http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/04/1960

BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
KAPUR, J.L.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:
1960 AIR 932 1960 SCR (3) 499
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1964 SC 855 (12)
R 1982 SC 710 (21)
R 1982 SC1126 (7)
F 1983 SC1073 (22)
D 1986 SC 180 (34)
RF 1986 SC 847 (12)

ACT:
Supreme Court Rules-Publication of list of touts by
Registrar-Rules, if ultra vires the Powers of this Court-
Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended), O. IVA, rr. 23, 24-
Constitution of India, Arts. 145(1)(a), 14, 19, 21.

HEADNOTE:
On a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme
Court Bar Association, the Registrar of the Supreme Court
issued notices to the appellant and another under r. 24, 0.
IVA of the Supreme Court Rules to show cause why their names
should not be included in the list of touts to be published
by him thereunder. A preliminary objection was raised that
rr. 23 and 24 were ultra vires the powers of this Court
conferred by Art. 145(I)(a) of the Constitution and that the
Registrar had, therefore, no jurisdiction to initiate the
proceedings. The Registrar overruled the objection and on
the evidence adduced by the complainant found both the
persons to be touts within the meaning of r. 23 of the said
order and directed their names to be included in the list of
touts to be hung up on the Court notice board. The
appellant appealed to the Chamber judge and on his direction
the matter was placed before the Constitution Bench:
Held, that rr. 23 and 24 of 0. IVA of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1950, as amended, are intra vires the rule-making
powers of this Court and the order of the Registrar must be
upheld.
There can be no doubt that this Court has the inherent
jurisdiction to regulate its proceedings relating to the
conduct of persons appearing before it, in and out of Court,
in so far as it relates to the profession and its ethics.
Apart from such jurisdiction, Art. 145(1)(a) of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
Constitution by using the expression " the practice and
procedure of the
65
500
Court," which has to be construed in its widest sense,
confers on this Court the power to regulate not merely the
conduct of advocates appearing in Court but also of their
assistants in relation to the business of this Court.,
Consequently, r. 23 which makes an advocate who accepts
engagement in legal business through a tout guilty of
misconduct and r. 24 which lays down the procedure for
including a person in the list of touts are clearly within
the rule-making powers of this Court.
No question as to r. 24 infringing Art. 14 of the
Constitution could arise since it does not discriminate
within the class to which it applies, nor does it contravene
Art.19 or 21 of the Constitution and it was futile to
contend that the word ’life ’ in Art. 21 included
’livelihood’. No tout can claim any rights in relation to
the business of the Court. This rule which seeks to
maintain the purity of the legal profession is no less in
the interest of the general public and it is the duty of
every Court to see that toutism is completely eliminated.

JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Misc. Petition No. 928
of 1959.
Appeal against the order dated May 16, 1959, of the
Registrar.
M. G. Bhimasena Rao, for Sant Ram.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
N. S’ Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the Attorney-General of
India.
1960. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SlNHA-. C. J.-This matter was placed before the
Constitution Bench by an order of the Chamber Judge dated
August 14, 1959, as it involved the vires of the rules
framed under Art. 145 of the Constitution with particular
reference to Rule 24 of Order IV-A of the Supreme Court
Rules (as Amended).
