 and WTC 2:
• Core columns (including column splices and lateral bracing below the 7th floor)
• Space frame (i.e., hat truss, including framing members and connections)
• Floor systems (including floor slabs and decks, trusses, rolled beams, bridging, and
connections)
The following is a list of the structural elements that were inspected in WTC 7:
• Foundation
• Framing (column splices, wind bracing systems, and interior beam connections)
• Floor slabs
A Due Diligence Physical Condition Survey was commissioned by the PANYNJ for WTC 1 and WTC 2
in 2000. On-site evaluations were performed during this survey to assess the general physical condition of
the property, as it existed at that time.
An inspection program to detect, record, and correct any signs of distress, deterioration, or deformation
that could signal structural problems was implemented by PANYNJ in 1986 for WTC 1 and WTC 2. This
program for structural integrity contained detailed guidelines on inspection, record-keeping, and follow-
up procedures.
The program included inspection or monitoring of the following items, among other things, in WTC 1
and WTC 2:
• Space usage
• Accessible columns, including exterior box columns at locations of spandrel intersections and
“tree” junctions below floor 7 and above floor 1 (Plaza Level)
• Bracing at exterior column line below elevation 294 ft 0 in., and in WTC 2 only, the transfer
trusses below floor 1 under exterior columns
• Steel framing, slabs, and the like where exposed for general repairs or tenant remodeling
• Damping units
• Fire stairs
In general, the structural integrity inspections found that the structural systems of WTC 1, 2, and 7 were
in good condition. The inspection consultants made numerous routine and some priority
recommendations for repairs to the PANYNJ, as outlined in the above sections of this report. As noted
above, it is evident that the PANYNJ did not complete action on some of these recommendations. Also,
according to the PANYNJ, all of the construction records on repairs following the inspections were lost
on September 11, 2001. Thus, it cannot be determined whether all of the recommended repairs were
performed.
Table 3–25 gives a chronological summary of the locations where fireproofing was reported to be missing
in WTC 1, 2, and 7, based on the findings from the applicable inspection programs.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7.
Inspection
Date Program Building(s) Location/Description
April Port Authority WTC 2 • Several small regions and a few large areas of fireproofing was
1990 Facility Condition found missing in elevator shafts 1–4, 8–13, 16, 18–21, 23, 24,
Survey Program – 31, 35, 40, 42, 47, 52, and 58 (see Table B1 in the inspection
WTC 2 report for floor levels that were inspected in these shafts).
• 8 in. wide by 1 ft-6 in. long area of fireproofing was found
missing on top flange of beam between shafts 30 and 31 on
floor 22.
• 100% of fireproofing was found missing on south face of
Column 908 between floors 27 and 29 in Shaft 1.
• On floors 1–6, fireproofing was found missing on the floor
framing at various locations.
• Hairline cracks were found in the concrete beam encasement
(fireproofing) at scattered locations on all four mechanical
equipment room levels.
October Port Authority WTC 1 • Missing fireproofing was found at various locations on the
1991 Facility Condition exterior wall columns and spandrel plates (exact locations were
Survey Program – not given in the report).
WTC 1 • Several small areas and a few large areas of fireproofing was
found missing from steel beams and columns in elevator shafts
2, 11, 12, 15, 26, 35, 43, 52, 62, 67, 77, 80, and 90 (see
Table B-1 in the inspection report for floor levels that were
inspected in these shafts).
• Fireproofing was found missing on a connection between a core
column and a floor beam on floor 30 (exact location was not
given in the report).
• Small areas of fireproofing were found missing from the floor
framing at scattered locations on floors 9 through 107 (exact
locations were not given in the report).
• Fireproofing was found missing on many damping units on
floors 9 through 107 (exact locations were not given in the
report).
• On 43rd floor, fireproofing was found missing on an area of
25 ft by 60 ft on the underside of metal deck between column
lines 351 to 359 and 411 to 428. Fireproofing was also found
missing on the floor beams in this area.
• On the 77th floor, fireproofing was found missing on an
approximately 100 sq ft area of metal deck.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
October SII Report on Bracing WTC 1 and • Between columns 148 and 151 of WTC 2 at the
1991 Below Elevation WTC 2 underside of Level B1, CMU wall acting as fireproofing
294 ft 0 in. was removed to allow pipes to pass through.
• Between columns 154 and 157 of WTC 2 at Level B2,
CMU wall acting as fireproofing was removed for a
doorway opening.
• Between columns 133 and 136 of WTC 2 at the
underside of Level B1, CMU wall acting as fireproofing
was removed for a doorway opening.
• Between columns 154 and 157 of WTC 2 between
LevelsB5 and B6, CMU wall acting as fireproofing was
removed for a doorway opening.
• Some degree of damage was found on all of the spray-on
fireproofing on the diagonal bracing members between
Levels B4 and B5 in both WTC 1 and WTC 2.
• Fireproofing (CMU and spray-on) was found missing at
the intersection of diagonal bracing members G120B,
G121B, and column 139 on Level B6 in WTC 2.
• CMU fireproofing was found missing at the intersection
of diagonal bracing member G119B and column 130 on
Level B6 in WTC 2.
• Fireproofing (CMU and spray-on) was found missing at
the intersection of diagonal bracing member G418B and
column 421 on Level B5 in WTC 2.
• At the base of column 357 on Level B6 in WTC 1, CMU
fireproofing was found missing.
• Damaged fireproofing due to flooding was found at the
intersection of diagonal bracing member G320A and
column 324 on Level B6 in WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing on the transfer truss
members located between column 242 and 248 on
Level B1 in WTC 2.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
October SII Report on Hat WTC 1 and • Fireproofing that was removed during the Facility
1992 Trusses WTC 2 Condition Survey inspections performed in 1990 and
1991 was not repaired.
• Fireproofing was found missing on two columns of the
elevator machine room on floor 110 of WTC 2.
• Considerable damage was found to gypsum wallboard
acting as fireproofing between column lines 806 and 807
on floor 107 in WTC 2.
• Gypsum wallboard acting as fireproofing was found
missing around columns 903 and 904 on floor 110 in
WTC 2.
