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Articles

Chinese Conceptions of “Rights”:

The recent explosion of popular protest in China, often framed as a demand for the fulfillment of “rights,” has captured widespread
attention. Some observers interpret the protests as signs of a “moral vacuum.” Others see the unrest as signaling a powerful new
“rights consciousness.” In either case, the protests are often regarded as a major challenge to the stability of the political system. In
this article, an examination of Chinese conceptions of “rights,” as reflected in the ethical discourses of philosophers, political leaders,
and protesters (and as contrasted with American understandings of rights), provides the basis for questioning prevailing assumptions
about the fragility of the Chinese political order. For over two millennia, Chinese political thought, policy, and protest have assigned
central priority to the attainment of socioeconomic security. As a result, the meaning of “rights” in Chinese political discourse differs
significantly from the Anglo-American tradition. Viewed in historical context, China’s contemporary “rights” protests seem less
politically threatening. The Chinese polity appears neither as vacuous nor as vulnerable as it is sometimes assumed to be.

I
n recent years, U.S. newspapers and magazines have A distinctly normative tone, inflected with an Anglo-
been filled with dramatic stories about all manner of American language of human rights, can be seen in many
popular protest in China: tax riots by aggrieved peasants of the recent writings on this issue. On the one hand,
in the agrarian countryside, strikes by disgruntled workers some journalists (and more than a few scholars as well)
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in the industrial rustbelt, petitions by feisty retirees whose describe the contemporary protests as symptoms of a per-
pensions fall short of expectations, resistance by irate vil- vasive “moral vacuum” in which Chinese supposedly find
lagers to the illegal sale of their collective lands, and so themselves. Post-Mao China is depicted as a society where
forth. Journalists are not the only people writing about Marxism has been discredited, but—absent a Western
this issue. The study of contentious politics in contempo- appreciation of individual natural rights—Chinese have
rary China has of late become a rapid-growth industry no moral compass to guide their changing and confused
among American social scientists.1 lives.2 Because of this alleged ethical and spiritual vac-
uum, we are told, millions of Chinese have turned to
other forms of solace (e.g., Falun Gong, underground
Elizabeth J. Perry is Henry Rosovsky Professor of Govern- Christianity, and so forth) that often result in the tram-
ment at Harvard University and is the current President of the pling of their unprotected human rights by the state. On
Association for Asian Studies ([email protected]). the other hand, many scholars (and some journalists as
A preliminary draft of this paper was delivered as a keynote well) have detected in the surge of popular protest in post-
address at the conference on Socioeconomic Rights and Jus- Mao China an emergent “rights consciousness”—indicating
tice in China held at Dickinson College in April 2004. The a supposed bottom-up claim to citizenship and auguring
author is grateful to the conference organizer, Neil Dia- a fundamental breakthrough in state-society relations.3 In
mant, for the invitation to consider these issues and to the other the judgment of these American analysts, “rights talk”
conference participants (especially David Strand and Jer- among Chinese protesters represents a powerful new social
ome Cohen) for their challenging comments and questions. A phenomenon, posing a potential challenge to the survival
substantially revised version was presented at the confer- of the Communist state.
ence in memory of Benjamin Schwartz, held in Shanghai at The Chinese government paints a very different pic-
East China Normal University in December 2006. Thanks ture, of course. In a State Council White Paper, issued in
are due to the conference organizers and participants (partic- the year 2000 and entitled “Fifty Years of Progress in China’s
ularly Zhu Zhenghui, Xu Jilin, Zhang Jishun, Tong Shi- Human Rights,” the government credits the People’s
jun, and Roderick MacFarquhar) for their stimulating Republic with having bestowed upon the Chinese people
suggestions. Appreciation is also extended to Stephen Angle, an unprecedented enjoyment of human rights—most nota-
Nara Dillon, Mary Gallagher, and Kevin O’Brien for bly in the form of socioeconomic justice. Interestingly,
their critical reading of an earlier draft. this official Chinese White Paper does not suggest that

DOI: 10.1017/S1537592708080055 March 2008 | Vol. 6/No. 1 37

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Articles | Chinese Conceptions of “Rights”

such rights were entirely absent before the Communist rary Chinese political order is neither as vacuous nor as
revolution. Rather, the State Council report contends vulnerable as sometimes depicted.
that—prior to the advent of Western imperialism—the The 2000 White Paper makes crystal clear, as have
Chinese people had experienced some minimal fulfill- numerous other publications by the Chinese government
ment of rights, but that this safety net was demolished by before and since, that—when it comes to human rights—
the foreign assaults of the mid-nineteenth century. To quote socioeconomic considerations rank first among its priori-
directly from the 2000 White Paper: ties. The recent amendment of the Chinese Constitution
to include a provision respecting and protecting human
Invaded and enslaved by various foreign powers, old China lost rights does not change this basic conception of human
its state sovereignty, and its people’s human rights lost their mini- rights. The 2004 Chinese White Paper on human rights
mum guarantee. The first important achievement of the Chinese progress, issued two weeks after the amendment of the
Communist Party . . . was to drive the imperialist invaders out Constitution, states the following: “The Chinese govern-
of China, paving the way for China to realize real indepen-
dence. . . . The genuine and complete independence of China ment continues to put the safeguarding and promotion of
has created the fundamental premise for the Chinese people’s the people’s rights to subsistence and development on the top
selection of their own social and political systems . . . and for the of its agenda.” 9
uninterrupted improvement of human rights in China.4 The government asserts, in other words, that its people
have a right to some minimum standard of living (“sub-
Beyond its obvious propagandistic flavor, this passage is sistence” or shengcun)—and, moreover, they have a right
revealing in several respects. First, it suggests that before to expect an improvement in that standard (“develop-
the opium wars of the mid-nineteenth century, imperial ment” or fazhan). The first idea—that people have a just
Chinese regimes did have some commitment to a mini- claim to a decent livelihood and that a state’s legitimacy
mum guarantee of “human rights” for their people. And depends upon satisfying this claim—goes very far back in
second, it makes clear that—in the eyes of the contempo- Chinese political thought. It has roots in the teachings of
rary Chinese government—the West was responsible not Confucius (sixth–fifth century BC) and was elaborated by
for bringing to China a newfound appreciation of human the influential Confucian philosopher Mencius (fourth–
rights, but rather for depriving the Chinese of rights that third century BC). Although Mencius never framed his
! they had previously enjoyed. State sovereignty and national arguments in a language of “rights,” he did emphasize the
independence are seen as the basic prerequisites for a fur- links between economic welfare and legitimate rule. The
ther improvement in human rights, an improvement that second idea—that the state should promote socioeco-
must after all be founded in a political and social system nomic development—is a more recent notion, advanced
of China’s own choosing. by Chinese political leaders since the late nineteenth cen-
Amnesty International and other human rights groups tury and articulated with particular force by Mao Zedong
immediately labeled this Chinese White Paper a “white- during his revolutionary drive to power and afterwards.10
wash” and denounced the PRC’s failure to live up to its Both of these concepts, subsistence and development, are
own claims.5 The U.S. State Department chided China not simply abstract mantras uttered by Chinese philoso-
for a “poor” human rights record marred by “numerous phers and statesmen; they are also central to the ways in
and serious abuses.” 6 The Chinese government responded which ordinary people in China think and act politically.
with an equally unflattering assessment of America’s human Concerns about socioeconomic justice are not pecu-
rights record, pointing to flagrant racial discrimination, liarly Chinese, of course. T.H. Marshall, in his classic work
callous neglect of the poor and homeless, and so on.7 This on the rise of citizenship in Western Europe, pointed to
war of words continued, and even escalated, in sub- “social citizenship”—or the collective right to economic
sequent years.8 welfare and social security—as the highest expression of
My purpose in this article is not to evaluate the actual citizenship. In Marshall’s evolutionary account, a mini-
human rights record of either America or China—whether malist civil citizenship—or the guarantee of individual rights
at present or in the past. My purview is limited to concep- to property, personal liberty, and legal justice—appeared
tions of rights, as reflected in the ethical discourses of Chi- in eighteenth-century Europe, while the nineteenth cen-
nese philosophers, political leaders, and protesters (and as tury saw the emergence of a more developed sense of polit-
contrasted with American understandings of rights). In ical citizenship—or the right to participate in the exercise
examining these normative claims, I will question both of government power. Only in the twentieth century, how-
the “moral vacuum” and the “rights-based challenge” per- ever, did a claim to full social citizenship (as embodied in
spectives that infuse much of the Western literature on the modern welfare state) become widespread across
contemporary China. Arguing that an enduring emphasis Europe.11
on collective socioeconomic justice distinguishes main- Samuel Fleischacker, in his recent history of distributive
stream Chinese political thought from an Anglo-American justice, traces the acknowledgment of “a right of all people
focus on individual rights, I conclude that the contempo- to a certain socioeconomic status” back to the eighteenth

