INTERNATIONAL

KEY NEGOTIATIONS & RELATED OUTCOMES OF

THE UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN BAKU
29th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP29)
November 11 – 24, 2024

Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

January 2025

SUMMARY
Dubbed the “finance COP” for the milestone adoption transition work programme. And despite a February 10,
of a New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance 2025, deadline for new nationally determined contribu-
(NCQG), the United Nations Framework Convention on tions (NDCs),1 the conference delivered relatively weak
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 29th Conference of Par- signals on the need for ambitious and urgent greenhouse
ties (COP29) held in Baku, Azerbaijan, achieved some gas emissions reductions.
success but left a number of important issues open. More Some other key outcomes from COP29 included:
specifically, COP29 delivered on its two main objectives. • a decision on the mitigation work programme
The first was agreement on a new climate finance goal: (MWP) that lacks the strong references to the out-
developed countries will take the lead in mobilizing at comes of the COP28 GST that many countries were
least U.S. $300 billion per year by 2035 for climate action pushing for
in all developing countries. However, the new U.S. $300
• additional guidance for the indicators under the
billion goal fell short of what many hoped for and was
United Arab Emirates (UAE) Framework for Global
decried as inadequate by some developing countries after
Climate Resilience and the establishment of the
adoption. In response, COP29 launched a process—the
Baku High-Level Dialogue on Adaptation
“Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”—that aims to scale up
• finalization of the arrangements for the Fund for
public and private finance to U.S. $1.3 trillion for devel-
responding to Loss and Damage, so that it can begin
oping countries, including through grants and non-debt
disbursing funds in 2025
creating instruments. This will likely be a major focus
ahead of COP30. • launch of the Baku Harmoniya Climate Initiative for
Farmers
COP29 also delivered on its second objective: finaliz-
ing outstanding elements of the Paris Agreement’s imple- • renewal of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on
menting guidance needed to fully operationalize carbon Gender for a period of ten years
markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. • renewal of the mandate of the Marrakech Partner-
Aside from these successes, Parties failed to adopt ship for Global Climate Action and UN Climate
a decision on how to take forward the global stocktake Change High-Level Champions until 2030.
(GST) outcomes agreed at COP28 or to advance the just
 FURTHER DETAILS ON KEY OUTCOMES OF COP29
NEW COLLECTIVE QUANTIFIED GOAL ON CLIMATE The NCQG also incorporates efforts to at least triple
FINANCE annual outflows from a 2022 baseline from the operating
entities of the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism by 2030.6
Key outcomes: The operating entities include the Fund for responding
to Loss and Damage, Green Climate Fund, Global Envi-
• an NCQG comprising: ronment Facility, Special Climate Change Fund, Adapta-
– raising at least U.S. $300 billion per year by tion Fund, and Least Developed Countries Fund.7
2035 for all developing countries
The U.S. $300 billion goal, however, is not sufficient
– a call for all actors to increase climate to raise the finance needed for developing countries to
financing from all sources to developing implement their NDCs, which is estimated to be between
countries to at least U.S. $1.3 trillion per U.S. $455–584 billion per year until 2030.8 Recognizing
year by 2035 this shortfall, a second piece of the NCQG is a target to
– a roadmap process to elaborate the pathway scale up financing from all public and private sources to
to raising U.S. $1.3 trillion. developing countries to at least U.S. $1.3 trillion per year
by 2035.9 This target’s calculation includes all public and
After three years of deliberations, Parties concluded private sources of finance; as such, there is no differentia-
negotiations on the NCQG on climate finance.2 The tion between developed and developing countries for the
NCQG comprises several pieces. One is a goal of mobiliz- provision or mobilization of finance. This novel climate
ing at least U.S. $300 billion per year for climate action financing configuration is evocative of the goal of the
in developing countries by 2035, with developed coun- Paris Agreement to make all finance flows consistent
tries taking the lead in providing and mobilizing these with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and
funds for mitigation and adaptation action.3 This goal climate-resilient development.10 Key to the agreement of
updates and supersedes the U.S. $100 billion per year this target was the creation of the “Baku to Belém Road-
goal set at COP15 in 2009. Like that goal, the U.S. $300 map to $1.3T” (the Roadmap).11 The Roadmap is a new
billion component of the NCQG will count a wide variety process aimed at elaborating the pathway to increasing
of sources “public and private, bilateral and multilateral, climate finance for developing countries for implementa-
including alternative sources.”4 However, this notably tion, including through grants, concessional loans, and
also includes the possibility of recognizing “all climate- non-debt creating instruments. The Azerbaijani COP29
related outflows and climate-related finance mobilized Presidency and incoming Brazilian COP30 Presidency
by multilateral development banks,”5 which encompasses will work together, in consultation with Parties, to deliver
outflows attributable to contributions from developed a report on the Roadmap at COP30.12
and developing countries as well as some non-Parties. Other noteworthy outcomes in the NCQG decision
include:
• a review of the implementation of the new goal as
part of the global stocktake process (the second
global stocktake will conclude in 2028)13
• encouragement for developing country Parties to
make voluntary contributions toward the U.S. $300
billion annual goal, including through South-South
cooperation14
• calls for international financial institutions and mul-
tilateral climate funds to adopt recommended mea-
sures to improve effectiveness, address debt burdens,
and enhance access to sources of climate finance15
• a mandate to produce a special assessment on ac-
Huddle at the COP29 closing plenary session. cess to climate finance for developing countries in
Photo: UN Climate Change - Habib Samadov
2030.16

