ADR43
ADR43
By
2022E1R043
6th Semester
School of Law
Jammu, India
2025
Assignment: Subject Code
ASSIGNMENT
Total Marks 20
Email: [email protected]
Assignment Objectives:
The objective of this assignment is to deepen the understanding of ADR process i.e.
Arbitration, Conciliation, Mediation and Negotiation in resolving the disputes outside
the Court.
Assignment Instructions:
Group C: 2022E1R013-
2022E1R017
Group D: 2022E1R018-
2022E1R022
Group E: 2022E1R023-
2022E1R027
Group F: 2022E1R028-
2022E1R033
Group H: 2022E1R034-
2022E1R038
Group I: 2022E1R039-
2022E1R043
Group J: 2022E1R044-
2022E1R049
Group K: 2022E1R050-
2022E1R054
Group L: 2022E1R055-
2022E1R060
Thoroughly understand the assignment topic, conduct in-depth research from reliable
sources, and organize your work with clear structure (introduction, body, conclusion).
Apply legal concepts critically, cite all references accurately, and ensure originality.
Group Q. No. Question BL CO Marks
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Format Guidelines
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1. 5 line spacing in the entire document, including the title page, headings, and
references.
2. Header: Include a header as Assignment and Course Code in the top right corner
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bold and capitalized.
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bold for main headings (e.g., "Introduction") and italics for subheadings (e.g.,
"Methods").
7. Page Numbers: Page numbers should be placed in the center of footer of each
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8. Citations and References: Use a consistent APA citation style to cite references.
9. Figures and Tables: If you include figures or tables, provide clear labels and
captions. The figure number should be placed below the Figure as ―Figure 1:
Figure name‖ and for the tables, the table number must be mentioned above the
table as ―Table 1: Table name‖.
10. Appendices (if needed): Include appendices for supplementary materials, such as
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11. Submission Format: Submit your assignment in the soft copy format as PDF and
upload it on CAMU as per the submission deadline. Please ensure that the
assignment is renamed as Roll Number.
12. Proofreading and Editing: Carefully proofread and edit your assignment for
clarity, grammar, and spelling errors before submission.
13. Plagiarism: Plagiarism must be below 15 percent for the assignment submitted.
QUE.1-Discuss the relationship between ADR and access to justice in India. How does
ADR help in reducing the burden on courts while promoting participatory justice,
especially for marginalized communities?
Lok Adalats (People’s Courts): Statutory forums under the 1987 Act, Lok
Adalats dispose of cases by consent at low or no cost. They are routinely
convened (nationally and state‐wise) to settle both pending and pre-litigation
disputes in one day. They embrace “speedy, cost-effective justice,” especially for
minor civil, family, and criminal (compoundable) cases. For example, in 2024-
25 (up to Sept 2024) 5,944 Lok Adalat benches heard over 10.11 lakh cases, with
an additional 98,776 cases resolved by Permanent Lok Adalats (pre-litigation
bodies for public utilities) in the same period. Even larger numbers arise at the
national level: the Fourth National Lok Adalat of Dec 2024 alone settled 1.45
crore cases, a landmark effort that “promoted swift and cost-effective justice”
and significantly reduced backlog. By enabling voluntary settlement with
judicial oversight, Lok Adalats have become a proven tool for participatory
justice – literally “the people’s court” – and are widely used by marginalized
litigants who might otherwise languish in formal courts.
Gram Nyayalayas (Village Courts): Enacted in 2008 to bring courts closer to
villages, Gram Nyayalayas hear petty civil and criminal cases (penalties up to 2
years) via simplified procedures and mandatory conciliation. They are presided
over by a Nyayadhikari (a judicial magistrate) assisted by conciliators drawn
from the community, emphasizing reconciliation in the spirit of traditional
panchayat justice. The goal is to “provide access to justice at the doorstep” of
rural citizens. In practice, however, implementation has been slow: by 2019 only
about 204 such courts were active nationwide (far below the 2,500 targeted).
Recently, the Supreme Court and legal activists have pressed states to expedite
rollout. For instance, in mid-2024 the Jharkhand High Court inaugurated new
Gram Nyayalayas in rural blocks, “eliminating the need for people to visit”
distant courts. The Chief Justice of Jharkhand hailed this as a “significant step
towards providing quick justice to the public,” especially in districts with large
tribal and SC populations. Such examples illustrate Gram Nyayalayas’ promise
to decongest regular courts and empower marginalized communities. The SC
has reiterated that fully nationwide Gram Nyayalayas would “enhance access to
justice, reduce the burden on trial courts, and provide affordable justice at the
doorstep”.
