CALEB JOSH T.

PACANA
CASE DIGEST MODULE 5
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II
JUDGE EMMANUEL PASAL

A. General principles

1. Concept of evidence

Bustos v. Lucero
G.R. No. L-2068,
October 20, 1948

FACTS:
During the preliminary investigation of his criminal case, the justice
of the peace informed Dominador Bustos of the charges and asked
him to plead. Bustos entered a plea of not guilty.
Bustos’ counsel moved for the complainant to present evidence so
that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined
in the manner and form provided by law. For this, the fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking Section 11 of Rule 108. The
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence,
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.
Now, Bustos filed a motion praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol (the court of
origin) in order that he might cross-examine the complainant and
her witnesses in connection with their testimony. However, this
motion was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion.
RULING:
No. While Section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in
it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring
out the truth.
But we made it clear that the defendant cannot, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the
issuance of the order of arrest. We called attention to the fact that
"the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of
his right to confront witnesses."

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

In a motion for reconsideration, the court further explained that

preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of
law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be
held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also

procedural. Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of
proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings'' - is identified with and forms part of the method by
which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and,
in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal
procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the
Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108
on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.

While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to

cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guarantee of due process
comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.

i. question of law and fact

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. 124043 (1998)

FACTS:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment to
YMCA in the total amount of P415,615.01 for deficiency income tax,
deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional
fees, and deficiency withholding tax on wages, along with
surcharges and interests.
The assessment was based on YMCA’s income of P676,829.80 from
leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like
restaurants and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from parking
fees collected from non-members.
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the leasing of YMCA’s facilities
to small shop owners, restaurant and canteen operators, and the
operation of the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of their objectives,
and the income derived therefrom are tax exempt.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the CTA,
concluding that the activities are already profit-oriented, not
incidental and reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives
of the YMCA. And thus, the income is taxable under the NIRC.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA can depart from the findings of fact by the CTA.

RULING:

The CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the
aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in
a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a
reversal of factual findings.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of

fact is clear-cut. It has been held that "[t]here is a question
of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts."

In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the
facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts.
That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA
is not irregular or abnormal.

2. Scope of the Rules on Evidence

Ferrer v. Carganillo,
G.R. No. 170956,
May 12, 2010

FACTS:
Felisa Ferrer claims to be the owner of a 6,000-square meters lot
situated at Brgy. Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan and being tenanted by
Domingo Carganillo. Without her knowledge and consent, Domingo
subleased the subject landholding to his brother, Sergio, for
₱15,000.00. Felisa only knew of this fact when she visited the place
and found Sergio in actual possession and cultivation of the
landholding in question.

In his answer, Domingo denied that he mortgaged his possessory

rights to Sergio and asserted that he is still in actual, continuous and
peaceful possession of subject property. Upon a verbal complaint
lodged by Felisa with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
of Tayug, Pangasinan, MARO Legal Officer Dionisio G. Estimada
conducted an investigation on the matter.

In his Investigation Report, Estimada stated that based on the

testimony he had gathered from other people, the cultivation and
possession of the subject landholding was subleased by Domingo to
Sergio as the former was applying for work abroad. In fact, Domingo
admitted the existence of the sublease. Based on the foregoing,
Estimada recommended that Sergio and Domingo be ejected from
the subject landholding.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled that

Felisa failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Domingo indeed subleased or executed a mortgage over the
property. Felisa appealed this decision to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and presented for the
first time an original copy of the Katulagan (Agreement) to prove
that Domingo obtained a loan in the amount of ₱15,000.00 from
Sergio.
The DARAB affirmed the ruling of the PARAD and held that the
Katulagan is inadmissible because it was not formally offered before
the PARAD, citing the ruling in People vs Mongado On appeal, the
Court of Appeals considered the Katulagan admissible, but
ultimately found it to be a mere promissory note to prove the
indebtedness of Sergio (not an evidence of mortgage).

ISSUE:
Whether new evidence can be presented for the first time on a
motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

No. Section 12, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedures provide that only one motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed a party which shall be based on the ground that:

(a) the findings of facts in the said decision, order or resolution are
not supported by substantial evidence, or
(b) the conclusions stated therein are against the law and
jurisprudence

As expressed by the Rule, the office of the Motion for

Reconsideration is not for the reception of new evidence. Hence,
when Felisa submitted new pieces of evidence in her Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, she went beyond the stated purpose of
the Motion for Reconsideration. In which case, we rule that the new
evidence presented by Felisa in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with Manifestation to the DARAB cannot be
admitted.

The rules on evidence under the Rules of Court generally do not

apply in quasi-judicial proceedings.
The Rules of Court, particularly the Revised Rules on Evidence, are
specifically applicable to judicial proceedings, to wit:

Sec. 2. Scope. – The rules of evidence shall be the same in

all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules.

In quasi-judicial proceedings, the said rules shall not apply except

"by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient". The DARAB Rules of Procedures explicitly provides
that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the
latter apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, we find that the
DARAB erred in holding the Katulagan as inadmissible since it was
not formally offered and admitted. Moreover, reliance on our ruling
in People v. Mongado, i.e., that "[t]he court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered," is misplaced. We
simply cannot find any legal basis for the DARAB to cite our ruling in
a criminal case; the fundamental rule found in Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court does not find any application in this agrarian case.

5. Factum probans versus factum probandum

Grace Park International vs. Eastwest

G.R. No. 210606.
July 27, 2016

FACTS:

Grace Park and Woodlink Realty Corporation entered into a

Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) with Eastwest Bank (EBC), Allied,
Security, and Banco De Oro Unibank (BDO), with EBC acting as
trustee.

Under the MTI, BDO was the majority creditor with 58.04%
ownership of the credit, with EBC, Allied, and Security having
18.33%, 12.58%, and 11.05% ownership, respectively. As
collaterals, petitioners mortgaged 8 parcels of land, as well as the
improvements found thereon.

Under the MTI, EBC, as trustee, cannot commence foreclosure

proceedings without the written instructions from the majority
creditors. During the pendency of the MTI, BDO's majority share in
the MTI was effectively paid for by Sherwyn Yao, Jeremy Jerome Sy,
and Leveric Ng. Thus, Sherwyn, et al. should have been subrogated
to BDO's majority interest in the MTI.

However, EBC refused to honor the subrogation, causing Sherwyn,

et al. to file an action for subrogation and injunction before the RTC
of Makati City (RTC-Makati). Meanwhile, EBC commenced
foreclosure proceedings in the RTC of Malolos without written
instructions from the majority creditors under the MTI, which by
virtue of subrogation, should be Sherwyn.

The foreclosure proceedings filed before the RTC-Malolos was

dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping since a civil case was
already filed in RTC Makati, involving the same parties.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal on the ground of forum shopping was proper.

RULING:
No. The underlying circumstances surrounding the causes of action
in both cases are likewise substantially different in that:

(a) in Civil Case No. 10-323, the cause of action arose from EBC's
alleged unjust refusal to subrogate Sherwyn, et al. to the rights of
BDO; while

(b) in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010, the cause of action stemmed from
EBC's purported breach of Section 6.0536 of the MTI which provides
that it should first secure a written instruction from the Majority
Creditors before commencing foreclosure proceedings against the
collaterals.

There is forum shopping when the following elements are present,

namely:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the

same interests in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and

(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

With respect to the second and third requisites of forum shopping,

hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean
absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the
operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the
relief sought.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is
to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

A judgment in Civil Case No. 10-323 will not necessarily result in res
judicata in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010. Being principally a
subrogation case which is an action in personam, a judgment in Civil
Case No. 10-323 will not bind any non-parties to it, such as the
corporation plaintiffs and the other defendants (aside from EBC) in
Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 that represent interests separate and
distinct from the parties in Civil Case No. 10-323.

At the most, a judgment in Civil Case No. 10-323 may only

constitute the factum probans (or evidentiary facts) by
which the factum probandum (or the ultimate fact) sought
to be proven by petitioners in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010,
i.e., EBC's non-compliance with the foreclosure provisions of
the MTI, could be established.

6. Admissibility of evidence

a) Requisites for admissibility of evidence

Waterous Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Commission,
G.R. No. 113271,
October 16, 1997

FACTS:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous

Drug Corp. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Inc., a supplier of medicine,
sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384
per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to
determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that

the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of
Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said
check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico. Catolico
denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous
Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check
amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered
the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from

YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional
right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the

constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

ISSUE:

Whether Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its

regular suppliers is contrary to the injunction against unreasonable
search and seizure and a person’s right to privacy of
communication.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993,
respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except
as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that
the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and
seizures which is hereby set aside.

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC

anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that
the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.

Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of

communication, and Waterous was justified in opening an envelope
from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter
was a business communication in which it had an interest. However,
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires
that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to
be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the
employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation.

Although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she

was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March
1990 issued by her supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of
her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of
"evidence in [Waterous] possession," which were not, however,
submitted. What the "evidence" other than the sales invoice and the
check were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolico's dismissal then was
grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and
even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's
arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was
not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.

Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as
to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the
evidence against Catolico was inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which was set aside.

7. Burden of proof and burden of evidence

Bautista v. Sarmiento
G.R. No. L-45137,
September 23, 1985
FACTS:

An information charging Fe BAUTISTA Milagros Corpus and

Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed before the sala of Judge
Malcolm G. SARMIENTO at the CFI of Pampanga Branch 1.

The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a separate trial.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial
the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. YAP as its only witness.

Believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, petitioners BAUTISTA moved to dismissal the
case by way of demurrer to the evidence. In an Order dated
June 3, 1976 respondent JUDGE SARMIENTO denied said
motion.
The Order states:
The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss filed by
BAUTISTA and Corpus are as follows:
First, the information alleges that the two accused received
jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on
consignment. The defense' contention is that the jewelries
were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and
sale. The defense overlooks the other allegation in the
Information specifically alleging:

That these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the

accused on commission basis and to pay or to deliver the
proceeds thereof to Dr. Leticia C. Yap if sold, and if not
sold to return said jewelries. ...
In spite of represented demands made on the said
accused, said accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds
thereof to the damage and prejudice of said Dr. Leticia C.
Yap in the total amount of P77,300.00.
The meaning of consignment is not a sale.
It means that the goods sent by one person to another, to
be sold or disposed of by the latter for and on account of
the former. The transmission of the goods.

The Court believes that the prosecution established a

prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information
against said accused on the evidence presented so far on
record.
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby denies the
defense' Motion to Dismiss and orders the trial of this case
for the reception of evidence of the accused on July 9, 1976 at
8:00 o'clock in the morning.

That in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof

beyond reasonable doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether the finding by Judge SARMIENTO that the prosecution

established a prima facie case of estafa against BAUTISTA and
Corpus, shifted the burden of proof to the defense.

RULING:

NO, when a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a

criminal case, the burden of proof does not shift to the
defense; it remains with the prosecution. HOWEVER, it is the
burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the
trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by
evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then
the burden shifts back.

In the case at bar, the order denying BAUTISTA and Corpis’ motion
to dismiss, required them to present their evidence. They refused
and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The
inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to
prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to
their guilt.

RATIO:
1. Since the denial of the motion to dismiss was anchored on a
finding of a prima facie case, a clear understanding of the
term and its implications is in order.

A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be

sufficient to counter-balance the general presumption of
innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and
controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it
improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and
 the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away
the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of the
jury be such as to rebut and control it.

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of

the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies
petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence
on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima
facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It
becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to
meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case
against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of
evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would
seem to believe.

2. When a prima facie case is established by the

prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains
throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—
the prosecution.

3. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to

party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of the trial. 8 This burden of going forward with the
evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced
by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.

4. A prima facie case need not be countered by a

preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of
plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.
As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof.
Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is
equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate
against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot
prevail. 9

5. In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to

dismiss, required them to present their evidence. They
refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of
their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of
 evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least,
raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken

and there being no grave abuse of discretion that attended its
issuance, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
petitioners.

The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga

where this case is now assigned, is hereby ordered to
continue immediately with the trial of Criminal Case No. 808
until its final disposition.

10. Quantum of evidence (weight and sufficiency of

evidence)

b) Preponderance of evidence

Tayao v. Republic,
G.R. No. 235682 (Notice),
[January 22, 2018])

Case Digest (G.R. No. 235682)

Facts:

 Petitioner Diwa T. Tayao was held liable for violation of

the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22.
 Tayao purchased flour from BRW Import Distribution
and issued ten checks as payment for the flour
delivered from January 2007 to May 2007.
 The checks were dishonored by the drawee banks due
to insufficient funds or closed accounts.
 A demand letter was sent to Tayao, but she failed to
pay her obligation.
 Ten separate informations for violation of B.P. 22 were
filed against Tayao.
 The Makati Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) granted
Tayao's demurrer to evidence, dismissing the criminal
case on the ground that it was not established that a
notice of dishonor was received by Tayao.
 The civil aspect of the case proceeded, and Tayao was
held liable for the face value of the dishonored checks
by the MeTC and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).
 Issue:

 Whether Tayao should be held civilly liable for the

violation of B.P. 22 despite her acquittal in the criminal
aspect of the case.

Ruling:

 Tayao's civil liability for the violation of B.P. 22 was

affirmed.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the demand
letters sent to Tayao can be used as evidence to
establish her civil liability, even though they may not
be sufficient to prove notice in the criminal aspect of
the case.
 Tayao's claim of partial payment was rejected due to
lack of supporting evidence.
 The principle against double jeopardy does not apply
to the civil aspect of a criminal case, and therefore,
Tayao's claim of double jeopardy was dismissed.

Ratio:

A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not


necessarily free from civil liability.
 The burden of proof required in criminal prosecution
(proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of
evidence).
 Tayao's acquittal in the criminal aspect of the case was
based on the prosecution's failure to prove her receipt
of the notice of dishonor, but it does not mean that she
is not indebted to BRW.
 The demand letter was considered valid and sufficient
to prove her monetary obligation.
 The burden of proving payment rests on the
defendant, and Tayao's claim of partial payment was
deemed a mere allegation without supporting
evidence.
 The principle against double jeopardy only applies to
subsequent criminal proceedings and does not prevent
the prosecution of the civil aspect of a criminal case.
 d) Clear and convincing evidence

Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor,

G.R. No. 102358,
[November 19, 1992],
290 PHIL 311-326)

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses went to private respondent Career Planners

Specialist International Inc., (CPSI), a licensed service contracting
firm to apply as driver and tutor in Saudi Arabia. Before boarding,
they were handed their contracts that shows a designation different
to what Gloria applied for but the CPSI employee said that the
change was only for the purpose of facilitating her departure and
did not in any way alter her employment as tutor.

CPSI provided petitioners with the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) of Filipino
Manpower Services, Inc. (FILMAN), a duly licensed recruitment
agency. Prior to departure, a placement fee was exacted from them
which is one of the grounds for the action filed before the POEA.
Petitioners sued private respondents before the Philippines
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charging them with
illegal exaction, false advertisement, and violation of other pertinent
laws, rules and regulations.

ISSUE:

Whether you require clear and convincing evidence to establish the

charge of illegal exaction in an administrative due process.

RULING:

No. In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or

suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies
of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the
charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All
administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not
clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic
respondents.

Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance,

but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13 while substantial evidence ". . .
consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ."
The POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, found that
private respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00 as
placement fees; consequently, it ruled that there was illegal
exaction.

B. Judicial notice and judicial admissions

2. Matters of judicial notice

b) Discretionary

Spouses Latip v. Chua,

G.R. No. 177809,
[October 16, 2009],
619 PHIL 155-170)

FACTS:

Rosalie Chua filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages

against petitioners, Spouses Latip. Rosalie attached to the complaint
a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg, signed by
Rosalie and the spouses as Lessor and Lessees respectively.

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip
already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel,
sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When
Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted the
aforesaid complaint.

Spouses Latip did not heed the demand, so Rosalie instituted the
aforesaid complaint. Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in
October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two cubicles
in Roferxane, Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during
the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to
purchase lease rights in the said building.

According to spouses Latip, the immediate payment of a sum of

money would be used to finish construction of the building giving
them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles. Spouses
further averred that the contract of lease they signed had been
novated by their purchase lease rights of the subject cubicles.

MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie. The RTC reversed the ruling and was
in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and in all other
substantial aspects, incomplete. CA reversed the RTC and reinstated
the decision of the MeTC, ruling that the contract of lease, ableit
lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remaind a
complete and valid contract.

On the issue whether the sum of money constituted payment of

good will, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the
area of Baclaran. According to the Appellate court, this judicial
notice was bolstered by the joint and sworn declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg

ISSUE:

WHether the judicial notice of the alleged practice was prosper.

RULING:

No. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and

discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial

notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is

apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial
notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety.

3. Judicial admissions

Estrada v. Badoy, Jr.,

A.M. Nos. 01-12-01-SC & SB-02-10-J,
[January 16, 2003],
443 PHIL 296-322

FACTS:

AM No 01-12-01 SC and AM No SB 02-10-J are consolidated

administrative cases against Justice Badoy Jr and Justice De Castro.
Under AM No SB-02-10-J, the facts are as follows:
Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed several criminal cases against
him, his family, and friends. One of them is Criminal Case No. 26558
wherein he, his son Jose "Jinggoy" and Atty. Edward Serapio stand
accused for violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan
composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M. Ilarde, now retired, as members.
On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial
conference between the parties, the Sandiganbayan furnished them
and their counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their
signatures.

In the course of an argument between Sandiganbayan Justice De

Castro and Justice Cuevas, Atty. Saguisag intervened. In the
process, he argued simultaneously with Justice Cuevas. Despite
Justice De Castro's request to wait for his turn, Atty. Saguisag
persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice and order him to
stop arguing. This led Justice Badoy to order four Sheriffs to take
Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom

Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed

portion of the Pre-trial Order could be deleted. The prosecution
manifested its acquiescence.

