IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

K.L. SMITH,

Plaintiff, [draft]

v.

PETE R. FLORES, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF PARALLEL ACTION (INCORPORATING AUTHORITY)

Plaintiff K.L. Smith, in propria persona, hereby notices the Court of the filing of a parallel

action in D.C. Superior Court, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and of the reason why that matter was

filed.

INTRODUCTION

This matter presents issues of urgent constitutional importance. Plaintiff recognizes that, owing

to the transfer from the previous judge, the Court may not yet be fully acquainted with the proce-

dural or historical context in which this case arises, as it invokes remedies rarely invoked in con-

temporary federal litigation. This précis is offered to assist the Court in understanding the core

claims and their historical foundation, without reference to more extensive filings.

I. THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE COMMON LAW

What they understood when they ratified this Constitution was that they were
affirming the rights of Englishmen.
~Antonin Scalia1

1
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 13, 2005) at~44 min. at
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/185122-1

1
 The most coherent way to understand what the Framers intended in designing our Constitution

is to think of how you would draft that document under the assumption that you would be the one

being governed, as opposed to doing the governing. They understood that power minus account-

ability equals tyranny, and in a rational system of government, no one would ever be invested with

unchecked power. “[C]onstant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to

abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go.” Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws XI ch. 4

(T. Nugent trans., Bell & Sons, 1914) (1748). Their solution was to diffuse that power as broadly

as possible—between the federal government and the states, between the various branches of the

government, and between government and the citizens it works for. In introducing what became

our Bill of Rights, James Madison provided a Rosetta Stone:

I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed [the proposed Constitution], disliked
it because it did not contain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular rights,
and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between
them and the magistrate who exercised the sovereign power: nor ought we to consider them
safe, while a great number of our fellow citizens think these securities necessary.

1 Annals of Congress 450 (Jun. 7, 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).

The Bill of Rights is, at essence, a bill of remedies. To a man, the Framers believed that our

natural rights were given to them by God and that governments could only take them away, and

the Constitution reflected that view. The last of the Five Rights in our present-day First Amend-

ment was the right to petition—the right to demand legislative redress when the normal mecha-

nisms of government were inadequate to redress injury. The Seventh Amendment jury trial pro-

tects the citizen against corrupt judges. The First Amendment prohibition against abridgment of

“the freedom of speech, or of the press” presupposes the existence of the prerogative writs—habeas

corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, and scire facias—which Madison em-

bedded into the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

2
A. QUO WARRANTO

At common law, actions seeking prerogative writs were ex parte proceedings. Standing was

not required, Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?,

78 Yale L.J. 816, 819 (1969); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of

Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1406-08 (Jul. 1988) (“the Framers did not see the ‘case

or controversy’ requirement as limiting popular actions), and the target only need appear to answer

the writ. Quo warranto is almost as old as the Conquest; the scire facias is over 500 years old.

The right to have public duties exercised by “those competent to exercise them” is a common

law right, for which there was a remedy enforceable in chancery court.2 The practice is consistent

with the Framers’ design, the common law, and the concept of popular sovereignty.

At the risk of stating the obvious, an oathbreaking adjudged insurrectionist who has not been

absolved by Congress may not serve as President. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. The writ of quo

warranto was the pre-existing enforcement mechanism contemplated by Congress,3 and it appears

that the power to wield it lies concurrently with this Court and the D.C. Superior Court.4 Plaintiff

doesn’t care which court tackles this problem, as long as a court does. The strength of our Con-

stitution lies in its myriad redundancies.

That Defendant Trump swore out a qualifying oath and was adjudged by a competent court to

have engaged in insurrection are noticeable facts, undisturbed by reviewing courts. As there was

2
"The common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for
this purpose." Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813); accord, United States v. Texas, 507 U.S.
529, 534 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted). All the common law writs were available. Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
3
The Enforcement Act of 1870, §14, 16 Stat. 143 (1870), repealed 35 Stat. 1153–1154, 62 Stat. 992–993 (1948),
imposed an affirmative duty on prosecutors to enforce Section 3, but did not need to specify the mechanism by which
it was enforced, as power to issue a quo warranto existed under the All-Writs Act.
4
Jurisdiction is granted to the Superior Court via statute, D.C. Code 16-3501, et seq.; Newman v. United States ex rel.
Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915), and the district courts. United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. First Federal Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 151 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Wisc. 1957).

3
an effective mechanism for enforcement in 1868, all that is left for a federal court to do is enforce

it—here, in relief in the nature of quo warranto. Importantly, the actions of a usurper are void as

a matter of law. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 443 (1886). Plaintiff has asked for both

a restraining order and a quo warranto.

B. SCIRE FACIAS/MANDAMUS:

As Defendant Roberts reminds us, the Supreme Court “is not a legislature.” Obergefell v.

Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). That under our Constitution, “judges

have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.” Id. I agree. And why is this of critical

import? Alexander Hamilton explains:

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. …
To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant
is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people them-
selves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not
authorise, but what they forbid.