• Damaged gypsum wallboard acting as fireproofing was
found around columns 707 and 708 on floor 108 in
WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the steel
members: (a) between columns 804 and 905 on floor
108 in WTC 1; (b) between columns 701 and 801 on
floor 108 in WTC 1; (c) between columns 707 and 708
on floor 110 in WTC 2; (d) between columns 903 and
904 on floor 110 in WTC 2; (e) between columns 702
and 703 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (f) between columns
802 and 803 on floor 109 in WTC 1; (g) between
columns 704 and 804A on floor 110 of WTC 1; (h)
between columns 807 and 908 on floor 108 of WTC 1;
(i) between columns 608 and 708 on floor108 of WTC
1; (j) between columns 1004 and 1005 on floor 108 of
WTC 1; (k) between columns 603 and 606 on floor 107
of WTC 2; (l) between columns 331 and 1004 on floor
110 of WTC 2; (m) between columns 605 and 705 on
floor 108 of WTC 1; (n) between columns 802 and 803
on floor 109 of WTC 1; and, (o) between columns 704
and 804A on floor 110 of WTC 1.
• Extensive gypsum wallboard damage was found
between columns 904 and 1004 on floor 110 in WTC 1.
Other gypsum wallboard damage was found at scattered
locations on floors 108-110 in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
November SII Report on Floor WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing on some steel members
1992 Framing Over WTC 2 in WTC 2 (exact locations were not specified in the
Tenant/Mechanical report).
Areas
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
November SII Report on Floor WTC 1 and • CMU fireproofing was found missing on Levels B2 and
1992 Framing Over WTC 2 B4 of WTC 2 next to the central corridor.
Tenant/Mechanical • Fireproofing was found not be reapplied after asbestos
Areas removal on floors 9, 10, and 12 (see Appendix A of SII
report for exact locations).
• Fireproofing was found missing on some beams in the
core area on floors 15 and 48 in WTC 2. Fireproofing
was also found missing on the undersides of metal deck
and top chords of floor trusses (exact locations were not
specified in the report).
January SII Report on WTC 1 and • Spalling and missing fireproofing was found on the steel
1993 Accessible Columns WTC 2 members in the express elevator shafts in both towers
(members and locations were not specified in the report).
• Large areas of fireproofing were found missing on the
faces of columns 606 and 607 in WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing at the splice location of
column 701 in WTC 1.
• Isolated areas of spalled fireproofing were found on
members in the local elevator shafts (members and
locations were not specified in the report).
February SII Report on Hat WTC 1 and • Fireproofing that was removed during the Facility
1995 Trusses WTC 2 Condition Survey inspections performed in 1990 and
1991 was not repaired.
• Damaged gypsum wallboard was found at column 704
on floor 109 in WTC 1.
• Damaged gypsum wallboard was found between
columns 904 and 1004 on floor 110 of WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing at the following
connections: (a) column 904 on floor 108 of WTC 2; (b)
between columns 804 and 904 on floor 108 of WTC 2;
and (c) Between columns 604 and 704 on floor 108 of
WTC 2.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
February SII Report on Hat WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the steel
1995 Trusses WTC 2 members: (a) between columns 503 and 504 on floor
(continued) 109 in WTC 1; (b) between columns 702 and 703 on
floor 109 in WTC 1; (c) between columns 705 and 706
on floor 110 in WTC 1; (d) between columns 707 and
709 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (e) between columns 702
and 703 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (f) between columns
801 and 802 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (g) between
columns 802 and 803 on floor 109 in WTC 1; (h)
between columns 803 and 805 on floor 110 in WTC 1;
(i) between columns 701 and 801 on floor 108 of WTC
1; (j) between columns 329-1005, 332-1004, and 903-
1003 on floor 110 in WTC 1; (k) between columns 804
and 904 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (l) between columns
504-604, and 704-804 on floor 109 in WTC 1; (m)
between columns 704 and 804A on floor 110 in WTC 1;
(n) between columns 604-704 and 604-705 on floor 109
in WTC 1; (o) between columns 805 and 905 on floor
109 in WTC 1; (p) between columns 608-708, 305-310,
234-238, and 149-508 on floor 108 in WTC 1; (q)
between columns 504 and 506 on floor 109 in WTC 2;
(r) between columns 603 and 606 on floor 107 in WTC
2; (s) between columns 706 and 707 on floors 108 and
110 in WTC 2; (t) between columns 802-803 and 805-
806 on floor 108 in WTC 2; (u) between columns 1004
and 1005 on floor 110 in WTC 2; (v) between columns
1005 and 1006 on floor 108 in WTC 2; (w) between
columns 331-1104, 804-904, and 904-1004 on floor 110
in WTC 2; and (x) between columns 903 and 904 on
floor 110 of WTC 2.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
March 1995 SII Report on Bracing WTC 1 and • Fireproofing (CMU and spray-on) was found missing or
Below Elevation WTC 2 damaged on the steel members in WTC 1: (a) between
294 ft 0 in. columns 101-103, 121-124, 131-136, 133-139, 148-151,
224-227, 236-239, 245-248, 248-251, 257-259, and 401-
403 on Levels B5-B6; (b) between columns 121-124,
127-130, 148-151, 142-145, 139-142, 136-139, 145-151,
151-154, and 251-254 on Levels B2-B3; (c) between
columns 254-257, 303-306, 306-309, and 445-448 on
Levels B4-B5; (d) between columns 251-254, 348-351,
401-406, 406-409, and 434-454 on Levels B1-B2; and,
(e) between columns 454-457 on Levels B3-B4.
• CMU fireproofing was found removed at column 409
between Levels B5 and B6 in WTC 1.
• CMU fireproofing was removed between columns 433
and 436 between Levels B4 and B6 in WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing at column 421 between
Levels B4 and B5 and at column 427 between Levels B5
and B6 in WTC 1.
• Fireproofing (CMU and spray-on) was found missing or
damaged on the steel members in WTC 2: (a) between
columns 115-118, 139-142, 142-145, 145-148, and 212-
218 on Levels B5-B6; (b) between columns 218-221,
330-333, and 342-345 on Levels B4-B5; (c) between
columns 227-230 on Levels B3-B4; (d) between
columns 133-136, 218-221, 227-230, 436-439, and 439-
442, and at column 101 on Levels B1-B2; (e) between
columns 242-248 between level B1 and floor 1; (f)
between columns 139-148 and 327-330 on Levels B2-
B3; (g) between columns 412-415, 415-421, and 421-
424 on Levels B4-B6; and, (h) between columns 321-
324, 439-442, 448-451, and 451-454 on Levels B4-B5.
• CMU fireproofing was removed at column 252 between
Level B1 and floor 1 in WTC 2.
