EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

MIA ARRA C. CAMACHO

Chairperson

MARIA KATHERINE C. DELOSENDO ALTHEA MAE C. APELIT JAMAELA CHERINA MARIE A. CALINISAN
Vice Chair for Academics Secretary Creative Director and Public Relations
Officer
IRAH BRIGETTE A. VALENZUELA THERESE ANN C. MIRANO
Vice Chair for Administration Treasurer PATRICIA ALLEN C. YUMA
Volunteer Core Head
MARICOR P. MARASIGAN MARIAN CLARESSE C. JAURIGUE
Operations and Logistics Head Auditor JESILENE MARRI Z. ELEGIDO
Ways and Means Officer

CRIMINAL LAW COMMISSION

WILLARD ENRIQUE R. MACARAAN
Criminal Law Commissioner

GUIA MARIE P. BARBO ERUEL JAMES A. QUITO MARK GIL B. MARTINEZ

Deputy Commissioner Subject Head – RPC Book Two (Part 1) Subject Head – SPL (Part 2)

AICEL P. ABAD NELSON M. VIVAR SAM JETHRO L. CUDILLO

Subject Head – RPC Book One (Part 1) Subject Head – RPC Book Two (Part 2) Subject Head – SPL (Part 3)

MA. THERESA G. MONTEMAYOR ILLONA TRINA J. CESANTE APRIL FRANCES S. NAVARRO

Subject Head – RPC Book One (Part 2) Subject Head – SPL (Part 1) Subject Head – Fundamental Principles
of Criminal Law & Strategic Plan for
Judicial Innovations 2022-2027

PATRICIA ANN D. ABRAHAM JEAN-EZEKIEL M. FERNANDEZ PAULA MARIE G. PINEDA

MARIA BERNADETTE F. AGUILA FATIMA N. FRANCISCO ALYANNA R. ROLON
LIEZEL T. ALINDOG MARIA CRISTINA ROCEL U. HO FIDEL M. RUBIAS
LOUSHELA SHAYNE A. APOSTOL LORRIENNE JUDITH MARIE G. JUANANI PATRICIA ELAINE V. SORIANO
URIEL M. BAGANG OWEN T. LAVA VINCE CHRISTIAN T. TAPIA
GERRIC F. BAUTISTA ANNE YZABEL M. LAVILLA JENNY M. TAYAMIN
MARK JOMER BORRES LAWRENCE B. MOLINA CHRISTIAN JOSEF M. TENGSON
ANALYN B. CABRERA VERALICE E. MORELOS DANIELLE ANNE VILLAMOR
INCIONG Q. DIAMANTE JACQUELYNE S. MOVIDA Members
CAREN CHARLOTTE DIMAYUGA KRISTINE L. MUYCO-LOPEZ
ARIS B. DUROY BIENVENIDO III L. ORTIZ ATTY. JAYSON A. FRANCISCO
KUMIKO S. OTOMO Subject Adviser

CENTER FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

[Link] M. VILLOSTAS
Director

ATTY. ANTONY J. PARREÑO

ATTY. LESTER NAZARENE V. OPLE
ATTY. REA MAY G. HERMOSURA
CLEAR Advisers

PHILIPPINE COPYRIGHT

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prohibited. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including but not limited
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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ⓒ 2025

Page 2 of 31
 CRIMINAL LAW (10%)

II. REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK ONE

A. Felonies Page
7. Conspiracy and Proposal
1. People of the Philippines v. Pagapulaan, et. al., G.R. No. 216936, 29 July 2019 5
B. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability
1. Justifying Circumstances
2. Ganal Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130, 02 December 2020 5
3. PO2 Cambe v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254269, 13 October 2021 6
2. Exempting Circumstances
4. People of the Philippines v. Macalindong, G.R. No. 248202, 13 October 2021 7
3. Mitigating Circumstances
5. People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 217022, 03 June 2019 7
6. People of the Philippines v. Doca, G.R. No. 233479, 16 October 2019 8
4. Aggravating Circumstances
7. People of the Philippines v. Pagkatipunan, G.R. No. 232393, 14 August 2019 8
D. Plurality of Crimes (Real and Ideal)
8. People of the Philippines v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, 08 September 2020 9
III. REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO
D. Title Four – Crimes Against Public Interest
9. Liwanag v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205260, 29 July 2019 9
F. Title Seven – Crimes Committed by Public Officers
10. Pineda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228232, 27 March 2023 9
11. Remolano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248682, 06 October 2021 10
G. Title Eight – Crime Against Persons
12. People of the Philippines v. Delos Santos Jr., G.R. No. 248929, 09 November 10
2020
13. People of the Philippines v. Espina, G.R. No. 219614, 10 July 2019 10
14. People of the Philippines v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, 25 January 2021 11
15. People of the Philippines v. Saltarin, G.R. No. 223715, 03 June 2019 11
16. People of the Philippines v. Galam, G.R. No. 224222, 09 October 2019 11
17. People of the Philippines v. Padal, Jr., G.R. No. 232070, 02 October 2019 12
18. People of the Philippines v. Angeles, G.R. No. 224289, 14 August 2019 12
19. People of the Philippines v. Almosara, G.R. No. 223512, 24 July 2019 13
20. People of the Philippines v. Albino, G.R. No. 229928, 22 July 2019 13
21. People of the Philippines v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 220486, 26 June 2019 13
22. People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 227013, 17 June 2019 14
23. People of the Philippines v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, 22 January 2020 14
24. People of the Philippines v. XXX264352, G.R. No. 264352, 03 December 2023 14
25. People of the Philippines Rapiz, G.R. No. 240662, 16 September 2020 15
26. People of the Philippines v. XXX263553, G.R. No. 263553, 30 November 2023 15
27. People of the Philippines v. Dumdum, G.R. No. 221436, 26 June 2019 15
28. People of the Philippines v. Siscar, G.R. No. 218571, 03 June 2019 16
29. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 225339, 10 July 2019 16
30. People of the Philippines v. Suwalat, G.R. No. 227749, 22 September 2020 16
31. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 230334, 19 August 2019 16
32. People of the Philippines v. Cubay, G.R. No. 224597, 29 July 2019 17
33. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 222492, 03 June 2019 17
34. People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, 04 September 2019 17
35. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 232308, 07 October 2020 18
36. People of the Philippines v. Carreon, G.R. No. 229086, 15 January 2020 18
37. People of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 229658, 28 August 2019 19
38. People of the Philippines v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 264958, 14 August 2023 19
I. Title Ten – Crimes Against Property

Page 3 of 31
 39. Tria v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 25583, 02 August 2023 19
40. People of the Philippines v. Mancao, G.R. No. 228951, 17 July 2019 20
41. People of the Philippines v. Casabuena et. al., G.R. No. 246580, 23 June 2020 20
42. People of the Philippines v. Catacutan, G.R. No. 260731, 13 February 2023 20
43. People of the Philippines v. Yumol, G.R. No. 225600, 07 July 2020 21
44. Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 252807, 22 June 2022 21
45. Garma v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248317, 16 March 2022 22
IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
E. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
[R.A. No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 3047; P.D. No. 677; P.D. No. 1288; Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 195; R.A. No. 10910]
46. Leonardo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246451, 03 February 2021 22
47. People of the Philippines v. Yap, G.R. No. 255087, 04 October 2023 23
48. Cabarios v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 228097-103 & 228139-41, 29 23
September 2021
49. Locsin Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 221787 and 221800-02, 13 23
January 2021
K. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
[R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364; R.A. No. 11862]
50. People of the Philippines v. Almero, G.R. No. 269401, 11 April 2024 24
51. People of the Philippines v. Becaylas, G.R. No. 266047, 11 April 2024 24
52. Ferrer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 223042, 06 July 2022 25
53. People of the Philippines v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 263706, 14 August 2023 25
54. People of the Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 263264, 31 July 2023 26
55. People of the Philippines v. BBB and XXX, G.R. No. 252507, 18 April 2022 26
L. Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
[R.A. No. 9262]
56. XXX261920 v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 261920, 27 March 2023 27
57. XXX256611 v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 256611, 12 October 2022 27
N. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
[R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640; A.M. 18-03-16-SC; IRR of R.A. No. 9165]
58. Xiuquin Shi v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228519, 16 March 2022 27
59. People of the Philippines v. Andanar, G.R. No. 246284, 16 June 2021 28
60. People of the Philippines v. Quijano, G.R. No. 247558, 19 February 2020 28
Q. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act
[R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. no. 9231; R.A. No. 11648]
61. Javarez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248729, 03 September 2020 29
62. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 252351, 07 July 2021 29
63. AAA261422 v. XXX261422, G.R. No. 261422, 13 November 2023 29
64. People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 230904, 08 January 2020 30
65. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235662, 24 July 2019 30
S. Law on Arson
[P.D. No. 1613]
66. People of the Philippines v. Dolendo, G.R. No. 223098, 03 June 2019 31

Page 4 of 31
 II. REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK ONE

A. Felonies

7. Conspiracy and Proposal

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PAGAPULAAN, ET AL., G.R. NO. 216936, 29 JULY 2019

FACTS: Ruben Pacho refused to pay barker Alvin Pagapulaan P10.00 after picking up passengers, prompting a
commotion. Pagapulaan cursed and hit the jeepney, causing the passengers to leave. When Pancho stepped out
with a samurai to defend himself, Pagapulaan, Jose Batulan, Renato Fuentes, and Junjun Fuentes attacked him.
They took turns stabbing and hacking him, leading to his death. Two accused fled but were later apprehended.
The trial court found all four acted in conspiracy, taking advantage of superior strength, and ruled that the killing
was attended by treachery.

ISSUE #1: Whether conspiracy was present in the murder of Pacho.

HELD #1: Yes. Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. What is important is that all participants performed specific
acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose to bring about the death
of the victim. The acts of Batulan and his co-accused were coordinated. Their attacks were synchronized, driven
by a single criminal intent—to kill Ruben. Their spontaneous agreement to commit the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility. Since conspiracy is present, Batulan is equally liable as his co-accused, regardless of
who delivered the killing blow. For where there is a conspiracy, all conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act
of one is the act of all.

ISSUE #2: Whether the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength.
HELD #2: No. Treachery did not attend the killing. Here, there was no showing that appellant deliberately chose
his method of attack to ensure the accomplishment of the crime without risk of retaliation coming from the victim.
Instead, abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder. This circumstance is appreciated whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his aggressors, and the latter took advantage of
such inequality to facilitate the commission of the crime. Unlike in treachery, where the victim was not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that
the victim was completely defenseless. It is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that
of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense,
although not annulling it.

B. Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability

1. Justifying Circumstances

2. GANAL, JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 248130, 02 DECEMBER 2020

FACTS: While Ganal Jr. was drinking at home, neighbor Follante arrived uninvited and, when refused entry, began
throwing stones at Ganal Jr.’s and his father’s houses. When Ganal Sr. came out to intervene, he saw Follante
with his uncle Julwin, who threatened to kill Ganal Jr. and his family. As Ganal Sr. tried to close the gate, Julwin
forced it open and struck him in the chest with a stone, causing him to collapse. Ganal Jr., witnessing this and
seeing Julwin still holding stones and a knife tucked in his waistband, fired a warning shot. When Julwin continued
advancing and was just two to three meters away, Ganal Jr., fearing for his life and his father’s, fired all rounds.
Julwin fell a meter from the door.

ISSUE: Whether the justfiying circumstance of self-defense should be appreciated in favor of Ganal Jr.

