TANKS IN UKRAINE

2022

MARK GALEOTTI ILLUSTRATED BY FELIPE RODRÍGUEZ

NEW VANGUARD 341

TANKS IN UKRAINE 2022

MARK GALEOTTI ILLUSTRATED BY FELIPE RODRÍGUEZ

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4

UKRAINIAN TANK FORCES BEFORE THE INVASION 6

• Production and inventory
• T-64BM Bulat/T-64BV
• T-80UD
• T-84 Oplot

RUSSIAN TANK FORCES BEFORE THE INVASION 14

• T-72
• T-80
• T-90

ARMOURED CLASHES, 2022 23

• The ‘Kyiv Convoy’ (February/March)
• The battle of Volnovakha (February/March)
• The harrowing of the 4th Guards Tank Division (September)

REINFORCEMENTS AND REFURBISHMENTS 34

• T-72 variants
• M-55S
• Captured tanks
• Field modifications

SUPPORTING THE TANKS 40

LESSONS OF 2022 42
• 1. Mass still matters
• 2. See it, kill it
• 3. Tank fights are often knife fights
• 4. The drone is unavoidable
• 5. Survivability and recovery count
• 6. The tank is not dead yet

INDEX 48
TANKS IN UKRAINE 2022

INTRODUCTION
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 saw mechanized war
return to Europe. Beyond the Balkan Wars and 2008 invasion of Georgia,
European conflicts had been small-scale and ‘hybrid’ (such as in Crimea1) or
scarcely-mechanized (including the undeclared war in the Donbas). While
armour played a very limited role in various NATO out-of-area operations
in the Middle East and Africa, the closest thing to real tank-on-tank actions
involving European forces took place in the context of the 1990–91 Iraq War,
some 30 years prior.
Although Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assertion that ‘the true
sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia… For
we are one people’ is one which many Ukrainians fiercely contest, the two
countries do share a great deal of history and the two nations did spring
from the same Soviet state at the end of 1991. As a result, even 30 years on,
they still drew on similar military lessons and traditions, and above all, had
inventories of weapons and equipment that came from the same sources and
the same design philosophies. Both nations had developed in different ways,
1 See Mark Galeotti, RAID 59 Putin Takes Crimea 2014 (Osprey, 2023)

Ukraine’s 2013–14 Revolution

of Dignity, also known as the
Euromaidan, not only toppled a
corrupt (albeit elected) leader,
it also provoked Vladimir Putin
first into annexing Crimea and
then an undeclared war, as he
was not willing to let Kyiv leave
what he regarded as Moscow’s
rightful sphere of influence.
(Sasha Maksymenko, CC
Attribution 2.0 Generic Licence)

4
not least in how they upgraded their tank fleets, but it did mean that in 2022,
one descendant of the Soviet tank tradition found itself facing another.
The 2014 Revolution of Dignity, which toppled the Moscow-friendly
government of President Viktor Yanukovych, led to a dramatic worsening
of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Putin denounced this as a Western-backed, if
not outright-organized coup, and shortly thereafter annexed the Crimean
Peninsula. Risings and protests in Ukraine’s predominantly Russian-speaking
south-eastern Donbas region were encouraged by Russian nationalists and
elements of the government. This turned into a full-scale rebellion that the
Kremlin then chose to back, starting an undeclared war that simmered all
the way into 2022 when Putin, apparently losing patience with indirect
pressure and convinced that the Ukrainians would not resist the imposition
of a puppet government, chose to invade.
The war began with air and missile strikes on the morning of 24 February
2022, followed by attacks all around Ukraine’s borders with Russia and
Belarus. As well as national will and leadership, it also became a test of quite
how each side had chosen to upgrade its tanks and its armoured doctrine and
tactics. While Moscow chose not to deploy its much-hyped but apparently
still-undeployable T-14 Armata, it threw some of its most modern vehicles
into the fray, including the T-90M, which first entered service in 2017 and
the 2016 version of the heavily upgraded T-72B3. At first, and especially in
its over-ambitious attempt to push forces to Kyiv, it faced largely Ukrainian
anti-tank systems, from Javelin and NLAWS missiles supplied respectively
by the USA and Britain, to Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones and even
 improvised roadside bombs. Elsewhere,
and especially as the war evolved, coming
to focus on the south-east of the country,
the defenders’ tanks came more to the
fore. These included their own distinctive
versions of Soviet-era designs, like the
T-64BM Bulat and the T-84 Oplot,
both products of the post-independence
Ukrainian defence industries. The result
would be clashes testing not just how the
respective sides had built on Soviet-era
designs and technologies, but also how
Even more than Russia, they had refined the tactics of armoured warfare they had inherited.
Ukraine’s armed forces were, Wars are always forcing houses of innovation and expediency, though,
until the invasion, dependent
on Soviet-legacy weapons,
and this one more than most. The Ukrainians in particular proved quick
such as these dated BMP-2 to explore new ways of developing their tank fleet, from battlefield
IFVs, shown here during an modifications to political outreach to the West for assistance in this specific
Independence Day parade in domain. Although 2022 would not see the introduction of the more
Kyiv. (Vitaliy, CC Attribution 3.0
advanced Western-built tanks that would arrive later, former Warsaw Pact
Unported Licence)
countries that had become members of NATO were quick to provide their
own modernized versions of Soviet designs. These were, after all, easier for
the Ukrainians to learn how to crew and maintain and yet also incorporated
significantly improved components. Meanwhile the Russians were also
beginning to adapt, from the battlefield modifications which would see their
vehicles begin to sport additional armour and anti-drone cages, through
to tactical innovations which would slowly see them remembering the
combined-arms warfare which was meant to have been at the heart of their
style of war.

UKRAINIAN TANK FORCES BEFORE THE INVASION

The post-independence Ukrainian army inherited Soviet organizational
structures and its tank-heavy way of war, and with it the elements of the
Soviet armed forces based on its soil, which left it with an inventory of some
6,500 tanks and 7,000 other armoured vehicles. The 1990s, though, were
especially tough for Ukraine, which suffered hyperinflation, a collapse in
industrial output, and a consequent steady decline in its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Military reform was by no means a priority, and although
a new State Programme for the Construction and Development of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine was adopted at the end of 1996, budgets never
met aspirations. The army was substantially shrunk; having inherited a
total strength of 800,000 officers and men in 1991, by 1998 it had fallen to
320,000. Divisions were downsized into brigades (many of which were still
under-strength): the 28th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Div), for example,
became the 28th Mechanized Brigade (Bde), while the 180th Motor Rifle
Div was first redesignated the 27th Mechanized Brigade in 1992, and then
disbanded altogether in 2004. The defence industrial complex, starved of
domestic procurement orders and subsidies, reoriented itself in a desperate
quest for export sales. This was reflected in its tank forces, which dwindled
at a dramatic rate.

6
 Soviet armies and corps inherited by the Ukrainian Army, 1991
1st Guards Army became 1st Army Corps, then Northern Territorial Directorate
6th Guards Tank Army became 6th Army Corps, then Southern Territorial Directorate
8th Tank Army became 8th Army Corps, dissolved 2015
13th Army became 13th Army Corps, dissolved 2015
38th Army dissolved 2003
32nd Army Corps became Coastal Defence Forces Command 2003, dissolved 2004

Under Yanukovych, the armed forces declined further; conscription was

briefly abolished, and by the end of 2013, Ukraine only had some 121,000
active-duty soldiers. After the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the annexation
of Crimea, though, Kyiv moved quickly to address its military weaknesses.
Conscription was revived, rates of pay revised upwards and, by the end of
that year, the combat strength had risen to 204,000. This would reach almost
300,000 by 2022 including the Territorial Defence Forces and National
Guard, with defence spending at around 5 per cent of GDP (compared with,
for example, the 2 per cent of GDP which had been the NATO target figure
for its members – and which was often not even reached). Meanwhile, a
deliberate ‘de-Sovietization’ policy was adopted, with Western-style ranks
and uniforms introduced, and the term ‘comrade’ abandoned as a greeting.
The Armoured Troops (TV) was an arm of the Ground Forces, which
had experienced particularly significant neglect. By 2014, it had only two
remaining brigade-strength formations: the 17th (which had been the 17th
Tank Div of the 6th Guards Tank Army) and the 1st (which had been formed
in 1997). These were all that remained of the 14 tank divisions which Ukraine
had inherited at the end of 1991. However, the new hostility from Moscow
led to the formation of three more tank brigades and one independent tank
battalion.

With Russia and Ukraine

fielding tanks with such similar
profiles, both sides took to
marking them with recognition
symbols that were often later
supplemented by national
flags, slogans and other
embellishments. This Ukrainian
T-80U sports not only the cross
they used for this purpose but,
for good measure, a number
of blue-and-yellow Ukrainian
flags. (SAMEER AL-DOUMY/AFP
via Getty Images)
A Ukrainian tank takes up a
firing position in the centre of
the contested city of Bakhmut
in December 2022. (Andre Luis
Alves/Anadolu Agency via
Getty Images)

Ukrainian tank units, 2022

1st ‘Severian’ Tank Bde, Honcharivske, Chernihiv Region (est. 1997)
3rd ‘Iron’ Tank Bde, Yarmolinski, Khmelnitski Region (est. 2016)
4th ‘Hetman Ivan Vyhovski’ Tank Bde, Honcharivske, Chernihiv Region (est. 2017)
5th Tank Bde, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Region (est. 2016)
17th ‘Kostiantyn Pestushko’ Tank Bde, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Region (formerly 17th Tank Div)
12th Independent Tank Bn, Honcharivske, Chernihiv Region

Each tank brigade has some 120 tanks, as well as infantry and other support
elements (see box below). By 2022, most were equipped with the modernized
T-64BM and T-64BV models, of which the Russian Army had some 720 in
service (with another 570 in storage). Ukraine also fielded more than 200
T-80UDs and at least 40 T-84s. There were also some older 200 T-72s of one
variant or the other, although many were no longer operational or were being
used as targets and training vehicles or retained to be converted to other uses.

Production and inventory

Ukraine was one of the main producers of tanks in the USSR: the Kharkiv
Morozov Machine-Building Construction Bureau (KhMDB) had actually
designed the iconic T-34 that was such a mainstay of the Soviet army in
World War II and later would build T-55s, T-64s and also design the T-80UD,

UKRAINIAN TANK BRIGADE

HQ Company (Coy) Engineer Bn
3 x Tank Bn, each with 3 x Tank Coy of 3 x 4-tank platoons plus a Maintenance Bn
command tank, for a total of 40 tanks Logistics Bn
Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Bn) Signals Coy
Artillery Regiment (Rgt), with SPG Bn, Rocket Artillery Bn, Electronic Warfare Coy
Anti-Tank Bn, Anti-Air (AA) Bn
Radar Coy
Recon Coy
Medical Coy
Sniper Coy

8
 Of all the various recognition
symbols used by the Russians,
the V and, especially, Z have
become widely used as
markers of Russian patriotism.
Here, frames representing
both letters have been set up
in front of the Kerch Bridge
linking Crimea to the Russian
mainland. (AFP via Getty
Images)

a diesel-engine version of the gas turbine-powered T-80. Despite the serious

economic pressures that followed Ukrainian independence at the end of
1991, it survived and went on to develop a series of local variants of Soviet
designs, both for the domestic and export markets.