ISSUE:

Whether Justice De Castro acted in deceit or with malice or bad faith

in stating in the pre-trial order that the defense admitted the
existence of certain exhibits.

RULING:

That respondents did not intend to deceive complainants is clear

from the fact that the Pre-trial Order states verbatim the Joint
Stipulations of Facts submitted by both parties. Furthermore, when
complainants expressed their objection to the inclusion of the
assailed statement, respondents immediately ordered its deletion.

On complainants' refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule

118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "All
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused
and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused."

Considering that the Pre-trial Order contains the recital of the

actions taken by the parties, agreements and admissions, the facts
stipulated, and the evidence marked, the parties must sign it. A
party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the
Joint Stipulation of Facts is expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a
party believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest
representation of what transpired in the pre-trial conference, then
he must specify his objections thereto and the court may modify it
to prevent injustice. This was what respondents exactly did when
complainants pointed out the assailed statement in the Pre-trial
Order.

3.a Adoptive admission

Estrada v. Desierto,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738 (Resolution),
[April 3, 2001],
408 PHIL 194-255

FACTS:

Governor Chavit Singson went on air and accused former president

Estrada of receiving money from jueteng lords, resulting in Senator
Guingona, Jr’s privilege of speech in Senate accusing Estrada of the
same.
A joint investigation was made by the Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and the call of some members of the House of
Representatives to impeach Estrada.
The Senate opened the impeachment trial after receiving the signed
Articles of Impeachment from the House of Representatives. During
the trial, a controversy occurred when a 11-10 vote by the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope allegedly
containing the petitioner had a secret bank account.
EDSA II ensued, demanding Estrada’s resignation. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was sworn into office, and on the same day, Estrada signed a
vaguely worded letter stating that he is unable to exercise the
powers of the presidency. As a result Arroyo discharged her power’s
as the prsident and senate terminated the impeachment Court.
Several cases were filed against Estrada for plunder, graft and
corruption. Estrada filed the petition for prohibition and petition for
quo warranto. Alleging (1) he did no resign from office, (2) he is only
on leave and arroyo is only an acting president, (3) he is inhibited
from resigning due to the pending impeachment trial, (4) the
president enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, and (5)
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation
due to public prejudice of guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether the former president Estrada resigned as president.

RULING:

Yes. Resignation is not a high-level legal abstraction. It is a factual

question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be

doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the
past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give
up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

4. Judicial notice of foreign laws, law of nations and

municipal ordinance

U.S. v. Blanco,
G.R. No. L-12435,
[November 9, 1917],
37 PHIL 126-132)
Facts:

The defendant and appellant was convicted originally in the

court of the justice of peace of the municipality of Castillejos,
Province of Zambales, and fined P25 on a charge of violation of an
ordinance of that municipality prohibiting and penalizing the
obstruction of the public highways. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Zambales, the accused was again
convicted and fined P25. The case is before the SC on appeal from
the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance. Counsel
contends that since no affirmative proof was offered in the court
below as to the date of approval of the ordinance, the court had no
evidence before it on which to base a finding that the ordinance was
in force at the date of its alleged violation.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance in question was in force at the date of its

alleged violation.

Ruling:

Yes. As shedding some light upon the contentions raised by

counsel in this connection, the Court inserts here a citation from
Dillon on Municipal Corporations, which, read together with the
citations in the noted appended by the author, indicates quite
clearly the line of reasoning upon which the courts in the United
States have proceeded in cases of this kind:

Mode of pleading ordinances. — The courts, unless they

are the courts of the municipality, do not judicially notice the
ordinances of a municipal corporation, unless directed by
charter or statute to do so. Therefore, such ordinances, when
sought to be enforced by action, or when set up by the
defendant as a protection, should be set out or stated in
substance in the pleading. It has been sometimes decided that
it is not sufficient that they be referred to generally by the title
or section. It is, however, believed to be sufficient, in the
absence of special legislative provisions prescribing the
manner of pleading, to set forth the legal substance of that
part of the ordinance alleged to have been violated, it being
advisable, for the purposes of identification, to refer also to the
tile, date and section. The liberal rules of pleading and practice
which characterize modern judicial proceedings should extend
to, and doubtless would be held to embrace, suits and
prosecutions to enforce the by-laws or ordinances of municipal
corporations.
C. Object (real) evidence

6. Chain of custody in relation to Section 21 of the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

People v. Adobar,
G.R. No. 222559 ,
[June 6, 2018])

Facts:

Adobar sell, trade, dispense and give away to another one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance, to a PDEA Agent, who acted as poseur-buyer, which after
a confirmatory test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, said
sachet is found positive of the presence of 0.03 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly
known as shabu, in consideration of Five Hundred pesos
(Php500.00) with Serial No. MR443620 which is recorded as marked
money in a buy bust operation. Adobar was able to escape during
the buy-bust operation and the marked money was not recovered.

It appears from the prosecution's submissions that among the

three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay Acenas and
the media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed
and signed the Inventory.

Issue:

Whether the subject drugs seized were admissible to comply

with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.

Ruling:

No. In People v. Beran, the Court held that while the matter of
marking of the seized illegal drugs in warrantless seizures is not
expressly specified in Section 21, consistency with the chain of
custody rule requires that such marking should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon
confiscation.

In the present case, a considerable period of time intervened

between the confiscation of the subject drugs and its subsequent
marking - which was unaccounted for by the prosecution.

The prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime

due to the serious lapses in observing Section 21 of RA 9165 and
the concomitant failure to trigger the saving clause. Anent the latter
point, the prosecution utterly failed to acknowledge and credibly
justify its procedural lapses and was unable to prove the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Adobar's innocence, as
presumed and protected by the Constitution, must stand in light of
the reasonable doubt on his guilt.

D. Documentary evidence

1. Meaning of documentary evidence

Torralba v. People,
G.R. No. 153699,
[August 22, 2005],
505 PHIL 71-87)

DOCTRINE:
The person who actually recorded should have be presented as a
witness in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of
the purported tape recording. Without the requisite authentication,
there is no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording in
evidence.
FACTS:
Cirse Francisco “Choy” Torralba was charged with the crime of
libel for allegedly discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation,
prestige and honor of the late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas in
the former’s radio program. As an evidence, the prosecution
presented Segundo Lim and Atty. Manuel Hontanosas, incorporator
and then president respectively, of the The Maritime Services
Incorporator (TMSI), former sponsor of Torralba’s radio program.
Atty. Hontanosas, son of the late Judge came to know of the
alleged acts of libel through a recording of Torralba’s radio program
which Segundino asked his adopted daughter Shirly Lim to record.
Torralba objected to the admissibility in evidence of the recording
that the prosecution should have presented Shirly Lim, the one who
actually recorded the same, for authentication.
ISSUE:
 Is the proper authentication of the recording by Shirly Lim, the
one who recorded the tape, necessary for the recording’s
admissibility in evidence?
RULING:

Yes. Without the said authentication, the tape recording is

incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible

because of its form where a proper foundation has been laid to
guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is
a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is
admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following
requisites must first be established, to wit: 1) a showing that the
recording device was capable of taking testimony; 2) a showing that
the operator of the device was competent; 3) establishment of the
authenticity and correctness of the recording; 4) a showing that
changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; 5) a showing
of the manner of the preservation of the recording; 6) identification
of the speakers; and 7) a showing that the testimony elicited was
voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the

criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, the
establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a
recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards
were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its
protection against tampering. In the case at bar, one can easily
discern that proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape
recording was not adhered to.

3. Best Evidence Rule

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 167147.
August 3, 2005

DOCTRINE:

The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth
certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar
authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal
certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy
of the birth certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the
victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under
certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or
other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's
mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of
the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.

Facts:

 Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994. She was six
years and nine months old when the rape was committed
on August 7, 2001.

 On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home taking
care of her younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene,
while her father was out.

 On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant Genaro Cayabyab,

went to the victim's house and asked her to lie down on her
father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her clothes
and his own clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed and
laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Alpha
Jane shouted in pain which startled the appellant who sprayed
her with tear gas and left.4

 Alpha Jane told her mother of what had happened. She

immediately reported the incident to the barangay officials and
brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital
for medical examination. She also sought assistance from the
police who arrested the appellant at his house. 5
 Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame and on August 10, 2001, to the Child Protection Unit
(CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further medical examinations, which both
found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the
victim's genitalia.8

 On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape. When

arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued. Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi.

 The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent
with the medical findings of the doctors. Moreover, it applied the
rule that an unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot
prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor
victim. Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
minority and imposed the penalty of death.

 The case was directly elevated to the Court of Appeals, 17 which

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial [Link] Supreme Court
reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.

 Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting

extortion by the victim's father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast
and consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's
testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the
medico-legal experts.

 Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal

transection at 5 oclock and laceration at 5 oclock are
synonymous. Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior
injury to the victim's hymen which might have been caused by
the insertion of a blunt object such as an erected penis which
was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped.

