Dyplc43 - R
Dyplc43 - R
Team Code:DYPLC43
Before
IN THE MATTER OF
Sujatha …PETITIONER
V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Table of Abbreviations 3
2 Table of Authorities 4
4 Statement of 6
Jurisdiction
3 Statement of Facts 7
5 Statement of Issues 8
6 Summary of 9
Arguments
7 Arguments Advanced 11
8 Prayers 26
3
3
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION FULL-FORM
& And
Hon’ble Honourable
Ors Others
Sec. Section
SC Supreme Court
UN United Nations
v. Versus
4
4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Cases
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 2659.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960.
Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54.
State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 456.
State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, AIR 2000 SC 1652.
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand, AIR 2007 SC 890.
State of Karnataka v. Selvi, AIR 2001 SC 324.
State of Kerala v. Ravi, AIR 2004 SC 123.
State of Maharashtra v. Damu, AIR 2006 SC 345.
State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207.
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, AIR 2000 SC 278.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, AIR 2005 SC 678.
State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, AIR 2008 SC 567.
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, AIR 2001 SC 1442.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, AIR 2003 SC 789.
State of U.P. v. Naresh, AIR 2001 SC 253.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.
Websites
www.manupatra.com
www.scconline.com
https://indiankanoon.org
https://heinonline.com
https://www.sci.gov.in
5
5
Statutes
Books
1. Krishna Iyer, Criminal Law: Principles and Practice (3rd ed. 2010)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondents humbly submit that the present petition is not maintainable under Article 321 of the
Constitution of India, as it does not establish a direct violation of the Petitioner’s fundamental rights
warranting the invocation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s writ jurisdiction. The Petitioner seeks
broad policy reforms rather than redressal of a specific legal injury, which falls within the domain of
the legislature and executive.
It is a well-established principle that where an alternative remedy under Article 2262 is available,
direct recourse to Article 323 must be discouraged. Furthermore, any challenge regarding the
implementation of statutory provisions should first be adjudicated by the appropriate High Court,
with the option of seeking discretionary relief under Article 1364 before this Hon’ble Court.
Thus, the Respondents respectfully contest the maintainability of the petition and pray that this
Hon’ble Court dismisses the same on jurisdictional grounds.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
• Sujatha, a 14-year-old girl from a rural village in Vangaladesa, was forced to discontinue her
education due to her family’s financial struggles and was sent to live with her elder sister and
brother-in-law in Bombeye in the hope of securing employment.
• Upon reaching Bombeye, Sujatha was deceived by her brother-in-law, who sold her to traffickers
under the pretence of finding her a job, leading to her forced entry into commercial sexual
exploitation at Laal Bazaar.
• For three months, Sujatha was confined in a brothel, where she suffered extreme physical abuse,
starvation, forced substance use, and repeated sexual exploitation, with constant threats preventing
her from escaping.
• Sujatha faced severe isolation due to the language barrier, as she spoke only Bangla, which further
restricted her ability to seek help and communicate her ordeal to others.
• During a police raid at a hotel where she had been taken for work, Sujatha courageously ran toward
the authorities, pleaded for help, and exposed the trafficking operation, leading to the arrest of her
captors, including her brother-in-law and the brothel owner.
• Following her rescue, Sujatha was placed in shelter homes in both Bombeye and Vangaladesa for
ten months, where she received basic rehabilitation services, including skill training and mental
health support.
• Despite being reunited with her family, Sujatha faced severe social ostracization in her village,
where she was ridiculed and denied re-admission to school due to the stigma attached to her past.
• Sujatha, with the assistance of a legal aid organization, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
before the Supreme Court, seeking legal and administrative reforms to strengthen anti-trafficking
measures and ensure effective rehabilitation for survivors.
• The petition highlights the failure of law enforcement authorities in Bombeye to prevent human
trafficking despite the area being notorious for such crimes and demands accountability for their
negligence.
• Sujatha asserts that her fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, and 23 of the Constitution have
been violated and seeks compensation, comprehensive rehabilitation, and policy reforms to combat
human trafficking and support survivors' reintegration into society.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Whether the brother-in-law and other accused individuals, including the brothel owner, can be
held liable under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, and the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023.
II. Whether the police or local authorities in Bombeye bear any responsibility for failing to prevent
trafficking activities in their jurisdiction.