• CMU fireproofing was removed between columns 418
and 421 and between columns 433 and 436 between
Levels B3 and B4 in WTC 2.
• CMU fireproofing was removed between columns 454
and 457 between Levels B2 and B3 in WTC 2.
• CMU fireproofing was removed between columns 412
and 415 and between column 115 and 118 between
Levels B1 and B2 in WTC 2.
• CMU fireproofing was removed between columns 154
and 157 between Levels B5 and B6 in WTC 2.
April 1995 SII Report on Framing WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found not be reapplied after asbestos
Over Tenant Areas WTC 2 removal on floors 17 and 22.
• Fireproofing was found missing on floor members at
multiple locations in WTC 1 and WTC 2.
• Large areas of fireproofing were found missing on the
underside of the floor trusses on floor 38 in WTC 1.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
April 1995 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Large areas of fireproofing were found missing in
Accessible Columns WTC 2 service elevators 49A, 49 B, 50A, and 50 B in both
towers.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the
following columns in WTC 1: (a) column 901 between
floors 2-44; (b) column 907 at Level B2 and floors 9,
16-20, 28-31, 34, and 36-38; (c) column 906 at Level
B2; (d) column 903 at floors 31, 33, 34, 38, and 39; (e)
column 902 at Level B2 and floors 39, 41, and 43; (f)
column 601 between floors 2-78; (g) column 605
between floors 3-5; (h) column 606 at floors 8, 11, 19,
25-30, and 43-45; (i) column 607 between floors 2-78;
(j) column 608 between floors 2-78; (k) column 704
between Level B1 and floor 78; (l) column 603and 606
at Level B2; (m) column 704 at Levels B1-B3; and, (n)
columns 802 and 905 at Level B3.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the
following columns in WTC 2: (a) column 908 on floors
27-31 and 33-36; (b) column 907 at floor 21; (c) column
902 at floors 7, 20, 22, 25, 34-36, 39, and 40; (d) column
901 at floors 15 and 31; (e) column 601 at floors 25 and
35-37; (f) column 602 at floors 7, 10, 12, 14,15, 27, 42,
48, 63, 66, and 75; (g) column 603 at floors 3 and 25;
(h) columns 605 and 606 at Level B2; (i) column 607 at
floors 29, 30, 47, 57, 59, 64, and 74; (j) column 608 at
floors 41, 45, and 80; (k) column 703 at Level B6 and at
floors 5, 17, and 48; (l) column 704 at Level B6 and at
floors 48 and 74; and, (m) column 903 at Level B2.
April 1996 SII Report on Framing WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found tearing away from the underside
Over Mechanical WTC 2 of the metal deck on F08 in WTC 2.
Areas • Damaged fireproofing was found on a beam in the
southwest corner of the core on floor 107 in WTC 1.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged at many
locations on the floor members supporting floor 75 in
WTC 1.
• A 3 ft by 3 ft hole was found in the gypsum wallboard in
the core area on floor 41 in WTC 1.
• Damaged CMU fireproofing for the perimeter diagonal
bracing at Level B6 was found at 5 locations in WTC 1
and 3 locations in WTC 2.
• Damaged CMU fireproofing was found on 2 columns in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 columns in WTC 2 at Level B6.
• Fireproofing was found missing at 3 locations in the hat
truss on floor 108 in WTC 2.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
May 1996 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing at the column bases that
Accessible Columns WTC 2 were inspected in the elevator pits in both towers.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
in the following elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 6A,
floor 77, column 904; (b) Shaft 17A, floor 1, column
604; (c) Shaft 34A, floor 15, column 706; (d) Shaft 35A,
floors 6-7, column 805; (e) Shafts 69A and 70A,
throughout entire shaft, columns 802 and 702; (f) Shaft
88A, floor 91, column 802; and (g) Shaft 95A, floors
98-100, column 706.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
in the following elevator shafts of WTC 2: (a) Shaft
18B, floor 3, column 605; (b) Shaft 19B, floors 2, 5, 46,
55, and 73, column 606; (c) Shaft 20B, floors 22, 47, 49,
57, and 64, column 606; (d) Shaft 21B, floor 21, column
607; (e) Shafts 34B and 35 B, throughout entire shafts,
columns 706 and 805; (f) Shaft 34B, floor 23, column
702; (g) Shaft 43B, floor 6, column 702; (h) Shaft 62B,
floor 57, column 805; (i) Shaft 70B, floors 69 and 72,
column 702; (j) Shaft 88B, throughout entire shaft,
column 802; and, (k) Shaft 96B, floor 101, column 706.
May 1996 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
(continued) Accessible Columns WTC 2 connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 34A, floors 22-23,
column 706; (b) Shaft 35A, floors 11 and 17, column
805; (c) Shafts 42A and 43A, throughout entire shaft,
columns 702 and 802; (d) Shafts 61A and 62A,
throughout entire shaft, columns 706 and 805; (e) Shafts
69A and 70A, throughout entire shaft, columns 702 and
802; (f) Shafts 78A and 79A, floor 76, column 707; (g)
Shaft 89A, Levels B1-B3, column 702; and, (h) Shafts
96A and 97A, throughout entire shafts, columns 707 and
806.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 2: (a) Shaft 7B, throughout
entire shaft, column 903; (b) Shaft 18B, floors 3 and 13,
column 605; (c) Shaft 19B, throughout entire shaft,
column 606; (d) Shaft 20B, floors 12, 13, 55, 57, 62, 67,
70, 74, and 77, column 606; (e) Shaft 34B, floor 24,
column 706; (f) Shaft 42B, floor 32, column 702; (g)
Shaft 43B, throughout entire shaft, column 702; (h)
Shafts 61B and 62B, throughout entire shafts, columns
706 and 805; (i) Shaft 88B, throughout entire shaft,
column 802; (j) Shaft 89B, floors, 82, 91, 96 and up, (k)
column 702; Shaft 89B, throughout entire shaft, column
802; and, (l) Shaft 96B, floor 77, column 706.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
April 1997 Port Authority Facility WTC 7 • Fireproofing was found missing on steel framing at
Condition Survey floors 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 19, 23, 24, 26, and 44. Largest
Program – WTC 7 areas of missing fireproofing were found on floor 5
above the Main Lobby and floor 2 above the Loading
Dock area.