It appears that on receipt of a letter dated April 28, 1959,
from the Supreme Court Bar Association forwarding a copy of
a resolution which had been passed by the Executive
Committee of that Association, the Registrar initiated
proceedings and held an enquiry under R. 24(2) of Chap. IV-
A. The enquiry was made against two persons named Sant Ram
and Budh Dev Sharma on a complaint made by the Honorary
Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association. The
complaint against those persons was to the effect that they
were " continuing their undesirable activities " and were
seen every day in the Court premises and
501
in the verandah in front of the Bar Association "accosting
clients". On receipt of the Secretary’s letter the
Registrar caused notices to be issued to the two persons
aforesaid to show cause why their names should not be
included in the " list of touts " to be kept hung up on the
Court notice board according to R. 24 aforesaid. The
Registrar fixed a date for holding the enquiry and called
upon those persons to appear before him and to adduce such
evidence as they may be advised, in showing cause against
the inclusion of their names in such a list. The notice
further called upon them to file their replies, if any, to
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
the complaint on or before May 6, 1959, and to be ready with
all their evidence and witnesses, if any, at the hearing on
May 9, 1959. Copies of the complaint and other relevant
papers were also sent to the Secretary of the Supreme Court
Bar Association inviting him to take such part in the
proceedings as the Association may be advised and requesting
him to furnish particulars of the evidence in support of the
complaint and to be ready with the evidence. In pursuance
of the notice aforesaid Budh Dev Sharma alias B. D. Pathak
filed his reply oil May 6, 1959, annexing thereto certain
documents and praying that he may be allowed to continue
earning his livelihood. He also prayed that his employer
Shri Dharam Bhushan, Advocate, may be accorded permission to
have his name registered as a clerk in the Registry and also
in the Bar Association. On May 8, 1959, Sant Ram filed his
reply to the said notice annexing thereto a certificate of
Mr. M. G. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate, and praying that the
notice against him may be discharged and that he be "
allowed to make both ends meet in the service of his present
employer ", meaning thereby Mr. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate.
The proceedings before the Registrar commenced on May 9,
1959, and were concluded on May 11, when evidence was
recorded.
A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the persons
proceeded against that the rules framed by the Supreme Court
under which the proceedings had been initiated against them
were ultra vires the powers of the Court conferred by Art.
145 of the Constitution.
66
502
It was contended on their behalf that the Registrar had no
jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings against them. The
learned Registrar overruled the preliminary objection and
held that it was not competent for him to go behind the
rules and that he must follow them, though he indicated that
if he had the competence to decide the preliminary objection
on its merits, he would have no difficulty in holding that
the objection was wholly unfounded.
After considering the evidence adduced before him the
learned Registrar by his order dated May 16, 1959, recorded
the finding that it had been proved to his satisfaction that
both those persons had been habitually frequenting the
precincts of the Court for the purpose of procuring business
for certain advocates in their profession, for remuneration,
over a period of years right up to the time the show cause
notice had been served upon them. He directed accordingly
that a list of touts be published forthwith in accordance
with R. 24(1), 0. IV-A, of the Supreme Court Rules, showing
the names of the two persons aforesaid in that list which
shall be kept hung up on the Court notice board.
Against this order of the Registrar only Sant Ram appealed
to the Chamber Judge. As already indicated, the learned
Chamber Judge directed the matter to be placed before the
Constitution Bench in view of the constitutional question
raised by the appellant challenging the vires of the rules
aforesaid.
Though other points were also raised in support of the
appeal before us, the most important question that falls to
be determined is whether this Court had the jurisdiction
under Art. 145 of the Constitution to frame the rules
impugned in this case. Before the rules which were amended
in the present form and which came into force with effect
from April 15, 1959, there was no provision in the rules of
this Court containing the definition of the word " tout " or
laying down the procedure for dealing with persons who were
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
alleged to have been acting as such. Order IV-A was
therefore added. It was headed: " Professional or Other
Misconduct ". It contains rules relating to the suspension
or removal of advocates from the roll of
503
advocates of this Court including the procedure to be
followed in proceedings started against an advocate of the
Court. Rules 23 and 24 which are the relevant rules are in
these terms:-
"23. Any Advocate, who accepts an engagement in any legal
business through a person included in the list of touts
published as provided in the next following Rule, shall be
deemed guilty of professional misconduct.
Explanation:-
" Tout " means a person who procures, in consideration of
any remuneration moving from any Advocate or from any person
on his behalf, the employment of such Advocate in any legal
business, or who proposes to any Advocate to procure, in
consideration of any remuneration moving from such Advocate
or from any person on his behalf, the employment of the
Advocate in such business, or who for purposes of such
procurement frequents the precincts of the Court."
24. (1) " The Registrar shall publish lists of persons
proved to his satisfaction, by evidence of general repute or
otherwise, habitually to act as touts, to be known as I
lists of touts’ and may, from time to time, alter and amend
such lists.