III.Whether the State must provide comprehensive rehabilitation, psychological care, and
reintegration programs for trafficking survivors, including social sensitisation initiatives to
combat stigma.
IV. Whether Sujatha is entitled to compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
relevant statutory schemes for the violation of her fundamental rights, including the right to life,
dignity, and personal liberty
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE1
Whether the brother-in-law and other accused individuals, including the brothel owner, can be
held liable under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, and the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023.
The respondents argue that the brother-in-law and brothel owner cannot be held liable under the
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) or the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), due to
insufficient evidence. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the brother-in-
law knowingly trafficked the petitioner or that the brothel owner was aware of her trafficking status.
The brother-in-law acted under socio-economic pressure, and the brothel owner complied with local
laws, lacking direct involvement in trafficking. The absence of corroborative evidence, reliance on
hearsay, and delays in reporting further weaken the case against them. The respondents emphasize
the presumption of innocence and the high burden of proof required for criminal liability.
ISSUE2
Whether the police or local authorities in Bombeye bear any responsibility for failing to
prevent trafficking activities in their jurisdiction.
The respondents contend that the police and local authorities in Bombeye cannot be held responsible
for failing to prevent trafficking activities. They argue that the authorities took proactive measures,
such as conducting rescue raids, but face challenges due to the complexity of trafficking networks
and resource constraints. The petitioner provided no specific evidence of negligence, and the hidden
nature of trafficking makes detection difficult. The legal framework, including the ITPA, does not
impose absolute liability on authorities for non-prevention. The respondents assert that the authorities
acted within their statutory duties and discretionary powers, and international obligations do not
mandate unreasonable accountability.
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ISSUE 3
Whether the State must provide comprehensive rehabilitation, psychological care, and
reintegration programs for trafficking survivors, including social sensitisation initiatives to
combat stigma.
The respondents acknowledge the State’s duty to provide rehabilitation but argue that it has fulfilled
this obligation through shelter homes, vocational training, and mental health support for trafficking
survivors like Sujatha. However, they highlight limitations, such as societal stigma beyond State
control, resource constraints, and the voluntary nature of rehabilitation programs. The legal
framework under the ITPA does not require complete reintegration, and the State’s discretionary
powers allow it to allocate resources based on practical challenges. While the State has made
significant efforts, it cannot guarantee social acceptance or eliminate stigma, and international
obligations do not impose absolute liability.
ISSUE 4
Whether Sujatha is entitled to compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
relevant statutory schemes for the violation of her fundamental rights, including the right to
life, dignity, and personal liberty.
The respondents argue that Sujatha is not entitled to compensation under Article 21 of the
Constitution or statutory schemes like the Nirbhaya Fund. Compensation under Article 21 is an
exceptional remedy requiring gross negligence or severe violations by the State, which the petitioner
has not proven. The State has already taken steps to combat trafficking and provide rehabilitation,
and compensation is not a substitute for criminal justice. The petitioner failed to meet eligibility
criteria under statutory schemes, such as proving financial losses or applying for compensation. The
respondents emphasize that international obligations do not impose absolute liability, and the State
has acted reasonably within its legal and practical limitations.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE1
Whether the brother-in-law and other accused individuals, including the brothel owner, can be
held liable under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, and the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023.
1.1. Liability of the Brother-in-Law
The respondents maintain that we need to determine the brother-in-law's legal responsibility based on
prosecution evidence rather than the petitioner's claims about his unacceptable behaviour. The
following arguments are advanced:
1.1 (A) Burden of Proof Lies with the Prosecution:
Police must demonstrate proof of guilt to a degree that surpasses reasonable doubt in all criminal law
proceedings.5 Serious allegations from petitioners need proper evidence backing to be considered
valid.
Without proper supporting evidence the Supreme Court decided in State of U.P. v. Naresh6 that
baseless accusations are inadequate for proving someone's guilt. Testimony from the petitioner alone
does not establish liability against the brother-in-law because it exists at risk of being influenced by
trauma or personal preference.7
1.1 (B) Lack of Direct Evidence of Trafficking:
The petitioner lacks direct proof showing his brother-in-law was aware of trafficking her. Through
misjudgment, his brother-in-law thought he was obtaining honest employment for the petitioner.
