LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.

SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause the publication of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders, in the Official
Gazette. Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the necessity of the publication of the presidential
issuances which are of general application. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration/clarification
asserting that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances in question.
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is an indispensable requirement for their
effectivity despite the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.” The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided”
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
G.R. No. 80718
January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
CO URT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents.

Facts:
The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed on the tailoring shop owned by
the private respondents, causing injuries and death to Marissa Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled
that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to respondents. The
petitioners appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. A copy of the
decision of the CA was received by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, the petitioners asked the CA to extend the time
to file a motion for reconsideration. According to a previous case, Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. The petitioners contend that the case of Habaluyas could not be made binding because
it has not been published in the Official Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.

ISSUE:
Is publication in the Official Gazette required before SC decisions can become binding and
effective?

HELD:
No, publication is not required.
There is no law requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the SC particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of SC decisions and in
such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
People v. Que Po Lay
G.R. No. L-6791 | March 29, 1954 | 94 Phil. 640
Publication is an indispensable requirement before a law or regulation can take effect, especially if
it imposes a penalty.
Facts:
Appellant Que Po Lay possessed U.S. dollars, dollar checks, and money orders
(approximately $7,000) and was charged with failing to sell them to the Central Bank through its
agents within one day as required by Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank. Circular No. 20 was
issued in 1949, but it was not published in the Official Gazette until November 1951, which was
after the act or omission attributed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, fined ₱1,000 (with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency), and ordered to pay costs. He appealed on the ground that
Circular No. 20 had no binding effect at the time of his alleged violation because it had not yet
been published, and therefore he could not be penalized under it.

Issue:
WON publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective
and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

Ruling:
YES. As a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. Although Circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank which issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is,
about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly
its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the
Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its
violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange
in his possession thereof.
National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial
*G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 611
Ponente: Justice Renato C. Corona
Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) issued Circular No. 99-75, which set forth internal
guidelines for the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced (ACSR). Item 3 of the
circular limited eligible bidders to companies or corporations that directly use aluminum as raw
material in their industrial operations. Pinatubo Commercial, a trader in scrap materials, applied to
participate in the bidding but was disqualified under these rules. NPC reasoned that as a mere
trader and not an industrial end-user, Pinatubo did not meet the qualifications. In response,
Pinatubo filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to annul the
disqualification provisions of the circular on the grounds that they violated due process and equal
protection, unreasonably restrained trade, and were invalid for lack of publication. The RTC ruled
in favor of Pinatubo, declaring the contested provisions unconstitutional. NPC then elevated the
case to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
The primary issues were (1) whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 required publication before it could
take effect, and (2) whether the provisions limiting participation in the bidding process to industrial
end-users violated the principles of due process and equal protection.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that Circular No. 99-75 was an internal
administrative issuance intended solely to guide NPC’s personnel in conducting public biddings.
As such, it did not require publication to be effective. The Court emphasized that not all
administrative regulations need to be published—only those that affect the public at large. Since
the circular did not impose obligations or penalties on the general public but was merely an
internal guideline, the requirement of publication under Tañada v. Tuvera did not apply.
On the issue of due process and equal protection, the Court ruled that the limitation in the
circular was a reasonable classification. It served the legitimate government interest of ensuring
that scrap materials, which could be used for illegal purposes such as electricity theft, were sold
only to users with a direct and verifiable industrial need. The Court added that participation in
government bidding is not a right but a privilege. Hence, the government, through its agencies like
NPC, has the discretion to impose reasonable qualifications in order to protect public interest. The
classification made between industrial users and traders was found not to be arbitrary or
discriminatory, but rather in pursuit of a valid regulatory purpose.
Doctrine:
An administrative regulation that is purely internal in nature and intended only for the guidance of
officials within an agency does not require publication to be valid and effective. Additionally,
participation in public bidding is a privilege, not a right, and the government may set reasonable
classifications and qualifications for participants without violating the equal protection clause.
Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (G.R.
No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
Ponente: Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro

Facts:
Romulo Neri, then Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
and later CHED Chair, was invited to appear before three Senate committees—Blue Ribbon,
Trade & Commerce, and National Defense—to testify on the controversial ₱16-billion NBN-ZTE
broadband project. During his testimony on September 26, 2007, he disclosed an alleged ₱200
million bribery attempt by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos and stated that he had informed
President Arroyo, who instructed him not to accept it. When the Senate sought to probe further—
specifically whether the President followed up on the project—Neri invoked executive privilege, as
formally directed by Executive Secretary Ermita, stating that disclosing further facts would impair
diplomatic, military, and economic relations with China. Neri honored the privilege directive and did
not attend the November 20 hearing. The Senate then issued contempt proceedings and an arrest
warrant on January 30, 2008. Neri sought relief via certiorari, claiming grave abuse of discretion by
the Senate.

Issue:
Were the three questions regarding follow-up actions by the President covered by legitimate
executive privilege, and was the Senate’s issuance of a contempt order and arrest warrant for
Neri’s refusal to answer those questions valid?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, in a 9–6 decision, granted the petition. It held that Neri was properly
protected by executive privilege with respect to the three disputed questions because (1) the
Executive Secretary invoked privilege “by order of the President,” (2) the communications were
made between Neri—qualified as a close presidential adviser—and the President, and (3) the
Senate failed to establish a compelling public need to override the privilege. The Court held that
the legislative inquiry was of oversight (Article VI, Section 22), not "in aid of legislation" (Section
21), meaning the privilege presumption remained unrebutted. Consequently, the contempt order
and arrest warrant were void, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Reasoning:
The Court reaffirmed that executive privilege is an extraordinary power—limited to the President,
or to the Executive Secretary acting by explicit order of the President—and applies to
communications involving policy deliberations, diplomacy, or national security. Drawing from
Senate v. Ermita and U.S. jurisprudence like U.S. v. Nixon, the Court emphasized that the privilege
safeguards candid executive decision-making. Communications between the President and a
close adviser (like Neri) concerning the NBN-ZTE negotiations and related diplomatic concerns
are presumptively privileged. The Senate was unable to demonstrate a specific and critical
legislative need to override the privilege, especially since the questions focused on executive
actions rather than supporting the enactment of legislation. The Court further pointed out
procedural irregularities in the Senate’s contempt process—specifically, that the committees failed
to first rule on the privilege claim, the committees’ rules had not been duly published (Article VI,
Section 21), and the contempt resolution and arrest order lacked proper plenary authorization
under Committee Rules. All these procedural flaws, combined with the valid privilege invocation,
led the Court to void the contempt citation and arrest order.

Doctrine:
Executive privilege is a constitutionally recognized protection confined to communications in the
President’s highest functions—such as policy-making and foreign relations—made with close
advisers. Only the President (or the Executive Secretary by order) may invoke it, and it can only
be overridden by a demonstrable, compelling public interest. Legislative committees conducting
oversight inquiries cannot subvert this privilege absent specific justification, and must comply with
procedural safeguards, including duly published rules of procedure and proper authorization for
contempt or arrest orders.