2 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

 Notably, finance for adaptation and climate resilience thorized for use toward achievement of NDCs and
did not receive any special focus or a separate sub-target other international mitigation purposes (such as the
in the NCQG, as some Parties called for. Though the voluntary carbon market)
text affirms that Parties should aim to achieve a “bal- • conditions for possible changes in the authorized
ance” between adaptation and mitigation,17 this balance use of ITMOs
remains undefined and does not address the COP26 goal • the components of an ITMO authorization and au-
to double adaptation finance by 2025.18 thorization statement, including the characteristics
of the underlying mitigation activity
CARBON MARKETS UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS • the reporting process, including requesting disclo-
AGREEMENT sure of additional information and the use of agreed
templates for reporting
Key outcomes: • the role of the Article 6 review team in identifying,
notifying, and assessing inconsistencies in reporting,
• a decision on Article 6.2 covering: interna-
as well as the correction of inconsistencies that could
tional registry arrangements; the authorization
impact emissions balances before any international
process for internationally transferred mitiga-
transfer can occur.
tion outcomes; and the reporting and review
process Article 6.4 addresses emissions reductions issued un-
• a decision on Article 6.4 covering: standards der the centralized Paris Agreement Crediting Mecha-
to assess methodologies, including for emis- nism (PACM). The COP29 decision sets out authoriza-
sions removal activities; further guidance to the tion procedures for “mitigation contribution” Article 6.4
Article 6.4 Supervisory Body; and a process for emissions reductions issued under the PACM and their
authorizing the international transfer of units possible transfer to the international registry as ITMOs.20
issued under the mechanism The COP29 decision sets out that:
• a decision on Article 6.8 covering: guidance • the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM) will
for the implementation of the work program’s recommend whether a time limit for deciding on
second phase. the international transfer of Article 6.4 (mitigation
contribution) units is required, and in the case it is,
the length of the limit
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes that some
countries will use international emissions trading to • credits issued from afforestation and reforestation
achieve their NDCs. Parties have worked to finalize activities under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Devel-
guidance to fully operationalize Article 6 since 2015 and opment Mechanism (CDM) can transition to the
resolved the larger technical issues underpinning inter- PACM if they align with Article 6.4 rules, including
national rules for carbon markets at COP26. At COP29, the standards for assessment of methodologies and
Parties adopted the remaining outstanding technical removals21
guidance, finalizing the Paris Agreement’s “rule book.” • the SBM should expedite the establishment of the
Article 6.2 sets out the accounting rules for “coopera- PACM registry, develop further guidance on specific
tive approaches” involving the exchange of carbon cred- concepts outlined in the standards for assessment
its as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes of methodologies and removals, and develop or ap-
(ITMOs). The COP29 decision creates a dual-layer inter- prove a set of priority methodologies to start issuing
national registry system that includes a basic accounting carbon credits in 2025.
function, Parties’ reported ITMOs and emissions bal- Under the PACM, participants may only use SBM-ap-
ances in tabular format, and an ITMO issuance function proved crediting methodologies, while under Article 6.2,
on request.19 The decision also sets out: countries are given more flexibility. PACM transactions
• when to apply corresponding adjustments (or emis- must also set aside a share of credits to the Adaptation
sions accounting corrections between the selling Fund (i.e., “share of proceeds for adaptation”) and cancel
country and the buying entity) if ITMOs are au- another share for the atmosphere (i.e., “overall mitiga-
tion in global emissions”).

Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 3
 Article 6.8 establishes a framework for collaborative cess the resources to prepare their BTRs. The UNFCCC
non-market approaches (NMAs) to support Parties in Secretariat and the GEF will organize a workshop for
achieving their NDC targets through holistic mitigation developing countries to share experiences in preparing
approaches that include adaptation, technology trans- their first BTRs in June 2025.28
fer, finance, and capacity building. The COP29 decision
adopts guidance for carrying out the second phase of ADAPTATION
the work programme under Article 6.8, including the
nomination of focal points and submissions to the NMA
Key outcomes:
Platform, a database that requires international coopera-
tion.22 Parties emphasized that more support in develop- • the GGA as a standing agenda item after
ing and implementing NMAs and further engagement COP30
with a broad range of non-Party stakeholders is needed. • a Baku Adaptation Road Map for implement-
ing the UAE Framework for Global Climate
TRANSPARENCY Resilience
• a Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation in the
margins of future COPs.
Key outcome:
• a June 2025 workshop for developing coun-
Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement established the global
tries to share their experiences in accessing
goal on adaptation (GGA) to elevate the importance of
resources to prepare their first biennial trans-
adaptation and provide a guiding framework to enhance
parency reports (BTRs).
adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vul-
nerability to climate change.29 Parties at COP28 agreed
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement sets out the Enhanced on the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience
Transparency Framework (ETF), through which all Par- (UAE Framework) to guide efforts to achieve the GGA
ties must regularly submit BTRs—documents setting out and monitor its progress. The framework aims to reduce
important national climate information and progress. the growing impacts, risks, and vulnerabilities of climate
BTRs are a key piece of the Paris Agreement’s five-year change, while also enhancing adaptation action and sup-
ambition cycle and are vital in tracking action and prog- port and sets out thematic targets to be achieved by 2030.
ress toward NDC implementation.23 Parties also launched work under the UAE-Belém Work
Transparency was a key priority of the Azerbaijani Programme to agree on indicators to measure progress
COP29 Presidency, which pushed for Parties to submit achieved toward the UAE Framework that are expected
their first BTRs and launched the Baku Global Climate to be adopted at COP30.
Transparency Platform (BTP). The BTP will support de- The COP29 decision makes the GGA a standing agen-
veloping countries in preparing their BTRs and encour- da item for future Subsidiary Body (SB) and Conference
age universal participation in the ETF.24 of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Paris
The deadline for Parties to submit their first BTRs was Agreement (CMA) meetings beginning in June 2026.30
December 31, 2024, with the exception of small island Parties also set forth additional guidance for the expert
developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries work to refine the UAE Framework indicators, aiming to
(LDCs) which may provide this information at their conclude identification of a list of 100 or fewer indicators
discretion.25 A total of 85 Parties successfully submitted by June 2025.31
BTRs in accordance with the December 31 deadline. As Two new processes were launched: the Baku Adapta-
of publication, 90 Parties had submitted BTRs, including tion Road Map and the Baku high-level dialogue on
17 G20 members.26 adaptation. The Baku Adaptation Road Map aims to sup-
At COP29, transparency negotiations focused on the port progress under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement
provision of financial and technical support to develop- and help implement the UAE Framework. This includes:
ing countries for reporting and capacity building.27 Par- sharing knowledge and information, contributing to fu-
ties acknowledged the efforts of the Global Environment ture GSTs, improving understanding of regional climate
Facility (GEF) to streamline processes to help Parties ac- risks and impacts, and identifying adaptation gaps and

