Mining: Anthropological Perspectives

Author(s): Ricardo Godoy

Source: Annual Review of Anthropology , 1985, Vol. 14 (1985), pp. 199-217
Published by: Annual Reviews

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Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 1985. 14:199-217
Copyright ? 1985 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

MINING: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES

Ricardo Godoy

Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge,

Massachusetts 02138

INTRODUCTION

Despite his antiquity, the miner, like Geertz's peasant, was recently discovered
by anthropologists. This discovery, not fortuitously, came when the energy and
environmental crisis made us all aware of the finite supply of nonrenewable
natural resources and the limits of industrial growth. If interest in mining came
late, systematic studies of mining have yet to arrive. Paraphrasing Geertz, one
is not likely to find ideas, much less a coherent system of ideas, in anthropolo-
gical studies of mining.
The aims of this essay are: (a) to review the anthropological literature on
mining, drawing attention to the contributions of neighboring disciplines, and
(b) to identify promising avenues for future research. The review deals with
hard, nonfuel minerals. Oil, gas, coal, and uranium are dealt with only
incidentally. Stress is placed on the extractive and not on the processing or
marketing stages for the sake of coherence and brevity.
The review is divided into three sections. The first deals with mineral
economics; the second contains a discussion of the demographic, social, and
political characteristics of mining communities; the final section involves
mining rituals, beliefs, and ideology. Implicit in this tripartite division is a view
of mining consisting of an economic base and a derivative sociopolitical and
ideological superstructure.

THE ECONOMICS OF MINING

Mining is a process composed of three major, logical, interrelated, and

tial phases: exploration, development, and production (189). Unique risks,
economic considerations, and constraints characterize each stage.

199
0084-6570/85/1015-0199$02.00
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200 GODOY

Exploration

Exploration is the most important phase of a mining venture because most of

the value added of a mineral deposit occurs at the moment of discovery. Most
orebodies currently under exploitation were discovered through, and grew out
of, enterprises initiated by small-scale producers (10, 151, 182). The strategies
used by these people in locating deposits remain unknown. Phimister (155)
discusses the formulas followed by the Shona of Southern Zambezia for finding
reef outcrops. Arnold (5) probes the cognitive distinctions made by the Maya
potters of Yucatan in classifying the physical properties of clay types and finds
that folk distinctions match the mineral composition of the materials. Although
he does not focus on how potters actually find mineral reserves, he pays
attention to the criteria they use in making distinctions among clays of different
qualities. Several mechanisms suggest themselves for sharing or shifting ex-
ploration risks (Figure 1).
Under scenario 1, the firm/miner receives a fixed fee or wage for exploration
irrespective of the outcome and thus bears none of the geological risks. This
contract structure does not contain built-in incentives to encourage exploration.
Under scenario 3, the firm/miner bears all the exploration risks. If they are
averse to risk, they may underexplore, as each party waits to see the outcome of
a neighbor's discovery (48, 95, 152, 178). The economic intuition here is: wait
until your neighbor strikes a vein, then explore in an adjacent area or else buy
the property. In so doing one shifts prospecting risks to a neighbor or, more
appropriately, the neighbor, having successfully borne the risks of exploration,
gives one a free ride. Godoy (77) notes that among Bolivia's peasant miners the
information spillover effect is more complicated and less detrimental than has
been assumed by natural resource economists. Scenario 2 depicts a situation in
which exploration risks are shared. This is the most common contractual format

Expected (3)
Returns

(1) t Risklees
Return

100%

Share of Exploration Risk Borne

Figure I Exploration risk and expected returns.
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 MINING 201

for exploration, be it among individuals or firms, because it reduces the risks of

failure in prospecting. Figure 1 suggests that the greater the share of exploration
risks borne, the greater the expected return.
A firm undertaking a risk-free pursuit expects a minimum return equal to or
greater than the next best alternative source of income. It expects a remunera-
tion, RI, greater than the opportunity cost of its capital. The future cash flow of
its new activity, when discounted at RI, should yield a net present value
(NPV)O. With inflation, the minimum discount rate includes an inflationary
component, R2. Further, if firms undertake a risky activity, such as explora-
tion, they expect a compensation, R3, for bearing the risk. The necessary
premium varies according to the relative risk aversion of the firm; gamblers do
not expect much above the opportunity cost of their investment. Prospectors
thus expect a minimum return adjusted for the alternative uses of their efforts,
inflation, and the share of exploration risk borne. Mathematically, the mini-
mum discount rate can be expressed by:

MDR = R1 + R3 + (1 + R1 + R3) x R2

where,

MDR = minimum discount rate

RI = opportunity cost of capital
R2 = expected future inflation rate
R3 = risk compensation/premium

The Jukumani data of Bolivia (77), as well as scattered historical material (76),
lend credence to this economic model, but more research is needed in estab-
lishing the causal links between the share of exploration risk borne and
expected returns.
Several authors discuss the inherent instability of exploration contracts (77,
113, 126, 127, 128, 174, 197, 198). In mining, as in marriage, after one party
makes an irrevocable first move, the other faces a reduced incentive to abide by
the contract. Once a miner or a multinational corporation (MNC) sinks invest-
ments in a successful exploration venture, property holders or host nations have
incentives to evict them or nationalize the venture. Moran (138), following
Vernon, explains the nationalization of the Chilean copper industry under
Allende. He also notes the growth of dependencia ideology as the outcome of a
shift in bargaining power in favor of the host nation over the life of the contract.

Development and Production

After discovering the orebody, the firm/miner must measure reserves to decide
on the best extractive and processing technology and the location of shafts and
infrastructural facilities. Development risks, like exploration risks, are project-
specific. The orebody, for example, may be of irregular mineralization and the
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202 GODOY

original reserve estimates may have to be revised. Unfortunately, development

risks have not been researched.
Tools for determining the financial/economic feasibility of developing a
mineral reserve include benefit/cost ratios, internal rate(s) of returns, payback
periods, and NPV. Benefit/cost ratios are of limited utility because of defini-
tional problems. Internal rates of return are useful provided the cash flow
remains positive after the initial investment. Payback periods are appropriate
only for risk-averse firms with short investment horizons. Since the NPV
approach allows one to transform a stream of cash into a stock of wealth, it
provides the best basis for ranking and evaluating mining projects (25, 115,
165). Despite the growing popularity of the NPV approach, one caveat should
be borne in mind: the NPV is as good as the price, costs, and inflation rate
forecasts on which it rests.
If the feasibility study shows the mineral reserve to be worthy of exploita-
tion, investments are made in building infrastructural facilities, shafts, and
processing plants. Geological risks shrink during the production stage and are
overshadowed by systematic marketing risks and country-specific political
risks. Marketing risk refers to the unanticipated movement of metal prices,
costs of inputs, or inflation rate. Under special circumstances, these risks can
be shifted backwards to producers by metal traders through piece-rate systems
of remuneration pegged to international quotations (77). The degree to which
firms can shift marketing risks forward to consumers or backward to producers
depends on the elasticity of demand and supply and the share of the market
controlled by producers. A better hedge against these risks is portfolio diversi-
fication.
One of the most important political risks during the production phase
involves expropriation (58, 106, 116). With fixed investments sunk, the
conditions are ripe and the incentives are large for host nations to confiscate the
holdings of mining firms. Mining expropriations in Less Developed Countries
(LDCs) have risen dramatically during the past decade leading to many contract
renegotiations (199). Zink (214) analyzes the causes and adaptation to political
risk by MNCs in Peru. Although his emphasis is on the manufacturing sector,
the strategies for political risk minimization are equally applicable to mining
enterprises. Lax & Sebenius (I 13) propose innovative ways for hedging politi-
cal risks in mining.
For heuristic ends, the production process can be categorized into its three
most important factors: technology, capital, and labor.

TECHNOLOGY Capital-intensive technology may be the "key to the mineral

industry," because it has allowed the industry to reduce real unit costs ( 11) and
exploit low-grade ores (186, pp. 191-200). The general opinion is that the
decline of ore grades requires the deployment of increasingly more complex

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 MINING 203

and expensive technology to find, extract, and purify mineral

(24, p. 262; 36, pp. 129-37; 143, p. 26). The trend toward more automated
operations and greater vertical integration is read as prima facie evidence for
the effectiveness of economies of scale. Such a view is challenged by the
growth of the artisanal mining sector in LDCs (1, 15, 145, 191, 192). Killick &
During (104) and Godoy (78) argue that artisanal mining technology is as
technically efficient as capital-intensive mining technology. Thoburn (188)
compares the capital-intensive mining system of dredge mining versus the
labor-intensive system of gravel pumping in Malaysia and finds little difference
in profitability of linkages.