Issue: What constitutes as the best evidence to prove the age of a

person. (guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance)

Held:

In the case of People v. Pruna,22 the Court took note of conflicting

pronouncements concerning the appreciation of minority, either as
an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were
a number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where
the Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved. 23On
the other hand, there were also several cases where it was ruled
that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite
the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the
offended party to prove her age. 24 Thus, in order to remove any
confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating
age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is

an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;
b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
c) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.25

To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a

person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof;
in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented
such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or
certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible
testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may
be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the
birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of
the victim's mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the
testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical

finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was
raped, based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and her
mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's
birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not object to
the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted
the same 'as to fact of birth.

The Court is not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a

mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any
showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was
unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the
victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.

However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as

expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. '

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
 d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
[Emphasis supplied]

Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the

custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly,
therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate
of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its
contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the
trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no
other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. 27

In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the
photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation
of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence,
and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby. 28

In fine, the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only
six-years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when the rape
incident happened on August 7, 2001.

4. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)

e) Audio, photographic, video and ephemeral

evidence

Nuez v. Cruz-Apao
(A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, 12 April 2005)

FACTS:
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct
against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the
Acting Division Clerk of Court of the 15 th Division, CA. The complaint
arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos from
Zaldy Nuez in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the
latter’s pending case in the CA, entitled “PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.”
Nuez initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the
Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network, whose crew
accompanied him to the PAOCC-SPG in Malacañang where he filed a
complaint for extortion.
This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation at the Jollibee
Restaurant, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations
Avenue, Manila, the place where the supposed hand-over of the
money was going to take place. Respondent’s apprehension by
agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation
prompted the creation of an ad-hoc investigating Committee, which
later on concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious
Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus
recommended respondent’s preventive suspension for 90 days
pending formal investigation of the charges against her. Later on
the Committee submitted a report to the CA Presiding Justice
recommending that the respondent be dismissed from service.
During the hearing of the case, respondent claimed that it was not
an entrapment but an instigation. However, the complainant was
able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text
messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee
that the latter asked for One Million Pesos in exchange for a
favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the text messages are admissible in court?

HELD:
YES, they are admissible in court. The text messages were properly
admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which
provides: “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to
telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,

“Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore
had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and
import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had
as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest
when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the
text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining
the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

Ang v. Pascua
(G.R. No. 182835, 20 April 2010)

Facts:

The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish
Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University
in Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that
Rustan has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of
this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to
elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish
refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia
messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread
her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added
in the text message that it is easy for him to spread those pictures
in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the
Vice-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local
police was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and
arrested Rustan.

Issue:

Whether or not Rustan’s contention that the multimedia messages

should not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was
not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic
Documents?

Held:

No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-
7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not
apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings. Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not
be given merit for the basic reason that such contention was only
raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption that
Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the
pictures. Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan
cannot be made possible in criminal case; such can only be made
before, civil and administrative actions.

The high court denied the petition.

5. Parol Evidence Rule

GAMBOA, RODRIGUEZ, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117456.
May 6, 2005

Facts:

The Pampanga Sugar Mills (PASUMIL) issued negotiable sugar

quedans to several planters, who had their sugar milled,
representing their share in the physical sugar. The planters
negotiated/sold their quedans to several [Link] preserve the
sanctity of sugar quedans the sugar quota administrator together
with the PASUMIL and sugar traders agreed that no quedans covering the
mill’s production share of the 1972-1973 crop will be issued, and
that the sugar shall be made available to service said outstanding
quedans. Out of the physical sugar set aside and earmarked to
service the unservice quedans, Gamboa were able to make partial
withdrawals. During the crop year 1973-1974, physical sugar
representing PASUMIL’s mill share for said crop year was again set
aside and earmarked to service the outstanding balance of the
quedans. However, they were not able to withdraw their respective
shares in the earmarked physical sugar. On May 25, 1974, PNB took
over the management, control, operation and assets of PASUMIL.
Consequently, the physical sugar earmarked from the mill share of
PASUMIL was not distributed to the creditors of PASUMIL. Thereafter,
they filed complaint for the recovery of the proceeds of their sale.
Then, the trial rendered decision awarding actual and moral
damages, which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether the actual and moral damages were duly proved.

Ruling:

There was no proof to support the award of actual and moral

damages. No evidence was presented as to how much petitioners
lost. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides: Except as provided by
law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.

In order that an award for moral damages can be justified, the

claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he underwent
such suffering and that the injury causing it sprang from any of the
cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220. Although petitioners alleged
that they were prevented from honouring their contractual
obligations, thus impairing their good business reputation and
goodwill, there was no evidence to support the same.

6. Authentication and proof of documents

a) Meaning of authentication

Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp.,

G.R. No. 157766,
[July 12, 2007],
554 PHIL 343-350)

Facts:

Domingo (in his capacity as SMMC chairman) and Salas (in his
personal capacity and as chairman of Inter-Alia Management
Corporation) formalized their agreement under a property and
financial management contract. SMMC, under Salas, leased the Sta.
Mesa market to Malaca Realty. However, it became apparent that
Malaca was financially incapable of improving the market- Malaca
was actually unable to pay the monthly rent. SMMC terminated the
lease contract. The SMMC board became dissatisifed with Salas, so
SMMC ended the management contract with Salas abd Inter-Alia.
Issue:

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining

its admissibility as evidence.

Ruling:

Rule 132, section 20. proof of private documents- Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other
private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be.

Rule 132, Section 27. Public record of a public document- An

authorized public record of a private document may be proved by
the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an approriate certificate that such
officer has the custody.

Neither party claimed that the copies presented were certified true
copies of audited FS obtained or secured from BIR or SEC, which
would have been public documents.

d) When evidence of authenticity of a private

writing is not required (ancient documents)

Lacsa v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. Nos. 79597-98,
[May 20, 1991], 274 PHIL 506-516)

Facts:

This is consolidation of two civil cases in order to recover a parcel of

land.

First Case: an action for recovery of possession with damages an

preliminary injunction ffiled by petitioner heirs against Aurelio
Songco and John Doe. They alleged that they are the heirs of the
original owner of the said parcel of land, Demetria Lacsa. They
claimed that Lacsa owned the said land which consisted partly of a
fishpond and uncultivated open lands. They claimed that the
principal respondent was able to occupy and claim possession of the
said land through stealth and fraud and caused the said land to be
cleared for expanded occupancy thereof.

Second Case: Petitioners call for the cancellation of title, ownership

with damages and preliminary injunction. They also alleged that
they are the heirs of the original owner of the parcel of land,
Demetria Lacsa. In addition, respondents later abandoned the land
in dispute afetr the first case was filed but they merely transferred
to the adjoining fishpond owned by the respondents.

They claimed that the documents petitioners based are spurious

and OCT in favor of a Demetria Lacsa was merely a reconstituted
copy, and OCT was cancelled by Guevarra and Limpin, Lacsa’s
children. TCT which respondents claimed was later superseded in
favor of Inocencio Songco, father of private respondents by virtue of
a sale. The lower court held in favor of respondents that Guevarra
and Limpin sell the said parcel of alnd to the respondents. CA
affirmed.

Issue:

Whether the documents which respondents based their claim

(Exhibit 3 and &) can be considered as “ancient documents” under
Section 22 , Rule 132.

Ruling:

For a document to fall under the ancient document rule several

requirements must be met: a.) more than 30 years old- the
documents in question fulfill this requirement since they were
excuted at 1923; b.) it is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine- both copies of the said documents
were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Register
of Deeds by the Deputy Register of Deeds; C.) the document must
appear on its face to be genuine- petitioners in this case, did not
present conclusive evidence to support their allegation of
falsification of documents.

Petition denied.

f) Public documents as evidence; proof of official

record
 Apostille Convention, see:
[Link]
[Link]

MODULE 5-A

E. Testimonial evidence

1. Qualifications of a witness

Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr.,

G.R. No. 198240,
[July 3, 2013],
713 PHIL 462-471

Facts:

Spouses Andres and Concepcion Navarro died and left behind

parcels of land which include the subject, a 108.39-hectare lot in
Milagros, Masbate. They were survived by their daughters, Luisa and
Lydia, and their son, Andres Jr.

Luisa and Lydia found that the heirs of their brother, Andres Jr., are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. The heirs based
their claim on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property executed by
Andres Sr., which purportedly donated the subject lot to Andres Jr.

Luisa and Lydia suspect that the affidavit is a forgery. This prompted
them to request a handwriting examination of the said affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres,
Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard
signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of this finding, the sisters sued the heirs for
annulment of the deed of donation.

After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a

witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2
Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due
process since no notice was given to them before the examination
was conducted.
The RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez
as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony
would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to
be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness,
because her testimony is not yet needed.

Issue: Whether PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.

Ruling: No, PO2 Alvarez should not be disqualified as a witness.

