G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. HON. RAMON G.

CODILLA,
JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM
SHIPPING, INCORPORATED

Facts:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent
Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then
moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for
damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioner’s power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before
the lower court. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc.
filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.
Public respondent judge later issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from
the records petitioner’s Exhibits and its sub-markings. The Court finds merit in the objections raised
and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff
has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the
documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission
of the photocopies by contending that “the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the
document” on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. The information in those Xerox or photocopies
was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence
must be authenticated, which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less
presented in evidence. The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record.
Aside from their being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals
thereof was not established by any competent proof.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioner’s obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based
on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court, the
photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based
on its own premise that an “electronic document” as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an “electronic document” can also refer to other
modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the
section’s catch-all proviso: “any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means”.
Issue:
Whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act
No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the
Rules on Electronic Evidence?
Held:
No. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that
not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since
these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are
not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered
as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
2. G.R. NO. 170633, October 17, 2007 MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, v. SSANGYONG
CORPORATION
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of
its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South
Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted
business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send
the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter
conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the
respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached
their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence
and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence
the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is
admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under
the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these
fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the
Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original
fax transmittals.
Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
Advertisement

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data
Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress
deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The
deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same
meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic
data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony
with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional
equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,”
but verily are paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that
is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless
environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual
reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition
of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,”
could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent
and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and
have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications
and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
“electronic data message.”
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are electronic data
messages or electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded
definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law,
further supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a document
from one place to another via a fax machine.

FACTS: Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo,
Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two
corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and
sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax. Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to
facilitate the payment of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a
letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-
POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing
expenses, interests and charges. Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for
damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached
their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2. After
Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order
dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented
had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According
to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to
substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes
of a prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence
and admissible in evidence as such?
RULING: R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the
Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An
electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if
it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. Thus,
to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
"electronic data message" or an "electronic document." In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there
exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-
printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same
legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all
respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data
message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-
based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data
message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It
is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and
cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such
a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos.
ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS et. Al.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are
to
be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them.
FACTS:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for
his documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
invited him in their mobile car to the police station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving
his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went
down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other
who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio
was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He then went
back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas was involved in the
attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone apparently left
behind by Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming messages and posed as Enojas. The
accused appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation and were convicted of murder
by RTC Las Pinas.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.
RULING:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of
them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to
the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them. 2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It
has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Here the
totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused.
G.R. No. 251778, February 22, 2023 GIOVANNI SANTOS PURUGGANAN, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011 ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
and GAMING CORPORATION

FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of respondent Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation . The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was
committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding
a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR
of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00
or P35,000.00.5 Based on the CIU’s investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine
jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU
identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which
included herein petitioner.
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty,
serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were
considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F.
Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resource and Development Department,
dismissing him from the service. The letter reads in part, to wit:
Please be informed that the Board of Directors, in its meeting on July 31, 2007, approved the
recommendation of the Adjudication Committee to dismiss you from the service effective
upon approval due to the following offense:
Dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules and regulations,
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the company and loss of trust and
confidence, committed as follows: For actively and directly participating in a scheme
to defraud the company in conspiracy with co-employees and SM customers by
padding slot machine Credit Meter Reading (CMR) receipts in favor of co-conspirator
customers who had said (sic) CMR receipts paid at the teller’s booth on numerous
occasions which caused substantial losses to the proprietary interests of PAGCOR.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its
Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other
benefits. Petitioner claimed that as a result of his unlawful, unjustified and illegal
termination/dismissal, he was compelled to hire the services of a counsel in order to protect
his rights.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner
failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner’s complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR’s
decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying
petitioner’s appeal.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal on August 13,
2007, which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of
a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR’s Office of the Board of Directors. He claims
that the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is
sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner
further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he
then filed his complaint before the CSC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which includes
facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000?
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling that there was no valid
letter/motion for reconsideration submitted to reconsider petitioner’s dismissal from the
service?

HELD:
Answer to the first Issue: NO.
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed
by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under
the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation,19 We determined the question of whether the original facsimile
transmissions are “electronic data messages” or “electronic documents” within the context
of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic
document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Answer to the second Issue: No.

