Preliminary Report

Accident involving Air India’s B787-8 aircraft bearing registration VT-

ANB at Ahmedabad on 12 June 2025

Government of India
Ministry of Civil
Aviation
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau
 FOREWORD
This document has been prepared based on the preliminary facts and
evidence collected during the investigation. The information is preliminary
and subject to change
In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Rule 3 of Aircraft (Investigation of
Accidents and Incidents), Rules 2017, the sole objective of the investigation
of an Accident/Incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents
and not to apportion blame or liability. The investigation conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the above said rules shall be separate
from any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or
liability.
Consequently, the use of this report for any purpose other than for the
prevention of future accidents or incidents could lead to erroneous
interpretations.

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 Contents
1. General Information......................................................................................................................................4
2. Background....................................................................................................................................................4
3. Injuries to persons.........................................................................................................................................5
4. Aircraft Information.......................................................................................................................................5
5. Damages........................................................................................................................................................6
6. Wreckage and Impact....................................................................................................................................7
7. Personnel Information.................................................................................................................................11
8. Meteorological Information.........................................................................................................................11
9. Aerodrome...................................................................................................................................................11
10. Communications........................................................................................................................................12
11. Flight Recorders.........................................................................................................................................12
12. Accident Flight...........................................................................................................................................13
13. Progress of Investigation............................................................................................................................15

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1. General Information
1. Aircraft Type Boeing 787-8
Nationality Indian
Registration VT-ANB
2. Owner and Operator Air India
3. Pilot ATPL Holder
Extent of Injuries Fatal
4. Co Pilot CPL Holder
Extent of Injuries Fatal
5. No. of Persons on board 230 passengers, 10 Cabin Crew and 02 Flight
Crew
6. Date & Time of Accident 12 June 2025, 0809 UTC (13:39 IST)
7. Place of Accident Ahmedabad
8. Co-ordinates of Accident Site 23°03'17.8"N 72°36'43.6"E
9. Last point of Departure Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport
(VAAH)
10. Intended landing place London Gatwick Airport (EGKK)
11. Type of Operation Scheduled Passenger
12. Phase of operation Initial Climb

2. Backgroun
d
On 12 June 2025, AAIB was notified of an accident involving Air India’s B787 aircraft
bearing registration VT-ANB at Ahmedabad. As per the notification, the aircraft was
operating Flight AI171 from Ahmedabad to Gatwick and crashed at about 0809 UTC
immediately after take- off. The notification was received from the Airport Authority of India
and the Airline Operator.
On receipt of the notification, a team of five officers from AAIB including DG, AAIB reached
Ahmedabad on the same day. Another three officers from DGCA’s Air Safety
Directorate arrived from Mumbai to assist in the accident site activities and were put up at
disposal of the DG, AAIB. The efforts at the site were led by the DG, AAIB and evidence
collection and other site activities were carried out.
The Initial notification of the accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was sent to National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA which represented the State of Design &
Manufacture. As per the information notified to AAIB, the fatalities amongst passengers
also included citizens from United Kingdom, Portugal and Canada. The initial notification
of the accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was also sent the AAIB-UK, GPIAAF-Portugal and
Transportation Safety Board (TSB)-Canada which represented the other States whose
citizens suffered fatalities in the accident.
NTSB, USA appointed an Accredited Representative and Technical Advisers from Boeing,
GE and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist in this Investigation. A team
led by the NTSB Accredited Representative comprising of representatives from Boeing, GE
and FAA arrived at Ahmedabad on 15.06.2025 and participated in the Investigation. A
team of officials from AAIB, UK also arrived at Ahmedabad and visited the site with DG,
AAIB.
The DG-AAIB, in excise of power conferred to him by the Rule 11 (1) of the Aircraft
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(Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules 2017, appointed Investigation
team

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comprising Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh as Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. Jasbir Singh Larhga
as Chief Investigator and, Mr. Vipin Venu Varakoth, Mr. Veeraragavan K and Mr.
Vaishnav Vijayakumar as Investigators.
Experienced Pilots, Engineers, Aviation Medicine Specialist, Aviation Psychologist and
Flight Recorder Specialists have been taken on board as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to
assist the Investigation in the area of their domain expertise.