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided

in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or

conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be
a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections

21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies
a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies
a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party.
Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged
communication.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive

and make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that
she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness
since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been
denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for
disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the
witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that
the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to
wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness

on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon

his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice
or detection from an unpracticed observer.

3. Disqualifications of witnesses

d) Disqualification by reason of privileged

communications

(i) Husband and wife

Alvarez v. Ramirez,
G.R. No. 143439,
[October 14, 2005],
509 PHIL 650-658

Facts:
Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
19933-MN for arson filed against the accused, Maximo Alvarez.
Maximo is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, Susan’s sister.

In the arson case, the prosecutor called Esperanza to stand as

witness against Maximo. Through counsel, Maximo filed a motion to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

The trial court ruled to disqualify Esperanza Alvarez from further

testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.

Issue: Whether Esperanza can be admitted as a witness against her

husband.

Ruling: Yes, Esperanza can be a witness against her husband in this

case.

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During

their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent

danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of
private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to
prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of

punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has
its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like
the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in
the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule.
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the

commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and
his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto
almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State
aims to protect.

(ii) Attorney and client

 People v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 115439-41,
[July 16, 1997],
341 PHIL 503-526

Facts:

Ceferino Paredes was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,

then became governor of the province, and became congressman.

Sometime in 1976, Ceferino Paredes applied for a free patent over

Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision
Survey, situated in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. His application
was approved and an original certificate of title was issued in his
favor. However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the
cancellation of Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land
had been designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey.

The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title
after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentation. Pertinently, Generoso Sansaet served as counsel
of Paredes in that civil case.

Consequently, Paredes was charged with perjury. However, the case

was dismissed on the grounds of prescription. Another complaint
was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Paredes with a violation
of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. This was
again dismissed on the grounds of prescription.

In January 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated

the perjury and graft charges against Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the respondents herein for
falsification of public documents.
He claimed that Mansueto Honrada (Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer), in conspiracy with Paredes and Sansaet, simulated
and certified certain documents purporting to be a notice of
arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken
during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.

Gelacio also attached to his letter a certification that no notice of

arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a
certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in
his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon
was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department
of Justice.

In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, Sansaet revealed

that Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed on the
ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case
had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned
therein. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes.

The Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against

all the private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected. The
Sandiganbayan, however, ruled that Sansaet cannot be presented
as a witness against Paredes without the latter’s consent due to the
lawyer-client relationship which existed between them.

Issue: Whether or not the projected testimony of Sansaet, as

proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege.
Ruling: The attorney-client privilege cannot apply, as the facts
thereof and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule.

For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be

considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be
committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his
lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has
theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot
be broken by the attorney without the client's consent.

The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with

regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a

crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof,
are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in
reference to communications between attorney and client.

In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from

Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by

Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the
crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past
by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-
respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a
future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.

(iii) Physician and patient

Lim v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 91114,
[September 25, 1992],
288 PHIL 1053-1066

Facts:

In November 1987, Juan Sim filed a petition for annulment of

marriage on the ground that Nelly Lim has been allegedly suffering
from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after
the marriage and until the present."

Juan’s counsel announced that he would present the Chief of the

Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia
Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.

Nelly’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the

testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since
the latter had examined Nelly in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. They contended
that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and
would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the
petitioner in a professional capacity.

The trial court allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus
took the witness stand as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither
revealed the illness she examined and treated the petitioner for nor
disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.

Nelly’s counsel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals to prohibit the reception of Dr. Acampado’s
testimony.

Issue: Whether Dr. Acampado’s testimony should be prohibited on

the basis of physician-patient privilege.

Ruling: Dr. Acampado’s testimony cannot be excluded since she is

sought as an expert witness in the case.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose

anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained
while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to
the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence which reads:

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or

obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient."

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional

capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the
date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated."

Dr. Acampado’s expert opinion excluded whatever information or

knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them.
As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot
then be excluded.
 (v). Public officers

Almonte v. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 95367,
[May 23, 1995], 314 PHIL 150-183

FACTS:

This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners

Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as
vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while

Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.
The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB
had been illegally disbursedPetitioners do not question the power of
the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the
relevancy or materially of the documents required to be produced,
to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Petitioners
claimed that they cannot be ordered to produce documents relating
to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the
plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the
documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of
EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its
plantilla . . . will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its
being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE:

Whether or not privilege communication may be invoked against a

subpoena duces tecum enjoining the production of records relating
to personal services funds on the ground that they are state secrets.
HELD:
Yes.
Under Rule [Link]. 24 (e) a public officer cannot be examined
during or after his or her tnure as to communications made to him
or her in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure.

For information to be accorded confidentiality on the ground that

such are state secrets, the necessity of according such treatment
must be shown. Governmental privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his
legal rights. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim
of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. A
fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege,
made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.

Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to

protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on
a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations,
courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege
of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to
the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
"illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting."

Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be

sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations
unless it falls under statutorily created ones such as the
Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who
furnish information of violations of laws.

(vi). Parental and filial privilege rule

See RA 11458

4. Examination of a witness

People v. Sergio,
G.R. No. 240053,
[October 9, 2019]

FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and

Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and
susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a
domestic helper in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane
ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked
Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied
that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she used
on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at
the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited
drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government

to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the
Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary
Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the
prosecution of Cristina and Julius.
 b) Order in the examination of an individual
witness

(ii) Cross examination

Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 118509 (Resolution),
[March 29, 1996],
325 PHIL 967-1013

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following

conditions relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in

Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane

shall be in writing.

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's
testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories
is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she
is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before
the court due to her imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the

deposition should be made before and not during the trial. The
depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not
designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open
court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they
argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right
to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as
provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they
claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced
because the affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES:
[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?

[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the
accused to confront the witnesses?

HELD:

On Substantive Matters

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary

circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction by final judgment and her
detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting
execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of
an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings
against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions
attached to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in
confinement in Indonesia, and any question propounded to her must
only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have allowed
the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate

court that the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the
relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule 23.
The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional
rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated
since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to
protect and preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure , in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be
shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or;
(b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category.
Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the Rules should be allowed.
We should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and the People of
their right to due process by presenting their case against the said
accused. By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the
respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of
Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify
through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of
the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian
authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply
with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking

Mary Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure

does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at
the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open
court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on

Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that
it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as
there is compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant

case, the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest
of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of
Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary

Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to

ensure that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with
the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-
making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an
accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State
entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be
given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge.

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a

witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe

the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and
Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal

proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test
the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2)
secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane

face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the
terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they
are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of
written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their
constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and
Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories
submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly
rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia
or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to
the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a
transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the
accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution
raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly
rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers
in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a
transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has
likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for
the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during
the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are

equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court
are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her
testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge.
She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the
presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines
enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness
and assess her credibility. SO ORDERED

e) How the witness is impeached by evidence of

inconsistent statements (laying the
predicate)

People v. Buduhan y Bullan,

G.R. No. 178196,
[August 6, 2008],
583 PHIL 331-366

5. Admissions and confessions

a) Res inter alios acta rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

MAJOR EMILIO COMILING,
G.R. No. 140405.
March 4, 2004.
FACTS:

Ysiong Chua, owner of a Grocery and his helper Mario were about to
close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy some
cigarettes. As the door opened, three masked, armed men barged
into the store and announce a hold-up.

Ysiong ran to the adjacent Bakery and out to the Police Station to
report the incident. Three officers rushed to the crime scene, and a
3 gunshots were heard coming from the inside all directed towards
Bonifacio Street.

PO3 was shot in the face and was rushed to the hospital, however
he died from the injury. Bothered by her conscience, Naty decided
to reveal to the police authorities what she knew about the case,
testifying she was present in all the four meetings in which the plan
to rob the grocery was hatched.

Comiling contends that Naty’s testimony was inadmissible against

him to prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios acta rule.

This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not
against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by
other independent evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether Naty’s confession is inadmissible.

RULING:

No. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial
declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the
witness stand where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

In the present case, Naty's admission implicating appellant Comiling

was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence
against him.
 e) Admission by a conspirator

People v. Yatco,
G.R. No. L-9181,
[November 28, 1955],
97 PHIL 940-947

FACTS:

Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban and another whose identity is still

unknown were charged for having conspired together the murder of
one Jose Ramos. During the trial, counsel for the defendant
interposed a general objection to any evidence on the confession
made by defendant Consunji on the ground that it was hearsay and
therefore incompetent as against the other accused, Panganiban.

The lower courts ordered the exclusion of the evidence but on a

different ground which is that the prosecution could not be
permitted to introduce the confessions of Consunji and Panganiban
to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such
conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions and
circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in excluding the prosecution’s

evidence.

