DELHI HIGH COURT CASES ON DEFAMATION

1. Vinai Kumar Saxena v. Aam Aadmi Party (2022)

Facts: The present suit has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff seeking relief of permanent
injunction and damages against the defendants on account of defamatory statements made
on behalf of Defendants 1 to 6 on the social media platforms of Defendants 7 and 8. The
plaintiff is the Lieutenant Governor (LG) of Delhi and is a constitutional authority.
Defendant 1 is a political party, Aam Aadmi Party. Defendants 2 to 6 are office-bearers of
Defendant 1 Party.

It is the case of the plaintiff that Defendants 1 to 6 have launched a barrage of personal
attacks against the plaintiff, making unsubstantiated and baseless allegations that the
plaintiff has indulged in corruption and money laundering to the tune of Rs 1,400,00,00,000
at the time of demonetisation in November 2016, while the plaintiff was the Chairman of
the Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC).

Defendants 1 to 6 have created and circulated hashtags, which include

“#LG_Saxena_Ko_Giraftar_Karo” and “#LG_Saxena_Chor_Hai”. Further, Defendants 1
to 6 have posted various tweets and videos in the form of interviews and press conferences
on social media platforms of Defendants 7 and 8 in order to tarnish the reputation of the
plaintiff. Defendants 1 to 6 have also conducted interviews in the news media towards
defaming the plaintiff. The whole foundation of the libelous posts/tweets and slanderous
statements of Defendants 1 to 6 is based on extracts of the statements of two accused
persons, being Mr Sanjeev Malik and Mr Pradeep Kumar Yadav, former employees of
KVIC, recorded pursuant to the FIR dated 10-7-2017 bearing number RC-DAI-2017-A-
0026 filed at p. 606 of the documents of the plaintiff.

Findings:

Paragraph 20: “Before turning to the submissions of the parties, it is deemed apposite to
spell out the contours of free speech, as provided in Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution afford the right of freedom of speech and expression
to all persons. However, the same is subject to restrictions under Article 19(2), which
includes defamation. Therefore, the right to freedom of speech and expression is not an
unfettered right in the garb of which defamatory statements can be made to tarnish the
reputation of a person. The fundamental right to freedom of speech has to be
counterbalanced with the right of reputation of an individual, which has been held to be a
basic element of the right to life consecrated in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P.”

Paragraph 22: “The statements made by Defendants 1 to 6, that the plaintiff was involved
in any acts of corruption at the time of demonetisation, are completely unsubstantiated.
There is nothing to suggest that the statements extracted at pp. 52 and 53 of the plaint and
relied upon in the tweet of 29-8-2022 are made by the accused persons before the
investigating agency. Even if the aforesaid statements are taken to be correct, the said
statements are completely based on hearsay, being premised solely on the accused persons
being told by other individuals that the said acts were to be done at the behest of the
Chairman. Further, the subject-matter of the aforesaid statement is a sum of Rs 17,00,000,
which has been exaggerated by the defendants many times over, to a fanciful sum of Rs
1,400,00,00,000.”

Paragraph 23: “Defendants 1 to 6 have also made allegations in respect of a contract of

Rs 80,00,00,000 being assigned to the daughter of the plaintiff while the plaintiff was the
Chairman of KVIC. Once again, the defendants have made unfounded allegations that an
imaginary sum of Rs 80,00,00,000 has been paid to the daughter of the plaintiff. There is
no material-on-record to substantiate the aforesaid statement. Further, KVIC in its letter
dated 2-9-2022 has clarified that no money was paid to the daughter of the plaintiff for the
professional services rendered by her.”

Paragraph 30: “On a prima facie view, the various statements/interviews/press

conferences/tweets/retweets/hashtags made by the defendants are per se defamatory. The
same have been made in a reckless manner, without any factual verification, in order to
tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff. It cannot be gainsaid that reputation of a person is
earned after years and the same cannot be tarnished by any other individual in a casual
manner. The damage caused to the reputation of an individual is immediate and far-
reaching on the internet. So long as the impugned content continues to be in circulation
and visible on social media, it is likely to cause continuing damage to the reputation and
image of the plaintiff. Balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendants. Grave and irreparable harm and injury would be caused to the reputation of the
plaintiff if the aforesaid defamatory content continues to exist on the internet and the social
media platforms of Defendants 7 and 8 and/or if the defendants are permitted to continue
making defamatory statements of this nature against the plaintiff.”