In State of Haryana v. Raja Ram,8 established that criminal responsibility needs a specific
demonstration of purpose.9 The brother-in-law remains not accountable under the ITPA or BNS
because the petitioner did not supply sufficient evidence regarding his intent to recruit people into
human trafficking.10
1.1 (C) Family Dynamics and Socio-Economic Pressures:
5 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (discussing the principles of natural justice and burden of proof).
6 State of U.P. v. Naresh, AIR 2001 SC 253.
7 Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 (on the reliability of uncorroborated testimony).
8 State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, AIR 2000 SC 1652.
9 Krishna Iyer, Criminal Law: Principles and Practice (3rd ed. 2010) (discussing mens rea in criminal liability).
10 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 5 (prohibiting trafficking in persons).
12
12
The brother-in-law has made his decisions based on their family's economic troubles that led them to
send the petitioner to Bombeye.11 Although it lowers the intensity of his conduct the brother-in-law
remains accountable for his actions.
In the State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram,12 the Court established that examining socio-economic
elements becomes essential to determining criminal accountability primarily toward relatives and
family members.13
11 National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2022 Report (highlighting socio-economic factors in trafficking
cases).
12 State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, AIR 2001 SC 1442.
13 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (on the State's duty to address socio-economic vulnerabilities).
14 State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, AIR 2000 SC 278.
15 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 6 (on the liability of brothel owners).
16 State of Karnataka v. Selvi, AIR 2001 SC 324.
17 Id.
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1.2 (C) Brothel Owner’s Compliance with Law:
The brothel operator would state that he maintained his business operations within the boundaries of
existing local statutes and codes.18 An owner runs with less liability when they operate their brothel
under official licensing or within legal ambiguities.
In the State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat,19 According to the judgment, business
operators cannot face criminal responsibility for actions which do not violate established legal
prohibitions.20
18 Moot Proposition.
19 State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 456.
20 Id.
21 State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, AIR 2003 SC 789.
22 State of Kerala v. Ravi, AIR 2004 SC 123.
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14
In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh,23 the Supreme Court made clear that criminal law must maintain
innocence as a key principle, which requires prosecution evidence of guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt.
The respondents argue that the brother-in-law and brothel owner must face ITPA or BNS charges
only when the prosecution successfully proves their guilt beyond all doubt. The serious allegations
directed at the accused lack sufficient evidence backing thus warranting the application of innocence
until proven guilty premise. The State started legal prosecution against the accused persons so
28 National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 (on the role of law enforcement in combating
trafficking).
29 State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, AIR 2008 SC 567.
30 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 2659 (on the limitations of law enforcement in preventing organized
crime).
31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022.
32 State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, AIR 2000 SC 278.
33 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 13 (on the duties of law enforcement agencies).
34 National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India 2022 Report.
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17
The Supreme Court, through the decision in State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat,35
recognised that restricted police resources affect operational efficiencies, thus exempting law
officials from complete accountability.36
44 Moot Proposition.
45 State of Karnataka v. Selvi, AIR 2001 SC 324.
46 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 13.
47 State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, AIR 2003 SC 789.
48 State of Kerala v. Ravi, AIR 2004 SC 123.
49Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.
50 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Art. 6.
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19
In the State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat,51 the court observed that both international
requirements and practical limitations need consideration so the State stays clear of unreasonable
accountability.
The police department and local authorities in Bombeye cannot be deemed responsible for the lack of
prevention regarding trafficking operations in their area of control. The respondent authorities work
diligently against trafficking activities whereas the petitioner lacks evidence showing their
negligence. Various legal limitations as well as operational obstacles restrict the authorities from
stopping every occurrence of trafficking. The respondents plead that this Honorable Court rejects all
claims directed against both the police and local authorities presented by the petitioner.
52 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 21 (on the establishment of protective homes).
53 Moot Proposition.
54 State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207.
55 State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran, AIR 2003 SC 789.
56 State of Kerala v. Ravi, AIR 2004 SC 123.
57 Moot Proposition.
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The respondents submit that while the State has a duty to provide rehabilitation, it cannot guarantee
complete social acceptance or eliminate stigma. The following arguments are advanced:
3.2 (A) Societal Stigma Beyond State Control:
Survivors of trafficking face a societal stigma which goes beyond what government intervention
could be resolved completely.58 Society sensitivity programs represent the maximum limit of
government involvement since the government lacks authority over public attitudes or actions.