CAPITAL AND INVESTMENTS Two types of capital are necessary for mining
ventures: risk capital for exploration/development and business capital for
actual production operations. Of the two, risk capital is the most difficult to
secure, especially for small-scale firms with no significant collateral. The
inability of mining firms to acquire risk capital has rendered the industry
inordinately vulnerable to mergers and speculators. Lewis (114) was among the
first to explore the implications of the capital requirements of the mining
industry. He discussed the growing subordination of free miners in the tin
mining areas of Cornwall and Devon ("the stannaries") to merchant monopo-
lists who advanced risk capital and transported the tinner's ore to coinage
towns. By early Tudor days the subordination of the independent tinner to the
"tender mercies of the middleman and regrator" were complete. Freund (62)
synthesizes the capital and labor strategies employed by the tin mining industry
of Nigeria, and others (43, 44, 61, 96, 97, 109, 193) discuss the strategies used
by mining firms in the Witwatersrand gold and diamond fields of South Africa
to secure capital prior to World War I. Phimister & Van Onselen (156) note that
one important factor hampering the development of the southern Rhodesian
mining sector was the inability of mining industrialists to secure international
capital and their reliance on local financial sources. Simmons (171) echoes the
same theme in writing about the indigenous coal mining industry of colonial
India.
Investment patterns in mining have changed significantly in the past two
decades. Prior to the 1960s, most investments in LDC mining projects flowed
from private, vertically integrated, capital- and technology-intensive, U.S.-
based corporations. These firms controlled capital and a "package" of technolo-
gical, marketing, and management skills (66, 121). The relationship led to the
development of metropolitan economies, to the enrichment of mining firms,
and to the pauperization and dependence of mineral-exporting LDCs (28, 71,
72, 108). During the 1960s a growing share of investments began to flow from
European and Japanese MNCs. The past decade has seen the rapid growth of
state-owned MNCs from LDCs, which account for a growing share of the

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204 GODOY

market production (14, 57, 70, 98, 186). These developments were accompa-
nied by the proliferation of new fiscal devices created by host countries to
capture a larger share of rents from MNCs (66, 68, 69), as well as new and more
complex contract structures between MNCs and host nations (174, 198). Due
in part to the increasing risks of expropriation in LDCs and the emergence of
state-owned MNCs, capital investments by the private mining sector of indust-
rial nations into LDCs have shrunk (127) and have been rechanelled to low-risk
developing countries (215).

DYNAMIC MODELS OF MINING In contrast to static, numerical analysis of the

mining industry (35, 169), dynamic models specify the allocation of capital and
labor and the intertemporal path needed to optimally deplete an exhaustible
reserve while maximizing the NPV (153). Using cost functions, growth or
partial equilibrium models, several scholars (92, 93, 168, 175, 183, 201)
conclude that the optimal extraction profile for perfect competitors involves
extracting all the finest ore and best deposits first. Using linear programming
techniques which incorporate geological, economic, and engineering vari-
ables, Conrad & Hool (40, 41) note that a profit-maximizing firm will not
necessarily extract the richest ore first. Rather, the order of ore grades extracted
should correspond to the ranking of discounted prices.
Distortionary variables in the optimal extraction profile include monopolies
(102, 179, 183) and low interest rates (59, 169), both of which may accelerate
the extraction pace. Taxes also have distortionary effects. Hotelling (95) and
Peterson (152) note that ad valorem and ad rem severance taxes lead industry to
shift extraction to later periods. McDonald (124) and Burnes (34) argue that
shifting can be toward either later or earlier phases. Several economists (40, 41,
68, 111, 177) maintain that output-based taxes lower the level of reserves by
raising the cut-off grade. Others (40, 67) argue that royalties, in addition to
inducing selective exploitation, also lead to meager exploration and inefficient
choice of technology since investments cannot be amortized or expensed when
paying a tax defined as a proportion of unit value.
Restrictive assumptions may limit the utility of some of these models for
understanding the behavior of miners. For example, some of the models
assume known price cycles and grade distribution in the firm's profit-
maximizing calculus. Mineral prices, costs, and tonnage are presumed to be the
only cut-off grade determinants. Firms are expected to operate in an environ-
ment with clearly defined and enforceable private property rights; they can wait
with equanimity until discounted metal prices peak before extracting the richest
ore. Finally, most studies (40, 66, 68, 111, 177) assume output-based taxes
raise the cut-off grade, thereby lowering the mineral reserves available to the
nation.
The socioeconomic environment in which Third World miners operate may