May 1997 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing at the column bases that
Accessible Columns WTC 2 were inspected in the elevator pits in both towers.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
in the following elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft
10A, floors 3, 9, 10, 22, and 27, column 902; (b) Shaft
11A, floors 8 and 30-33, column 901; (c) Shaft 24A,
floor 4, column 807; (d) Shaft 40A, floors 3 and 33,
column 702; (e) Shaft 51A, floor 45, column 807; (f)
Shaft 52A, floors 45 and 53, column 708; (g) Shaft 57A,
floors 44, 45, and 61, column 806; (h) Shaft 58A, floors
60 and 61, column 707; (i) Shaft 84A, floors 82 and 91,
column 702; (j) Shaft 90A, floors 79, 91, and 95,
column 703; and (k) Shaft 91A, floor 100, column 803.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
in the following elevator shafts of WTC 2: (a) Shaft
24B, floor 16, column 807; (b) Shaft 25B, floors 2, 11,
and 14, column 708; (c) Shaft 30B, floor 23, column
806; (d) Shaft 31B, floors 2-4, 6, 15, 25, column 707; (e)
Shaft 36B, floors 8 and 15, column 801; (f) Shaft 37B,
floor 32, column 701; (g) Shaft 48B, floors 35-41,
column 905; (h) Shaft 52B, floors 45 and 51, column
708; (i) Shaft 57B, floor 52, column 806; (j) Shaft 58B,
floors 57 and 60, column 707; (k) Shaft 67B, floor 47,
column 702; (l) Shaft 68B, floor 44, column 802; (m)
Shaft 90B, floors 94, 96, 98, and 99, column 703; and,
(n) Shaft 91B, floors 84, 96, and 98, column 803.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 10A, floors 16 and
22, column 902; (b) Shaft 24A, floors 2, 3, and 9,
columns 708 and 807; (c) Shaft 41A, floors 19-24,
column 802; and, (d) Shaft 84A, floor 81, column 702.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 2: (a) Shaft 24B, floors 2, 5, and
12, column 807; (b) Shaft 48B, throughout entire shaft,
column 905; (c) Shaft 57B, floors 44 and 55, column
806; (d) Shaft 64B, floor 49, column 701; (e) Shaft 68B,
floors 44, 47, and 56, column 802; (f) Shaft 88B, floors
82 and 84,column 802; and (g) Shaft 90B, floor 98,
column 703.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
December SII Report on Floor WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the floor
1997 Framing Over Tenant WTC 2 framing on the following floors in WTC 1: 15, 20, 28,
Areas 92, 95, 96, and 97. On floors 95-97, the fireproofing was
found to be less than 0.25 in. thick. On the other floors,
the fireproofing appeared to be fairly new, and was
found to be approximately 1.5 to 2.0 in. thick.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on the floor
framing on the following floors in WTC 2: 35, 37, 38,
57, 77, 78, 86, 87, 92, and 93. On floors 77, 86, 87,
92,and 93, the fireproofing was found to be less than
0.25 in. thick. On floors 35 and 57, the fireproofing
appeared to be fairly new, and was found to be
approximately 1.5 to 2.0 in. thick.
May 1998 SII Report on Plaza WTC 1 and • In WTC 1, approximately 2 to 3% of the fireproofing on
Level Box Columns WTC 2 the plaza level columns was found to be deteriorated
and/or missing.
• Fireproofing was found to be deteriorated and/or missing
on the column and seated beam connections at columns
236, 242, and 248 in WTC 1.
• In WTC 2, approximately 1 to 2% of the fireproofing on
the plaza level columns was found to be deteriorated
and/or missing.
May 1998 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing at the column bases that
Accessible Columns WTC 2 were inspected in the elevator pits in both towers.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
in the following elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 5A,
floor 7, column 906; (b) Shaft 29A, floor 11, column
806; (c) Shaft 30A, floors 8 and 24, column 806; (d)
Shaft 46A, floors 32 and 40, column 703; (e) Shaft 47A,
floors 19, 23, 26, and 32, column 803; (f) Shaft 48A,
floors 2-17, 18, and 29-40, column 905; (g) Shaft 56A,
floors 45 and 46, column 806; (h) Shaft 67A, floor 48,
column 702; (i) Shaft 68A, floors, 48, 66, and 67,
column 802; (j) Shaft 73A, floor 43, column 703; and
(k) Shaft 78A, floors 77, 78, and 86, column 707.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
May 1998 SII Report on WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on columns
(continued) Accessible Columns WTC 2 in the following elevator shafts of WTC 2: (a) Shaft 3B,
floors 7 and 39, column 907; (b) Shaft 4B, floors 3, 5
and 23, column 906; (c) Shaft 8B, floor 14, column 903;
(d) Shaft 9B, floors 10, 18, 23, and 34, column 902; (e)
Shaft 16B, throughout entire shaft, column 603; (f) Shaft
17B, floors 28, 31, 38, 45, 52, 58, 59, 66, 69, and 73,
column 604; (g) Shaft 28B, Level B1, column 707; (h)
Shaft 40B, Level B1, column 702; (i) Shaft 41B, floor 2,
column 802; (j) Shaft 46B, Level B1 and floors 2, 8, 13,
17, 20, and 35, column 705; (k) Shaft 47B, floors 4, 7,
17, 31, and 40, column 803; (l) Shaft 74B, floor 66,
column 803; (m) Shaft 83B, floor 89, column 701; (n)
Shaft 85B, floors 83, 89, and 93, column 802; and, (o)
Shaft 94B, floors 77, 101, 104, and 106.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 28A, throughout
entire shaft, column 707; (b) Shaft 29A, floors 9 and 12,
column 806; (c) Shaft 30A, floors 10 and 25, column
806; (d) Shaft 31A, throughout entire shaft, column 707;
(e) Shaft 46A, throughout entire shaft, column 703; (f)
Shaft 47A, floors 16, 17, 32, and 34, column 803; (g)
Shaft 55A, floors 44-49 and 56, column 707; (h) Shaft
56A, floor 48, column 806; (i) Shaft 67A, throughout
entire shaft, column 802; (j) Shaft 68A, floor 61, column
802; (k) Shaft 78A, floor 82, column 707; and (l) Shaft
79A, throughout entire shaft, column 806.