T-64BM Bulat/T-64BV
The single most common tank design in the Ukrainian inventory at the time
of invasion was the T-64 in its various iterations. The original T-64, which
ended up being deployed within tank divisions while the less capable T-62
served in mechanized ‘motor rifle’ units, was a ground-breaking tank for the
Soviets, with composite armour and a smoothbore 125mm 2A21 gun. The
2A21, at the time the most powerful tank gun in the world, was served by
an autoloader, that allowed the crew to be reduced from four to three, and
the vehicle’s profile kept low, to increase survivability and keep the weight
down to 38 tonnes.2 The downside was that it was expensive – which is
why it did not supplant the T-62 – and temperamental, such that many of
these innovations needed to be refined in later iterations. Its 5TD engine was
unreliable, for example, and the autoloader was notorious for trying to insert
the gunner into the breech instead of a fresh round. As a result, it was soon
succeeded by the T-64A, with a more powerful 125mm 2A46 main gun, and
then the T-64B with an improved fire-control system and the 2A46M1 main
gun, which could also fire the 9K112-1 Kobra (NATO code AT-8 Songster)
anti-tank missile. Nonetheless, the design was still regarded as sufficiently
secret and temperamental that it was not exported, even to fellow Warsaw
Pact states.
In the newly independent Ukraine, this tradition of incremental redesign
continued, with the KhMDB, the Malyshev Factory (ZIM), also based in
Kharkiv, and the Kharkiv Tank-Building Factory (KhBTZ) developing a
variety of upgrades, both for domestic use and also in the hope of securing
exports. Given that even by 1995, Ukraine had more than 2,300 T-64s – far
more than it needed or could afford to field – then modernization of old
stock rather than construction of new seemed the most logical and cost-
effective option.

2 See Steven Zaloga, NVG 223 T-64 Battle Tank (Osprey, 2015)
 Main Ukrainian MBTs
Tank Introduced Armament Top Speed Range
T-64BM Bulat 2010 125mm KBA3 smoothbore 43mph on road 240 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 22mph off-road
12.7mm NSVT MG
T-64BV 2019 125mm KBA3 smoothbore 40mph on road 310 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 22mph off-road
12.7mm NSVT MG
T-80UD 1987 125mm 2A46M1 smoothbore 43mph (50mph for T-80U) on road 310 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 30mph cross-country
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG
T-84 Oplot 1994 125mm KBA3 smoothbore 43mph on road 310 miles (road)
7.62mm KT-7.62/PKT coaxial MG 28mph cross-country
12.7mm KT-12.7/NSVT MG

By 2010, ZIM was beginning to deliver modernized T-64B tanks to

the Ukrainian armed forces in the new T-64BM Bulat variant that was
increasingly fitted with domestic systems, as the old Soviet-era defence
industrial complex had drawn components from across the USSR. The
T-64BM Bulat incorporated the more advanced Nizh (Knife) explosive
reactive armour (ERA) as well as the Varta (Sentinel) active protection
system, and an automatic fire-suppression system. Its 125mm KBA3 main
gun is a locally produced version of the 2A46, and as well as the usual
range of rounds can fire the Kombat tandem-warhead laser-guided missile.
Although it weighs 45 tonnes, its 850hp 5TDFM multi-fuel diesel engine
gives it a top speed of 43mph, with a maximum range of 240 miles, although
it proved to be less manoeuvrable than earlier, lighter versions.
The first batch of ten was delivered in 2010, and by 2022, the Ukrainians
fielded around a hundred. This was, after all, much cheaper than re-
equipping fully with the later version, the T-84. A 2019 upgrade programme
led to the T-64BM2 Bulat variant, with an improved fire-control package
and TPN-1TPV thermal sight, a more powerful 6TD-1 engine, Lybid-2
radios and the Basalt battlefield information system, and enhancements to
the tank’s protection including anti-RPG screens over the enlarged engine
compartment. The design was undergoing field tests in 2021, but only up to
a dozen were definitely in service by the time of the invasion.
A separate programme led to the T-64BV, a modernization programme
for the older T-64s led by the KhBTZ. The initial 2017 version lacked the
more powerful engine of the T-64BM but did have a range of improvements

T-64BM AND T-84 OPLOT

A Various models of the T-64 and its successors formed the backbone of the Ukrainian tank fleet in
2022. The top illustration is a T-64BM of the 1st ‘Severia’ Tank Brigade’s 2nd Battalion, marked with
the white crosses that were adopted by the Ukrainians in the early stages of the war to distinguish
their vehicles from the often-identical Russian ones. In 2022, the brigade took part in the
successful defence of Chernihiv and was then redeployed to the Donbas offensive, earning it the
‘For Courage and Bravery’ unit award. Below is a T-84 Oplot from the 3rd Tank Brigade’s 11th
Independent Tank Battalion during the Kharkiv counteroffensive in a distinctive blocky digital
camouflage pattern. Note the new Duplet ERA blocks, optimized to resist tandem warheads and

10
 to its protection systems and sights,
with thermal imaging as standard
for all crew. In 2019, the Lviv Tank-
Building Factory (LBTZ) also began
to upgrade existing T-64s to this
pattern, and in 2022 a new T-64BV
obr.22 version was reported to be
going through field tests, with further
refinements including the substitution
of the commander’s turret-mounted
machine gun with a domestically
produced 12.7mm Snipex Laska K-2.
However, it is unclear whether any
were actually fielded in the first year
of the war.

A close-up of the infrared (IR) T-80UD

beacon element of the Varta The T-64 was also the progenitor of the T-80, an evolution of the design built
soft-kill active protection
around a powerful (but monstrously fuel-hungry) gas turbine rather than
system on the turret of a T-84
Oplot, designed to blind IR diesel engine, and also incorporating features from the separate and slightly
sensors and missile guidance. more modern T-72. It was a controversial design, and although the T-80
(VoidWanderer, CC Attribution- entered service in 1976, and became the armoured backbone of the Group
Share Alike 4.0 International of Soviet Forces in Germany, it would continue to polarize opinion among
Licence)
users and planners. The Ukrainian Morozov Design Bureau was a partner in
developing the second-generation T-80U version, with a more powerful and
reliable GTD-1250 gas turbine engine and Kontakt-5 reactive armour, but
at the same time was developing an alternative, the T-80UD. This replaced
the gas turbine with a more conventional and fuel-efficient diesel. Some
A T-64BM2 Bulat during 500 T-80UDs had been built by the collapse of the USSR, with 300 still at
rehearsals for the 2021 KhMBD’s factory at time of independence (largely being kept in the hope
Independence Day military
parade in Kyiv. (VoidWanderer,
of securing export deals), so the new Ukrainian military eagerly adopted it.
CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 Indeed, it was also then able to sell T-80UDs to Pakistan – and 4 T-80Us to
International Licence) the United Kingdom for OPFOR (‘opposing force’) evaluation purposes, via a
middleman ostensibly procuring them
for Morocco, with one then supplied
to the United States for testing at their
Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Beyond the adoption of a 1,000hp
6TD multi-fuel turbo-diesel engine,
giving it a road range of 310 miles
(compared with just over 200 miles for
the T-80U), the T-80UD is essentially
similar, with the same 2A46M1
smoothbore gun able also to fire
the 9M119 Refleks (AT-11) missile.
Like the Russian T-80U, in battle
the T-80UD proved especially prone
to catastrophic ‘pop top’ damage,
in which a penetrating hit detonated
stored ammunition and blew the
turret off the tank.

12
 The T-80U’s powerful gas
turbine engine meant that
it would be hyped as the
‘flying tank’ at arms fairs and
exhibitions and invariably,
at some point, dramatically
leap from a suitable ramp to
underline its speed. Much less
attention was drawn to its fuel
consumption. (Photo by Laski
Diffusion/Getty Images)

T-84 Oplot
A further refinement of the T-80UD was the T-84, which was developed
by the KhMBD in post-Soviet times and first built in 1994. Given the lack
of available resources in the tough early years of independence, this was
mainly envisaged as an export model, but without much success. Instead, the
T-84 began to enter Ukrainian service in 1999, but it was soon superseded
by the more advanced T-84 Oplot (Bulwark), with the first ten entering
Ukrainian service in 2001. It includes a series of refinements, including an
armoured ammunition magazine in its turret bustle, to try and address a
familiar problem with Soviet-heritage tanks, of the turret being blown off
by a catastrophic explosion when the shells lined up for the autoloader
are detonated by an attack. The T-84BM Oplot-M is the current standard,
introduced in 2013.
The T-84 Oplot is armed with a KBA3 125mm smoothbore gun, essentially
a domestically produced equivalent 2A46M1, stabilized in two planes, with
a modern fire-control system including a PTT-2 thermal imaging sight. It

A T-84U of 3rd ‘Iron’

Independent Tank Brigade,
which was issued with T-72s
when it was formed in 2016.
As of the invasion, it was still
in the process of being re-
equipped, and so all three of its
tank battalions fielded a mix of
T-72s and T-84Us. (3rd ‘Iron’ Tank
Brigade/Ukrainian Ministry of
Defence, CC Attribution 4.0
International Licence)
THE UNDEPLOYABLE ARMATA because of problems building and integrating its advanced
The T-14 Armata, which appeared in 2015, is post-Soviet Russia’s computerized systems, as well as an embarrassing breakdown
first genuinely new tank design, and was presented as a game- during the rehearsals for the 2015 Victory Day parade in
changing system, with a remote-controlled turret mounting a Moscow. Claims that it had seen service trials in Syria were
2A821M 125mm smoothbore gun, three crew sitting in a never confirmed, nor ones that there had been a limited
heavily armoured pod inside the main hull, advanced optics deployment in Ukraine. As it was, on March 2024, it was finally
and the Afganit active protection system with both soft- and admitted that the T-14 had never been deployed anywhere, and
hard-kill capabilities (such that an incoming round not able to was too expensive either for the war or yet for series
be spoofed or distracted would instead be intercepted). The production. The T-90 and T-72B3 would thus remain the
programme was beset with unexplained delays, though, likely standard tanks, with only a few dozen T-14s built to date.

also mounts a coaxial 7.62mm KT-7.62 or PKT machine gun, and a remote-
controlled 12.7mm KT-12.7 or NSVT machine gun on the commander’s
cupola. Its armour is supplemented by Duplet ERA, optimized for tandem
warheads, and its 2TD-2E multi-fuel engine gives it reasonable mobility,
although as of the invasion, the Ukrainians were considering replacing it with
a more powerful 6TD-3 following their experience in developing the T-84-
120 Yatagan in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to win a Turkish contract.

RUSSIAN TANK FORCES BEFORE THE INVASION

Starting from the same Soviet foundations as the Ukrainians, the Russians
had continued to follow their own evolutionary design process (until the
T-14, which has still not become operational: see box). Although later, as
losses ate into their forces, they would start to have to deploy older systems,
the bulk of their tank fleet in 2022 therefore comprised upgraded T-72s,
T-80s and T-90s, in a range of variants. While their armoured forces had, like
the Ukrainians’, decayed seriously in the cash-strapped 1990s, since Vladimir
Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000, increasing sums had been spent
on military reform. The Kremlin’s obsession with ‘teeth’ over ‘tail’ – in other
words, front-line combat assets over logistics, training and similar essential
support capabilities – had in particular ensured that the Russian military had
modernized its main armoured units.
Most units that were deployed were Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), an
innovation introduced after 2012 as Russia tried to modernize its army and
optimize them for limited overseas interventions. With the brigade having
replaced the division as the basic building block of the army as part of the
so-called ‘New Look’ modernization programme launched in 2007, the
idea was that each brigade would be able to generate one or two of these

UKRAINIAN T-72 AND RUSSIAN T-72BM3

B The T-72 was one of the staples of the Soviet tank fleet and remains in service on both sides of the
war. Ukraine had largely upgraded its T-72/72As to the new AMT standard, with ERA and other
improvements, but the immediate demands of the invasion forced them also to take
unmodernized tanks out of storage, especially for the Territorial Defence Forces. The top picture is
of a Ukrainian T-72 assigned to one of the few tank platoons in the 114th Independent Territorial
Brigade, part of the Kyiv Region security forces. Below is a substantially more-advanced Russian
T-72B3 from a BTG generated by the 27th Independent Guards Sevastopol Red Banner Motor Rifle
Brigade, part of the Western Military District forces based near Moscow. Note the NSVT heavy
machine gun on the turret and the additional slat armour to the rear and Kontakt-5 ERA on the
turret and glacis.