4 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

 Given the outcome of the first GST, which called on
Parties to contribute to a number of global mitigation-
focused targets and signals, many Parties have called
for the MWP to be a space for reflection on action and
progress toward those targets and signals. These include
a just transition away from fossil fuels, tripling renewable
energy capacity, and doubling energy efficiency by 2030.
However, there is no consensus on this interpretation of
the scope of the MWP and at COP29.
Parties ultimately adopted a decision recognizing the
thematic discussions from 2024, “Cities: buildings and
urban systems” and noted some key findings, opportuni-
ties, barriers, and actionable solutions from those discus-
Photo: UN Climate Change - Habib Samadov
sions.35 The decision, however, lacks strong references to
needs.32 The Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation the mitigation outcomes of the GST and to the need for
aims to enhance adaptation action and support and will ambitious new NDCs in 2025.
take place on the margins of each session of the CMA
during future COPs.33 LOSS AND DAMAGE
At COP28 Parties decided to consider defining trans-
formational adaptation within the UNFCCC at COP29.
Key outcomes:
However, transformational adaptation became a conten-
tious issue during COP29. Some Parties did not want to • the World Bank signed agreement to be the
address transformational adaptation, as they thought it host of the Fund for responding to loss and
would lead to greater restrictions for accessing finance. damage (FRLD), for an interim of four years,
Others thought that acknowledging transformational allowing it to begin dispersing funds in 2025
adaptation, as opposed to only incremental adaptation, • Philippines was selected as and signed the
is necessary to deal with increasing climate threats. As a agreement to be the host country for the Board
compromise, Parties requested the UNFCCC Secretariat of the FRLD
to publish a more accessible, reader-friendly version of its • other final arrangements of the FRLD.
pre-COP29 technical paper on transformational adapta-
tion by April 2025.34 At COP29, Parties fully operationalized the FRLD, which
was adopted to provide finance developing countries that
MITIGATION AMBITION AND IMPLEMENTATION are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of cli-
mate change, in responding to loss and damage (L&D).36
Key outcomes: On November 12, 2024, the World Bank signed the host
agreement for the FRLD, which means it can now accept
• a High-Level Ministerial Round Table on pre-
contributions and disburse funding. The Philippines
2030 Ambition
signed the agreement to be host country to the FRLD’s
• continued work under the Sharm el-Sheikh
Board. 37 Parties set out the FRLD Board’s 2024–25 Work
Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work
Plan, which includes: the rapid approval of funding, the
Programme (MWP), without strong references
creation of a long-term fundraising strategy by 2025,
to the mitigation outcomes of the GST or to the
and improved coordination with other climate finance
need for ambitious new NDCs in 2025.
sources.38
Other L&D work was deferred until June 2025. Parties
Established at COP26 and launched at COP27, the MWP at COP29 were unable to reach agreement on the 2024
aims to scale up mitigation ambition and implementa- review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM),
tion before 2030. It features two annual global dialogues postponing discussion until June 2025. The review as-
and investment-focused events. sesses the long-term vision of the current global L&D

Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 5
support system under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agree- tions refining the procedural and logistical elements of
ment and explores how it can more effectively support the overall GST process based on experience from the
developing countries in addressing and responding to first GST.44 Parties also postponed this work until June
L&D. They also did not reach an agreement on the joint 2025, unable to agree on key issues, such as whether
annual report of the WIM Executive Committee and the and how to ask the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Santiago Network, which together guide coordination, Change (IPCC) to consider shifting its assessment report
enhance action and support, and produce knowledge cycle to inform future GSTs.
products and technical assistance on L&D.39 Third, Parties were expected to adopt a report on
the June 2024 GST dialogue to facilitate the sharing
TAKING FORWARD THE OUTCOMES OF THE of knowledge and good practice on how the outcomes
GLOBAL STOCKTAKE of GST are informing the preparation of Parties’ next
NDCs.45 Parties were unable to agree on whether to
include reference to key messages and the new NDCs due
Key outcomes:
in 2025 and will revisit discussion in Belém.
• no decision on the UAE Dialogue on imple-
menting the GST outcomes
JUST TRANSITION
• no decision on refining the GST (“procedural
and logistical elements of the global stocktake
process”) Key outcomes:
• no agreement on consideration of the report of • a High-Level Ministerial Round Table on Just
the annual GST dialogue to facilitate the shar- Transition
ing of knowledge and good practices on how • postponed work on the UAE Just Transition
the outcomes of the GST are informing the Work Programme (JTWP) until June 2025.
preparation of Parties’ next NDCs.

Launched at COP27 and operationalized at COP28, the

aim of the JTWP is to discuss pathways to achieve the
Under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, Parties are goals of the Paris Agreement. The JTWP is built on and
required to undertake a GST every five years to assess complements both the elements and structure of other
collective progress toward the agreement’s long-term work programs, as well as the workstreams and bodies,
mitigation, adaptation, and finance goals and enhance under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement where just
international cooperation for climate action.40 The first transition is also being addressed. Each year, the JTWP
GST concluded at COP28 and, as part of the Paris Agree- holds two dialogues, hosts a high-level ministerial round-
ment’s “ambition cycle,” new NDCs due by February 10, table, and recommends a draft decision on its work for
2025,41 must include information on how Parties have consideration and adoption at that year’s COP.
considered the GST outcome.42 At COP29, Parties were The JTWP has completed its first year of work. Howev-
unable to agree on how and whether the outcomes of the er, at COP29 Parties were unable to agree on a decision
first GST should be reflected and addressed, delaying recognizing the work of the JTWP or future guidance.
work on the several GST processes set out by the Dubai While Parties largely welcomed the work from the past
decision. year, they were unable to resolve differences regarding:
First, a UAE Dialogue on implementing the outcomes key messages from the work; whether and how the work
of the GST, established by the COP28 GST decision, program reflects the outcome of the GST, which sets
should have started in Baku—but did not.43 Parties were out targets and signals for the needed energy transition;
deeply divided on whether the focus of the Dialogue and whether references to unilateral trade measures and
should be finance or all outcomes of the GST more provision of support to developing countries for imple-
broadly, postponing discussions until June 2025. mentation of just transition should be included. Parties
Second, Parties were expected to adopt recommenda- will take up these issues again in June 2025.

6 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

AGRICULTURE GENDER

Key outcomes: Key outcomes:

• an online portal for the Sharm el-Sheikh joint • ten-year renewal of the enhanced Lima Work
work on implementation of climate action on Programme on Gender
agriculture and food security • a new Gender Action Plan (GAP) to be ad-
• launch of the Baku Harmoniya Climate Initia- opted at COP30.
tive for Farmers: Empowering Farmers for
Climate Resilience.
To integrate gender considerations into the work of Par-
ties and the UNFCCC Secretariat, COP20 established
COP27 established the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on the Lima work programme on gender (LWPG).52 Parties
Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and adopted an enhanced LWPG at COP25 with a renewed
Food Security, a four-year initiative to discuss increas- five-year GAP—both expired at the end of 2024.53 To
ing ambition on climate action in agriculture and food complement and facilitate implementation of the LWPG,
security.46 Its joint work roadmap requested the UN- Parties established the Gender Action Plan in 2017,
FCCC Secretariat to develop an online portal for sharing which focused on five key priority areas: capacity build-
information on projects and initiatives for implementing ing, gender balance, coherence, gender-responsive imple-
climate action in addressing issues relating to agricul- mentation, and monitoring.54 Parties at COP28 agreed to
ture and food security.47 At COP29, Parties welcomed the finalize the review of the enhanced LWPG and its GAP at
launch of the online portal and requested the UNFCCC COP29.
Secretariat to further develop it.48 Discussions will con- Parties finalized the review of the LWPG at COP29,
tinue on the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work in June 2025,49 extending the enhanced LWPG for a period of ten years.
when Parties will participate in a workshop on “systemic The extended enhanced LWPG encourages mainstream-
and holistic approaches to implementation of climate ac- ing of gender- and age-disaggregated data into existing
tion on agriculture, food systems and food security, un- policies for the first time.55 In addition to continuing its
derstanding, cooperation and integration into national ongoing work to support Parties in implementing the
plans” informed by Party and observer submissions.50 work programme, the decision encourages the UNFCCC
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of Secretariat to ensure all budget proposals have consid-
the United Nations and the COP29 Presidency launched ered effects on gender equity and to appoint gender
the Baku Harmoniya Initiative for Farmers, which seeks focal points in all departments.56 Parties diverged on
to unify the fragmented landscape of existing agricul- whether or not to include of language around intersec-
tural initiatives and mobilize investments for sustainable tionality, human rights, and diversity. To resolve this, the
agriculture.51 It builds on previous efforts to accelerate decision supports gender equality and empowerment for
the transformation of agriculture and food systems, “all” women and girls in the context of climate change.57
including COP27’s Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Parties requested a new GAP to be adopted at
Transformation (FAST) Partnership and the COP28 COP30.58 In preparation, the decision sets out a techni-
UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient cal workshop in June 2025 and a synthesis report on the
Food Systems, and Climate Action. design of GAP activities, including progress, challenges,
gaps and priorities identified by Parties.

Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 7
FEATURES OF NDCS

Key outcomes:
• no agreement on guidance on features of
NDCs
• guidance for features of NDCs to be consid-
ered in 2026.

Despite previous rounds of negotiations, including

those at COP29, Parties have not reached agreement on
guidance for features of NDCs.59 Parties agreed to revisit
guidance for NDC features in 2026. Photo: UN Climate Change - Habib Samadov

tripling of renewable power by 2030. The Latin America

NON-PARTY STAKEHOLDERS AND THE CLIMATE
Energy Organization’s (OLADE) and the Africa Energy
ACTION AGENDA
Commission of the African Union (AFREC) set regional
energy efficiency targets; the Utilities for Net Zero Alli-
Key outcomes: ance (UNEZA) backed COP29’s Global Energy Storage
• renewal of the mandate of the Marrakech and Grids Pledge and reinforced their commitment to
Partnership (MP) for Global Climate Action and annual grids and renewables investment to more than
UN Climate Change High-Level Champions U.S. $117 billion.63
(HLCs) through 2030 On the issue of strengthening the accountability of
• UNFCCC Recognition and Accountability climate commitments, the UNFCCC disclosed planned
Framework implementation plans updates to the Global Climate Action Portal (GCAP)
• coalitions to accelerate adoption of high-integ- based on the outcomes of the Recognition and Account-
rity international carbon markets frameworks ability Framework consultation.64 Updates included the
including Article 6. type of information requested for disclosing pledges
and initiatives and the process for having Race to Zero
members recognized for their climate leadership in the
Parties first established the HLCs at COP21. The HLCs GCAP.65 The Task Force on Net-Zero Policy also released
facilitate, scale-up, and introduce voluntary efforts, a progress report evaluating the implementation of the
initiatives, and coalitions including non-Party stakehold- UN High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) recommenda-
ers (NPS), such as subnational governments, businesses, tions for embedding net-zero integrity criteria for compa-
NGOs and academia. Since COP22, the HLCs lead the nies and financial institutions into policy.66
MP for Global Climate Action to strengthen collabora-
On carbon markets at COP29, multilateral and
tion between Parties and non-Party stakeholders toward
independent voluntary initiatives joined forces to help
environmental, economic, and social systems transforma-
governments further establish carbon market strategies.
tion.60 At COP29, Parties extended the mandate for the
The International Organization of Securities Commis-
work of the HLCs, due to expire at the end of 2025, until
sions set out integrity requirements for carbon credit
2030.61
markets with a focus on trading and disclosures. The
Cities, regions, businesses, investors, and civil society Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market also
made several announcements at COP29 to demonstrate approved three methodologies on reducing emissions
their progress in 2024 toward implementing climate from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
solutions.62 Many focused on mobilizing finance toward countries (REDD+) that meet the council’s high-integrity
COP28 GST outcomes, particularly on efforts to con- Core Carbon Principles (CCPs).67
tribute to the doubling of global energy efficiency and