Paragraph 31: “In view of the aforesaid, an ad interim injunction is passed against
Defendants 1 to 6 in the following terms:
(i) Defendants 1 to 6 are restrained from posting any defamatory or factually incorrect
tweets, retweets, hashtags, videos of press conferences/interviews, comments, captions and
taglines against the plaintiff and/or his daughter in any manner whatsoever, which are in
the nature of the content set out in the plaint.
(ii) Defendants 1 to 6 are directed to delete/remove all the defamatory or factually incorrect
tweets, retweets, hashtags, videos of press conferences/interviews, comments, captions and
taglines against the plaintiff and/or his daughter published on the social media platforms
of Defendants 7 and 8 respectively, as set out in documents 10 to 13 of the documents filed
by the plaintiff, and any other allegations, hashtags, videos of press conferences/interviews,
posts, tweets, retweets, comments, captions and taglines similar thereto.”
2. Abhijit Mishra vs Wipro Ltd (2025)

Facts: The plaintiff has filed the present suit, claiming damages amounting to Rs.
2,10,00,000/- for alleged defamation by his employer, asserting that the 2 imputations made
in the termination letter are contrary to the employment contract and have caused serious
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill.

On 05.06.2020, the defendant, through its authorized representative Mr. Srinath Sridharan,
issued a termination/relieving letter. The letter attributes the conduct of the plaintiff as
“malicious” and 3 further claims that his actions had resulted in an irreparable breakdown
in the employer-employee relationship. Aggrieved by the aforesaid allegedly defamatory
remarks contained in the termination letter, the plaintiff has instituted the present suit
seeking the issuance of a fresh termination letter expunging the observations impugning
the plaintiff’s character and professional integrity. He further contends that the allegations
contained in the impugned termination letter, including the usage of words like 4
“malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust,” are baseless and have been made in a
manner that is both defamatory and vexatious.

Findings:

Paragraph 61: “In light of the foregoing discussion, a detailed examination of the facts of
the present case, tested on the anvil of the essential constituents of civil defamation, is both
apposite and warranted. Whether the purportedly defamatory remarks are false and
defamatory, and is there an absence of a valid defense?”

Paragraph 68: “Upon careful consideration of the aforesaid, the Court finds that the
defendant has failed to bring on record any documentary evidence, such as warnings,
disciplinary findings, or inquiry reports, to support the grave allegations made in Ex. P-2.
The absence of such records weakens the case of the defendant as mere allegations in the
written statement and evidence affidavit, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence placed on
record, are in the teeth of the defence of the defendant.”

Paragraph 70: “Accordingly, it is found that the statements in question are demonstrably
false and defamatory in nature. Further, no valid defence has been established by the
defendant, as the truth of the statements has not been proven, and the statements were not
justified or made in good faith with due care. The threshold for falsity and absence of valid
defence stands fulfilled.”
Paragraph 95: “The Court is further of the opinion that such injury, being devoid of factual
support and yet carrying grave implications for the plaintiff‟s future employability and
professional standing, warrants the intervention of this Court by way of appropriate and
equitable relief. In the absence of any valid defence or evidentiary justification offered by
the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to the protection of his reputation”
3. Major General M.S. Ahluwalia vs Tehelka.Com and Others (2023)

Facts: The plaintiff a General Officer in Army was working as Addl. Director General,
Ordnance Services (Technical Stores) in Army Head Quarters since 16th April, 1999 and
was responsible for overseeing the functioning of Central Depots for Technical Stores,
ammunition and procurement of indigenous equipment primarily for ex Directorate
General Ordnance Factory and Public Sector Undertakings.
The defendant no. 2, the proprietor of defendant no. 1 portal Tehelka.com was responsible
for managing the release of news items/articles on the website of Tehelka.com. A media
blitz was launched on 13.03.2001 carrying a story about the alleged corruption in the
defence deals relating to import of new defence equipments. The story was done and
recorded by two Reporters namely defendant Nos. 3 and 4, allegedly working undercover
by representing themselves on behalf of a fictitious defence equipment Firm based in
London keen to introduce new defence equipments in the Indian Army. The defendant No.
7, which is a news and entertainment channel available through Cable TV networks,
allegedly telecasted selective video pictures of the Army officers, other civilian officers
working in the Ministry of Defence and politicians allegedly involved in corruption in
defence deals relating to the import of defence equipments along with selective transcript
showing that all the persons referred above had taken money to do the work for the
fictitious firm based in West End, London, which subsequently featured in various
newspapers as well.
It was shown that defendant No. 3 and 4 using retired Defence Officers as middlemen
approached serving Army Officers, civilians officers in the Ministry of Defence and
politicians with the purpose to expose corruption in the import of defence equipments in
the Indian Army. The conversations and the transcript of the conversations had been
released selectively to highlight that the officers and politicians involved in the import of
defence equipment and purchases were amenable to inducement, bribe and corruption to
help the so called fictitious Firm in order to obtain the purchase orders and introduce them
in the Indian Army.