38 Perspectives on Politics

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century, to the writings of Rousseau, Smith, Kant, and besides an expressed concern for collective welfare, was an
Babeuf.12 According to Fleischacker, however, “for most of explanation—and in Mao’s case even a celebration—of
human history practically no one held, even as an ideal, the popular uprisings as a legitimate response to a government’s
view that everyone should have their basic needs satis- failure to fulfill its social responsibilities. When Mencius
fied.” 13 While Fleischacker may well be correct in his cri- was asked by one anxious king what he should do in order
tique of early Western thought, his argument entirely to hold onto the throne, Mencius answered simply: “Pro-
overlooks the Confucian tradition. An abiding concern with tect the people.” 19 He continued, “An intelligent ruler
distributive justice has marked Chinese political thought will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as to make
for more than two millennia.14 Contrary to the scenario sure that . . . in good years they shall always be abun-
that Marshall outlines for Western Europe, in China an dantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall escape the
appreciation of “social citizenship” predated political citi- danger of perishing.” 20 Here then was a crisply stated
zenship by many centuries.15 Confucian “moral economy” that made protecting and
In the U.S., by comparison with both ancient China promoting the people’s livelihood the cornerstone of
and modern Europe, a commitment to social citizenship statecraft.
has been notably weak. American political philosophers, The Book of History (Shujing), an ancient Chinese
in pondering the primary function of government, have philosophical text from which Mencius—like Confucius—
historically emphasized the protection of individual free- drew many of his central ideas, contained the notion of
doms (or what Marshall regarded as the lowest form of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) which treated rebel-
citizenship). This view, which prizes strict limits on state lion as Heaven’s way of removing the mantle of leadership
intervention, has pervaded popular political sentiment in from immoral rulers and bestowing it instead upon those
the U.S. as well. The political theorist Louis Hartz char- who were virtuous enough to replace them. The concept
acterized the American Way of Life as “a nationalist artic- of the Mandate of Heaven as a rationale for rebellion first
ulation of Locke which usually does not know that Locke appeared in China around the founding of the Zhou
himself is involved.” 16 Fundamental to Locke’s political dynasty in the eleventh century BC. Seven hundred years
philosophy was an emphasis upon natural rights as both later, Mencius expanded upon this idea by linking the
prior—and superior—to laws enacted by the state. Locke’s authority of Heaven (tian) with the support of the people
understanding of natural law stressed individual inalien- (ren). When asked by one of his disciples how a ruler had !
able rights (to life, liberty, and property). In his concep- gained the realm, Mencius replied, “Heaven gave the empire
tion, the role of government was a limited one; the state to him; the people gave it to him” (tian yu zhi, ren yu
simply guaranteed the social order necessary to permit the zhi ).21 He went on to explain, “The people are the most
exercise of individuals’ natural rights. Rebellion was justi- important element . . . Therefore to gain the support of
fiable, but only if government violated the “social con- the ordinary people is to become emperor.” 22 Mencius’
tract” either by failing to ensure public order or by idea of anchoring political legitimacy in the assent of the
aggrandizing its powers vis-à-vis society.17 Locke’s views people may not seem particularly noteworthy today; after
were consistent with mainstream European political all, since the American and French revolutions most mod-
thought in his day, which saw the state’s responsibilities as ern states have advanced far bolder claims to popular sov-
highly circumscribed. ereignty. But considering the time in which it was proposed,
By contrast, Chinese statecraft since the times of Men- more than two millennia ago, this stress on popular sup-
cius has envisioned a more proactive role for government— port was truly extraordinary.
which was expected to promote economic welfare and When we compare the Mencian Mandate of Heaven
security. Such expectations carried important practical con- with a European divine right of kings or a Japanese belief
sequences. As R. Bin Wong observes in his comparison of in an unbroken imperial line descending from the Sun
European and Chinese state formation, “When we turn Goddess, the contrast is stark. In Mencius, royal blood
to issues of material welfare, we find a [Chinese] tradition did not constitute a continuing basis of political legiti-
of intervention in subsistence issues that dwarfs European macy. The Mandate of Heaven was subject to change (tian-
government efforts to address the insecurities of agrarian ming feichang),23 and required constant renewal through
economies.” 18 The idea that good governance rests upon popular support. How did one garner such backing? By
guaranteeing the livelihood of ordinary people has been a behaving benevolently and providing for the people’s live-
hallmark of Chinese political philosophy and practice from lihood. The ancient emperors, Mencius noted with nos-
Mencius to Mao—and beyond. It is reflected not only in talgic approval, undertook frequent “tours of inspection”
government pronouncements and policies, but also in grass- for the purpose of ensuring a bountiful harvest: “In the
roots protests—an issue to which I shall return later in spring they examined the plowing, and supplied any defi-
this paper. ciency of seed; in the autumn they examined the reaping,
Another thing that the ancient philosopher Mencius and supplied any deficiency of yield.” 24 Only when the
and the modern revolutionary Mao shared in common, harvest was secure and the peasantry was satisfied did a

