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453 Phil. 1059

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA
[IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND
R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-
ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution
dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision
dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the
amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60
as of January 31, 2002.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through

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the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R.
Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to Executive
Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the

aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to
be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks:

(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation

accounts;

(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-

Valamo-Spinus- Avertina
Foundation accounts;

(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation

accounts;

(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation

accounts and

(5) Maler Foundation accounts.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25

million and US$5 million in treasury notes which
exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired
property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central
Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the

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PCGG.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos,

Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General

Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6] dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos
children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the
Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the
approval of said agreements and for the enforcement
thereof.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements

sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.
The aforementioned General Agreement specified in
one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that
petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three
Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The
said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter
Consandey, granting petitioner's request for legal
assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits
in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of
illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to
await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to
restitution.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the

motion to approve the General/Supplemental

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Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented

as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial
implementation of said agreements.

On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for

summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto
which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc,
Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.

In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the

Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the
ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for
summary judgment."

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May

26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion
for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that
she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10%
belonging to the Marcos estate.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with

the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an
additional request for the immediate transfer of the
deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request
was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December
10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of
Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the
funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the
Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children moved that the funds be placed in custodia
legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was
allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8,
1998, granted the motion.

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After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial

order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October
28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case
was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on
March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary
judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356
million, based on the following grounds:

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT

THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT
OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379
ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS
MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDING.

II

RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING

THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE
ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE
FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR
FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE
OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS
WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]

Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial

conference, certain facts were established, warranting
a summary judgment on the funds sought to be
forfeited.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the

petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which
opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents

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Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.

On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for

summary judgment was conducted.

In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the

Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for
summary judgment:

CONCLUSION

There is no issue of fact which calls for the

presentation of evidence.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is

hereby granted.

The Swiss deposits which were transmitted

to and now held in escrow at the PNB are
deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten
wealth.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
and against the respondents, declaring the
Swiss deposits which were transferred to
and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total
aggregate value equivalent to
US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000
together with the increments thereof
forfeited in favor of the State.[10]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for

reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion

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for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs.

Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000
adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.

Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.

In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the

Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000
decision, thus denying petitioner's motion for summary
judgment:

CONCLUSION

In sum, the evidence offered for summary

judgment of the case did not prove that the
money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the
Marcos spouses because no legal proof
exists in the record as to the ownership by
the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from
the Swiss Banks.

The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the

government cannot be deemed to have
been established and our judgment thereon,
perforce, must also have been without
basis.

WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court

dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered
and set aside, and this case is now being set
for further proceedings.[12]

Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same,

petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing
its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

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jurisdiction considering that --

PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY
THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA
R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT
ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR
SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC
OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED
FROM ENGAGING IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.

B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO

ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE
SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR
OWNERSHIP THEREOF:

1. ADMISSIONS IN
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS'
ANSWER;

2. ADMISSION IN THE
GENERAL /
SUPPLEMENTAL
AGREEMENTS THEY
SIGNED AND SOUGHT
TO IMPLEMENT;

3. ADMISSION IN A
MANIFESTATION OF

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PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IMELDA
R. MARCOS AND IN
THE MOTION TO
PLACE THE RES IN
CUSTODIA LEGIS;
AND

4. ADMISSION IN THE
UNDERTAKING TO PAY
THE HUMAN RIGHTS
VICTIMS.

C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE

EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME
OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND
IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS.

D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A

PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.

II

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED
ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE

THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE
LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY
FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS
CLEARLY A SHAM; AND

B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING
OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS
DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

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ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE

OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND
THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE
RENDITION OF A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

III

THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE

IMPLEADED.

IV

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND
THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE
AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND
THEIR "AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS"
HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE
COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED
EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE
TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS
DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY
29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US
DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO

HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13]

Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the

respondents' motions for reconsideration and

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supplemental motion for reconsideration were the

authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss
decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was
incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of
lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for
reversing itself because respondents themselves never
raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration
and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the
translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be
resurrected anymore because said decisions had been
previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in
resolving a "decisive issue" before it.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the

non-production of the authenticated translations of the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a
marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by
any measure the conclusiveness and strength of what
had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by
the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus
belonged to the Filipino people.

In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos

filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002.
After several motions for extension which were all
granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand,
Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were
filed on May 27, 2002.

Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied

on the following grounds:

A.

PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND

ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE

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SANDIGANBAYAN.

B.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]

Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit
the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions.
Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now
elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs.
Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply
with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed.
Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its
petition before this Court must be dismissed.
Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case
for further proceedings cannot and should not be
considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment.

Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their

comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on
the grounds that:

(A)

BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10
MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED
FROM DOING SO.

(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment

was based on private respondents'

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Answer and other documents that

had long been in the records of the
case. Thus, by the time the Motion
was filed on 10 March 2000,
estoppel by laches had already set
in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express
admissions prior to filing the Motion
for Summary Judgment on 10
March 1990, petitioner had legally
bound itself to go to trial on the
basis of existing issues. Thus, it
clearly waived whatever right it had
to move for summary judgment.

(B)

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS

NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR
THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.

(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the

applicable law, is a penal statute.
As such, its provisions, particularly
the essential elements stated in
section 3 thereof, are mandatory in
nature. These should be strictly
construed against petitioner and
liberally in favor of private
respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the
third and fourth essential elements
in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with
respect to the identification,
ownership, and approximate
amount of the property which the

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Marcos couple allegedly acquired

during their incumbency.

(a) Petitioner has failed to prove

that the Marcos couple acquired
or own the Swiss funds.

(b) Even assuming, for the sake of

argument, that the fact of
acquisition has been proven,
petitioner has categorically
admitted that it has no
evidence showing how much of
the Swiss funds was acquired
during the incumbency of the
Marcos couple from 31
December 1965 to 25 February
1986.

(3) In contravention of the essential

element stated in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to
establish the other proper earnings
and income from legitimately
acquired property of the Marcos
couple over and above their
government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the
three essential elements provided
in paragraphs (c)[15] (d),[16] and
(e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the
inescapable conclusion is that the
prima facie presumption of unlawful
acquisition of the Swiss funds has
not yet attached. There can,
therefore, be no premature
forfeiture of the funds.

(C)

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IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING

AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS
MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF
CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO
TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS"
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO
JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS
FUNDS.

(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the

Rules of Court, the General and
Supplemental Agreements, as well
as the other written and testimonial
statements submitted in relation
thereto, are expressly barred from
being admissible in evidence
against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh
the alleged admissions together
with the other statements on
record, there would be a
demonstrable showing that no such
judicial admissions were made by
private respondents.