RULING:
Yes. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-
accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established
by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have
been admitted as such.

f) Admission by privies

City of Manila v. Del Rosario,

G.R. No. 1284,
[November 10, 1905],
5 PHIL 227-231
FACTS:

The case is an action to recover the possession of 2 lots occupied by

Jacinto Del Rosario. Del Rosario moved for the dismissal of the case
upon the ground that the City of Manila failed to establish the
allegation in the complaint.
During the hearing, the City of Manila introduced documentary and
oral evidence by several witnesses.

The oral evidences were:

 John Wilson testified that he did not know of his own
knowledge if the land belonged to the city
 Eduardo Timoteo testified that Calles Clavel and Barcelona
was formerly a part of plaza divisoria which belonged to the
Central Government (not the city) and that he did not know to
whom it belongs.
 Juan Villegas testified that the land in question was formerly
included in the Gran Divisoria and that all land included in it
belonged to the city.
 Sotera Roco testified that a certain Lorenzo del Rosario paid
100 pesos to her brother for the purpose of instituting a
possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle
Clavel.
 Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the
ownership of the land. They simply testified as o the
authenticity of some of the documentary evidence presented
by the City of Manila.

Documentary evidence being a map and two public instruments one

Lorenzo del Rosario admitting the authenticity of both documents
which contain an offer to the City of Manila to purchase the land.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidences are admissible as proof to prove Manila’s

claim of title to the land.

RULING:

No. From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by

the plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land in question.
Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor
the documentary evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is
the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as
claimed in the complaint.

Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public

instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to
support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that
the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was
recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle
Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had
been in the adverse possession of the land.

The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as
to the ownership of the land. They simply testified as to the
authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by
the plaintiff.

Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had

learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city.

The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del
Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother Cipriano Roco for the
purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the property
abutting on Calle Clavel.

It appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano
Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in
this case. Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay
testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see how it can be
inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the
property.

g) Admission by silence

People v. Paragsa,
G.R. No. L-44060,
[July 20, 1978],
173 PHIL 316-338

FACTS:

Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 and a half year old girl,
Magallanes. The information alleged that victim was alone in her
house when Paragsa entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife,
forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse. The deed
was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s
house.

Magallanes’ Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused
exiting the house when she came knocking. Magallanes did not
immedately reveal to her parents that she was raped, only 3 days
after the incident when her and her mother arrived from Negros
Occidental.

The accused admits having intercourse with Magalles, but denied

that he employedforce or intimidation against Mirasol, claiming the
sweethearts defense.

Magallanes did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the

appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and
Mirasol were actually sweethearts.

ISSUE:

Whether the silence of Magallanes is an admission of the truth of

the testimony of the accused.

RULING:

Yes. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied

admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be
taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he
heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to
interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and
calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his
knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be
drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.

These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present

case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission
of the truth of such assertion.
 6. Hearsay Rule

b) Reason for exclusion of hearsay evidence

National Development Co. v.

Workmen's Compensation Commission,
G.R. No. L-21724,
[April 27, 1967],
126 PHIL 226-235)

Facts:

Respondent averred that her husband was employed at the

National Development Co., for more than 12 years, his last
designation being machine tender in the Finishing Department. On
account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from the service of
petitioner on May 6, 1953; eight months after (on January 23, 1954),
he died of pulmonary tuberculosis.

Petitioner contends, however, that both respondent's

testimony as well as Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" should have been
excluded, because the first is self-serving while the second are
hearsays. Petitioner adds that while the death certificate (Exh. "E")
is admissible to prove the fact and date of death, it is not competent
to prove the cause thereof.

Issue:

Whether the evidence presented by the respondent is admissible

to support an award in her favor.

Ruling:

Yes. While Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" may be hearsay by common
law rules of evidence, they are nevertheless admissible under
section 49 of the Act. Section 49 is patterned after similar legislation
in the United States, especially New York, where the widespread
adoption of Workmen's Compensation statutes was accompanied by
a demand for a more simple and summary method of procedure and
proof than those given by the common law. As noted in a leading
article.

Legislatures needed the deep sense of injustice felt by workers

that the burden of proof rested always on them and that
probative evidence was often kept out because it was hearsay. A
growing distrust of our court system had thus grown up among
working men and it was essential to the successful operation of
the acts that workmen feel they were treated fairly while at the
 same time duly protecting the interests of industry and the
community's interest in economy.

Indeed, enactments of the type of section 49 were precisely

aimed at the hearsay rule, for the rejection of hearsay evidence,
often of strong probative value, was one of the grievances of
working people against the procedure of the old employer's
liability law.9 Not that hearsay evidence is adequate to support
an award for compensation,10 but that as aptly observed:

[A] compensation board which wants to avoid reversal on

admissibility-of-evidence grounds can beat do so by admitting
everything and excluding nothing. It can be presumed to apply
the appropriate discount to various kinds of hearsay, but it
cannot be presumed to have reached a right result if some
important piece of evidence which have swayed the result has
been erroneously excluded on technical grounds

c) Exceptions to the hearsay rule

(vi) Part of the res gestae

Air France v. Carrascoso,

G.R. No. L-21438,
[September 28, 1966],
124 PHIL 722-742

Facts:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino

pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. The defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man",
who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. The
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that

the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent.

Issue:

Whether the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in

evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court explained that the subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not
come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible.

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the

dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part
of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and
mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were
really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the
purser could have cleared up the matter.

7. Opinion rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA,
G.R. No. 116918.
June 19, 1997

Facts:
 Accused-appellant Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified
persons were charged with the special complex crime of robbery
with rape. Appellant claims in his brief that the amounts alleged in
the information as the bases of his civil liability for robbery were just
concocted and founded on speculation and conjectures. To prove
the value of the burglarized properties, the prosecution presented
an affidavit executed by Ernesto Buenvinida containing a list of the
stolen movables and with their corresponding values.

Issue:

Whether the prosecution has failed to prove the value of the

stolen properties and, for lack of evidence thereon.

Ruling:

No. Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary

witnesses, the value of the stolen items was established. It is a
standing doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in
evidence on ordinary matters known to all men of common
perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles. 31
Here, the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but virtually an
expert, since his work as an investigator of crimes against property
has given him both the exposure to and experience in fixing the
current value of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar.
Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never dared to cross-
examine on the points involved, which opportunity to cross-examine
takes the testimony of Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack
of objection to the value placed by Castro bolsters his testimony
under the cited exception to the opinion rule.

8. Character evidence

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.

ALLYSON BELAGAN
G.R. No. 132164.
October 19, 2004

Facts:

Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and

harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of any
offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast,
Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City. Respondent claimed that the
numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her
character, integrity, and credibility.

Issue:

Whether Magdalena’s derogatory record sufficient to discredit

her credibility.

Ruling:

No. Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the

truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person’s integrity, and to
the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by
evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty or
integrity.

When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by

proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown
should be that which existed before the occurrence of the
circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at the time of the
trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory
character or reputation can still change or reform himself.

9. Rule on Examination of a Child witness (A.M. No.

004-07-SC)

Genil v. Rivera,
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1619,
[January 23, 2006],
515 PHIL 335-347

Facts:
  May 30, 2003, one of complainant’s constituents, Nancy
Silfaban filed before the MTC Sta. Catalina, two criminal
complaints against Roderick Sales, one for rape and the other
for forcible abduction with rape (Crim Case Nos. 3791 and
3792) and also filed a criminal complaint against Janice Sales
for violation of RA 7610 (Crim Case No. 3793).
 Respondent conducted a preliminary investigation of Crim
Case Nos. 3791 and 3792 two and a half months later or on
August 13, 2003. Preliminary investigation was made in open
court.
 During the preliminary investigation, Nancy, a minor, was
called to the witness stand and, in the course of her testimony
subjected to humiliation as all those present, including
respondent, the counsel for the defense Atty. Arturo Erames,
and SPO4 Herminigildo Ortiz Cadungog of the PNP who acted
as prosecutor, were laughing. Respondent had yet to act on
Crim Case 3793.
 Apprehensive that respondent would dismiss the cases which
Nancy filed, complainant requested this Court for a change of
venue. The letter-complaints were eventually referred for
investigation to Judge Orlando C. Velasco of Branch 63 of the
RTC Bayawan City who directed respondent, public prosecutor
and Roderick’s counsel to file their Comment

Comment of Respondent Judge

 Respondent explained that preliminary investigation on the
complaints filed by Nancy were not immediately conducted as
the evidence was "weak" and "unbelievable," it being
"manifestly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the natural
course of things."
 Respondent claimed that not only did Nancy not request
otherwise; she, albeit a minor, "looks energetic,
psychologically mature and somewhat aggressive who
answers questions quickly," and there was nothing in her
affidavit or testimony which warranted the exclusion of the
public from the proceedings.
 And respondent disclaimed the occurrence of any laughing
incident during the preliminary investigation, he adding that
"all were eager to observe the proceedings."

Comment of SPO4 Cadungog

 Claimed that he is not learned in the law which could explain
complainant’s dissatisfaction with his performance when he
 acted as prosecutor during the preliminary investigation of the
complaints filed. And he too denied that there was laughing
during the preliminary investigation.