14
The presence of a T-14 Armata
following a T-90 is proof that
this picture was taken at a
stage-managed display – in
this case, at the Russian army’s
Alabino training ground –
because this ‘wonder tank’
has yet to be deployed in a
combat role. (Russian Ministry
of Defence, CC 4.0)

combined-arms manoeuvre units from its kontraktniki, professional soldiers

(as conscripts were banned from foreign deployments except in time of war).
Their precise composition would vary by mission and parent unit, but a BTG
would typically comprise 600–800 soldiers in three mechanized companies
and a tank company, with a disproportionate share of the brigade support
elements, including a self-propelled howitzer/rocket battalion, an anti-tank
company, an air defence platoon, and a squad of engineers. A tank brigade,
conversely, might generate a BTG with two companies each of armour and
mechanized infantry.
In practice, many of the 110 BTGs deployed in the initial invasion were at
least a quarter under-strength, not least given the lack of proper preparation.
Moscow’s apparently sincere belief that it would win an easy and largely
uncontested victory meant, in particular, that it had not mobilized its

Soviet-legacy tanks tend to

show little concern for the
convenience of their crews,
and loading new rounds for the
main gun, as being carried out
here by DNR servicemen in the
Donbas Region’s Yasinovatsky
district, can be an irksome
and time-consuming manual
process. (Photo by Leon Klein/
Anadolu Agency via Getty
Images)

16
reserves. Given the legal constraints on sending conscripts abroad (as well
as the practical and political risks in doing so), they were having to rely
on kontraktniki in the ranks of units already deployed along the Ukrainian
border. As a result, there were units where infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)
were being driven into battle empty of the soldiers they were meant to be
carrying, and tanks deployed, in an unforgivable breach of doctrine and
common sense, without the infantry support they need to flush out ambushes
and maintain proper situational awareness. In practice, a BTG is a unit best
suited to small-scale intervention and counter-insurgency operations, not
full-scale war, and it is telling that as divisions began to be recreated, the
larger regiment looks set again to be the primary manoeuvre unit.

Russian tank fleet at February 2022

T-72B 1,135
T-72BA 93
T-72B3/B3M 806
T-80U 186
T-80BV/BVM 279
T-90A 186
T-90M 47

Main Russian MBTs

Tank Introduced Armament Top Speed Range
T-72 1973 125mm 2A46M smoothbore 32mph on road 290 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 22mph off-road
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG
T-72B3 2011 125mm 2A46M-5 smoothbore 40mph on road 310 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 25mph off-road
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG
T-80U 1985 125mm 2A46M smoothbore 50mph on road 208 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 30mph cross-country
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG
T-90A 2004 125mm 2A46M smoothbore 45mph on road 340 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 37mph cross-country
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG
T-90M 2017 125mm 2A46M-5 smoothbore 45mph on road 340 miles (road)
7.62mm PKT coaxial MG 37mph cross-country
12.7mm NSVT/DShK MG

T-72
The T-72 Ural was in many ways the iconic main battle tank (MBT) of
the later Soviet military: light, relatively fast and manoeuvrable, low in
profile, packing a powerful but not always terribly accurate punch from its
125mm gun, and cheap by the standards of the tanks of the day.3 Ironically,
though, it emerged from a rivalry between design bureaus in which it won
out by being the most conventional. KhMBD and Uralvagonzavod from
Nizhny Tagil were competing for a replacement for the unsatisfactory T-62.
Alexander (Olexander) Morozov from Kharkiv proposed the more ambitious

3 See Steven Zaloga, NVG 6 T-72 Main Battle Tank (Osprey, 1993)
This Russian T-72B’s Kontakt-5
ERA didn’t protect it, and it was
abandoned near the village of
Bogorodychne in the Donetsk
region during back-and-forth
struggles for its control through
summer and autumn 2022.
(SAMEER AL-DOUMY/AFP via
Getty Images)

design, with an autoloader, advanced diesel engine and all-new suspension,

while Uralvagonzavod’s Leonid Kartsev stuck with the turret from the T-62,
retaining a fourth crewman as loader. Ultimately, the former design was
adopted as the T-64 but while Kartsev’s approach initially found favour for
its cheapness, it ultimately underperformed in trials. As construction of the
more advanced T-64 fell behind schedule, largely because of the complexity
of the engine, Kartsev proposed a new design, which incorporated the
autoloader and other elements of Morozov’s, and this was eventually
adopted as a simpler alternative ‘mobilization tank’ which could quickly be
produced in time of war. Eventually, as T-64 production continued to lag, a
more advanced iteration of Kartsev’s tank was adopted as the T-72, coming
into service in 1974.
What became clear is that while the T-72 had its undoubted flaws,
including cramped conditions and poor survivability when hit, it would
prove an unexpectedly good platform for modernization and also for variants
ranging from the BREM-1 armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) to the TOS-1
thermobaric rocket launcher. It would be exported around the world, from
Algeria to Yugoslavia. By the time of the invasion, the majority of T-72s in
service had been brought to the T-72B3 or T-72B3M standard, introduced
in 2011 and 2016, respectively. The T-72B3, drawing on components built
for the newer T-90, mounts a 125mm 2A46M5 smoothbore gun also able
to fire 9K119M Refleks-M (AT-11) guided missiles, as well as a 7.62mm
PKT coaxial machine gun and a 12.7mm NSVT or DShK machine gun
on the commander’s cupola. A fire-control system built around the PNM
Sosna-U panoramic multi-spectral sensor including a French-designed Thales
Catherine-FC thermal imager provides better range, accuracy and general
situational awareness, although as a result of sanctions, since around 2016
this has been superseded by the domestically built TPK-K. An improved
V-92S2F 1,130hp engine and improved suspension offer it superior mobility,
while protection has been improved by fitting Relikt reactive armour and
side skirts.

18
 A T-72B3 on parade. In many
ways, this tank has been the
mainstay of Russia’s armoured
forces in Ukraine, even if
technically superseded by
designs such as the T-90. (Vitaly
V. Kuzmin, Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 4.0
International Licence)

T-80
As discussed above, the T-80 was innovative for its use of a gas turbine
engine, and controversial for the same reason.4 Beyond its powerpack, the
initial T-80 was beginning to look dated even when fielded. It was under-
armoured and not fitted for additional ERA, it could not fire anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGMs) through its gun because it lacked the appropriate
guidance system, and its fire control was essentially that of the T-64A, whose
turret it adopted. As a result, work began immediately on the T-80B model,
which was adopted in 1978. This would soon acquire an improved engine
but the main advantage was that a new turret meant that it was equipped
not only with a more modern fire-control system but also the capacity to
fire 9M112 Kobra (AT-8 Songster) missiles. The T-80B also gained better
composite armour, intended to help resist the anti-tank missiles of the day.
In 1985, two new versions were introduced. The T-80BV was a quick
fix: essentially a T-80B now fitted for Kontakt-1 ERA and armed with an
improved 2A46M1 main gun. The T-80U was a more comprehensive revision,
with a better engine, new turret fitted for Kontakt-5 reactive armour, more
advanced armour on the hull, and the guidance system for the 9K120 Svir
laser-guided missile. While the T-80U and the T-80BV were meant to become
the standard Soviet MBT, there was still considerable reluctance to commit
to the design. In the 1990s, amidst post-Soviet austerity, the Russian defence
ministry had decided to standardize either on the T-80 or Uralvagonzavod’s
T-90. The First Chechen War (1994–96) was an especially bad war for the
T-80BV, though, which suffered heavy losses, and although this was not so
much because of the design but that they found themselves in urban combat
without infantry support against smart, experienced guerrillas – T-72s in
similar circumstances performed no better – it severely tarnished the brand.
Besides, the thirstiness of the engine was a serious problem. It burns nearly
as much fuel while idling as on the move, for example, such that many of the
T-80BVs waiting outside Grozny on New Year’s Eve 1994 actually ran out
of fuel before they could even be ordered into the attack.

4 See Steven Zaloga, NVG 152 T-80 Standard Tank (Osprey, 2009)
The turret of a T-80BV fitted
with older Kontakt-1 ERA
blocks. Note the gunner’s
thermal imaging sight; the
T-80BV was armed with a newer
2A46M1 120mm smoothbore
gun able to fire the improved
9M112M Kobra missile,
but crews highlighted the
importance of the tank’s optics
over the characteristics of its
gun. (Vitaly V. Kuzmin, Creative
Commons Attribution-Share
Alike 4.0 International Licence)

In 1996, production began to be phased out, although as late as 2001 the

Omsk Transmash works were still producing them for export (with sales to
Cyprus, Egypt, South Korea, Uzbekistan and Yemen). Nonetheless, in 2017,
the T-80BVM upgrade was introduced to make the tank compatible with the
T-90 and, by 2022, the Russians still had over 400 T-80s in various models in
service, mainly T-80BV/BVMs. They also had perhaps another 5,000 tanks
in storage, which they began to recondition to replace battlefield losses.
Despite its limitations – some logistics officers have dubbed the T-80 the
obzhora, ‘guzzler’, for its fuel requirements – it remains an effective threat
on the battlefield, although the experiences of the 4th Guards Tank Div,
detailed below, have only strengthened the hand of those who say this was
not a successful experiment. A greater proportion of T-80s, after all, were
abandoned in 2022 than any other Russian tank line; of all of them lost
in the first year, more than two-thirds were captured or abandoned, likely
because of their inordinate fuel requirements and the greater chance that they
simply ran dry.