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Articles | Chinese Conceptions of “Rights”

ruler enjoy the Mandate of Heaven. To neglect the people’s the Chinese Communist Party were still focusing on work-
livelihood was to invite rebellion: “When the hungry go ers in the cities rather than on the rural peasantry. Based
without food . . . the people become unruly.” 25 The most upon a 32-day investigation of five counties in his home
important virtue of a ruler was benevolence (ren) or sym- province of Hunan, Mao described his awakening to the
pathy with the plight of the people. If a sovereign failed to importance of the peasantry. As he wrote:
provide for the well-being of his people, rebellion was the
In a very short time, in China’s central, southern and northern
natural reaction. As Benjamin Schwartz noted, “It is made provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty
amply clear in the Analects and particularly in the Men- storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no
cius, that the moral behavior of the masses is dependent power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will
upon their economic welfare.” 26 smash all the trammels that bind them and rush forward along
The differences between the Chinese and other impe- the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists,
warlords, corrupt officials, local bullies and evil gentry into their
rial systems (European as well as Japanese) were signifi- graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary com-
cant, but so too were the differences with many modern rade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they
republican political systems. Compare Mencius’ view of decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and
rebellion with that of Thomas Jefferson, for example. Both lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing?
Mencius and Jefferson stress the granting or withholding Or to stand in their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free
to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly.32
of popular support, but to very different ends. Jefferson’s
understanding of revolution drew not on the Book of Here Mao depicts the peasantry as a force of nature—“a
History but on Locke’s Second Treatise. 27 In Jefferson’s stir- mighty storm,” “a hurricane”—and argues that revolution-
ring speeches, rebellion was both natural and justifiable— ary success hinges upon acknowledging and accepting the
but as a check on political tyranny, not as a reaction to natural inclinations of the peasants, rough and violent as
socioeconomic injustice. A child of the Enlightenment, they may be.
Jefferson viewed periodic armed rebellion as essential in
The peasants are clear-sighted. Who is bad and who is not, who
sustaining democratic freedoms. As he put it, “God forbid is the worst and who is not quite so vicious, who deserves severe
we should ever be twenty years without such a rebel- punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly—the peasants
lion. . . . What country can preserve its liberties if the keep clear accounts and very seldom has the punishment exceeded
! rulers are not warned from time to time that their people the crime . . . A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an
preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take up arms. . . . essay, or painting a picture or doing embroidery; it cannot be so
refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind courteous,
The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time restrained and magnanimous. . . . The rural areas need a mighty
with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their
manure.“ 28 For Thomas Jefferson, tyranny, not poverty, millions to become a powerful force.33
was the root cause of periodic rightful rebellion.
Mao Zedong, who came of age more than a century In Mao’s view the revolutionary instincts of the peasantry
after Jefferson, was of course deeply influenced by West- derive from their poverty. Hence it is the poorest peasants,
ern political philosophies—first anarchism and then Marx- those with the least to lose, who are naturally the most
ism. But many of Mao’s ideas were congruent with his revolutionary.
own cultural traditions as well. As Schwartz stresses, Leadership by the poor peasants is absolutely necessary. Without
although a principal source of the Maoist vision was the poor peasants there would be no revolution. To deny their
Marxist-Leninist ideology, “this does not preclude the fact role is to deny the revolution. To attack them is to attack the
that in some of its aspects it coincides with certain tradi- revolution. They have never been wrong on the general direction
of the revolution.34
tional Chinese habits of thought and behavior.” 29 Indeed,
there are more than a few points of commonality between In these stirring passages, Mao puts forth a view of revo-
Confucianism and Marxism. The belief that human nature lution quite different from that of Marx and Lenin; whereas
is inherently social, and that conflict between the individ- for Marx the urban proletariat served as the revolutionary
ual and the larger community is unnatural and unneces- vanguard and for Lenin the Communist Party fulfilled
sary, is certainly central to both.30 that purpose, Mao is here assigning the role of revolution-
Here I would like to highlight two affinities between ary vanguard to the poor peasants who, as he described
Mao and Mencius: the importance of popular—in partic- them “are not afraid of losing anything.”
ular peasant—support in establishing political legitimacy, Although Mao’s Marxian celebration of class struggle put
and relatedly, the natural propensity of those who are hard him at odds with a Confucian preference for social har-
pressed economically to rebel against rapacious officials.31 mony, he nevertheless shared with Mencius a stress on the
Nowhere did Mao express these views more passionately peasantry as the decisive political force—and a belief that
or eloquently than in his famous “Report on an Investi- peasant poverty was the root cause of revolution (the mod-
gation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” published in ern Chinese term for which, geming, carries the meaning of
March of 1927 at a time when most of his comrades in “to change the mandate”).35 After the establishment of a

40 Perspectives on Politics

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Communist regime in China, when Mao’s thoughts turned ity (Heaven) was linked to the well-being of the peasantry—
to developmental issues, he continued to emphasize the piv- and political leaders, if they were to retain their legitimacy,
otal and dynamic role of the peasantry. In late 1955, Mao would have to get in step with peasant demands to protect
wrote of agricultural collectivization much as he had writ- and promote their livelihood.
ten of rural revolution thirty years before: For Mencius, peasant demands had been limited to
subsistence. By Mao’s time, the peasantry was seen as
A new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is imminent
throughout the countryside. But some of our comrades are tot-
demanding not only subsistence, but development as well.
tering along like a woman with bound feet and constantly com- Central to Marxism-Leninism is of course an apprecia-
plaining, “you’re going too fast” . . . The high tide of socialist tion of the dynamism of economic transformation. Peas-
transformation in the countryside . . . will soon sweep over the ants now rightfully expected to see an improvement in
whole country. It is a vast socialist revolutionary movement involv- their livelihood—and held government officials account-
ing a rural population of more than 500 million and it has
extremely great and world-wide significance . . . . The leadership
able to this higher standard. Mao cautioned that cadres
should never lag behind the mass movement, but the present would have to stop tottering along like women with bound
situation is one in which the mass movement is running ahead of feet if they were going to satisfy the peasants’ escalating
the leadership . . .36 aspirations.
Today, more than thirty years after Mao’s death, his ideas—
Again it was the peasantry, rather than the cadres, who
not to mention those of the ancient Mencius—may appear
were naturally attuned to the demands of revolutionary
somewhat dated. I have revisited these ideas because I
progress. And again it was poverty that generated their
believe that they offer some telling clues about contempo-
insight and enthusiasm:
rary Chinese politics. Chairman Mao’s successors—Deng
Both the poor peasants and the lower strata of the new and old Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao—have
middle peasants are enthusiastic about the socialist road . . . all emphasized economic development, and specifically
because the poor peasants are in a difficult economic position
poverty alleviation for the hard-pressed peasantry, as a cor-
and because the lower middle peasants are still not well off,
although their economic position is better than before liberation.37 nerstone of their claim to political legitimacy. This was the
rationale with which Deng Xiaoping launched his historic
Those who were materially well off, by contrast, failed to economic reforms in December 1978—spearheaded by the
appreciate the latent power of the masses. They failed, in household responsibility system for peasants in poorer !
other words, to grasp the “Mandate of Heaven.” parts of the countryside. When rural incomes soared in the
The well-to-do jeered: “Those ragamuffins think they can set up early 1980s, Deng rejoiced that his reforms were off to a
a cooperative. Never heard of a chicken feather flying up to promising start.
Heaven.” But that is just what this chicken feather has done . . . Although Western observers have often faulted the post-
The poor want to remake their lives. The old system is dying and Mao leadership for a failure to promote democratization
a new system is being born. Chicken feathers really are flying up and the enlargement of political rights, Chinese leaders
to Heaven.38
themselves appear far more concerned about aggressively
Here, six years after the founding of a new Communist pursuing socioeconomic objectives—especially the goal of
government, Mao was again identifying peasant poverty ensuring that poor peasants enjoy a decent and improving
as the motor propelling historic transformation—now not livelihood. When Deng Xiaoping initiated his reforms, in
political revolution but economic development in the form sharp contrast to Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, he talked
of agricultural collectivization. not of glastnost (political openness) or of perestroika (restruc-
We can certainly question the degree to which collec- turing) but of xiaokang (economic comfort).
tivization benefited the Chinese peasantry, but regardless In December 1979 Deng Xiaoping was asked by the
of how we evaluate China’s actual record of collectivized Prime Minister of Japan about the meaning of China’s
agriculture, it is worth recalling the political rationale that so-called Four Modernizations, the catchy phrase that
lay behind it. As Mao presented the situation to his skep- summed up the post-Mao reform effort. The Four Mod-
tical colleagues, collectivization was being driven by the ernizations, as articulated by the late Premier Zhou Enlai,
irrepressible yearning of the poor peasants for a better life. called for developing China’s agriculture, industry, science
Once again, as had been true twenty years before when he and technology, and national defense. Some Chinese dis-
investigated the peasant movement in Hunan, Mao insisted sidents, such as Wei Jingsheng, criticized the Chinese lead-
that the peasants were out in front of the Communist ership for not including a fifth modernization in its recipe
party—and party cadres would have to catch up quickly for development: democratization. But Deng Xiaoping,
unless they were to be trampled underfoot by a restless in responding to the inquiry of the Japanese Prime Min-
populace rushing forward along the road toward social- ister, mentioned none of these things. Instead, he replied
ism. The impoverished peasants, he exclaimed, were per- this way: “The Four Modernizations that we want to imple-
forming what had once seemed impossible: chicken feathers ment are a Chinese-style of Modernization. Our concept
were flying up to Heaven. As in Mencius, cosmic author- of Four Modernizations is not the same as your concept of