Defamatory Statements:

One of the interstitial transcripts recorded in writing that a bribe of Rs. 50,000/- was paid
to the plaintiff by defendant No. 4 in the presence of Lt. Col. Sayal. The exact words were
to the following effect:“Our next meeting with Gen Ahluwalia takes place 10 days later.
Here he accepts a token bribe of Rs. 50,000/- which is never delivered to him.” “Sayal
goes near Ahluwalia and tried to hand Rs. 50,000/- which he accepts later.”

It is submitted by the plaintiff that in the video tape as well as in the transcript, an
impression has been created that the plaintiff had asked and demanded “Blue Label
Whisky” and ten lakhs from defendant No. 4 when he and Lt. Col. Sayal met the plaintiff
at his residence.

The Indian Army took a serious note of the telecasted video tape and ordered a Court of
Inquiry in this issue. The plaintiff was summoned in the Court of Inquiry and his military
reputation and honour had been tarnished and put under a cloud of suspicion. The
allegations made against him by the defendants were false to their knowledge as same had
been proved and the stand of the plaintiff was vindicated in the Court of Inquiry

Findings:

Paragraph 102: “DW1 Sh. Anirudhha Bahl has explained in his cross-examination that
he had given the equipment as well as Rs. 50,000/- to defendant No. 4 Sh. Mathew Samuel
as Lt. Col. Sayal had informed defendant No. 4 that plaintiff had demanded the same. He
has admitted that no such demand of Rs. 50,000/- was made from him personally. Once,
no demand was made from him being the Supervisor and the person In-charge and
responsible for conducting this Operation West End, it was the bounden duty of defendant
No. 1 to ascertain the authenticity and genuineness of the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/-
by the plaintiff.”

Paragraph 103: “He has further admitted in his cross-examination that the impression was
created from the recorded conversation that the demand was made, yet at the same time he
has admitted that this amount of Rs. 50,000/- was never accepted by the plaintiff.”

Paragraph 104: “These admissions of the DW1 in his cross-examination establish that no
demand whatsoever was made by the plaintiff during his conversation which was recorded
in the tapes by defendant No. 4 Mathew Samuel, at which time Defendant no. 3 was not
even present. It was merely an inference drawn by DW1 on the basis of his conversation
with defendant No. 4. Blatantly from the admissions in the cross-examination, it is evident
that there was neither any demand made by the plaintiff nor any money was paid despite
which the transcript contains the comments to this effect from defendant No. 3 which are
proved to be not authentic and genuine, but a figment of imagination/impression of
defendant No. 3.”

Paragraph 105: “The plaintiff was a man holding the position of Major General in the
Army and was a man of repute. There cannot be worse defamation and disrepute to a
person of integrity and honour than a false imputation of him having demanded and then
accepted bribe of Rs. 50,000. There was wide publicity of this transcript which was
admittedly put on the website of Tehelka.com, Defendant No. 1. and it continues to remain
on their website.”
4. TATA SIA Airlines Limited and Another vs Ashraf Alam (2024)