8 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

 WORLD CLIMATE ACTION SUMMIT AND MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENTS
Around 80 Heads of State and Government attended World Leaders Climate Action Summit (WLCAS) at COP29.68
Major announcements included:
• Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang stated that, since 2016, China has “provided and mobilized” more than 177
billion RMB (U.S. $24.5 billion) in support of climate action in other developing countries.
• Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will cut emissions by 81 percent compared to 1990 levels by
2035. He also encouraged other countries to come forward with ambitious NDC targets.
• Sweden announced pledges of more than U.S. $750 million to the Green Climate Fund and approximately U.S.
$20 million to the fund responding to loss and damage.69
COP29 was also notable in that the United Arab Emirates and Brazil—both members of the Presidencies’ Troi-
ka—announced their new NDCs.70 As of publication, two other Parties have submitted their new NDCs: Uruguay71
and the United States.72 New and updated NDCs are tracked in the NDC Registry.73 The deadline to submit new
NDCs is February 10, 2025.74

OTHER MATTERS
• A little over 54,000 participants representing governments, business, and civil society registered to attend
COP29.75 Of those, 26,858 were Parties; 11,576 people participated on behalf of UN units and bodies, the Global
Climate Action Agenda, other specialized agencies and related organizations, intergovernmental organizations,
and non-governmental organizations. While COP28 saw over nearly 84,000 participants, COP30, like COP29, is
likely to be significantly smaller in terms of in-person participants.
• During the second week of COP29, the Presidency hosted an open-ended, single session “Qurultay,” described as
an “official gathering for collective and united decision-making on a path forward.” Ministers and delegates used
this space to react to new texts proposed by the Presidency.
• In support of the Climate Action Agenda and to provide pathways for global actors to collectively commit to en-
hanced ambition across key climate priorities, the COP29 Presidency led a number of declarations and pledges,
including the:76
– COP29 Truce Appeal
– COP29 Global Energy Storage and Grids Pledge
– COP29 Green Energy Zones and Corridors Pledge
– COP29 Hydrogen Declaration
– COP29 Declaration on Green Digital Action
– COP29 Declaration on Reducing Methane from Organic Waste
– COP29 Multisectoral Action Pathways Declaration to Resilient and Healthy Cities
– COP29 Declaration on Enhanced Action in Tourism
– COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action.
• Other COP29 Presidency initiatives included the Baku Initiative on Human Development for Climate Resil-
ience77 and the COP29 Baku Ocean Declaration.78

FUTURE SESSIONS
• Negotiations will resume at the annual mid-year meeting of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies to be held in Bonn,
Germany on June 16–26, 2025.
• Brazil will host COP30 on November 10–21, 2025, in the city of Belém.
• The host of COP31 in 2026 is yet to be confirmed. Both Türkiye and Australia have offered themselves as pro-
spective hosts.

Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 9
C2ES Resources

What’s at Stake at COP29?

[Link]/2024/10/whats-at-stake-at-cop29

Rising to the Climate Finance Challenge

[Link]/document/rising-to-the-climate-finance-challenge

Issues and Options: Transparency Arrangements Under the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
[Link]/document/issues-and-options-transparency-arrangements-under-the-new-collective-quantified-goal-on-climate-finance

Linkages Between the New Collective Quantified Goal and the Global Goal on Adaptation
[Link]/document/linkages-between-the-new-collective-quantified-goal-and-the-global-goal-on-adaptation-issues-and-options

The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance: Elements for Consideration
[Link]/document/the-new-collective-quantified-goal-on-climate-finance-elements-for-consideration

Delivering on the Targets and Signals of the Global Stocktake

[Link]/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/[Link]

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for the Tripling of Renewable Energy

[Link]/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-tripling-of-renewable-energy-capacity-globally-by-2030

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for the Doubling of Energy Efficiency

[Link]/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-doubling-of-energy-efficiency-by-2030

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels
[Link]/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-transition-away-from-fossil-fuels

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for Early Warning Systems

[Link]/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-early-warning-systems

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for Halting and Reversing Deforestation

[Link]/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-halting-and-reversing-deforestation-and-forest-degradation

Enhancing Action and Cooperation for Sustainable Agriculture and Resilient Food Systems
[Link]/document/enhancing-action-cooperation-for-sustainable-agriculture-resilient-food-systems

Features and Normative Requirements for Nationally Determined Contributions

[Link]/document/features-and-normative-requirements-for-nationally-determined-contributions-technical-paper

What are Investable NDCs?

[Link]/document/what-are-investable-ndcs-discussion-paper

The Enhanced Transparency Framework in Practice

[Link]/document/the-enhanced-transparency-framework-in-practice

Transformational Adaptation for COP29: Issues and Options

[Link]/document/transformational-adaptation-for-cop29-issues-and-options

Public Sector Finance for Loss and Damage: Issues and Options
[Link]/document/public-sector-finance-for-loss-and-damage-issues-and-options

Engaging the Private Sector in the Loss and Damage Fund: Issues and Options
[Link]/document/engaging-the-private-sector-in-the-loss-and-damage-fund-issues-and-options-fact-sheet

10 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

 ENDNOTES
1 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter UNFCCC], Report on the 11th meeting of the Paris
Agreement Implementation and Compliance Meeting, PAICC/2024/M11/4, ¶ 19 (April 17-19, 2024), [Link]
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every five years thereafter). UNFCCC, Report on the 11th meeting of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance
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2 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6 (November 23, 2024), [Link]
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3 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 8.

4 UNFCCC, The Cancun Agreements, Decision 1/CP.16 (March 15, 2011), ¶ 99 [Link]
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5 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 8(c).

6 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 16.

7 “Funds and financial entities,” UNFCCC, accessed December 16, 2024, [Link]
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8 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 3.

9 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 7.

10 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Article 2 ¶ 1 (December 12, 2015), [Link]

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13 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 36.

14 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 9.

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16 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 34.

17 UNFCCC, New collective quantified goal on climate finance, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 17.

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Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 11
 21 UNFCCC, Application of the requirements of Chapter V.B (Methodologies) for the development and assessment
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25 UNFCCC, Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for transparency framework for action and support referred
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28 UNFCCC, Provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-
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29 UNFCCC, “Paris Agreement,” Art. 7.1.

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33 UNFCCC, Global goal on adaptation, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶ 30.

34 UNFCCC, Global goal on adaptation, Decision -/CMA.6, ¶¶ 40-42.

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37 “Fund for responding to Loss and Damage ready to accept contributions,” COP29, November 12, 2024, https://
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12 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

 38 UNFCCC, Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the
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39 UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts and
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40 UNFCCC, “Paris Agreement,” Art 14.3.

41 UNFCCC, Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph
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Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 13
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14 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

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Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku 15