HELD: Yes. To successfully claim self-defense, an accused must satisfactorily prove the following elements: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. A person who is assaulted does not
have the time or mental clarity to think, calculate, and choose the weapon to be used. In such emergencies,

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 human nature acts not on formal reasoning but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent
that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, the courts must hold the actor not responsible in law for the
consequences. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability. Here, although the
petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2) lacerations on Julwin, the number of wounds alone should
not automatically suggest that the petitioner had a determined intent to kill.

3. PO2 CAMBE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 254269, 13 OCTOBER 2021

FACTS: Police officers PO2 Anthony Cacho and PO2 Randolph Cambe were charged with Frustrated and Attempted
Murder for shooting brothers Lynyrd and Paul David Cueva as they exited a videoke bar. The prosecution alleged
that the officers, annoyed by the group’s noise, confronted and shot the victims—Cambe hitting Paul in the thigh
and Lynyrd in the abdomen. The defense claimed they were conducting surveillance and acted in self-defense
after being attacked, with Roberto Dicipulo allegedly striking Cambe with a beer bottle. Both officers later
surrendered. The RTC found them guilty and imposed penalties and damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
prompting the petitioners to raise issues on self-defense, voluntary surrender, and whether the correct crimes
were Frustrated and Attempted Murder.

ISSUE #1: Whether the justfiying circumstance of self-defense should be appreciated in favor of PO2 Cambe.
HELD #1: No. PO2 Cambe must prove the following to establish self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Only the first two elements of self-
defense are present here - the initial aggression came from the victims and PO2 Cambe employed reasonable
means to defend himself. But as for the third element, there was sufficient provocation on the part of PO2 Cambe.
For perspective, petitioners' first encounter with the victims was when they (petitioners) admonished the latter for
being rowdy. A verbal altercation ensued which led PO2 Cambe to push Merlyn and curse at the latter "Wag kang
makialam putang ina mo!" Thereupon, Roberto struck PO2 Cambe using a beer bottle, causing the latter to slump
on the ground. Lynyrd and Paul immediately prepared to follow up on the attack, hence, PO2 Cambe shot each of
them once. The above sequence showed how the verbal altercation escalated into a shooting incident. As it was,
PO2 Cambe's act of pushing and cursing Merlyn triggered Lynyrd, Paul and Roberto to assault him. Roberto
launched an attack on PO2 Cambe. Lynyrd and Paul were about to follow up on the attack but PO2 Cambe repelled
them with his service firearm.

ISSUE #2: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to PO2 Anthony Cacho
and PO2 Randolph Cambe (petitioners).
HELD #2: No. The claim of voluntary surrender could not be credited to the petitioners, as their actions were
limited to reporting the incident rather than acknowledging guilt. Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance
requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in
authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity
and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture. Here, petitioners went to the police station not to surrender themselves but to report the
incident. Unfortunately, this is not the acknowledgement of guilt contemplated by law for purposes of mitigating
one’s criminal liability.

ISSUE #3: Whether PO2 Cambe is guilty of frustrated and attempted murder.
HELD #3: No. Instead, PO2 Cambe is guilty of frustrated and attempted homicide. In the absence of
circumstances which qualify the crime to murder, parricide, or infanticide, the killing would only be classified as
homicide under Article 249 of the RPC. Both murder and homicide, in either their frustrated and attempted stages,
require intent to kill. The difference between their frustrated stages, on the one hand, and their attempted stages,
on the other, lies on the gravity of the injuries inflicted. The killing is frustrated when the victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; it is in its attempted stage when the victim
sustained only a non-fatal wound because of mere partial execution of the acts necessary to accomplish the killing,
provided that the partial execution is not on account of the perpetrator’s spontaneous desistance. Thus, in order
to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated murder or homicide, or physical injuries, the
crucial points to consider are: first, whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused; second, whether
there are circumstances present which qualify the crime to murder; and third, whether the injury sustained by the
victim was fatal.

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 2. Exempting Circumstances

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MACALINDONG, G.R. NO. 248202, 13 OCTOBER 2021

FACTS: Leonardo Macalindong was charged with murdering his live-in partner, Jovelia Malinao, by stabbing her
multiple times with a bladed weapon during a quarrel, causing her instant death. Their seven-year-old daughter,
Lyn Joy, testified that she witnessed her father stab her mother. The police corroborated the circumstances
surrounding Macalindong’s arrest. At trial, Macalindong claimed he blacked out and could not recall the incident.
He presented medical evidence that he had schizophrenia and argued he should be exempted from criminal liability
due to insanity. The trial court found him guilty of murder, ruling that his mental illness was not proven to be of
such severity as to render him completely deprived of reason or discernment at the time of the crime.

ISSUE #1: Whether Macalindong should be exempted from criminal liability due to insanity.
HELD #1: No. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission
of the act; that is, the accused is entirely without reason and acts without the slightest discernment due to a total
lack of the power to understand or a complete absence of free will. Jurisprudence consistently holds that a plea
of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Therefore, if the accused is found to have been sane at
the time of the commission of the offense, conviction must follow, as the accused has already admitted to
committing the criminal act. Here, appellant's plea of insanity – that he was suffering from schizophrenia – at the
time he killed Jovelia was unsubstantiated. More specifically, though he claimed to have blacked out on the day in
question, there was no showing that the same happened at the time of, or immediately preceding, the killing of
Jovelia. All he said was he blacked out and was not sure whether it was he who killed the victim. True, there was
an Initial Report dated March 10, 2008 from the NCMH and a Medical Certificate dated November 9, 2007 issued
by Dr. Lindo. Yet, Dr. Lindo was not even called to identify the medical certificate, let alone, expound on the
contents of the NCMH initial report specifically the extent and the specific time frame of appellant's illness.
Consequently, appellant's defense of insanity cannot be credited as an exempting circumstance.

ISSUE #2: Whether Macalindong was properly convicted of murder.

HELD #2: No. There were no qualifying circumstances that would elevate the crime to murder. Hence, the proper
charge is homicide. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in the
same article; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The evaluation of the qualifying circumstances
showed that the sudden and impulsive nature of the attack did not meet the threshold for treachery or abuse of
superior strength. Consequently, since Jovelia’s killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstance that would
elevate the crime to murder, the appellant is only guilty of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the RPC.

3. Mitigating Circumstances

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 217022, 03 JUNE 2019

FACTS: Salve Gonzales physically assaulted her 13-year-old son, Ronald, after learning he had sold the bronze
wire from their electric meter. She first hit him with a hanger until it broke, then used a broom’s wooden handle
to strike his head and body. The next day, Ronald was weak, unable to eat, and had vomited and urinated on his
bed. Instead of helping him, Gonzales again struck him and wounded his lips by forcing the broom handle into his
mouth. When Ronald collapsed, she dismissed his condition as an act. It was only when Ronald’s aunt arrived that
he was brought to the hospital, where he later died. Gonzales was convicted of parricide. She claimed that the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be appreciated in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong should be
appreciated in favor of the respondent.

HELD: No. Undoubtedly, Gonzales was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline Ronald for his mistake but
by an evil intent to ruthlessly beat up the helpless little boy. Her cruelty toward her young child wickedly defies
human nature especially the mother's protective instinct toward her own. It is inexplicably tragic that the very
person who brought Ronald into this world, with the natural and unconditional obligation to protect and nurture
him, was also the one who brought his life to a premature end at the very young age of thirteen (13). Plainly,

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 Gonzales’ brutish acts sufficiently produced, and did produce, her son's death. She, therefore, cannot be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOCA, G.R. NO. 233479, 16 OCTOBER 2019

FACTS: Roger Celestino and his companions were walking in Barangay Gadu, Solana, Cagayan when they saw
Jomar Doca, visibly drunk and angry, inside a waiting shed with a Rambo knife strapped to his waist. As Celestino
passed by, Doca suddenly stabbed him in the chest, then fled. Celestino died from severe hemorrhage. The next
day, Doca voluntarily surrendered to the barangay captain, who turned him over to the police. At trial, Doca
claimed self-defense, alleging provocation by Celestino. However, he failed to substantiate this claim. The trial
court convicted him of murder, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no unlawful aggression to justify self-
defense and holding that his voluntary surrender did not mitigate his criminal liability.

ISSUE #1: Whether Doca’s voluntary surrender mitigates his criminal liability.
HELD #1: Yes. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender requires the following: (1) the accused has
not been arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary. After killing Roger, Doca immediately fled out of fear for his life. However, the following
day, he surrendered to Brgy. Captain Palattao, who took him to the police authorities. The requisites for voluntary
surrender are met, effectively mitigating his criminal liability.

ISSUE #2: Whether Doca is guilty of murder.

HELD #2: No. Doca is not guilty of the crime of murder. Since there were no qualifying circumstances (evident
premeditation or treachery) attending the killing to elevate the charge to murder, Doca may only be convicted of
homicide. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from
the defense that the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that attack is deliberate and without
warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with
not chance to resist or escape.

4. Aggravating Circumstances

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PAGKATIPUNAN, G.R. NO. 232393, 14 AUGUST 2019

FACTS: Joseph Pagkatipunan entered eight-year-old AAA’s home in Cainta, Rizal, where she was sleeping alone.
He undressed her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Two days later, while AAA was again alone in her house,
Pagkatipunan returned. He ordered her to undress, spread her legs, and lick her vagina. AAA’s father, BBB, arrived
during this act and witnessed it, leading to Pagkatipunan’s flight and subsequent arrest. The trial court and Court
of Appeals convicted Pagkatipunan. The incidents occurred within AAA’s dwelling. The second incident involved
specific acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE #1: Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly considered in imposing the penalties.
HELD #1: Yes. The crime of rape was committed in the victim’s home, violating the sanctity of the dwelling. The
law considers this aggravating, as crimes committed in one’s home are considered more heinous. The accused,
Pagkatipunan, entered the victim’s home and took advantage of the situation while the victim was alone. This
blatant disregard for the victim’s privacy heightened the severity of the crime.

ISSUE #2: Whether the act committed is tantamount to an act of lasciviousness.

HELD #2: Yes. The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits
any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex and (b) the act of lasciviousness or
lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. “Lewd” is
defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous, signifying a form of immorality related to moral impurity. Here,
all the elements of lascivious conduct under RA 7610 and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC were
established.

ISSUE #3: Whether the accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct.
HELD #3: Yes. Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below
twelve (12) years of age, the requisites of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met, in

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 addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7610. When the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age at the time the offense was committed, the offense shall be designated as Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610. To convict an accused of child abuse through lascivious
conduct under RA 7610, the elements of both Article 336 of the RPC and Section 5 of RA 7610 must be present.
In this case, all such elements were sufficiently proven.

D. Plurality of Crimes (Real and Ideal)

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BENDECIO, G.R. NO. 235016, 08 SEPTEMBER 2020

FACTS: Appellant Nestor Bendecio fired at Gerry Marasigan but missed, fatally hitting Gerry’s 7-year-old daughter,
Jonabelle, and injuring his sister, Princess. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty of attempted murder with
homicide. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction to attempted murder with murder, ruling that
Jonabelle’s killing was committed with treachery and her helplessness rendered it murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the appellant of the complex crime of attempted murder
with murder.

HELD: No. Appellant committed the complex crime of murder with attempted murder under Article 48 of the RPC,
which states that a complex crime occurs when a single act constitutes two (2) or more grave or less grave
felonies. Here, the appellant’s single act of firing his gun constituted the crime of attempted murder concerning
Gerry and the crime of murder relating to Jonabelle. Under Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the most serious
crime is imposed and applied in its maximum period. The most serious crime is murder, so the imposable penalty
is that of murder in its maximum period.

III. REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK TWO

D. Title Four - Crimes Against Public Interest

9. LIWANAG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 205260, 29 JULY 2019

FACTS: C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, Sr. was convicted of falsification under Article 171 of the RPC after a falsified
Temporary Operator’s Permit (TOP), used by his son in a vehicular accident, was found to contain false entries,
including an incorrect birthdate and badge number. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling that intent
to gain or injure a third party is not essential for the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the intent to gain or injure a third person is a necessary element for the crime of Falsification of
a Public Document under Article 171 of the RPC.

HELD: No. The intent to gain or injure is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public documents.
The principal concern in such cases is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth, as solemnly
proclaimed in public documents. The crime of falsification is established by making untruthful statements in a
public document, regardless of the offender’s intent to cause harm or gain. Here, the petitioner was convicted of
falsification of public document because when he issued the TOP, he made untruthful statements in a narration of
facts.

F. Title Seven - Crimes Committed by Public Officers

10. PINEDA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 228232, 27 MARCH 2023

FACTS: PO2 Arthur Pineda was charged with Conniving with/Consenting to Evasion under Article 223 of the RPC
when he consented to the escape of a detainee after prisoner Marcelino Nicolas escaped while under his hospital
watch. Pineda left his post for two hours, claiming he responded to a robbery. The MTC convicted him under
Article 223 of the RPC, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) modified the conviction to Evasion through Negligence
under Article 224 of the same Code. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed RTC’s decision arguing that that the
Information, despite its caption, actually charged a violation of Article 224, not Article 223, of the Revised Penal
Code.

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 ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was correctly convicted of Evasion through Negligence under Article 224 and not
Conniving with/Consenting to Evasion under Article 223 of the RPC.

HELD: No. The petitioner was not charged with either Conniving with/Consenting to Evasion under Article 223 nor
with Evasion through Negligence under Article 224. The allegations in the Information were neither here nor there.
It was even replete with contradictions. Consequently, petitioner cannot be found guilty of either one of the
aforesaid crimes. To do so would certainly violate his Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. While an offense charged necessarily includes one proved if the former’s essential
elements, as alleged, constitute the latter. However, this principle is inapplicable here because Conniving
with/Consenting to Evasion does not necessarily include Evasion through Negligence, as their elements are distinct.

F. Title Seven - Crimes Committed by Public Officers (Direct Bribery)

11. REMOLANO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 248682, 06 OCTOBER 2021

FACTS: Traffic aide Silverio Remolano was caught in an entrapment operation after accepting money from a
motorist to avoid issuing a traffic ticket. Initially charged with robbery, he was convicted by the trial court. The CA
later modified the conviction to direct bribery, finding no intimidation. Remolano argued that the conviction for
direct bribery was improper since he was not formally charged with that offense.

ISSUE: Whether the crime of direct bribery is covered by Remolano’s indictment for the crime of robbery.

HELD: No. The crime of direct bribery is not covered by Remolano’s indictment for the crime of robbery; thus, he
cannot be convicted of it. The variance between the allegations in the Information and the conviction will justify a
conviction for either offense only if one is necessarily included in the other. As shown, this is not the case here.
To convict Remolano of direct bribery, as the Court of Appeals did, violates both the Constitution and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is a constitutional guarantee
essential to due process and the preparation of a proper defense.

G. Title Eight - Crimes Against Persons

Parricide

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DELOS SANTOS, JR., G.R. NO. 248929, 09 NOVEMBER 2020

FACTS: Paulino Jr., while intoxicated, arrived at his cousin’s house where Michael and others were gathered, and
immediately argued with his brother Marcos, waking their father, Paulino Sr. Despite their father’s attempt to
intervene, Paulino Jr. refused to leave, challenged him to a fight, and suddenly stabbed him in the upper left chest.
Paulino Sr. collapsed and died before reaching the hospital. Michael, who witnessed the incident, positively
identified Paulino Jr. as the assailant. The prosecution established the familial relationship, the fatal stabbing, and
the direct participation of Paulino Jr., leading to his conviction for parricide.

ISSUE: Whether Paulino Jr. is guilty of parricide.

HELD: Yes. Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the accused is the killer; and (3) the deceased is either the legitimate spouse of the accused or any legitimate or
illegitimate parent, child, ascendant or descendant of the accused. Michael positively identified the appellant as
the killer of his father, Paulino Sr., and the third element is undisputed. The appellant admitted under oath that
the deceased, Paulino, Sr,. was his father. The absence of the appellant’s certificate of live birth does not negate
his culpability, as oral evidence of his filial relationship with the victim may be considered admissible.

Murder

13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESPINA, G.R. NO. 219614, 10 JULY 2019

FACTS: While drinking at Pio Manjares’ house with Ernando Reyes, Jr., Russel, Dante, and others, Ponciano Espina
briefly left and returned with a .45 caliber gun, which he showed to the group. After letting others hold it, Espina
tucked the gun into his waist. Later, he pulled it out, pointed it close to Ernando’s chest, and said, “Ano gusto?

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 Patay buhay?” He then suddenly shot Ernando, who later died at the hospital. Espina was charged and convicted
of murder, with the court finding treachery in the killing.

ISSUE #1: Whether Espina should be acquitted of murder due to insufficient evidence of intent to kill.
HELD #1: No. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is determined by the courts only through external
manifestations. It must be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence, which may consist of (1) the means
used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct
of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed. Appellant’s vicious attack was unprovoked. He just shot Ernando in the right chest
during the drinking spree. It is well-settled that when death results from a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed. Verily, the appellant’s intent to kill Ernando was amply established.

ISSUE #2: Whether there was treachery in Ernando’s killing.

HELD #2: Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without
the slightest provocation on the latter’s part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the
moment of the attack. What is decisive is the offender launched the attack without the slightest provocation from
the victim, making it impossible for the latter to defend himself or retaliate. In fine, treachery or aleviosa attended
Ernando’s killing.

14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. TORO, G.R. NO. 245922, 25 JANUARY 2021

FACTS: Danilo Toro y Diano was convicted of murder for fatally stabbing Pascualito Castillo Espiña, Sr. on March
21, 2004, in Northern Samar. The victim’s son testified that the appellant stabbed his father while a co-accused
held him. The autopsy revealed ten fatal stab wounds. The RTC and CA found that the killing was attended by
treachery, thus qualifying it as murder. The appellant denied involvement and claimed he fled out of fear upon
discovering the body.

ISSUE: Whether treachery or evident premeditation attended the killing, thereby making the appellant guilty of
murder.

HELD: No. The Court modified the conviction from murder to homicide as the prosecution failed to establish
treachery, as the eyewitness did not observe the attack’s commencement. Where no particulars are known as to
the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim’s death began and
developed, treachery cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior to the very
moment of the aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. Similarly, evident premeditation
was not proven, as there was no demonstration of a prior decision to commit the crime or sufficient time for
reflection.

15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALTARIN, G.R. NO. 223715, 03 JUNE 2019

FACTS: Fifteen-year-old Gerry Narido testified that he saw the accused, Marcelino Saltarin, stab Joval Benitez de
Jesus in the chest while they were seated together in a parked kuliglig on the night of November 6, 2011. The
victim died later that night from a stab wound that pierced his heart. Narido, seated beside the victim, identified
Saltarin as the assailant, stating they were only an arm’s length apart. The defense denied the accusation, claiming
lack of positive identification and absence of any qualifying circumstance for murder.

ISSUE: Whether all the elements of murder are herein satisfied.

HELD: Yes. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is committed when: (1) a person
was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in this article; and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide. The second and third
elements of murder were established through the positive identification of the accused and the presence of
treachery. The sudden and deliberate attack left the victim defenseless, ensuring the crime’s execution without
risk to the aggressor.

16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GALAM, G.R. NO. 224222, 09 OCTOBER 2019

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 FACTS: Eusebio Antolin was shot dead by Lito Galam while his brother, Dante Galam, was present and involved
in a confrontation with the victim. Witnesses, including the victim’s children, testified that Lito threatened Eusebio
before shooting him in the chest, and that both accused had previously threatened the victim. Evidence showed
the attack followed a prior dispute and that the accused fled immediately after the shooting. The RTC and CA ruled
the killing was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. The defense denied involvement and invoked
alibi.

ISSUE: Whether treachery or evident premeditation attended the killing, making the appellant guilty of murder.

HELD: No. Treachery and evident premeditation did not attend the killing. Treachery requires: (1) means of
execution that denies the victim any chance to defend or retaliate, and (2) such means were deliberately adopted.
The appellants did not launch a surprise or sudden attack on Eusebio. There was no showing that appellants
consciously or deliberately adopted any particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the commission of
the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. The use of gun, does not necessarily imply
treachery. Furthermore, evident premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious; it must be sufficiently proven
by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient.
Although appellants could have really intended to kill Eusebio when they threatened to kill him two (2) days before
they actually gunned him down, their threat alone, without outward acts showing they clung to their threat to kill
does not equate to evident premeditation.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PADAL JR., G.R. NO. 232070, 02 OCTOBER 2019

FACTS: Ragnel Laguardia was attacked and fatally stabbed by Romeo Padal Jr. after being pursued by him and
three others riding a motorcycle. During the attack, Reynan Padal and his companions blocked potential help using
a sumpak. The use of the motorcycle facilitated the group’s pursuit and escape, leading to their conviction for
murder.

ISSUE: Whether the use of a motor vehicle during the commission of the crime properly qualified the killing as
murder.

HELD: Yes. The “use of motor vehicle” qualified the victim’s killing as murder. The appellants’ use of a fast means
of transportation allowed them to quickly gain an advantage, overtake, and catch up with the victim, who was
running for his life. The motorcycle facilitated the crime by allowing the appellants to catch up with the victim and
escape after they accomplished their mission to kill the victim. The use of motor vehicles aided in the commission
of murder by enabling the accused to easily catch up with the victim, directing the latter to the crime scene, and
utilizing it to abscond, as in this case.

18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ANGELES, G.R. NO. 224289, 14 AUGUST 2019

FACTS: Angeles and three others were charged with murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder for the
stabbing incident. Eric, Elmer, and Mark Ryan Evangelista went outside their house when they saw men on a
tricycle; they were suddenly attacked Elmer was stabbed fatally, Eric and Mark Ryan were seriously injured.
Abelardo Evangelista, who tried to help, was stabbed multiple times by the group, including Angeles, and later
died. The assailants fled, and the victims were brought to the hospital. Angeles claimed he was merely a bystander
and did not take part in the attack.

ISSUE #1: Whether Angeles is guilty of murder for the death of Abelardo Evangelista.
HELD #1: Yes. To establish murder, it must be shown that a person was killed, the accused killed them, the
killing was attended by qualifying circumstances under Article 248, and the killing was not parricide or infanticide.
Abelardo died from multiple stab wounds, with no evidence linking him to Angeles by consanguinity or affinity,
excluding parricide or infanticide. Prosecution witnesses positively identified Angeles as one of the stabbers, and
the Court found the killing involved abuse of superior strength due to the victim’s disadvantage.