The CSC did not give credit to petitioner’s claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of
his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found PAGCOR’s denial of having received
petitioner’s letter more credible as it was supported by certifications issued by its
employees. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner
allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the
PAGCOR’s Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned
about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint
and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its Comment.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit
consideration petitioner’s claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a
letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR’s Chairman, members
of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo
that a letter reconsideration was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such
facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed resolution revealed that the
telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the recipient of the faxed document sent
was not that of PAGCOR’s Office of Board of Directors.
The CA then concluded that PAGCOR’s decision which was contained in a letter dated
August 4, 2007 dismissing petitioner from the service had already attained finality since
there was no motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the manner and within the
period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules on the Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007 EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs CITIBANK

Summary of the Case:

In this civil case, the plaintiff, Aznar, alleged that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, causing
embarrassment and inconvenience when it was dishonored at several establishments during his
travels. However, the court ruled against Aznar due to lack of sufficient evidence.

Key Points:
Burden of Proof: As the plaintiff, Aznar was required to prove his claims by a preponderance of
evidence, which he failed to do.
No Direct Proof of Blacklisting: Aznar admitted he had no personal knowledge that his card was
blacklisted. His claim was based on presumptions drawn from the card’s dishonor.
Exhibit “G” (Computer Print-out): Aznar presented a print-out to prove the card was blacklisted,
but:
It was not authenticated as required by evidentiary rules.
He could not prove who made the entries or in what official capacity.
Even if accepted, it showed the card was declined for being over the limit, not blacklisted.
Citibank's Evidence:
Citibank presented authenticated Warning Cancellation Bulletins proving Aznar’s card was not on
any hot list during the time in question.
A bank officer, Dennis Flores, credibly testified on this matter.
Credit Limit Issue: Aznar claimed an additional deposit should have increased his credit limit. The
court found that Citibank did credit the deposit, allowing him to purchase a ticket over his original
limit, showing no negligence or breach on Citibank’s part.
Contract of Adhesion: The court acknowledged that Citibank’s credit card terms were a contract of
adhesion and certain liability limitations were unconscionable. However, this didn’t change the fact
that no legal breach was proven.
No Liability for Damages:
There was no proof of fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence by Citibank.
While Aznar may have suffered embarrassment, there was no legal injury attributable to Citibank’s
actions.
The case falls under the principle of “damnum absque injuria” — damage without a legal wrong.

