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EX PARTE AD INTERIM INJUNCTION
Q. „X‟ files a civil suit against „Y‟ claiming possession of a residential property and alleging
that „Y‟ is attempting to forcibly dispossess him. Along with the suit, „X‟ also files an
application for exparte ad interim injunction. The trial court, without issuing notice to „Y‟ or
examining the pleadings and documents thoroughly, grants an ex parte ad interim injunction
in favour of „X‟. As a result, „Y‟, who is in actual possession of the property, is restrained
from entering or using it. „Y‟ later produces records showing he is the lawful tenant and
alleges that „X‟ has filed the suit with forged documents and false averments only to harass
him and extract money. Critically examine the validity of the ex parte ad interim injunction
granted in favour of „X‟
Ans. The issue is whether the ex parte ad interim injunction granted by the trial court in
favour of „X‟, without proper scrutiny or notice to „Y‟, is valid and sustainable in law.
Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), a temporary
injunction can be granted by the court only upon satisfaction of the triple test: existence of a
prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, and likelihood of
irreparable harm if relief is denied.
An ad interim injunction is a temporary relief granted by a civil court before the final disposal
of the injunction application, intended to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable
harm. It may be granted either ex parte or after hearing the other side.
An ex parte injunction is an injunction granted without issuing notice to the opposite party
under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the CPC, usually in urgent or exceptional cases where delay in
granting relief would defeat the very purpose of the suit, but in such cases, it must record
reasons and ensure immediate service of documents on the opposite party as prescribed in the
proviso to Rule 3. Further, Order XXXIX Rule 3A CPC requires the court to dispose of the
injunction application within thirty days if granted without notice, or else record reasons for
delay.
In Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC 249, the supreme
court held that courts must be extremely cautious while granting ex parte ad interim
injunctions. The Court strongly discouraged the mechanical grant of such injunctions, noting
that once granted, they tend to continue indefinitely, thereby unduly benefiting the
wrongdoer. The Court held that, as a general rule, trial courts should issue short notices and
hear both parties before granting injunctive relief, unless exceptional circumstances exist.
The purpose of this strict approach is to uphold the sanctity of judicial processes, prevent
forum shopping, and ensure justice is not delayed or defeated by dishonest litigants. The
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policy underlying this jurisprudence is to remove the incentive for wrongdoers and to
safeguard the integrity of civil trials.
In the present case, „X‟ obtained an ex parte injunction without the trial court verifying the
genuineness of his claim or the supporting documents. The order prejudiced „Y‟, who was in
possession and later showed legitimate tenancy records. This scenario precisely reflects the
abuse highlighted in Ramrameshwari Devi, where the Court condemned the misuse of
interim relief to dispossess lawful occupants or to coerce settlements through delay and
procedural manipulation.
Therefore, the ex parte injunction granted in favour of „X‟ is legally unsustainable and
violative of settled judicial norms.
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PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Ganga Bai Menariya (Dead) through LRs
& Ors., 2024 INSC 121
This case involved a dispute over land situated in Udaipur, Rajasthan, where the respondents
(original plaintiffs) sought a permanent injunction against the Urban Improvement Trust,
claiming ownership and possession based on a lease (patta) allegedly granted by Gram
Panchayat Titardi in 1959. The land in question was government land (bilanam sarkar),
classified as gochar (pasture) land under Khasra No. 1163, which the appellants argued could
not be legally leased by the Gram Panchayat. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that
the respondents failed to prove valid title, and that a simpliciter suit for injunction was not
maintainable without a declaration of ownership—especially since the Gram Panchayat was
not impleaded. However, the First Appellate Court and the High Court reversed this, relying
on oral testimony from two alleged former panchayat members and accepting the patta under
Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act due to its age. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside
the findings of the appellate courts and restored the trial court‟s dismissal. The Court held
that the patta was not sufficiently proven—there was no supporting Gram Panchayat record,
the issuing Sarpanch was not examined, and the document's recitals could not be presumed to
be true solely because of its age. It further ruled that a simpliciter injunction suit was not
maintainable when title is disputed and that the Gram Panchayat was a necessary party. The
Court also emphasized the procedural safeguards under Rule 266 of the Rajasthan Panchayat
(General) Rules, 1961, for transfer of abadi land, which had not been followed.
Q. A person files a suit for permanent injunction claiming to be in possession of a plot based
on a lease deed executed by the Gram Panchayat in 1959. However, the land is recorded in
government revenue records as “Gochar” (grazing) land. The lease deed is not proved with
official records but only with oral testimony of two persons who claimed to be former
Panchayat members. The trial court dismisses the suit, holding that title is not proved and
injunction suit to protect possession not maintainable when plaintiff title is disputed. Decide.
Ans. The question involves examining whether a suit for permanent injunction, based on
an unproven lease deed and disputed title, is maintainable
The public policy underlying injunctions is to safeguard peaceful, lawful possession and
prevent forcible dispossession. However, courts have repeatedly held that injunctions are not
meant to protect encroachments or unauthorized possession of public land. Where possession
is disputed and not backed by valid title or official records, courts must be cautious in
granting equitable relief, especially against public authorities charged with protecting
government land.