• Fireproofing was found missing or damaged on
connecting steel beams to columns in the following
elevator shafts of WTC 1: (a) Shaft 4B, floors 7, 15, 23,
31, 39, and 40, column 906; (b) Shaft 8B, floors 14, 20,
and 45, column 903; (c) Shaft 9B, floor 34, column 902;
(d) Shaft 16B, floors 2-48, column 603; (e) Shaft 17B,
floors 28, 40, 48, and 69, column 604; (f) Shaft 40B,
throughout entire shaft, column 702; (g) Shaft 46B,
throughout entire shaft, column 703; (h) Shaft 47B,
floors 6, 9, 13, 15, 27, 31, 33, and 34, column 803; (i)
Shaft 82B, floors 86 and 87, column 801; (j) Shaft 83B,
floor 86, column 701; (l) Shaft 84B, floor 94, column
702; (m) Shaft 85B, floors 78, 79, and 86-88, column
802; (n) Shaft 94B, floors 89 and 101, column 805; and
(p) Shaft 95B, floors 81, 87, 94, and 101, column 706.
Table 3–25. Summary of locations where fireproofing was found missing during
structural inspections of WTC 1, 2, and 7 (continued).
Date Inspection Program Building(s) Location/Description
May 1999 SII Report on Floor WTC 1 and • Fireproofing was found missing on four perimeter braces
Framing Over WTC 2 in Level B6 of WTC 2. Most of other fireproofing on
Mechanical Areas perimeter braces as reported in 1996 report was found to
be repaired.
• A 3 ft by 3 ft hole was found in the gypsum wallboard in
the core area on floor 41 in WTC 1.
• Damaged CMU fireproofing for the perimeter diagonal
bracing at Level B6 was found at 5 locations in WTC 1
and 3 locations in WTC 2.
• Damaged CMU fireproofing was found on 2 columns in
WTC 1 and WTC 2 columns in WTC 2 at Level B6.
• Fireproofing was found damaged on one of the hat truss
members on floor 108 in WTC 1. Most missing
fireproofing on hat truss members as reported in the
1996 was found to be repaired in WTC 2.
November SII Report on Floor WTC 1 and • A 6 ft length of fireproofing was found to be missing on
1999 Framing Over Tenant WTC 2 the bottom chord of one of the long-span floor trusses
Areas spanning from the core to the west wall on floor 89 in
WTC 2 (see Appendix B of SII report for exact location
of floor truss).
3.4 REFERENCES
Cerami and Associates, Inc. 1996. World Trade Center Tower I and II Floor System Natural Frequency
Test. LERA Report No. 4076. March. (part of WTCI-66-L).
LERA (Leslie E. Robertson Associates). 1995. One and Two World Trade Center Floor Frequency
Measurements. LERA Report No. 4055. April. (part of WTCI-66-L).
LERA (Leslie E. Robertson Associates). 1996. One and Two World Trade Center Damper Testing.
May. (WTCI-230-L).
Lucius Pitkin, Inc. 1993. Examination of Box Columns and Diagonal Beam Repairs – World Trade
Center, NY. Report No. ME-4525 S1. December. (part of WTCI-66-L).
Merritt & Harris, Inc. 2000. Report of Due Diligence Physical Condition Survey – World Trade Center.
December. (WTCI-6-P).
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1986. Standards for Structural Integrity
Inspection of the World Trade Center Towers A and B. Infrastructure Engineering Design Division,
Engineering Department. March. (part of WTCI-66-L).
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1990. Port Authority Facility Condition
Survey Program, World Trade Center Tower “B.” Engineering Quality Assurance Division,
Engineering Department. (WTCI-120-P).
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1991. Port Authority Facility Condition
Survey Program – World Trade Center Tower A Structure Elements. Engineering Quality Assurance
Division, Engineering Department. October. (WTCI-118-P).
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1997. Port Authority Facility Condition
Survey Program – 7 World Trade Center. Engineering Quality Assurance Division, Engineering
Department. April. (WTCI-122-P).
SHCR (Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, Robertson). 1971. Vibration Characteristics of the Floors in the
World Trade Center Towers. LERA Report No. 1012. September. (part of WTCI-66-L).
WSHJ (Worthington, Skilling, Helle, & Jackson). 1966. Part I, Final Chapter, WSHJ Wind Report.
June. (part of WTCI-68-L).
WSHJ (Worthington, Skilling, Helle, & Jackson). 1967a. Structural drawings of WTC 1 and 2. (WTCI-
50-L).
WSHJ (Worthington, Skilling, Helle, & Jackson). 1967b. The World Trade Center Report No. DU-1,
Viscoelastic Damping Units. July. (part of WTCI-67-L).
4.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter contains a summary of the significant modifications and repairs that were made to the
structural framing systems of World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 from initial occupancy to
September 11, 2001, including a discussion of the repairs that were made after the February 1993
bombing of WTC 1.
Structural modifications involving openings made in the floor slabs are listed in Table 4–1, along with a
brief description of the work that was performed with respect to the modifications.
In all of the cases cited in Table 4–1, except for the 1995 case, documents included general notes and
drawings that listed the codes, design criteria, and materials that were used in the design, and the
proposed sequence of construction. Structural calculations on the design of new structural members and
on the check of the capacities of existing structural members were included for the modifications made in
1995 and 1997. The documents for the 1999 modifications include comments made by the Tenant
Construction Review Unit of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ or Port
Authority) in regard to the project submittal. The Tenant Alteration Application Request Form, submitted
to the Port Authority on behalf of the tenant, is also included.
Smaller floor penetrations, also made in the floor slabs, are not included in Table 4–1. In 1995, a number
of openings were made in the floor slabs on levels 106 and 107 (Windows on the World Restaurant) to
allow installation of equipment (W95-1114, PANYNJ, Newark).1 The maximum opening size was
5 ft 0 in. by 2 ft 6 in., and new beams were introduced to support the beams added around the openings.
The structural engineer for this project was Leslie E. Robertson Associates (LERA). LERA was also the
structural engineer for the chiller and condenser pipe penetrations on floors 94 through 100 that were
made in 1998 for the tenant J&H Marsh & McLennan (W98-1197-02, PANYNJ, Newark). Openings
ranged in size from 6 in. diameter core holes to 1 ft 6 in. by 6 in. slab openings.
Openings in floor slabs that were subsequently closed are listed in Table 4–2. These openings were cut
primarily for stairways.
1
The Port Authority document number is given in brackets; document was obtained from PANYNJ office in Newark, NJ.
General notes and drawings were provided for the 1985 and 1987 modifications listed in the table. These
included the codes, design criteria, and materials that were used in the design, and the proposed sequence
of construction. Design of the new structural members and checks of the capacities of existing structural
members are contained in the documents for the modifications made in 1998.