The Federalist No. 78, p. 438 (I. Kramnick ed. 1987) (Alexander Hamilton). Judge Bork adds that

the “illegitimacy of the Court's departures from the Constitution is underscored by the fact that no

Justice has ever attempted a justification of the practice … [and] a long habit of abuse of authority

does not make the abuse legitimate.” Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21

(Nov. 1996). Every justice named as a defendant here has voiced assent,5 so this is not a contro-

versial proposition.

5
Roberts: “Judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644,
135 S.Ct. 2584, 2811 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Thomas: “Judicial power… is never exercised for the purpose
of giving effect to the will of the Judge.” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1982 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring); Alito: “It is the job of a judge… to interpret the Constitution, not distort [it],” Confirmation Hearing
on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 465 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.); Gorsuch:
“Ours is the job of interpreting the Constitution… according to its original public meaning,” Cordova v. City of Albu-
querque, 816 F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring); Kavanaugh: “The Constitution does not grant
[us] unilateral authority to rewrite” it, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, __, 142 S.Ct.

4
 Our Constitution provides that “Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their

Offices during good Behaviour,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. As we all learned in Property, this is a

life estate subject to a condition: Violate the condition, and you forfeit your sinecure. As a judge

holds office in parens patriae for the benefit of the public, there are two remedies the public may

resort to: (relief in the nature of) a writ of scire facias removing the judge from the office he holds

and a mandamus voiding illicit acts of judicial lawmaking.6

Structurally, a regime where the President is immune from criminal prosecution for all acts he

deems “official,” has plenary and exclusive control over the investigative and prosecutorial appa-

ratuses, and can hand out and even sell pardons, is more of a regime than a Republic. That Clarence

Thomas signed off on this, Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), borders on the inexpli-

cable, as it is dramatically at odds with his public missives.7 If a “decision is manifestly absurd or

unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it is not law.” 1 Wm. Black-

stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *70 (1765). Whereas English judges were at liberty

to ignore bad precedent, ours could stay on the books indefinitely, absent mandamus relief.8

2228, 2306 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring); Barrett: “Partisan politics are not a good reason for deciding a case.”
Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1729 (2012-13).
6
In the timeless words of Justice Holmes, judicial lawmaking is ‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts
of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.” Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). There is no intrinsic reason why illicit judicial acts cannot be withdrawn,
as courts can and do withdraw egregiously erroneous opinions on occasion, e.g., Harrington v. Wilson, No. 06-1418
(10th Cir. Jun. 7. 2007) (withdrawn) (matter dismissed for lack of jurisdiction dismissed ‘with prejudice’). Judges “are
infallible only because we are final" because judges say so in a concurrence, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring), is not a compelling argument where an act of judicial malfeasance can often be cured by a
petition to Congress, but judges wrote this time-honored remedy out of the Constitution sua sponte. John E. Wolfgram,
How the Judiciary Stole the Right to Petition, 31 U. W. L.A. L. Rev. (Summer 2000).
7
Albeit not speaking ex cathedra, Thomas observes: “We should always start, when we read the Constitution, by
reading the Declaration, because it gives us the reasons why the structure of the Constitution was designed the way it
was.” Conversation with Justice Clarence Thomas, 36-10 Imprimis 6 (Oct. 2007); see e.g., Gamble v. United States,
587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. at 1980-90 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8
Before he could speak ex cathedra, Holmes added: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469
(1897).

5
C. PRIVATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

[N]o stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due observance of the
law of the land, by all persons under all circumstances, than is given by the power, con-
ceded to everyone by the English system, of testing the legality of any conduct of which
he disapproves, either on private or on public grounds, by a criminal prosecution.9

Private criminal prosecution is a remedy ubiquitous among former British colonies, from Aus-

tralia to Zimbabwe. It is "a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part

of authority," Gouriet v. Union of Post Ofc. Workers [1978] A.C. 435, 477 (H.L.), flourishing a

pedigree as old as the common law itself.10 As it is a remedy no sane person would knowingly

9
Note, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 Yale L. J. 209, 209 (1955)
(quoting 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law 496 (1883).
10
From time immemorial, it has been the common duty of every Englishman—including the King—to ‘keep the
King’s peace’, and one of the tools handed down was the right of any subject—now, citizen—to enforce the law by
prosecuting criminals.
As our society and law became more complex, we delegated this task to professionals. But “one of the ultimate
sanctions [of the common law] is the right of private persons to lay informations and bring prosecutions,” Lund v
Thompson [1958] 3 All E.R. 356, 358, and it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "[t]he com-
mon law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute beclear and explicit for this pur-
pose." Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813). "Statutes which invade the common law ... are
to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statu-
tory purpose to the contrary is evident [and] to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to
the question addressed by the common law.” United States v. Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993) (quotations and citations
omitted). This, in turn, begs two questions: (1) Has Congress ever attempted to repeal this right, and if so, (2) does it
even have the raw power to do so? As it is an unenumerated fundamental right, U.S. Const. amend. IX-X, essential to
thev preservation of liberty, which has not been expressly relinquished in the Constitution, the answer must be no.
What we can say for certain is that there is nothing in the Framers’ Constitution extinguishing the right. The con-
stitutional charge to the President that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, §
3, did not do so, as both the New York, N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XIX (1822), and Pennsylvania constitutions, Pa.
Const. of 1776, § 20 (1820), had virtually identical clauses, and were not interpreted as banning it; in Philadelphia, it
had devolved into a sort of “blood sport.” Allen Steinberg, "The Spirit of Litigation:" Private Prosecution and Crim-
inal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia, 20 J. Social History 231 (1986). Nor can vestment of the executive
power in the President, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, for the same reason.
“Reason is the soul of the law,” 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 209 (15th ed. 1883), and the judgment of the entire
civilised world confirms this conclusion. No one would ever give this right up. The power to either force officials to
prosecute a crime or prosecute it yourself is ubiquitous in democratic countries—and even in countries that are not
exactly staunch redoubts of human rights, such as Zimbabwe. Even in Harare, a victim of a crime has the legal right
to prosecute if their Attorney-General declines:
In all cases where the Attorney-General declines to prosecute for an alleged offence, any private party, who can
show some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the trial arising out of some injury which he individ-
ually has suffered by the commission of the offence, may prosecute, in any court competent to try the offence,
the person alleged to have committed it.
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 2004, [Chapter 9:07], Part 13 (Zimbabwe).