(D)

SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN

ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR
FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION
THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI,

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THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS

THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.[18]

For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the

petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to
comply with a very plain requirement of respondent
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an
attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and
incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other
matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of
the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and
impertinent as far as this Court is concerned.
Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as
eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested
person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially
translated in our known language. She says the
authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court
decisions should be presented. This should stop all
speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus,
respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be
denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which,
in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper
before this Court.

PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

But before this Court discusses the more relevant

issues, the question regarding the propriety of
petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule
65[19] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002
should be threshed out.

At the outset, we would like to stress that we are

treating this case as an exception to the general rule
governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of

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the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under

Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is
undeniably ingrained with immense public interest,
public policy and deep historical repercussions,
certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]

One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino

Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the
unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by
former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their
relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the
very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then
President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to
office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1,
issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
and charged it with the task of assisting the President
in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship. The urgency of this
undertaking was tersely described by this Court in
Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:

surely x x x an enterprise" of great pith and

moment"; it was attended by" great
expectations"; it was initiated not only out
of considerations of simple justice but also
out of sheer necessity - the national coffers
were empty, or nearly so.

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In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the

PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such
cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan.
But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all
parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of
form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued.
Almost two decades have passed since the government
initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal
acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or
illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all
the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural
sidetracks.[23]

We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with

finality all the issues therein.

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT

The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are:

(1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine
issue of fact which would either justify or negate
summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner
Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any

genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on
motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment
should take place as a matter of right.

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In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary

judgment was described as a judgment which a court
may render before trial but after both parties have
pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by
one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who
may in turn file an opposition supported also by
affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after
the court summarily hears both parties with their
respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine
issue between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned
in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for

claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.[25]

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no

genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.[26]
The theory of summary judgment is that, although an
answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner Republic.

The Solicitor General made a very thorough

presentation of its case for forfeiture:

xxx

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4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now

deceased and represented by his
Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for
several decades continuously and
without interruption as Congressman,
Senator, Senate President and
President of the Republic of the
Philippines from December 31, 1965
up to his ouster by direct action of the
people of EDSA on February 22-25,
1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos

(Imelda, for short) the former First
Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-
year martial law regime, occupied the
position of Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 up to the
peaceful revolution in February 22-25,
1986. She likewise served once as a
member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa during the early years of
martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as
Metro Manila Governor in concurrent
capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be

pointed out that based on the Official Report
of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries
of former President Marcos as President
form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and
from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while
that of the former First Lady, Imelda R.
Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements
from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986
was P75,000 a year xxx.

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ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME

xxx

12. Based on available documents, the

ITRs of the Marcoses for the years
1965-1975 were filed under Tax
Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the
years 1976 until 1984, the returns
were filed under Tax Identification No.
M 6221-J 1117-A-9.

13. The data contained in the ITRs and

Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses
are summarized and attached to the
reports in the following schedules:

Schedule A:

Schedule of Income (Annex "T"

hereof);

Schedule B:

Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex

"T-1" hereof);

Schedule C:

Schedule of Net Disposable Income

(Annex "T-2" hereof);

Schedule D:

Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex

"T-3" hereof).

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14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex

"T" hereof), the Marcoses reported
P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91
in total income over a period of 20
years from 1965 to 1984. The sources
of income are as follows:

Official P 2,627,581.00
- 16.01%
Salaries -
Legal 11,109,836.00
- 67.71%
Practice -
Farm
- 149,700.00 - .91%
Income
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
P16,408,442.00
Total - 100.00%
-

15. FM's official salary pertains to his

compensation as Senate President in
1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and
P1,420,000.00 as President of the
Philippines during the period 1966
until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda
reported salaries and allowances only
for the years 1979 to 1984 in the
amount of P1,191,646.00. The records
indicate that the reported income
came from her salary from the Ministry
of Human Settlements and allowances
from Food Terminal, Inc., National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation,
National Food Authority Council, Light
Rail Transit Authority and Home
Development Mutual Fund.

16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported

income from legal practice, the
amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96%
represents "receivables from prior

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years" during the period 1967 up to

1984.

17. In the guise of reporting income using

the cash method under Section 38 of
the National Internal Revenue Code,
FM made it appear that he had an
extremely profitable legal practice
before he became a President (FM
being barred by law from practicing his
law profession during his entire
presidency) and that, incredibly, he
was still receiving payments almost 20
years after. The only problem is that in
his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965
ITR immediately preceeding his
ascendancy to the presidency he did
not show any Receivables from client
at all, much less the P10,65-M that he
decided to later recognize as income.
There are no documents showing any
withholding tax certificates. Likewise,
there is nothing on record that will
show any known Marcos client as he
has no known law office. As previously
stated, his networth was a mere
P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The
joint income tax returns of FM and
Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the
skeletons of their kleptocracy.

18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00

as Other Income for the years 1972 up
to 1976 which he referred to in his
return as "Miscellaneous Items" and
"Various Corporations." There is no
indication of any payor of the

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dividends or earnings.

19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not

declare any income from any deposits
and placements which are subject to a
5% withholding tax. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue attested that after a
diligent search of pertinent records on
file with the Records Division, they did
not find any records involving the tax
transactions of spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1,
Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A,
Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1,
Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of
the Revenue Collector of Batac.
Further, BIR attested that no records
were found on any filing of capital
gains tax return involving spouses FM
and Imelda covering the years 1960 to
1965.

20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported

income over the twenty-year period
was P14,463,595.00 which represents
88% of the gross income. The
Marcoses paid income taxes totaling
P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59.
The business expenses in the amount
of P861,748.00 represent expenses
incurred for subscription, postage,
stationeries and contributions while
the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest
charges, medicare fees, taxes and
licenses. The total deductions in the
amount of P1,994,845.00 represents

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12% of the total gross income.

21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative

disposable income amounts to
P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This
is the amount that represents that
portion of the Marcoses income that is
free for consumption, savings and
investments. The amount is arrived at
by adding back to the net income after
tax the personal and additional
exemptions for the years 1965-1984,
as well as the tax-exempt salary of the
President for the years 1966 until
1972.

22. Finally, the networth analysis in

Schedule D, represents the total
accumulated networth of spouses,
Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent's
Balance Sheet attached to their 1965
ITR, covering the year immediately
preceding their ascendancy to the
presidency, indicates an ending
networth of P120,000.00 which FM
declared as Library and Miscellaneous
assets. In computing for the networth,
the income approach was utilized.
Under this approach, the beginning
capital is increased or decreased, as
the case may be, depending upon the
income earned or loss incurred.
Computations establish the total
networth of spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984
in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal
practice is real and valid x x x.