Perpetual injunction is governed by Sections 37(2) and Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963(SRA). As per Section 38(1) SRA, A perpetual injunction may be granted to prevent the
breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff, whether the obligation is express or
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implied. Further, Section 38(2) SRA, clarifies that If the obligation arises out of a contract,
the court shall follow the rules under Chapter II of the Act (relating to specific performance).
As per Section 38(3) SRA, in case of Property Rights, if the defendant invades or threatens to
invade the plaintiff‟s right to or enjoyment of property, the court may grant injunction in the
following cases:
● (a) Defendant is a trustee of the property for the plaintiff.
● (b) No standard exists for determining actual or possible damage.
● (c) Monetary compensation is not adequate relief.
● (d) To prevent multiplicity of legal proceedings
However, the court may refuse grant of permanent injunction on the ground of:
● Inequitable conduct of the Plaintiff
● Acquiscience
● Order goes against public servant
● Lapse of limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, three years
from the accrual of the cause of action.
In The Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024
INSC 121, the Supreme Court held that a suit for permanent injunction is maintainable only
where the plaintiff is in lawful possession and such possession is either admitted or not
seriously disputed. However, when the defendant disputes the plaintiff‟s title and raises a
challenge to the legality of possession, the suit for injunction simpliciter must be
accompanied by a prayer for declaration of title.
In the present case, The plaintiff relied solely on an unregistered lease deed from 1959,
which was not proved through original records or verified through the concerned Gram
Panchayat. The land is shown as Government “Gochar” land in revenue records. The lease
was sought to be proved only through oral testimony of two alleged ex-Panchayat
members, who were not even signatories. Thus, the plaintiff’s possession was not legally
established, and the title was clearly disputed.
In conclusion, the suit filed by „A‟ for permanent injunction, without proving title, and in the
face of a serious title dispute, is not maintainable.
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MANDATORY INJUNCTION
Q: A is a real estate developer. He signed a Development Agreement with B, who was earlier
appointed by a Housing Society for slum redevelopment. Under their agreement, B gave 55%
of the saleable area to A, but without getting the Housing Society‟s permission.
Later, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between the Society, A, and B, in which the Society
was promised 22,500 sq. ft. area, including 8 flats and 16 parking spaces.
Due to disputes, the Society filed a civil suit asking for specific performance and also applied
for an interim mandatory injunction directing B to give them possession of 8 flats and 16
parking spaces. At the same time, A and B were already in arbitration against each other.
The High Court passed an order giving interim mandatory injunction and asked B to hand
over the flats and parking to the Society. B challenged this, arguing:
● The High Court had given final relief at the interim stage, which is not allowed.
● His rights as a developer were being ignored.
● The construction was incomplete due to A‟s fault.
Decide whether the interim mandatory injunction granted by the High Court was justified.
Ans. In this case, the main issue is whether the interim mandatory injunction granted by the
High Court—directing B to hand over 8 flats and 16 parking spaces to the Housing Society—
was justified, especially when the final rights were yet to be determined and arbitration
between A and B was ongoing.
A mandatory injunction under Section 39 of SRA is a form of preventive relief where the
court compels the defendant to perform a specific act to prevent the breach of an obligation.
It may involve the reversal of some wrongful act already committed. Mandatory injunction is
prohibitory, restitutory, and positive in nature. This form of injunction is granted only in
cases where:
● The plaintiff‟s legal right has been violated;
● There is no other adequate remedy;
● The act compelled is necessary to prevent continuing breach of obligation or injustice.
Mandatory injunction is granted via suit under Chpater 8 SRA whereas the interim madatory
injunction, is established under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter CPC),
particularly in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and under Section 94 read with Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2.
In Bhojwani v. Aurora Properties, (2018) 17 SCC 203, the Supreme Court considered the
scope of civil courts' power to grant interim mandatory injunctions. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court reiterated that although the courts do possess the jurisdiction to grant interim
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mandatory injunctions, such reliefs must be granted with extreme circumspection. The Court
emphasized that the status quo should not ordinarily be altered at the interim stage, unless the
case falls within extraordinary and compelling circumstances. It was held that the grant of
such an injunction at the interim stage may result in granting the final relief itself, thereby
making the trial redundant. Therefore, the court must assess whether granting such relief
would cause irreparable injury and whether the applicant has approached the court with clean
hands and reasonable diligence.
In the present case the High Court's interim order directs delivery of specific flats and parking
spaces, which was one of the main prayers in the suit for specific performance. Therefore,
granting such an order at an interim stage effectively grants the final relief without trial.
Moreover, B (developer) had claimed that construction was still incomplete due to A‟s fault,
and there were pending arbitration proceedings between A and B. This indicates that factual
disputes regarding performance and responsibilities were still unresolved.
The High Court‟s order of interim mandatory injunction was not justified, as it went beyond
preserving the status quo and granted substantial final relief. When rights are disputed and the
matter is complex, such relief should be reserved for final adjudication after evidence is
considered.