6
give up—the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China are cautionary tales—it is un-

likely that Congress could extinguish the right in the face of a Ninth/Tenth Amendment challenge,

even if it tried.

This is not a theoretical question. Plaintiff added pertinent allegations related to “Signalgate”

to the Complaint in direct response to Attorney General Pam Bondi’s stunning assertion that she

The salutary purpose of such a rule, according to Justice Holmes, was to accommodate a natural desire for revenge
within the law by avoiding "the greater evil of private retribution." Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 41-42
(1881). Even in Tanzania, the notion that the State could be trusted with the exclusive, uncontrolled franchise in
prosecution of crimes is inconceivable, as Professor Nreseko of the University of Botswana notes, relating comments
in an unpublished case of that nation's Court of Appeals:
We are surprised because we did not think anyone in our country could be vested with such absolute and total
powers. It would be terrible to think that any individual or group of individuals could be empowered by law to
act even mala fide. As it turned out to our great relief the exercise of the powers by the DPP under the Criminal
Procedure Act is limited by the Act. Although the powers of the DPP appear to be wide, the exercise is limited
by three considerations. That wherever he exercises the wide powers he must do so only in the public interest,
in the interest of justice and in the need to prevent abuse of the legal process.
D. N. Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Trials and Int'l Tribunals, Int'l Soc'y for the Reform of Crim-
inal Law (undated), at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Nsereko.pdf, quoting Director of Public Prosecutions v. Mehboob
Akbar Haji & Another, Cr, App. No. 28 of 1992 (unreported).
No other country in the civilised world—not even Zimbabwe!—thinks it is a good idea to grant the State an exclu-
sive franchise to decide which crimes it will prosecute, and which it will ignore, without any external control whatever.
Understandably, the right exists throughout the Commonwealth, even if it is invoked sparingly. E.g., Barrymore
Facing Pool Death Case, BBC News, Jan. 16, 2006 (Great Britain); Plans for Private Prosecution Against Winnie,
BBC News, Nov. 26, 1997 (South Africa: prosecution of Winnie Mandela proposed). Malaysia allows private criminal
prosecution by the aggrieved party, Criminal Procedure Code, Act 593, Sec. 380 (Malaysia) and even citizen's arrests.
Id., Sec. 27(1). The procedure is robust in Jamaica, Private citizens can initiate criminal prosecutions without fiat
from DPP - AG's Chambers, The Gleaner (Jamaica), Nov. 30, 2015, https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-sto-
ries/20151202/private-citizens-can-initiate-criminal-prosecutions-without-fiat-dpp, and perhaps unsettled in Kenya,
Kenya: DPP Urges Court to Drop Private Prosecution Case, The Star (Nairobi), Aug. 5, 2013, reprinted at http://al-
lafrica.com/stories/201308052173.html (the right itself appears to be intact, but the procedure is uncertain), but for
the most part, Commonwealth nations tend to follow the example of Mother England.
A brief survey of established Western democracies reveals that, in most instances, prosecutors have little or no
discretion as to whether to prosecute a crime. Italy includes an express duty to prosecute in its constitution. Cos-
tituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution] art. 112 (Italy 1947). As anyone who has been following the news
already knows, Martin Sieff, Spain Wants Torture Charges Against Bush Six Dropped, UPI, Apr. 16, 2009, Spain
trusts her citizens with wide latitude to initiate criminal proceedings. Constitución Espanola de 1978 [1978 Constitu-
tion] art. 125 (Spain). Prosecutorial discretion in most states is governed by statute and often, quite limited. See e.g.,
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 Amer. J. Comp.
L. 508 (1970).
In our own hemisphere, most countries have robust private prosecution systems. see generally, Kathryn Sikkink,
The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (Norton, 2001), The Phillippines
has a separate court—the Sandiganbayan—dedicated to prosecuting public corruption, where private prosecutors may
intervene in specified circumstances. See, Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2011) (Phil.) (discussing
limits on intervention). And unlike the United States, our former protectorate still has the writ of certiorari. Id.