A copy of every list of touts shall be kept hung upon the
Court Notice Board.
Explanation:-
The passing of a resolution by the Supreme Court Bar
Association declaring any person to be a tout shall be
evidence of general repute of such person for purpose of
this Rule.
(2) No person shall be included in the list of touts unless
he has been given an opportunity to show cause against his
inclusion in such list. Any person may appeal to the
Chamber Judge against the order of the Registrar including
his name in such list.
(3) The Registrar may, by general or special order, exclude
from the precincts of the Court all such persons whose names
are included in the list of touts."
The question is whether these rules are within the rule-
making power of this Court conferred by
504
Art. 146(1)(a) :’of the Constitution which is in these
terms:-
" 145(1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with
the approval of the President, make rules for regulating
generally the practice and procedure of the Court including-
(a) rules as to the persons practising before the Court :
It has been contended that the power of this Court to frame
rules is confined to making rules for regulating the "
practice and procedure " do not include rules to declare a
person a tout and the procedure leading up to such a
declaration. In our opinion there is no force in this
contention. It has not been, and it cannot be, contended
that this Court is incompetent to frame rules regulating
conduct in and out of Court bearing on the professional
activities of an advocate of this Court. This Court has the
inherent jurisdiction to regulate its proceedings relating
to conduct of persons appearing before it, in and out of
Court, in so far as such conduct has a bearing oil their
professional relations and ethics, apart from the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
constitutional provisions of Art. 145 set out above. This
Court must in the very nature of things have the fullest
power to lay down rules with a view to ensuring honest and
efficient discharge of their duties by officers of the
Court, including legal practitioners admitted to the roll of
advocates of the Court. This Court has, subject to such
legislation as may be made by Parliament, the responsibility
vested in it of maintaining proper discipline in Court and
of insisting upon proper standards being observed by legal
practitioners who have the privilege of appearing, acting
and pleading in this Court. This Court must, therefore, in
the proper discharge of its duties as the highest Court in
the land make such rules as would ensure sound ad-
ministration of justice and proper conduct on the part of
those whose duty it is to help the Court in the discharge of
its responsibilities. Apart from the inherent jurisdiction
of this Court, the Constitution itself has
505
authorised the Court to make rules for regulating generally
the practice and procedure of the Court. The expression, "
the practice and procedure of the Court " must be construed
in its fullest amplitude and must include regulating the
conduct of all persons, appearing before the Court, in
relation to the business of the Court. Thus the conduct of
advocates and their assistants in relation to the business
of the court must form the subject matter of regulation by
the rules of the Court.
Once it is held that this Court has the authority to frame
rules relating to the conduct of persons practising in this
Court, it follows that this Court has the power to prescribe
a code of conduct for advocates, regulating their relations
with their clients and their conduct in Court as officers of
the Court. When this Court, as in R. 23, provides that an
advocate shall be guilty of professional misconduct if he
accepts an engagement in any legal business through a person
included in the list of touts, such a rule cannot be said to
be beyond the rule-making powers of this Court. It follows
that with a view to enforcing that rule, a " tout " has to
be defined, which is done by the explanation to R. 23. It
is equally clear that R. 24, which lays down the procedure
for publishing lists of touts and for holding an enquiry to
determine whether or not a particular person should be
included in such a list must be equally within the purview
of of the rule-making power of this Court. In our opinion,
therefore, it is futile to contend that R. 24 in question is
ultra vires the rule-making power of this Court.
It is next contended that Art. 14 of the Constitution has
been infringed by the provisions contained in R. 24 It was
difficult for the appellant to indicate in what way the
alleged discrimination occurs. It was faintly suggested
that there was some difference between the provisions now
impugned and those of s. 36 of the Legal Practitioners’ Act
(Act XVIII of 1879). Assuming that there is some difference
between the two provisions, it cannot be said that ipso
facto there is discrimination. All persons who frequent the
precincts of this Court shall be dealt with under the same
506
rules, if and when the occasion arises. All persons who are
included in the list of touts under R. 24 will be liable to
be dealt with in the same way irrespective of any other
considerations. Hence there is no room for any
discrimination so far as the precincts of this Court are
concerned.
