THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ADVANCED LEGAL
STUDIES, KOCHI
(ESTABLISHED BY ACT 27 OF 2005 OF THE KERALA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY)
CPC INTERNAL ASSESSMENT TEST-III
SUBMITTED BY:
FATHIMA LIYANA C.M
ROLL NUMBER: 1884
6TH SEMESTER B.A. LL.B. (HONS.)
SUBMITTED TO:
ADV. SHINIL PAUL MATHEWS
COURSE FACULTY: CPC
QUESTION 1
FACTS
Alan files a suit for recovery of money against Bibin after a delay of 5 months beyond the
prescribed limitation period. Alan contends that he was suffering from a medical condition and
was unable to initiate proceedings in time.
ISSUES
1) Whether Alan’s medical condition amounts to a ‘sufficient cause’ the Limitation Act, 1963
to condone the delay in filing the suit?
2) How do courts assess claims of medical condition?
3) What factors are considered by courts in condoning delay?
ANALYSIS
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: “Any appeal or application may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause
for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”
The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes specific time periods within which various suits, appeals, and
applications must be filed. Section 5 of the Act provides for extension of the prescribed limitation
period if the applicant satisfies the court that they had “sufficient cause” for not filing the suit,
appeal, or application within the prescribed period.
“Sufficient cause” is not defined in the Act but has been interpreted through numerous judicial
decisions. The doctrine is founded on the principle that justice should not be denied merely on
technical grounds when a genuine impediment prevented timely filing. In the landmark case of N.
Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998), the Supreme Court held that the expression “sufficient
cause” should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice. The Court observed that rules
of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties but to ensure that they approach the court
without unreasonable delay. For medical conditions specifically, courts generally consider the
following factors:
1. Severity of the medical condition: In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (1987), the
Supreme Court established that illness of a serious nature affecting the party's ability to
pursue legal remedies constitutes sufficient cause. Alan's medical condition must have been
severe enough to prevent him from taking legal action.
2. Duration of incapacity: The entire period of delay should be reasonably explained. In State
of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972), the Supreme Court held
that the applicant must account for the entire period of delay, not just portions of it.
3. Diligence after recovery: In Elechem Transport v. Shah Speeding (2005), the court
considered whether the party acted promptly once the disability was removed. Alan should
have filed his suit within a reasonable time after recovering from his medical condition.
4. Prejudice to the opposing party: In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962), the Supreme
Court noted that courts should consider whether condonation would cause undue prejudice
to the opposing party.
The Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (1987) outlined four important
principles for courts to consider: (a) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter
being thrown out at the threshold, defeating justice (b) Judicial approach should be justice-oriented
rather than technical (c) Every delay does not defeat justice (d) Promoting substantial justice
should be the primary aim.
VERDICT
Alan's claim for condonation may succeed if he provides sufficient medical evidence showing his
condition was severe enough to prevent timely filing, accounts for the entire 5-month delay with
proper documentation, filed promptly after recovery, and if condonation won't unduly prejudice
Bibin. Courts generally adopt a liberal approach in such cases, balancing technical rules against
justice. While serious illness is typically accepted as sufficient cause, Alan must substantiate his
claim with credible evidence covering the full delay period and demonstrate reasonable diligence
after recovery.
QUESTION 2
FACTS
Joseph files a suit for possession of immovable property after 15 years of dispossession. The
defendant, Thomas, claims ownership through adverse possession. Examine the doctrine of
adverse possession and its relation to the law of limitation.
ISSUES
1) How does it differ from acquiescence and prescription?
2) What are the conditions for establishing adverse possession?
3) how is time computed?
ANALYSIS
The doctrine of adverse possession is a method of acquiring title to real property by possessing it
for a statutory period against the rights of the true owner. This principle is recognized under the
Limitation Act, 1963, which bars legal remedies after specified time periods have elapsed.
Under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the limitation period for a suit for
possession of immovable property based on title is 12 years from the date the possession of the
defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Once this period expires, not only is the rightful
owner's remedy extinguished, but the adverse possessor also acquires a positive title to the
property.
The Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) affirmed that upon
completion of the statutory period, the adverse possessor acquires an absolute title which can even
be used to recover possession if subsequently dispossessed.
The Supreme Court in its decision reported in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India,
distinguished between these concepts, noting that adverse possession requires hostility to the
owner’s title, while acquiescence implies some form of acceptance. The relevant extracts are as
follows
“11... If a former owner neglects and allows the gradual dissociation between himself and what
he is claiming and he knows that someone else is caring by doing acts, the attachment which one
develops by caring cannot be easily parted with. The bundle of ingredients constitutes adverse
possession...”
Conditions for establishing adverse possession:
1. Actual possession: The possession must be actual physical possession of the property. In
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004), the Supreme Court emphasized
that possession must be actual, not constructive or symbolic.
2. Open and notorious possession: The possession must be visible and known to the public.
In M. Venkatesh v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2000), it was held that possession must
be open and notorious enough to give notice to the true owner.
3. Continuous and uninterrupted possession: In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma
(2007), the Supreme Court stated that possession must be continuous throughout the
statutory period without significant interruptions.
4. Exclusive possession: The possession must be exclusive against the world, including the
true owner. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam (2007), the court emphasized the need for
exclusive possession.
5. Hostile and adverse: The possession must be hostile to the interests of the true owner and
without permission. In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina (1964), the Supreme Court clarified
that possession with the owner's permission cannot be considered adverse.