Comment of Atty Erames

 Disclaimed that there was laughing during the preliminary
investigation. He advanced though that the relatives of the
accused in the first two criminal cases "may have been
pleased" with Nancy’s testimonies which tended to support
the defense claim that the accused and Nancy were
sweethearts.

 Judge Velasco noted that Nancy was subjected to

"unhampered ridicule, embarrassment and humiliation" during
the preliminary investigation, and respondent even "ordered
her to turn clockwise to the delight of every one present."

OCA
 recommends that the administrative case against respondent
be docketed as a regular administrative matter and that he be
fined P21,000 for gross ignorance of the law, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely:
o xxx Respondent took no action on Crim Case
No. 3793 from the date of its filing on 30 May 2003 until
09 October 2003 and offered no explanation for its
delay. He conducted the preliminary investigation in
Crim Case Nos. 3791 and 3792 only on 13 August
2003, but he has not yet submitted his resolutions
thereon to the Provincial Prosecutor.
o Respondent judge displayed blatant insensitivity to the
child victim. He allowed the defense counsel to
cross-examine the child witness and her mother
which caused them extreme humiliation and
embarrassment. xxx Parties cannot be subjected to
direct examination or cross-examination. (during PI)
Questions or issues that may arise during the
investigation should be addressed to the investigating
judge who should propound the same to the party
concerned.
o Noteworthy is that the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 21 November 2000) does
not permit a defense counsel to even approach a child
 who is testifying if it appears that the child is fearful of
or intimidated by the counsel. xxx
o Neither does the Rule require a manifestation from the
child or her mother to exclude the public from the
hearing. The court may motu proprio exclude the public
from the courtroom to protect the right to privacy of the
child; if requiring the child to testify in open court would
cause psychological harm to him; if it would hinder the
ascertainment of truth or result in his inability to
effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear or
timidity; and if the evidence to be produced is of such
character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Issue: What may the court do when a child witness testifies?

Ruling:
 Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides that when a
child testifies, the court may, motu proprio, order the
exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do not have a
direct interest in the case.
 In issuing such order, the court is to consider, inter alia,
o the developmental level of the child,
o the nature of the crime, and
o the nature of his testimony regarding the crime.
 It may also exclude the public from the courtroom if the
evidence to be produced is of such character as to be
offensive to decency or public morals.

Issue: Under the RECW, what is the duty of the court when
questioning the child?

Ruling:
 On top of Sec. 3(e) of Rule 112 of the ROC that the parties in a
preliminary investigation have no right to examine or cross-
examine, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness provides
that the court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth and
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to their
developmental level and protect them from harassment or
undue embarrassment.
Application
 Examination or cross-examination by the parties is proscribed
during preliminary investigation. Section 3(e) of Rule 112
provide
o (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there
are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a
witness. The parties can be present at the hearing
but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to
the party or witness concerned.

 Yet respondent not only allowed SPO4 Cadungog who acted as

prosecutor to cross-examine the accused Roderick Sales; he
also allowed the defense counsel to propound questions to
Nancy and her mother.
 It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and,
where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. (Underscoring supplied)

F. Offer and objection

Zambales v. Zambales,
G.R. No. 216878,
[April 3, 2019]

2. When to make an offer

De la Torre v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 102786,
 [August 14, 1998],
355 PHIL 628-642

Facts:

Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned

toinspect six electric meters installed inthe premises of the
CAPASSCO on Dela Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, discovered that the said electric meters were missing.
He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig
City. Manalo and Felino Olegario gave statements to the Northern
Police District regarding the loss of the electric meters. They
suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the
electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the
attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters.
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded
to the scene of the crime and inquired from people he saw there if
they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the post
near the gate of CAPASSCO. The crew members were taken to the
NPD headquarters for crew members. Based on the statements of
Manalo, Olegario, Enopia, and Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor
Macapagal filed an information charging petitioner de la Torre with
Qualified Theft. Judge Cañizares-Nye, relying heavily on the
testimony of Garcia, found petitioner dela Torre guilty of Qualified
Theft. Petitioner appealed to the CA contending (a) that his
constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation
conducted in the case; (b) that the RTC erred when it admitted in
evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when the
same were not formally offered; © that the RTC took into account
hearsay evidence in arriving at its judgment; and (d) that the
uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision. The CA subsequently denied reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:

WON the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally offered

Held:

Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when the fact is that
before they testified, their testimonies were not formally offered as
required by Rule 132,§35 of the Rules of Court. x x x Petitioner
raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus
waived his objection by his failure to raise it at the close of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court. As
already noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28,
1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new
rule which required that the offer be made at the beginning of the
testimony of a witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and
objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not
before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time their
testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of
the prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed
to have waived his objection based on this ground. Consequently,
the trial court committed no error in considering the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses in its
decision despite the fact that such testimonies had not been offered
before they were given.

7. Tender of excluded evidence

Fortune Tobacco Corp. v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 192024, [July 1, 2015],
762 PHIL 450-467

Facts:

Fortune is the manufacturer/producer of cigarette brands.

Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the cigarette brands were
subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then Sec. 142 of the Tax Code
of 1977, as amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240
took effect causing a shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to
the specific tax system. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid
cigarette brands were subjected to specific tax under Section 142
thereof, now renumbered as Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997.

Under said law the rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes shall
be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.

To implement the provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of

excise tax on cigars and cigarettes packed by machines by January
1, 2000, the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue(CIR), issued RR No. 17-99. It
provides in the last paragraph of Section 1 thereof, "that the new
specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed
by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be
lower than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January
1, 2000."

On 31 March 2005, Fortune filed a claim for tax credit or refund

under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC for erroneously or illegally
collected specific taxes covering the period June to December 31,
2004 in the total amount of Php219,566,450.00.

On November 14, 2005, Fortune filed a Petition for Review which

was raffled to the Former First Division of the CTA. The CIR in his
Answer raised among others that the amount of Php219,566,450.00
being claimed by Fortune as alleged overpaid excise tax for the
period covering 1 June to 31 December 2004, is not properly
documented.

After trial on the merits, the Former First Division of the CTA
rendered the assailed Decision, dated April 30, 2009, which
consistently ruled that RR 17-99 is contrary to law and that there is
insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund.

Fortune filed its motion for reconsideration therefrom, and which

was denied. Fortune elevated its claim to the CTA En Banc, but was
rebuffed after the tax tribunal found no cause to reverse the
findings and conclusions of the CTA Division.

Fortune claims that it paid a total amount of P219,566,450.00 in

overpaid excise taxes. For Fortune, considering that the CTA found
RR 17-99 to be contrary to law, there should be no obstacle to the
refund of the total amount excess excise taxes it had paid.

Issue:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of

Fortune’s claim for tax refund?

Held:
No

Procedural Issue

The denial of Fortune’s claim for tax refund in this case is based on
the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove its
claim and the amount thereof. As a result, Fortune seeks that the
Court re-examine the probative value of its evidence and determine
whether it should be refunded the amount of excise taxes it
allegedly overpaid.

This cannot be done. The settled rule is that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is
not the Supreme Court’s function to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, the
Court’s jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on
these matters are received with respect. A question of law which the
Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. This is in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

In fact, the rule finds greater significance with respect to the

findings of specialized courts such as the CTA, the conclusions of
which are not lightly set aside because of the very nature of its
functions which is dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax
problems and has accordingly developed an expertise on the
subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of
authority.

Moreover, it has been said that the proper interpretation of the

provisions on tax refund that does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants is
a question of law. Conversely, it may be said that if the appeal
essentially calls for the re-examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the appellant, the same raises a question of
fact. Often repeated is the distinction that there is a question of law
in a given case when doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.

Verily, the sufficiency of a claimant’s evidence and the

determination of the amount of refund, as called for in this case, are
questions of fact, which are for the judicious determination by the
CTA of the evidence on record.

Failure to Submit Original Documents

Granting that the Court could take a second look and review
petitioner’s evidence, the result would be the same. Fortune only
submitted mere photocopies of their documentary evidence. Section
3 of A.M. No. 05-11-07 CTA, the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax
Appeals, provides that the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily in
the proceeding before the tax tribunal. In this connection, Section 3
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the Best Evidence Rule
with respect to the presentation of documentary evidence, which is
that original document must be produced subject to a few
exceptions.

In this case, Fortune did not even attempt to provide a plausible

reason as to why the original copies of the documents presented
could not be produced before the CTA or any reason that the
application of any of the foregoing exceptions could be justified.
Although petitioner presented one (1) witness to prove its claim, it
appears that this witness was not even a signatory to any of the
disputed documentary evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the CTA Division, Fortune knew all along
that it had committed the foregoing procedural lapses when it filed
its Formal Offer of Evidence. Although Fortune orally manifested
that it was going to seek reconsideration of the CTA Division order
excluding its evidence, in the end, Fortune did not even bother to
file any such motion for reconsideration at all.

Failure to Offer Any Proof or Tender of Excluded Evidence

At any rate, even if the Court should find fault in the ruling of the
CTA Division in denying the admission of petitioner’s evidence, the
result would be the same because petitioner failed to offer any proof
or tender of excluded evidence.