7
was not going to hold fellow Trump Administration officials accountable for breathtaking viola-

tions of espionage laws intended to keep us safe. Devlin Barrett, Bondi Suggests Signal Chat

Episode Is Unlikely to Be Criminally Investigated, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2025.

The Framers had seen this rodeo before—not once, but twice. In the middle of the 17th century,

King James II decided, sua sponte, that he would decide for himself which laws were to be en-

forced, and against whom. He was deposed in the Glorious Revolution 1688, and Parliament in-

vited William and Mary to assume the English throne. In so doing, Parliament passed the Bill of

Rights [1688] 1 W & M Sess 2 c 2, declaring in pertinent part:

That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority
without consent of Parliament is illegal;
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal author-
ity, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.11

The second, of course, was summarized in the list of grievances recounted in our Declaration

of Independence:

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless
suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he
has utterly neglected to attend to them.
He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, un-
less those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right
inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.

The Declaration of Independence para. 3-5 (U.S. 1776).

This begs the obvious question of why the Framers, who knew of the example of King James

and endured the rule of King George, would ever entrust that kind of unfettered discretion to the

11
Id., as reprinted at The Avalon Project (Yale Law School), English Bill of Rights 1689. Stylistic changes were made
in the Avalon version; owing to quirks in English law, even though it was passed in December, 1689, the proper cite
is [1688].

8
hands of one man. At bare minimum, a suggestion that it would have been done sub rosa "taxes

the credulity of the credulous." Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

In short, they wouldn’t ... because they didn’t.12 To the Framers, the Attorney General was

simply the lawyer for the Crown. In private prosecutions, his task was to superintend the prose-

cution, protecting the rights of the accused by insisting that prosecutions were meritorious and

12
If a right is reserved to the people by virtue of the Bill of Rights, only a countervailing constitutional provision could
divest the people of it. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (the Constitution alone is the paramount ‘law of the
land’). Private prosecution may well have fallen into desuetude, but it cannot simply be read out of the Constitution.
First, it can be said with confidence that as of 1789, no jurisdiction creating an office of attorney general had vested
exclusive right to prosecute in that office, despite language in their state charters substantially identical to that of the
Constitution. Second, there is no “clear indication” in the Constitution that the Framers had intended to abolish whole-
sale all common law remedies for official misconduct (the rationale that the Supreme Court used to preserve absolute
judicial immunity for state judges, in the face of its prima facie abolition in the ubiquitous Section 1983. Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). Given the general rule that all common law remedies of long pedigree were intended
to be constitutionalized in the Bill of Rights, for this power to be delegated to government, there has to be a mechanism
by which it was in fact delegated. Careful review of the Constitution and its state counterparts reveals no evidence of
such delegation.
In the eighteenth century, crime was generally viewed as a private injury; there was no distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings. Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and
America, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 437 (1935). A “prosecutor” was anyone coming before a grand jury with a complaint,
e.g. United States v. Sandford, F.Cas. No. 16,221 (C.Ct.D.C. 1806), and throughout the colonies, the attorney general
was simply the lawyer for the Crown. See e.g., Collections of the Mass. Historical Society, Vol. VI, Series V (undated)
at 68 and fn. 1, reprinted at http://books.google.com/books?id=m-QNAAAAYAAJ (reference to Attorney-General
Anthony Checkley dying of smallpox in 1702). The office of attorney-general, created in many state constitutions,
e.g., Pa. Const. of 1776, § 20 (1820); N.J. Const. of 1776, art. XII (1844), readily co-existed with the ubiquitous
practice of private prosecution in every state, both before and after the Revolution. In Britain, it was known to have
existed since at least the fourteenth century. Rita W Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The At-
torney General in England and the American Colonies, Am. J. Legal Hist., Vol. 2, No. 4 (Oct., 1958) at 304.
It can further be said with confidence that there is no historical warrant for the proposition that the constitutional
charge to the President that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, invests
the Executive with that exclusive authority. Both the New York, N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XIX (1777), and Pennsyl-
vania constitutions, Pa. Const. of 1776, § 20 (1820), enacted a decade before their federal counterparts, sported virtu-
ally identical clauses. They were certainly not interpreted as outlawing private prosecution; in the city of Philadelphia,
it had evolved into a sort of ‘blood sport.’ See generally, Allen Steinberg, “The Spirit of Litigation:” Private Prose-
cution and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia, 20 J. Social History 231 (1986).
Further, it cannot be credibly maintained that vestment of the executive power in the President, U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 1, can grant the Attorney General exclusive power to initiate criminal prosecutions, as virtually every state consti-
tution of the day vested supreme executive power in a governor, e.g., N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XVII (1821), and/or
governing council, e.g., Pa. Const. of 1776, § 3 (1790), but private prosecution in those jurisdictions remained ubiq-
uitous. The Judiciary Act of 1789 merely imposed a “duty” upon United States Attorneys to prosecute all crimes and
offences occurring within their districts, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 at § 35. Holmes famously quipped that "a
page of history was worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). Volumes of
legal history, carefully unearthed by Steve Winter of Wayne State University, demonstrate that private prosecution
was not merely accepted, but a practical necessity, during the formative years of our Republic.

