Italy and Tito s Yugoslavia in the Age of

International Detente Bucarelli - PDF Download

(2025)

[Link]
the-age-of-international-detente-bucarelli/

Visit [Link] today to download the complete set of

ebooks or textbooks
Here are some recommended products for you. Click the link to
download, or explore more at [Link]

Balkan Babel The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the

Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic 4th Edition Sabrina
Petra Ramet
[Link]
yugoslavia-from-the-death-of-tito-to-the-fall-of-milosevic-4th-
edition-sabrina-petra-ramet/

Break Up of Yugoslavia and International Law Studies in

International Law 1st Edition Peter Radan

[Link]
international-law-studies-in-international-law-1st-edition-peter-
radan/

The Prosecution of International Crimes A Critical Study

of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
1st Edition Madeleine Sann
[Link]
crimes-a-critical-study-of-the-international-tribunal-for-the-former-
yugoslavia-1st-edition-madeleine-sann/

Reclaiming Justice The International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia and Local Courts Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich

[Link]
tribunal-for-the-former-yugoslavia-and-local-courts-sanja-kutnjak-
ivkovich/
The Breakup of Yugoslavia Kate Transchel

[Link]
transchel/

Bonney s Gynaecological Surgery Eleventh Edition Tito

Lopes

[Link]
eleventh-edition-tito-lopes/

Energy Policies of IEA Countries Italy 2003 International

Energy Agency

[Link]
italy-2003-international-energy-agency/

The UN International Criminal Tribunals The Former

Yugoslavia Rwanda and Sierra Leone 1st Edition William A.
Schabas
[Link]
tribunals-the-former-yugoslavia-rwanda-and-sierra-leone-1st-edition-
william-a-schabas/

Fascist Spectacle The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini s

Italy Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi

[Link]
power-in-mussolini-s-italy-simonetta-falasca-zamponi/
Italy and Tito s Yugoslavia in the Age of International
Detente Bucarelli Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Bucarelli, Massimo(Editor);Micheletta, Luca(Editor);Monzali,
Luciano(Editor);Riccardi, Luca(Editor)
ISBN(s): 9783035265873, 3035265879
File Details: PDF, 3.08 MB
Year: 2016
Language: english
 38 I s s u e s

International
World War II and East-West confrontation redefined borders between
Italy and Yugoslavia, reshaped national frontiers and adversely affected

Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age

political relations. As a result, major quarrels and disputes arose over
territorial claims, demarcation of State boundaries, expulsion of national
minorities, and diverging visions on international and domestic politics.
It was only in the 1960s and 1970s, during the years of Détente, that
rapprochement between Rome and Belgrade became possible and

of International Détente
normalization of bilateral relations was attained. Long-lasting territorial
disputes, such as the Trieste question, were solved and bilateral
relationship greatly improved, so much so that Belgrade became an
important asset in Italy’s Balkan and Adriatic strategy, while Rome was a
sort of bridge between Socialist Yugoslavia and Western Europe.
This book is intended to shed light on the process of Italian-Yugoslav
normalization and rapprochement, which ultimately brought to the
Adriatic Détente. Based on a wide collection of primary sources and
documentary materials, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of
the history of the Adriatic region, a conflicted European space that had
been affected by territorial disputes and ethnic strife for decades during
the 20th century.

M. Bucarelli, L. Micheletta,
L. Monzali & L. Riccardi (eds.)
Massimo Bucarelli, Luca Micheletta,
Massimo Bucarelli teaches History of International Relations and
Diplomatic History at the Department of History, Society and Human Luciano Monzali & Luca Riccardi (eds.)
Studies, at the University of Salento (Lecce).
Luciano Monzali is Associate Professor of History of International
Relations at the Political Sciences Department in the University of Bari Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in
“Aldo Moro”.
Luca Micheletta is Associate Professor of History of International
the Age of International Détente
Relations at the University of Rome “Sapienza”.
Luca Riccardi is Full Professor of History of International Relations at
the University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale.
P.I.E. Peter Lang

P.I.E. Peter Lang

ISBN 978-2-87574-313-8

P.I.E. Peter Lang,

[Link]
Brussels
 38 I s s u e s

International
World War II and East-West confrontation redefined borders between
Italy and Yugoslavia, reshaped national frontiers and adversely affected

Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age

political relations. As a result, major quarrels and disputes arose over
territorial claims, demarcation of State boundaries, expulsion of national
minorities, and diverging visions on international and domestic politics.
It was only in the 1960s and 1970s, during the years of Détente, that
rapprochement between Rome and Belgrade became possible and

of International Détente
normalization of bilateral relations was attained. Long-lasting territorial
disputes, such as the Trieste question, were solved and bilateral
relationship greatly improved, so much so that Belgrade became an
important asset in Italy’s Balkan and Adriatic strategy, while Rome was a
sort of bridge between Socialist Yugoslavia and Western Europe.
This book is intended to shed light on the process of Italian-Yugoslav
normalization and rapprochement, which ultimately brought to the
Adriatic Détente. Based on a wide collection of primary sources and
documentary materials, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of
the history of the Adriatic region, a conflicted European space that had
been affected by territorial disputes and ethnic strife for decades during
the 20th century.

M. Bucarelli, L. Micheletta,
L. Monzali & L. Riccardi (eds.)
Massimo Bucarelli, Luca Micheletta,
Massimo Bucarelli teaches History of International Relations and
Diplomatic History at the Department of History, Society and Human Luciano Monzali & Luca Riccardi (eds.)
Studies, at the University of Salento (Lecce).
Luciano Monzali is Associate Professor of History of International
Relations at the Political Sciences Department in the University of Bari Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in
“Aldo Moro”.
Luca Micheletta is Associate Professor of History of International
the Age of International Détente
Relations at the University of Rome “Sapienza”.
Luca Riccardi is Full Professor of History of International Relations at
the University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale.
P.I.E. Peter Lang

P.I.E. Peter Lang

ISBN 978-2-87574-313-8

P.I.E. Peter Lang,

[Link]
Brussels
 Italy and Tito’s
Yugoslavia in the Age
of International Détente

P.I.E. Peter Lang

Bruxelles · Bern · Berlin · Frankfurt am Main · New York · Oxford · Wien
 Massimo Bucarelli, Luca Micheletta,
Luciano Monzali and Luca Riccardi (eds.)

Italy and Tito’s

Yugoslavia in the Age
of International Détente

International Issues
Vol. 38
This book has been published thanks to the financial support of : Dipartimento di
Storia, Società e Studi sull’Uomo (Università del Salento, Lecce); Dipartimento di
Scienze Politiche (“Sapienza” Università di Roma); Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche
(Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro”).

This publication has been peer-reviewed.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, microfilm
or any other means, without prior written permission from the publisher. All rights
reserved.