It is also contended that the impugned rule infringes Arts.
19 and 21 of the Constitution, because it has the effect of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
excluding him from the precinct,-, of the Court, and of
carrying on his occupation and that it has a tendency to
deprive him of his livelihood. The rule, as already
indicated, has been made with a view to ensuring the purity
and soundness of the profession of law so far as the
advocates of this Court are concerned. It cannot,
therefore, be said that it is not in the interest of the
general public to exclude touts from the precincts of this
Court. If the appellant has been rightly declared to be a
tout, he cannot justly complain that he is being deprived of
the right to carry oil his occupation, an occupation which
is regarded as having a corrupting influence. A tout as
such cannot claim any rights in relation to the business of
the Court and it is incumbent on every Court where legal
practitioners are allowed to appear and plead to see that
toutism is completely eliminated.
With reference to the terms of Art. 21, it was also argued
by the appellant himself, after he had been permitted by the
Court to dispense with the services of his advocate, that
life must include livelihood. The argument that the word
"life" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes " livelihood
" has only to be stated to be rejected. The question of
livelihood has not in terms been dealt with by Art. 21 of
the Constitution. That question is included in the freedoms
enumerated in Art. 19, particularly cl.(g), or even in Art.
16 in a limited sense, but the language of Art. 21 cannot be
pressed into aid of the argument that the word "life" in
Art. 21 includes "livelihood" also. Even if this extreme
proposition were to be accepted as well founded, the
appellant will have to be kept out of the precincts of the
Court only after the procedure established by the rules of
this Court has been observed. We have already held that the
rule in
507
question is not ultra vires. That being so, the only
question that remains to be considered is whether the
procedure laid down by the rule has not been followed as
contended by the appellant. It has already been stated that
the appellant had been properly served with the notice to
show cause why his name should not be included in the list
of touts. He put in his show cause petition and he was
given time to adduce such evidence as he may have been
advised in support of his case. The appellant has not
contended that the procedure laid down in the rule has not
been followed, but his contention was that as the Registrar
did not grant further time arid did not issue summons to his
witnesses he had been deprived of his right to adduce
evidence. In our opinion, there is no substance in this
contention. The enquiry was a summary one. The matter was
dealt with by the Registrar on two dates. If the lawyers
whom the appellant wished to examine on his behalf did not
turn up on the date fixed, it may be due to the fact that
they were not willing to support his case. It is a little
difficult to appreciate what those advocates, even if they
had appeared before the ]Registrar, could prove. They could
not prove the negative. It was for the complainant to
adduce evidence in support of the allegation that the
appellant is a tout. The whole question, therefore, which
the Registrar had to determine was whether or not the
evidence adduced in support of the complainant’s case was
sufficient to make out that complaint. The Registrar has
come to a distinct finding that it had been established to
his satisfaction by evidence of repute that the appellant is
a tout. It appears that the appellant started coming to
this Court as a litigant after his conviction under s. 409
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
of the Indian Penal Code. He said he worked as clerk with a
lawyer who had taken up his cause, but he appears to have
changed his masters rather too frequently and pretended to
have worked as an advocate’s clerk without his name being
shown in the register of clerks maintained by the Bar
Association. His case that a number of advocates of this
Court had started a false propaganda against him and some
others, because they felt that their clients were being
misled into
508
engaging other advocates, has not been accepted by the
Registrar. It appears to have been the case that not being
a registered clerk, he could not do any job permissible for
such a clerk. Naturally, therefore, he was found wandering
about in the corridors in circumstances which led to the
genuine belief that be had no other business in Court than
that of touting for such legal practitioners as would engage
him. for that nefarious activity. We cannot, therefore,
accede to the argument that the appellant has been a victim
of mere suspicion. The evidence of general repute against
him, in our opinion, was sufficient to brand him as a " tout
".
It follows that there is no merit in this appeal, which is
hereby dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.