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Articles | Chinese Conceptions of “Rights”

modernization. What we seek to realize is an economi- Appropriately enough for a 16th Party Congress, sixteen
cally comfortable family (xiaokang zhi jia).” 39 targets were announced. For example, whereas in 2002,
The term xiaokang has an ancient lineage. It appears China’s per capita GDP stood at 8,000 yuan, by 2020 it is
repeatedly in the Confucian classics. In both the Book of supposed to soar to 24,000 yuan.44 While in 2002, per
Rites (Liji ) and the Book of Songs (Shijing), the term capita peasant income was a mere 2,476 yuan, by 2020 it
xiaokang refers to a type of society which, although not as is projected to reach 6,860 yuan. And so on. Still, com-
perfect as the utopian Great Harmony (datong)—the ideal pared to Jiang’s paramount interest in economic growth,
society that both Confucius and Mao were prone to his successors have put greater emphasis upon socioeco-
invoke—is nevertheless the next best thing because it pro- nomic well-being. At the last party congress, several cen-
vides everyone with economic comfort.40 In the Book of tral leaders pointed out that peasants lag behind city
Songs the “economically comfortable family” (xiaokang dwellers not only in terms of income, but also in access to
zhi jia) is described as a household whose labors afford it medical care, education, and other key indicators of human
a decent level of subsistence. welfare.
In January 1980, Deng gave concrete meaning to this The aim of an economically comfortable society is con-
concept. He explained his economically comfortable (xiao- siderably less ambitious than the utopian Confucian (or
kang) standard as a per capita GDP for China of $1,000 Communist) vision of a “Great Harmony,” but the cur-
(U.S.) dollars by the end of the twentieth century. Four rent Chinese leadership in directing attention to the plight
years later, Deng backpedaled a bit, shaving a couple of the peasantry draws inspiration from Mao Zedong as
hundred dollars off his target. As he put it in October well as from Mencius. Both Premier Wen Jiabao and Pres-
1984: “We have established a clear political goal: to reach ident Hu Jintao have made highly publicized trips to poor
a per capita GDP of $800 (U.S.) by the end of this rural areas that once served as Mao’s revolutionary bases—
century, so that the people’s livelihood reaches an eco- underscoring the central government’s deep concern for
nomically comfortable standard (renmin shenghuo dadao the livelihood of the struggling peasantry and its avowed
xiaokang shuiping).” In June of 1986, he explained fur- commitment to socioeconomic justice. On a visit to the
ther: “By the year 2000 we plan to establish an econom- site of the former Jiangxi Soviet in the summer of 2003,
ically comfortable society (xiaokang shehui ). To be too Hu Jintao enjoined officials at all levels of the party to
! ambitious won’t work. We must seek truth from facts. A “carry on the revolutionary tradition.” As Hu put it, “Com-
so-called economically comfortable society, although not rade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the elder
wealthy, is able to make do. We are a socialist country. generation not only made historical achievements by real-
Our national income should be distributed fairly so as to izing national independence and liberation, but also
allow all the people to benefit—without some people bequeathed to us precious spiritual wealth.” A front page
becoming too rich and others too poor.” article in People’s Daily elaborated on Hu’s remarks: “such
A similar rationale was embraced by Deng’s successor, revolutionary spirit and tradition, which were fostered
Jiang Zemin, when he announced his Great Western Devel- through arduous struggles, provide strength for overcom-
opment Strategy in June of 1999. Jiang’s “Great Leap West” ing difficulties and risks of all kinds in our way forward.” 45
called for massive state investment, foreign loans, and pri- The current leaders of China are acutely mindful of the
vate capital to be diverted from the rich coastal areas to decisive role of the peasantry in facilitating—or
the more remote regions of the interior countryside. The forestalling—overall national progress. At the 10th National
stated goals of Jiang’s ambitious policy were to “increase People’s Congress in March 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao set
the income of the population” and “bring prosperity to all forth the guiding policy of “building a new socialist coun-
nationalities.” 41 In his final speech as General Secretary of tryside.” In an international press conference held at the
the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang updated Deng’s xiao- conclusion of the NPC, the Premier explained:
kang target, pledging to turn China into an “economically
comfortable society” with a GDP of $ 4 trillion (U.S.) by The issues concerning agriculture, rural areas and farmers are
the year 2020.42 fundamental ones bearing on the overall interests of China’s mod-
ernization drive . . . The development of rural areas . . . will
In the run-up to the 16th Party Congress in the fall of facilitate our efforts to build an economically comfortable soci-
2002, an article in the Communist Party newspaper, People’s ety (xiaokang shehui ) in the countryside and modernize China’s
Daily, announced that “the ancient Chinese ideal of an agricultural sector. This is a significant step in terms of the over-
economically comfortable society (xiaokang shehui ), revi- all modernization of the country. . . To build a new socialist
talized by the country’s late leader Deng Xiaoping, is likely countryside . . . we need to respect . . . the will of the people in
rural areas . . . We need to . . . deliver tangible benefits to farm-
to be a hot topic at the 16th National Congress of the ers. . . And we need to use this as a yardstick to measure our
Communist Party of China.” 43 At the 16th Party Con- progress and performance.” 46
gress the new Chinese leadership, in keeping with Jiang
Zemin’s parting pledge, set forth the goal of establishing A year later, Wen’s two-hour keynote speech at the March
an “economically comfortable society” by the year 2020. 2007 National People’s Congress struck a similar theme,