© P.I.E. Peter Lang s.a.

éditions scientifiques internationales
Brussels, 2016
1 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
pie@[Link]; [Link]

ISSN 2030-3688
ISBN 978-2-87574-313-8
eISBN 978-3-0352-6587-3
D/2016/5678/13

Printed in Germany

CIP available from the British Library, UK and from the Library of Congress, USA.

“Die Deutsche National Bibliothek” lists this publication in the “Deutsche Nationalbibliografie”;
detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at [Link]
 Table of Contents

Introduction............................................................................................. 9
List of Archives, Fonds, Collections of Documents
and Abbreviations................................................................................. 15

Section I: The International Context

From London to Osimo. American Attitude to Yugoslav-Italian
Settlement of the Trieste Question....................................................... 23
Ivan Laković
The Soviet Union and Yugoslav-Italian Détente (1968-1973)........... 37
Aleksandar Životić
French Diplomacy and the Road to the Osimo Agreements ............ 49
Stanislav Sretenović
Great Britain and the Italian-Yugoslav Relations in the 1970s........ 75
Gorazd Bajc
Romania and the Rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia.... 99
Alberto Basciani
Italy and Albania in the Era of Détente. A Tacit Alliance............... 115
Luca Micheletta

Section II: The Bilateral Dimension

A Mistaken History? A Survey of the Short Century
of Italian-Yugoslav Relations............................................................. 133
Raoul Pupo
Italian Foreign Policy in the Years of Détente. Ideas
and Actions of Amintore Fanfani and Aldo Moro............................ 159
Luca Riccardi
Aldo Moro, Italian Ostpolitik and Relations with Yugoslavia........ 199
Luciano Monzali

7
Détente in the Adriatic. Italian Foreign Policy
and the Road to the Osimo Treaty..................................................... 217
Massimo Bucarelli
A Difficult Reconciliation on the Adriatic. The Yugoslav
Road to the Osimo Agreements of 1975............................................ 249
Saša Mišić

Section III: The Local Reactions

The Contribution of Slovenia to the Osimo Treaty.......................... 285
Viljenka Škorjanec
Croatia and Italian-Yugoslav Relations. The Issues of
Demarcation Line, Minority and Property Rights (1943-1983)..... 299
Darko Dukovski
The Italian Communist Party’s Policy on Trieste
as Viewed by Vittorio Vidali (1954-1975).......................................... 323
Patrick Karlsen
Imperfect Normalization. The Political Repercussions
of the Treaty of Osimo........................................................................ 343
Diego D’Amelio
Resisting Détente. The Associative Network
and the Osimo Treaty......................................................................... 367
Fabio Capano

Biographical Notes of Authors........................................................... 397

Index of Names.................................................................................... 401

8
 Introduction

After the Second World War, political and diplomatic relations

between Italy and Yugoslavia were characterized by misunderstandings,
polemics and hostility, which were mainly, though not exclusively, due to
the Trieste question, a territorial dispute that had divided the two Adriatic
countries for decades. After Italy’s defeat in the Second World War and
Yugoslavia’s attempt to take possession of Trieste and most of Venezia
Giulia, the Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 assigned the whole Italian
territory to the east of the Tarvisio-Monfalcone line to Yugoslavia, with
the exception of a narrow coastal belt which included Trieste (Zone A),
occupied by the Anglo-Americans, and Koper (Zone B), under Yugoslav
occupation. Under the Peace Treaty this coastal area was envisaged as a
buffer state, the Free Territory of Trieste, which was to be formally built
through the appointment of a governor by the UN Security Council.
As a consequence of the war, Italy passed from the status of an
imperial power to that of a mere object of international policy, searching
in vain to influence the fate of the border areas. Instead, Yugoslavia was
in a position of strength. As a victorious country that had been attacked
by Italy, Yugoslavia could legitimately sue for reparations, and it would
try to devise a grand foreign policy design to create a regional scenario
which would avert the danger of finding itself encircled by hostile powers
one more time in the post-war period. However, the division of Europe
into opposing political and ideological blocs made the establishment of
FTT impossible. Cold War and bipolar logic turned the Trieste question
from a local problem into the Adriatic version of the Iron Curtain. In the
light of containment policy adopted by the US government in response
to the power policy of the Soviets and to the expansion of the communist
movement, the defense of Trieste took on a new importance: the Adriatic
city became a sort of a Western shield intended to contain any communist
infiltration into Northern Italy. It was for this purpose that the governments
in London and Washington postponed the appointment of the governor of
the FTT by the UN and preferred to wait for an agreement between Rome
and Belgrade, a hypothesis which was virtually impossible at that time.
However, a few months after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, a
new variable was added to the already complicated framework of Italian-
Yugoslav relations: during 1948 a political, more than ideological, breakup
occurred within the communist world. Following the Tito – Stalin split,
Yugoslavia moved away from the Soviet orbit and subsequently closer

9
Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente

to the Western bloc, which from that moment became the main source of
economic and military aid to Tito’s regime. The realignment of Yugoslav
policy affected the evolution of the Trieste question. Given the importance
of Belgrade for the political and military strategies of Washington
and London and due to the impossibility to create the FTT because
of unbridgeable differences between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Anglo-
Americans favored a compromise: the London Memorandum of 5 October
1954. By the terms of the agreement, Italian officials replaced British and
American authorities in the administration of Zone A of the FTT, while in
Zone B Yugoslav military administration had to be replaced with a civil
administration. It was the de facto partition of the FTT, which was intended
to eliminate a dispute considered harmful for the Western bloc. Despite the
normalization of the bilateral relations that followed the signature of the
Memorandum, Italy and Yugoslavia failed to establish an atmosphere of
cordiality and friendly collaboration essential for the solution of the Trieste
question. The government in Belgrade expected Italy to formally recognize
the extension of Yugoslav sovereignty over Zone B of the still-born FTT.
Italy’s government, instead, reaffirmed the practical and provisional nature
of the Memorandum, aiming at launching new negotiations in order to get
further territorial acquisitions in addition to Trieste and Zone A.
It was only due to crucial domestic changes in Italian politics and to
dramatic international events in Eastern Europe during the 1960s that the
Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement, which led to the settlement of the Trieste
question in 1975, became possible. Following the formation of a center-left
cabinet in Italy in 1963 – a coalition consisting of Christian Democratic
Party and Socialist Party – Italy and Yugoslavia made a new effort to break
the deadlock reached not just in the solution of the territorial dispute, but also
in their political collaboration on the international stage. As a consequence
of the violent solution to the communist crisis in Czechoslovakia and
to the Prague Spring of 1968, the center-left government in Rome was
increasingly interested in preserving and consolidating the role of Tito’s
Yugoslavia as a necessary territorial and ideological buffer between Italy
and countries of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet aggression to Czechoslovakia and
the enunciation of the “Brežnev doctrine” put the Belgrade government on
alert as it was concerned about the possible application of this doctrine
in the case of Yugoslavia, which was struggling with the re-emergence
of national and internal problems. Until then, Tito had been able to
maintain an independent policy between the blocs, due to the special
relationship with the West and the parallel rapprochement with the East
that followed Stalin’s death, also opening to economically underdeveloped
but politically important countries of the “Third world”. However, all of
these accomplishments were not enough to keep the country out of a major
international crisis.

