CARINO VS. CHR G.R. No.

96681

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances.
The Secretary of Education, Isidro Cariño, served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours
or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant
to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged
a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino
decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo.

In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement
as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC upheld the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work
orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were
denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, hear or determine, certain specific types of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.

RULING: NO. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency or o icial. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Dr. Paulino J. Garcia was appointed as the first Chairman of the National Science
Development Board for a six-year term under Republic Act 2067. After a change in administration
following the 1961 elections, he was advised to resign but refused. Consequently, he was accused
of electioneering. The Executive Secretary then required a written explanation from petitioner
regarding charges of electioneering, based on a idavits from four individuals.

Petitioner submitted his written explanation, denying the charges as false, malicious, and
unsubstantial. However, acting under presidential authority, the Executive Secretary declared
petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory and ordered his preventive suspension.

Petitioner filed a petition arguing that the preventive suspension had exceeded the maximum 60-day
period as prescribed by Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260). Petitioner
contended that the continued suspension was illegal and void, and he sought immediate
reinstatement.

ISSUE: Whether Section 35, which provides for the lifting of preventive suspension after 60 days if
the administrative case is not finally decided, applies to all persons in the Civil Service, including
o icers appointed by the President.

RULING: YES.

Except for the insertion of the clause " is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service,"
there is nothing in Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260 which distinguishes between the preventive
suspension of an o icer appointed by the President, and the suspension of subordinate o icers or
employees undergoing administrative investigation. The phrase "o icer or employee" used in said
section is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in Section 34, when speaking of the
preventive suspension ordered by the chief of a bureau or o ice. In fact, the last sentence of Section
35 which provides that "if the respondent o icer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to
his position with full pay from the period of suspension", is applicable to all o icers and employees
whether suspended by the President or by the chief of o ice or bureau, or investigated by the
Commissioner of Civil Service or by a presidential investigating committee.

The provision in Section 35 of Republic Act No. 2260 that "when the administrative case against the
o icer or employee under preventive suspension, is not finally decided by the Commissioner of the
Civil Service within the period of 60 days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the
respondent shall be reinstated in the service," merely demonstrates the feeling of Congress that, in
line with its policy of strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the inroads
of partisan political consideration, pursuant to the spirit of the Constitution, all disciplinary
administrative cases should pass through the impartial scrutiny of the Commissioner of Civil Service,
even though the final decision on the matter may not be his, as an appeal from such decision to the
Civil Service Board of Appeals is expressly authorized by the same law. So also, it may be conceded,
can the President in the exercise of his power control and supervision over all o ices and
departments of the executive branch of the government, revise, review, or revoke the decisions of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and of the Civil Service Board of Appeals. But this power has nothing
to do with the preventive suspension because this is not intended to be a penalty.
ANG TIBAY V. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)

FACTS:

Toribio Teodoro, owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army, averred
that a number of his employees were temporarily laid o due to alleged shortage of leather soles.

On the other hand, the National Labor Union, Inc prayed for the vacation of the judgement rendered
by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial, contended that:

The reason for employees lay o is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the BOC
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

The supposed lack of leather materials was but a sched to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of the bond with the Philippine Army, despite the breach of contract

The National Worker’s Brotherhood registered employee’s union dominated by Teodoro is

Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU Inc. and unjustly
favoring the National Worker’s Brotherhood

Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.

The case then reached the CIR and eventually elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial by the
NLU contending there were inaccessible documents which could not be o ered in the CIR. That
these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
e ect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

RULING: YES.

The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, a irmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive.

It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or a ecting employers and employees or
laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).

The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable."

Further the SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process embodied as primary
rights:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or a ected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented

7. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.

The Court held that the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that
it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth here in above.

ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA

FACTS: Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Jeannette
Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his o ice. It
was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated
cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was
not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed
the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of
Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing
Lumiqued.

Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to security
of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right a orded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is
not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry.

In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any
crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could
be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel
is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. There is nothing
in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured
by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards
life, liberty and property. Public o ice is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process.
But when the dispute concerns one’ constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public o ice
is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully
be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven,
as in this case, that the public o icer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e.,
that all public o icers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and e iciency.