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G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN

SWISS BANKS

23. The following presentation very clearly

and overwhelmingly show in detail
how both respondents clandestinely
stashed away the country's wealth to
Switzerland and hid the same under
layers upon layers of foundations and
other corporate entities to prevent its
detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or
corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts.
But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and
documenting all those secret accounts
as well as the enormity of the deposits
therein hidden, the following
presentation is confined to five
identified accounts groups, with
balances amounting to about $356-M
with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.

H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos

issued a written order to Dr. Theo
Bertheau, legal counsel of
Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA,
also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for
him to establish the AZIO Foundation.
On the same date, Marcos executed a

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power of attorney in favor of Roberto

S. Benedicto empowering him to
transact business in behalf of the said
foundation. Pursuant to the said
Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was
formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz.
Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also
of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth
Merling from Schaan were designated
as members of the Board of Trustees
of the said foundation. Ferdinand
Marcos was named first beneficiary
and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was
second beneficiary. On November 12,
1971, FM again issued another written
order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In
Sydney, Australia, as the foundation's
first and sole beneficiary. This was
recorded on December 14, 1971.

25. In an undated instrument, Marcos

changed the first and sole beneficiary
to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change
was recorded on December 4, 1972.

26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO

FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO
FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees
remained the same. On March 11,
1981, Marcos issued a written directive
to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and
to transfer all its assets to account of
FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank
Hofman in Zurich under the account
"Reference OSER." The Board of
Trustees decided to dissolve the
foundation on June 25, 1981.

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27. In an apparent maneuver to bury

further the secret deposits beneath the
thick layers of corporate entities, FM
effected the establishment of VIBUR
FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in
Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust, were
designated as members of the Board
of Trustees. The account was officially
opened with SKA on September 10,
1981. The beneficial owner was not
made known to the bank since Fides
Trust Company acted as fiduciary.
However, comparison of the listing of
the securities in the safe deposit
register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as
of February 27, 1981 with that of
VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December
31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly
the same securities were listed.

28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it

is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION
is the beneficial successor of VERSO
FOUNDATION.

29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-

designated Board of Trustees decided
to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A
notice of such liquidation was sent to
the Office of the Public Register on
March 21, 1986. However, the bank
accounts and respective balances of
the said VIBUR FOUNDATION
remained with SKA. Apparently, the
liquidation was an attempt by the
Marcoses to transfer the foundation's

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funds to another account or bank but

this was prevented by the timely
freeze order issued by the Swiss
authorities. One of the latest
documents obtained by the PCGG from
the Swiss authorities is a declaration
signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee)
stating that the beneficial owner of
VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Another document signed by
G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR
FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos
Familie"

30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance

of the bank accounts of VIBUR
FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under
the General Account No. 469857
totaled $3,597,544.00

I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-
SCOLARI- VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

31. This is the most intricate and

complicated account group. As the
Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2)
groups under the foundation organized
by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's
benefit, eventually joined together and
became one (1) account group under
the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the
benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is
the biggest group from where the $50-
M investment fund of the Marcoses
was drawn when they bought the
Central Bank's dollar-denominated
treasury notes with high-yielding

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interests.

32. On March 20, 1968, after his second

year in the presidency, Marcos opened
bank accounts with SKA using an alias
or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS,
apparently to hide his true identity.
The next day, March 21, 1968, his First
Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened
her own bank accounts with the same
bank using an American-sounding
alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the
voluminous documents in Malacañang
shortly after they fled to Hawaii in
haste that fateful night of February 25,
1986, were accomplished forms for
"Declaration/Specimen Signatures"
submitted by the Marcos couple. Under
the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand
and Imelda signed their real names as
well as their respective aliases
underneath. These accounts were
actively operated and maintained by
the Marcoses for about two (2) years
until their closure sometime in
February, 1970 and the balances
transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.

33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was

established on March 3, 1970 in
Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and
E. Scheller were named as members of
the Board of Trustees.

34. FM and Imelda issued the written

mandate to establish the foundation to
Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970.
In the handwritten Regulations signed

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by the Marcos couple as well as in the

type-written Regulations signed by
Markus Geel both dated February 13,
1970, the Marcos spouses were named
the first beneficiaries, the surviving
spouse as the second beneficiary and
the Marcos children - Imee, Ferdinand,
Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene - as equal
third beneficiaries.

35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was

renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on
August 29, 1978. The Board of
Trustees remained the same at the
outset. However, on March 27, 1980,
Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter
Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos issued a written
order to the Board of Wintrop to
liquidate the foundation and transfer
all its assets to Bank Hofmann in
Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST
COMPANY. Later, WINTROP
FOUNDATION was dissolved.

36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was

established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz
with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as
members of the Board of Trustees.
Two (2) account categories, namely:
CAR and NES, were opened on
September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner of AVERTINA was not made
known to the bank since the FIDES
TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary.
However, the securities listed in the

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safe deposit register of WINTROP

FOUNDATION Category R as of
December 31, 1980 were the same as
those listed in the register of
AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR
as of December 31, 1981. Likewise,
the securities listed in the safe deposit
register of WINTROP FOUNDATION
Category S as of December 31, 1980
were the same as those listed in the
register of Avertina Category NES as of
December 31, [Link] the
circumstances, it is certain that the
beneficial successor of WINTROP
FOUNDATION is AVERTINA
FOUNDATION. The balance of Category
CAR as of December 31, 1989
amounted to US$231,366,894.00
while that of Category NES as of 12-
31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest
documents received from Swiss
authorities included a declaration
signed by IVO Beck stating that the
beneficial owners of AVERTINA
FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda.
Another document signed by G. Raber
of SKA indicates that Avertina
Foundation is owned by the "Marcos
Families."

37. The other groups of foundations that

eventually joined AVERTINA were also
established by FM through his
dummies, which started with the
CHARIS FOUNDATION.

38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was

established in VADUZ on December

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27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst

Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter
were named as directors. Dr. Theo
Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as
founding director in behalf of FM by
virtue of the mandate and agreement
dated November 12, 1971. FM himself
was named the first beneficiary and
Xandy Foundation as second
beneficiary in accordance with the
handwritten instructions of FM on
November 12, 1971 and the
Regulations. FM gave a power of
attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on
February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf
with regard to Charis Foundation.

39. On December 13, 1974, Charis

Foundation was renamed Scolari
Foundation but the directors remained
the same. On March 11, 1981 FM
ordered in writing that the Valamo
Foundation be liquidated and all its
assets be transferred to Bank
Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust
Company under the account
"Reference OMAL". The Board of
Directors decided on the immediate
dissolution of Valamo Foundation on
June 25, 1981.