10
 Introduction

Facing the instability of the neighboring Yugoslav Federation, Italy

was obviously concerned about the possibility of seeing Warsaw Pact
troops enter Yugoslav territory under the “Brežnev doctrine” and of
finding itself directly neighboring the Soviet bloc, bringing again the
Iron Curtain near Gorizia and Trieste. As for the bilateral dimension of
Italian-Yugoslav relations, the center-left leaders were convinced that
it was impossible to modify the territorial settlement established by the
London Memorandum. The overall situation created by the Memorandum
was supposed to be respected without bringing in any changes. The
missing step for stabilization of the border was the transformation of
the demarcation line between Zone A and Zone B of the unborn FTT
into a state borderline. This solution had to be presented to Italy’s public
opinion as a final agreement that would lead to territorial benefits such as
the Zone A with Trieste which the Peace Treaty of 1947 had left outside
of the national borders as well as political and economic benefits through
the revival of the Italian-Yugoslav friendship.
Also Tito and his entourage were interested in settling the long
standing dispute with Italy and favoring a sort of Adriatic Détente. At
that time, Yugoslavia was facing serious internal problems; nationalistic
ideas and ethnic divisions surfaced again inside the country and exposed
the political weakness of the Federation. Political instability was also
exacerbated by economic difficulties caused by the early failures of the
Yugoslav socio-economic model that had been based on self-management
and local autonomies. The Yugoslav road to socialism ended up deepening
economic differences and political divisions between Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia and the other Yugoslav Republics. Between 1969 and 1971,
growing domestic dissensions shook up the internal cohesion of the
country to the point that the affirmation and development of Yugoslavia
as a socialist regime seemed to be called into question. Tito and his closest
associates, fearing the re-emergence of internal national conflicts, wanted
at least the Adriatic border to be formally recognized and pressed for the
quick closure of the territorial issue with the hope to regain Slovenian and
Croatian support, increasingly uncertain and wavering.
The Osimo agreements had a positive impact on political and economic
interests of both Italy and Yugoslavia, and contributed to greatly improve
bilateral relations between Rome and Belgrade. For the first time in the
history of Italian-Yugoslav relations, a true friendship was attained, followed
by several important economic, commercial and financial agreements.
As a consequence of the Adriatic détente, it became customary to define
Italian-Yugoslav relations as a model of peaceful cooperation between two
countries that were governed by different social and political systems and
belonged to the same geographical area. Furthermore, the Italian-Yugoslav
border was presented as the most open border in the world. The presence of

11
Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente

an Italian national minority on Yugoslav territory was no longer considered

a source of tension and worries; rather, it was publicly portrayed as a
political opportunity and a real bridge between the two peoples.
The settlement of the Trieste question and the normalization of bilateral
relationship were also crucial factors in the making of the foreign policies
of both countries. For Rome, overcoming the territorial and political
disputes with Yugoslavia strengthened Italy’s international role, making
it more autonomous. For Belgrade, the Italian acceptance of the existence
of Communist Yugoslavia had a profound impact on the stability of Tito’s
regime, undercutting external support to anticommunist opposition. Italy
and Yugoslavia started playing a crucial role for the achievement of their
respective international goals. Indeed, Belgrade became an important
asset in Italy’s Balkan and Adriatic strategy, while Rome was a sort of
bridge between Socialist Yugoslavia and Western Europe.
This book is intended to shed light on the process of Italian-Yugoslav
normalization and rapprochement, which ultimately brought to the Osimo
agreements of 1975. This volume is based on a wide collection of primary
sources and includes relevant scholarly literature on the subject. It aims to
contribute to a better understanding of the history of the Adriatic region,
a conflicted European space that had been affected by border disputes and
ethnic strife for decades during the 20th century. As it has been recalled,
the settlements after the Second World War, as well as the Cold War,
redefined the borders and reshaped the national frontiers between Italy and
Yugoslavia; as a result, major quarrels and disputes arose over territorial
claims, demarcation of State borders, national minorities, expulsion of
ethnic groups and other acts of violence committed by members of one
national group against members of another.
Thus, the editors of this volume have decided to focus not only on
the bilateral and diplomatic dimensions of the Adriatic question and
détente, but also on the different local reactions and perceptions inside
Italy and Yugoslavia, among political parties, public opinions and ethnic
groups. Italy and Yugoslavia were both fragile countries, economically
weak and with instable domestic political situation. Italy’s ruling party,
the Christian Democratic Party, had to face tough far left and far right
opposition. This was led by the Communist Party, which was the
strongest in Western Europe, as well as by Movimento Sociale Italiano,
seen as the principal extreme right party, and neo-fascist party in Italy.
Likewise, Tito’s communist regime had to rule a country deeply divided
in conflicting ethnic groups, and the political opposition was lead both
by the Catholic Church and nationalist movements. Even though they
had been gruesomely crushed and silenced after the War, they had not
disappeared. Thus, this project not only explores bilateral affairs but also
evaluates the connection between political decisions on a national scale

12
 Introduction

and their consequences on a regional and international level in order to

provide the reader a better understanding of regional conflicts and their
solutions inside the Adriatic region.
Moreover, this volume explores the views and strategies of both eastern
and western powers toward the region in order to illuminate the broader
international political context within which Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement
and détente took place. It suggests that Italy’s and Yugoslavia’s foreign
policies during the Cold War held significant similarities. They were both
positioned at the borderlines of the two blocs and such strategic positions
enhanced their political importance for the United States and the Soviet
Union. Both Rome and Belgrade tried to exploit their position to develop
an international policy in search of partial autonomy and tried to play
a role as mediator between the blocs. While Italian-Yugoslav détente
deeply affected Italian and Yugoslav foreign policies and resulted in the
solution of the long standing territorial dispute over Trieste and Istria, it
also significantly affected the lives of their local communities across the
Adriatic border. Indeed, the rapprochement between Rome and Belgrade
was a turning point in the recent history of the Adriatic region. From that
moment, Italy and Yugoslavia inaugurated a strategy of close political,
economic and cultural cooperation which resulted in great mutual
advantage even after the collapse of the Yugoslav State.