Various floor members were reinforced to accommodate floor loads that were greater than the original
design loads. A summary of reinforced members is contained in Table 4–3. In the introduction to
documents submitted for the 1998 modifications, it is stated that the existing structural elements were
checked using the PANYNJ Design Guidelines and Specifications. Calculations show that the Port
Authority criteria were used for the existing loads on the floor system. The Tenant Alteration Application
Review Request Form that was submitted to the Port Authority on behalf of the tenant was also included
in the submittal package.
The explosion of February 26, 1993 occurred on the second basement level (Level B2) near the center of
the south wall of WTC 1 and adjacent to the Vista Hotel. Structural steel columns, diagonal braces, and
spandrel beams in the immediate vicinity of the blast were damaged. Concrete floor slabs at Levels B1
and B2 in the parking garage and unreinforced masonry walls were also damaged over a large area. A
discussion on the structural damage in WTC 1 caused by the blast is given below. A summary of the
damage assessment in WTC 1 at Level B1 and Level B2 can be found in the floor plans in Figs. 4–1 and
4–2, respectively.
The explosion tore out the diagonal brace between Column 324 at Level B2 and Column 327 at Level B1
and severely bent the brace between Column 324 at Level B2 and Column 321 at Level B1 (see Figs. 4–1
and 4–2) (LERA 1993a). The braces on the south face of WTC 1 that were damaged by the blast are
shown in Fig. 4–3.
Spandrel beams at Level B1 from Column 321 to 324 and from Column 324 to 327 were also damaged by
the blast. Spandrels were bowed and cracked, and some had missing bolts (LERA 1993b).
Sig. Mod. & Repairs to the Struc. Framing Sys. of WTC 1, 2, & 7
Source: Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Chapter 4
NIST NCSTAR 1-1C, WTC Investigation
Source: Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
LERA observed a crack along the edge of the field splice in Column 324, located 3 ft above Level B2,
that extended across most of the four faces of the column. Lucius Pitkin, Inc., a testing company that was
hired to perform detailed examinations of the structural steel members and welds, confirmed the crack in
Column 324. Ultrasonic testing was used to determine that the crack extended across the full width of the
weld on the south face of the column and at each end of the weld on the north face. Magnetic-particle
testing procedures were used to determine that the crack extended across the weld on the east face of the
column and the majority of the weld on the west face as well. A small inward bow above Level B2 was
also observed on the south face of this column. LERA noted that the braces and cracked column should
be repaired, but they were not critical to the structural integrity of the building (LERA 1993a).
The explosion damaged the floor beams framing into the tower side of Column 324 (see Figs. 4–1
and 4–2) (Woodson 1993). The floor beam that framed into Column 324 at Level B1 sustained a
horizontal displacement of about 2.5 in., and the beam at Level B2 had a displacement of about 1 in. The
bolted end connections of these beams also failed. Damage to floor beam connections also occurred at
Columns 321 and 324 at Levels B3 and B4.
The concrete spandrel beam at Level B3 between Columns 318 and 330 sustained damage as a result of
the blast. Similar damage occurred to the spandrel beam at Level B4 between the same columns.
The masonry walls in WTC 1 were also damaged by the explosion (Woodson 1993). The 6 in. thick walls
on the south side of WTC 1 were breached over distances of approximately 50 ft to the east and 120 ft to
the west of the blast origin. The 20 ft long masonry wall that formed part of the mechanical plenum that
was located 10 ft inside of WTC 1 (near columns 321, 324, and 327) was completely destroyed. The
masonry walls of the elevator shafts located approximately 60 ft inside of WTC 1 were also damaged.
Other masonry walls inside of WTC 1 were damaged at distances of up to 90 ft from the blast origin.
None of the damaged walls were load bearing, and none were supported at the top. The walls were built
to 1 in. below the structure above; the joint was subsequently caulked. Many of the damaged walls
deflected as though they were free at the top.
Repair Work
The diagonal bracing members between Levels B1 and B2 that were damaged by the explosion were
removed and replaced with new members, which consisted of plates that were welded together (see
Fig. 4–4). Also, new plates were added on the flanges of the diagonal between Column 312 at Level B2
and Column 315 at Level B1 (see Fig. 4–4).
New plates were added to the damaged spandrel beam at Level B1 between Columns 324 and 327 (see
Fig. 4–4 and Fig. 4–5) and between Columns 321 and 324. Also, the cracked weld on the south face of
the spandrel beam at Level B1 near Column 324 was removed and replaced (see Fig. 4–6).
LERA prescribed an eight-step procedure for repair to the crack in Column 324 immediately adjacent to
the field weld at the column splice above Level B2 (LERA 1993a). No documentation was found to
confirm that this crack was repaired according to that procedure.
The Level B1 floor beams framing into Columns 321, 324, and 327 that were damaged during the
explosion were repaired by welding new short segments of W12×53 to the existing beams (see Fig. 4–7).
New welded connections between the new beam segments and existing columns were provided.
Connections between floor beams and columns on Levels B3 and B4 were also repaired. As shown in
Fig. 4–8, the damaged connection at Level B3 was removed, and a new beam seat and clip angle were
installed at the connection between the W12×72 beam framing into Column 324. New web connection
angles were installed for the beam framing into the same column at Level B4. At Level B3, repairs were
made to the damaged bolts and to the gouge in the weld in the connection between the existing W12×72
floor beam and Column 321 (see Fig. 4–9).
Along the south face of WTC 1, the damaged concrete spandrel beams were demolished and replaced.
Figures 4–10 and 4–11 show the details of the repair between Columns 318 and 330 at Levels B3 and B4,
respectively. Similar repairs were made to the concrete spandrel between Columns 333 and 345 at
Level B3.
Columns 321, 324, and 327 were encased in 4 in. thick concrete masonry units (CMU) at the subgrade
levels after the explosion, as depicted in Fig. 4–12. According to the drawings, existing spray-on
fireproofing on spandrels and diagonals was to be repaired or patched after the columns were encased.
Source: Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Source: Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey.
Source: Part of WTCI-303-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 4−10. Repair of damaged reinforced concrete spandrel beam at Level B3 in WTC 1.
Source: Part of WTCI-303-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Figure 4−11. Repair of damaged reinforced concrete spandrel beam at Level B4 in WTC 1.