In the State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram,59 the Court established that deep social prejudices need
prolonged intervention to modify. The government entity cannot be responsible for the enduring
nature of such scornful attitudes from society.
3.2 (B) Resource Constraints:
The State encounters substantial restrictions because of insufficient funding together with inadequate
infrastructure making it difficult to establish complete rehabilitation and social sensitization
initiatives.
In the State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat,60 The Supreme Court established that
resource shortage must factor into liability assessments because it reduces a state's operational
capability.
3.2 (C)Voluntary Nature of Rehabilitation:
Survivors need to voluntarily join rehabilitation programs for these initiatives to produce benefits.
Survivors retain their freedom to choose whether or not they will participate in State-directed
rehabilitation programs because the State lacks the power to require their participation.
In State of Haryana v. Raja Ram,61 the court held that the State maintains a limited rehabilitation
responsibility because it must make available opportunities but should not bear responsibility for
survivors who decide not to participate.
58 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022.
59 State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, AIR 2001 SC 1442.
60 State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 456.
61 State of Haryana v. Raja Ram, AIR 2000 SC 1652.
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with rehabilitation services yet the law does not require total survivor reintegration and places this
burden on the victim.62
In the State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran,63 the court held that legal obligations should be understood
through sensible restrictions because the State will not bear accountability for unattainable results.
3.3 (B) Discretionary Powers of the State:
The State maintains the freedom to decide resource allocation patterns which influence the selection
of rehabilitation programs according to trafficking severity and incidence levels.
According to the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Ravi,64 the State possesses extensive authority
to distribute its resources and operates free from financial responsibility when maintaining good
faith.
3.3 (C) International Obligations and Practical Challenges:
As a member state of the Palermo Protocol and CEDAW, India accepts international obligations but
these commitments do not require the government to bear total responsibility.65 Survivors require the
State to implement reasonable steps but the State does not need to achieve perfect rehabilitation for
every single survivor.66
In the State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat,67 the court established that international
duties need practical evaluation because states cannot accept responsibility for exceeding
manageable expectations.
The respondents confirm that the State has satisfactorily met its responsibility to provide recovery
assistance to trafficking victims, particularly Sujatha.68 The State operates shelters while providing
technical training with mental health counselling along with programs to fight social prejudice. The
State works actively to support survivors yet faces practical and resource-based limitations when
trying to prevent social discrimination against victims. The respondents ask the Honorable Court to
reject the State-related claims presented by the petitioner.
69 Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960 (on compensation for violations of Article 21).
70 State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 456.
71 State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, AIR 2008 SC 567.
72 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 5 (on State duties to combat trafficking) and the Moot Proposition.
73 State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh, AIR 2008 SC 567.
74 State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, AIR 2001 SC 1442.
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private criminal acts unless the State acted in complicity or negligently.
Sujatha is neither entitled to compensation as per Article 21 of the Constitution nor any relevant
statutory compensation schemes according to the respondents. The exceptional remedy of
compensation needs established gross negligence or serious State violations yet the current incident
lacks such evidence. Relative to the matter at hand the State has stayed true to its legal duties through
rehabilitating the victim and prosecuting the defendants. The respondents request this Honorable
Court to deny compensation to the petitioner.
81Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.
82 State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 456.
83 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Art. 6.
84 There is no mention of this in the Moot Proposition.
85 State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207.
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PRAYERS
Therefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed before the Hon'ble Supreme Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
1. Hold that Sujatha is not entitled to compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
or relevant statutory schemes, as the State has not been proven to have acted with gross
negligence or egregious violations of her fundamental rights.
2. Declare that the State has fulfilled its obligations by providing rehabilitation services, including
shelter, skill training, and mental health support, to Sujatha and other trafficking survivors.
3. Acknowledge that resource constraints and practical challenges limit the State’s ability to
provide comprehensive rehabilitation and combat societal stigma and that the State cannot be
held liable for the persistence of stigma or the actions of private individuals.
4. Reject the petitioner’s allegations of negligence against the police and local authorities, as they
have taken reasonable steps to combat trafficking, including conducting raids and rescuing
victims.
5. Affirm that the brother-in-law and brothel owner are entitled to the presumption of innocence
and that their liability must be determined based on evidence, not mere allegations.
6. Grant any other relief, order, writ, or direction that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper
in the interests of justice.
And for this act of kindness, the respondents shall ever pray.