13
 List of Archives, Fonds, Collections
of Documents and Abbreviations

AAPBD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland
AC Archivio Coloni
ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma
ADC Archivio Democrazia Cristiana
AFG Archivio Storico Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Roma
AFMFA Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affaires,
La Courneuve
AJ Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd
AMG Allied Military Government
AMIP Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva inostranih poslova
Srbije, Beograd
ANIC Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale, Bucureşti
ANII Associazione Nazionale Italia Irredenta
ANVGD Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia
AP Atti parlamentari
APC Archivio Partito comunista italiano
APR Arhiv Predsenika Republike
ASC Archivio Storico Camera dei Deputati, Roma
ASL Archivio Storico Luigi Sturzo, Roma
ASMAE Archivio Storico Diplomatico Ministero Affari Esteri
Italiano, Roma
ASR Archivio Storico del Senato della Repubblica, Roma
AST Archivio di Stato, Trieste
AT Archivio Tombesi
AVNOJ Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja
Jugoslavije
AUS Archivio Ugo Spirito, Roma
AVŠ Personal Archive of Viljenka Škorjanec
AVV Archivio Vittorio Vidali

15
Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente

CAB Cabinet Office

CB Carte Berlinguer
CFPF Central Foreign Policy Files
CK Centralni Komitet
CK KPH Centralni komitet Komunističke partije Hrvatske
CK SKH Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Hrvatske
CK SKJ Fond 507/ Arhiv Centralnog Komiteta Saveza
Komunista Jugoslavije
CM Papers of Aldo Moro
CNC National Centre for the Coordination of the
Committees for the Defense of the Zone B and Istria
CNL Comitato Liberazione Nazionale
CO Country Files
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPR Cabinet of the President of the Republic
CPSI Carte Partito Socialista Italiano
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CREST CIA Records Search Tool
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas
DC Democrazia Cristiana
DEFE Ministry of Defense
DF Diario di Amintore Fanfani
DGAP Direzione Generale Affari Politici
DDI I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
DPS Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza
DT Archivio Diocesi di Trieste
EESD Eastern European and Soviet Department
ECM European Common Market
EDC European Defense Community
EEC European Economic Community
FBIS American Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLP Fondo Luigi Papo
FN Fondazione Nenni, Roma

16
 List of Archives, Fonds, Collections of Documents and Abbreviations

FNRJ Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija

FO Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
FSEA Federal Secretariat of External Affairs
FT Fondazione Turati, Firenze
FTT Free Territory of Trieste
FUCI Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana
GAB Gabinetto
GNOR Gradski narodni odbor Rijeka 1945-1947
GRDS General Records of the Department of State
HR-DAPA Državni Arhiv u Pazinu
HR-DARI Državni Arhiv u Rijeci
IRSMLFVG Archivio Istituto Regionale per la Storia del
Movimento di Liberazione nel Friuli Venezia Giulia,
Trieste
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KMOV Fond 507/ IX Komisija za Međunarodne Odnose i Veze
KMJ Fond 836 Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije
KNO Kotarski narodni odbor
KPJ Komunistička partija Jugoslavije
KPR Fond 837 Kancelarija Predsednika Republike
LC Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
LMOU London Memorandum of Understanding
LN Archivio Lega Nazionale, Trieste
MA Military Archive of Armed Forces of Serbia
MAE Ministero degli Affari Esteri
MD Manuscript Division
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI Ministero dell’Interno
NARA National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park (MD)
NSC National Security Council Files
OG Official Gazette
OMPP Personal Papers of Ottone Mattei
ONOI Oblasni narodni odbor za Istru

17
Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente

OT Osimo Treaty
PA Political archive
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano
PCM Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
PCTT Partito Comunista del Territorio Libero di Trieste
PS Permanent Secretary
PUS Permanent Under Secretary
RD Research Department
RG Record Group
SFRJ Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija
SHS Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci
SKJ Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije
SSFA Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs
SSRNH Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Hrvatske
TNA The National Archives, Kew-London (UK)
TP 1947 Paris Peace Treaty
UA Archival Unit
UCD Ufficio del Consigliere Diplomatico
UI Archivio Unione degli Istriani
UKDEL NATO UK Delegation to NATO Brussels
UZC Archivio Ufficio Zone di Confine
VIRI 23 Škorjanec, Viljenka, Osimski pogajalski proces. I.
Del: Uvodna sinteza pogajanj; II. Del: Diplomatska
pogajanja 1973-1974, Viri No. 23, Ljubljana:
Arhivsko društvo Slovenije – Arhiv Republike
Slovenje, 2006
VIRI 24 Škorjanec, Viljenka, Osimski pogajalski proces. III.
Del: Od Strmola do Osima 1974-1975, Viri No. 24,
Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije – Arhiv
Republike Slovenje, 2007
VIRI 25 Škorjanec, Viljenka, Osimski pogajalski proces. IV.
Del: Jugoslovansko-italijanski odnosi po Osimu
1975-1980, Viri No. 25, Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo
Slovenije – Arhiv Republike Slovenje, 2008
VUJA Vojna Uprava Jugoslavenske Armije
WED Western European Department