40. The SPINUS FOUNDATION was

established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz
with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as
members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially

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opened with SKA on September 10,

1981. The beneficial owner of the
foundation was not made known to the
bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as
fiduciary. However, the list of securities
in the safe deposit register of Valamo
Foundation as of December 31, 1980
are practically the same with those
listed in the safe deposit register of
Spinus Foundation as of December 31,
1981. Under the circumstances, it is
certain that the Spinus Foundation is
the beneficial successor of the Valamo
Foundation.

41. On September 6, 1982, there was a

written instruction from Spinus
Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss
Franc account and transfer the balance
to Avertina Foundation. In
July/August, 1982, several transfers
from the foundation's German marks
and US dollar accounts were made to
Avertina Category CAR totaling DM
29.5-M and $58-M, respectively.
Moreover, a comparison of the list of
securities of the Spinus Foundation as
of February 3, 1982 with the safe
deposit slips of the Avertina
Foundation Category CAR as of August
19, 1982 shows that all the securities
of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.

J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized

on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W.

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Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr.

Otto Tondury as the foundation's
directors. Imelda issued a written
mandate to establish the foundation to
Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The
regulations as well as the agreement,
both dated August 28, 1970 were
likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was
named the first beneficiary and her
children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr.
(Bongbong) and, Irene were named as
equal second beneficiaries.

43. Rayby Foundation was established on

June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler,
Scheller and Ritter as members of the
board of directors. Imelda issued a
written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau
to establish the foundation with a note
that the foundation's capitalization as
well as the cost of establishing it be
debited against the account of Trinidad
Foundation. Imelda was named the
first and only beneficiary of Rayby
foundation. According to written
information from SKA dated November
28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the
intention in 1973 to transfer part of
the assets of Trinidad Foundation to
another foundation, thus the
establishment of Rayby Foundation.
However, transfer of assets never took
place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda
issued a written order to transfer all
the assets of Rayby Foundation to
Trinidad Foundation and to
subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the
same date, she issued a written order

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to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the

foundation and transfer all its assets to
Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust
Co. Under the account "Reference
Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6,
1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on
August 3, 1981.

44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was

established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz
with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as
members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially
opened with the SKA on September
10, 1981. The beneficial owner was
not made known to the bank since
Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary.
However, when one compares the
listing of securities in the safe deposit
register of Trinidad Foundation as of
December 31,1980 with that of the
Palmy Foundation as of December 31,
1980, one can clearly see that
practically the same securities were
listed. Under the circumstances, it is
certain that the Palmy Foundation is
the beneficial successor of the Trinidad
Foundation.

45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending

balance of the bank accounts of Palmy
Foundation under General Account No.
391528 is $17,214,432.00.

46. Latest documents received from Swiss

Authorities included a declaration

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signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the

beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation
is Imelda. Another document signed
by Raber shows that the said Palmy
Foundation is owned by "Marcos
Familie".

K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS

47. Rosalys Foundation was established in

1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its
Articles of Incorporation was executed
on September 24, 1971 and its By-
Laws on October 3, 1971. This
foundation maintained several
accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation
(SBC) under the general account
51960 where most of the bribe monies
from Japanese suppliers were hidden.

48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys

Foundation was liquidated and all its
assets were transferred to Aguamina
Corporation's (Panama) Account No.
53300 with SBC. The ownership by
Aguamina Corporation of Account No.
53300 is evidenced by an opening
account documents from the bank. J.
Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-
President and Senior Vice President,
respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a
declaration dated September 3, 1991
stating that the by-laws dated October
3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation
was the same by-law applied to
Aguamina Corporation Account No.
53300. They further confirmed that no

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change of beneficial owner was

involved while transferring the assets
of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM
remains the beneficiary of Aguamina
Corporation Account No. 53300.

As of August 30, 1991, the ending

balance of Account No. 53300
amounted to $80,566,483.00.

L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

49. Maler was first created as an

establishment. A statement of its rules
and regulations was found among
Malacañang documents. It stated,
among others, that 50% of the
Company's assets will be for sole and
full right disposal of FM and Imelda
during their lifetime, which the
remaining 50% will be divided in equal
parts among their children. Another
Malacañang document dated October
19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and
Imelda pertains to the appointment of
Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis
Sunier as attorneys of the company
and as administrator and manager of
all assets held by the company. The
Marcos couple, also mentioned in the
said document that they bought the
Maler Establishment from SBC,
Geneva. On the same date, FM and
Imelda issued a letter addressed to
Maler Establishment, stating that all
instructions to be transmitted with
regard to Maler will be signed with the
word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will

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have the same value as the couple's

own personal signature. The letter was
signed by FM and Imelda in their
signatures and as John Lewis.

50. Maler Establishment opened and

maintained bank accounts with SBC,
Geneva. The opening bank documents
were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr.
Sunnier as authorized signatories.

51. On November 17, 1981, it became

necessary to transform Maler
Establishment into a foundation.
Likewise, the attorneys were changed
to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However,
administration of the assets was left to
SBC. The articles of incorporation of
Maler Foundation registered on
November 17, 1981 appear to be the
same articles applied to Maler
Establishment. On February 28, 1984,
Maler Foundation cancelled the power
of attorney for the management of its
assets in favor of SBC and transferred
such power to Sustrust Investment
Co., S.A.

52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance

of Maler Foundation's Account Nos.
254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF
9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258,
respectively, for a total of SF
25,278,825.00. GM only until
December 31, 1980. This account was
opened by Maler when it was still an
establishment which was subsequently

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transformed into a foundation.

53. All the five (5) group accounts in the

over-all flow chart have a total balance
of about Three Hundred Fifty Six
Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as
shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached
as integral part hereof.

x x x x x x.[27]

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M.

Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.,
in their answer, stated the following:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and

4 of the Petition.

5. Respondents specifically deny

paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as
it states that summons and other court
processes may be served on
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the
stated address the truth of the matter
being that Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos may be served with summons
and other processes at No. 10-B Bel
Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos
Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and
ADMIT the rest.

xxx xxx xxx

10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of

the Petition.

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11. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and that they cannot
remember exactly the truth as to the
matters alleged.

12. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs and
Balance Sheet.

13. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

14. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

15. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the

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allegation since Respondents cannot

remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

16. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as
it attributes willful duplicity on the part
of the late President Marcos, for being
false, the same being pure conclusions
based on pure assumption and not
allegations of fact; and specifically
DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents cannot remember with
exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs or the attachments thereto.

17. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

18. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs and that
they are not privy to the activities of
the BIR.

19. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of

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knowledge or information sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

20. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

21. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.

22. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and
hid the same under layers and layers
of foundation and corporate entities for
being false, the truth being that
Respondents aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired.

23. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and
30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents were not privy to

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the transactions regarding the alleged

Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts,
except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37,
38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for
lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since
Respondents are not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction
they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of
the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction
they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

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26. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction
they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds

that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children
indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their
answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is
an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently
lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of
knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall
because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of
Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired"
are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues.
Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and
evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the
issues.

The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses

are replete with indications of a spurious defense:

(a) Respondents' Answer dated October

18, 1993;

(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4,

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1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental

Pre-trial Brief dated October 19,
1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs.
Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the
pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and
Manifestation dated October 19,
1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta
adopting the pre-trial briefs of her
co- respondents;

(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment dated March 21, 2000,
filed by Mrs. Marcos which the
other respondents (Marcos
children) adopted;

(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2,

2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and
adopted by the Marcos children;

(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated

September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs.
Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed
by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.,
and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 9,
2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;

(f) Memorandum dated December 12,

2000 of Mrs. Marcos and
Memorandum dated December 17,
2000 of the Marcos children;

(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998;

and

(h) General/Supplemental Agreement

dated December 23, 1993.

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An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER DATED OCTOBER 18,

1993.

In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny

each and every allegation contained in the petition for
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they
gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient
knowledge" or "they could not recall because it
happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos,
"the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the
basis of such assertions.

Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

provides:

A defendant must specify each material

allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall
set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. Where
a defendant desires to deny only a part of
an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny the
remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint, he shall so
state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.[28]

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a

specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will
disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial,
together with the matters they rely upon in support of
such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to
avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of
time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on

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the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true

terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in

which one, more deeply schooled and skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position,
entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a
contest in which each contending party fully
and fairly lays before the court the facts in
issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of
form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by
a rapier's thrust.

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds

were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to
particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the
lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject
funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer
with the other respondents that the funds were
"lawfully acquired" without detailing how exactly these
funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even
in this case before us, her assertion that the funds
were lawfully acquired remains bare and
unaccompanied by any factual support which can
prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing,
that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the
Marcos family.

Respondents' denials in their answer at the

Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations of the petition.

It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under

the rules is a denial through a statement that the
defendant is without knowledge or information

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sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material

averment in the complaint. The question, however, is
whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer
qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules.
We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,
[30] this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and

specifically charges a party with having done,

performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a
categorical and express denial must be made.

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations

against them, the Marcoses responded by simply
saying that they had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for
forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent
Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that
they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[31]

To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in

paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:

23. The following presentation very clearly

and overwhelmingly show in detail
how both respondents clandestinely
stashed away the country's wealth to
Switzerland and hid the same under
layers upon layers of foundations and
other corporate entities to prevent its
detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or
corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts.
But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and

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documenting all those secret accounts

as well as the enormity of the deposits
therein hidden, the following
presentation is confined to five
identified accounts groups, with
balances amounting to about $356-M
with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.[32]

Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation

was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and
hid the same under layers and layers
of foundations and corporate entities
for being false, the truth being that
Respondents' aforesaid properties
were lawfully acquired.[33]

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of

what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative
pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission
of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at.[34]
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied

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while the fact itself is admitted.[35]

In the instant case, the material allegations in

paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically
denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer.
The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer
was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the
petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents'
answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of
the following substantial facts:

(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and

(2) that the estimated sum thereof was

US$356 million as of December,
1990.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture

on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum
of about US$356 million, not having been specifically
denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed
admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:

Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be

deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.[36]

By the same token, the following unsupported denials

of respondents in their answer were pregnant with
admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
Republic's petition for forfeiture:

23. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and
30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a

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belief as to the truth of the allegation

since respondents were not privy to
the transactions regarding the alleged
Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts,
except that, as to respondent Imelda
R. Marcos, she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to
such transactions they were privy to,
they cannot remember with exactitude
the same having occurred a long time
ago, except as to respondent Imelda
R. Marcos, she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the
petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to from a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction
they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude, the same
having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully

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acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY

paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the
petition for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction
they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the

respondents' answer pertained to the creation of five
groups of accounts as well as their respective ending
balances and attached documents alleged in
paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for
forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never
specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds.
Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully
acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the
existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her
earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of
the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the
US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.

The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the

petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and
amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-
a[39] of the said petition with respect to the sum of the
Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million
were again not specifically denied by respondents in

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their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to

the issues raised in these paragraphs and the
existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were
therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa
vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendant's denial is a
negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.

Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the

petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity
to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures on some of the vital documents[41] attached
to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to
specifically deny as required by the rules.[42]

It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents

attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed
personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said
documents were within their knowledge. As correctly
pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco
Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:

The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2)

use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3)
approving regulations of the Foundations for
the distribution of capital and income of the
Foundations to the First and Second
beneficiary (who are no other than FM and
his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for
the Foundations, 5) changing the names of
the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and
assets of the Foundations to other
Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of
the Foundations as substantiated by the
Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture]

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strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda

were the real owners of the assets
deposited in the Swiss banks, using the
Foundations as dummies.[43]

How could respondents therefore claim lack of

sufficient knowledge or information regarding the
existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation
of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her
late husband personally masterminded and participated
in the formation and control of said foundations? This is
a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.

Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically

admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the
veracity of the contents thereof.

The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and

balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out
that respondents' denial was not really grounded on
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief but was based on lack of recollection. By
reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses
could have easily determined the genuineness and due
execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They
also had the means and opportunity of verifying the
same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the
President. They did not.

When matters regarding which respondents claim to

have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of

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information will not be considered a specific denial.[44]

An unexplained denial of information within the control
of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive
and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.[45]

The form of denial adopted by respondents must be

availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly
not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as
to what allegations of the petition are really being
challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of
delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did not
only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth
attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by
presenting an obviously contrived defense.

Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact

which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's
knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no
denial at all.[47] Respondents' ineffective denial thus
failed to properly tender an issue and the averments
contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed
judicially admitted by them.

As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries,

Inc.:

Its "specific denial" of the material

allegation of the petition without setting
forth the substance of the matters relied
upon to support its general denial, when
such matters were plainly within its
knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed
to properly tender on issue.[48]

Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the

allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as

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to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy

to the transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a
defense because they are the legal heirs and
successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are
therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the
Swiss funds.

PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the

three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos
stressed that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state
and substantiate how these funds were acquired
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single
document that would show and prove the truth of their
allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:

The parties shall file with the court and

serve on the adverse party, x x x their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall
contain, among others:

xxx

(d) the documents or exhibits to be

presented, stating the purpose thereof;

xxx

(f) the number and names of the witnesses,

and the substance of their respective
testimonies.[49]

It is unquestionably within the court's power to require

the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state
the number of witnesses intended to be called to the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of

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them is expected to give as well as to disclose the

number of documents to be submitted with a
description of the nature of each. The tenor and
character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the
documents to be deduced at the trial thus made
known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and
law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being
put forward necessitating the holding of a trial.
Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a
formal identification and specification of the issues and
their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and
submit them to the court within the specified period for
the prompt disposition of the action.[50]

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently

adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:

xxx

WITNESSES

4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself

as a witness and reserves the right to
present additional witnesses as may be
necessary in the course of the trial.

xxx

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to

present and introduce in evidence
documents as may be necessary in the
course of the trial.

Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the

documents constituting her evidence. Neither the
names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony
was stated. What alone appeared certain was the

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testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had

previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge.
And even then, the substance of her testimony, as
required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally
unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no
genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for
summary judgment.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT DATED MARCH 21, 2000

The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for

summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner
Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as
their own opposition to the said motion. However, it
was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions
or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:

x x x The adverse party may serve opposing

affidavits, depositions, or admissions at
least three (3) days before hearing. After
hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.[51]

The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and

admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the
Republic's motion only demonstrated that the
averments of such opposition were not genuine and
therefore unworthy of belief.

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DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DATED MAY 2, 2000;[52]

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION;[53] AND
MEMORANDA OF MRS. MARCOS AND THE MARCOS
CHILDREN[54]

All these pleadings again contained no allegations of

facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds.
Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without alleging facts which would have been
admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to
raise genuine issues of fact.

Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October

21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated
that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs.
Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the
funds.

This is yet another indication that respondents

presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-
trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied
ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:

PJ Garchitorena:

Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos

is concerned through the statement of Atty.
Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360
million more or less subject matter of the
instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from
the various Swiss Foundations do not belong
to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos
herself. That's your statement of facts?

Atty. MARCELO:

Yes, Your Honor.

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PJ Garchitorena:

That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc

and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point
here? Does the estate of Marcos
own anything of the $360 million
subject of this case.

Atty. TECSON:

We joined the Manifestation of

Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:

You do not own anything?

Atty. TECSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

PJ Garchitorena:

Counsel for Irene Araneta?

Atty. SISON:

I join the position taken by my

other compañeros here, Your Honor.

xxx

Atty. SISON:

Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not

own any of the amount, Your Honor.
[55]

We are convinced that the strategy of respondent

Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what

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facts they would prove or what issues they intended to

pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our
mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and
now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this
forfeiture case to eternity.

MANIFESTATION DATED MAY 26, 1998 FILED BY

MRS. MARCOS; GENERAL/SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 28,
1993

These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented

nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings,
respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge
of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they
could no longer remember anything as it happened a
long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered
that it was lawfully acquired.

In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos

stated that:

COMES NOW undersigned counsel for

respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before
this Honorable Court, most respectfully
manifests:

That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns

90% of the subject matter of the above-
entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of
the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;

That in fact only 10% of the subject matter

in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

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In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements,

respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed
distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of
ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.

But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial

conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as
well as ownership of the Swiss funds.

Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put

forth no real defense. The "facts" pleaded by
respondents, while ostensibly raising important
questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere
verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and
constituted no genuine issues for trial.

We therefore rule that, under the circumstances,

summary judgment is proper.

In fact, it is the law itself which determines when

summary judgment is called for. Under the rules,
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are
not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by
the rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56]

In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact

which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are
not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57] A
summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a
party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits that there are no important questions or

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issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for
summary judgment is premised on the assumption that
the issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is
no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the
prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists
no serious controversy.[58] Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a
genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may
on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
established by affidavits, depositions or admissions
that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the
Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment for petitioner.[59]

In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture,

petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the
Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of
funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names
of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements
substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank
deposits. In their answer and other subsequent
pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general
denials of the allegations against them without stating
facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby
failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.

Under these circumstances, a trial would have served

no purpose at all and would have been totally
unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on
the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing
affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the
witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the

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inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the

Marcoses' answer were false.

Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like

this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if
the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is
only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly
not in the interest of justice to allow respondent
Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded
by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the
prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino
people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of
respondents' good faith should have been made to the
court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and
argumentation, this protracted litigation could have
ended a long time ago.

Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first

filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered
are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or
lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it
happened a long time ago" or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the
funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits
them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds
and allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate.
It has been an incredible charade from beginning to
end.

In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise,

respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and
Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that by its positive
acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion
for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner
Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of
existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever
right it had to move for summary judgment.[60]

We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and

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express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it

from filing a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35

Summary Judgment

Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant.

- A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after
the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.

Section 2. Summary judgment for defending

party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof. (Emphasis ours)[61]

Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary

judgment "at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim) has been served. No fixed reglementary
period is provided by the Rules. How else does one
construe the phrase any time after the answer has
been served?"

This issue is actually one of first impression. No local

jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon
this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign

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laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United

States where many of our laws and rules were copied,
is in order.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that a party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary
judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action or after service
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, and that a party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for
summary judgment at any time.

However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules

of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a
motion for summary judgment may not be made until
issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer
has been served.[62] Under said rule, after issues have
been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be
made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed
prescriptive period is provided.

Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York,

our rules also provide that a motion for summary
judgment may not be made until issues have been
joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the
answer before he can move for summary judgment.[64]
And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a
fixed reglementary period within which to move for
summary judgment.

This being so, the New York Supreme Court's

interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice
can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of
Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

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Under the New York rule, after the issues have been
joined, the motion for summary judgment may be
made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly
does the phrase at any stage of the litigation mean? In
Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New York Supreme Court
ruled:

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the

defendants rested on the case made by the
plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to
the serious illness of the trial justice, a
decision was not rendered within sixty days
after the final adjournment of the term at
which the case was tried. With the approval
of the trial justice, the plaintiff moved for a
new trial under Section 442 of the Civil
Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for
summary judgment under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was
opposed mainly on the ground that, by
proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had
waived her right to summary judgment
and that the answer and the opposing
affidavits raised triable issues. The amount
due and unpaid under the contract is not in
dispute. The Special Term granted both
motions and the defendants have appealed.