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repeatedly emphasizing the central government’s concern sign outside the tax office saying: “Like the imperial grain
for the “three rurals” (sannong)—i.e., peasants (nongmin), tax, the state tax cannot be resisted.” 50 But of course much
agriculture (nongye), and countryside (nongcun): “We will has in fact changed since imperial days, and contempo-
focus on rural economic development and make substan- rary peasant protesters have other, more recent rhetorical
tial progress in building a new socialist countryside. We weapons with which to fight their battles. In phrases red-
need to consolidate, improve and strengthen policies for olent of Mao Zedong, today’s protesters proclaim, “It is
supporting agriculture and giving favorable treatment to right to rebel,” “All Power to the Peasants,” “The Peasants
farmers, provide more support for agriculture, rural areas are Clear Sighted,” “Down with the new landlords!” 51
and farmers, and promote restructuring of agriculture and Peasants are not the only protesters to draw inspiration
the rural economy.” 47 from the Chinese tradition of distributive justice. A pro-
The central leadership is not shy about touting the Mao- test by displaced workers at a knitting mill in Chongqing
ist bona fides of its “new socialist countryside” campaign. was one of many such incidents that have erupted in
As one government report lauded the benefits of the depressed industrial centers around the country in recent
program: years. The factory announced in November 1992 that it
was declaring bankruptcy and that its 3,000 workers would
By the side of the Red Well in Shazhoubei Village in Ruijin City,
an old villager named Yang Qingpo could scarcely believe his have to seek alternative employment on their own. More-
eyes when he strolled around the newly built cement roads of the over, retired workers were to be reduced to monthly sti-
village. How could a village where he’d lived for over 60 years pends of only 50 yuan, in contrast to original levels of 150
change overnight? The old toilets and dilapidated pigpens had to 250 yuan. To protest these reversals, a petition move-
been torn down and the garbage that had been piled high around ment was launched:
all the houses was gone. Newly built houses were neat and clean
. . . ‘The new socialist village construction has brought us old The retired workers who led the demonstration procession knelt
folks great benefit. Thanks be to the Communist Party!’ He down before the armed policemen, pleading tearfully that they
touched the stone tablet next to the Red Well which read, ‘When only wanted to lodge a petition to be able to receive their origi-
drinking the water, don’t forget the one who dug the well. Think nal pensions and only hoped for the right of subsistence. . . The
often of Chairman Mao.’ He felt that it expressed his own deep- retired workers said that the pensions represented the work accu-
est sentiments.48 mulation that they had made in the past decades and belonged
to part of the surplus value they had created . . . Workers on the
In practice, the new socialist countryside initiative— job said: We just worked according to orders, and business losses !
which is often coercively implemented—replicates some were caused by mistakes in the economic plan for guiding pro-
of the excesses and insensitivities toward the peasantry for duction; the blame should not be placed on the workers. The
which Mao’s own campaigns were known.49 Yet, concep- state should be responsible for the future of the workers and
tually, it shares with Maoism an overriding concern for should provide them with jobs and training, thus guaranteeing
workers’ basic right of survival. 52
peasant livelihood.
While Western critics express disappointment that While arguments about surplus value and the economic
China’s leaders seem reluctant to devote the same atten- plan reflect the influence of Marxism and Communism,
tion to political reform that they lavish upon precise indi- demands claiming a fundamental right to subsistence—
cators of socioeconomic goals, those who are most affected presented on bended knee—have a much older pedigree.
by these policies—the ordinary Chinese people—may feel We find numerous expressions of this Mencian claim in
somewhat differently. If we examine the recent protests urban as well as rural protests. A report in 1995, for exam-
that have erupted in China, we generally find them framed ple, noted that “workers in Liaoning and Sichuan often
in a language more reminiscent of Mencius or Mao than took to the streets and staged demonstrations to express
of Locke or Jefferson. their resentment. They called for ‘being able to get food
In many rural protests, the symbolism of the Mandate for survival.’” 53 Sociologist Ching Kwan Lee concludes in
of Heaven remains salient. Just a few years ago, peasant a recent survey of labor unrest in China that “subsistence
protesters in Hunan—in the manner of third century BC rights occupied top priority in the slogans.” 54 In fore-
rebels Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, who led the first peas- grounding subsistence demands, today’s workers are echo-
ant revolt recorded in Chinese history—swore an oath to ing long established protest frames. In the first major
Heaven and marched behind banners proclaiming “Pre- industrial strike instigated by Mao and his comrades—the
pare the Way for Heaven” as they pressed their demands Anyuan coal miners’ strike of 1922—the strikers (who
for lower taxes on township and county offices. Their rhet- were among the best compensated workers of their day)
oric was replete with Mencian resonance: “The people’s issued a manifesto that proclaimed: “We want to live! We
anger overwhelms Heaven;” “If the people are impover- want to eat! Now we are starving! Our lives are in danger!
ished, the realm should be anxious; if the people com- Seeking life in the midst of death, we have no choice but
plain, the realm should be afraid.” Equally interesting is to take up the weapon of last resort—to strike.” 55 During
the manner in which local officials responded to these recent pension protests at the Anyuan mine, retired min-
challenges. In one Hunan county, authorities posted a ers demanding higher compensation highlighted the gap

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between the image of xiaokang prosperity put forth by contemporary United States focused on a demand for eco-
the Communist Party leadership and their own dismal nomic justice. Instead, collective actions generally center
circumstances.56 on claims of individual civil rights. Take, for example, the
In contemporary Chinese labor protests, moral econ- numerous—and sometimes violent—confrontations sur-
omy claims to subsistence are often laced with Marxist rounding the question of abortion. “Pro-life” advocates put
rhetoric: “Workers are the masters of the country,” “Yes to forth claims on behalf of an unborn child’s “natural right”
socialism, no to capitalism,” “Long live the working to life, whereas “pro-choice” advocates advance claims on
class.” 57 Frequently the catchwords of the central leader- behalf of “reproductive rights”—or a woman’s “natural right”
ship are invoked, as in the recent Anyuan pensioners’ dem- to control her own body. Fierce as the conflict is, both sides
onstration: “Strengthen the Three Represents! We want to agree that the proper role of government in this bitter con-
eat, and we also want to move toward economic comfort troversy is to protect inalienable individual rights (whether
(xiaokang)!” 58 The slogans that appear to resonate most by upholding or by overturning the Roe v. Wade Supreme
strongly with officials, however, are those that avow an Court decision of 1973).
age-old claim to a basic livelihood. A newspaper report on Consider another persistent source of unrest in contem-
a series of labor protests in the northern industrial city of porary America—the extremist militia groups which have
Shenyang gave the following account: mushroomed across the land in recent years. Armed mili-
tias claiming Jeffersonian roots have been linked to a string
Workers have marched on government offices to protest against of terrorist attacks against the U.S. federal government.64
their wretched living conditions. . . Soft-hearted officials could Insisting that their activities conform to the spirit of the
not turn away the request for subsidies and wages . . . The mayor
of Shenyang declared, “The people are ours. They must at least American Revolution, these groups honor an individual’s
be able to eat.” 59 right to bear arms in defense of freedom (enshrined in the
Second Amendment) as the central cause and lasting leg-
To be sure, the protests sweeping both urban and rural China acy of the Revolution.65 As a member of the Missouri
today spring from multiple causes and are manifested in Fifty-First Militia puts it, “the primary trigger for the Rev-
many different ways. In the countryside, with the recent olution was the same as it is today: you don’t mess with a
abolition of the state agricultural tax, land disputes have free man’s right to keep and bear arms.” 66 In the eyes of
! replaced tax protests as the primary trigger of collective their militant members, these maverick militias stand as
violence. Even so, the insistent demand for socioeconomic guardians of a natural right to personal liberty against an
justice—framed as a moral claim to subsistence—is a thread oppressive federal government. The literature produced
that binds many of these otherwise disparate incidents by such groups makes frequent reference to an eighteenth-
together. Although the land disputes concern property rights, century republican ideology that saw the armed citizen as
they tend to be presented in moral economy terms. In a a people’s best protection against despotism. Thomas Jef-
recent protest against the seizure of collective land in Guang- ferson’s call to arms is quoted with particular fervor.67
dong’s Shunde county, for example, villagers complained In America, even fundamentally economic protests are
to higher-level officials that local cadres “don’t care if the framed as a question of civil rights. Take the case of the
peasants are without land and livelihood.” 60 In a land dis- “California Tax Revolt,” whose successful challenge to esca-
pute near Shenzhen, a protester explained to a foreign jour- lating property taxes (with the passage of Proposition 13
nalist, “I have no choice. I have an obligation to fight for in 1978) ignited similar protests across much of the U.S.68
our land, along with my fellow villagers. We have to keep The leader of the movement, Howard Jarvis, justified his
fighting until we get our land back. This is the root of our activities not with socioeconomic arguments, but in terms
life.” 61 In response to the spate of land conflicts, Premier of a struggle by rights-bearing citizens against despotism:
Wen Jiabao declared that “some locales are unlawfully “The entire basis of free government in America was being
occupying farmers’ land and not offering reasonable eco- destroyed by virtually unlimited taxation, which can only
nomic compensation and arrangements for livelihood, and lead to . . . dictatorship.” 69 Tyranny, not poverty, was
this is sparking mass incidents in the countryside . . . We offered as the reason for rightful rebellion. To Americans,
absolutely cannot commit a historic error over land prob- liberty rather than livelihood is the foundation of political
lems.“ 62 Wen’s speech was followed by a deluge of state- morality.
issued pledges for the construction of a new, more just In arguing for a significant difference between main-
“socialist countryside.”The articulation of a well-recognized stream Chinese and American conceptions of rights, and
right to a decent livelihood indicates that, despite the Chi- their implications for popular protest, I do not mean to
nese government’s apparent lack of concern for human rights suggest that all (or even any) Chinese think only about
as Americans may define them, the country is not neces- socioeconomic security, to the exclusion of all other con-
sarily suffering from a moral vacuum.63 cerns. That would be just as silly as to suggest that Amer-
Despite America’s own persistent problems of poverty and icans care only about political freedom and eschew all
homelessness, we do not see many social movements in the material interests. The example of China’s Tiananmen