Facts: The present suit has been filed for permanent injunction restraining defamation,
disparagement, causing nuisance and breach of privacy, dilution and tarnishment of
trademark, damage to reputation and tarnishment of brand equity, brand dilution,
infringement of registered trademark, passing off, damages, etc. Plaintiff no. 1 is engaged
in the business of operating, managing and providing scheduled Air Transport Services
under the brand name, ‘VISTARA’.
The defendant in the instant case, is a former employee of the plaintiff no. 1, whose services
were terminated on 26th June, 2021. Thereafter, the defendant, in order to malign the
reputation of the plaintiff no. 2, and to disparage the brand ‘VISTARA’, made defaming
and disparaging post on his twitter and LinkedIn Accounts. Through the said online posts,
the defendant made false and baseless allegations against the plaintiffs.
Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that vide order dated 1st February,
2022, defendant was directed to delete the defamatory tweets of plaintiff no. 2 and has been
restrained from uploading further derogatory tweets regarding plaintiff no. 2-company and
its family/associated members. The tweets in question have already been brought down, by
the defendant. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that he is ready to give
up his claim for damages, and that the suit can be decreed in terms of the submissions made
by the defendant, that That the tweets prove that defendant has no involvement in making
such tweet as alleged by the plaintiff. Further, Defendant has no idea about the handler of
the above-said tweeter handle. That the defendant has no relation and control with the
above-mentioned tweeter handle. That the defendant himself, never showed any disrespect
toward the Vistara but bestowed high regards to it.

Findings:

Paragraph 17: “Considering the submission made before this Court, this Court is of the
view that the suit can be decreed in terms of the submission made by the defendant in the
reply, and written statement, as noted above.”

Paragraph 18: “This Court notes that the objectionable, defamatory and disparaging
posts and messages, have already been taken down, and deleted.”

Paragraph 19: “Thus, the present suit is decreed and a permanent injunction is granted
against the defendant from engaging in any activity whatsoever, amounting to defaming
or disparaging the plaintiffs, its top officials and its well known and registered trademark
‘VISTARA’, in any form or manner, whatsoever.”
5. Hanuman Beniwal and Others vs Vinay Mishra and Others (2022)

Facts: This is a suit for perpetual and mandatory injunction, consequential relief for
damages and defamation. The plaintiff No. 1 is a serving Member of Parliament and is
founding member and National Convenor of the Rashtriya Loktantrik Party (RLP). The
plaintiff No. 2 is the Member of Legislative Assembly from Bhopalgarh and the Party's
State President while plaintiffs No. 3 and 4 are also the Member of Legislative Assembly
from Khinsvar and Merta respectively. The defendant No. 1 is the Member of Legislative
Assembly (MLA) from Dwarka, Delhi and Election In-Charge for the State of Rajasthan
for defendant No. 2/Aam Admi Party.

As per the case of the plaintiffs, since Rajya Sabha elections were scheduled on 10.06.2022,
the RLP along with the other plaintiffs took the decision to vote in favour of an independent
candidate Mr. Subhash Chandra on 06.06.2022 at 08 : 54 PM. The plaintiff No. 1, who is
also the National Convener of the Rashtriya Loktantrik Party posted a tweet on his twitter
page which reads as under:“The three MLAs of @RLPINDIAorg will not vote for the BJP
and Congress candidate in the upcoming Rajya Sabha elections and respecting the dignity
of democracy, will vote in support of the independent candidate Mr.@. : subhashchandra”

Defamatory Statements: The series of tweets as posted by defendant No. 1 w.e.f.

06.06.2022 onwards:

“@hanumanbeniwall Sir, the people of entire Rajasthan have come to know about your
reality. You are with BJP. Subhash Chandra ji is a candidate with BJP support. So how
much was the deal? Tell me some details. I have heard that you do not even go to your area
for free.”

“When the farmer brothers were sitting on the Delhi border against the black agricultural
law, those farmers were being called terrorists, anti-nationals on a channel. Today the
owner of the same channel @hanumanbeniwal ji's party has announced to vote in the Rajya
Sabha elections. Our Jat brothers will never forget this. They have been deceived.”

“I have heard that the president of a party in Rajasthan has taken Rs. 40 crore to three
MLAs of his party to get the owner of a news channel to cast the votes of his three MLAs
in the Rajya Sabha. How long will this purchase trade last? The peasant society has been
put to shame. This is very sad.”

“3 MLA= 30 Crore. 10 crore own expenses. A total of 40 crore rupees was lifted in a jolt
by a party by selling its total 3 MLAs in the Rajya Sabha elections. Didn't even think about
what would be passing on the farmer brothers? In 40 crores, 2-4 lakhs will be given to
their IT cell people, who will sing praises throughout the day, everything else is missing.”
“One Hanuman gave up everything for the sake of Lord Rama. Another, Hanuman sold
the vote of the people of Lord Rama like Rajasthan for 40 crores. Hey Ram, Kaliyug
Kaliyug.”