3. Injuries to
persons
Injuries Crew Passengers Others
Fatal 12 229 19
Serious NIL 1
67
Minor/None NIL NIL

4. Aircraft Information
Aircraft Model Boeing 787-8
Aircraft Sr. No. 36279
Year of Manufacturer of Aircraft 2013
Name of Owner Air India Limited
Certificate of Registration 4475/4
Certificate of Airworthiness 6584 valid subject to the validity of Airworthiness
Review Certificate (ARC)
Last ARC issued on 22 May 2025
ARC valid up to 23 May 2026
Category Normal (Passenger/Mail/Goods)
Total Aircraft Hours 41868
Engine Type Left Hand (LH) GEnx-1B70/75/P2
Date of Manufacture of Engine (LH) 20 May 2012
Engine Sl. No. (LH) 956174
Total Engine Hours/Cycles (LH) 27791:43/4298
Engine Type Right Hand (RH) GEnx-1B70/P2
Date of Manufacture of Engine (RH) 21 Jan 2013
RH Engine Sl. No. (RH) 956235
Total Engine Hours / Cycles (RH) 33439:30/ 6202
The last major line maintenance check as per the Aircraft Maintenance Program was L1-
1 and L1-2 check carried out at 38504:12 Hrs and 7255 cycles. The next major check (D
Check) was due on the aircraft in Dec 2025.

The LH Engine with ESN956174 was installed on 01 May 2025 and the RH Engine with
ESN956235 was installed on the aircraft on 26 Mar 2025.
There were four CAT ‘C’ Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items active on aircraft as
of
12.06.2025. These MELs were invoked on 09.06.2025 and validity of these MEL were
till
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19.06.2025. These MEL were for flight deck door visual surveillance, airport map
function, core network, FD printer.

There was a CAT A MEL active w.r.t. Nitrogen generation performance, which was valid till
20.06.2025. There were other Category D MELs/NEFs on the aircraft related to cabin
and cargo, the validity of these MELs were also within the due date.
All applicable Airworthiness Directives and Alert Service Bulletins were complied on the
aircraft as well as engines.

The FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) No. NM-18-33 on
December 17, 2018, regarding the potential disengagement of the fuel control switch locking
feature. This SAIB was issued based on reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that
the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The
airworthiness concern was not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant
airworthiness directive (AD) by the FAA. The fuel control switch design, including the
locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models including part number
4TL837-3D which is fitted in B787-8 aircraft VT-ANB. As per the information from Air
India, the suggested inspections were not carried out as the SAIB was advisory and not
mandatory. The scrutiny of maintenance records revealed that the throttle control module
was replaced on VT-ANB in 2019 and 2023. However, the reason for the replacement
was not linked to the fuel control switch. There has been no defect reported pertaining to the
fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB.

5. Damages

The Aircraft was destroyed due to impact with the buildings on the ground and
subsequent fire. A total of five buildings shown in the figure below were impacted and
suffered major structural and fire damages.

Figure 1 Accident Site with respect to airport (left) and debris field

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6. Wreckage and
Impact

After takeoff, the aircraft impacted the BJ Medical College hostel which is 0.9 NM from the
departure end of Runway 23. The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) was not
activated during this event. The wreckage, from the first impact point till the last identified
aircraft item, was distributed in an area of approx. 1000 ft * 400 ft. A layout of the crash site
has been given in Fig. 2 indicating the significant parts of the aircraft. The buildings at the
wreckage site have been labelled alphabetically from A-F in the layout for easy reference.

Figure 2 Wreckage layout

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As the aircraft was losing altitude, it initially made contact with a series of trees and
an incineration chimney inside the Army Medical Corps compound before impacting the
northeast wall of the Building A. The distance between the tree on which the aircraft made
its initial contact and the point on the Building A where the aircraft impacted is 293 ft. As
the

8o

Figure 3 Aircraft attitude at the time of impact with Building A

aircraft moved forward, it continued fragmenting and collided with other structures and
vegetation. The impact witness marks on the building and airplane indicated a likely nose-
up attitude (about 8°) and wings level.

