Centre for Conflict Resolution
Report Part Title: Uganda
Report Title: WAR AND PEACE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION
Report Author(s): DAWN NAGAR and FRITZ NGANJE
Centre for Conflict Resolution (2016)
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5. Uganda
President Yoweri Museveni’s 30-year rule in Uganda, with a population of 39 million, has been mixed.
His National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) has been credited with restoring stability, the
rule of law, and human rights in Uganda after 1986.
In the early days of his rule, Museveni was also able to rebuild Uganda’s economy and infrastructure, while
creating an enabling environment for civil society to flourish. However, according to critics, Museveni and the
NRM have since become an obstacle to peace and progress both in Uganda and in the wider Great Lakes
region. Similarly, his autocratic rule is based on a system of patronage that is dominated by the military. The
Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) continues to play a major role in society. It has special representation
in the Ugandan parliament, and coordinates a nation-wide agricultural development programme, Operation
Wealth Creation, which was launched by Museveni in July 2013. Uganda’s continued role in the AU Mission in
Somalia also reflects the dominance of the military in the country’s politics and governance. In addition to the
militarisation of society and the police, as well as government corruption, Museveni’s rule has also stoked
divisions among Uganda’s diverse ethnic groups and regions. These developments have contributed to the
president’s legitimacy and that of his NRM party being questioned. Museveni’s rule may have come to resemble
the autocracy of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko in the way that it identifies itself closely with the state. Museveni, as
did Mobutu, has also sought to use African tradition to legitimise his rule, and is thus comparable to the Zairian
autocrat in the way he manipulates foreign donors to garner support for his rule.
Museveni has also played a major role in the region, and Uganda’s foreign policy has largely been driven by his
personal decisions. Thus, Kampala has played the role of both “arsonist” and “fire-fighter” in the region. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) required Uganda to pay reparations to the DRC in a decision in 2005, and the
2002 final report of the United Nations panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo
accused both Kampala and Kigali of looting the DRC’s resources. 42 The alliance between Uganda and Rwanda fell
apart in the 1998–2003 phase of the war, leading to three military clashes in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000 in which
scores of Congolese were killed, 43 as well as resulting in violence between their local proxies in the DRC. In December
1999, Museveni attempted to play the role of peacemaker by bringing together several rebel factions in the DRC –
the Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (RCD-G), the Congolese Rally for Democracy–Kisangani (RDC-K), and
the Movement for the Liberation of Change (MLC) – in a bid to resolve their differences. Similarly, Museveni, while
chair of the ICGLR between January 2012 and January 2014, hosted talks in which M23 fighters eventually laid down
their arms. Since July 2015, the Ugandan leader has also chaired and hosted talks on behalf of the EAC between
Burundi’s government and groups that had opposed president Nkurinziza's third presidential term.
The February 2016 presidential election in Uganda should be viewed in the context of Museveni’s increasingly
autocratic rule. Eight opponents unsuccessfully ran against Museveni in the polls. Amama Mbabazi, who was a
trusted ally of Museveni’s for 40 years, was removed as prime minister in September 2014, allegedly due to his use
42 See International Court of Justice, “Armed Activities On The Territory Of The Congo (Democratic Republic Of The Congo V. Uganda”, 2005/26,
decided 19 December 2005; and UN Security Council Report, S/2002/1146, 15 October 2002, pp. 19–23.
43 See Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993
and June 2003, August 2010, pp. 189–190.
20 WAR AND PEACE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION
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of the position to mobilise support for his own political ambitions. Although Museveni won the election, the
credibility of the polls was questioned by domestic observers as well as Commonwealth and EU observers. In a
society in which dissent is sometimes criminalised, elections have degenerated into a ritual that serves only to
legitimise autocratic practices. The intimidation and harassment of Museveni’s opponents, notably the opposition
leader, Kizza Besigye, in the lead-up to and after the 2016 polls, confirmed these perceptions. Prospects for change
in Uganda thus appear bleak. The regime’s heavy-handed approach to dealing with dissent forecloses the possibility
of peaceful protests against Museveni’s government. With the president also demonstrating contempt for, and
refusing to negotiate with, other political actors, peaceful change has been made more difficult. The role of regional
and external actors in forestalling an imminent outbreak of violence in Uganda is thus critical. In particular, powerful
Western donors such as the US and Britain in their engagement with Museveni’s government, should prioritise the
promotion of democratic values in Uganda instead of simply following their parochial national interests.
Museveni has also used anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies to deflect attention from his domestic failings, and
clamped down harshly on dissent, particularly through harassing sections of the media. His framing of the LRA
rebellion in northern Uganda as an act of terrorism garnered him political support and military aid from the US
government. Although the war in northern Uganda has ended, the region remains marginalised, aggrieved, and
volatile. Museveni’s approach to governance reflects his predisposition to militarism. He came to power in 1986
through the barrel of the gun rather than through the ballot box. This militaristic tendency has not only shaped
the domestic identity of his regime, but also informed Uganda’s role in the Great Lakes. Museveni views the
region as a security threat to his regime, and engages with it as such. This has earned him a reputation among
critics as a regional bully who cannot be trusted to play a constructive role in addressing the challenges of the
region. Museveni has thus never fully been trusted by members of IGAD such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan
(which have their own narrow agendas as well) to play a neutral role in the search for peace in South Sudan
following the outbreak of civil war in that country in December 2013. Similarly, although he was initially
appointed by the EAC to mediate in the political crisis in Burundi, many critics pointed to Museveni’s own
governance deficiencies as denying him the credibility to lead this process.
From left: Dr Paul Omach, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda; Mr Paul Mulindwa,
Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Dr Pamela Khanakwa, Lecturer, Department of History, Makerere University.
WAR AND PEACE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 21
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