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 MINING 205

be sufficiently different to render these assumptions inoperative

ries inapplicable. For instance, poor knowledge of ore-grade distribution and
price cycles, coupled with poorly defined property rights and political uncer-
tainty, may compel miners to extract all the finest ore first, irrespective of
future discounted prices. In addition to cost/benefit calculations, the miner's
cut-off grade may be influenced by contractual arrangements (76, 79, 160) and
demographic and sociocultural variables. Finally, it is unclear to what extent, if
any, shifting the cut-off grade upwards constitutes a waste of the nation's
resources in a labor-glutted market with few alternative sources of employment
(76).
The optimal extraction profile of nonrenewable stocks brings up the issue of
the ultimate depletion of such resources. The Club of Rome (125) projected
future rates of population growth and consumption of raw materials and
concluded that the world would run out of minerals within the next century.
They endorsed the use of royalties and progressive income taxes as a means of
conservation. Marxists (186) disagree with the prognosis, arguing that the
so-called shortage is induced by the irrational exploitation of the MNCs. More
orthodox analysts find objectionable the Club of Rome's failure to incorporate
rising prices which should encourage conservation and galvanize the search for
substitutes (17, 102, 146).

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MINING

The physical and social isolation of mining communities, coupled with the
harsh working conditions and the labor requirements of the mining industry,
give rise to recurrent patterns of population dynamics, labor recruitment
practices, and political organization.

Demography

The notion that mining populations have high fertility was first set forth by the
United Nations (190), taken up by Wrigley (210) in his study of Western
Germany, North France, and Belgium, and irrefragably proved by Haines (89)
for the 19th-century coal mining regions of Poland, England, Wales, and
Pennsylvania. Nineteenth-century coal miners had higher fertility rates than
rural dwellers from the surrounding countryside because of higher infant and
adult debility/mortality, low levels of female labor force participation outside
the home, low child-rearing costs, and early marriage for women. Although
Haines's findings were independently corroborated by Friedlander (65), who
used national and county data for England and Wales, the general thesis
regarding high fertility of miners remains to be tested cross-culturally for
contemporary populations.

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206 GODOY

Labor Recruitment and Migration

Mining, especially during the early phases, has been, and in many LDCs
continues to be, a labor-intensive operation. Consequently, one of the first and
most important requirements of the mining industry has been the procurement
of an ample and reliable supply of inexpensive laborers. Some have stressed the
coercive means employed by the industrial sector in securing a vast supply of
miners (97, 194, 205). Recruitment mechanisms included taxation (3, 19, 39,
62, 133), quelching indigenous economic initiatives (3, 84), indebtedness to
labor contractors or employers (50, 60, 163, 170, 172, 209), and the purchas-
ing of entire landed estates with their tenants (129, 171). Revisionist scholars
suggest that there may have been a voluntary element in the decision to enter the
mining labor force (8, 9, 46, 64, 105, 164, 184, 185), such as the wish to build
up cattle stock after epidemics (18, 19), to prove one's manliness (161, 167), to
escape quarrels, witchcraft accusations, and arduous duties (134, p. 17), or, as
in Indian coal mining, simply to meet seasonal subsistence shortages (173).
To minimize costs and avoid political liabilities, mining firms under the
auspices of the state tended to pay workers below subsistence wages and took
steps to preserve indigenous production systems, forcing miners to return home
after their contract in the mine expired or once workers reached the age of
retirement (90, 151). Indigenous societies thus bore much of the costs of
reproducing and maintaining the mining labor force (6, 19, 50, 60, 208). The
inadequacy and insecurity of the industrial wage, "repulsive" labor organiza-
tion, and the difficulties of meeting subsistence needs in the rural sector
underwrite a circular or "spiral" flow of migrants to and from the mining
centers (49, 50, 56, 84, 132, 171, 176, 196, 200).
The early anthropological literature stressed the deleterious effects of migra-
tion upon indigenous patterns of political leadership and production. Richards
(162) deplored the "hungry, manless areas" of Africa, and other anthropolog-
ists associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute agreed that migration to
the mines undermined traditional values and authority patterns (64, 74, 75,
133, 161, 206, 207). Chauncey (37) recently stressed the growth of the female
population in the Zambian Copperbelt and the parallel rural decline brought
about by the absence of women. Other work, however, suggests that the impact
of migration on indigenous societies does not imply either factually or logically
that there will be a rural decline; in fact, it may even reinforce traditional values
and social organization (4, 55, 64, 196, 200).
Although the stabilization of the labor force brought about by the mechaniza-
tion of the mining industry may bring about a complete or nearly complete
breakage with the country (27, 50, 91, 108), active links with rural areas are
maintained by migrant miners to keep rights to land, validate membership in
the group, and mobilize political support (123, 176, 196). These links are

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 MINING 207

nurtured though periodic visits, remittances (74), or ceremonial occasions (26).