9
proper procedures were followed. Federal statutory law solves this problem by empowering the

United States Attorney to supervise prosecutions, 28 U.S.C. § 519, and to intervene where justice

demands:

The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obliga-
tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

The controlling public policy issue is whether a prosecuting attorney, by virtue of his or her

virtually unlimited "discretion," can abrogate the most elemental promise of civil society: that

"none are above the law, and none are beyond its protection." Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke,

Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty and the Limits of Law, Law and Social

Inquiry, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 (May 2008) 387. As no Republic worthy of the name could long survive a

corrupt prosecutor with an exclusive franchise, this Republic did not grant one.

While Plaintiff would much rather have a Special Counsel or the Public Integrity Section of the

Department of Justice address malfeasance by the current Administration (as observed in greater

detail in the petition filed with the D.C. Superior Court), Attorney General Bondi has taken a pro-

verbial meat cleaver to the Department’s internal watchdog network.13 This Court can order access

to a grand jury, if the problem persists.

13
In a spectacle reminiscent of Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre—Plaintiff is old enough to remember—the seven
attorneys leading the Justice Department’s Public Integrity Section resigned after refusing to participate in a deal
wherein a corruption prosecution of New York City mayor Eric Adams would be suspended, provided that Adams
agreed to be Trump’s supplicant. Scott MacFarlane, et al., Top DOJ officials, Manhattan federal prosecutor resign
after receiving orders to drop Eric Adams case, CBS News, Feb. 14, 2025.
But the Valentine’s Day Massacre at DOJ was infinitely worse. According to retired U.S. Attorney Barb McQuade,
“DOJ leadership has put all Public Integrity Section lawyers into a room with 1 hour to decide who will dismiss Adams
indictment or else all will be fired.” Josh Gerstein, Justice Department in crisis over Eric Adams showdown, Politico,
Feb. 14, 2025.
The Valentine’s Day Massacre is a unique window into the character of DOJ leadership under Ms. Bondi. Hagen
Scotten, one of the Public Integrity attorneys who resigned in protest, distilled the controversy to essentials: “No
system of ordered liberty can allow the Government to use the carrot of dismissing charges, or the stick of threatening

10
 That having been said, Plaintiff knows his limitations.

Canada’s system is fairly representative of the private prosecution system used in Common-

wealth countries. “Any one who, on reasonable grounds, believes that a person has committed an

indictable offence may lay an information in writing and under oath before a justice, and the justice

shall receive the information.” Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 504 (Can.), current to May

12, 2025. (An “indictable offence” translates to a felony, and a justice of the peace is roughly a

magistrate.) The case is then referred to a federal judge, who performs an ex parte review for

sufficiency, § 507(1), which is the equivalent of the request Plaintiff would make to this Court for

access to a grand jury. The Crown is informed; it has the option of either prosecuting or superin-

tending the case. See, 28 U.S.C. § 519. The rights of the accused are vigorously protected by both

the courts and the Crown, but the prosecutor’s discretion is tightly cabined in.

In Commonwealth jurisdictions, it is not only permissible but desirable for the accuser to hire

competent counsel to handle the actual prosecution. While Plaintiff is a reasonably capable expo-

nent of constitutional theory, a competent criminal prosecution requires a seasoned professional.

If the process got that far, one would almost certainly be crowdfunded.

II. CLARENCE THOMAS V. CLARENCE THOMAS

We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is

to bring them again, to induce an elected official to support its policy objectives.” Hagan Scotten, E-mail (to Emil
Bove), Re: United States v. Eric Adams, 24 Cr. 556 (DEH).
For Scotten—"an Iraq War veteran and Bronze Star recipient who clerked for Chief Justice John Roberts at the
Supreme Court and at an appeals court for Justice Brett Kavanaugh,” and a registered Republican, Gerstein, Justice
Dept. in Crisis, supra., this was not about partisan politics. This is about the rule of law. And character. In Pam
Bondi’s DOJ, blackmail for political purposes is “Tuesday.” And she can be expected to act in the public interest, as
opposed to Donald John Trump’s?
14
George Orwell, The Taming of Power (book review), New Adelphi, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939), at 205.

11
 If our Constitution is to mean anything, an oathbreaking adjudged insurrectionist who has not

been absolved by Congress is ineligible to be President. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. The damage

to the fabric of our rule of law compounds daily; while the D.C. Superior Court enjoys concurrent

jurisdiction, there is no intrinsic reason why this Court cannot act decisively.