44 Perspectives on Politics

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Uprising (led by students demanding democracy) or of cius and Mao than in the liberal tradition of Locke or
America’s pay equity campaign (led by women demand- Jefferson. In a series of newspaper articles that Mao Zedong
ing equal pay for equal work) is enough to dispel any such published in 1922 to promote the idea of a national labor
misunderstanding.70 But there is nonetheless, I believe, law, Mao (drawing upon the international socialist dis-
an important difference in emphasis between the two polit- course of his day) identified three “rights” (quan) that
ical cultures—manifested not only in abstract philosoph- such a law would guarantee: (1) the right to subsistence
ical discourse but in political rhetoric and popular protest (shengcun quan); (2) the right to work (laodong quan);
as well. and (3) the right to the entire proceeds of one’s labor
For that reason, I am skeptical of a central theme in (laodong quanshou quan).79 Surely, then, we should not
much of the recent American social science scholarship on impute to the discussion surrounding China’s latest labor
China, suggesting that the popular discourse of “rights” law some new sense of citizenship rights heralding a dem-
observable in recent protests indicates a newfound claim ocratic revolution-from-below. Indeed, when Sociologist
to citizenship that poses a fundamental challenge to state Ching Kwan Lee, impressed by the “constant invocation
authority.71 Such arguments, I believe, overstate both the of law and legal rights in workers’ interaction with local
novelty and the political threat posed by such protests. officials,” suggested to some protest leaders that they were
Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, in their study of rural fighting for citizens’ legal rights, she was greeted with rid-
protest in contemporary China, note that “the notion of icule: “Workers’ thinking is not that advanced,” “Legal
being a citizen is seeping into popular discourse” and urge rights? What is legal, where is the law?” 80 The 1995 Labor
that “we should not underestimate the implications of Law makes clear that its provisions are designed to facili-
rising rights consciousness and a growing fluency in ‘rights tate state goals: “This Law is hereby formulated in accor-
talk’ in a nation where rights have traditionally been weakly dance with the Constitution in order to protect the
protected”—on grounds that “today’s rightful resistance legitimate rights and interests of laborers, readjust the labor
could . . . evolve into a more far-reaching counterheg- relationship, establish and safeguard the labor system to
emonic project.” 72 David Zweig attributes China’s “cur- suit the socialist market economy, and promote economic
rent political and social dilemma” to “the confrontation development and social progress.” 81
between an emerging ‘rights conscious peasantry’ and rapa- China’s pervasive moral economy protests, framed in a
cious or entrepreneurial bureaucrats.” 73 Maria Heimer language of “rights,” have often demanded (sometimes !
highlights the possibility that “growing rights conscious- successfully) the removal of unpopular lower-level offi-
ness in the Chinese countryside may contribute to signif- cials. Rarely, however, have they questioned the ruling
icant political changes.” 74 Merle Goldman argues in her authority of either the Communist Party or its ideology.
book From Comrade to Citizen that “one of the major In this respect, contemporary protesters bear some resem-
changes in the last two decades of the twentieth century blance to imperial-era rebels. The endemic unrest that
was a growing sense of rights consciousness, particularly punctuated the history of imperial China often led to the
of political rights” among the Chinese population at large. replacement of particular officials (and very occasionally
The rapid and widespread development of citizenship and even of dynasties), while at the same time retaining and
civil society, she contends, has the potential “to produce reinforcing certain basic principles of the Confucian order.
in China changes as profound as those that occurred ear- Writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, the English
lier in Eastern Europe.” 75 Sinologist Thomas Meadows offered the following expla-
The impact of China’s 1995 Labor Law on the swelling nation for the remarkable longevity of the imperial Chi-
tide of labor disputes has attracted particular attention from nese system: “In China . . . it is precisely the right to rebel
observers in this country.76 Mary Gallagher sees the new that has been a chief element of a national stability, unpar-
law, and related legal institutions as helping to generate alleled in the world’s history.” 82 While one would be fool-
“increased societal conflict and rising rights-consciousness hardy to forecast for the current political order anything
among Chinese workers . . . .[W]orkers are increasingly approaching the lengthy lifespan enjoyed by the imperial
likely to use these new institutions to press for the protec- system, it does nonetheless appear that today’s patterns of
tion of their rights and interests.” 77 Bolder claims appear protest—still animated by a widespread appreciation of
in journalistic reporting on China; a recent Business Week “the right to rebel” 83 —may prove more system-supportive
article, mindful of the precedent of Solidarity in Poland, than system-subversive. In an authoritarian polity, where
speaks glowingly of “a new labor-rights revolution sweep- elections do not provide an effective check on the misbe-
ing China.” 78 havior of state authorities, protests can help to serve that
There is no doubt that the terms “rights” (quanli ) and function—thereby undergirding rather than undermin-
“citizen” (gongmin) suffuse both official and popular dis- ing the political system.84 Moreover, the current central
course in contemporary China. But workers who demand government’s willingness to respond to some of the pro-
that as “citizens” they have a “right” to eat would seem to testers’ key grievances, witnessed most dramatically in the
be following more in the moral economy footsteps of Men- 2006 abolition of the age-old agricultural tax followed by