In the mining community itself, new cultural (75, 85, 131, 159), political (56,
200), and legal (180) forms emerge, cross-cutting tribal and ethnic group
boundaries (75, 135, 137, 156).
The evidence suggests that migration to the mines of Africa, Latin America,
and North America occurs on a more frequent basis and for longer periods of
time (74, 119, 130, 148, 206). Until recently the net transfer of wealth flowed
from the rural to the mining sector. In recent years, however, that subsidy has
been reversed, with mining wages shoring up a rapidly decomposing indige-
nous subsistence structure (3, 18, 21, 49, 64, 118, 119, 140-142, 176).

Mining Communities and Political Organization

The location of mineral deposits in inaccessible areas gives rise to relatively
self-contained communities, which can range from the open mining camps
described by Luebben in Colorado (118, 119); Baffios de Chungara (12) and
Harris & Albo (91) in northern Potosi, Bolivia; to the paternalistic company
states of Northern Chile (157, 158), Toquepala, Peru (83, pp. 169-74), or Ajo,
Arizona (181); to the hermetic, total institutions of the South African mining
compounds (3, 84, 136, 139).
Given the capital immobility of the mining industry, a salient determinan
industrial strategy centers on cost minimization through the control and ex-
ploitation of labor (56, 97, 144, 186, 194, 205). The combination of low
wages, coercive organization (29, 33, 85), dangerous but autonomous working
conditions (82, 180), the economic leverage of miners flowing from the
importance of mining exports to the health of the national economy (103), and
the physical and social isolation of many mining enclaves (53, 103) under-
writes the formation of intense forms of worker solidarity and radical labor
movements (29, 33, 47, 86, 136, 137, 203) as well as the growth of new forms
of political consciousness (139, 150, 194). The genesis and growth of radical
mining movements is well analyzed in Bolivia (12, 117, 120, 144, 203), Chile
(211, 213), Mexico (20, 22, 23, 147, 166, 212), Peru (16, 49, 50, 60, 107,
108, 110), Nigeria (2, 62), Zambia (13, 32, 33, 56, 99, 100), Ghana (42), and
South Africa (149). As Phimister, Van Onselen, and Freund note, social
protest can take informal hues such as ore theft (63), desertions (39), loafing,
voluntary migration to the best labor markets, and deliberate wastefulness (60,
156, 194, 195). The origin of workers' political consciousness antedates the
eruption of strikes or the creation of labor unions.

EcologicallEconomic Impact of Mining

The mining industry requires not only capital and labor, but food for its workers
and physical inputs for its operations. Consequently, mining activities tend to
integrate surrounding regions into a single economic sphere. Several African-

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208 GODOY

ists (6, 30, 151, 154) hold that the mining industry in Sou
demands for foodstuffs, which were initially met by Afr
1920s, however, White Afrikaner farmers, with the backing of the state,
succeeded in displacing native producers. The growing interest of mining
capital in labor rather than in agricultural products made such a switch possible
(208). In a more creative spirit, the Marxist historian Van Onselen (195), with
his customary insights and warm humanity, has recently discussed in two
tomes the effects of the Witwatersrand mines on the life of marginal segments
of society such as liquor sellers, prostitutes, cab drivers, etc.
Assadourian and his colleagues (7) provide a theoretical framework for
conceptualizing the interrelationship between the mining enclave and the
surrounding rural Andean societies, while other Andeanists have explored the
specific effects of the mining industry on transportation (38), fuels (80, 202),
food (112), and other inputs (129).
Since national development policies traditionally give preference to mining
enterprises in the exploitation of subsoil mineral wealth (31, 45), and mining
codes are vague about indemnifying indigenous populations for ecological
damages and land expropriation, mining projects often produce ecological
alterations on the surrounding landscape. The environmental impact of mining
can range from minor, subtle, imperceptible "shadow effects" involving noise,
dust, run-off, seepage, and vibration (122) to major, permanent, and irrevers-
able ecological transformations, rendering mining districts useless for subse-
quent economic developments (31). The range of impacts reflects the scale of
operation and type of mining (52). Dewind (49) documents the effects of the
smelter's smog of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in Peru on the land and stock
of surrounding peasant communities. Diamond (51) and Freund (62, pp.
156-73) note that tin mining produced extensive topsoil destruction in the lan
of the Birom-speaking peasantry of the Jos Plateau, Nigeria. Gjording (73)
discusses some of the potential economic and ecological problems facing the
Guaymi Indians of Panama if the Cerro Colorado copper project were to be
carried out. Some international lending institutions now require a social and
environmental impact statement before they fund mining projects in LDCs
(81).