ISSUE #2: Whether Angeles is guilty of attempted murder for the injury of Eric Evangelista.
HELD #2: Yes. If a victim survives physical injuries, the crime is consummated physical injuries without intent to
kill, or frustrated/attempted murder if intent to kill is present. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of

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 wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; (e) the words uttered by the offender
at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim; and (f) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed. The attendant circumstances showed that appellant and his companions intended to kill Eric and his
brothers Elmer, Abelardo, and Mark Ryan, who sustained multiple fatal stab wounds. Although Elmer and Abelardo
died and Mark Ryan and Eric survived due to timely medical care and non-fatal wounds, appellant remains liable
for attempted murder.

ISSUE #3: Whether Angeles is guilty of frustrated murder for the injury of Mark Ryan Evangelista.
HELD #3: Yes. The Court found Angeles guilty of frustrated murder for Mark Ryan’s injury. A crime is considered
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution that could have resulted in the crime, but it does
not occur due to reasons beyond the offender’s control. Medical evidence showed that Mark Ryan’s injury was
fatal and could have led to his death if not for timely medical intervention. All the elements of frustrated murder
were present, as Angeles performed all acts of execution but failed to produce Mark Ryan’s death due to causes
independent of his will.

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALMOSARA, G.R. NO. 223512, 24 JULY 2019

FACTS: After a drinking session, Antonio Almosara and his relatives returned armed with bolos following an
argument with Arnulfo Cabintoy. Antonio pinned down Arnulfo and repeatedly stabbed him, with his relatives also
inflicting stab wounds, resulting in Arnulfo’s death. Antonio claimed self-defense, alleging that Arnulfo attacked
him first with a metal pipe and that Ronnie was the one who stabbed Arnulfo.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio Almosara is guilty of murder.

HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty of murder as all the elements of murder are present. Treachery attended the
killing. The essence of treachery hinges on the aggressor’s attack sans any warning, done in a swift, deliberate,
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
Appellant and his relatives attacked the victim while the latter was gathering stones right outside his home. The
victim may have had a bolo around his waist, but the sudden attack launched on him by appellant and his relatives
effectively prevented the victim from drawing the bolo around his waist to defend himself. Treachery may still be
appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger on his person. The decisive factor leans on
whether the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.

20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALBINO, G.R. NO. 229928, 22 JULY 2019

FACTS: During a benefit dance, a fight broke out between the groups of Dexter Albino and Marlon Soriano. As
Marlon and his brother tried to calm the situation, Albino suddenly shot Marlon in the chest without warning.
Marlon died from the gunshot wound, and Albino was convicted of murder, with treachery alleged as the qualifying
circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC.

HELD: No. The appellant should be convicted of homicide, not murder, as killing of Marlon was not attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC, despite the Information alleging that
treachery attended it. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in
a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or
escape. Here, though the attack was sudden, it did not amount to treachery, as appellant was enraged and did
not have time to reflect on his actions. There was no showing that he consciously launched the sudden attack to
facilitate the killing without risk to himself; hence, appellant may only be convicted of homicide.

21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CORPUZ, G.R. NO. 220486, 26 JUNE 2019

FACTS: Jerry Corpuz was pinned to the ground by Porfirio Corpuz Jr. during a scuffle when Elinjer Corpuz arrived
and shot Jerry twice, resulting in his death. Elinjer claimed self-defense, alleging Jerry drew a gun first and it
accidentally discharged. The RTC and CA found him guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.

ISSUE: Whether treachery attended the killing, making the appellant guilty of murder.

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 HELD: Yes. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder requires the presence of a qualifying circumstance, such as
treachery. Treachery exists when the offender employs the means, methods, or forms to execute the crime that
directly and primarily ensure the crime’s execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might
make. Here, the appellant shot the victim twice without warning while the victim was already pinned down by the
appellant’s brother, rendering the victim defenseless. The sudden attack on a subdued victim constituted treachery,
ensuring the execution without risk. Thus, the killing was correctly qualified as murder, and the conviction was
affirmed.

22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. REYES, G.R. NO. 227013, 17 JUNE 2019

FACTS: Jun Balmores was attacked in Quiapo, Manila by Aries Reyes, Demetrio Sahagun, and others after a prior
argument. Demetrio struck Jun with a chair, others beat him with broomsticks, and Argie Reyes stabbed him
multiple times, causing his death. The RTC and CA found appellants guilty of murder, qualified by abuse of superior
strength and aggravated by treachery.

ISSUE: Whether treachery and abuse of superior strength attended the killing of Jun Balmores.

HELD: No. The essence of treachery lies in the swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner by which the offense
was committed, affording the victim no opportunity to resist, escape, or defend himself or herself. Although Jun
did not expect the sudden and concerted attack of his assailants, he was not rendered defenseless or prevented
from escaping his assailants. Furthermore, abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and advantageous to the aggressor/s
and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. Evidence must show that
the aggressor/s intentionally sought to exploit their superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does not
automatically imply abuse of superior strength.

Infanticide

23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ADALIA, G.R. NO. 235990, 22 JANUARY 2020

FACTS: Giralyn Adalia, despite denying pregnancy, exhibited a bulging belly. After claiming a headache, she was
seen near an abandoned shanty where a baby was heard crying. A dead newborn was found in a creek, and
bloodied rags were found in the shanty. Medical examination confirmed Adalia had recently given birth. She later
admitted a last menstrual period contradicting earlier denials. The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction of
infanticide and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Adalia claims that the lesser penalty of prision
correccional, not reclusion perpetua, should be imposed on her, as she committed the crime only because she
wanted to conceal her dishonor.

ISSUE: Whether appellant Adalia should be sentenced to prision correccional only and not reclusion perpetua.

HELD: No. To convict an accused charged with infanticide, the following elements must be proved: (a) a child
was killed; (b) the deceased child was less than three (3) days old; and (c) the accused killed the child. Article 255
provides that: “If the crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty
shall be prision mayor.” There is absolutely no evidence on record showing that appellant killed her child
supposedly to conceal her dishonor for being an unwed mother or a woman who bore a child although she did not
have a boyfriend.

Rape

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX264352, G.R. NO. 264352, 03 DECEMBER 2023

FACTS: On December 10, 2016, AAA (AAA), a 69-year-old woman, was raped in her home by her brother-in-law
after she was startled awake. Despite her attempt to defend herself by grabbing a bolo, her resistance proved
futile due to her frailty. The accused pulled up her duster, forcibly spread her legs, mounted her, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. Afterward, he stood up and left. Her distressed state was discovered by her daughters,
prompting a police report. Medical evidence confirmed sexual assault.

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 ISSUE: Whether XXX is guilty of the crime of rape.

HELD: Yes. Under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape requires the following elements:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force,
threat, or intimidation. Here, XXX held both of AAA’s hands, pushed her against the wall, and twisted her arm. He
then forced her to lie down, pulled her legs apart, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. These
acts, taken together, constitute the crime of rape.

25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAPIZ, [Link]. 240662, 16 SEPTEMBER 2020

FACTS: On April 2, 2015, AAA, then 20, was left alone with Raymundo, her mother’s cousin. She alleged he
pointed a weapon, but her testimony lacked specifics on its use or physical force. She did not resist, despite being
physically capable. Subsequent voluntary meetings with Raymundo, including intimate touching and a trip to
Baclaran where she allowed a kiss, suggest comfort rather than coercion. Raymundo argued AAA’s actions were
inconsistent with a rape victim’s, challenging the presence of force, intimidation, or moral ascendancy, which are
essential elements of rape.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of force and intimidation or moral ascendancy are present to convict the accused
of the crime of rape.

HELD: No. Complainant is a full grown 20-year old woman at the time of her alleged sexual ravishment. More,
appellant is not even considered a close kin under the law, being her mother's cousin. Verily, moral ascendancy
cannot be taken into account and considered as substitute for threat or intimidation. Indeed, rape is essentially a
crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also committed without
force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. Here,
there is no doubt that complainant had impliedly given her consent for appellant to have carnal knowledge of her.

26. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX263553, G.R. NO. 263553, 30 NOVEMBER 2023

FACTS: The accused-appellant, XXX263553 (XXX) faces five counts of rape against his granddaughter AAA263553
(AAA), who was a minor at that time. AAA testified to repeated sexual abuse. Her younger brother, BBB263553,
corroborated one incident, reporting it to their catechist, Sandag, who then aided in filing a police report. Medical
examination confirmed findings consistent with sexual intercourse. XXX denies all charges, claiming alibi and a
good relationship with his grandchildren.

ISSUE: Whether moral ascendancy alone is sufficient to convict XXX of rape, despite the requirement of force,
threat, or intimidation.

HELD: Yes. When a grandfather commits the odious crime of rape against his own granddaughter who was a
minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, as in this case, there is no need to prove actual force, threat
or intimidation because his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.

27. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DUMDUM, G.R. NO. 221436, 26 JUNE 2019

FACTS: AAA was dragged by Eric Dumdum to a dark, isolated area with no houses or vehicles nearby, where he
raped her while threatening her and her family. Despite her initial silence, her co-worker’s observation of kiss
marks on her neck led her to reveal the incident. Medical examination confirmed hymenal lacerations and
contusions. The defense attempts to challenge the conviction by arguing the incident occurred in a well-lit area
surrounded by houses.

ISSUE: Whether Dumdum should be acquitted of rape, given that the incident occurred along a well-lit highway
surrounded by houses.

HELD: No. Under Article 266-A (1-a) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape is committed when a person
has carnal knowledge of another through force, threat, or intimidation. Rapists are not discouraged from
committing sexual abuse by the mere presence of people nearby. In other words, rape is committed not exclusively
in seclusion. Rape may be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along roadside, within

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 school premises, inside an occupied house, and even where other members of the family are sleeping. For lust is
no respecter of time and place.

28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SISCAR, G.R. NO. 218571, 03 JUNE 2019

FACTS: AAA was soliciting support in Oriental Mindoro when Allan Siscar attacked her from behind, hitting her
head and punching her stomach. He then dragged her to a grassy area, where he forcibly undressed and raped
her, covering her mouth to prevent her from shouting. AAA immediately reported the incident to her father and
the police, identifying Siscar and noticing his distinctive clothing at his house. A medical examination confirmed
the assault. Siscar was charged and convicted of rape. The defense argues that the proximity to a road and
residential houses precluded the commission of rape.

ISSUE: Whether Siscar should be acquitted of rape, as rape could not have happened in a place near the road
and surrounding residential houses.

HELD: No. Rape may be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within
school premises, inside an occupied house, and even where other members of the family are sleeping. For lust is
no respecter of time or place.

29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 225339, 10 JULY 2019

FACTS: AAA, while sleeping beside her three younger brothers, awoke to find her uncle, XXX, on top of her,
sexually assaulting her. She struggled, kicked him off, and he threatened her family if she reported it. AAA
recognized XXX’s voice. She immediately informed her mother, and they reported the incident to the barangay. A
medical examination confirmed hymenal lacerations. XXX was charged with rape. The defense argues that the
presence of AAA’s siblings in the room made the commission of the rape impossible.

ISSUE: Whether XXX must be absolved of the conviction of rape, considering the presence of AAA’s siblings in
the same room, making the commission of the rape impossible.

HELD: No. The presence of AAA’s three (3) younger siblings in the same room which they shared with other
members of the family including AAA and appellant himself obviously did not deter appellant from sexually
ravishing his own niece right in the same room. Appellant’s depraved behavior proved that lust is not a respecter
of people, time, or place. The Court has encountered far too many instances where rape was committed in plain
view. Rape could be committed under circumstances as indiscreet as a room full of family members sleeping side
by side.