The vertical stabilizer (fig. 5) separated from the aft

fuselage and came to rest about 200 feet south of
the initial point of contact with the Building A. The
tail section and the RH Main Landing Gear (MLG) of
the aircraft were found embedded in the northeast
wall of the Building A while the rest of the airplane
continued its forward movement.

Figure 4 Tail section & RH MLG embedded in Figure 5 Vertical Stabilizer adjacent to Building A
the building A

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As the airplane continued its path
across the roof of the Building A
the right engine (fig. 6) struck
the concrete water tank structure,
separated from the airplane and
rested underneath the water tank
structure facing a heading of
approx. 226 degrees near
south- west wall of the Building A.
The inboard parts of the right wing
were found in Buildings A & B and Figure 6 RH Engine
the areas surrounding the buildings. The right-wing mid-section and the outboard section
(fig.7) was about 280 feet and 520 feet
southwest respectively from the initial point of
contact with the Building A.

The left main landing gear (LH MLG) and left

wing outboard and middle section struck building C,
came to rest approx. 345 feet south from the initial
point of contact. (fig. 8). The left wing middle
section of the wing was stuck in the north corner of
the fourth floor of the Building C while the left wing
inboard section was lying about 670 feet southwest
of the initial point of contact with the Building A. (fig.
8).
The nose landing gear (NLG) (fig. 9) was found on
the ground about 307 feet southwest from the initial
point of contact with Building A.
The left engine (fig.8) got separated from the airplane
and struck the north corner of Building D at the
Figure 7 : RH Wing ground level where it remained and was roughly
Outboard
perpendicular to the right engine resting position, at
heading of approx. 326 degrees. The wall was
pushed into the
building and the northwest building column was damaged such that portions of the concrete

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Figure 8 LH Engine Figure 9 Nose Landing Gear

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were missing and exposing the internal metal
rebar. The engine, remaining portions of
attached cowling, and the surrounding area
were heavily damaged by fire.
After the tail section was brought down, the APU
was inspected and found intact inside the APU
compartment. The APU air inlet door (fig. 10),
which was intact, was found open. The fuselage Figure 10 APU Air Inlet Door
fragmented and sustained thermal damage as it traveled along the northwest faces of
Buildings C, D, E, and F with the furthest debris observed at about 765 feet southwest from
the initial point of contact with building A. The flight deck area and windshield support
structure came to rest at about 650 feet southwest from the initial point of contact with
Building A.

Figure 11 Flap Handle Lever Figure 12 Landing Gear Lever Module

The flap handle assembly (fig.11) sustained significant thermal damage. The handle
was found to be firmly seated in the 5-degree flap position, consistent with a normal
takeoff flap setting. The position was also confirmed from the EAFR data. The landing gear
lever was in “DOWN” position. (fig.12)
The thrust lever quadrant sustained significant thermal damage. Both thrust levers were
found near the aft (idle) position. However, the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers
remained forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact. Both fuel control switch were found in
the “RUN” position. (fig.13) The reverser levers were bent but were in the “stowed” position.
The wiring from the TO/GA switches and autothrottle disconnect switches were visible,
but heavily damaged.

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Figure 13 Thrust Lever Quadrant & Fuel Control Switch

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7. Personnel Information
Age/Gender 56/ Male 32/Male
License ATPL License holder CPL License holder
Date of Issue of License 14-May-2021 26-Sept-2020
Validity of License 14-May-2026 26-Sept-2025
Type Endorsements PIC: TB 20, BE, PIC: C172, PA-34
C152, A310, B787, Co-Pilot: A320,
B777 B787
Date of Class I Medical Exam 05 Sept 2024 04 Feb 2025
Total Flying Experience 15638:22 Hrs 3403:12 Hrs.
Total Flying Experience on Type 8596:43 Hrs 1128:14 Hrs
Total Flying Experience as PIC on Type 8260:43 Hrs 0 Hrs
Total Flying Experience during last 180 days 262:58 Hrs 233:07 Hrs
Total Flying Experience during last 30 days 56:58 Hrs 66:24 Hrs
Total Flying Experience during last 07 days 07:12 Hrs 06:10 Hrs
Total Flying Experience during last 24 hours 00:00 Hrs 00:00 Hrs