RITUAL AND IDEOLOGY

The seminal piece on miners' belief system is Eliade's The Forge and the
Crucible (54). Eliade draws the analogy between obstetrics and mining, with
ore equated to embryo, mine to uterus, shaft to vagina, and miner to obstetri-
cian. Much in the same way embryos develop in the womb, so ores grow inside
the earth until extracted by miners. Eliade's insights are interesting because
they provide a framework for linking ideology to productive processes in

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 MINING 209

mining. Unfortunately, anthropologists have not capitalized on Eliade's

observations. The few contemporary pieces explicitly dealing with ideology
lack both a sharply defined focus and the elegance of Eliade's simple but
compelling thesis.
Chief among these works are Nash's We Eat The Mines (144), and Taussig's
widely praised (e.g. 94, 204) The Devil and Commodity Fetishism (187), both
of which deal with Quechua-speaking Bolivian miners. Nash and Taussig each
attempt to explain the twin concepts of the devil (el tio) and the underground
ritual libations (ch'alla) offered to this deity. Nash, perhaps unknowingly,
follows Eliade's lead in suggesting that tin ores are a living substance, reple-
nishable by the devil after receiving periodic libations. The devil assumes a
pivotal role both for controlling the supply of ores and for monitoring under-
ground safety. In this context, Nash suggests that the ch'alla is a ceremony
designed to placate the devil and a forum for expressing worker solidarity. To
Nash, rituals unify the group. (88).
Taussig distances himself from such a functionalist approach. In a message
familar to students of contemporary symbolic anthropology, he asserts that the
devil figure cannot be reduced to a psychological mechanism for coping with
anxiety nor to a social device for displaying solidarity, because to do so is to
reduce a rich cultural form to its functions and consequences. Such explana-
tions can "tell us next to nothing" about detailed motifs, "precise configura-
tion," vividness, and inner meanings of so rich a collective representation.
Taussig's own "esoteric attempt" to clarify the devil belief system consists in
viewing it in its own right, as a cultural/symbolic representation of alienation.
His ultimate aim is thus not so much historical or explicative, as literary;
namely, it is to "convey something of the 'feel' of social experience."
Explicit in Taussig's analysis is a dichotomization of modes of production
into precapitalist (peasant) and capitalist. The precapitalist mode of production
is characterized by use value, reciprocity, loose division of labor, satisfaction
of need, and efficiency. Furthermore, precapitalist agriculture attempts to
"replicate the natural ecology" and thus "preserves most of the pre-existing
ecosystem." The capitalist mode of production, in contrast, is characterized by
market (exchange) value, accumulation, unequal exchange, and rigid division
of labor. As capitalist modes of production supplant precapitalist formations,
social tensions arise, providing the groundwork for the emergence of the devil
belief. More concretely, the transformation of the peasant mode of production
generates conflict, suffering, and alienation, all of which concretize in the devil
figure. As Bolivian peasants were transformed into proletarians, their rituals
changed: the incorporeal mother earth spirit pachamama gave way to the devil,
a virile and unpredictable figure. Unlike the pachamama, the devil is repre-
sented in idol form and requires frequent ritual libations. In agrarian rituals,
peasants engage in balanced reciprocity with the pachamama; in mining rituals,