The Special Term properly held that the

answer and the opposing affidavits raised no
triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of
Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act
prescribe no limitation as to the time
when a motion for summary judgment
must be made. The object of Rule 113
is to empower the court to summarily

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determine whether or not a bona fide

issue exists between the parties, and
there is no limitation on the power of
the court to make such a determination
at any stage of the litigation. (emphasis
ours)

On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, any stage

of the litigation means that even if the plaintiff has
proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from
thereafter moving for summary judgment.[66]

In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary

judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date
for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses
argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the
pre-trial conference, petitioner waived its right to
summary judgment.

This argument must fail in the light of the New York

Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to
this case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the
motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to
that raised by the Marcoses, that is, that plaintiff had
waived her right to summary judgment by her act of
proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New
York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for summary
judgment even after trial and submission of the case
for resolution, more so should we permit it in the
present case where petitioner moved for summary
judgment before trial.

Therefore, the phrase anytime after the pleading in

answer thereto has been served in Section 1, Rule 35
of our Rules of Civil Procedure means at any stage of
the litigation. Whenever it becomes evident at any
stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or
that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham

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or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment.

A contrary interpretation would go against the very
objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is
to weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding
the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.[68]

In cases with political undertones like the one at bar,

adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay
the proceedings in the hope that a future
administration sympathetic to them might be able to
influence the outcome of the case in their favor. This is
rank injustice we cannot tolerate.

The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and

expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and
prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and
the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the
speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one
of them.

Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary

judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense
and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that
petitioner Republic could validly move for summary
judgment any time after the respondents' answer was
filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the
litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to
trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for
summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact
was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.

This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle

enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure that the [r]ules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.[69]

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Respondents further allege that the motion for

summary judgment was based on respondents' answer
and other documents that had long been in the records
of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on
March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.

We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or

neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, warranting a
presumption that the person has abandoned his right
or declined to assert it.[70] In effect, therefore, the
principle of laches is one of estoppel because it
prevents people who have slept on their rights from
prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed
reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their
successors-in-interest.[71]

A careful examination of the records, however, reveals

that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its
case against respondent Marcoses through every
remedy available to it, including the motion for
summary judgment.

Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary

judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied
because of the pending compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the
pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of
the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another
motion for summary judgment now under
consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent
events that transpired after the answer was filed,
therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the
questioned motion. It was definitely not because of
neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second)
motion for summary judgment years after respondents'

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answer to the petition for forfeiture.

In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches,

respondents must show not only unjustified inaction
but also that some unfair injury to them might result
unless the action is barred.[72]

This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the

pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed
ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners,
as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested
right or interest which could be adversely affected by
petitioner's alleged inaction.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that

laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights.[73] Nor can
estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public
policy.[74]

As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is

not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[75] Equity
demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred
from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.

(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture

The matter of summary judgment having been thus

settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic
was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance
with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now
takes center stage.

The law raises the prima facie presumption that a

property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to

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forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly

disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:

xxxxxx

Section 2. Filing of petition. - Whenever any

public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount or
property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired.

xxxxxx

Sec. 6. Judgment - If the respondent is

unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall
declare such property in question, forfeited
in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall
become the property of the State. Provided,
That no judgment shall be rendered within
six months before any general election or
within three months before any special
election. The Court may, in addition, refer
this case to the corresponding Executive
Department for administrative or criminal
action, or both.

From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the

following facts must be established in order that

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forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be

effected:

(1) ownership by the public officer of

money or property acquired during
his incumbency, whether it be in his
name or otherwise, and

(2) the extent to which the amount of

that money or property exceeds, i.
e., is grossly disproportionate to,
the legitimate income of the public
officer.

That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public

officials during the time material to the instant case
was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent
Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations
in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the
personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a
public official who served without interruption as
Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President
of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1,
1965 to February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents
admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of
the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda
R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro
Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.[78]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10

of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the
petition for forfeiture which referred to the
accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79] The combined
accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were
reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued
by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto

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Romulo.[80] The Certification showed that, from 1966

to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000
and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, AS
PRESIDENT

1966-1976 at
P660,000
P60,000/year
1977-1984 at
800,000
P100,000/year
1985 at
110,000
P110,000/year
P1,570,00
IMELDA R. MARCOS, AS MINISTER

June 1976- at
P718,000
1985 P75,000/year

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to

1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from
January to February 1986 in the amount of
P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries
amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars
on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange
rates prevailing during the applicable period when said
salaries were received, the total amount had an
equivalent value of $304,372.43.

The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the

official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso
and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the
official monthly rates of exchange in January and
February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical
Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4,

Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

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Section 4. - Judicial admissions - An

admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was
made.[81]

It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a)

in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course
of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.[82] Thus,
facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case
at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and
respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]

The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only

known lawful income of respondents since they did not
file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be
determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive
"any other emolument from the Government or any of
its subdivisions and instrumentalities".[84] Likewise,
under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could "not receive during his tenure any
other emolument from the Government or any other
source."[85] In fact, his management of businesses,
like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution:

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) - The President and

the Vice-President shall not, during their

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tenure, hold any other office except when

otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor
may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be
financially interested directly or indirectly in
any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government
or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled
corporation.

Article VII, Sec. 11 - No Member of the

National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall
he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof including any
government owned or controlled corporation
during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of
the government for his pecuniary benefit.

Article IX, Sec. 7 - The Prime Minister and

Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to
the provision of Section 11, Article VIII
hereof and may not appear as counsel
before any court or administrative body, or
manage any business, or practice any
profession, and shall also be subject to such
other disqualification as may be provided by
law.

Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can

therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for

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determining the existence of a prima facie case of

forfeiture of the Swiss funds.

Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to

establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the
Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential
elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)
of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions
are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly
against the petitioner and liberally in favor of
respondent Marcoses.

We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the

Marcoses' other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to
apply because, as between petitioner and respondents,
the latter were in a better position to know if there
were such other sources of lawful income. And if
indeed there was such other lawful income,
respondents should have specifically stated the same in
their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was
concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful
income of respondents.

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides

that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten
wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and other material possessions of those covered by
Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion
to the known lawful income of such persons. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of
Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth
could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was
in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their
SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.

Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the

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admissions made by them in their various pleadings

and documents were valid. It is of record that
respondents judicially admitted that the money
deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them.

We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses

made judicial admissions of their ownership of the
subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos'
Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and
the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take
note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that
respondents had made judicial admissions of their
ownership of the Swiss funds.