Source: Part of WTCI-303-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
Damaged concrete encasement around existing steel beams was also repaired as required. Figure 4–13
shows a typical reconstruction detail for a beam located at Level B2. The extent of concrete encasement
reconstruction at Levels B1 and B2 is shown in the drawings that were prepared by LERA
(LERA 1993c).
Other repairs were made to spandrel beams at Level B5 and to the connection between the floor beam and
Column 357 at the Concourse Level (see Figs. 4–14 and 4–15, respectively).
Lucius Pitkin, Inc. was hired to perform a thickness survey of box columns by the ultrasonic method and
an ultrasonic flaw detection survey of diagonal and beam weld repairs made at WTC 1
(Lucius Pitkin 1993). Ultrasonic thickness measurements were made at Columns 345, 348, and 351 on
Level B1. Ultrasonic flaw detection measurements were made on full penetration butt welds of new
diagonal bracing repairs at Columns 321, 324, and 327 at Levels B1 and B2. Additional measurements
were made on butt and fillet welds of beam repairs at Columns 321 and 327 between Levels B1 and B2.
Results of the thickness survey are given in Table 1 and Fig. 1 of the Lucius Pitkin report
(Lucius Pitkin 1993). Results of the ultrasonic flaw survey are given in Figs. 2 through 4 of the same
report. No conclusions were made in the report on the adequacy of the test results.
Source: Part of WTCI-158-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey.
Figure 4−13. Reconstruction details for existing encased steel beams in WTC 1.
Source: Part of WTCI-303-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey.
Source: Part of WTCI-303-STB. Reproduced with permission of The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey.
An FM transmitter station was installed on the 110th floor in 1997 for WNYC-FM (W96-1171, PANYNJ,
Newark). The structural engineer for this project was J. C. Westrick & Associates. The documentation for
this modification includes: (1) the Tenant Alteration Application Review Request Form submitted to the
Port Authority on behalf of the tenant, (2) Port Authority comments made on the project submittal, (3)
J. C. Westrick & Associates comments in response to Port Authority comments, and (4) a letter dated
January 14, 1997 from the Supervisor of the Tenant Alteration Application Unit of the Port Authority to
the Vice President of Operations and Engineering at WNYC-FM stating that review on the project was
complete.
In June of 2000, structural calculations were submitted by LERA for the WABC Control Room on
floor 110 (W00-1180, PANYNJ, Newark). A new transmitter and ductwork were suspended from the
existing floor system at this level. The documentation for this modification includes: (1) the Tenant
Alteration Application Review Request Form submitted to the Port Authority on behalf of the tenant, (2)
Port Authority comments made on the project submittal, (3) LERA comments in response to Port
Authority comments, and (4) a letter of approval from the Port Authority dated May 30, 2001.
Although no major modifications were made to the existing structural members because of the two
projects cited above, they illustrate that the guidelines set forth by the Port Authority for alterations to the
structural systems of the WTC buildings were followed (see Chapter 2 of this report for information on
the Port Authority guidelines for inspection, repair, and modifications).
Structural modifications involving openings made in the floor slabs are listed in Table 4–4,which includes
a brief description of the work that was performed with respect to the modifications.
In all of the cases cited in Table 4–4, except for the 1987 case, general notes and drawings in the
documents listed the codes, design criteria, and materials that were used in the design and the proposed
sequence of construction. Structural calculations were included for the modifications made in 1993, 1998,
and 1999 (floors 25 and 26). The design of the new structural members and a check of the capacities of
existing structural members were included in the calculations.
For the modifications performed in 1997, the documentation includes the Tenant Alterations Application
Review Request Form and comments from the Port Authority in regard to the submittal. Similar
documents are included in the submittal package for the modifications performed in 1998 and 1999 (work
done on 88th and 89th floors).
Smaller floor penetrations, the largest of which was 17 in. in diameter, were made on floor 110 in 1979
for Sage Gray Todd & Sims (LERA Box 8). The structural engineer was LERA.
Openings in floor slabs that were subsequently closed are listed in Table 4–5. The design of the new
structural members and a check of the adequacy of existing structural members were included in
calculations in all cases.
A summary of the structural members that were reinforced in WTC 2 is given in Table 4–6. The Tenant
Alteration Application Review Request Form is included in the documentation for the modifications
performed in 1999.
In 1994, the slab in the elevator lobby on floor 90 (bounded by core columns 702, 703, 902, and 903) was
repaired for Fiduciary Trust for some unknown reason (WTCI-66-L). LERA was the structural engineer
for this repair, which consisted of demolishing and replacing a 5 in. lightweight aggregate concrete slab in
this area.
A summary of the major modifications and repairs made to WTC 7 is given below. All modifications
were to be made in accordance with the PANYNJ Tenant Construction Review Manual (see Chapter 2 of
this report).
Structural modifications due to new loading requirements are listed in Table 4–7. Included is a brief
description of the work that was performed with respect to the modifications. In most cases, members
were reinforced to accommodate floor loads that were greater than the loads for which these members
were originally designed.
In all of the cases cited in Table 4–7, structural calculations were included on the check of the existing
structural members and on the design of new structural members. The documents related to the 1988
modifications include comments made by the Tenant Construction Review Unit of the Port Authority in
regard to the project submittal and responses from the structural engineer to the Port Authority on these
comments. Similar documents are available for the modifications made in 1999 on the 40th floor, which
include a copy of the Tenant Construction or Alteration Application that was submitted to the Port
Authority on behalf of the tenant.
Table 4–7. Modifications made due to new loading requirements in WTC 7 (continued).
Structural
Date Floor(s) Tenant Engineer Description of Modification Reference
1993 28 Salomon Office of Eight additional shear studs were added to W93-7138
Brothers Inc. Irwin G. an existing W16x26 beam located in the PANYNJ
Cantor mechanical/electrical room to support new (Newark)
equipment loads.
1993 7, 8 American Office of A new W12x14 beam located on the west W93-7233
Express Bank James side of the building between column lines PANYNJ
Ruderman 7 and 8 was added on the 8th floor to (Newark)
support a new CMU wall.
1994 7 through 29 Salomon Office of Bottom cover plates were added to twenty- WTCI-166-
Brothers Inc. Irwin G. two existing beams between columns 5 P Disk 4
Cantor and 25 on the south side of the building on W93-7232
each floor between levels 7 and 29 to
support larger live loads. Similarly, bottom
cover plates were added to eight beams on
the east side of the building between
column lines 31 and 37 on each of these
floors.