18
Other documents randomly have
different content
 KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was your office in the SS?
KÖRNER: I never held any office in the SS, neither was I in
charge of an SS formation. I was just a member of the SS.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you not Obergruppenführer?
KÖRNER: Yes, I was an SS-Obergruppenführer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to these unauthorized
concentration camps, you were asked who set them up, and I do not
think you answered. Will you tell us about who set up these
concentration camps?
KÖRNER: I remember two camps. In the case of one, I know for
certain it was Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Gruppenführer of what?
KÖRNER: SA-Gruppenführer Heines, in Breslau.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the other?
KÖRNER: I cannot say exactly. I believe it was Karpfenstein, but I
am not sure of it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was he?
KÖRNER: Karpfenstein was Gauleiter in Stettin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Gauleiter was a Party official?
KÖRNER: Yes, he was a Party official.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the concentration camps were
designed to take care of not only enemies of the State but enemies
of the Party, were they not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Prime Minister of Prussia was the
Chief of the Secret State Police?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in his absence the State Secretary
of the State Ministry was to act as Chief of the Secret State Police?
KÖRNER: No, that was Diels.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that not the law, whatever was
done about it? Did you not know that that was the law under which
the Secret State Police was set up, Section 1, Paragraph 2?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember that law any more. I no longer
know the details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know the law of 30 November
1933? You do not know the law under which you were operating?
KÖRNER: I do not remember that law now. I would have to see it
again.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what was wrong with these
concentration camps that they had to be closed down?
KÖRNER: These unauthorized concentration camps had been
established without permission of the then Prussian Prime Minister
and for that reason he prohibited them immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the only reason, that they were
set up without this authority?
KÖRNER: I believe so; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he had them stopped immediately?
KÖRNER: Stopped; yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring did not tolerate concentration
camps that were not under his control and the Führer backed him up
in it, is that right?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, from time to time complaints came
to you about the treatment of people in concentration camps, during
all the time you were with Göring, did they not?
KÖRNER: Yes, there were frequent complaints.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did they complain of?
KÖRNER: Various things.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Tell the Tribunal what the complaints
were with which you had to deal.
KÖRNER: Well, mostly from relatives of the people taken to
concentration camps whose release was applied for; or complaints
that these people had been taken to a concentration camp without
reason.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, that they were innocent people,
innocent of any offense?
KÖRNER: The relatives asserted this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you do anything to get them
released from concentration camps?
KÖRNER: The Reich Marshal had ordered that all complaints
were to be replied to. Every case was followed up at once.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you find that many of these
people were innocent, or did you find that they were guilty?
KÖRNER: If anybody was found to have been wrongly taken to a
concentration camp he was released immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And to whom was the communication
given, that he had been found innocent and was to be released from
the concentration camp?
KÖRNER: It was given to the Secret State Police.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: To whom at the Secret State Police?
Who was the man you communicated with?
KÖRNER: I cannot name the individual who dealt with these
matters. The chief, as far as I remember, was first Heydrich and then
Kaltenbrunner or Müller.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was on good terms with all of
those, was he not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well acquainted with all of those men?
KÖRNER: Of course.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you say that Göring obtained
the release of people from concentration camps, are you talking
about just one or two cases or did he obtain the release of a good
many people?
KÖRNER: In the course of the years, there were naturally several
cases.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What do you mean by “several”?
KÖRNER: Well, I cannot give the number now, but there were
quite a lot of releases.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you find any where the people were
guilty when you investigated?
KÖRNER: If they could not be released, then they were guilty
somehow.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who decided that?
KÖRNER: That, as far as I know, was decided by the chief men
of the Secret State Police.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, then, what did you do in
requesting their release? Did you advise the Secret State Police that
you disagreed with their conclusion that the man was guilty, or did
Göring simply order the man to be released or request his release?
KÖRNER: No, they were told the exact reason why the man
should be released.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know of any instance in which
Göring requested the release of a person from a concentration
camp, where it was not granted?
KÖRNER: I cannot say that now. I have to think it over.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot recall any today, can you, in
which Göring’s word requesting a release was not honored?
KÖRNER: At the moment I cannot remember any particular case.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were put in
concentration camps as a result of the Röhm revolt?
KÖRNER: That I cannot say either.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How many people were killed as a result
of it?
KÖRNER: I cannot say from memory. As far as I know, the
figures were published at the time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, would it be a couple of hundred
people that were killed for it?
 KÖRNER: I should not like to tie myself to a figure, because I
may be wrong.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was a very large number of
people was it not?
KÖRNER: No, I am sure it was not a very large number.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Give a figure.
KÖRNER: The number was published at the time. This could still
be checked.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, why did the Reich Marshal want
Hitler to stop punishing the people who had been a party to the
Röhm revolt?
KÖRNER: I did not quite understand the question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your testimony to be that
the Reich Marshal went to Hitler at some time and wanted this
campaign against people who were in the Röhm revolt to be
stopped. And I want to know why he wanted it stopped?
KÖRNER: In order to prevent innocent people being involved.
Only the really guilty were to be caught and punished accordingly. It
was clear that someone or other might seize this opportunity to take
personal revenge and do away with his enemy, and in order to
prevent this the action should be stopped immediately and only
ordinary courts should deal with the matter.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was in charge of the selection of
the people who were shot or otherwise killed as a result of the Röhm
revolt?
KÖRNER: The Führer himself.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Reich Marshal had sufficient
influence to stop that immediately when he complained?
KÖRNER: At that time, yes, the Reich Marshal definitely had
sufficient influence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In connection with this Four Year Plan
you said that it was its function to regulate the confusion in the labor
market?
 KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the Reich Marshal
at many meetings, did you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And was not one of your functions to get
prisoners of war to work in the armament industry and other
industries that needed labor?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never had anything to do with that?
KÖRNER: No. The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor of course applied for prisoners of war for labor.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You attended many meetings when that
was discussed, did you not?
KÖRNER: I cannot recall that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you report to the Reich Marshal what
happened at those meetings?
KÖRNER: When questions of a general nature were discussed, a
report was made and submitted to the Reich Marshal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were a member of the Central
Planning Board, were you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were representing the Reich
Marshal on that Board?
KÖRNER: No. I did not represent the Reich Marshal there. It was
a board of three men—Minister Speer, Field Marshal Milch and
myself. The Central Planning Board was set up in the spring of 1942.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you?
KÖRNER: The three of us were appointed to the Central Planning
Board.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who appointed you?
KÖRNER: As far as I remember, Göring.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you reported to him, did you not,
what occurred from time to time?
