Lecture 6: Deterrence and Security Dilemmas
Noel Anderson
POL209H5F
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto Mississauga
26 October 2021
A Motivating Puzzle
photo: Reuters
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
A Motivating Puzzle
Key question:
• When are negative inducements (ex. threats of punishment)
the best way to elicit compliance, and when do positive
inducements (appeasement or promises of reward) work best?
• Both policies sometimes succeed...
• ...but both can also make things worse
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Two Models of (In)Security
The Deterrence Model
• Posits that positive inducements, such as appeasement, worsen
an opponent’s behavior
• Why? Because positive inducements will demonstrate that an
aggressor’s policy is working; therefore, the aggressor will issue
more threats, demand ever-greater concessions
• The aggressor is likely to dismiss the appeaser’s threats even if
the appeaser later adopt a deterrence approach, thereby
triggering war
• Therefore, best policy is:
I Threaten punishment rather than appease
I Negative inducements safer than positive inducements
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Two Models of (In)Security
photo: AP Photo
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Two Models of (In)Security
The Spiral Model
• Posits that negative inducements, such as punishment, worsen
an opponent’s behavior
• Why? Whether angered or frightened, an opponent is likely to
act more aggressively and be more willing to use force to
defend itself
• Its initial punishment having failed, the punisher must respond
with yet more punishment; the other side is likely to grow even
more belligerent
• Reactions spiral, escalating a minor difference into war
• Therefore, best policy is:
I Appease rather than punish
I Positive inducements safer than negative inducements
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Two Models of (In)Security
source: Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2019: 18
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Two Models of (In)Security
• Two key concepts to explore:
I Deterrence
I Security Dilemmas
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
• “An effort to preserve the status quo through the threat of
force” (Frieden, Lake, Schultz 2019: 103)
• Aims to persuade the opponent to not initiate some action
• Takes the form: “Don’t do x, or else”
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
Considerations for successful deterrence:
• Capability—can you do it?
• Credibility—will you do it?
I Brinkmanship (“slippery slopes”)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
photo: Martyn Goddard/Getty Images
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
Considerations for successful deterrence:
• Capability—can you do it?
• Credibility—will you do it?
I Brinkmanship (“slippery slopes”)
I Audience costs (“tying hands”)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
source: The State
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
Considerations for successful deterrence:
• Capability—can you do it?
• Credibility—will you do it?
I Brinkmanship (“slippery slopes”)
I Audience costs (“tying hands”)
I Paying for power (“sinking costs”)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence
source: Wikimedia Commons
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence vs. Compellence
Compellence
• “An effort to change the status quo through the threat of
force” (Frieden, Lake, Schultz 2019: 102)
• Aims to persuade the opponent to change some behavior they
are already doing
• Takes the form: “Give me x, or else” or “Stop doing x, or else”
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Deterrence vs. Compellence
photo: Jim Huylebroek
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
The security dilemma:
• The fact that policies designed to increase one state’s security
can have the effect of decreasing a second state’s security, even
though this is neither intended nor desired
• Ex. build a larger military to defend oneself; other states fear
this is designed to attack them; threatened states arm
themselves in response
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
photo: U.S. Naval Historical Center
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
• Security dilemmas generate spirals of fear and insecurity
• The concept helps explain how states with compatible interests
and motives can still end up in potentially violent competition
with one another
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
What increases or decreases the
intensity of security dilemmas?
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
1 Fears about opponent’s current intentions
I Is your opponent status quo oriented or revisionist?
2 Fears about opponent’s future intentions
I Should you make worst-case assumptions today to ensure your
future security?
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
3 Offense vs. defense balance
I Is it easier to protect and hold, or to destroy and capture?
I Two key determining factors:
• Geography
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
photo: Zoran Djekic
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
source: Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2019: 18
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
3 Offense vs. defense balance
I Is it easier to protect and hold, or to destroy and capture?
I Two key determining factors:
• Geography
• Technology
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
3 Offense vs. defense balance
I Is it easier to protect and hold, or to destroy and capture?
I Two key determining factors:
• Geography
• Technology
I The balance matters both in reality and in leaders’ minds
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
4 Offensive-defensive distinguishability
I Whether weapons that support offensive missions are different
from those that support defensive missions
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
How to improve cooperation under the security dilemma?
• Increase incentives to cooperate (increase gains from mutual
cooperation and decrease costs of being the “sucker”)
• Decrease the incentives for defection (decrease gains of taking
advantage of others, increase cost of mutual defection)
• Increase each side’s expectation of future cooperation
(iteration)
• See Jervis (1978)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
The Security Dilemma
A few examples:
• Dividing up a large transaction into a series of small ones
• Adopt tit-for-tat strategies
• Increasing transparency, verification, safeguards against
cheating (ex. institutions)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
A Contemporary Example
photo: Reuters
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
A Contemporary Example
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
A Contemporary Example
Two stories:
1 Moscow has invaded and captured Crimea, instigated war in
eastern Ukraine, and provoked NATO forces in and around the
Baltic—all moves that validate the fact that under Vladimir
Putin, an increasingly aggressive Russia is determined to
dominate its neighbors and menace Europe
2 Russia is the aggrieved party. The US has failed to uphold a
deal negotiated in 1990 that promised NATO would not expand
into Eastern Europe. NATO is encircling Russia; Russia has
been forced to forestall NATO’s eastward march as a matter of
self-defense
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
A Contemporary Example
• Does Europe’s stability depend on the West’s willingness to
deter Russian adventurism, or willingness to reassure Russia
about NATO’s limits?
• Consider debate between Goldgeier (2014) and Kay (2014)
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Outline
1 Two Models of (In)Security
2 Deterrence
3 The Security Dilemma
4 A Contemporary Example
5 Looking Ahead to Next Week
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
Looking Ahead
Next week:
• Topic: Bargaining and War
• Readings:
I Reiter, Dan. 2003. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,”
Perspectives on Politics 1 (1): 27-43.
I Goddard, Stacie. 2006. “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible
Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International
Organization 60 (1): 35-68.
Two Models Deterrence The Security Dilemma Contemporary Example Looking Ahead