T-90
While the T-72 was going through a series of upgrades, the design was also
eventually selected as the basis for a new tank which could, in due course,
replace the array of different vehicles in use: the T-64, T-72 and T-80 (and
some remaining T-62s, for that matter).5 Once again, a more ambitious
5 See Steven Zaloga, NVG 255 T-90 Standard Tank (Osprey, 2019)

T-80UK OF THE 4TH DIVISION

C Were it not that Russia so desperately needed tanks to make up for the losses it was suffering, the
mauling the 4th Guards Kantemir Tank Division’s T-80s received in 2022, especially during their
retreat from the Ukrainians’ Kharkov counteroffensive, would likely have guaranteed the final
withdrawal of the T-80 into mobilization storage. As is, attrition will likely ensure the Russian army
soon has few of their old T-80/T-80U stocks left. This is a T-80UK command tank version of the
basic T-80U, with improved communications gear and an auxiliary generator to power it when the
tank is stationary. Although the decision was made not to make it standard for the T-80 for reasons
of cost, the T-80UK mounts the Shtora-1 countermeasures suite also fitted on the T-90 tank,

20
Two Russian T-80BVs in rough
going. (KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/
AFP via Getty Images)

design (known as Object 187) was discarded, and a further incremental

modernization of the T-72 from Uralvagonzavod was chosen, although
eventually the designation T-90 was chosen to mark that this was the first
tank to be mass produced in the post-Soviet 1990s, entering service in 1992.
It shows its characteristic lineage, but has also been modified in a range of
This view of the front hull and distinctive ways. Its 125mm 2A46M smoothbore gun is better able to fire
turret of a T-90A, sometimes accurately on the move thanks to a 1A45T fire-control system, with thermal
known as the ‘Vladimir’ after its sight, with an effective range of out to over 2 miles, depending on the round,
chief designer, Vladimir Potkin, or 3.7 miles with a laser beam-riding Refleks missile with tandem warhead.
clearly shows the two active
IR emitters of the Shtora-1
As well as composite and Kontakt-5 ERA, it mounts the Shtora-1 (Curtain-1)
protection system on each side missile-jamming system that activates both smoke grenades and infrared-
of the gun. In use, these can dazzling beacons when painted by a guidance laser.
glow, giving the tank distinctive An export version, the T-90S, with a more powerful engine was later
‘red eyes’. (Boevaya mashina,
Creative Commons Attribution-
adopted by the Russians as the T-90A, but the main update was the T-90M
Share Alike 4.0 International Proryv (Breakthrough), fielded in 2017. This has a much-improved all-
Licence) welded turret mounting a more advanced 2A46M5 main gun and improved
optics, an even more powerful 1,130hp
V-92S2F engine, and a protective suite which
replaced the jammers of the Shtora-1 with
the Arena-M hard-kill system, as well as
Relikt ERA. Considering that catastrophic
ammunition explosions have tended to be
a vulnerability of these Soviet and Russian
designs, which achieve their low profile
through tight packing of shells, the T-90
stores most of them to the rear of the turret,
where they are considered less likely to be
hit, with blowout panels meant to divert any
blast away from the crew. The experience of
the T-90 in Ukraine has demonstrated that
this is only partly effective, but overall, it
has proved much more survivable than its

22
 For all its modernization efforts,
arguably Russia’s personnel
carrier fleet remained largely
Soviet vintage, such as this
BMP-2 IFV, marked with the
usual recognition symbols,
which was committed to the
attack on Balakliya in the
Kharkiv Region. (Metin Aktas/
Anadolu Agency via Getty
Images)

predecessors. Notoriously, in 1990 a T-90A was accidentally hit by a Konkurs

ATGM during the Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the Astrakhan region; the tank
was heavily damaged, but with the exception of burns to the commander’s
face and hands, the crew suffered no serious injuries.

ARMOURED CLASHES, 2022

The first year of the invasion saw relatively few large-scale tank-on-tank
engagements, but their central role in Russian tactics ensured they would
be in action across the entire battlespace. Three engagements are worth
highlighting to demonstrate some of the particular characteristics of this
war and the way both sides used their tanks. In the so-called ‘Kyiv Convoy’
(February/March 2022), what should have been a formidable armoured
thrust against Ukraine’s capital degenerated into bloody farce, proof that
poor planning and co-ordination can outweigh any combat strength. At the
battle of Volnovakha (March 2022), the Russians were able to win the day
eventually thanks not only to greater numbers but also their capacity to
combine their tank forces with infantry and artillery support, in a manner
that they so often failed to do in this war. Finally, the decimation of Russia’s
4th Guards Tank Div during Ukraine’s Kharkiv Offensive (September 2022)
was a reminder that the real killer on the battlefield remains the artillery, and
if tank forces allow themselves to bunch together along predictable routes,
especially in the age of the ubiquitous reconnaissance drone, they suffer as
much as anyone else.

The ‘Kyiv Convoy’ (February/March)

The initial Russian plan had pivoted around a quick seizure of Kyiv
through the capture of the nearby Antonov Airfield at Hostomel by
helicopter-lifted paratroopers, and using this quickly to airlift in adequate
heavier forces. Not only did resistance at the airfield prove more fierce
than Moscow had envisaged, but the people of Kyiv, rather than passively
Anti-tank barricades and other
defences soon became a part of
daily life, but these ‘hedgehogs’
in central Kyiv underline the
extent to which, at the start of
the war, there was a genuine
fear that Russian forces would
take the capital. (Oleksii
Chumachenko/SOPA Images/
LightRocket via Getty Images)

awaiting a new, Russian-picked government, began to mobilize to resist.

In the first day alone, 18,000 AK-47 rifles were issued to volunteers,
while others began to dig trenches, raise barricades and assemble stocks
of Molotov cocktails.
In response, the Russians stepped up their air and missile attacks, but also
launched an operation to encircle the city from the north and the east. In
particular, a massive mechanized force began to advance on the city from the
territory of Belarus: perhaps 10,000 troops from at least 10 BTGs, including
almost 1,000 tanks. The line between formidable task force and a 40-mile
traffic jam, though, proved all too easy to cross. Snowy and muddy conditions
forced the Russians to stick to the roads, and with limited co-ordination and
co-operation between BTGs, they soon began to get in each other’s way.
Even without Ukrainian involvement, incompetence, breakdowns and the
fact that many of the unprepared forces only had three days of fuel meant
that this advance moved forward very slowly before grinding to a halt.
In any case, the Ukrainians absolutely were involved. Bridges along
potential routes were blown up, to channel the invaders onto other roads or
force them to waste time building new ones. Soldiers of the 80th Air Assault
Bde, for example, were camped within the forests of the outer layer of the

T-90M FIRING MISSILE

D The T-90M Proryv represented the most advanced Russian tank in service in 2022, and was
expected to be able to, in the words of one major of the armoured forces, ‘gobble up Ukrainian
tanks like snacks’. In fact, the Ukrainians proved more indigestible than anticipated, but
nonetheless the T-90M did prove a formidable weapon, especially as its 2A46M5 125mm
smoothbore gun could also, as here, fire the 9M119M Refleks ATGM. With semi-automatic
command to line of sight (SACLOS) laser beam-riding guidance, the Refleks can hit targets out to
more than 3.7 miles, including helicopters as well as ground targets, with a powerful tandem
shaped-charge HEAT warhead. This T-90M from the 90th Guards Tank Division, operating during
the initial drive towards Kharkiv, has just fired a missile at a Ukrainian T-80U some 3 miles away,
which hit, but fortunately for the crew, largely glanced off the glacis. Below is shown a Refleks
missile along with the 9Kh949 ejecting mechanism that fires it from the gun, before its own
engine ignites.

24
The Anglo-Swedish NLAW
anti-tank missile launcher was
one of the early ‘stars’ of the
war, easy to use and supplied
in adequate numbers such
that they could be distributed
widely. It has an effective range
of out to 800mm and its 1.8kg
warhead can be fired either
in direct or top-attack mode.
(SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via
Getty Images)

Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, created by the 1986 nuclear disaster, and they
destroyed the bridge connecting Chernobyl with the town of Ivankiv to the
south-west. As a result, the Russian BTG dispatched along that axis had to
spend an extra day building a replacement pontoon bridge, while the 80th
Bde fell back to join the defence of Kyiv.
At the same time, the convoy was harried by drones and ambushes. In the
early days, before the Russians adapted, Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 drones
successfully struck self-propelled guns (SPGs), surface-to-air (SAM) missile
systems and several tanks with their bombs, supplemented by homemade
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) carrying grenades and smaller charges.
Arguably even more effective were surprise attacks on columns using anti-
tank weapons, including the US FGM-148 Javelin, lighter UK-supplied
NLAWS and German Panzerfaust 3, domestic systems such as the Skif
(Scythian)/Stuhna-P and RK-3 Korsar (Corsair) laser beam-riding missiles,
and even shorter-ranged man-portable RPG-7 and RPG-18 rocket-propelled
grenade launchers.
Roman, a lieutenant in a BTG from the 37th Independent Guards Motor
Rifle Bde commanding a platoon of T-72B3s, recounted on social media
how his unit had rounded a corner on the road north of Demydiv to be met

KYIV CONVOY UNDER ATTACK BY UKRAINIAN ATGMS

E Despite some claims of a bloodbath, in the main the infamous ‘Kyiv Convoy’ was eventually
withdrawn in relatively good order once it became clear that hopes of an easy seizure of Kyiv had
been dashed. Nonetheless, there were a series of devastating attacks on the convoy, even as it
pulled back. Whereas anti-tank missiles had played a key role in hindering the initial advance, it
was again artillery that did the most damage during the withdrawal. Here, a mixed force of T-72B3
tanks and BMP-3 IFVs from the 36th Independent Guards Motor Rifle Brigade withdrawing
towards Prybirsk has come under a devasting attack from Ukrainian 152mm artillery, with fire
being corrected thanks to the presence of two Bayraktar TB2 drones, one of which is passing
above the killing zone.

26
A Ukrainian T-64BM opens fire
with its 125mm KBA3 gun,
produced by the Malyshev ZIM
plant. (US Army photo by Spc
Javon Spence)

with a simple barricade of two parked buses. Despite his own misgivings,
on the order of his commander, he sent one of his tanks to shunt the first
bus out of the way, when an ambush was sprung. An improvised bomb in
one of the buses was detonated, although this failed to do more than rock
the lead tank. Then, an ATGM, likely a Stuhna-P, was launched by a team
concealed in a nearby building. This blew away three of the tank’s right-side
roadwheels and broke the treads, essentially immobilizing it. Meanwhile,
two RPGs were launched at Roman’s own tank. One missed, the other
glanced off the angled side of the turret before exploding harmlessly. As
Roman grumbled, ‘we had no infantry support then, so all we could do is
blast away left and right with 125 [main gun] and MGs [machine guns],
and hope we scared them away’. The Ukrainian attackers quickly withdrew,
apparently taking no losses. With his commander refusing to countenance

Even the most advanced

tanks are vulnerable, and here
Ukrainian soldiers scavenge
an abandoned Russian T-90A
in Kyrylivka, near Kharkiv, in
September 2022. (YASUYOSHI
CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images)

28
any delay, Roman’s team had to abandon the damaged tank and again use
their vehicles to bulldoze the burning wreckage of the buses out of the way.
They then had to check no serious damage had been done to their vehicles
before continuing. This one minor engagement, just one of many, had cost
the Russians one modern tank and, above all, an extra hour or two. Even so,
they were lucky – as Roman concluded, ‘there were a dozen trucks backed
up behind us; had the [Ukrainians] had any artillery on call, we would have
lost food, ammunition, the lot’.
The initial plan, according to captured Russian schedules, had been that
after the first BTG crossed the Ukrainian border at 4.00 am on 24 February, the
column was meant to reach Kyiv by 2.55pm the same day. This presupposed
neither accidents nor resistance, and was always wholly unrealistic. Even so,
a march that should have taken at most three days to reach Kyiv, according
to most independent military analysts, was still more than 15 miles away
by the beginning of March and apparently stalled. By the end of the month,
Moscow had begun pulling this force back – leaving a graveyard of wrecked
and abandoned vehicles in its wake – to focus its efforts on the south and east.