30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SUWALAT, G.R. NO. 227749, 22 SEPTEMBER 2020

FACTS: Complainant testified that the appellant raped her twice. The first incident occurred in August 2006 at
the appellant’s house, where he threatened her into silence. The second rape happened on November 1, 2006, in
her own home, where he used a knife to coerce her. After the second incident, she immediately reported it to her
father, leading to formal complaints. A medico-legal examination confirmed sexual abuse. Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals convicted the appellant of two counts of rape, finding the prosecution’s evidence credible.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of two (2) counts of rape.

HELD: No. The prosecution had established beyond moral certainty the elements of carnal knowledge and force
or intimidation in both incidents. The victim positively identified the appellant as the man who had carnal
knowledge of her, against her will, on two (2) separate occasions. She made a clear, candid, and positive narration
of how, in both incidents, the appellant went to her bed, undressed her, mounted her, and inserted his penis into
her vagina while threatening to kill her if she told her father or the appellant’s wife. The complainant could not
have merely concocted these ugly details had she not experienced them in the appellant’s hands.

31. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 230334, 19 AUGUST 2019

FACTS: AAA, a minor, accused the defendant of three counts of qualified rape in April 2000. She testified that
while she was alone at home on April 16, 18, and 23, the armed defendant threatened and forced her into sexual

Page 16 of 31
 intercourse, warning her against reporting it. Medical evidence corroborated her testimony with consistent
lacerations. The trial court found AAA’s account credible, convicting the defendant on all counts. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the rape convictions.

ISSUE: Whether the lower courts erred in affirming the conviction for three (3) counts of qualified rape.

HELD: Yes. The accused is guilty of only one count of qualified rape. Each charge of rape must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution failed to establish the elements of rape for the incidents on April 18 and
April 23. While AAA’s testimony was credible for the first incident, it lacked sufficient detail for the subsequent
incidents, raising reasonable doubt regarding their occurrence. The prosecution must present clear and convincing
evidence for each count, and the absence of such evidence for the latter two counts resulted in the acquittal of
the accused for those charges.

32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CUBAY, G.R. NO. 224597, 29 JULY 2019

FACTS: AAA, a congenital deaf-mute student, resided in a dormitory at a SPED Center where Dante worked as a
night watchman. AAA’s aunt noticed AAA missed her menstrual period and a pregnancy test was positive. AAA,
through sign language interpreters, identified Dante as the father and testified that he repeatedly entered her
dormitory room at night during school days, undressed her, touched her body, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Dante admitted to sexual acts but claimed they were consensual, arguing AAA fabricated the rape charges
due to embarrassment from her pregnancy and their affair.

ISSUE: Whether Dante is guilty of forty-four (44) counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of rape, particularly the presence of force or
intimidation. Then eighteen (18) year old AAA, albeit she is a deaf-mute with low capacity to learn formal sign
language, is in truth, mentally capable of giving or withholding consent. AAA revealed the supposed rape (forty-
four [44] counts altogether) only when her relatives discovered she was pregnant. The foregoing circumstances
taken singly or collectively, are exculpatory evidence which compel no less than a verdict of acquittal.

33. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 222492, 03 JUNE 2019

FACTS: AAA was repeatedly raped by her father, XXX, inside their various homes in Tagkawayan, Quezon, and
Quezon City, including a one-room squatter area dwelling. One instance occurred at 4:30 AM after her mother and
sibling had left. Despite her pleas, XXX continued. To escape, AAA confided in a friend, Carmina, leading them to
the barangay to file a complaint. Barangay officials promptly arrested XXX. A physical and medical examination of
AAA revealed deep healed lacerations. The trial court convicted XXX of qualified rape. Appellant asserts that AAA’s
failure to shout for help negates the claim that she got raped.

ISSUE #1: Whether XXX is guilty of qualified rape due to the presence of qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship.
HELD #1: Yes. Rape is defined and penalized under article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended. It
requires the following elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender
accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented. The prosecution had established
beyond moral certainty the element of carnal knowledge. Complainant positively identified appellant, her own flesh
and blood, as the man who had carnal knowledge of her against her will. The Information properly alleged that
complainant was only thirteen years old at the time of rape and the offender was her own father, herein appellant.
Complainant's minority and her relationship with appellant were sufficiently proved by complainant’s birth
certificate on record.

ISSUE #2: Whether AAA’s failure to shout for help negates the claim that she got raped.
HELD #2: No. Even the victim’s lack of resistance, especially when the sexual predator is her own father, does
not signify consent. For in rape cases committed by a close kin, especially by the victim’s father himself, the use
of actual force or intimidation is unnecessary; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

34. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ZZZ, G.R. NO. 224584, 04 SEPTEMBER 2019

Page 17 of 31
 FACTS: Thirteen-year-old AAA accused her father, ZZZ, of two counts of rape in October and November 2007.
On the first occasion, ZZZ threatened AAA with knives and forced intercourse. She testified to fearing for her life
and not shouting. Medical examinations confirmed healed lacerations. On the second occasion, ZZZ sexually
assaulted her with his finger. The trial court found AAA's testimony credible despite ZZZ's denial and alibi,
convicting him of rape. The facts address the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship relevant to
qualified rape.

ISSUE: Whether ZZZ was guilty of qualified rape.

HELD: Yes. The elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and
without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen [18] years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Here, ZZZ had sexual congress with his daughter, who was 13 years old at the time, proven by her certificate of
live birth. He employed force and threats so that AAA would submit to his bestial lust. Even assuming there was
no actual threat, violence, or intimidation, the ZZZ’s moral ascendancy and influence are sufficient to substitute
for force or coercion. In incestuous rape cases, the father's abuse of his moral ascendancy and influence over his
daughter can overpower her will, forcing her to comply with his demands. Otherwise stated, the father’s moral
and physical dominance is enough to intimidate the victim into submitting to his beastly desires. ZZZ’s moral
ascendancy over AAA eliminated the need for physical force or intimidation, as their relationship inherently placed
AAA in a vulnerable position.

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 232308, 07 OCTOBER 2020

FACTS: On August 4, 2009, a 17-year-old minor was raped by her uncle (her father's first cousin) in his house
after he lured her inside. Despite her struggles, he forcibly had carnal knowledge of her. Afterward, she confided
in her aunt about wanting to commit suicide due to the rape and, fearing further assault, spent the night elsewhere.
Her mother reported the incident, and a medico-legal examination confirmed recent sexual intercourse, revealing
fresh lacerations and abrasions.

ISSUE: Whether XXX was guilty of qualified rape.

HELD: No. The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the RPC requires the concurrence of the twin
aggravating circumstances: the victim’s minority and her relationship with the perpetrator. Both must be alleged
and proven. Otherwise, the accused could only be held guilty of simple rape. While the prosecution sufficiently
established the complainant’s minority, the qualifying relationship must be within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to qualify rape under Article 266-B. Here, the relationship cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying/aggravating circumstance because the accused is the cousin of the complainant’s father, making him a
relative only within the fifth civil degree. Therefore, the relationship cannot be considered a qualifying
circumstance, and the accused may only be convicted of simple rape, not qualified rape.

H. Title Nine - Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

36. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CARREON, G.R. NO. 229086, 15 JANUARY 2020

FACTS: Philip Carreon was accused of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of minor AAA, with whom he had
a romantic relationship, from March 31 to June 3, 2010. AAA testified Carreon took her to various relatives’ houses
against her will, where she was constantly monitored and allegedly deprived of liberty. She cited fear and lack of
means as reasons for not escaping despite opportunities. Carreon was arrested after AAA sustained injuries. The
trial court convicted him of serious illegal detention with rape. The core issue is whether actual deprivation of
liberty was proven.

ISSUE: Whether Carreon was guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC,
which requires proof of actual deprivation of liberty.

Page 18 of 31
 HELD: Yes. Carreon was guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Illegal detention primarily involves the
deprivation of liberty, which does not necessarily require physical restraint. AAA, being a minor and unfamiliar with
the area, could not leave despite having opportunities to escape. Her limited knowledge of her surroundings and
Carreon’s influence over her created a situation where her freedom was effectively restricted. The prosecution did
not need to prove physical confinement but rather the intent to deprive AAA of her liberty, evident from the
circumstances surrounding the case. The Court’s decision reinforced that the legal definition of illegal detention
encompasses various forms of restraint, particularly when the victim is a minor.

37. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 229658, 28 AUGUST 2019

FACTS: On August 18, 2009, Roman Pugeda was abducted at gunpoint by armed men, including Elmar Santos.
The kidnappers demanded a P1 million ransom, later reduced to P100,000, which Pugeda’s wife deposited. During
captivity, Pugeda was blindfolded and moved between vehicles. He identified Santos during the police
investigation. Santos was arrested while seeking medical treatment for a gunshot wound and offered an alibi. Both
the trial court and Court of Appeals convicted Santos, relying on Pugeda’s identification and the crime’s
circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether Santos is guilty of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC.

HELD: Yes. The prosecution proved all elements required under Article 267 of the RPC: (a) the offender is a
private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act
of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If
the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, or if the crime is perpetrated for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of detention is immaterial. The essence of the crime is the purposeful or knowing
action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. These elements were indubitably
established in this case: appellant is a private individual who deprived Pugeda of his liberty by restraining him and
not allowing him to leave and go home unless and until ransom was paid in exchange for his freedom.

38. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DELOS REYES, G.R. NO. 264958, 14 AUGUST 2023

FACTS: Fifteen-year-old AAA264958 accompanied Jonnel Delos Reyes. AAA264958 later testified that Jonnel held
him at knifepoint, took him to a frat camp, bound his hands, and pushed him into a 20-foot-deep pit, where he
remained for two days before escaping and reporting.

ISSUE: Whether Jonnel is guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention.

HELD: Yes. All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present. The essence of serious illegal
detention is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused
to cause such deprivation. It consists of placing a person in an enclosure and depriving them of liberty in any
manner. Jonnel’s calculated actions demonstrated a deliberate intent to deprive the victim of his liberty.
Undoubtedly, Jonnel effectively restrained AAA264958’s freedom of movement. The minority of AAA264958 is
undisputed. Lastly, AAA264958 positively identified Jonnel as the one who blindfolded him, tied his hands, and
pushed him into the pit.

I. Title Ten – Crimes Against Property

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

39. TRIA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 255583, 02 AUGUST 2023
FACTS: Tria and AAA’s relationship turned sour when the former became jealous and started to treat her
differently. He hacked AAA’s business Facebook, posting manipulated nude photos when she refused his P55,000
demand. Tria offered to remove them in exchange for money, a hotel stay, and reconciliation. Though AAA
complied, he re-uploaded the images when she ceased contact. Tria then demanded P55,000 again, settling for
P20,000 and later an additional P15,000 for hotel expenses. AAA reported him, leading to an entrapment operation

Page 19 of 31
 where Tria was arrested receiving money. The trial court convicted him of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons or extortion.

ISSUE: Whether Tria should be acquitted of the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294(5) of the RPC, considering that AAA voluntarily gave him the money.

HELD: No. Article 294(5) requires that: (a) there is personal property belonging to another; (b) that there is
unlawful taking of that property; (c) the taking is with intent to gain; and (d) there is violence against or
intimidation of persons. Here, AAA was forced to part with her money in exchange for the deletion of her nude
photos posted on her Facebook page. Her compromising photos damaged and continued to damage her family
life, reputation, and online business; thus, she felt she had no choice but to accede to Tria’s demands. The taking
was deemed complete the moment Tria gained possession of her money. Meanwhile, Tria’s intent to gain is
presumed.