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the promulgation of a new property rights law, points individual freedoms: “As rights consciousness gets increas-
more toward political flexibility than toward fragility. ingly developed, people’s duties become increasingly
The Chinese state itself actively encourages a concep- strong.” 92 This understanding of rights as an expression
tual linkage between “livelihood” and “rights.” At a of group unity, rather than of personal liberty, can be seen
government-sponsored art exhibition held in Beijing in in Republican-period popular discourse as well. The
February, 2003, to celebrate the first anniversary of the Anyuan coal miners, whose 1922 Communist-inspired
founding of the officially-authorized Chinese journal, strike manifesto had highlighted subsistence claims, savored
Human Rights, the editor-in-chief (speaking beneath por- their historic victory with a return-to-work manifesto which
traits of Mao, Deng, and Jiang) praised the exhibits for pledged a continuing struggle for collective rights: “Start-
portraying “stories in which the Chinese government and ing today, let us tighten our group unity, a multitude with
the Chinese people fight for human rights (renquan). but a single mind, to struggle for our own rights!” 93
Graphically, they reflect the spirit of the Chinese people Liang Qichao was certainly not the only modern Chi-
in striving for a xiaokang, or economically comfortable nese thinker to develop a conception of rights as a corner-
standard of living, and a vigorous development of the stone of his philosophy. But regardless of variations in
human rights under-taking in China.” 85 partisan leanings, and despite the growing influence of
This is not to deny that the pervasive “rights talk” in Western ideas on this discussion, political rights in mod-
contemporary China, officially encouraged though it is, ern China were consistently regarded as bound up with a
may serve to stimulate even further popular protest. Indeed moral responsibility to the larger political community. The
the Chinese term for “human rights” (renquan) also car- anarchist Liu Shipei credited Mencius (via Wang Yang-
ries the possible meaning of “people’s power.” However, ming) with an ethical understanding of human nature
expectations of welfare provision from the state (i.e., what that underpinned his own views of rights as inextricably
T.H. Marshall called “social citizenship”) clearly cannot tied to mutual and collective responsibilities on the part
be equated with demands for legal protections against the of rulers and ruled alike.94 The co-founder of the Chinese
state (“civil citizenship”)—nor with demands for partici- Communist Party, Chen Duxiu, concluded that it was
pation in the state (“political citizenship”). Moreover, in necessary for the sake of the nation to “sacrifice a part of
China even political citizenship (e.g., the right to vote, to the rights of individuals, in order to protect the rights of
! file petitions, to stage protests, to establish associations, the whole citizenry.” 95 A similar perspective, in which the
etc.) is generally understood as a state-conferred privilege state is both the benefactor and the beneficiary of citizen
rather than as a natural or inalienable prerogative. Andrew rights, permeates official Chinese state discourse. Exam-
Nathan points out that “political rights in China were ining China’s national constitutions from the late Qing
consistently regarded as a grant given by the state to the (1908) through the PRC, Nathan observes that “in none
citizens, to enable them to contribute their energies to the of the constitutions were rights considered to be derived
needs of the nation.” 86 from human personhood; they were derived from citizen-
The Chinese term for “citizen” (gongmin)—literally a ship in the state . . .” 96
“public person”—connotes collective membership in the Stephen Angle’s careful study of the philosophical ori-
polity, rather than a claim to individual or inalienable gins and implications of Chinese conceptions of human
rights vis-à-vis the state. Although the term “rights” (quan rights since the Song Neo-Confucianists argues persua-
or quanli ) did not figure centrally in Mencius, it has played sively that “Chinese rights discourse is not merely an
an important role in Chinese political discourse since its imperfect attempt to mirror Western ideals . . . it has a
introduction in the mid-nineteenth century by the Amer- coherent history and is made up of Chinese concepts
ican missionary, W.A.P. Martin.87 But the meaning of the and concerns . . . China has a rich and distinctive rights
term quan (as is also true of the term “rights” in Western discourse.” 97 This is of course not to suggest that Chi-
philosophical discourse) was from the start inconsistent.88 nese conceptions of rights are consistent, unchanging, or
Even Martin sometimes used the character quan to trans- impervious to foreign influence. However, rather than
late the English word “authority” as well as “rights.” 89 assume that the invocation of “rights” in contemporary
And Chinese thinkers who contributed to what Marina China bears a close affinity to Anglo-American concep-
Svensson has characterized as “a rich and internally con- tions of human rights and civil society, which ipso facto
tested debate on human rights since the late Qing dynas- imply a liberal critique of overweening state power, we
ty,” 90 often did so within a Confucian—specifically should be alert to the distinctive origins and implications
Mencian—framework. of “rights talk” in other cultural and political contexts.
Liang Qichao, modern China’s most influential propo- In a country where rights are seen more as state-
nent of “rights consciousness” explicitly linked his con- authorized channels to enhance national unity and pros-
cept to Mencius’ understanding of human morality.91 perity than as naturally endowed protections against state
Liang’s notion of rights implied an ethical responsibility intrusion, popular demands for the exercise of political
toward the collective good, rather than a protection of rights are perhaps better seen as an affirmation of—rather

46 Perspectives on Politics

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than an affront to—state power. For this reason, I prefer the world’s worst human rights offenders. The Chi-
to characterize the framing of protest in contemporary nese response painted America as a nation riddled with
China as “rules consciousness” rather than “rights con- violent crime and racial discrimination, embroiled
sciousness.” 98 In 2004, the Anyuan protesters presented a in a scandal over the presidential authorization of the
petition to the Pingxiang Mining Company and its Com- wiretapping of some domestic phone calls, and
munist Party Committee: patrolled by brutal policemen who shoot dead infants,
bash retired teachers, and abandon prison inmates
Please permit us, along with the majority of retired workers across (in New Orleans) as flood waters rise. As journalist
the country, to enjoy the newly designated wage standards. If
you ignore this, and refuse to resolve the issue of our legitimate John Taylor put it, “You can almost say ‘one report
rights and interests . . . at an appropriate time, in accordance deserves another.’” See “Correspondents Report”
with our constitutionally given rights, we will organize a large- (March 12, 2006) in http://www.abc.net.au/
scale protest demonstration. We will enlist the assistance of the correspondents/content/2006/s1589404.htm.
media in upholding justice. And we may ask relevant govern- 9 Information Office of the State Council of the
ment agencies to investigate the insider economic machinations
of the Company. This is the democratic and legitimate super- People’s Republic of China, 2004. Emphasis added.
visory authority given to us by the Chinese Communist Party. 10 On the nineteenth-century formulation, see
Of course a confrontation is not our first choice; our first choice Schwartz 1964. On Mao’s drive to power, see
is a peaceful livelihood.” 99 Schwartz 1951.
11 Marshall 1964.
In their various manifestos, the Anyuan retirees stressed
12 Fleischacker 2004, ch. 2.
that their protest was purely a demand for economic jus-
13 Fleischacker 2004, 2.
tice, as promised by the state; it therefore posed no threat
14 Munro 2001.
to political stability. An activist explained, “We’re seeking
15 Wong 1999, 97–122.
wages and welfare, not power (quan) or politics. We are
16 Hartz 1955, 11.
asking for permission to stage a demonstration. We may
17 Locke 1960.
not receive it, but the right to request it is stipulated in the
18 Wong 1997, 97.
national constitution.” 100
19 Mencius, Book I, Part I, ch. 7, verse 3.
It is of course entirely possible, indeed probable, that
20 Mencius, Book I, Part I, ch. 7, verse 21. !
Chinese protesters—like their counterparts around the
21 Mencius, Book V, Part I, ch. 5, verse 6.
world—often parrot the language of the state in order to
22 Mencius, Book VII, Part II, ch. 14, verses 1–2.
maximize the chances for a favorable outcome and mini-
23 Mencius, Book IV, Part I, ch. 7, verse 5.
mize the likelihood of repression from otherwise hostile
24 Mencius, Book I, Part II, ch. IV, verse 5.
officials. Even so, it would seem unwarranted (and quite
25 Mencius, Book I, Part II, ch. 4, verse 6.
misleading) to read into their impassioned pronounce-
26 Schwartz 1964, 11.
ments something resembling an Anglo-American “rights
27 In fact, “so close is the Declaration of Independence
revolution.” Taken seriously on its own terms, widespread
to Locke in form, phraseology, and content, that
popular protest in China points neither to an indigenous
Jefferson was accused of copying the Second Trea-
moral vacuum nor toward an epochal clash with state
tise.” Peardon 1952, xx.
authority.
28 Jefferson 1787.
29 Schwartz 1968, 172.
Notes 30 Munro 2000.
1 For a small sampling of this large literature, see 31 Again it is important to note that Mencius did not
Perry and Selden 2003; Gries and Rosen 2004; and employ the term “rights” (quanli ); nonetheless he
O’Brien and Stern forthcoming. viewed peasant rebellion in the face of poverty as a
2 See, for example, Gilley 2004, 45 ff. natural occurrence. Mao held a considerably more
3 See, among many others, Goldman 2007, 71ff. positive view of rebellion; as he put it, “Marxism has
4 Information Office of the State Council of the hundreds and thousands of principles, but they can
People’s Republic of China. 2000; emphasis added. be summed up in one sentence: ‘it is right to rebel’
5 See, for example, the reaction by Human Rights (zaofan youli )!”
Watch, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/04/10/ 32 Mao 1971, 23–24.
china242.htm. 33 Mao 1971, 29–30.
6 U.S. Department of State, 2002. 34 Mao 1971, 34–35.
7 Information Office of the State Council of the 35 Schwartz 1951, 188–204 emphasized Mao’s embrace
People’s Republic of China, 2002. of a “purely peasant mass base” as the heart of his
8 In March 2006, Condoleezza Rice issued the 2005 distinctive revolutionary approach.
State Department report branding China as one of 36 Mao 1971, 389–90.