Post-2015 Arbitration Reforms: Historically, arbitration in India was slow and
subject to heavy court interference. The 2015 and 2019 Amendments to the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (along with the Commercial Courts Act,
2015) ushered in modern ADR reforms. These reforms codified strict timelines
(e.g. awards in 12 months under Section 29A) and limited frivolous judicial
intervention. They added detailed “Schedules” specifying conflicts of interest
and disqualifications, and require arbitrators to make mandatory disclosures (Sec.
12). Courts are now directed to stay litigation where a valid arbitration clause
exists, and provisional orders/interim relief by tribunals were bolstered. On the
enforcement side, these amendments tightened grounds for challenge (e.g.
overruling “patent illegality” in foreign awards) and decoupled stay of execution
from setting-aside applications. While aimed primarily at commercial disputes,
these reforms also contribute to access to justice by offering faster, dedicated for
a for business conflicts and reinforcing party autonomy.
These ADR mechanisms have demonstrably reduced court backlogs and expanded
justice. National statistics highlight their impact: in 2024-25 alone (Apr–Sep), over 21
lakh cases were settled through Lok Adalats, and 3 lakh cases through Gram Nyayalayas
(2020–Oct 2024). Moreover, the government’s legal aid network (NALSA) supports
ADR by funding over ₹200 crore in 2024-25 and maintaining tens of thousands of panel
lawyers and para-legals for rural outreach. These volunteer judges and counsel often
accompany ADR drives (e.g. Lok Adalat camps) to help the poor negotiate disputes. By
resolving countless petty claims cheaply and informally, ADR allows underrepresented
groups – including women, tribals, and the poor – to participate in the justice system.
As one commentator notes, Lok Adalats “cater mainly to the poor,” making them
instrumental for their legal empowerment.
Case Studies: Beyond raw numbers, success stories abound. In Punjab and Haryana, for
example, daily Lok Adalats have resolved tens of thousands of family and land cases by
mutual consent. The “National Lok Adalat” held Dec 2024 resolved over 1.45 crore
disputes, many involving low-income litigants, without court hearings. In Jharkhand’s
Saraikela, a mobile “Justice on Wheels” court scheme (an extension of Gram Nyayalaya
principles) visits remote villages weekly to hear petty cases, yielding near-instant
settlements at village gatherings. Similarly, courts often collaborate with panchayats and
NGOs to organize community mediation sessions (e.g. environmental or consumer
disputes) under the ADR umbrella. These examples illustrate how ADR – from
institutional national drives to local village courts – effectively decentralizes justice. By
resolving disputes amicably, it not only lowers judicial backlog but also builds trust in a
participatory system of justice.
QUE.2- Critically assess the impact of the Supreme Court’s interpretation in TRF Ltd. v.
Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. and Perkins Eastman on the neutrality of arbitrators in
institutional and ad hoc arbitrations.
India’s Arbitration Act (1996) mandates that arbitrators be independent and impartial.
Sections 12–14 expressly require an arbitrator to disclose any relationship or interest
likely to affect neutrality, and prescribe immediate disqualification if a disqualifying
circumstance is present (the Fifth and Seventh Schedules enumerate such conflicts).
These mirror international norms: UNCITRAL’s Model Law and Code of Conduct, for
instance, define “impartiality” as the absence of bias or predisposition and
“independence” as freedom from external control. The IBA Guidelines and ICSID rules
likewise require arbitrators to disclose conflicts and remain unbiased. The Indian
Supreme Court has reinforced these principles in two recent landmark decisions:
• TRF Ltd. V. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd. (2017): In TRF, a sole arbitrator (a
former Railway official) who was statutorily ineligible under Section 12(5) had,
before being challenged, unilaterally named the replacement arbitrator. The SC
held that once an arbitrator becomes ineligible by operation of law, he loses the
power to appoint another arbitrator – regardless of whether the nominee appears
neutral. In other words, a tainted arbitrator’s mandate is void “de jure,” and any
appointment he attempts is invalid. This ruling closed a loophole: a party could
not escape the disqualification rules by having a proxy arbitrator (even an
otherwise eligible person) make the appointment. As one legal analysis notes,
TRF “strengthened the independence of arbitration” by ensuring that anyone
disqualified from serving cannot purport to influence the tribunal makeup.