Robbery with Homicide

40. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MANCAO, G.R. NO. 228951, 17 JULY 2019

FACTS: While Enriquez was texting on his cellphone and waiting for a jeepney ride, Mancao stealthily moved
toward him and stabbed him in the neck. Thereafter, Mancao dragged his body toward an alley. When SPO2 Kelvin
Magno and his team arrested Mancao, they were able to recover Enriquez’s silver necklace from Mancao’s
possession.

ISSUE: Whether Mancao is guilty of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the RPC.

HELD: Yes. Robbery with homicide requires the following elements: (1) taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with
animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. A
conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human
life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In this case, Mancao’s primary purpose was to
rob the victim and the killing was merely resorted to in order to gain easy access to the victim’s personal
belongings. The killing was committed on the occasion only or by reason of the robbery.

41. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CASABUENA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 246580, 23 JUNE 2020

FACTS: Casabuena, Formaran, and Arizala (accused) robbed jeepney passengers at gun and knifepoint, taking
belongings from Abella and others. As police responded, one suspect fled and was chased, while PO2 De Pedro
struggled with another, fatally shooting Arizala. The trial court convicted them of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether the accused may be held liable for robbery with homicide, notwithstanding that the victim is one
of the robbers.

HELD: Yes. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and
objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life. The killing, however, may occur before, during, or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference to the circumstances, causes, or modes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime, that has to be taken into consideration. In robbery with homicide, it is essential that there be a direct
relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing. It does not matter whether both crimes were
committed at the same time. In the same manner, it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery; or that two (2) or more persons are
killed; or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority is committed by
reason or on occasion of the crime. Further, it is irrelevant if the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. In such
scenario, the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Verily, once a homicide is committed by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide.

42. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CATACUTAN, G.R. NO. 260731, 13 FEBRUARY 2023

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 FACTS: Edgardo Catacutan, also known as “Batibot,” “Enzo,” and “Gerry,” was charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide for killing Alexander Tan Ngo under Article 294 of the RPC. A condominium guard
testified he was escorted to Ngo’s unit as a friend, while another witness stated Catacutan admitted Ngo had
invited him for sex. Catacutan then stabbed Ngo several times, hid the knife, and stole his cell phone, camera,
and money.

ISSUE: Whether Catacutan is guilty of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the RPC.

HELD: No. In robbery with homicide, the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery. Here, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant’s original
intent was to steal from Alexander. The facts merely established two things: (1) the appellant killed him, and (2)
then took several of his belongings. From these circumstances, it is unclear what the appellant’s intention was
when he caused Alexander’s death. If the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but
robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should
be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex offense. The Court thus convicted Catacutan
of two crimes: Homicide and Theft.

Robbery with Rape

43. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. YUMOL, G.R. NO. 225600, 07 JULY 2020

FACTS: Appellant Denel Yumol was charged with robbery with rape. The 16-year-old victim, AAA, testified that
Yumol, armed with a gun, robbed her phone and then forcibly raped her multiple times in a nearby park. AAA
identified Yumol through his voice, clothing, and appearance, leading to his arrest. A medical examination
confirmed injuries consistent with sexual assault.

ISSUE: Whether Yumol is guilty of robbery with rape.

HELD: Yes. Robbery with rape is a special complex crime that contemplates a situation where the accused’s
original intent was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and, on occasion thereof,
also commits rape. It requires the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized
by an intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. All these elements are herein
present.

Estafa

44. FLORES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 252807, 22 JUNE 2022

FACTS: Petitioner, a jeepney driver, was hired by Hernandez, who wore an Aboitiz ID, to pick up goods from TRM
Sales Marketing for P1,000. She gave him a sealed envelope for Sarmiento, who, after reading it, released goods
and had him sign two sales invoices. Petitioner delivered the goods to Paco Market with Hernandez and others,
receiving another P1,000. Later, he was arrested after TRM filed a complaint against him. He was charged with
two (2) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner took part in inducing TRM to sell goods by means of misrepresenting himself as the personnel
of Aboitiz authorized to pick up the goods.

ISSUE: Whether Flores was guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.

HELD: No. Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC requires the following elements: 1) there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must
have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, they were induced to part with their
money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (4) as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage. In this case, petitioner was simply an errand boy who mechanically did as
he was told. He was a modest person who was merely trying to make a decent living for himself and his family by
sweating it out as a jeepney driver.

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 H. Title Nine – Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security

Grave Threats

45. GARMA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 248317, 16 MARCH 2022

FACTS: Pedrito Garma was convicted of grave threats against Barangay Captain Roseller Ballon. Garma and his
late twin brother allegedly threatened to kill Ballon, causing him great fear. Witnesses testified Garma uttered the
threatening words: “Patayen mi koman” (We should have killed him). Garma claimed he was reporting illegal
fishing and not threatening Ballon.

ISSUE: Whether Garma is guilty of the crime of grave threats.

HELD: No. Like any other crime defined by the RPC, grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The
actus reus is the actual speaking or uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is
that the accused intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words or that the accused
intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the accused to convey a threat; in other
words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken seriously. It is not necessary that the recipient themself
actually feels intimidated or actually takes the words seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they
were intended by the accused to have that effect. The accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of
proof on his or her shoulders; it is for the prosecution to demonstrate guilt and not for the accused to establish
innocence. The prosecution here evidently failed to overcome the onus probandi of establishing petitioner’s guilt
to a moral certainty. In sum, since both the actus reus and the mens rea of grave threats that petitioner threatened
Ballon with the infliction upon his person of any wrong by uttering “Patayen mi koman” is wanting, reasonable
doubt persists.

IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

E. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

[R.A. No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 3047; P.D. No. 677; P.D. No. 1288; Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 195; R.A. No. 10910]

46. LEONARDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 246451, 03 FEBRUARY 2021

FACTS: Mayor Stewart Leonardo of Quezon, Bukidnon allegedly used the LGU’s P100,000 bid deposit for his
personal equipment purchases at an Olongapo City auction, instead of for the five trucks he bought for the
municipality. He argued on appeal that no undue injury occurred since he reimbursed the amount after the
Municipal Accountant demanded it. The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted him of violating Section 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

ISSUE: Whether Leonardo violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

HELD: Yes. The elements of the offense in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he or she must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his or her action caused injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her
official functions.

Here, petitioner, then Quezon’s Municipal Mayor, was expressly authorized to represent Quezon at the auction sale
of trucks and heavy equipment. As it was, he did not only bid for Quezon, but also for himself. He merged the bid
of Quezon and his own bid to make it appear that they all pertained to Quezon. He also rode on Quezon’s bid
deposit and transport arrangement for his own personal advantage. Here, petitioner acted with both manifest
partiality and evident bad faith when he took advantage of his public office to secure unwarranted benefits for
himself, allowing Quezon’s bid deposit to be credited to his personal purchase price; and causing the equipment
he personally bought to be transported using the transport arrangement of Quezon without him spending anything
therefor.

Page 22 of 31
47. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. YAP, G.R. NO. 255087, 04 OCTOBER 2023

FACTS: The Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) aimed to upgrade its firefighting capabilities for
the 12th ASEAN Summit. The MCIAA Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) held a pre-bidding conference attended
by the accused-appellants, including MCIAA General Manager Adelberto Yap (Yap) and Marlon Barillo (Barillo), a
representative of Asia Border. Asia Border won the bid to supply an Aircraft Rescue Firefighting Truck. Yap
approved a P6 million disbursement to Asia Border for opening a letter of credit, despite the contract specifying
this as Asia Border’s obligation. The Sandiganbayan found Yap and others guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act due to manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence.

ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellants are guilty of violating section 3(e) and section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

HELD: No. The element of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence is not present in
this case. Evident bad faith “does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence” but of having a “palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.”. Manifest partiality, on the other hand, is defined as a clear, notorious,
or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another, while gross inexcusable
negligence is defined as negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care. It presupposes acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

48. CABARIOS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 228097-103 & 228139-41, 29 SEPTEMBER
2021

FACTS: Former Zamboanga Sibugay Board Member Eric A. Cabarios was convicted of five counts of graft for
fraudulently claiming reimbursements for an “Aid to the Poor Program.” The Commission on Audit (COA) found
that many listed beneficiaries were fictitious or untraceable. Cabarios claimed he used personal funds for actual
beneficiaries and disputed the audit, suggesting some recipients may have died or moved. While his office located
some beneficiaries, the Sandiganbayan found 29 of those to be fictitious or non-existent, deeming it improbable
that so many had relocated quickly.

ISSUE: Whether Cabarios is guilty of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for causing undue injury to the government
by facilitating reimbursements based on fictitious beneficiaries.

HELD: No. The non-existence of the beneficiaries being in doubt, the other charge of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019 likewise cannot prosper. The charge is anchored on the claim that accused caused undue injury to the
government by making it appear that the fund was used for the Aid to the Poor Program of Zamboanga Sibugay,
when in fact it was not, considering the fact that the alleged beneficiaries of the fund are fictitious or non-existent.
As in the Malversation charge, everything rests on the alleged non-existence of the beneficiaries. How can undue
injury caused to the government be even presumed when the claimed non-existence of the beneficiaries of the
fund remains in doubt? Given the fact that three (3) of the beneficiaries were found, it is not impossible that the
rest likewise exist had the search been thorough.

49. LOCSIN JR. V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 221787 AND 221800-02, 13 JANUARY 2021

FACTS: Elpidio Locsin, Jr., former President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF), was convicted on four
counts of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. He was found guilty of gross and inexcusable negligence for
appointing his three children as student laborers, assigning them to his office, and approving their Daily Time
Records (DTRs) and salaries totaling P5,100.00, despite them rendering no actual work. Testimonies from ISCOF
faculty members supported the prosecution’s case, which the Sandiganbayan deemed proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved that Locsin committed gross inexcusable negligence in
appointing his children and signing their DTRS.

Page 23 of 31
 HELD: No. The Amended Informations only charged petitioner with gross inexcusable negligence in causing the
release of his children’s salaries as student laborers by signing their DTRs even though they allegedly did not
render actual labor services to the damage and prejudice of ISCOF. Although the Amended Informations also
mentioned the word “appoint,” they did not specify any irregularity, let alone the offense committed when
petitioner appointed his children as student laborers. The Amended Informations did not even state that
petitioner’s children were ineligible to avail of any student labor program. As such, the Amended Informations
failed to state how other deserving indigent students of ISCOF were prejudiced by petitioner’s decision to appoint
his own children as student laborers. The Sandiganbayan went beyond the issues of the case (i.e., the charge in
the Amended Informations) when it tried and convicted petitioner essentially for alleged violation of RA 7323. To
reiterate, the Amended Informations never alleged that his children were not eligible to avail of any student labor
program. Worse, records show that petitioner’s children were indeed qualified under DBM Circular Letter No. 11-
96.

K. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003

[R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364; R.A. No. 11862]

50. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ALMERO, G.R. NO. 269401, 11 APRIL 2024

FACTS: On at least three occasions, Almero asked AAA, a 14-year-old, if she was willing to have sex with a man
in exchange for money. AAA repeatedly answered in the negative. One afternoon, Almero and AAA rode a pickup
truck driven by Carlo. After parking in a drive-in garage, Carlo led AAA to an adjacent room while Almero waited
outside. Carlo instructed AAA to take a shower. Next, AAA lay on the bed and covered her naked body with a
blanket. AAA then asked Carlo what they were going to do, and Carlo responded that it was up to her. So AAA put
Carlo’s penis in her mouth and performed fellatio. Carlo then touched AAA’s breasts and vagina. Afterwards, they
dressed up and went out of the room. Almero was still waiting outside. The three rode the pickup truck again.
There, Carlo gave Almero P1,000.00. Almero was charged of qualified trafficking in persons.