KÖRNER: The Central Planning Board was merely an office for
the distribution of raw materials. We usually met every 3 months in
order to fix the quotas for the following quarter. Previously the office
of the Four Year Plan, in co-operation with the Minister of
Economics, handled the distribution and, from the spring of 1942 on,
the Central Planning Board handled it in the interests of armament.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, do you want us to understand that
the Central Planning Board only met every 3 months?
KÖRNER: Yes, approximately. In very rare cases another meeting
was called, especially if there were urgent problems to be solved. I
remember, for instance, the case when it was said that agriculture
was not getting enough nitrogen and that if the nitrogen quota were
too small, agricultural production would suffer. In view of this State
Secretary Backe asked for a meeting to be called and this took place
at the Central Planning Board office.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would you testify that Sauckel did not
report to the Central Planning Board, at a meeting at which you
were present, that out of all the labor that came to Germany only
200,000 came voluntarily—out of the millions who came only
200,000 came voluntarily?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you say that the Central Planning
Board never discussed labor questions?
KÖRNER: At the Central Planning Board only demands for labor
were submitted, and the quota holders to whom raw materials were
allocated also demanded the necessary labor. Only very rough
figures were given and then passed on to the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about prisoners of war?
KÖRNER: With these the Central Planning Board was not at all
concerned, as it was given only rough figures. For instance, if some
branch of industry needed so many thousand workers, they were
asked for.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What about concentration camp labor?
KÖRNER: The distribution of labor was dealt with by the labor
exchanges. The Central Planning Board had nothing to do with it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are you familiar with a letter dated 9
March 1944, reciting that 36,000 concentration camp prisoners were
now being used and wanting an increase to 90,000?
KÖRNER: I do not know about these demands.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the use of Russian
prisoners of war in manning anti-aircraft guns?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After Göring closed the unauthorized
concentration camps, did you know that the number of
concentration camps increased very greatly in Germany?
KÖRNER: This I do not know. What happened after they were
turned over to Himmler is beyond my knowledge. It may be that a
large number of concentration camps was then set up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How do you come to know about
Göring’s relations with Himmler? Did he tell you?
KÖRNER: Göring once spoke about it, and I concluded that the
relations were not at all good.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know about the appointment of
Kaltenbrunner as head of the Austrian State Police after the
Anschluss?
KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you know who obtained that
appointment for Kaltenbrunner?
KÖRNER: No, I have no idea.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you say that Göring and you were
in Munich on the night or nights of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Goebbels also there?
 KÖRNER: No.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Go ahead; do you want to say
something else?
KÖRNER: On 9 November we traveled from Munich to Berlin, so
Goebbels could not be there then.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why could he not be there?
KÖRNER: Because the Reich Marshal, with his entourage,
traveled in his train to Berlin.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I mean, did you know that Goebbels was
in Munich before these uprisings?
KÖRNER: Yes, that I heard afterwards—that Goebbels was in
Munich. All National Socialist leaders were in Munich because 9
November was a day when all of them met.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Goebbels spoke in Munich on the
Jewish question that night, did he not?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I do not remember the speech.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was there to attend the meeting
of the National Socialist leaders, was he not?
KÖRNER: Yes, on 9 November the entire leadership of the
National Socialist Party met in Munich. It was an anniversary
meeting.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring attended regularly?
KÖRNER: Of course he did.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did?
KÖRNER: I did also.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Hess attended?
KÖRNER: As I said, all National Socialist leaders always attended
if they possibly could. Nobody ever failed to attend unless he were
ill, or prevented by official duties.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which of the defendants in the dock
attended those meetings? Ribbentrop, of course?
KÖRNER: Ribbentrop, certainly.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Keitel?
KÖRNER: I assume so.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Kaltenbrunner?
KÖRNER: I never saw Kaltenbrunner, because Kaltenbrunner held
a public post only during the latter years, and during these years the
meetings were not as regular as before.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Rosenberg, of course, was there?
KÖRNER: Of course, as I said before.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Frank and Frick?
KÖRNER: Certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Streicher?
KÖRNER: Not during the latter years, I do not think so; but
previously he attended.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was that, during the latter years?
KÖRNER: As far as I know, Streicher did not attend during the
latter years, but I do not know for certain.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He attended in November 1938 when
the anti-Jewish uprisings took place, did he not?
KÖRNER: I believe so, because at that time Streicher was still in
Nuremberg.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active, was he not?
KÖRNER: I did not understand the question quite correctly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was very active in the anti-Jewish
matters, was he not?
KÖRNER: Yes; this is generally known.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he see Funk at those meetings?
KÖRNER: I believe that Funk frequently attended these meetings.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the subject considered at this
meeting of 9 November, the night of the anti-Jewish uprising?
KÖRNER: I do not know of any discussions as there was always a
fixed program on that day, and I did not know about anything else,
nor can the Reich Marshal have known.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the adjutant who informed him
on his arrival the next morning that something had happened during
the night?
KÖRNER: This I cannot say exactly as the adjutants were always
changing. I only know that an adjutant came and reported.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What did he say that happened?
KÖRNER: He reported that during the night anti-Jewish riots had
taken place and were still going on; that shop windows had been
smashed, goods thrown into the streets. Göring was infuriated about
this.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was he infuriated about?
KÖRNER: About the riots.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of
the Jews?
KÖRNER: About the entire action.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that he was taking the part of
the Jews?
KÖRNER: Göring always showed a different attitude to the Jewish
question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You just tell us what it was. You may go
into all details. Tell us what his attitude was.
KÖRNER: He always showed a moderate attitude towards the
Jews.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Such as fining them a billion Reichsmark
right after the fire, right after these outrages? You know that he did
that, do you not?
KÖRNER: Yes. The Führer demanded it.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Führer is dead, do
you not? Do you know that for a fact?
KÖRNER: Yes, I know he is dead.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is generally understood, is it not,
among all of you, that the Führer is dead?
KÖRNER: Yes.
 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the Führer ordered the Reich Marshal
to levy a fine of a billion Reichsmark? Who ordered the confiscation
of the insurance of the Jews a few days after this assault?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I can no longer remember the
details.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you not remember that that was
Göring’s order?
KÖRNER: I cannot recall it now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why did Göring go to Hitler to get this
stopped? Why did he not go to the head of the police, which is
supposed to prevent crime?
KÖRNER: Naturally he went to the highest chief so that an
authoritative order could be given for these riots to cease
immediately.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he have any idea who had started
them?
KÖRNER: It had gone round that Goebbels had instigated these
riots.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know that the Gestapo and SS
also participated?
KÖRNER: I do not know. As far as I know the SS did not
participate.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo?
KÖRNER: No, I do not know that either.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So he went to Hitler to complain about
Goebbels instigating these riots, is that the fact?
KÖRNER: Yes, that is correct.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that he knew the next morning that
these riots against the Jews had been instigated by members of the
Government?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated at Obersalzberg,