“I have heard that two out of 3 MLAs say that they took 40 crores, what did I get? I will
vote only where I feel like. Revolt among legislators.”

“So much money by selling 3 MLAs. Imagine if the people of Rajasthan had given 30 by
mistake, they would have sold the entire Rajasthan today. Shem shem No one had even
thought that he would give support to those who call farmers terrorists.”

“4000000000 today a party president earned this much by selling his 3 MLAs for Rajya
Sabha elections.”

“You give me blood, I will give you freedom. Netaji Subhash Cliandra Bose (Freedom
Fighter) You vote for me, I will sell your vote for 40 crores. Netaji Beniwal, (Rajya Sabha
seat seller).”

“Wouldn ‘t vote better than this, or put up your candidate for Rajya Sabha
@hanumanbeniwal ji you. What was the need to vote for such people who called the
farmers terrorists, anti-nationals in the whole peasant movement. What would the families
of the 700 martyred farmers be thinking today? Has cheated on them.”

“After all, today @hanumanbeniwal ji has fulfilled the duty of being a watchman. By the
way, I know one thing that Jat society has neither become a watchman of anyone nor will
it be. The point of Hanuman Beniwalji is different, he will merge his party with BJP one
day.”

“With what money will this case be fought? Will the MLA be sold again for the 40 crore
he got by selling that MLA or for this? B team of BJP please tell the people of Rajasthan
clearly.”

“Salute to the BTP MLAs who have decided not to participate in the voting of Rajya Sabha
elections, respecting their conscience and public vote. He could have sold it if he wanted.
The rest some people even sell their MLAs for 40 crores and then threaten to do the case.”

The defendant No. 1 also made defamatory statements on social media including Facebook,
Twitter and in print media and the link of news coverage was widely shared by the official
page of the defendant No. 1.

Findings:
Paragraph 27: “It cannot be ignored that with the advent of internet, the impact of the
views formulated and disseminated on electronic media has a considerable impact on the
viewers and followers and mould the public opinion on vital issues of political and national
importance.”

Paragraph 28: “It is also well settled that reputation is an integral part of the dignity of
each individual. As such, there is a need for balance between the freedom of speech and
expression vis-à-vis the right to reputation. The defamation per se is also an offence and
has been dealt in Sections 499 & 500 of IPC. Thus, the freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended to intentional hurt to any
other person's reputation, though imputation of truth which public good requires to be made
or published, is considered as a valid defence against defamation”

Paragraph 31: “Coming back to the facts of the case, on the face of record, the tweets in
question referred at serial No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 & 13 in para 5, prima facie appear to
be libellous statement made by defendant No. 1 and are per se defamatory. The same
appear to be reckless in the absence of any supporting material reflected in the aforesaid
tweets and are completely in disregard of the right to reputation of the plaintiffs guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. I am of the considered opinion that if the
same are permitted to continue on record, it is likely to further blemish/blot the reputation
and goodwill of the plaintiffs and may cause a misimpression in the trust of the
voters/supporters of the party or common citizens of the country in the absence of any
cogent evidence. It cannot be ruled out that the tweets may have been actuated by malice
with an attempt to impact the Rajya Sabha elections which were scheduled for 10 th June,
2022 and to cause loss of reputation to the plaintiffs, which may have been built by sheer
dedication and hard work over a long period of time.”

Paragraph 32: “I am further of the opinion that defendant Nos. 1 & 2 cannot be permitted
to further inflict injury on the reputation of the plaintiffs by virtue of re-tweeting similar
tweets which appear to be calculated to injure the reputation of the plaintiffs by exposing
them to an adverse opinion or ridicule in the eyes of the public. It cannot be ignored that
unfounded allegations in print or electronic media can be damaging forever, if there is no
opportunity to vindicate one's reputation. The voting strategy of an individual or of a
political party or their nominees is purely based upon the ideology and policy of the
political party or an individual, and alleging that the same had been sold off, without any
foundational basis, deeply causes an irreparable harm, loss and damage to the reputation
of the individual/party concerned and clearly encroaches the right of privacy.”