Conclusion:
The court denied Aznar’s petition due to failure to prove that Citibank blacklisted his card or acted
with negligence or bad faith. Therefore, no damages were awarded.
ACT Teachers, Rep. Antonio Tinio vs. President Rodrigo Duterte GR No. 236118 January 24, 2023
FACTS:
Oppugned in the consolidated cases is the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10963 or the
"Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion" (TRAIN) Act, which amended RA No. 8424, or the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. The TRAIN Act was the first package of the Duterte
administration's Comprehensive Tax Reform Program. Prior to its enactment, the precursor tax
reform bills of RA No. 10963, i.e., House Bill (HB) No. 5636 and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1592, were
certified as urgent by former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. This tax measure was primarily intended
to fund the government's accelerated spending under its "Build, Build, Build" program.
Petitioners (in G.R. No. 236118, hereafter referred to as "Tinio, et al.," and in G.R. No. 236295 "Laban
Konsyumer and Dimagiba") both avouch that the TRAIN Act violates the equal protection clause.
Tinio, et al. argue that inflation and prices have been continuously rising ever since the law was
passed and this deleterious economic burden is felt pronouncedly by the most vulnerable sectors.
In the main, they proffer that the passage of the law was unconstitutionally railroaded when the
TRAIN Bicameral ConferenceCommittee (BCC) Report was ratified despite the supposed glaring lack
of quorum in the House on the night of 13 December 2017.
Meanwhile, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba claim that the excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG, and
kerosene expressly discriminate against the poor while having no impact on the rich. Moreover, some
provisions in the Act, such as the excise tax on coal,15 avowedly did not originate from the House, in
violation of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. They likewise assert that the foregoing
excise taxes directly violate Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution Act for being "regressive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the TRAIN Act violative of Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution?
Whether or not the Section 48 of the TRAIN Act constitutes a violation of Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution?
Whether or not the TRAIN Act was validly passed.
RULLING:
[Link] Court rules and so holds that petitioners have failed to adduce proof of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the equal protection clause.
Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."
In the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance enunciates that the foregoing Constitutional
provision does not prohibit the imposition of regressive taxes but merely directs Congress to evolve
a progressive system of taxation:
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are ... to be
preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized."
The provisions of the TRAIN Act were intended by Congress to be progressive, and in actual fact, the
data prepared by the DOF demonstrate that the TRAIN Act was designed so as to not trigger extreme
price shocks especially in terms of prime commodities.
Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to 'evolve a progressive system of taxation. These provisions are put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
[Link] Supreme court held that Section 48 of the TRAIN Act is not a prohibited rider thus does not
violate Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 24, Article VI thereof, provides that "all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. "
As applied in these consolidated Petitions, there is undoubtedly no constitutional prohibition for the
Senate to introduce new provisions not originally found in the House version of the eventual TRAIN
Act. Although the amendment introduced to Section 151 of the Tax Code, which increases the excise
tax rates for domestic and imported coal and coke, inter alia, is only present in Senate bill it is not
contained in the title of House bill. The amendments to Section 151 of the Tax Code introduced by
SB No. 1592 likewise serves the stated purpose of HB No. 5636.
Both HB No. 5636 and SB No. 1592 contain provisions for the earmarking of the incremental revenues
to be generated by the law which are targeted not only for infrastructure projects but also for social
welfare programs, further bolstering the idea that the two Houses of Congress were more or less in
agreement as to their objectives for amending the Tax Code.
Ⅲ. The Supreme court held that the TRAIN Act was validly enacted into law.
Appositely, Section 16(2), Article VI requires the presence of a quorum before either of the Houses
can transact its business -
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
Indeed, Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution authorizes each House of Congress to determine
the rules for the conduct of its own proceedings.
Rule XI of the Internal Rules of the House of Representatives provides, Section 71, in turn, indicates
that in exceptional cases, absent Members of the House are still deemed present and counted
towards quorum when they are attending committee hearings, upon notification to the Secretary
General, or are on oficial missions, as approved by the Speaker. It is uncontroverted that on
December 13, 2017 session of the House commenced with the declaration of a quorum, consistent
with Sections 72 and 74 of its Internal Rules of Procedure. When the roll was called at 4:00 p.m., 232
out of the 295 members responded. Plain as day, no question was raised in this regard. Clearly, the
physical absences of these Members do not militate against their attendance in a particular session
and do not automatically translate to the fact of quorum being "lost," especially so when they have
had their presence recorded during the initial roll call.
In précis, even assuming that the Court should look beyond what was written in the Journal and that
the enrolled bill doctrine may be disregarded, petitioners' evidence utterly falls short of passing
judicial muster. To ingeminate, the mere filing of a case raising the existence of a quorum as an issue
does not automatically enjoin the Court to accept the invitation to pry into the proceedings of a co-
equal branch of government. Petitioners bear the burden in convincing the Court to exercise its
exceptional judicial power to review such assailed acts by substantiating its averments with clear
and convincing evidence. Petitioners miserably failed in discharging this bounden duty.
8.
Background of the Case
This case stemmed from the case decided by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals of Cebu, convicting accused-appellant, Eul Vincent Rodriguez, for qualified
trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking of Persons Act of 2003,
finding that the videos and recordings of the chat logs of his conversations with an undercover agent
can be admitted as evidence.
Rodriguez was arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by operatives of Regional Intelligence
Division (RID) and Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in a hotel in Cebu City in February 2014.
The victim, who was a 13-year-old boy, was rescued and testified that he was forced to do sexually
explicit acts with Rodriguez, and was strip naked in front of the camera for about 20 separate
occasions. The nude acts were reportedly streamed live online and sold to foreigners.
Rodriguez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and was sentenced to life imprisonment
without eligibility for parole and to pay fine amounting to PhP2,000,000.00, and to pay the offended
party in the amount of PhP500,000.00 in moral damages, and PhP100,000 exemplary damages, with
interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards for damages from the date of the
finality of the decision until fully paid.
Legal Issue/s
1. Whether the evidences presented during the trial were inadmissible for violating the privacy rights
of the accused-appellant.
2. Whether the arrest of the accused-appellant was illegal.