the interrogation center, on the 4th of October of last year by Dr.
Kempner of our staff, were you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you stated in the beginning of your
interrogation that you would not give any testimony against your
former superior, Reich Marshal Göring, and that you regarded Göring
as the last big man of the Renaissance; the last great example of a
man from the Renaissance period; that he had given you the biggest
job of your life and it would be unfaithful and disloyal to give any
testimony against him; is that what you said?
KÖRNER: Yes, that is more or less what I said.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is still your answer?
KÖRNER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution wish
to examine this witness?
GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can remember, Witness, the
conference of the heads of the German authorities in the occupied
territories which took place on 6 August 1942 under the
chairmanship of Defendant Göring.
KÖRNER: I cannot remember straight off what conference that
could have been.
GEN. RUDENKO: Perhaps you can recall that after this conference
of 6 August you circulated the minutes to all the ministers. The
appendix to these minutes showed how much foodstuff and other
raw materials should be supplied to Germany by the occupied
territories?
KÖRNER: I cannot remember offhand.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall put before you a document signed by
you yourself which gives proof of this meeting.
KÖRNER: Yes, I have read it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you circulated this
document, do you not?
KÖRNER: Yes.
 GEN. RUDENKO: The document shows that certain figures were
fixed as to how much foodstuff should be sent to Germany:
1,200,000 tons from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway.
From Russia, 3,000,000 tons of grain were to be sent to Germany, et
cetera. Do you not consider such deliveries to be a spoliation of the
occupied territories?
KÖRNER: It was a matter of course that the occupied territories
had to make every effort in contributing to the food supply. Quotas
were imposed on the occupied territories which they could meet or,
if they were not in a position to do so, they could subsequently ask
for modifications.
GEN. RUDENKO: You said something about “squeezing out,” I
think?
KÖRNER: No, I never talked of squeezing out. I said it was a
matter of course that the occupied territories had to contribute to
the food supply with all the means at their disposal.
GEN. RUDENKO: That the occupied territories had to contribute?
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Had these occupied territories asked Germany
to come and rule over them?
KÖRNER: I did not quite understand that question.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not suppose you did. I now want to ask
you another question in connection with this. You did not see that
this was plunder, but do you not recall that Göring himself . . .
KÖRNER: No, this could not have been plunder.
GEN. RUDENKO: Göring himself at the same meeting said in his
address that he intended to plunder the occupied territories
systematically; you do not remember his expression “systematically
plunder”?
KÖRNER: No, I do not know this expression.
GEN. RUDENKO: No, you do not remember. Perhaps you can
recall that at the same meeting, when addressing the leaders of the
occupied territories, he said to them, “You are sent there not to work
for the welfare of the people you are in charge of, but you are sent
there in order to squeeze out of that country everything possible.”
Do you remember these words of the Defendant Göring?
KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember these words.
GEN. RUDENKO: You cannot remember?
KÖRNER: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not recall a lengthy correspondence
between Göring and Rosenberg in which Rosenberg insisted that all
functions relative to the economic exploitation of the occupied
territories of the Soviet Union should be taken away from the
military economic offices and transferred to the ministry headed by
Rosenberg?
KÖRNER: No, I do not recall this letter.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know. And in connection with this
you do not remember that this correspondence did not lead to a
final settlement of the question?
KÖRNER: I do not know anything about this correspondence.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know anything, do you? In 1944 do
you not recall that . . .
DR. STAHMER: I should like to point out that the interpretation is
very incomplete and hard to understand. We ourselves do not fully
understand the questions either.
GEN. RUDENKO: I suggest it is not my fault if the witness does
not get all my questions.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you not recall that in 1944, after the
Red Army had driven the German troops from the Ukraine, Göring,
wishing to shelve the question of the economic exploitation of the
Ukraine, wrote to Rosenberg that it should be postponed until a
more opportune time, and Göring mentioned a second seizure of the
Ukraine and other Soviet territories?
KÖRNER: Is this supposed to have happened in 1944?
GEN. RUDENKO: In 1944.
KÖRNER: No, I cannot remember it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall not argue about it.
 [Turning to the President.] Evidently, Mr. President, you wish to
adjourn now. I have a few more questions, but I assume it will be
convenient to resume after the adjournment.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
 Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn at 4:30 today.
GEN. RUDENKO: Witness, I intend to hand you a document
which is a letter addressed to you by the Permanent Delegate of the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This is Document
Number USSR-174. I want you to read it and say whether you have
ever seen this letter before. You will see that this document begins
with the words, “Honorable Secretary of State and dear Party
Comrade Körner.”
This letter deals with the unification of economic leadership.
KÖRNER: I have taken note of this document. I definitely
received it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have received it; that is quite obvious. As is
quite clear from this communication, the question is that of holding
a special meeting under your leadership.
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore I may conclude that you were a very
close collaborator of the Defendant Göring in the matter of the so-
called unification of economic leadership?
KÖRNER: Yes, for the conference mentioned.
GEN. RUDENKO: One last question. Do you confirm that the
Defendant Göring as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, was at the
head of both the civilian and the military German organizations
dealing with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories,
and that you were his closest collaborator where these economic
measures were concerned?
KÖRNER: The conference mentioned in this document never took
place. The unification of economic leadership was a problem which
arose, but which never really became a fact. Therefore the
conference mentioned was superfluous.
 GEN. RUDENKO: The problem was not solved, because of
circumstances over which you had no control. It depended on the
advance of the Red and Allied Armies. Am I right?
KÖRNER: I did not understand the question clearly enough to
answer it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that the question was not solved. I ask
you, is it not a fact that the problem was not solved because of
circumstances which did not depend on yourselves? You were
prevented by the Red and Allied Armies?
KÖRNER: I believe that at the time this letter was sent no such
influence could have been felt. The question of the comprehensive
organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not, as a
fact, materialize because it was opposed by other circumstances.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not mean to discuss these causes with you
at the present moment, but you have not yet answered my last
question. I asked: Do you confirm that Göring, as Delegate for the
Four Year Plan, was at the head of both the civilian and the military
German organizations dealing with the economic exploitation of all
the occupied territories, and that you were his closest collaborator?
KÖRNER: As far as the exploitation of occupied countries is
concerned, it cannot be dealt with in this manner. The Four Year
Plan had the possibility of exerting influence in economic questions
in the occupied countries, but it was done only if it was absolutely
necessary. In general it did not concern itself with such problems.
The authorities who took care of economic matters in the occupied
countries were the military commanders or the heads of the civil
administration. In the East was the Economic Staff East and
Rosenberg’s Ministry. Only if there was a matter between the military
and the economic authorities or between German departments,
where there was a dispute or a disagreement, could the Four Year
Plan be drawn in. The Reich Marshal in those cases could make
special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases as, for
instance, in the case of this conference mentioned today, concerning
the occupied countries having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe.
We had the right, since in the occupied territories not only in the
East but also in the West, we carried out many new developments in
the sphere of agriculture. In the West I can point out . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: What right are you discussing?
KÖRNER: I speak of the right which Germany had to share in the
agricultural production of these countries, because we introduced
many new developments there. I would like to point out that in the
East, the regions which had been completely devastated, which had
no seed, no machines, and with greatest difficulty . . .
GEN. RUDENKO: Who gave that right to the Germans?
KÖRNER: The right? It is only natural that once we have
occupied a country and built it up, we are entitled to share in the
surplus. We had to take care of the whole of Europe and we knew
what anxieties and problems we encountered in the occupied