Paragraph 33: “Having established the prima facie case, the balance of convenience also
lies in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. In case the ex-parte interim relief
is not granted, at this stage, the plaintiffs are likely to further lose their credibility in public
life.”
Paragraph 34: “In view of above, defendant Nos. 1 & 2 are restrained and injuncted from
re-publishing, releasing, transmitting, distributing or publishing, circulating through print
or electronic media any defamatory statements in relation to the tweets dated 6th, 7th, 8th &
9th June, 2022 as referred to in para 5 above till further orders. The defendant Nos. 1&2 are
also restrained from posting any further defamatory or scandalous or factually incorrect
tweet on Twitter account or electronic/print media against the plaintiffs specifically in
relation to tweets referred to above without any clear and cogent evidence.”
6. Sammaan Capital Ltd. vs Bhupinder Singh Rana and Others (2025)

Facts: Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff submits that the plaintiff
is a public limited company and is engaged, inter alia, in the business of providing home
loans and loans against property. It is submitted that the instant civil suit has been filed
against the defendants no. 1 to no. 4 seeking damages and relief of injunction along with
appropriate further directions against purported defamatory statements made by the
defendant no. 1 to no. 3 on the platform established and maintained by defendant no. 4.

Learned senior counsel submits that the defendants no. 1 to 3 are individuals, who have
availed a loan facility from the plaintiff for a total amount of Rs. 25,00,000, on a floating
rate of interest. Learned senior counsel submits that subsequently another loan facility of
Rs. 6,83,294/- was availed by Defendant No. 1 and 2 from the Plaintiff on floating rate of
interest. He further contends that the said defendants no. 1 to 3 have posted various
defamatory and derogatory material on the platform administered by defendants no. 4

Findings:

Paragraph 14: “The Court has perused the content available on the record of the Court
and is of the prima facie view that the material posted by the defendants is defamatory.”

Paragraph 15: “The Court is conscious of the rights of the individual defendants
expressing their disputes/criticism/opinion, etc in their capacity as consumers and they are
lawfully entitled to do so. However, the Court is also conscious of the jurisprudence on the
aforesaid freedom of expression and the bounds of lawful criticism. A perusal of the
material available on record would indicate that the actions undertaken by the defendants
steps beyond the legal and permissible domain and entered into targeted harassment
and defamation. Under the guise of voicing a consumer complaint, the defendants have
engaged in an orchestrated effort to publicly vilify a reputable corporate entity in violation
of the law.”

Paragraph 19: “In the facts of the present case, it prima facie appears that the dispute
originates in a contractual relationship between the parties, bearing the character of a
lender-borrower arrangement. The defendants, who are stated to be the borrowers, have
allegedly failed to honour their obligations under the loan agreements executed between
the parties.”

Paragraph 20: “In addition to the alleged contractual default, the defendants are also
stated to have engaged in a targeted campaign against the plaintiff by publishing and
disseminating defamatory material calculated to injure the reputation of the plaintiff
entity. The immediate provocation for the present suit appears to be the incident dated
11.04.2025, wherein Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are alleged to have affixed photographs of the
Directors and key managerial personnel of the plaintiff entity onto a car bearing
registration no. DL3CBN1518.”

Paragraph 21: “To compound the insult and inflict reputational damage, the said
photographs were encircled with garlands made of shoes, and further accompanied by
printed materials containing derogatory and defamatory statements imputing that the
plaintiff had defrauded the said defendants. These acts, if proven, prima facie constitute a
deliberate and malicious attempt to publicly defame the plaintiff and its management in a
manner that exceeds the legitimate contours of critique and expression.”

Paragraph 26: “In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the considered opinion that the
necessary ingredients for the grant of an interim injunction in a defamation suit have been
met. The plaintiff has prima facie demonstrated the existence of a compelling case based
on balance of convenience, the likelihood of irreparable injury, and the targeted nature of
the defamatory conduct. Moreover, in the absence of any justification offered by the
defendants despite notice having been served, the allegations stand unrebutted at this
stage.”