Therefore, the appeal by B is maintainable, and the interim mandatory injunction should be
set aside.
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DYNAMIC / DYNAMIC PLUS / SUPERLATIVE INJUNCTION
In UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Ors. v. 1337X.to & Ors., 2019 DHC 2047, the
Delhi High Court outlined the following ten-point test to assess whether a website should be
classified as a Rogue Website or Flagrantly Infringing Online Location (FIOL):
1. Primary Purpose Test: Whether the primary purpose of the website is to commit or
facilitate copyright infringement.
2. Flagrancy of Infringement: The flagrancy of the infringement, or the flagrancy of the
facilitation of the infringement.
3. Anonymity of Registrant: Whether the details of the registrant are masked and no
personal or traceable information is available about the registrant or user.
4. Response to Takedown Notices: Whether there is silence or inaction by the website
after receipt of takedown notices related to copyright infringement.
5. Facilitation Infrastructure:nWhether the online location makes available directories,
indexes, or categories that assist users in infringing or facilitating infringement of
copyright.
6. General Disregard for Copyright: Whether the owner or operator of the online
location demonstrates a disregard for copyright laws in general.
7. Foreign Court Orders: Whether access to the online location has been disabled by
courts in other jurisdictions on grounds relating to copyright infringement.
8. Circumvention Tools: Whether the website contains guides or instructions to
circumvent technological measures or court orders aimed at blocking access to the site
due to copyright infringement.
9. Traffic Volume and Access Frequency: The volume of traffic or frequency of access
to the website—implying its scale and impact.
10. Any Other Relevant Factor: Any other matter relevant to assess the nature and
operations of the website in the context of copyright violation.
Q. UTV Software Communications Ltd., a reputed film production company, discovers that
several websites are hosting and streaming their copyrighted content without authorization.
Despite earlier court orders to block specific infringing websites, new websites keep
emerging under different domain names or URLs but with essentially the same infringing
content and interface. The company seeks a broader remedy that can prevent access not only
to the original infringing websites but also to any future mirror or redirect websites. The court
considers the repetitive, evasive tactics of such websites and grants a “dynamic injunction.”
Decide the validity of order.
Ans. The issue is whether the grant of a dynamic injunction—and its evolved form as a
dynamic+ injunction—is legally valid in cases where infringing websites and mobile
applications repeatedly emerge in defiance of earlier court orders, and whether such relief
balances enforcement with due process and constitutional protections.
Unauthorized communication of a copyrighted work to the public constitutes infringement
and courts are empowered to grant civil remedies, including injunctions, to restrain ongoing
or imminent violations. However, traditional injunctions—being static in nature—are often
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rendered ineffective when infringers use mirror, redirect, or alphanumeric domains to
circumvent blocking orders. In UTV Software Communication Ltd. v. 1337X.to, 2019
SCC OnLine Del 8002, the Delhi High Court addressed this problem by devising the
concept of a dynamic injunction. This permitted extension of the original blocking order to
newly emerging rogue websites upon submission of an affidavit, subject to challenge by
affected parties.
This jurisprudence was extended in Universal City Studios v. Dotmovies.baby, 2023
LiveLaw (Del) 719, as dynamic plus injunction and later in Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. IPTV
Smarter Pro & Ors., where the Delhi High Court encountered piracy through mobile apps
and streaming platforms during IPL 2025. Recognizing the urgency of live broadcast rights
and the rapid proliferation of infringing sources, the court granted what it called “superlative
injunction.” thus, a superlative injunction, which, for ease of reference can easily be referred
to as an extended version of the available dynamic+ injunction, as the said superlative
injunction also opens up an additional route for the plaintiff(s) to avail the grant of real-time
relief(s) against the infringing activities of „rogue‟ defendant(s) irrespective of the mode(s)
thereof.
The purpose and policy behind such injunctions are rooted in balancing rights. Article 300A
protects the intellectual property rights of creators, while Article 19(1)(a) guarantees access
to information. Courts must ensure that anti-piracy enforcement does not lead to over-
blocking or arbitrary censorship. By formulating an objective test for what constitutes a
"rogue" or “flagrantly infringing online location,” and by preserving the opportunity to
contest inclusion, the judiciary ensures proportionality and procedural integrity.
In the present case, UTV Software Communications Ltd. had already obtained orders against
specific infringing websites. However, new websites continuously appeared with identical or
substantially similar content, violating the spirit of those orders. The nature of infringement
was systemic and malicious. Conventional remedies had proven inadequate due to
technological adaptability of the infringers. The plaintiff sought a broader injunction that
would proactively prevent access to new versions of these rogue websites without requiring
repeated litigation. The court, by granting a dynamic injunction, addressed this recurring
problem effectively. The mechanism ensured the injunction was not static but could adapt to
future infringements. Therefore, the relief granted was not only proportionate but essential to
protect the commercial and moral rights of the copyright holder.
Therefore, the dynamic and dynamic+ injunctions granted in these cases are legally sound
and necessary innovations.
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