countries.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you, where did the Germans get the
right?
KÖRNER: I am no jurist. Therefore I cannot answer the question.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you were talking about German rights.
KÖRNER: I am speaking only of the natural right that if we built
up a country we should share in the results of that work of
development.
GEN. RUDENKO: After you had devastated these areas?
KÖRNER: Germany did not devastate these areas, especially not
in any agricultural respect. We, in fact, instituted great
developments. I remember, in the West, that some parts of France
were completely devastated and our organizations performed
reconstruction work there. Thus we rebuilt the uncultivated land
which we found in France, through a German organization which had
reconstructed whole areas in Reich territory, and repatriated French
people there, giving them the possibility of working again as
peasants and sharing in the agricultural production of the country. In
the East we found territories whose agriculture had been greatly
damaged through the war. All the machines had disappeared. All the
tractors had been taken away by the Russians, and all agricultural
implements had been taken away or destroyed. There we had to
start in the most elementary and primitive way to build up
agriculture again.
That it was possible for us in the years of our occupation in the
East to restore agriculture, German initiative and German machinery
alone are to be thanked.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did German initiative also include, together with
the restoration of agricultural measures and developments, a vast
net of concentration camps which you established in the occupied
countries? Was that also included in the extent of the German
initiative?
KÖRNER: I had nothing to do with that problem, and can say
nothing about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: But I am asking you this question . . .
KÖRNER: And therefore I do not understand what you mean.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are not sufficiently informed on the
question of concentration camps, but it would appear that you are
quite well informed, or appear to be informed, on restoration work in
the agricultural field?
KÖRNER: Naturally, I know a great deal about the rehabilitation
of agricultural areas.
GEN. RUDENKO: But you know nothing about concentration
camps?
KÖRNER: I was not concerned with these matters.
GEN. RUDENKO: You knew nothing about the fact that millions
were being annihilated by the German occupational authorities?
KÖRNER: No, I knew nothing about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: You really knew nothing about it?
KÖRNER: I have only just found out about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Only now?
KÖRNER: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further question to ask.
 HERR GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, do you know
that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked defendants’ counsel at the end of the
examination by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any
questions, and they said they did not wish to ask any questions.
Therefore it is not your turn now to ask any questions.
HERR BOEHM: Mr. President. In the interrogation by Mr. Justice
Jackson a point arose which I did not know of before and which calls
for comment. It concerns the Chief of Police, Heines. May I be
allowed to put two or three questions to the witness so that the
point in question may be clarified?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We hope you will not take too long.
HERR BOEHM: I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, do you know that Heines was
Chief of Police at Breslau?
KÖRNER: Yes.
HERR BOEHM: Further, do you know that in that capacity he was
in charge of the prisons in Breslau?
KÖRNER: Of course, the Police Chief is in charge of prisons.
HERR BOEHM: Do you know whether at the time in question
when this camp was set up, the police prisons of Breslau were
overcrowded?
KÖRNER: That I do not know. I mentioned the case of Heines
only as one of the camps which at that time were set up without the
permission of the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior.
HERR BOEHM: Then you also know that Heines could establish
this camp merely in his capacity as Chief of Police?
KÖRNER: Yes, that may be.
HERR BOEHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask?
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
 DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the Tribunal I call as next
witness, Field Marshal Kesselring.
[The witness Kesselring took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
ALBERT KESSELRING (Witness): Albert Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak
the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit if you wish.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, since when have you served with the
Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Since 1 October 1933.
DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold on your transfer to the
Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: Up to that time I was a colonel and officer
commanding artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired as air
commodore.
DR. STAHMER: You helped to build up the Luftwaffe?
KESSELRING: During the first 3 years I was Chief of the
Administrative Office, subsequently Chief of the General Staff, and I
then served in the Gruppenkommando.
DR. STAHMER: Was the Luftwaffe being built up for defensive or
aggressive purposes?
KESSELRING: The German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of
defense. I must, however, add the comment that the single plane as
well as the whole of an air force by its very nature is an aggressive
weapon. Even in land fighting, mere defense unaccompanied by
offensive movements is considered not to lead to any appreciable
results or successes. This applies to a still greater degree to air
warfare. The air force covers a wider range, both for defense and
attack. This had been realized by the Reich Marshal and his
generals.
 It is obvious that when an air force is being built up, only light
machines are produced, or are the first types to reach the units.
Thus, up to 1936-37 we had only light craft, fighters, Stukas,
reconnaissance planes, and a few “old sledges” as we called them,
such as Ju 52, Do 11 and D 13—all obsolete bomber types.
One may hold the view that defense can be successfully
conducted with these light craft. On the other hand, I should like to
point to the end of the World War, when the German defensive air
force was smashed by the offensive air force of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is
dealing with this matter in far too great detail.
KESSELRING: I will go on. Up to 1937-38 there was no offensive
air force, especially no bombers, and the bombers which were built
later had neither the range nor the load capacity necessary for an
offensive weapon. There were no four-engine bombers.
DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Warsaw?
KESSELRING: As Chief of Air Fleet 1, I led this attack.
DR. STAHMER: Did the military situation at the time justify this
attack, and how was it carried out?
KESSELRING: Several attacks were made on Warsaw. In the
German view, Warsaw was a fortress, and, moreover, it had strong
air defenses. Thus the stipulations of the Hague Convention for land
warfare, which can analogously be applied to air warfare, were
fulfilled.
As to the first phase of the attack on Warsaw, according to the
operational principle governing the employment of the Luftwaffe, the
enemy air force and the aircraft factories in the immediate vicinity of
the airfields were to be attacked. These attacks were in my opinion
fully justified and they comply with the rules.
The second phase concerns the combating of the operational
movements of the Poles. I may add that Warsaw is a junction for
northern and central Poland. When our long-range reconnaissance
reported—this was confirmed by the final phase—that the railway
stations were crammed with material and that reinforcements in
increasing numbers were moving on Warsaw, the air attack on these
movements was ordered and carried out.
It was mainly directed against railway stations and sidings and
the Vistula bridges. For the execution of these attacks I detailed
Stukas and ground “strafer” aircraft, because the precision of these
machines afforded the guarantee that mainly the military targets
would be hit.
The third phase was the shelling of Warsaw. I consider the
shelling to be an army action in which, at the request of the army,
small units of the Luftwaffe were employed against military targets. I
myself was over Warsaw, and after practically every air attack I
consulted the army commanders about the execution. From my own
experiences and reports I can assert that everything that was
humanly possible was done to hit military targets only and to spare
civilian targets.
DR. STAHMER: Can you confirm conclusively that these attacks
were kept throughout within the limits of military necessity?
KESSELRING: Absolutely.
DR. STAHMER: Did you play any part in the attack on Rotterdam?
KESSELRING: As Air Force Chief 2, to which rank I had been
promoted, I led air attacks on Holland, Belgium, and France, and the
airborne corps operated under my command also. The airborne
corps was commanded by General Student, who asked for his
paratroops to be supported by a bomber attack. General Student
had such a comprehensive knowledge of the ground situation that
he alone must be considered responsible for preparation and
execution of the attack. The Fourth Air Corps was ordered to provide
air support, and one group, the smallest unit necessary for this
purpose, was employed. The attack was carried out solely in
accordance with the tactical requirements and technical possibilities.
The orders of General Student reached my command very early.
Thus all preparations could be made leisurely according to plan. At
the instance of the Reich Marshal the unit was informed of possible
changes within Rotterdam and of the approach of Panzer divisions.
The objective set by General Student was quite clear as to extent,
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

[Link]