The battle of Volnovakha (February/March)

Volnovakha, a strategic city in the contested eastern Donetsk region, is a hub
on the rail lines between the regional capital Donetsk and Russia, as well
as the lines connecting to Crimea and the port city of Mariupol. Captured
briefly by pro-Russian forces in May 2014, it was recaptured in July and
remained in government hands until it was taken in March 2022 in a brutal
assault by the Russians and forces putatively controlled by the ‘Donetsk
People’s Republic’ (DNR), one of Moscow’s two proxy regimes in south-
eastern Ukraine. Nonetheless, its resistance is considered to have delayed the
crucial Russian attack on Mariupol by at least a fortnight, which gave the
defenders greater time to prepare for the eventual siege.
On 25 February 2022, the town came under shelling and the next day
the DNR’s Sparta Bn and 100th Bde attacked the city, where they were met
by the government’s 53rd Mechanized Bde and the Aidar Assault Bn. The

The forces of Russia’s DPR and

LNR pseudo-states were, until
they rolled into the Russian
army when they were formally
annexed in September 2022,
largely equipped with dated
hand-me-downs and vehicles
captured from the Ukrainian
government. There were
exceptions, though, such as this
T-72BV. (Photo by Leon Klein/
Anadolu Agency via Getty
Images)
A T-72AV of the Ukrainian 10th
Mountain ‘Edelweiss’ Assault
Brigade in Donetsk Region.
(Khrystyna Lutsyk/Global
Images Ukraine via Getty
Images)

100th Bde included a tank battalion with a mix of T-64s and T-72s, while
the 53rd Bde fielded a battalion of T-64BVs. Tank units from both sides
found themselves clashing at the bus station in the centre of the city, not least
because it offered more open terrain suited to such an engagement. However,
smoke and driving snow quickly reduced visibility, making this more of
a tank brawl than a choreographed engagement. The DNR forces were
generally poorly trained and equipped with older-version tanks, whereas the
53rd was a seasoned unit and a third of its T-64BVs had been fitted with
thermal imaging sights, which gave them a considerable advantage in the
murky conditions: ‘we could see them, they were blind’, summarized one
59th Bde tanker.
At first, the government forces were thus able to hold their own, even
as the city was being battered around them, with a number of DNR tanks
knocked out or simply abandoned by their crews on being hit, even if their
vehicle was still wholly operational. However, over time the numbers of the
attackers, and the risk from infantry-fired anti-tank weapons began to force
the defenders to retreat. Even more serious was the threat posed by artillery
fire, as the DNR forces began plastering the area with 122mm rounds from
D-30 guns and 2S1 SPGs, as well as rockets from a battery of BM-21 Grad
launchers. The only reinforcements that would be available to the Ukrainian
forces were a few volunteer units, while the DNR troops would soon be
joined not only by their own Vostok Bn and 3rd Independent Motor Rifle
Bde, but also by regulars from the 429th Motor Rifle Rgt of the Russian 19th
Motor Rifle Div.
On 28 February, the invaders launched a renewed push, and in contrast
with earlier attacks, actually began to practise their combined-arms tactical
training, with infantry supporting the tanks, and artillery used to cover
advances and shatter Ukrainian attempts to assemble for a counterattack. A
real difference was made by the better-trained and -equipped 429th Rgt, not
least as it fielded a battalion of T-72B3s that proved much more dangerous
than the ageing vehicles of the DNR forces. Fortunately for the defenders,
by this stage the battle had largely become a vicious close-quarters struggle
in Volnovakha’s ruins. The Russians largely used their tanks as fire support
‘snipers’ from a distance, to avoid their being caught in anti-tank ambushes
at close range. This minimized the risks they faced, but also allowed the
Ukrainian forces to retreat behind the ample cover provided by the ruined
city. Although the defenders were joined by elements of the 503rd Naval
Infantry Bn, the 15th Mountain Assault Bn and the 54th Mechanized Bde,

30
 A Ukrainian T-62 which has
been immobilized by a Russian
Lancet loitering outside the
contested city of Bakhmut.
(Lynsey Addario via Getty
Images)

they were driven out of what was left of the city, opening the way for the
Russians to move against Mariupol. The weight of the attacking force, which
was joined by a BTG from each of the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Bde and
31st Air Assault Bde, as well as at least two from the 150th Motor Rifle Div,
combined with greater air and artillery support, swung the day.
Volnovakha eventually fell on 11 March after a failed Ukrainian
counterattack, and with the city in ruins. The Ukrainians lost at least eight
T-64BVs, abandoned or destroyed, and one T-72B. General Kyrylo Budanov,
head of Ukrainian military intelligence, would later describe this as one
of the three major Ukrainian defeats in the war, the other two being the
occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the battle of Sievierodonetsk in Luhansk
region in May/June 2022, a hard-fought urban engagement more reminiscent
of Stalingrad in World War II. One could question this assessment, not least
when set against the far more brutal struggle for Mariupol which followed.
However, what Volnovakha did demonstrate was the importance of not just
training but, in particular, modern optics and fire-control systems in the tank
battle – but also how numbers and artillery can override almost any such
advantage.

The harrowing of the 4th Guards Tank Division (September)

The 4th Guards Kantemir Tank Div is one of the elite ‘palace guard’ units,
based at Naro-Fominsk just outside Moscow and along with the 2nd Guards
Taman Motor Rifle Div is intended as much to deter any risk of a coup
from the other armed formations in and around the capital as to undertake
combat operations. Indeed, in October 1993 it played a crucial role in the
constitutional crisis that led to a stand-off between President Boris Yeltsin
and his recalcitrant parliament. Several T-80UDs from the 4th Guards
Tank shelled the confusingly named White House – the seat of the Russian
parliament at that time – forcing it into surrender. Nonetheless, it was and
is also a combat unit and participated in the First and Second Chechen
Wars (1994–96, 1999–2009), as well as peacekeeping deployments in South
Ossetia (1997) and Kosovo (1998–2002). While briefly downsized as part
of wider reforms to the 4th Independent Guards Tank Bde in 2009, it was
reconstituted as a division in 2013.
A view of a Russian T-80U from
the 4th Tank Brigade that shows
clearly the turret’s armoured
stand-off flaps around it,
intended to protect against
shaped-charge and tandem
rounds, and the mountings for
ERA blocks (currently not fitted)
on the roof. (Vitaly V. Kuzmin,
Creative Commons Attribution-
Share Alike 4.0 International
Licence)

As part of the 1st Guards Red Banner Tank Army, it played a major role
in efforts to capture Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv. In the initial stages of
the invasion, the Russians were able to make serious inroads into Kharkiv
Region, taking the strategic city of Izium, south-east of Kharkiv, in April.
Kharkiv itself came under direct attack by early May, but held, and by
summer the front line was stabilizing. However, as Moscow diverted forces
in a vain attempt to hold the southern city of Kherson, Kyiv concentrated
forces for a counterattack which would prove stunningly successful. On 6
September, they launched a surprise operation that swept through Russian
positions which had been stripped of many of their garrisons, and were
often held instead by DNR and LNR militias of indifferent quality and
Rosgvardiya – Russian National Guard – internal security paramilitaries
rather than front-line troops. Izium and the strategic town of Kupyansk (east
of Kharkiv) were liberated within a week. As newly supplied US HIMARS
guided-rocket artillery was used to hit supply bases and troop concentrations
behind the lines, the Russians withdrew from most of Kherson Region, to
behind the Oskil River. Even so, efforts to organize a new line of defence

The war quickly demonstrated

that in an age of advanced fire
control systems and accurate
long-range guns and missiles,
it is better to be concealed
than well-protected, hence
the generous amounts of
camouflage netting on this
vehicle from Ukraine’s 1st Tank
Brigade. (Pierre Crom/Getty
Images)

32
 Although direct fire from
other tanks, ATGMs, mines
and drones all took their toll,
artillery pieces like these
Ukrainian 122mm 2S1 SPGs
remained the real lords of
the battlefield. (PULSE NEWS,
Creative Commons CC BY)

along the Oskil and Siversky Donets rivers were only partly successful, and
the Ukrainians would establish a number of bridgeheads on the eastern banks
of both rivers such as to threaten the Russian-held Lugansk Region. By the
end of the operation in early October, the Ukrainians had retaken more than
4,500 square miles in the Kharkiv Region
The bulk of the 4th Guards Tank Army had been redeployed to Kherson,
but much of the 4th Guards Tank Div remained, in Izium and east towards
the Oskil. Most reports say two tank regiments were present, although
these may have been augmented BTGs drawn from its 12th and 13th Rgts,
respectively, along with support elements from the 137th Reconnaissance Bn
and 275th Self-Propelled Artillery Rgt. As they were one of the few regular
Russian units in the area, the Ukrainians targeted them as a priority with
long-range artillery and accurate HIMARS fire.
These two BTGs were briefly engaged around Izium, but then hurriedly
withdrew to avoid being encircled. In the process, they left behind ten
T-80BVs. The 4th was, after all, the largest single user of T-80s in the
Russian army at the time, and in the first three weeks of the war, according
to Ukrainian intelligence sources, had lost 71 of them (65 T-80Us and six
T-80BVs) out of a total fleet of 200–217 tanks. As they withdrew, they were
hit by the T-72s and T-64s of the Ukrainian 4th Tank Bde, as well as further
artillery salvos. According to survivors of the division, the artillery was a
particular problem, as the Ukrainians had powerful 152mm 2S3 SPGs in
range and – although initially the Russians did not realize this – drones in
the air to provide real-time fire correction. Although accounts of a rout were
exaggerated, the remnants of the 4th Div were forced to retreat farther, all
the way to Borovaya inside the LNR. They left behind another 80 or so
T-80s, meaning that since the start of the war they had seen some three-
quarters of their initial fleet destroyed or abandoned, and while they had
been partially reconstituted in that time, the Ukrainians estimated they had
received no more than 50 new T-80s, so these elements of the 4th Div were
still at no more than half strength by the time they limped into Borovaya –
while at least 20 of their former tanks would be taken into Ukrainian service.
The war would be fought in
a range of conditions and
environments, and the deep
Ukrainian winter offered
particular advantages for
armoured units when the
ground froze hard, but equally
serious challenges when the
thaw, the so-called rasputitsa
– literally, the season of bad
roads – turned it into thick
mud. The Ukrainian T-64BV has
assumed a firing position in the
southern Donbas as it awaits an
anticipated assault by soldiers
of Russia’s Wagner mercenary
army. (Scott Peterson/Getty
Images)

REINFORCEMENTS AND REFURBISHMENTS

Not having anticipated hard or protracted fighting, the Russians were not
ready for the heavy losses they suffered, including an estimated 1,500 tanks
destroyed, seriously damaged or abandoned in 2022 alone. In the scramble
to fill the gap, Moscow began to raid reserve stocks of older tanks which
had been in storage depots. Dated, and often needing considerable work to
make them battleworthy, these did at least represent a source of heavy metal
at their disposal. Already by May, T-62s reactivated from a depot in Siberia
were arriving in Ukraine, although it would take until the following year
for even older T-55s to appear. By the end of the year, though, the Russians
had established fairly well-organized programmes not simply to reactivate
reserve stocks, but also to give them simple upgrades, including ERA and
1PN96MT-02 analogue thermal gunner’s sights. These hardly brought them
up to modern standards, but did help make them a little more useful on the
battlefield.
Meanwhile, Ukraine was the beneficiary of donations of tanks from
NATO member states, largely former Warsaw Pact nations which had

PT-91, M-55S, T-72M4 CZ

F Although later more-advanced Western designs would be supplied (as well as less-advanced ones
such as the 1960s-vintage Leopard 1), the first tanks to be supplied to the Ukrainians were
upgraded Soviet-legacy vehicles from Central Europe. From top to bottom, this illustration shows
three such tanks: the Polish PT-91 Twardy, the Slovenian M-55S and the Czech T-72M4 CZ. Poland
initially provided relatively unmodernized T-72Ms, with the main bulk of their PT-91s, a much more
heavily retooled version, arriving in 2023. This example is still in distinctive Polish camouflage and
is flying the Polish army pennant during the handover ceremony. Note the Erawa composite
armour blocks on hull and turret. Whereas most of these donations were T-72 variants, the M-55S
is an upgraded T-55 with its original 100mm gun replaced by a NATO-standard 105mm L7 with a
thermal sleeve and additional metal and reactive armour. This unit, now in service with the 47th
Mechanized Brigade, has been stencilled with the Ukrainian military cross on its glacis. The T-72M4
CZ is a very well-regarded T-72 upgrade, here shown still in its Czech camouflage even though it is

34
 upgraded Soviet vehicles. These
were, after all, at once much
more familiar to Ukrainian
crews and technicians and
also, to be blunt, tanks that the
donors were happy to dispose
of, so that they could re-equip
with more modern counterparts
more inter-operable with other
NATO models. Kyiv received
72 T-72M4 CZs from the
Czech Republic (as well as a
crowdfunded T-72 Avenger),
over a hundred Polish T-72M1s
and PT-91 Twardy tanks and 28
M-55Ss from Slovenia.