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210 GODOY

on the other hand, miners are simple intermediaries between the devil and
proprietors.
Despite Taussig's literary skills, his analysis remains unconvincing. Taussig
critiques positivist orientations such as functionalism because they reduce
social forms to the part they play in the maintenance of social systems. Despite
his attempt to liberate himself from the fetters of so-called capitalist epistemol-
ogy, Taussig's own "esoteric" approach does not amount to much more than a
sophisticated form of symbolic neofunctionalism, in which belief systems
serve the role of mediating between tensions, critiquing capitalist systems of
production, or fetishizing evil. The functionalism of social structural interde-
pendencies is replaced by the functionalism of interrelated symbols and mean-
ings.
The book is premised on the notion that "neophyte proletarians" are "indiffe-
rent and outright hostile" to participation in the market economy. This is an
empirical proposition, not a philosophical conclusion. As applied to Bolivia
and other developing countries, it is wrong. It is wrong because peasants have
often entered the mines during the first years of colonial rule to find, extract,
and market the ore on their own free will. The Bolivian mines during the first
half century of colonial rule, for example, were not run by Spaniards but by
voluntary Indian workers who had been "attracted to the mines by the profits
they could make from extracting and processing the richer ores" (8, 9, 184,
185). Taussig views the process of proletarianization as coercive, tyrannical,
and unilineal, but this overlooks the fact that in Bolivia, as in Africa (46, 64,
105, 164), there was a voluntary dimension to this process. Furthermore, in
contrast to Marxists' analyses, mining proletarianization may, in actuality, be a
reversible process. In many mineral-exporting LDCs such as Malaysia, Sierra
Leone, Brazil, and Bolivia, a substantial portion of the mining sector is
undergoing a process of involution: more piece-rate workers, treatment of
progressively lower ore grades, decapitalization, less machinery, and greater
reliance on seasonal laborers to process ores of thinner and thinner quality. This
involutionary process suggests, contrary to Taussig's claim, that miners in
many LDCs may be currently shifting back and forth between precapitalist and
capitalist relations of production with much less conflict, stress, and agony than
he assumes.

CONCLUSIONS
Dividing the mining industry into an economic base, social organization, and
ideology, one notes several important points about the contributions made by
anthropologists to our understanding of mining. First, there is a paucity of
anthropological writing about mineral economics. If, as several international
organizations maintain, the small-scale, artisanal mining sector is expanding in
mineral-exporting Third World nations, then anthropologists could make sub-
stantial contributions to mineral economics through the study of the small-scale
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 MINING 211

sector. The questions that need to be explored include the methods and rules of
thumb utilized by miners in localizing mineralized deposits. Having found the
deposit, how do they categorize/conceptualize geological/mineral formations
and different ore grades; and, based on native distinctions, how do miners
decide where the cut-off grade is? Finally, the risk management strategies used
in each mining phase deserve attention.
The paucity of research on mineral economics is matched by a lack of interest
in the productive process and workplace itself. It is not unusual in a book-length
monograph on miners for these topics to be treated in a page or two. This void
may reflect simple lack of interest in production, difficulties inherent in
conducting research underground, and management's objection to research
conducted on its workforce. Godfrey Wilson's and Epstein's study of mining
compounds in the Copperbelt of northern Rhodesia, for instance, were pre-
maturely ended when management cancelled permission and withdrew facili-
ties for research. Gordon's (84) fascinating account of a Namibian mine is all
the more remarkable when one considers the hermetic and despotic nature of
these totalitarian institutions.
Not surprisingly, anthropological contributions to mining tend to focus on
social organization and migration. But even here serious gaps remain. We have
noted the absence of demographic research on contemporary mining popula-
tions. In contrast, the causes, consequences, and meaning of migration to the
mines have been examined ad nauseam, and it is unlikely that anything
conceptually novel will emerge from further research on this topic, except,
perhaps, for more unneeded case studies.
Since engineers, geologists, economists, political scientists, geographers,
historians, and sociologists study mining, one might ask, what can anthropo-
logists contribute to this field that will be new? At the risk of sounding trite, a
truly anthropological study of mining will examine both the geological and
economic infrastructure of the firm/industry as well as their secondary sociopo-
litical and ideological dimensions. This integrative perspective is currently
missing, not only from anthropological studies, but also from research done in
neighboring disciplines. The anthropologists' obsession with migration is
matched by the economists' preoccupation with the effect of taxes on reserves
and extraction rates, or with the political scientists' interests in the genesis of
political consciousness. These seemingly disparate phenomena are interrelated
if we examine the economic, social, and ideological dimensions of the produc-
tion process as a whole. Given the anthropologists' penchant for, and strengths
with, small-scale social systems, the major and first impact of anthropological
contributions is likely to be made in the small-scale mining sector.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Elizabeth Bangs and Sung Hee Suh for their help in preparing
this chapter.
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212 GODOY

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