8. Meteorological Information:

The weather as per the Meteorological office at SVPI Airport, Ahmedabad at the time of the
accident was as follows:

Wind Cloud Trend

Time Visibility Temp QNH
(degre Wx
(UTC) (m) (°C) (hPa)
es/Kts)
0730 240/06 6000 - NSC 36 1001 Not Significant
0800 250/07 6000 - NSC 37 1001 Not Significant
0830 240/03 6000 - NSC 37 1000 Not Significant
0900 260/06 6000 - NSC 38 0999 Not Significant

9. Aerodrome

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport, Ahmedabad is a DGCA licensed airport

having a license valid up to 09/06/2028. The ARFF category at the airport as per the AIP is
Category
9. The runway details are as below:
Runway Length Width Surface Strength Remarks
Orientation (m) (m) Type
05-23 3505 45 Asphalt 100/F/B/W/T RWY 05 – Non precision
approach
RWY 23 – ILS CAT-1

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10. Communications

After the accident the ATC data was preserved. The replay of ATC recordings data
was conducted. Summary of events based on the replay is as below:
Time (in UTC) Event
07:43:00 The aircraft requested pushback and startup.
07:43:13 ATC approved pushback.
07:46:59 ATC approved Start up.
07:49:12 ATC queried if the aircraft required full length of the runway. The aircraft
confirmed requirement of full length of RUNWAY 23.
07:55:15 The aircraft requested taxi clearance, which was granted by ATC.
08:02:03 The aircraft was transferred from Ground to Tower Control.
08:03:45 The aircraft was instructed to line up on the Runway 23.
08:07:33 The aircraft was cleared for Take-Off from Runway 23, Wind 240°/06 Kts.
08:09:05 MAYDAY call was made by AI171.

11. Flight
Recorders
The aircraft is equipped with two Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorders (EAFR) part number
866-0084-102. The EAFR are fitted at two locations, one in the tail section at STA 1847 and
other in the forward section at STA 335. The two EAFRs are similar in construction and
record a combined data stream of digital flight data and cockpit voice information, with both
stored on the same device.
The aft EAFR receives electrical power from the aircraft’s main electrical system. The
forward EAFR contains an additional power source from the Recorder Independent
Power Supply (RIPS), a system that provides electrical power to the forward EAFR in the
event of a power or bus loss on the aircraft. This allows the forward EAFR to continue to
record available digital flight data, and voice data from the Cockpit Area Microphone (CAM),
even after power is lost to other aircraft systems.

Figure 14 EAFR AFT & FWD

The aft EAFR was located on the roof top of Building A on 13 th June 2025. The EAFR had
impact and thermal damages to the housing. The wires were protruding from the housing
and the connectors were burnt.

The forward EAFR was located on 16th June 2025 from the wreckage debris besides the
Building F. The EAFR was burnt and covered in soot. The EAFR was still attached to the

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equipment shelf with part of the connector melted but still connected. The ULB was
still connected to the housing and the lithium battery was also attached to the equipment
shelf, which was removed later prior to transportation.

Both EAFRs were transported from Ahmedabad to AAIB’s facility at New Delhi on 24 th
June 2025. Like various other cases where the data from damaged flight recorders was
downloaded by AAIB after sourcing ‘Golden Chassis’ and relevant download cables from
the DGCA and other Accident Investigation Authorities, in this case the ‘Golden Chassis’
(Identical EAFR unit) and Download cables required to download data from EAFR were
sourced from NTSB, USA. The items arrived on 23rd June 2025.

The download from the FWD EAFR was attempted at the AAIB Lab on 24 th June 2025. The
CPM was retrieved from the EAFR and found to be in good condition. The CPM was
mounted on the Golden Chassis and the raw data was downloaded from the EAFR.
The downloaded flight data contained approximately 49 hours of flight data and 6 flights,
including the event flight. The recovered audio was two hours in length and captured
the event. Initial Analysis of the recorded audio and flight data has been done.
The aft EAFR was substantially damaged and could not be downloaded through
conventional means. The CPM was opened to inspect the memory card. The damage was
extensive.