ISSUE: Whether Almero must be absolved of criminal liability of qualified trafficking in persons since AAA
consented to the sexual act.

HELD: No. Under Section 4(k)(2) in relation to Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended, viz.: “SEC. 4.
Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the
following acts: … (k) To recruit, transport, harbor, obtain, transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide, adopt or receive
a child for purposes of exploitation or trading them, including but not limited to, the act of baring and/or selling a
child for any consideration or for barter for purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for purpose of exploitation of
children shall include: … (2) The use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography, or for pornographic performances…” Trafficking is qualified when the trafficked person is a child.

Trafficking in persons is committed even though the trafficked person knew about or consented to the act of
trafficking. The gravamen of the offense is the act of recruiting or using a fellow human being for sexual
exploitation. “A minor's consent to [a] sexual transaction [is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208 and is]
irrelevant to the commission of the crime.” Indeed, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will
even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means. In all, Almero offered AAA, a child, to Carlo for
sexual exploitation.

51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BECAYLAS, G.R. NO. 266047, 11 APRIL 2024

FACTS: Based on a tip, the NBI conducted a two-week surveillance and entrapment operation targeting Jeffrey
Becaylas, Kier Rome De Leon, and Justine Lumanlan for offering women for sex. An NBI agent, posing as a
customer, arranged to purchase six women for P4,000 each. On August 3, 2018, at Eurotel, Becaylas introduced
the women, and after receiving marked money, was arrested along with his co-accused, and the women were
rescued. One rescued woman, AAA, testified to being trafficked and prostituted by the accused. Both the trial court
and Court of Appeals convicted the accused of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellants must be absolved of criminal liability for qualified trafficking in persons
as the prosecution failed to prove the means employed to exploit AAA.

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 HELD: No. Under paragraph 2, Section 3 (a) of RA No. 9208, as amended, it expressly provides that the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not involve any of the means stated under the law.
Trafficking is considered qualified when the trafficked person is a child. Here, it is undisputed that AAA was a 16-
year-old minor when accused-appellants committed the crime. Even if AAA was aware of the transaction and
received payment on her behalf, the same shall not exculpate accused-appellants. A victim’s consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.
Even without the use of such means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

52. FERRER V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 223042, 06 JULY 2022

FACTS: In February 2009, Ferrer and Jamuad were charged with qualified trafficking for recruiting and
transporting nine people, including seven minors, for prostitution. Sixteen-year-old AAA testified that petitioners
enticed her and others to Cebu, promising more money through “bar fines,” which involved customers paying to
spend days with them. During the trip, petitioners instructed the girls to lie about their purpose if questioned by
authorities. Upon arrival, police intervened, and the girls were turned over to CIU-DSWD. Petitioners claimed they
were also prostitutes and that the victims consented to travel. They also argued that actual prostitution was not
proven.

ISSUE #1: Whether the petitioners’ status as prostitutes and victims of trafficking negates criminal liability.
HELD #1: No. The fact that petitioners are prostitutes themselves does not render them incapable of committing
the crime of trafficking in persons. On the contrary, their occupation rendered them well-placed and experienced
to do just that. At any rate, petitioners’ “defense” could hardly relieve them of their criminal culpability. Indeed,
the harsh reality is that victims of prostitution are sometimes led to victimize others as well. To end the cycle, the
victim-turned-trafficker should also be penalized for violating R.A. No. 9208.

ISSUE #2: Whether the consent freely given by the victims is a valid defense.
HELD #2: No. The allegation that petitioners never forced the victims to travel with them is not a valid defense.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 is clear – the crime may be perpetrated “with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge.” More so when the victims are minors who could not validly give consent. The Court ruled that the
victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent
is not given out of his or her own free will.

ISSUE #3: Whether actual prostitution of the victims is necessary to establish the petitioners’ liability.
HELD #3: No. Under R.A. No. 9208, a victim does not need to be actually subjected to prostitution for an accused
to be held liable for trafficking in persons. Neither the presence of clients nor the occurrence of sexual intercourse
is necessary to establish trafficking. The law does not require that victims be taken to or found in a brothel or
prostitution den for recruitment or transportation to be considered a crime. It is enough that the accused lured,
enticed, or transported the victims with the intent of exploitation, including prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, or organ trade.

53. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NUÑEZ, G.R. NO. 263706, 14 AUGUST 2023

FACTS: An American informant reported a woman offering minors for sex. An entrapment operation ensued,
where a decoy met the accused-appellant, Nuñez, and three minors (AAA, BBB, CCC). Nuñez offered the girls for
a “photoshoot” and sex for P10,000 each, confirming their underage status. After the marked money was
exchanged, officers arrested Nuñez and rescued the minors. The RTC and CA convicted Nuñez of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons, finding she peddled minors for sex and that the offense was qualified due to the victims’
minority and large-scale trafficking.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has sufficiently established the elements of qualified trafficking in persons.

HELD: Yes. All the elements of qualified trafficking in persons are present under Section 4 (a) and (e), in relation
to Section 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical to recruit, transport,
transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means for prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; and to maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography. It shall be considered as qualified trafficking when the trafficked person is a child or

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 a minor or when it is a large-scale crime, i.e., when three or more persons were victimized individually or as a
group. The accused-appellant recruited three minor victims, taking advantage of their vulnerability by promising a
photoshoot job and instructing them to wear suggestive clothing, all with the clear purpose of sexual exploitation
and prostitution for money.

54. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AQUINO, G.R. NO. 263264, 31 JULY 2023

FACTS: Thirteen-year-old BBB263264 and fourteen-year-old AAA263264 met accused Karen Aquino at a mall.
Aquino and co-accused Rey Rosal, Jeffrey Dela Cruz, and Ericson Mariano then invited the minors to a party,
promising money for drinking. There, the girls were forced into sexual intercourse with strangers for money. For
the next month, they were held at an accused’s house and compelled to engage in further commercial sex acts.
The victims eventually escaped and reported to authorities. The accused were charged with recruiting,
transporting, and exploiting minors for sexual purposes. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals found the accused
guilty of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

ISSUE #1: Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of trafficking in persons against the
appellants.
HELD #1: Yes. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall be considered as “trafficking in persons”. Here, the appellants acted in unison for the
accomplishment of a common purpose of recruiting, transporting, and harboring the victims for the purpose of
engaging them in prostitution. It lasted for a month until the victims decided to leave and report the incident to
the authorities. It was through the employment of deception and taking advantage of the victims’ vulnerability as
minors that appellants were able to successfully entice them to be recruited, transported, and harbored for the
ultimate purpose of subjecting them to sexual exploitation to gain profit or money.

ISSUE #2: Whether the prosecution has proven the minority of the victims to qualify the crime of trafficking in
persons.
HELD #2: No. However, although the prosecution failed to prove the minority of the victims when they presented
only a photocopy of their birth certificates, it was duly established that the trafficking of persons was committed
by three or more persons which qualifies the crime under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208.

ISSUE #3: Whether consent to the sexual acts freely given by the victims is a valid defense.
HELD #3: No. It is immaterial that BBB263264 and AAA263264 had given consent to the sexual acts. Under R.A.
No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364, trafficking in persons could still be committed with or without the
victims’ consent. The victims of the crime are in the best position to state that the accused had recruited and used
them by giving them payment in exchange for their sexual exploitation.

55. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BBB AND XXX, G.R. NO. 252507, 18 APRIL 2022

FACTS: BBB, mother of 13-year-old AAA, allegedly conspired with XXX, a foreign national, to traffic her daughter.
BBB deceived AAA into a marriage with XXX at a mosque, asserting it was for travel and inheritance. AAA had
previously been sexually abused by XXX, BBB’s former employer and romantic partner, during his visits. BBB denied
knowledge of the abuse or coercing the marriage, claiming she learned of it coincidentally. The facts are centered
on the alleged deceptive marriage of a minor to an adult.

ISSUE: Whether qualified trafficking in persons is committed by forcing a minor to marry a person of legal age.

HELD: Yes. All the elements of qualified trafficking in persons are present under Section 4 (c), in relation to
Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, as amended by RA 10364. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical
to offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading
them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage and the act shall be considered as qualified trafficking when the trafficked person is a child or when
the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee. At the time of her fraudulent
marriage to XXX, AAA was only 13 years old, and her mother, BBB, facilitated this union by coercing her minor
daughter into marrying XXX for sexual exploitation.

L. Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004

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 [R.A. No. 9262]

56. XXX261920 V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 261920, 27 MARCH 2023

FACTS: After a quarrel in May 2017, petitioner told his wife to leave their home; she left with their 2-year-old
daughter while their older child stayed. A psychologist diagnosed the wife with Major Depressive Disorder due to
repeated neglect and abuse. The RTC acquitted petitioner of economic abuse, finding no willful denial of support,
but convicted him for causing psychological harm by forcing his wife and child out. The CA affirmed. Petitioner
claimed he never evicted them and had been providing P5,000.00 monthly, though his net pay was limited due to
substantial loan deductions.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

HELD: No. The elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are:

(a) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(b) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(c) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(d) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or
omissions.
Here, there is doubt as regards the fourth element. The act which should have caused the wife’s mental or
emotional anguish should be the May 2017 incident i.e., her ouster from the conjugal dwelling. However, the
prosecution failed to show an indubitable nexus between the act complained of and the alleged mental or emotional
anguish on the part of the wife. Furthermore, the record is bereft of any evidence that petitioner ordered his wife
to leave the conjugal dwelling with a view to willfully and deliberately inflict mental or emotional anguish upon
them.

57. XXX256611 V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 256611, 12 OCTOBER 2022

FACTS: From 1999 to 2002, AAA256611 and XXX256611 lived together and had two children. In 2008, XXX256611
agreed to give P1,000 monthly support but failed to pay regularly and stopped altogether in 2010. AAA256611
claimed the lack of support caused her emotional and psychological anguish. XXX256611 argued he provided
support until 2012, but a disabling accident, medical expenses, and later cancer left him financially incapable. He
claimed his remaining income was spent on health needs and court-related travel.

ISSUE: Whether the deprivation of financial support to AAA256611 and their children met the statutory
requirement of being ‘willful’ having the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her children’s
movement or conduct.

HELD: No. There is no proof that XXX256611 deliberately refused to give support to control his wife’s behavior or
actions. The prosecution’s evidence only established his failure or inability to provide financial support, which is
not enough to convict under the law. Mere denial of financial support is not enough for a prosecution of violation
of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. The language of Section 5 (e) is that: the denial of financial support, to be punishable,
must have the “purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s . . . movement or conduct.” The use of
the word “deprive” connotes willfulness and intention. Thus, the willful deprivation of financial support, therefore,
is the actus reus of the offense, while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman’s or her
children’s conduct.

N. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

[R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640; A.M. 18-03-16-SC; IRR of R.A. No. 9165]

58. XIUQUIN SHI V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. NO. 228519, 16 MARCH 2022

FACTS: On April 18, 2010, SPO3 Corbe acted as poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation targeting Chua for the sale
of half a kilo of shabu. Inside Chua’s vehicle, Hong handed over the shabu in exchange for marked bills, while Sy,

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 Hong’s wife, was also present. The operatives arrested all three and brought them to Camp Bagong Diwa, where
the seized items were marked and inventoried in the presence of two Barangay Kagawads, but without DOJ or
media witnesses. The seized substance tested positive for shabu. The RTC convicted Chua and Hong for illegal
sale, and all three, including Sy, for illegal possession.

ISSUE #1: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
HELD #1: Yes. To secure a verdict of conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object, and consideration, and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and payment. On the other hand, to sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must establish the following elements: (a) the accused had an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

ISSUE #2: Whether Sy successfully refuted the presumption of animus possidendi over the seized items.
HELD #2: No. Under RA 9165, possession includes both actual and constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. Constructive possession,
on the other hand, exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he or she has
the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Here, Sy was found in constructive
possession of the fourteen (14) packs of shabu inside her husband’s car. Her mere possession of a regulated drug
per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict her absence of a
satisfactory explanation for such possession.

59. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ANDANAR, G.R. NO. 246284, 16 JUNE 2021

FACTS: Michael Andanar was arrested in a buy-bust for illegal drug sale. On the other hand, Mary Jane Garbo
was charged with maintaining a drug den, her house, where the transaction occurred and drug paraphernalia was
found.

ISSUE: Whether Mary Jane Garbo should be convicted of illegal maintenance of a drug den under Section 6 of
RA 9165.

HELD: No. The offense requires the following elements: a) that the place is a den - a place where any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes,
distributed, sold, or used in any form; and b) that the accused maintains the said place. It is not enough that
dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in the place. More than a finding that the dangerous drug is
being used there, it must also be clearly shown that the accused is the maintainer or operator or the owner of the
place where the dangerous drug is used or sold.

The alleged drug den is a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the
maintainer of the den. The word “regular” means doing the same thing in uniform intervals, or something that is
a common occurrence. Here, the prosecution had only presented a singular occurrence of the so-called illegal drug
activity in Garbo’s house. Garbo, therefore, cannot be considered a maintainer of a drug den.

60. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUIJANO, G.R. NO. 247558, 19 FEBRUARY 2020

FACTS: During a commotion inside the city jail, a jail officer saw Tulipat receive a bag and hand it to Quijano.
The officer then seized the bag and found therein a transparent bag with white crystalline substance. The seized
items, weighing 735.8 grams, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thereafter, Quijano was
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Quijano asserts that the element of animus possidendi was
absent as he did not know what was inside the bag and was only requested to hold the same.

ISSUE: Whether Quijano is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

HELD: Yes. The elements of the offense are: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as
a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. This crime is mala prohibita, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. The
prosecution, however, must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus possidendi). Here, Quijano

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 was caught in possession of illegal drugs of considerable quantity 729.2 grams of shabu inside the Manila City Jail,
sans any authority. Further, the circumstances altogether negate his pretense of lack of animus possidendi.

Q. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act

[R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 9231; R.A. No. 11648]

61. JAVAREZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 248729, 03 SEPTEMBER 2020

FACTS: On February 7, 2008, public school teacher Joel Javarez struck student BBB with a broomstick during
class, causing a swollen cheek. Earlier that day, he also pushed student AAA while breaking up a fight, causing
the child to fall and sustain minor injuries. Javarez claimed both actions were disciplinary and not abusive. He was
convicted by the RTC for child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Javarez appealed, arguing his conduct did not amount to child abuse under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Javarez is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

HELD: No. Javarez is not guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 but of slight physical injuries
under Article 266(2) of the RPC. For an act to be classified as child abuse, there must be a clear intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the child’s dignity. In the case of AAA, the push was deemed accidental, occurring while
Javarez was trying to stop a fight with no intent to humiliate or harm the student. He was not held criminally liable
for this act. However, in the case of BBB, the Court found that his action of striking the child with a broomstick
was meant as a form of discipline rather than an intent to degrade or demean. Since the injury lasted less than
seven days, this constituted slight physical injuries rather than child abuse.

62. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 252351, 07 JULY 2021

FACTS: The appellant, stepfather to minor AAA, was charged with qualified rape and child abuse. On March 11,
2004, the appellant, returning from drinking, forced AAA to massage him, then raped her while threatening her
life. AAA, fearing retaliation, did not immediately report. After confiding in her aunt, she reported the crime on
March 22, 2004. Medical examinations confirmed injuries consistent with sexual assault. Later, when AAA retrieved
belongings with barangay officials, the appellant slapped her, causing her to fall. The appellant denied the
allegations. The trial court and Court of Appeals convicted him of both rape and child abuse.

ISSUE #1: Whether the appellant is guilty of qualified rape under RPC.
HELD #1: No. The Court found the appellant guilty of simple rape only under Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended. For an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship must be properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial. While the minority of
AAA was proven, both the prosecution’s and the defense’s testimonies disproved the claim that the appellant was
AAA’s stepfather. The appellant is not legally AAA’s stepfather, as he and AAA’s mother were merely common-law
partners and not legally married. Consequently, the appellant can only be held liable for simple rape, not qualified
rape, as correctly determined by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE #2: Whether the appellant is guilty of child abuse under RA 7610.
HELD #2: Yes. Under Section 10(a), Article VI, of RA 7610, “any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.” Under Section 3(b)
paragraph 2 of RA 7610, child abuse may be committed by deeds or words that debased, degraded, and demeaned
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The appellant’s act of slapping the 15-year-old AAA in
front of witnesses debased and humiliated her, constituting an act of cruelty. This action was likely a panicked
attempt to create a false impression of a concerned father, and to silence or intimidate AAA after she reported the
rape.

63. AAA261422 V. XXX261422, G.R. NO. 261422, 13 NOVEMBER 2023

FACTS: In their small home, 13-year-old AAA, while asleep on December 25, 2017, was awakened by her
stepfather, XXX, who unzipped her shorts, inserted his finger into her vagina, and sucked her breasts. These acts

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 were repeated in January 2018. AAA reported the incidents to her aunt, YYY, leading to complaints with authorities.
A medical examination confirmed a hymenal laceration and an un-intact hymen. In three separate informations,
XXX was charged with rape through sexual intercourse, rape through sexual assault, and acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

ISSUE: Whether XXX is guilty of the crimes charged in the three informations.

HELD: No. Instead, the Court convicted XXX with three counts of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610. In People v. Tulagan, the Court explained that where the victim is at least 12 years old1 but below
18 years old, as here, acts of sexual assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, as amended, and acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366 of the RPC, which also constitute lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610, were committed against said victim, the offender shall be held liable for the latter offense as it
imposes a higher penalty consistent with the State’s policy to provide special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination.

To warrant a conviction of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the following elements must
be shown with moral certainty: (1) the accused committed the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2)
the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. “Other sexual abuse” is a broad term that includes all
other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. The prosecution’s evidence proves all the elements of lascivious
conduct under Section 5(b), establishing that XXX committed the acts on three occasions.

64. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 230904, 08 JANUARY 2020

FACTS: The accused, XXX, the stepfather of AAA (17) and BBB (15), was charged with multiple offenses including
rape and acts of lasciviousness against them, and a violation of R.A. 9262. On August 14 and 21, 2002, when AAA
was 14, XXX committed carnal knowledge upon her. On August 3, 2006, when AAA was 17, XXX sexually assaulted
her by inserting his finger. The following day, XXX committed lascivious acts on AAA, including kissing and mashing
her breasts. On August 5, 2006, he also committed lascivious acts on BBB by touching her thighs and breasts.

ISSUE #1: Whether XXX is guilty of two (2) counts of rape by carnal knowledge against AAA.
HELD #1: Yes. The elements of rape by carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(1)(a) are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Here, on
August 14, 2002 and August 21, 2002, XXX had carnal knowledge of AAA, a minor daughter of her live-in partner
DDD, through force, threat and intimidation.

ISSUE #2: Whether XXX is guilty of rape by sexual assault against AAA.
HELD #2: No. The Court modified the charge of rape by sexual assault to lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610. Appellant committed two (2) counts of lascivious conduct on AAA. XXX’s act of inserting his finger into
AAA’s vagina would have amounted to rape by sexual assault punishable under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Considering, however, that AAA was only seventeen (17) years old when she was abused
by appellant, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of appellant’s crime. When sexual assault is committed
against a victim 12 years old2 or older but below 18, or is 18 years old but under special circumstances, the crime
committed is lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. XXX’s act of sexually assaulting AAA on August 3,
2006 qualifies as lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

ISSUE #3: Whether XXX is guilty of acts of lasciviousness against BBB.

HELD #3: No. The Court modified the charge of acts of lasciviousness to lascivious conduct under Section 5(b)
of RA 7610. On August 5, 2006, around 8 o’clock in the evening, she was alone with XXX in their house when the
latter molested her. XXX only stopped when AAA, CCC and DDD arrived home. As earlier discussed, however, there
is a similar need here to modify the designation of appellant’s offense from “acts of lasciviousness” to “lascivious
conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610.”

65. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. NO. 235662, 24 JULY 2019

1
Now 16 years old, as amended by R.A. No. 11648.
2
Now 16 years old, as amended by R.A. No. 11648.
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 FACTS: XXX is the father of AAA and BBB, aged fifteen-year-old and fourteen-year-old, respectively. Their mother
is an overseas Filipino worker (OFW). One day, AAA and XXX were alone in their home. XXX brought AAA to a
room and sexually abused her. XXX promised to give her money. Thereafter, XXX abused AAA multiple times. XXX
also had carnal knowledge with his daughter BBB. In several instances, XXX would have carnal knowledge of BBB
despite AAA and his son, CCC, being in the same room. BBB knew that XXX also raped AAA. AAA kept silent for 3
years because their mother did not believe her. AAA left their home and told her aunt about what XXX had done
to them. XXX was charged with two counts of rape (for the rape of his daughters AAA and BBB) and lascivious
conduct (on his daughter BBB).

ISSUE #1: Whether XXX should be convicted of qualified rape.

HELD #1: Yes. The elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and
without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen [18] years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. At the outset, AAA and BBB were young girls under the age of
eighteen (18) when they were sexually abused by XXX. As for the element of relationship, AAA and BBB were the
appellant’s legitimate children.

ISSUE #2: Whether XXX is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
HELD #2: Yes. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 are as follows: 1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and 3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age. “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of a person. XXX committed lascivious conduct when he performed acts of lasciviousness by pulling down BBB’s
shorts and underwear, touching and kissing her private parts, and attempting to insert his penis into her vagina.

S. Law on Arson [P.D. No. 1613]

66. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOLENDO, G.R. NO. 223098, 03 JUNE 2019

FACTS: On September 18, 1996, Nestor Dolendo allegedly set fire to the dwelling of Leonardo Perocho, Sr. in
Masbate, causing the death of six-year-old Leonardo Perocho, Jr. due to massive burns. Eyewitnesses Deolina and
Jessie Perocho identified Dolendo as the perpetrator. Dolendo denied involvement, claiming he was in Bulacan
during the incident. The trial court found him guilty of arson with homicide. The Court of Appeals modified the
conviction to simple arson, finding insufficient proof of intent to kill.

ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of simple arson only.

HELD: Yes. In People v. Malngan, the Court established guidelines for determining the crime committed in cases
of arson involving death: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death
results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide
is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building
or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only;
lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and the offender has already done so, but fire is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed -
homicide/murder and arson.

Hail to the Chiefs!

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