1995 20 ITT Hartford The Cantor Bottom cover plates were added to the W95-7153
Seinuk existing W16x26 beams along column WTCI-197-
Group lines 23 and 25 to support new filing P
cabinets. Similarly, WT sections were
welded to the bottom of the existing
W16x26 beams that framed in between the
above-mentioned beams.
WT sections were welded to the bottom of
the existing W16x26 beam east of column
line 18 and the W16x26 beam on column
line 19 to support new filing cabinets.
Similarly, a bottom cover plate was added
to the existing W16x26 beam east of
column line 19.
1999 37 Salomon Gilsanz A new W16x40 beam was added between W99-7134
Smith Barney Murray two existing W14x22 beams along column PANYNJ
Steficek lines 76 and 77 to support a new high- (Newark)
density filing system.
1999 13 The Standard The Cantor Ten additional shear studs were added to W99-7137-
Chartered Seinuk an existing W4x55 beam to support 02
Bank Group additional loads from a new file room and PANYNJ
a new UPS/LAN room. Exact location of (Newark)
this beam could not be determined from
the documentation.
1999 40 Salomon Gilsanz Four new W18x35 beams were added to W99-7172
Smith Barney Murray support the new high-density files near PANYNJ
Steficek column 76. WT4x20 sections were welded (Newark)
to the bottom of two existing W14x22
beams that supported the files. New
W16x50 beams were connected below to
the existing W36x135 girders that
supported the beams in this area.
Table 4–7. Modifications made due to new loading requirements in WTC 7 (continued).
Structural
Date Floor(s) Tenant Engineer Description of Modification Reference
2000 31 Salomon Gilsanz Top and bottom cover plates were added to W00-7122
Smith Barney Murray an existing W27x94 beam between PANYNJ
Steficek columns 77 and 80 to support a new high- (Newark)
density filing system. The existing beam
connections were also reinforced with
stiffened seat connections.
2000 38 Salomon Gilsanz Bottom cover plates were added to W00-7224
Smith Barney Murray existing W14x22 beams between columns PANYNJ
Steficek 76 and 77 and between columns 77 and 78 (Newark)
to support a new high-density filing
system. Also, the following existing
girders were reinforced with bottom cover
plates: (1) W36x135 between columns 76
and 79, (2) W27x94 between columns 77
and 80, and (3) W27x84 between columns
78 and 81.
2000 39 Salomon Gilsanz New W14x53 beams were added under W00-7202
Smith Barney Murray each rail of a new high-density filing PANYNJ
Steficek system in lieu of reinforcing existing (Newark)
W14x22 beams between columns 76
and 77.
It is stated in PANYNJ (1997) that the 41st and 43rd floor slabs were completely removed on the east side
of the building to accommodate the trading floors for Salomon Brothers Inc.
According to The Office of Irwin G. Cantor P.C. (1989), columns 76, 78, 79, 80, and 81 were reinforced
with plates that ran from the top of the 39th floor to the underside of the 40th floor due to the removal of
the floor slab at the 39th floor. Similarly, column 74 was reinforced with plates that ran from the top of
the 43rd floor to the underside of the 44th floor due to the removal of the floor slab at the 43rd floor.
Structural modifications involving openings made in the floor slabs are listed in Table 4–8, including a
brief description of the work that was performed with respect to the modifications.
Structural calculations on the design of new structural members and on the check of the existing structural
members were included for the modification made in 1989 (3rd floor) and 1990.
Modifications made to beam webs and flanges are summarized in Table 4–9 including a brief description
of the work that was performed with respect to the modifications.
A list of structural modifications that were made to WTC 7 prior to April of 1997 is given in Chapter IV,
Section A(5) of the Facility Condition Survey Report for WTC 7 (PANYNJ 1997). The following is a
summary of the modifications that are noted in that report:
• In the Convention Area on the 3rd floor between column numbers 45 and 48A, steel plates
have bee installed around the perimeter of the room between the slab and the floor surface
(behind the wall coverings and above the suspended ceiling). According to the PANYNJ
report, these plates were installed to protect attendees at the Convention Center from the
magnetic field generated from the ConEd Substation beneath the conference rooms. No
documentation was located that provides any additional details on this modification.
• On the north side of the 5th floor generator room, masonry block walls were added to
partition the eight transformer vaults installed for Salomon Brothers. The vaults were
between columns 46 and 53. No documentation was located that provides any additional
details on this modification.
• A penthouse was constructed on the 47th floor roof to house the chiller plant and the cooling
towers for Salomon Brothers. The chiller plant was an enclosed steel-framed structure with
corrugated steel walls. It was approximately 25 ft in height and took up about one-third of the
square footage of the 47th floor roof. The cooling towers were supported on a steel frame and
were enclosed by louvered walls on the north and south sides and by the chiller plant and the
bulkhouse on the east and west sides, respectively. No documentation was located that
provides any additional details on this modification.
The list of modifications in the PANYNJ report also included the removal of the floor slabs on floors 41
and 43 to accommodate the trading floors for Salomon Brothers, as noted in Sec. 4.4.2 of this report.
4.5 REFERENCES
LERA (Leslie E. Robertson Associates). 1993a. The World Trade Center – The Explosion of 26
February 1993, Inspection Program, South Wall of Tower 1. May. (WTCI-69-L).
LERA (Leslie E. Robertson Associates). 1993b. “WTC Structural Integrity Investigation, Visual
Inspection – Spandrel Damage Assessment.” July. (part of WTCI-160-STB).
LERA (Leslie E. Robertson Associates). 1993c. “Reconstruction of Tower A, El. 294-0 and 284-0,”
structural drawing RE-TA-1.” December. (WTCI-456-STB).
Lucius Pitkin, Inc. 1993. Examination of Box Columns and Diagonal Beam Repairs – World Trade
Center, New York, Report No. ME-4525 S1. December. (part of WTCI-67-L).
PANYNJ (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). 1997. Port Authority Facility Condition
Survey Program – 7 World Trade Center. Engineering Quality Assurance Division, Engineering
Department. April. (WTCI-122-P).
The Office of Irwin G. Cantor P.C., “Salomon Brothers Inc. Base Building Modifications – 7 World
Trade Center Structural Computations,” January 1989 (W-7004, Port Authority, Newark).
Woodson, S.C., Davis, J.L., and Walton, B.A., 1993. Observations of World Trade Center Damage,
Technical Report SL-93, US Army Corps of Engineers Waterways Experiment Station. September.
(part of WTCI-67-L).