Ukrainian 2S1 Gvozdika self- T-72 variants

propelled howitzer during the While still a unified satellite of Moscow’s, Czechoslovakia produced the
Independence Day parade
in Kyiv. (Michael, Creative
T-72M to the Soviet design in its ZŤS Martin works, but as the original
Commons Attribution 3.0 tanks became increasingly outdated, and given the opportunities to draw
Unported Licence) on modern Western components, the Czech Republic decided to upgrade a
battalion’s worth of them. Between 2003 and 2006, VOP CZ, in partnership
with Italy’s Finmeccanica and Israel’s Nimda, upgraded 30 to the new
T-72M4 CZ standard. The original 125mm 2A46M main gun was retained,
but made much more accurate with the fitting of a Selex Galileo TURMS/T
computerized fire-control system. A new Perkins Condor CV 12 powerpack,
along with new automatic transmission and a modified chassis makes it more
agile, while beyond some reinforcement of the armour, it is also fitted with
Dyna ERA and an active protection system that warns the crew and fires
smoke grenades when the tank is being painted by a laser rangefinder.
The Czechs were among the first to send tanks to Ukraine. In April
2022, they sent 40 export-grade T-72M1s which had been mothballed, in
a deal whereby Berlin then recompensed them with 15 Leopard 2A4 tanks
and a Buffel ARV. Next, the Czechs bought more T-72M1s from Bulgaria
for Ukraine, and then in October, the first seven of 72 T-72M4 CZs which
represented their entire operational fleet of this model. All told, in the first
year of war, Prague sent Kyiv 89 tanks, including ‘Tomáš the Tank’, a unique
T-72 ‘Avenger’ crowdfunded by ordinary Czech citizens who raised more
than $1.3 million to upgrade it with new optics, fire control, powerpack and
armour in a campaign dubbed ironically ‘A Gift for Putin’.
Poland was also an early and enthusiastic supporter of Ukraine’s, and over
the first two years of the war would end up sending its entire fleet of T-72s
to the war, clearing its inventory for the 980 South Korean K2 Wilks (Wolf)
and 350 American M1A2SEPv3 Abrams tanks it would go on to buy. First,
in April, it provided Kyiv with almost 100 T-72M1s that had been built in
Poland in Warsaw Pact times by Bumar-Łabędy. It then started sending its
upgraded PT-91 Twardy (Obdurate), with most of its total fleet of 230 being
transferred to Ukraine’s military in 2023. Modernized by Bumar-Łabędy, the
PT-91 features an upgraded Wola 850hp diesel powerpack and transmission,
Erawa-1 or -2 ERA and new communications and digital fire-control systems.

36
M-55S
Unlike the Czech and Polish designs,
the M-55S is a heavily modernized
T-55. All 30 of Slovenia’s stock of
T-55s were rebuilt in 1997–99 with
the co-operation of Israeli company
Elbit Systems. Their original 100mm
gun was replaced with a version
of the British Royal Ordnance L7
105mm rifled gun, a venerable
weapon – even if still better than the
original – made rather more effective
with the introduction of a digital
ballistic computer and stabilized
fire-control system and a Fotona
SGS-55 day/night sight, with laser
rangefinder. There was not much that could be done with the tank’s rather A late-model T-72B on the
thin armour, but reactive armour and rubber skirts help provide a degree of outskirts of Bakhmut in
December 2022. Note the Luna
extra protection, and with new suspension and a more powerful V-55 V12 IR searchlight alongside the
diesel engine, it is more nimble. In September 2022, Slovenia announced main gun, as well as the usual
it would donate all 28 of its working M-55Ss to Ukraine as part of a deal recognition cross. (SAMEER AL-
whereby it would receive 35 trucks from Germany in return. DOUMY/AFP via Getty Images)

Captured tanks
The spectacle of abandoned but fully functional Russian armoured vehicles
being towed away by Ukrainian farmers’ tractors became something of a
meme in 2022, following the case in February when an MT-LB tracked
transporter, left behind when its fuel ran out, was neatly seized even as
a crewman vainly tried to run after it. Subsequently, video footage aired
showing two tractors towing away an Osa (SA-8) surface-to-air missile
system and in April even a T-72B3 tank. More often, though, vehicles were
abandoned when damaged or broken down, and captured by Ukrainian
forces and pressed into service – sometimes needing nothing more than a full
tank of fuel – or if beyond repair, stripped for spare parts. Considering that
both sides’ equipment shares the same basic DNA, it was relatively easy for
captured vehicles to be used by both sides.
As the Ukrainians launched successful counterattacks, such as the
September–October Kharkiv operation, they would seize even more tanks
and other equipment left behind by the retreating Russians. Because Izium
was a rear-area support base, for example, when it fell, they also acquired
such heavy equipment as 152mm Msta-S SPGs and even a T-90M in the
unusual Nakidka (Cape) ‘stealth’ coating, intended to reduce a tank’s

MEMETIC WARFARE images of everything from the Kremlin to Russia’s sole aircraft
Kyiv proved much more imaginative and effective than Moscow carrier, the Kuznetsov, being dragged away behind tractors. In
in mobilizing genuine footage and images of the war along July 2022, the Ukrposhta postal service issued two stamps
with humorous caricatures to raise morale at home and win showing Russian tanks under tow. In March, the National
friends abroad. However few the cases of Russian vehicles Agency for the Protection against Corruption even reassured
repossessed by farmers might have been in reality, they potential tank-nappers that captured Russian armoured
spawned a whole cottage industry of such memes, with online vehicles would not be taxed.
 infrared and radar signatures. The
10th Mountain ‘Edelweiss’ Assault
Brigade, indeed, ended up fielding
a number of trophy tanks, mainly
T-80s. According to one independent
assessment, in 2022 alone, the
Ukrainians captured 544 Russian
tanks, although by no means all
were battleworthy. Nonetheless,
this ironically made Russia the
Ukrainians’ most significant
single supplier of armoured
vehicles in 2022.
This was a two-way process,
though. In particular, the forces
of both the DNR and LNR fielded
This Russian tank was taken captured Ukrainian tanks, taken in the past eight years of undeclared
as a trophy by the Ukrainians conflict. These included several dozen T-64s captured in the early stages of
during the September fighting
for Izium. The notation ‘Allahu
the 2014 insurrection, of which around a hundred were in use at the start
Akhbar’ on the end of the of the invasion, and T-64BVs taken by the DNR forces when Mariupol fell
barrel suggests a crew from in May 2022.
one of the under-developed
Muslim regions of the
Russian Federation, which are
Field modifications
disproportionately represented All wars are as much struggles of innovation as anything else, and this
in the army because it is conflict saw both sides climbing a very rapid learning curve, as they adapted
an escape from poverty. to unexpected threats or old challenges used in new ways. Over time, their
(Viacheslav Mavrychev/
responses would take more standardized forms, but through 2022, they
Suspilne Ukraine/JSC ‘UA:PBC’/
Global Images Ukraine via were typically ad hoc, often amateurish and sometimes wholly unproductive.
Getty Images) Russian vehicles in particular quickly began to sport improvised additional
armour in response to the proliferation of advanced Western anti-tank
systems such as the Javelin. This often involved little more than bolting,
hanging or welding additional armour plates on the hulls, sometimes backed
with thick rubber sheets, although this had more value for thinner-skinned
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and the like.
The extensive use of drones also bred its own series of countermeasures.
The larger and more conventional systems such as the Turkish Bayraktar
TB2, sometimes armed with laser-guided bombs, but otherwise spotting for
artillery, were initially effective but proved too large and slow to be especially
valuable once the Russians were ready for them. On being detected by radar
or direct observation, they could be shot down by ground-based gun or

RUSSIAN T-80BV WITH CAGE AND EXTRA ARMOUR, TOP AND SIDE
G Quite soon in 2022, Russian tanks began appearing with improvised extra armour, as well as
stand-off cages and roofs, intended less in the hope of defeating advanced top-attack ATGMs such
as the Javelin so much as lighter kamikaze drones or the grenades, RPG-7 rounds and similar
smaller munitions dropped by improvised UAVs. These two T-80BVs from the 5th Independent
Guards Tatsin Tank Brigade, engaged in operations near Izium, have been fitted with simple mesh
screens over the turrets as well as additional metal and rubber additions to the side skirts – note
the placement of ERA blocks between them on the lead tank. These mesh screens did not prove
especially effective, and by mid-2023, the brigade’s tanks would instead often be seen with
tougher slat armour screens, which in some cases extended also to protect the relatively

38
 missile systems or, increasingly, jammed. According
to Lt Gen Andrei Demin, commander of Russia’s
Air Defence Force, over the first 12 months of the
war, more than 100 TB2s were downed. However,
the ‘kamikaze drone’ or loitering munition became
one of the key weapons of the war, from the highly
effective Russian ZALA Lancet, to jerry-rigged
Ukrainian FPV (first-person view) commercial
drones able to drop a grenade or other warhead.
While their main targets were often less-armoured
high-value targets such as artillery, air defence
systems and APCs, tanks were also vulnerable,
especially when not ‘buttoned up’ – their hatches
closed – or if hit on the engine deck at the rear.
In due course, the Russians would start fitting
individual vehicles with their own electronic
warfare jammers, but a simpler field expedient
was to fit ‘roofs’ or metal cages (often known as
‘cope cages’ in the West, but ‘barbecues’ in Russian
slang) onto them, to detonate stand-off warheads
and incoming drones prematurely. The results
may look inelegant, but could sometimes make
the difference between a tank-killing top-attack
and a scorching of the paintwork. In due course,
Reactive armour can make the especially as the Lancet and Russian-improvised ‘kamikaze drones’ became
difference between life and increasingly widespread, the Ukrainians would also start fitting ‘cope cages’
death for a tank and its crew,
but is still destructive, not
of their own.
least as it means detonating
an explosive charge on the
hull. In this case, for example, SUPPORTING THE TANKS
the shaped-charge warhead
of a Russian Lancet loitering
munition was largely disrupted, Of course, tanks need to be supported (even if at times the Russians failed
but even so, the blast tore to observe this fundamental principle), with everything from APCs and IFVs
away a track shoulder and to provide infantry support, to ARVs ready to ferry damaged vehicles away
destroyed the smoke grenade
from the front line for repair. The first year of the invasion saw the use and
launchers. (Ukrainian Military
Center‘Militarnyi’, https://mil. combat debuts of a number of distinctive such vehicles on both sides, as well
in.ua/en/) as the renewed use of veteran designs.