But this case is about a lot more. As Clarence Thomas observed, “it was the structure of the

government that was supposed to protect our liberty. And what has happened through the years is

that the protections afforded by that structure have been dissipated.” A Conversation, supra. The

Framers’ Constitution lies in tatters: The once-mighty citizen has been reduced to serfdom, as the

12
First Amendment right to petition,15 the Framers’ Seventh Amendment jury trial,16 to equal justice

under law via mandatory certiorari review,17 to the private criminal prosecution of crimes,18 to sue

States for damages in a neutral forum,19 to hold public officials and their principals accountable in

15
John E. Wolfgram, How the Judiciary Stole the Right to Petition, 31 U. W. L.A. L. Rev. (Summer 2000),
http://www.constitution.org/abus/wolfgram/ptnright.htm.
16
The crown jewel of the English legal system was the right to have a trial by jury, under which, the judge was reduced
to little more than father-confessor. It "is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, of wish for,
that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of
his neighbours and equals." 4 Blackstone, Commentaries at 379. Juries were the ultimate deciders of questions of
law, Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1793) (jury instructions of Jay, C.J.), before judges dismantled it. United
States v. Callender, 25 F.Cas. 239, 257 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit). Judges look down on you; juries
look at you.
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. It “is a fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot be
legislated away." Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (D.Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J., riding circuit). According to
Framer (and signatory to the Declaration of Independence) Elbridge Gerry, its purpose was to “guard agst. corrupt
Judges.” 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 587 (1909). Quoting Blackstone and Matthew
Hale, Elbridge Gerry observed "that property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitu-
tional trial by jury," and that it "is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce."
Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions (1788) as reprinted
in, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published During its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 10
(P. Ford ed. 1888). John Dickenson viewed it as a "Heaven-taught institution," Fabius, Letter (to the editor), Delaware
Gazette (1788), as reprinted in, John Dickinson, The Letters of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal Constitution; and in
1797 on the Present Situation of Public Affairs 32 (1797), and one of "the corner stones of liberty." Id. at 34.
There was no dissent. See e.g., 1 J. Elliot, Debates at 504 (remarks of Mr. Lee, of Virginia); The Federalist No. 83,
at 465 (Alexander Hamilton); Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to William C. Jarvis), Sept. 28, 1820, at 1. Even Justice
Rehnquist concurred: “The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important
bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might
be added, to that of the judiciary.” Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
17
At common law, certiorari is a supervisory writ, apprising a superior court of "jurisdictional error, failure to observe
some applicable requirement of procedural fairness, fraud and ‘error of law on the face of the record.’" Craig v South
Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 175 (H.C. Austl.) (citations omitted). “The underlying policy is that all inferior courts
and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This is the concern
of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in
motion.” Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 (India). American courts no longer correct even
egregious errors, Sup. Ct. R. 10, forever interring the concept of equal justice under law. Needless to say, the Framers
did not intend this. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 121, 126 (1795); 2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (James D.
Andrews ed., 1896).
18
“[O]ne of the ultimate sanctions [of the common law] is the right of private persons to lay informations and bring
prosecutions,” Lund v Thompson [1958] 3 All E.R. 356, 358, which serves as "a valuable constitutional safeguard
against inertia or partiality on the part of authority." Gouriet v. Union of Post Ofc. Workers, [1978] A.C. 435, 477
(H.L.). While this right has never been repealed (and probably couldn’t be, as it is an unenumerated right no citizen
would ever knowingly relinquish), as "[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language
of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose," Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813),
judges have relegated it to the rubbish bin sua sponte.
19
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (effectively adopting the version the Amendment’s framers explicitly rejected).
See John Paul Stevens, "Two Questions About Justice," 2003 Ill. L. Rev. 821 (proving this point).

13
tort,20 the right to meaningful appellate review,21 to enforce our judges’ good behavior tenure,

Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.C. Dist. 2014), and the right to cast a meaningful vote, Rucho

v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019), are all extinct. Without any semblance of constitutional

authority, judges have assumed roles intended for citizens by devices such as summary judgment22

and heightened pleading rules,23 all but eradicating the jury’s democratic function as a check on

government and elites.

The core of the Constitution fared no better. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments died the death

of a thousand cuts. Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022) (swallowing Bivens whole). The Ninth

Amendment bled out on the operating table, butchered by judicial abortionist Samuel Alito. Dobbs

20
Judges gave their guild an absolute immunity against civil suits, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (a judge
must possess jurisdiction over a dispute to claim immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (immunity is
virtually unlimited); see also, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), (holding that "any person" means “any person
but us judges”). extending it to prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). States, e.g., Alden v. Maine,
supra., the federal government, United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 9-10 (2012), and now, even the President. Trump
v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024). Conversely, “[a]t the time of Marbury v. Madison there was no doctrine of
domestic sovereign immunity, as there never had been in English law”; Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Ad-
ministrative Law, Y.B. Supreme Court Hist. Soc’y. 103 (1985) (emphasis in original).
21
Allowing so-called “unpublished” opinions, granting judges the raw power to write ad hoc, ex post facto designer
‘law’, applicable to one and only one set of litigants. E.g., Smith v. United States Ct. of App. for the Tenth Circuit, No.
07-736 (cert. den. Feb. 19, 2008); cf., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on
other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
At the federal appellate level, by the judges’ own admission, the average judge spends more time on the toilet than
he does in considering a typical appeal. Panels in the Ninth Circuit might issue 150 rulings in a three-day session,
Alex Kozinski, Letter (to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.), Jan. 16, 2004 at 5, and the late Richard Arnold admitted that
his panel had issued fifty rulings in two hours. Perfunctory Justice: Overloaded Federal Judges Increasingly Are
Resorting to One-Word Rulings, Des Moines Register, Mar. 26, 1999, at 12. See also, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Adminis-
tering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 29, 32-33 (1990) (a typical appeal “takes only a little of their
time”). As Judge Murnaghan of the Fourth Circuit adds, “it is well known that judges may put considerably less effort
into opinions that they do not intend to publish. Because these opinions will not be binding precedent in any court, a
judge may be less careful about his legal analysis, especially when dealing with a novel issue of law.” Wilson v. Layne,
141 F.3d 111, 124 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). As Professors Reynolds and Richman lament, our
appellate courts are certiorari courts. William M. Reynolds & William L. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 275 (1995-96).
22
The “Celotex Trilogy”—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986) and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)—further erodes juror prerog-
atives by empowering judges to weigh evidence, assess credibility, and resolve cases without a jury. See generally,
Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 Va. L. Rev. 139 (2007).
23
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) abolished the
traditional notice pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), effectively requiring plaintiffs to
plead evidence before discovery.