12. Accident
Flight

On 12th June 2025, Air India’s B787-8 aircraft bearing registration VT-ANB arrived at
Ahmedabad airport operating flight AI423 from Delhi. The aircraft touched down at 05:47
UTC (11:17 IST) and was parked at the bay 34.
The crew of the previous flight (AI423) had made Pilot Defect Report (PDR) entry for
status message “STAB POS XDCR” in the Tech Log. The troubleshooting was carried out
as per FIM by Air India’s on duty AME, and the aircraft was released for flight at 0640 UTC.

The aircraft was scheduled to operate flight AI171 from Ahmedabad to Gatwick with ETD
07:40 UTC (13:10 IST). The flight was to be operated by the flight crew comprising an
ATPL holder PIC, a CPL holder Co-pilot along with ten cabin crew. Both pilots were based
at Mumbai and had arrived at Ahmedabad on the previous day. They had adequate rest
period prior to operating the said flight. The co-pilot was Pilot Flying (PF), and the PIC was
Pilot Monitoring (PM) for the flight.
The crew of flight AI171 arrived at the airport and underwent preflight Breath Analyzer test
at 06:25 UTC and were found fit to operate the flight. The crew is seen arriving at the
boarding gate in the CCTV recording at about 07:05 UTC (12:35 IST).
There were 230 passengers on board, out of which 15 passengers were in business
class and 215 passengers were in economy class including two infants.

Fuel on board was 54,200 Kgs and as per the load and trim sheet of the flight, the Take-
off Weight was 2,13,401 Kgs (Max. allowed - 2,18,183 Kgs). The take-off weight was
within allowable limits for the given conditions. There was no ‘Dangerous Goods’ on the
aircraft.
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The calculated V speeds with available conditions at Take-Off were V1 - 153 Kts, Vr - 155
Kts, V2 -162 Kts.

The A-SMGCS replay of the flight was also carried out after the accident. The aircraft was
observed departing from the bay 34 at 07:48:38UTC. The taxi clearance was received at
07:55:15 UTC and the aircraft taxied from the bay at 07:56:08 UTC. The aircraft taxied to
Runway 23 via Taxiway R4, backtracked and lined up. The take-off clearance was issued
at 08:07:33 UTC. The aircraft started rolling at 08:07:37 UTC.
As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153
kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at
08:08:35 UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff
at 08:08:39 UTC.
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was
cut off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting
deployed during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity
is observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before
crossing the airport perimeter wall.

RAT in extended position

Figure 15 CCTV screenshot of RAT Deployment

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.

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As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at
about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC,
consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel
cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are
moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual
engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of
ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able
to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly
to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at
08:09:11 UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
The ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the
aircraft crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.
At 08:14:44 UTC, Crash Fire Tender left the airport premises for Rescue and firefighting.
They were joined by Fire and Rescue services of Local Administration.

13. Progress of
Investigation
➢ The wreckage site activities including Drone photography/videography have been
completed, and the wreckage has been moved to a secure area near the airport.
➢ Both Engines were retrieved from the wreckage site and quarantined at a hangar
in the airport.
➢ Components of interest for further examinations have been identified and
quarantined.
➢ Fuel samples taken from the bowsers and tanks used to refuel the aircraft were
tested
at the DGCA’s Lab and found
satisfactory.
➢ Very limited amount of fuel samples could be retrieved from the APU filter and
Refuel/Jettison valve of left wing. The testing of these samples will be done at a suitable
facility capable of carrying out the test with the limited available quantity.
➢ The EAFR data downloaded from forward EAFR is being analyzed in
detail.
➢ The statement of the witnesses and the surviving passenger have been obtained
by the Investigators.
➢ Complete analysis of postmortem reports of the crew and the passengers is
being undertaken to corroborate aeromedical findings with the engineering appreciation.
➢ Additional details are being gathered based on the initial
leads.
➢ At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or
GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers.
➢ Investigation is continuing and the investigation team will review and examine
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additional evidence, records and information that is being sought from the stakeholders.

*** END OF REPORT ***

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