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37 Mao 1971, 394. 71 Of course this argument is not made in precisely the
38 Mao 1971, 422–24. same way, or to the same degree, by every author.
39 Beijing Times (November 10, 2002). Still, Merle Goldman’s conclusion that “a growing
40 On Mao’s invocation of the concept of “Great Har- consciousness of citizenship and organized efforts to
mony,” see Wakeman 1973. assert political rights . . . . signify the beginnings of a
41 People’s Daily Online (September 16, 2000; May 21, genuine change in the relationship between China’s
2002); China Development Brief (October 1, 2000). population at large and the state at the beginning of
42 People’s Daily Online (November 8, 2002). the twenty-first century” is shared by much of the
43 People’s Daily Online (November 6, 2002). mainstream scholarly literature. Goldman 2007, 74.
44 In 2002, 8,000 yuan was equivalent to $960 (U.S.). 72 O’Brien and Li 2006, 126–127. In a thoughtful
45 Renmin ribao [People’s Daily] (September 3, 2003). footnote at 117–118, O’Brien and Li provide a
46 People’s Daily Online (March 15, 2006). discussion of the meaning of rights in a Chinese
47 China Daily Online (March 19, 2007). context that is quite compatible with central argu-
48 Zhang, Luo and Gong 2005, 8. ments in this paper.
49 Han 2006, 36–38. 73 Zweig 2003, 132.
50 Yu 2003. 74 Heimer and Thogersen 2006, 68.
51 Ouyang 1991, 55; Shih 1993, 40. 75 Goldman 2005, 2, 24.
52 Niu 1993, 67; emphasis added. 76 Lee 2002.
53 “Dispatch from Beijing: ‘Labor Unrest Reportedly 77 Gallagher 2005, 121, 158.
Occurs in Liaoning and Sichuan’”. 1995. In Lianhe 78 Roberts 2005.
bao (Hong Kong), translated in Foreign Broadcast 79 Hunan Federation of Trade Unions, ed., Hunan
Information Service (May 8), 42–43. yundong shiliao xuanbian [Selected historical materi-
54 Lee 2003, 80. als on the Hunan labor movement] (Changsha:
55 Pingxiang City Chinese Communist Party Editorial 1984), vol. 1: 148–149.
Group. 1990. Vol. 1, 41. 80 Lee 2007, 116.
56 Qunzhong liyi wuxiaoshi [The prerogatives of the 81 Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China, promul-
! masses are no trifling matter], unpublished protest gated on January 1, 1995.
manifesto (Anyuan: June 2004). 82 Meadows 1856, 27.
57 Lee 2003, 81. 83 The classical phrase “It is right to rebel” (zaofan
58 Yu 2006, 365. youli )—sometimes translated as “to rebel is
59 Sun and Ma 1995, 24. justified”—was deployed by Mao Zedong at the
60 Radio Free Asia, November 9, 2006. start of his Cultural Revolution to encourage stu-
61 Luis Ramirez, Voice of America, August 13, 2006. dent Red Guards to attack “capitalist roaders.” For a
62 Buckley 2006. recent history of the Cultural Revolution, see Mac-
63 Edmund Fung observes that “while Marxism is a Farquhar and Schoenhals 2006.
dead letter in the PRC, democratic socialist values 84 The much-ballyhooed village elections, it should be
are not.” Fung 2006, 479. noted, are seldom fully democratic procedurally,
64 Crothers 2003. and in any case do not extend beyond the village
65 In fact, the Second Amendment to the U.S. Consti- committee—which is not part of the formal state
tution guarantees a collective, not an individual, structure (the lowest rung of which is the town-
right to bear arms: “A well regulated Militia being ship government).
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 85 http://www.humanrights-china.org.
the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 86 Nathan 1985, 107.
infringed.” 87 Angle 2002, 3.
66 Mulloy 2004, 47. 88 Huang 1994.
67 Hamilton 1996, 1. 89 Angle and Svensson 2001, xv.
68 Sears and Citrin 1985, 226–235. 90 Svensson 2002, 2.
69 Jarvis 1979, 7. 91 Angle 2002, 153–154.
70 Calhoun 1994; McCann 1994. But it is important 92 Liang Qichao, “On Rights Consciousness;” quoted
to note that pay equity was also presented as an in Angle, 2002: 159.
individual right to equal treatment under the law, 93 Pingxiang City Chinese Communist Party Editorial
rather than as a collective economic right. See Weir Group 1990, volume 1, 45.
1992 for an analysis of the persistent failure of a 94 Liu Shipei, “The Essentials of the Chinese Social
general “right to work” movement to take hold in Contract” and “Textbook on Ethics,” quoted in
the United States. Angle 2002, 172–175.

48 Perspectives on Politics

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95 Chen Duxiu, “The Direction of Contemporary a study of Liang Qichao’s accommodative thinking].
Education;” quoted in Angle 2002, 186. Taipei: Academia Sinica Modern History Institute.
96 Nathan 1985, 111. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s
97 Angle 2002, 206–207; 250–251. Republic of China. 2000. “Fifty Years of Progress in
98 Perry 2007, 20–21. China’s Human Rights.” Beijing.
99 Yu 2006, 372. _. 2002. “Human Rights Record of the United
100 Yu 2006, 417. States in 2001.” Beijing.
_. 2004. “China’s Progress in Human Rights in
2004.” Beijing.
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