Fortune posits that if their exhibits are admitted together with the
testimony of their witness, the same would sufficiently prove their
claim. A closer scrutiny of the records shows that it did not file any
offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence.

Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides if documents or

things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror
may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was
rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not move that the
same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by
the appellate court, as documents forming no part of proofs before
the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case. For
the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered
by one party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the
constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case, the CIR, to
due process of law.

Although it may be suggested that the CTA should have been more
liberal in the application of technical rules of evidence, it should be
stressed that a liberal application, or suspension of the application
of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled
principle that rules must be complied with for the orderly
administration of justice.

To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made

without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. To merit
liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying its
noncompliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
substantive justice.

But even if the Court would consider Fortune’s otherwise excluded

evidence, the same would still fail to sufficiently prove their
entitlement to the claim for refund.

As correctly held by the CTA En Banc the documents are a mere

summary of excise taxes paid by Fortune for ALL of its cigarette
brands. The CTA cannot verify the amounts of excise taxes paid for
the brands in issue which are Champion M-100s, Camel Filter Kings,
Winston Filter Kings, and Winston Lights. The SC cannot likewise
rely solely on Fortune's Excise Tax Refund Computation Summary.
The figures therein must be verified through other documentary
evidence which the Court must look into and which Fortune failed to
properly provide.

G. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

 [Link] of evidence

Bautista v. Batalla,
A.C. No. 11395 (Notice),
[July 27, 2016]

FACT:

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the
Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's
testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories
is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she
is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before
the court due to her imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the

deposition should be made before and not during the trial. The
depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not
designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open
court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they
argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right
to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as
provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, they
claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced
because the affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES:

[1] Does Rule 23 apply to criminal cases?

[2] Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the
accused to confront the witnesses?

HELD:

On Substantive Matters
The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary
circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction by final judgment and her
detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting
execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of
an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings
against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions
attached to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in
confinement in Indonesia, and any question propounded to her must
only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have allowed
the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate

court that the State failed to show compelling reasons to justify the
relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule 23.
The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional
rights of Cristina and Julius to confront a witness will be violated
since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to
protect and preserve their rights.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure , in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be
shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or;
(b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category.
Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the Rules should be allowed.
We should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and the People of
their right to due process by presenting their case against the said
accused. By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice to the
respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of
Mary Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify
through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of
the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian
authorities and for the Philippine Government the chance to comply
with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary Jane.
The extraordinary factual circumstances
surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking

Mary Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper? Yes.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure

does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at
the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open
court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on

Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that
it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as
there is compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant

case, the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the
provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest
of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of
Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary

Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to

ensure that all the parties have their day in court. It is in accord with
the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-
making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an
accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State
entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be
given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge.

No violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a

witness
Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe
the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and
Julius.

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal

proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold
purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test
the testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and (2)
secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane

face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the
terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they
are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of
written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their
constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and
Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories
submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly
rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions
would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia
or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to
the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a
transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the
accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross
interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution
raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly
rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers
in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a
transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has

likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for
the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during
the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are

equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court
are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her
testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge.
She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the
presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines
enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness
and assess her credibility. SO ORDERED

3. Sufficiency of extrajudicial confession for conviction

People v. Lim y De Guzman,

G.R. No. 90021,
[May 8, 1991],
274 PHIL 219-230

5. Weight of opinion of expert witness

Tabao y Perez v. People,

G.R. No. 187246 (Resolution),
[July 20, 2011],
669 PHIL 486-512

FACTS

 PROSECUTION: At around 10:00 p.m. of Jan. 21, 1993, the

petitioner Tabao was driving his Toyota Corolla car (PCH-111)
along Gov. Forbes corner G. Tuazon St towards Nagtahan
when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping
Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the
impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on
her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez speeding blue Toyota
Corona car (PES-764) ran over Rochelle’s body. Bystanders —
armed with stones and wooden clubs — followed Mendez’ car
until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Cielo, a newspaper
boy, went inside Mendez’ car, sat beside him, got his driver’s
license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez
 followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while
backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the
sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought
Rochelle’s body inside Mendez’ car. The three of them (the
petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST
Hospital, where she died due to septicemia secondary to
traumatic injuries.
 DEFENSE: The petitioner was driving along Gov. Forbes corner
G. Tuazon St. when his car ramped on an island at the foot of
the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards,
but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw that
its 2 rear wheels had been elevated. He returned inside his car
to turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were
approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and
saw a person lying on the road. He looked at his left side and
saw a car that was "running fast like a wind" pass by. He
approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she
was still breathing and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez’
car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car.
Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the
UST Hospital.
 Mendez testified that as he was driving on his way home, he
saw a vehicle ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another
vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He
slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from
the car that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that
what had fallen was a person’s body. When he moved his car
backwards to help this person, many people approached his
car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had
happened. The people replied that someone was run over;
some of them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having
run over the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner
carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez’ car.
Thereafter, the two of them brought the victim to the UST
Hospital.
 The petitioner and Mendez were charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide before the RTC, Br. 39,
Manila. The RTC convicted the 2 accused of the crime
charged. It found that the petitioner’s car first hit the victim,
causing her to be thrown into the road on her back, and that
Mendez’ car ran over her as she was lying down.
 The CA agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and
affirmed its decision with the modification on the penalty.
Issue:

WON the CA erred in disregarding the witness of the accused

Held:

No.

Weight of expert testimony

The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Sec. 49, Rule 130
when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior
Inspector Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioner’s car
could not have bumped the victim because the latter’s body was not
thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues
that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic
accident investigation, and as such, his statements are "backed-up
by [the] principles of applied physics, engineering, and
mathematics.”

Sec. 49, Rule 130 states that the opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he
is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the
word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing
the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the
testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness
must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in
favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the
determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or
not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts
and the applicable law. It has been held of expert testimonies:

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they

may place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies
in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and
sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of
the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process
of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible
bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of
the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which
deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may
not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view
of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court
whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of
discretion.

P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his

testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report
prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness the
incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimony
did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been
involved in the incident. From P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio’s testimon, it is
clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility that
the victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise
admitted that the location of an accident victim in relation to the
vehicle would also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the
point of impact.

6. Substantial Evidence

Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor,

G.R. No. 102358,
[November 19, 1992],
290 PHIL 311-326

Facts:

Petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo responded to a newspaper

advertisement looking for a couple to work as a driver and
tutor/babysitter and went to Career Planners Specialists
International, Inc. (CPSI) to do so. CPSI was owned by herein private
respondents spouses Fernandez. Petitioners were hired to work for a
family in Saudi Arabia for a monthly salary of US$350 each, and
allegedly had to pay a placement fee of P40,000 as a precondition
for the processing f their papers. The managed to pay P30,000
upfront and executed a promissory not for the balance. They were
not issued a receipt despite their demand.

It was subsequently found by the petitioners that their positions had

been misrepresented. Before boarding, Gloria Manalo noticed that
her position was changed to that of domestic help, but a CPSO
employee assured her that the change was only to facilitate her
departure. CPSI provided spouses Manalo with their Travel Exit
Passes(TEP) of Filipino Manpower Services (FILMAN), a duly licensed
recruitment agency.

Both of the spouses Manalo were forced to return home after finding
that Gloria was made to work as a maid, and that the work
conditions of Vicente’s employment was unbearable. However,
before leaving, Vicente had to execute a promissory note to cover
his plane fare and sign a quitclaim in favor of CPSI and his employer.

POEA: Spouses Manalo sued private respondents, charging them

with illegal exaction, false advertisement, and other violations. They
demanded the refund of the amount exacted from them plus moral
damages.

Private respondents filed in their Answer that Gloria had applied as

domestic help fully aware that she could not be a tutor due to the
language barrier, that the promissory note was required because
the spouses had been hired without paying placement fees, that the
spouses were well educated and would not have parted with their
money without securing a receipt, that a quitclaim had been
executed by Vicente, and that the employment papers from FILMAN
were valid as it was a sister company of CPSI.

POEA ruled in favor of spouses Manalo, finding that their version of

the case was more convincing that CPSI’s.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

granted. The resolution issued by POEA, however, stated that the
sole basis of POEA holding herein respondent liable for illegal
exaction was the uncorroborated testimony of the complainants.

Secretary of Labor: Sustained the reconsideration of POEA.

Issues:

1. Whether or not herein public respondents gravely abused

their discretion when they required clear and convincing
evidence to establish the charge of illegal exaction.
Held:

1. Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.

In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or

suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies
of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the
charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All
administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not
clear and convincing evidence.

Clear and convincing proof is more than mere preponderance but

not to extent of such certainly as is required beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases.

Substantia evidence consists of more than a scintilla of evidence but

may be somewhat less than a preponderance.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt > clear and convincing evidence >
preponderance of evidence > substantial evidence.

PETITION GRANTED.