6. Peaceful possession: In State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011), the court noted that
possession obtained through force or fraud cannot be the basis for adverse possession until
the effect of force or fraud has been removed.
Computation of time:
o The statutory period begins when possession becomes adverse to the true owner.
o The period is continuous, but under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, if the owner is
under a legal disability (minority, insanity, etc.), the period is extended until three years
after the disability ceases.
o Section 14 provides for exclusion of time spent in proceedings prosecuted in good faith
in a court without jurisdiction.
o Under Section 15, time during which the defendant has been absent from India is
excluded.
Adverse Possession vs. Acquiescence:
o Adverse possession is based on hostile possession for the statutory period regardless of
the owner's knowledge or attitude.
o Acquiescence refers to implied consent where the true owner, despite knowledge, takes
no action against encroachment, creating an estoppel. In Md. Rustam Ali v. Md.
Shanawaz Ali (2012), the Supreme Court distinguished that acquiescence involves
knowledge and passive acceptance by the true owner, while adverse possession can
exist even without the owner's knowledge.
Adverse Possession vs. Prescription:
o Adverse possession leads to acquisition of title to property after the statutory period.
o Prescription relates to acquisition of easement rights (not ownership) through long-
continued use. Under the Indian Easements Act, 1882, easement rights can be
acquired by prescription after 20 years of continuous use.
In Prakash Chandra v. Rabindra Nath (2011), the Supreme Court clarified that prescription
pertains to rights of use over another's property, while adverse possession concerns acquisition of
title to the property itself.
VERDICT
Based on the provided facts and the law of adverse possession, Thomas's claim would likely
succeed if he can establish all six elements of adverse possession for the continuous period of 12
years required under the Limitation Act. Since Joseph has waited 15 years to file his suit, he has
exceeded the 12-year limitation period specified in Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Joseph's right
to recover possession would be barred by limitation unless he can prove that Thomas's possession
was not adverse (e.g., it was permissive), or that there were circumstances that would extend the
limitation period (such as legal disability or fraud). If Thomas can demonstrate that his possession
was actual, open, continuous, exclusive, hostile, and peaceful for the entire 12-year period, he
would have acquired ownership through adverse possession, and Joseph's suit would fail.
QUESTION 3
FACTS
In a suit for breach of contract, the plaintiff relies on a written acknowledgement of liability signed
by the defendant one year after the limitation period began. Analyze the legal effect of such an
acknowledgement under the Limitation Act.
ISSUES
1) What are its essential elements?
2) How does it affect the computation of the limitation period?
3) What are the consequences of an improperly drafted acknowledgement?
ANALYSIS
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the effect of acknowledgement of liability in
writing. This provision allows for a fresh period of limitation to begin from the date of such
acknowledgement.
When a person acknowledges liability in writing with respect to a right or property, a fresh period
of limitation begins to run from the time of such acknowledgement. This effectively extends the
limitation period by providing a new starting point for computing it. In Tilak Ram v. Nathu (1967),
the Supreme Court held that an acknowledgement under Section 18 gives a fresh starting point for
limitation but does not create a new right or cause of action. It merely extends the period within
which the original cause of action can be enforced.
Essential Elements of a Valid Acknowledgement:
1. It must be in writing: In S.F. Mazda v. Durga Prasad (1961), the Supreme Court
emphasized that oral acknowledgements have no effect under Section 18.
2. It must be signed by the party against whom the right is claimed: In Venkata Reddi v. Rani
(1997), the court clarified that the signature must be of the person against whom the right
is claimed or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf.
3. It must be made before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period and must contain
an admission of subsisting liability: In S.F. Mazda v. Durga Prasad (1961), the Supreme
Court held that the acknowledgement must indicate the existence of a jural relationship and
admit a subsisting liability.
4. It need not contain a promise to pay: In Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluminium
Corporation of India Ltd. (1971), the court clarified that while an acknowledgement must
admit liability, it need not contain a promise to pay or settle the liability.
5. Effect on Computation of Limitation Period: When a valid acknowledgement is made,
Section 18 provides that a fresh period of limitation begins to run from the time of such
acknowledgement. In the present case:
1. The limitation period began running at a certain point
2. One year later, the defendant signed a written acknowledgement
3. A fresh limitation period would begin from the date of this acknowledgement
For breach of contract cases, Article 55 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a
limitation period of three years from the date of breach. Due to the acknowledgement, the three-
year period would now commence from the date of acknowledgement rather than the date of
breach. In Pandit Ishwar Dat v. Smt. Jaswant Kaur (1973), the Supreme Court clarified that each
acknowledgement creates a fresh starting point, and successive acknowledgements can continue
to extend the limitation period.
VERDICT
In this case, since the defendant signed a written acknowledgement of liability one year after the
limitation period began (and thus before the expiration of the limitation period for breach of
contract), a fresh period of limitation would begin from the date of such acknowledgement,
provided the acknowledgement meets all the essential requirements. This would effectively extend
the time available to the plaintiff to file the suit by providing a new starting point for computing
the limitation period. The plaintiff would have three years from the date of acknowledgement to
file the suit for breach of contract, rather than three years from the date of breach.
For the acknowledgement to have this effect, it must clearly admit subsisting liability, be in
writing, be signed by the defendant, and contain no conditions or qualifications that would negate
liability. If the acknowledgement fails to meet any of these requirements, it would not extend the
limitation period, and the original limitation period would continue to apply.