Paragraph 27: “If the impugned material is not taken down or further restrained, the
plaintiff is likely to suffer grave and irreversible damage to its reputation, which cannot
be remedied through monetary compensation”
7. Paras Dass son of Jugal Kishore vs Paras Dass son of Baij Nath (1968)

Facts: In this criminal revision, the accused Shri Paras Dass son of Shri Baij Nath
challenges the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dated 30th November,
1965 affirming on appeal the order of his conviction made by Shri B.K. Malhotra,
Magistrate 1st Class, Delhi, dated 18th August, 1965 convicting him of an offence under
section 500, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo four months' simple imprisonment to
two counts, the sentences to run concurrently.
According to the complaint, the accused was in the service of the complainant as a Munirn
for about three or four months, a short time prior to the institution of the complaint. He was
dismissed from service by the complanant because he was found incompetent and
dishonest. After his dismissal the accused started making false complaints against the
complainant to the Income-tax Department, as a result of which a raid was organised by
the said department, but nothing incriminating was found on such search. The accused is
also alleged to have distributed on 19th March, 1963 pamphlets marked Exhibits P. 2 and
P.3 in Parade ground, Dehi on the occasion of Rishab Jayanti Mela and also at the red
temple at Delhi. On 20th March, 1963, the accused is again alleged to have distributed
pamphlets of the same kind in the Income-tax Department, when he was caught by Shri
N.H. Naqvi. Director of Inspection (Investigation). The contents of the pamphlets are stated
to be highly defamatory and to have brought the complainant into hatred and to have
lowered his prestige.

Decision by Lower Courts: After going through the entire evidence, the learned
Magistrate trying the accused came to the conclusion that the accused had distributed the
pamphlets in question He also came to the conclusion that the pamphlets were
defamatory per se. The witnesses for the complainant had also advised the accused not to
distribute the pamphlets, but the accused replied that he wanted to extract money out of the
complainant. According to the trial Court, even a defence witness examined by the accused
supported the contention of the prosecution witnesses on this point. Holding the accused
guilty for distributing the pamphlets on 19th March, 1963 in the public meeting and also
on 20th March, 1963 in the Income-tax Department, the learned Magistrate convicted him
as mentioned earlier. On appeal. the learned Additional Sessions Judge in a fairly detailed
and well-reasoned order upheld the conviction. but in lieu of imprisonment, he awarded to
the accused the sentence of fine to the extent of Rs. 500/-. The revision petition filed by
the complainant for enhancement of the sentence was, however dismissed.

Findings:
Paragraph 11: “The essence of the offence of defamation indisputably consists in its
tendency to cause that description of pain which is felt by a person who knows himself to
be the object of the unfavourable sentiments of his fellow creatures and those
inconveniences to which a person, who is the object of such unfavourable sentiments, is
exposed. The right of a person to the unpaired possession of his reputation and good name
is recognised by law and it seems to me to be the inherent right of everyone to have his
reputation preserved inviolated. A man's reputation is, in a way, his property and may, from
one point of view, be considered to be more valuable than any other form of property.
Reputation depends on opinion and opinion on communication of thought and information
from one to another. But this right has sometimes to give way in favour of and in defence
to the public good because on such occasions the individual's interests are treated as of
lessor weight in the scale of social values and the interests of the public good are given
greater protection.

Exceptions 1 and 9 to section 499, I.P.C., as indeed, in a general way, all Exceptions,
appear to me to have been inspired by a desire to strike a just and equitable balance between
the right of an individual to his fame and the general public good. The injury to the feelings
of the individual must in such cases produce a compensating advantage to the public. In so
far as Exception 9 is concerned, the accused person has to show that he made or published
the imputation in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of
any other person or for the public good. It is not even pretended on behalf of the accused
that his interest or the interest of any other person required protection in this case. The
Court in this case is only confined to the enquiry whether the imputation was published in
good faith for the public good. Whether or not an accused person has acted in good faith
under this Exception, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case and
it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any rigid rule or test which would fit all
conceivable contingencies as a straight jacket. What has to be kept in view is the nature of
the imputation made or published the circumstances under which it came to be made or
published; the person to whom it is made or published; the status of the person making or
publishing the imputation; the presence or otherwise of malice in his mind at the lime he
did so and other similar relevant factors. Unnecessary repetition of the publication has also
to be taken into account.