14
v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (not about abortion per se, but defenestrat-

ing Madison’s effort to secure citizens’ unenumerated rights). The right to “equal and impartial

justice under the law,” Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 468 (1891), and the quaint notion that “[t]he

law [was] no respecter of persons,” Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 453 (1875), died when Chief Justice

Taft sat on them.24 The Supremacy Clause met an equally ignominious fate with respect to trea-

ties.25 And this is by no means a seriatim list.

24
When President Taft ascended to the bench, he went on a crusade to make “Supreme Court Justice” a part-time job,
by inventing the concept of standing in public interest cases, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); cf., Raoul
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816, 819 (1969) and
persuading Congress to pass The Judges’ Bill, 43 Stat. 936 (Feb. 13, 1925), jettisoning the right to certiorari review.
25
E.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), eliminates all
forms of sovereign immunity, under the rationale that, if the government can violate your human rights with impunity
whenever it strikes public officials’ fancy, you really don’t have any actual rights at all but rather, a mere tenancy at
will in your liberties. ICCPR, § 2.
The United States’ ratification was subject to a non-self-execution declaration, further warranting “that this Cove-
nant shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction
over the matters covered therein.” U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992). The Constitution provides that valid treaties
are the law of the land, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884), and Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains.” Murray v. the Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). Congress expressed its intent that pro-
visions of the ICCPR "will become binding international obligations of the United States," 138 Cong. Rec. S4,783
(1992) (stmt. of Sen. Moynihan (D-MA)). Our State Department has warranted to the international community that
whenever conforming legislation is required to comply with treaty obligations, it is Defendant United States of Amer-
ica’s consistent practice to withhold an instrument of ratification until appropriate legislation is enacted. United States
Dept. of State, Core Doc. Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties, United Nations Doc. No.
HRI/CORE/USA/2005 (Jan. 16, 2005) at ¶ 157.
In considering ratification, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that it wanted to defeat the claim that it was
an international hypocrite. Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 3 (102d Sess. 1992) (“In view of the leading role that the United States plays
in the international struggle for human rights, the absence of U.S. ratification of the covenant is conspicuous and, in
the view of many, hypocritical”). If the ICCPR were not pellucid on its face, this speaks to congressional intent.
This is where things become surreal. Congress declared in 1992 that domestic law was in conformance with the
treaty, and the courts are obliged as reading it as being in conformance pursuant to the Charming Betsy canon. More-
over, Under Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), if a reservation is fundamentally
incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty, it is void and severable.* As the ICCPR is substantially coter-
minous with the hortatory Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec.
10, 1948), the self-evidence object and purpose of the ICCPR is to add teeth to international human rights law.
As sovereign and official immunity are judge-made law, and the ICCPR is the Law of the Land, U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2, with respect to immunity, either directly or indirectly, the judge-made doctrine of immunity was overturned
as a matter of law. This issue came to the Court as a matter of first impression in Smith v. Bender, 350 F. App’x 190
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2097 (June 28, 2010); cf., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109–
10 (1801) (treaties used to be the law of the land), but for the pro se litigant, the Supreme Court does not exist. David

15
 It is bad enough that the Supremacy Clause, Petition Clause, Free Speech Clause, Due Process

and Equal Protection Clauses, and the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amend-

ments are all gone, but now, even the rules we were taught to rely on for “how to read law” are

left in tatters. A self-executing Constitution. The Rule of Charming Betsy. The Plain Meaning

Rule. Reliance on legislative history. Precedent on precedent. “Every word has meaning.” All,

Dead. Dead. Dead.

Still, the most breathtaking demolition project is what the courts have done to Marbury v. Mad-

ison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803): “The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a

government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the

laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Id. at 163. As a matter of law

and logic, a right cannot exist without an effective remedy for its breach, Ashby v. White [1703]

92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (H.C.), and “[t]o take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to

take away the right itself.” Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). But judges con-

structed an impenetrable fortress of immunity, procedural hurdles, and naked discrimination based

on one’s means. And we are now a government of men, not laws. The redoubtable Antonin Scalia

distills the concept to essentials: “This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected commit-

tee of nine robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Inde-

pendence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” Obergefell v.

Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947
(2007).
_____________________

(*Even though the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, several Circuits have
said that they look to it "as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties," see e.g., Ehrlich v.
American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 373 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,
308-09 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2000); other Circuits treat it as an authoritative statement of peremptory norms of international
law. E.g., Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A., 22 F.3d 634, 1994.C05.42049, ¶ 29 and fn. 9 (5th Cir. 1994). Under
the Rule of Charming Betsy, it is a distinction without a difference).

16
 The Constitution is dead. And that used to be a good thing. Katie Glueck, Scalia: The Consti-

tution is 'dead', Politico, Jan. 29, 2013. That Plaintiff would have to make Clarence Thomas’

argument about restoring protections afforded by the Constitution’s structure to Clarence Thomas’

law clerk in a case where Clarence Thomas is a proper-party defendant is just one of life’s many

ironies.

CONCLUSION

If we don't like an act of Congress, we don't have much trouble to find grounds for
declaring it unconstitutional.
~Justice John Marshall Harlan26

Plaintiff won’t even pretend to sugar-coat this. Our judiciary has failed. Catastrophically. Over

a century ago, our Supreme Court declared that you have a right to “equal and impartial justice

under the law,” and that this right is “secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the

individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692,

697-98 (1891). But as Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit confessed, "[t]he American legal

system has been corrupted almost beyond recognition.”27

“A constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat its evident purpose, but

rather so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it was aimed.” Jarrolt

v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580, 586 (1880). Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment was pellucid, and

intended to prevent the overthrow of our government. What even its own perpetrators openly call

a coup ďêtat: "‘We are in the process of the second American Revolution, which will remain

26
Alphaeus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren vii (La. St. U. Press, 2d ed. 1968).
27
Geraldine Hawkins, American Legal System Is Corrupt Beyond Recognition, Judge Tells Harvard Law School,
MassNews.com, Mar. 7, 2003, reprinted at https://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/News/AmerLegalSystCor-
rupt-030307.pdf

17
bloodless, if the left allows it to be.’" Flynn Nicholls, Project 2025 Leader Promises 'Second

American Revolution', Newsweek, Jul. 3, 2024 (emphasis added).

If Plaintiff were confident that Madison’s “parchment barrier” could arrest the encroaching

spirit of power, The Federalist No. 48, or there wasn’t a danger that federal judges won’t “consti-

tutionalize [their] personal preferences,” Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003)

(Kozinski, J., dissenting from den. of reh. en banc; citations omitted), a parallel filing in D.C.

Superior Court would be redundant. But the legendary Judge Kozinski, a Romanian émigré who

knows at first hand what living under tyranny’s thumb looks like, has a message this Court needs

to hear:

The prospect of tyranny may not grab the headlines the way vivid stories of gun crime
routinely do. But few saw the Third Reich coming until it was too late. The Second
Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those exceptionally rare circum-
stances where all other rights have failed—where the government refuses to stand for
reelection and silences those who protest; where courts have lost the courage to oppose,
or can find no one to enforce their decrees. However improbable these contingencies may
seem today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.

Id. at 570 (emphasis added).

Over two decades ago, this prospect was indeed far-fetched. But Stephen Colbert was fired

yesterday. John Koblin, CBS Canceling ‘Late Show with Stephen Colbert’ After Next Season,

N.Y. Times, Jul. 17, 2025. “Gee, Paramount, that’s an awfully nice merger you got there. Be a

shame if something happened to it….”28

28
Paramount probably does need the Skydance merger, as it has $15B in long-term debt and a credit rating of BBB-.
Fitch Downgrades Paramount's IDR to 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative, Mar. 6, 2024, https://www.fitchratings.com/re-
search/corporate-finance/fitch-downgrades-paramount-idr-to-bbb-outlook-negative-06-03-2024. Paramount TV is its
cash cow, generating 2/3 of its revenue and all of its profits last quarter. Earnings Press Release, Paramount, May 8,
2025, at https://ir.paramount.com/static-files/bc7fc848-1ba4-4dcc-b01a-f1ebfefbcb71. Colbert owned his time slot,
Jed Rosenzweig, Here Are Final Late Night Ratings for Q2 2025, LateNighter, Jul. 14, 2025, and the firing occurred
just days after Paramount settled a nuisance lawsuit filed by Trump, Brian Flood, CBS parent company sparks massive
outrage with Trump lawsuit settlement, Fox News, Jul. 7, 2025, for an insane $16 million. Benjamin Mullin, et al.,
Paramount to Pay Trump $16 Million to Settle ‘60 Minutes’ Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jul. 2, 2025. Trump’s FCC got
involved, lending support to the shakedown theory. FCC demands CBS News turn over ’60 Minutes’ interview amid
Trump lawsuit, Yonkers Observer, Jan.31, 2025 (various expert quotes).

18
 Dissenting voices, methodically silenced. This is what Fascism looks like. It’s staring us in

the face. This is real. This is now. America is bleeding out on a daily basis. We won’t get another

chance to do this right. That’s why I’m here … and there.

The defense of our Republic is not optional.

19