Practically, TRF means that in ad hoc arbitrations under Section 11, parties must
carefully check each prospective arbitrator against the Fifth/Seventh Schedules.
If a contract or nomination inadvertently designates a disqualified arbitrator (e.g.
an ex-employee or counsel for a party), both that arbitrator and any appointee he
makes are nullified.
• Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2019): Perkins Eastman
involved an arbitration clause giving each party a shortlist of nominees but
ultimately allowing one party to select two arbitrators (including itself) without
joint consent. The Supreme Court emphatically held that “a party with an
interest in the dispute cannot unilaterally appoint an arbitrator,” since that would
corrupt the neutrality of the tribunal. It emphasized that both disputing sides
must have an equal right to approve arbitrator(s), a reflection of the fundamental
equality of parties. By prohibiting one-sided appointments, Perkins Eastman
upholds procedural fairness and prevents any party from dictating the tribunal’s
constitution. In effect, the Court invalidated any clause (or practice) under
Indian law where one party has unfettered appointment power. As commentators
observe, Perkins put an end to “the rampant practice of unilateral appointments”
and reaffirmed impartiality as essential to arbitration.
Impact on Institutional vs. Ad Hoc Arbitration: These rulings directly govern India-
seated arbitrations under the A\&C Act, whether ad hoc or administered. In pure ad hoc
cases (Section 11 petitions), the courts now strictly enforce TRF/Perkins: any nominee is
screened for independence, and any unilateral or procedurally improper appointment is
struck down. Many Indian institutions and arbitral centers have likewise taken note.
For example, domestic institutions increasingly require that each party nominate
arbitrators of its own choice (rather than one party naming the panel), or that
appointment be made by a neutral authority (e.g. the court or the Chief Justice). In
contrast, international institutions (ICC, LCIA, SIAC, etc.) typically have their own
nomination procedures that generally align with neutrality: e.g. ICC allows each party to
name an arbitrator and the two co-arbitrators select the presiding arbitrator, a built-in
check. ICSID arbitrations require each State party to appoint one arbitrator, with ICSID
appointing the chair, ensuring independence by design. Thus, Perkins/TRF had little
practical effect on foreign-seated or ICSID cases (where unilateral nomination is not the
norm), but they have driven Indian institutions to tighten domestic rules on arbitral
appointments.
Comparison with International Standards: On the merits, the Indian Supreme Court’s
insistence on impartiality mirrors global norms. UNCITRAL’s Code of Conduct, for
example, enshrines that an arbitrator must avoid conflicts and maintain an appearance of
neutrality, and it explicitly cites the IBA Guidelines as useful benchmarks. ICSID’s
Convention likewise mandates that arbitrators be independent of all parties. In that
sense, TRF and Perkins align with these principles: they simply put procedural teeth
behind impartiality by governing how arbitrators are chosen. International best practice
emphasizes disclosure and recusal, while the SC rulings go further by policing
appointment mechanics themselves. For instance, under the IBA Guidelines a nominee
might avoid disclosure only if no “justifiable doubts” arise; India’s Fifth/Seventh
Schedules codify many such categories. TRF enforces even the indirect consequence of
a conflict – not only must an arbitrator be unbiased, but if he is disqualified, his act of
naming any arbitrator taints the process. Perkins’ emphasis on party equality also
echoes the Model Law’s principle of equal treatment (Art. 18) and echoes arbitral rules
requiring consensus.
In summary, the TRF and Perkins Eastman rulings reinforce the core idea that tribunals
must be constituted without bias. They have significantly influenced domestic
arbitration practice by ensuring that only fully independent arbitrators (and no proxies of
conflicted persons) can serve, and by giving all parties an equal hand in appointments.
These outcomes are broadly consistent with international norms from ICSID and
UNCITRAL – where arbitrator impartiality is paramount – even as the Indian courts
have carved out specific doctrinal rules to plug loopholes in practice. The cumulative
effect is to bolster confidence in arbitration (both institutional and ad hoc) as a neutral
forum.
4.Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decisions in TRF and Perkins Eastman mark a progressive step
toward ensuring the neutrality and fairness of arbitration proceedings in India, aligning
with global best practices. While these rulings promote trust and integrity in the
arbitration system, especially protecting weaker parties, they also introduce uncertainty
and limitations on party autonomy, particularly in ad hoc arbitrations. The challenge now
lies in balancing neutrality with efficiency and flexibility, possibly through clearer
legislative standards and greater institutionalization of arbitration in India.