The question of good faith, it must be borne in mind is normally a question of fact, though
sometimes in a given, case it may be regarded as a mixed question of law and fact.
Adverting to Exception No. 1, here again, it is for the accused to show that the imputation
made or published was true and for the public good and the question of public good has
been expressly stated by the Legislature to be a question of fact. The question of public
good, as it concerns us, has, in my view to be considered from the point of view of the good
of the general public as contra-distinguished from that of an individual. The learned
counsel for the petitioner before me has not been able to show as to how the wide and
repeated publication in question was designed to serve the good of the general public at
large to whom the pamphelets were indiscriminately distributed more than once. It is
argued that the complainant was the President of the Aggarwal Samaj, Delhi, and,
therefore, the members of that Samaj were desired by the accused to be informed about the
defects of character in the complainant. Whether or not this, would bring the plea of the
accused within the fold of Exception 1 and 9, the indiscriminate distribution of the
pamphlets in question to all and sundry, more than once in my view, cannot possibly be
justified under the said Exceptions and the learned counsel for the accused has not been
able to put for the any cogent ground for justifying such distribution.

Paragraph 12: “I have designedly not reproduced the offending material because the
question of their being defamatory per se has not been re-agitated or canvassed in this Court
and the petitioner's contention has been confined only to the attempt to bring them within
the aforesaid Exceptions.”

Paragraph 13: “Of course the petitioner's learned counsel has submitted that the
imputations arc true, but truth alone assuming the counsel to be right is not conclusive. At
this stage, I consider it proper to point out that the general impression which appears
normally to be entertained by some laymen in this country that truth alone is by itself
acomplete and conclusive justification for persons to go about giving indiscriminate
publicity to defamatory statements or imputations regarding others is unfounded and a
person so doing runs a grave risk and cannot, on this misconceived notion, alone avoid
facing the legal consequences. Indiscriminate publication of defamatory matter inspired by
malice for serving selfish purposes or satisfying ignoble instincts may land one in great
difficulties, because prima facie, this is violative of the defamed person's valuable rights,
which the publishers under the influence of uncontrolled zeal and excessive raw matter in
them, are apt to forget. In the case in hand, malice in widely distributing the pamphlets in
question is clearly established on the record and the language used in the pamphlets is an
example of exceeding all limits of decency expected to be observed in civilized societies.
The accused is lucky in having his sentence reduced by the lower Appellate Court.”
8. Dabur India Limited vs Emami Limited 2004 SCC Online Del 431

Facts: It is contended in the plaint by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has very recently come
across a T.V commercial of Himani Sona-Chandi Am-ritprash whereby the defendant
seeks to disparage the product of the plaintiff, namely, Dabur Chayawanprash. The said
T.V commercial stars the popular film star Sunny Deol and the visual depicts the Hero
(Sunny Deol) dressed up as an Army outfit walking through the desert with another Army
officer. Also shown in the commercial is a camel walking with the two officers. The T.V
commercial depicts that on account of excessive heat, the other commander faints and the
hero i.e Sunny Deol, who was walking ahead of him comes back running to rescue the
fainted officer, puts him on his shoulder and walks to the camp. The commercial shows the
hero carrying a bottle of Himani Sona-Chandi Amritprash. Towards the end of the
commercial the hero while holding the bottle of Himani Amritprash in his Hand declares
“GARMION MEIN CHYAWANPRASH BHOOL JAO, HIMANI SONA-CHANDI
Amritprash KHAO.

Contention of the Counsel - The contention of the counsel for defendant on the other hand
was that neither the aforesaid advertisement could be said to be defamatory nor is a measure
of negative campaigning. It was submitted that the defendant itself is manufacturing and
marketing Chayawanprash, which is to be used in the winter months and not in the summer
months and, therefore, only a general statement made by the defendant through the
aforesaid commercial/TV advertisement. It was also submitted that ‘chyawanprash’ is a
generic word and there is no exclusivity which could be claimed to the said word. It was
further submitted that there is neither any malice nor mala fide in the aforesaid
advertisement as against the product of the plaintiff and, therefore, no injunction, as sought
for by the plaintiff, could be granted in the present suit.

Findings:
Paragraph 11: “The defendant could not have taken up a plea that Chayawanprash, which
is a competitor to Amritprash, is bad during the summer months and since the defendant
has resorted to the same, the same is disparaging and, therefore, the case in hand calls for
an action in terms of the prayer made in the injunction application. In the light of the
aforesaid discussion, I allow the application filed by the plaintiff and issue a temporary
injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, distributors, stockists and all others acting
on its behalf from telecasting the impugned Himani Sona Chandi Amritprash T.V.
Commercial, during the pendency of the present suit. The application stands disposed of in
terms of the aforesaid order.”