SUPPORTING VEHICLES: BTR-4E AND 9P149 TANK DESTROYER

H Without support, tanks are often lumbering and expensive targets, and both Ukrainian and
Russian forces seek to ensure (with varying degrees of success) proper combined arms support for
their armoured operations. The Ukrainian BTR-4E (top) has a superficial similarity to the Soviet
BTR-70/80 APC, but is a more modern vehicle built to Western standards and design assumptions,
with the driver and commander in their own compartment at the front, engine and transmission
in the middle, and a troop compartment at the rear. This version is fitted with extra slat armour
around the remote-controlled Shturm turret, which is armed with a ZTM-1 30mm autocannon,
two R-2 Baryer ATGMs (essentially the same as the Stuhna-P) and a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun.
It is serving in the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, whose emblem has been applied to the door.
Supporting vehicles may also hunt rather than protect tanks. This Russian 9P149 tank destroyer is
firing a 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral-2) radio-guided ATGM during the battle for Mariupol, which
means, given that it bears the V recognition symbol used by Naval Infantry BTGs attacking from
Crimea, that it was presumably from the 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade. The 9P149 is based

40
 The Russians, for example,
deployed their new KAMAZ-
63968 Typhoon-K MRAP personnel
carriers, losing several, as well as
ageing vehicles such as the venerable
BTR-50 APC, a number of which
were present in the arsenals of the
DNR and LNR forces (sometimes
taken from museums). A key
weakness that was identified early
on was the fleet of armoured
recovery vehicles, primarily the
BREM-1 on a T-72 chassis and the
newer BREM-1M based on the T-90.
Soldiers complained that there were
not enough of them, and that too
The BREM-1 armoured many were old and had not been maintained properly, such that it was often
recovery vehicle is based on impossible to retrieve tanks which would have been easy to repair.
a T-72 chassis and mounts a
12-tonne crane and 25-tonne
Perhaps most dramatic was their use of armoured trains. In total, 2022
winch. It is in use by both sides, saw the Russian Railway Troops using four: the existing Baikal and Amur
although increasingly a target and two more, the Volga and the Yenisei, which were cobbled together from
of choice, to prevent the enemy Ukrainian rolling stock. Largely used for protected rear-area logistics and as
from recovering immobilized
command centres, they all have different configurations but are commonly
vehicles, and Ukrainian and
Russian soldiers alike complain equipped with EW systems, ZU-23-2 twin 23mm AA guns and a signals
there simply are not enough of van, as well as at least one troop wagon with escort infantry. The Baikal,
them. (Vitaliy Ragulin) for example, was given a second ChME3 locomotive so that it could be
expanded to ten wagons, including a flatbed used to carry a BMP-2 IFV, as
well as its own drone team and embarked security company with mortars
and machine guns. The Baikal was deployed to the southern front, being
identified near the Ukrainian city of Melitopol in March 2022, as a mobile
stronghold.
A number of newer Ukrainian designs also saw combat in 2022. Although
the BTR-3U and BTR-4 Butsefal wheeled APCs, KhMBD’s take on the Soviet
BTR-80, had already seen action, the latter in both Iraq and the Donbas,
they would play a significant role in providing protected mobility during the
Kharkiv counteroffensive, when speed was often crucial.

LESSONS OF 2022
The first year of war was testimony to the old adage that no plan survives
contact with the enemy. Obviously, Putin’s dreams of a quick, easy and
almost bloodless regime change were especially deluded, but the Ukrainians

T-62 APCS ‘Azovets’ heavy APC built by an engineering group belonging to

Before the war, the relative surplus of T-62 chassis in Ukrainian the Azov Bn. Heavily up-armoured (including with Nizh ERA
stocks encouraged experimentation with converting them into blocks), it was fitted with two turrets intended to mount GSh-23
heavy personnel carriers, such as UMR-64 APC and BMP-64E IFV 23mm aircraft autocannon or anti-tank missiles, yet it was
with remote weapons turrets. These did not enter service, but ultimately abandoned because of problems sourcing
did provide the basis for improvised one-off designs such as the appropriate optics and was seized by DNR forces in 2024.

42
 Another vehicle built on a
T-72 chassis, Russia’s BMPT
Terminator is a fire support
vehicle armed with two 30mm
2A42 autocannons, four 9M120
Ataka missile launchers, two
AG-17D grenade launchers,
and a coaxial 7.62mm PKTM
machine gun. These examples,
spotted in the Lugansk Region,
were provisionally identified as
serving within the 90th Guards
Tank Division. (Ukrainian
Ministry of Defence/CC -
Attribution 4.0 International
Licence)

themselves, for all that they had wargamed scenarios of Russian aggression
since 2014, also often found themselves scrambling to respond to
circumstances. Ultimately, in this first year in particular, they proved much
quicker and more imaginative than the hide-bound Russians. Tanks proved
to be at once powerful offensive forces when able to be used as intended, but
also often terrifyingly vulnerable in an age of precision-guided ATGMs and
constant drone surveillance.
Moscow invaded Ukraine with an estimated 3,417 MBTs, and lost
perhaps 1,500 in 2022 alone. Conversely, the defenders, who had closer to
1,000 tanks, lost perhaps 250. Indeed, by the end of the year, about a third
of Ukraine’s entire fleet of T-64 variants had been destroyed. Both sides
would, through the war, continue to revise and redevelop their armoured
tactics just as they modified their platforms, but even so one can identify

The driver of a Ukrainian

tank during the fighting near
Bakhmut in December 2022.
Note the distinctive soft
padded crew helmet, that dates
back to Soviet times. (Narciso
Contreras/Anadolu Agency via
Getty Images)
 six particular lessons which emerged
from the armoured battles of 2022.

1. Mass still matters

Just as Russia often had to resort
to mass infantry attacks – accepting
the inevitable casualties – so too it
frequently used its tanks en masse,
sometimes in what were almost pre-
modern cavalry charge tactics. This
was, of course, wasteful of lives
and materiel, but not necessarily
ineffective for all that. In an age
of increasingly ‘exquisite’ – highly
capable but also complex and
expensive – systems, in certain
A Russian tank commander circumstances numbers still matter. Indeed, as the Russians in particular
takes a break atop his T-80BV were forced to raid their stockpiles of older tanks later in the war, a US army
during the tough fight for
Mariupol in April 2022. The
officer working as a liaison in Kyiv was forced ruefully to admit that:
white armband was another
way in which Russian troops however many mistakes [he actually used a rather more vivid word than
distinguished themselves ‘mistakes’] the Russians made with their tanks at the outset of the war, they
from their enemies (they also
didn’t just learn how to use them better, they benefitted from having never lost
used red, or bands in the black
and orange of the ribbon of sight of the fact that an old tank in the right place at the right time is better
St George, while Ukrainians than not having one there at all. The Soviets left them a legacy of old tanks
used blue, yellow or sometimes that may outlast NATO’s stocks, in that we have so much fewer to give the
green). (Maximilian Clarke/
Ukrainians.
SOPA Images/LightRocket via
Getty Images)
2. See it, kill it
It has long been a precept of modern war that to be seen by the enemy is
to be open to being killed by them, but the importance of advanced optics
(notably thermal imaging, allowing good visibility at night and in unclear
conditions) and fully stabilized main guns became very clear in Ukraine. Only
around a quarter of Russia’s tank fleet mounted an advanced gunner’s sight
(generally, the Sosna-U) with day/night capability, as well as modern fire-
control systems. The proportion of Ukraine’s admittedly smaller tank fleet
with comparable capability was closer to a third. Denys, a retired tanker who
rejoined the Ukrainian military in 2022, had served on T-64Bs, which have
notionally stabilized fire control; however, being assigned to a modernized
T-64BM with thermal imaging and advanced sights was a revelation to him.
‘This is actually what stabilization ought to be, actually allowing me to
keep a target in my sights when we are on the move. It’s a game changer.’
During the second battle of Lyman, a successful Ukrainian counterattack in
September–October 2022 that saw them retake this embattled city, Denys
recounted being able to damage two Russian T-72s at ranges of up to half a
mile, while moving at speed, admitting that he would have been hard-pressed
to have done that in his old T-64B.

3. Tank fights are often knife fights

Although tank-versus-tank engagements were quite rare, they did happen,
but often not in ways that either side had predicted. The emphasis given in

44
 The configuration of the
autoloaders used in so many
Soviet-legacy tanks means
that there is a ring of rounds
stored around the turret, ready
for use. When detonated by
an incoming round, they often
explosively pop off the turret.
(Dmytro Smolyenko/Ukrinform/
Future Publishing via Getty
Images)

design and training on long-range ‘sniping’ by tank gunners often gave way
in reality to short-range armoured mêlées such as at Volnovakha, where
rapid response, targeting and reloading were crucial. The traditional trade-
off inherent in Soviet tank designs, of speed and a low profile in exchange for
heavier armour, proved a bad deal in many such close-quarters tank battles.
In the advance to the port city of Mariupol, for example, the T-90As of the
150th Motor Rifle Div’s 68th Guards Tank Rgt proved very effective at
engaging and destroying Ukrainian positions and a number of T-64s deployed
to try and slow them down. However, once the battle became a bloody and
messy urban fight, their engagements with the defenders’ relative handful
of T-64 variants saw the honours much more even, as positional advantage,
speed and luck proved more important than any notional differences in Although they lagged behind
armour and technology. the Ukrainians in the breadth
and scale of their use, especially
4. The drone is unavoidable in the first year of the war, the
Russians also supported their
The Russian-Ukrainian War has proved to be the first conflict in which the forces with drones, such as this
drone – and anti-drone countermeasures – really has proved to be essential in Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAV.
every aspect of the fight. Early claims that the drone made the tank obsolete (Andrey Rusov/RMOD)
were premature, as tank-busting systems
such as the Bayraktar TB2, for example,
took heavy losses once the Russians
were alive to the threat they posed and
improved both their EW and also AA
protocols to address them. By 2023,
Col Volodymyr Valiukh of Ukrainian
military intelligence was admitting that
‘I don’t want to use the word useless,
but it is hard to find situations where
to use [TB2s].’ Although drones would
continue to have an anti-tank role using
bombs and missiles, the proliferation of
small reconnaissance systems, notably
commercial FPV quadcopters, would
A mechanic works on a
damaged tank at a Ukrainian
repair warehouse. (Viktor
Fridshon/Global Images
Ukraine via Getty Images)

mean that the battlefield was under constant surveillance. Any concentration
of forces could be identified well in advance of an attack, and any high-value
target – including advanced tanks – spotted for artillery. Artillery remains,
after all, the main threat to tanks as much as to every other asset on the
battlefield. When the Russian 6th Tank Regiment advanced into the town of
Brovary in March 2022 during the attack on Kyiv, for example, it first hit a
minefield and then its first and last vehicles were hit by ATGMs (probably
Stuhna-Ps). The real damage was done when the temporarily immobilized
column was then plastered with 122mm rounds from the 2S1 SPGs of the
72nd Mechanized Bde. While combat drones and loitering munitions would
become staples of the war, it was this ability for both sides to have a great
awareness of the battlefield that would be one of the most pervasive changes,
and meant that tanks had increasingly to be protected by EW and other
counter-drone measures just as much as physical armour.

5. Survivability and recovery count

Once Western vehicles with their different design philosophies started to
enter Ukraine’s arsenal in 2023, this would become even more obvious,
but even before then, it was very clear that a crucial advantage would go
not only to whichever side’s tanks were less vulnerable to enemy fire, but
which were more able to be salvaged and repaired. According to data from
the Dutch open-source defence analysis group Oryx, a penetrating hit on a
Russian/Soviet tank, for example, was eight times more likely to destroy it
rather than leave it just damaged, a far higher ratio than would be considered
acceptable in NATO forces. Even so, there were many immobilized or
otherwise damaged tanks. The very trajectory of the war in 2022, with rapid
Russian advances, often followed by equally rapid withdrawal, especially
along the Kyiv and Kharkiv axes, ensured that the Ukrainians would have
ample opportunities not only to recover and repair their own damaged tanks
(only about half their losses in 2022 were permanent), but also to capture
and salvage abandoned Russian ones. This was magnified, though, by the
Russians’ lack of emphasis on recovery. Not only did advancing units often

46
 The doughty T-34 was originally
developed in Soviet Ukraine,
and here one has been used as
a Great Patriotic War memorial
at Trostyanets in the Sumy
Region. The tank has come on
a long way since then – and
will continue to evolve. (Alexey
Furman/Getty Images)

lack ARVs, or even the capacity to call in repair teams from elsewhere, but
the unrealistic demands being put on them by the political leadership for
rapid advances meant that they often had to abandon easily repairable tanks
and other equipment. This would change over time, but given that the BTGs
deployed in 2022 were generally those equipped with the best Russian tanks,
it did mean a disproportionate wastage of more modern designs, which would
often have to be replaced with older, reconditioned models. As Roman, the
lieutenant ambushed on the road to Kyiv, recounted, ‘my platoon lost a
T-72B3. We only got a replacement in 2023, and it was a 40-year-old T-72A
with transmission that was already on its last legs.’ The Russian war machine
was by no means beaten, but just as Ukraine would start to receive modern
Western tanks, it was already issuing hand-me-downs.

6. The tank is not dead yet

As usual, the sight of twisted wreckage prompted claims that in the age of the
drone and the top-attack missile (which flies above a vehicle and then fires
its warhead downwards into its more vulnerable top armour), the tank is
obsolete. Yet it is far too soon to write it off. First of all, losses are inevitable
in war, and casualties have yet to convince anyone the infantryman is no
longer useful on the battlefield, after all. Second, many of the losses reflected
poor Russian tactics and practices. Tanks were deployed in open terrain and
without proper infantry cover, or were abandoned when they broke down
or ran out of fuel and subsequently destroyed if the Ukrainians could not
salvage them. Training (or the lack of it) also played a role; while many
Russian tanks were fitted with ERA, at least some crews were clearly not
properly trained in fitting and maintaining the explosive blocks, meaning
that they were badly fitted and thus less effective, or not fitted at all. Both
sides took heavy losses to their tank fleets in 2022, but showed no inclination
to abandon them. The tank is undoubtedly adapting, whether acquiring
heavier armour, EW jammers or ‘cope cages’, but it has been ever since the
first tracked boxes appeared on the muddy battlefields of World War I. It
isn’t going to be retiring quite yet.
INDEX
Note: Page locators in bold refer to plate LBTZ (Lviv Tank-Building Factory) 9 T-72AV 30
captions, pictures and illustrations. Matèriel LNR (Lugansk People’s Republic) forces 29, 32, T-72B 31, 37
without a country of origin is either from the 33, 38 T-72B3 5, 14, 17, 18, 19, E(26)27,
USSR or used currently by Russia and Ukraine. 26–29, 30, 37, 47
markings and symbols 7, 9, A(10)11, 23, T-72B3M B(14)15, 18
2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer (Ukraine) 36 F(34)35, 37, H(40)41, 44 T-72BV 29
matèriel losses 33, 34, 43 T-72M1 36
ammunition loading 16 memetic warfare 37 T-72M4 CZ (Czech) F(34)35, 36
APCs (armoured personnel carriers) 38, 40, mesh screens G(38)39 T-80 12, 14, 19–20, 33, 38
military budgets 6 T-80B 19
H(40), 42
military design philosophies 4–5, 6, 9, 14, T-80BV/BVM (Russia) 19, 20, 20, 22, 33,
T-62 (Ukraine) 42
17–18, 40, 45 G(38)39, 44
armour protection B(14)15, 18, 19, 34, 36, 37, military lessons for tank role in the Russia- T-80U (Russia) 7, 8, 12, 13, 17, 19,
38, G(38)39, 40, H(40)41, 47 Ukraine war 44–47 C(20), D(24), 32, 33
Afganit 14 military strengths 6–7, 7, 8, 9, 16, 33, 43 T-80UD (Ukraine) 8–9, 10, 12, 31
Duplet ERA (explosive reactive armour) Morozov, Alexander 17 T-80UK (Russia) C(20)21
A(10)11, 14 Morozov Design Bureau, the 12 T-84 Oplot (Ukraine) 6, 8, 10, 10, A(10)11,
Kontakt-1 ERA 20 13–14
Kontakt-5 ERA 12, B(14)15, 18, 19, 22 National Guard, the 7 T-84U 13
Nizh ERA 10, 42 NATO military assistance F(34)35, 34–37 T-90 (Russia) 16, 18, 19, 19, 20–23
Relikt ERA 22 T-90A 22, 22, 23, 28, 45
armoured trains 42 padded helmet (Ukraine) 43 T-90M 5, 14, 14, 17, 22, D(24)25, 37
ARVs (Armoured Recovery Vehicles) 36, 40, 47 parades 12, 14, 36 T-90S 22
BMPT Terminator (Russia) 43 post-independence Ukrainian economy, the 6, 9 Territorial Defence Forces 7, B(14)
BREM-1 18, 42, 42 Potkin, Vladimir 22 thermal imaging sights 13, 18, 20, 22, 30, 34, 44
autoloaders 9, 13, 18, 45 production 8–9, 10, 18, 20, 22 training 8, 14, 16, 30, 31, 45, 47
Putin, President Vladimir 4, 4, 5, 14, 42 turret explosions 12, 13, 22, 45
battle of Mariupol, the 29, 31, 38, H(40)41,
44, 45 ranges 10, 10, 12, 22, D(24), 26, 44 Ukrainian army, the 6–7, 7, 30–31
recovery of damaged tanks 46–47 72nd Mechanized Bde 46
battle of Sievierodonetsk (May–June 2022),
remote-controlled turrets 14, H(40)41, 42 80th Air Assault Bde 24–26
the 31
repairs 37, 40, 42, 46, 46–47 92nd Mechanized Brigade H(40)41
battle of Volnovakha (March 2022), the 23, reserve stock 34 tank brigades 7–8, 8
29–31, 45 Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan), the 4, 5, 7 1st ‘Severia’ A(10)11
Budanov, Gen Kyrylo 31 Rosgvardiya (Russian National Guard), the 32 1st Tank 32
Russian Army, the 3rd ‘Iron’ Independent 13
camouflage A(10)11, 32, F(34)35 4th Guards Kantemir Tank Div 20, C(20)21, 3rd Tank Bde A(10)11
captured tanks 37, 37–38, 38, 46 23, 31–33 4th Tank Bde 33
Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, the 26 19th Motor Rifle Div 30 10th Mountain ‘Edelweiss’ 30, 38
Crimea annexation, the 4, 5 90th Guards Tank Div 43 114th Independent Territorial B(14)15
150th Motor Rifle Div 45 Ukrainian resistance strategy 5–6, 23–28,
DNR (Donetsk People’s Republic) forces 29, brigades 14–16 E(26)27, 32–33, 37, 37, 43
29–30, 38, 42 4th Tank 32 upgrades and modernization programmes
Donbas region, the 5, 16, 34, 42 5th Independent Guards Tatsin Tank 9, 10–12, B(14), 20, 22, 23, 34, 36
drones 23, 33, 45–46 Brigade G(38)39
Bayraktar TB2 drone (Turkey) 5, 26, 27th Independent Guards Sevastopol Red variants 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, F(34), 36, 43, 45
E(26)27, 38–40, 45 Banner Motor Rifle B(14)15 Valiukh, Col Volodymyr 45
Orlan-10 (Russia) 45 36th Independent Guards Motor Rifle
E(26)27 weaponry 10, 42, 42, 43
ZALA Lancet (Russia) 40, 40
37th Independent Guards Motor Rifle 7.62mm KT-7.62 machine gun (Ukraine)
26–28 14, H(40)41
engines 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 37 BTGs (Battalion Tactical Groups) B(14)15, 7.62mm PKT machine gun (Russia) 17, 18
EW systems 42, 45, 46, 47 14–16, 17, 24, 26, 29, 31, 33, H(40), 47 9M112-1 Kobra missile 9, 19, 20
Shtora-1 C(20)21, 22, 22 Russian conscripts 16–17 9M119 Refleks/9K120 Svir (AT-11) missile
Varta optronic countermeasures system Russian-controlled areas (map) 5 12, 18, 19, 22, D(24)
A(10)11, 12 Russian strategy 14, 23, 24, 26–29, 30, 32, 34, 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral-2) ATGM
exports 6, 9, 12, 13, 18, 20, 22 42–43, 44, 46 (Russia) H(40)41
12.7mm Snipex Laska K-2machine gun
field tests 10, 12, 14, 18 speeds 10, 10, 13, 17, 44 (Ukraine) 12
fire-control systems 10, 13, 18, 19, 22, 32, 36, 105mm L7 gun (Slovenia) F(34)35, 37
37, 44 tank destroyers 125mm 2A21 tank gun 9
First Chechen War (1994–96), the 19, 31 9P149 (Russia) H(40)41 125mm 2A46 tank gun 9, 17
fuel consumption 12, 13, 19, 20 BTR-4E (Ukraine) H(40)41 2A46M1 9, 12, 13, 19, 20, 22, 36
tank-on-tank engagements 4, 23, 44–45 2A46M5 17, 18, 22, D(24)25
IFVs (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) 17, 40 tanks 8, 16, 43, 45 125mm 2A821M tank gun (Russia) 14
BMP-2 (Ukraine) 6, 23, 42 M-55S (Slovenia) F(34)35, 36, 37 125mm KBA3 tank gun (Ukraine) 10, 10,
BMP-3 (Ukraine) E(26)27 PT-91 Twardy (Poland) F(34)35, 36 13, 28
infantry support 8, 17, 19, 23, 28, 30, 31, 40, 47 T-14 Armata (Russia) 5, 14, 14, 16 FGM-148 Javelin missile (US) 5, 26, G(38)
T-34 (USSR) 8, 47 HIMARS guided-rockets (US) 32, 33
intelligence 31, 33, 45
T-55 (USSR) 34, 37 Konkurs ATGM 23
T-62 (USSR) 9, 17, 18, 31, 34, 38 NLAWS missile (UK) 5, 26, 26
Kartsev, Leonid 18 T-64 (Ukraine) 9, 10, 12, 18, 30, 33, 38, 43, 45 NSVT machine gun (Russia) 14, B(14)15,
Kerch Bridge, Crimea 9 T-64A 9, 19 17, 18
Kharkiv Offensive (September-October 2022), T-64B 9, 10, 44 RPGs 26, 28, G(38)
the C(20), 23, 32, 37, 42 T-64BM Bulat 6, 8, 9, 10, 10, A(10)11, SPGs (self-propelled guns) 26, 30, 33, 37, 46
KhBTZ (Kharkiv Tank-Building Factory), 28, 44 Stuhna-P ATGM (Ukraine) 28, 46
the 9, 10 T-64BM2 10, 12, 30 TOS-1 rocket launcher (Ukraine) 18
KhMBD (Kharkiv Morozov Machine-Building T-64BV 8, 9, 10, 12, 30, 31, 34, 38 ZTM-1300 autocannon (Ukraine) H(40)41
Construction Bureau), the 8–9, 12, 13, 17, 42 T-72 (Russia) 5, 12, 14, 17, 17–18, 19, 22, Yanukovych, President Viktor 5, 7
kontraktniki (professional soldiers) 16, 17 30, 33, 44
‘Kyiv Convoy,’ the 23–24, E(26)27 T-72 ‘Avenger’ 36 ZIM (Malyshev Factory), the 9, 10, 28

48
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