In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of

the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted
ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents'
answer stated:

22. Respondents specifically DENY

PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges
that respondents clandestinely stashed
the country's wealth in Switzerland
and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate
entities for being false, the truth being
that respondents' aforesaid
properties were lawfully acquired.
(emphasis supplied)

By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank

deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted
their ownership thereof.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of

the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of certain

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actionable documents bearing her signature attached

to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule
8[86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
material averments in the complaint shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied.

The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements

executed by petitioner and respondents on December
28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner
Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in
accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of
RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General
Agreement declared that:

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a

judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal
on December 21, 1990, that the $356
million belongs in principle to the Republic
of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met, but even after 7
years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able
to procure a final judgment of conviction
against the PRIVATE PARTY.

While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter

alia, that:

In consideration of the foregoing, the

parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of
25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss
deposits.

The stipulations set forth in the General and

Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the
manifest intent of respondents to enter into a
compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents'
willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the

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Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss

deposits for the simple reason that no person would
acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.

Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement

by this Court that the General and Supplemental
Agreements were null and void.[89] They insist that
nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in
evidence against them because they stood on the same
ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27,
Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides that "in civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror."

We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of

nullity of said agreements was premised on the
following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1)
the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was
against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to
exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be
retained by the Marcos heirs was against the
Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to
cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the
Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other
courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The
reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit
even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of
respondents' admission with respect to their ownership
of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain
admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot
now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the
subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the
agreements themselves were later declared null and
void.

The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice

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Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the decision dated

September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:

x x x The declaration of nullity of the two

agreements rendered the same without
legal effects but it did not detract from the
admissions of the respondents contained
therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions
made in said agreements, as quoted above,
remain binding on the respondents.[91]

A written statement is nonetheless competent as an

admission even if it is contained in a document which is
not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made,
either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a
party thereto, or by reason of not being signed,
executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have
been held as competent evidence of admissions,
although they may be unenforceable.[92]

The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.

during the hearing on the motion for the approval of
the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent
credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that
respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank
accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand
Jr.'s formal declarations in open court:

ATTY. FERNANDO:

Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any

meetings with PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

Yes. I have had very many

meetings in fact with Chairman.

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ATTY. FERNANDO:

Would you recall when the first

meeting occurred?

PJ GARCHITORENA:

In connection with what?

ATTY. FERNANDO:

In connection with the ongoing

talks to compromise the various
cases initiated by PCGG against
your family?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

The nature of our meetings was

solely concerned with negotiations
towards achieving some kind of
agreement between the Philippine
government and the Marcos family.
The discussions that led up to the
compromise agreement were
initiated by our then counsel Atty.
Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FERNANDO:

What was your reaction when Atty.

Mesina informed you of this
possibility?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

My reaction to all of these

approaches is that I am always

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open, we are always open, we are

very much always in search of
resolution to the problem of the
family and any approach that has
been made us, we have
entertained. And so my reaction
was the same as what I have
always ... why not? Maybe this is
the one that will finally put an end
to this problem.[94]

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FERNANDO:

Basically, what were the true

amounts of the assets in the bank?

PJ GARCHITORENA:

So, we are talking about liquid

assets here? Just Cash?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

Well, basically, any assets. Anything

that was under the Marcos name in
any of the banks in Switzerland
which may necessarily be not cash.
[95]

xxx xxx xxx

PJ GARCHITORENA:

x x x What did you do in other

words, after being apprised of this
contract in connection herewith?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

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I assumed that we are beginning to

implement the agreement because
this was forwarded through the
Philippine government lawyers
through our lawyers and then,
subsequently, to me. I was a little
surprised because we hadn't really
discussed the details of the transfer
of the funds, what the bank
accounts, what the mechanism
would be. But nevertheless, I was
happy to see that as far as the
PCGG is concerned, that the
agreement was perfected and that
we were beginning to implement it
and that was a source of
satisfaction to me because I
thought that finally it will be the
end.[96]

Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and

in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents'
recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are
receivable against him. If a party, as a witness,
deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the
force of a judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from
Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos family agreed
to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope
of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the
Marcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was
doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their
part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness
stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial
admission when a party testifies clearly and
unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his
own knowledge.[98]

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In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26,

1998, respondent Imelda Marcos
furthermore revealed the following:

That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns

90% of the subject matter of the above-
entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of
the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;

That in fact only 10% of the subject matter

in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos;

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as

borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as
sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary
of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures
on the appended copies of the documents
substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name
of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to
specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such
documents, especially those involving "William
Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to
Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively.
That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the
existence, much less the genuineness and due
execution, of the instruments bearing her signature,
was tantamount to a judicial admission of the
genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999,

Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the

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Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release

and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner.
She further made the following manifestations:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The Republic's cause of action over the

full amount is its forfeiture in favor of
the government if found to be ill-
gotten. On the other hand, the
Marcoses defend that it is a
legitimate asset. Therefore, both
parties have an inchoate right of
ownership over the account. If it turns
out that the account is of lawful origin,
the Republic may yield to the
Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses
must yield to the Republic.
(underscoring supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the

Marcoses having committed
themselves to helping the less
fortunate, in the interest of peace,
reconciliation and unity, defendant
MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby,
hereby affirms her agreement with the
Republic for the release and transfer of
the US Dollar 150 million for proper
disposition, without prejudice to the
final outcome of the litigation
respecting the ownership of the
remainder.

Again, the above statements were indicative of

Imelda's admission of the Marcoses' ownership of the

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Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it

(Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."

On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-

Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene
Marcos-Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998
asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss
deposits) in custodia legis:

7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is

fraught with danger! Unless the
aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in
custodia legis or within the Court's
protective mantle, its dissipation or
misappropriation by the petitioner
looms as a distinct possibility.

Such display of deep, personal interest can only come

from someone who believes that he has a marked and
intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits.
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children
revealed their ownership of the said deposits.

Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG,

the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10,
1999, confirmed the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss
bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to
light their readiness to pay the human rights victims
out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines

sympathizes with the plight of the human
rights victims-plaintiffs in the
aforementioned litigation through the
Second Party, desires to assist in the
satisfaction of the judgment awards of said
human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing,
assigning and or waiving US$150 million of
the funds held in escrow under the Escrow

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Agreements dated August 14, 1995,

although the Republic is not obligated to do
so under final judgments of the Swiss courts
dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and
January 8, 1998;

WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing

to release, assign and/or waive all its rights
and interests over said US$150 million to
the aforementioned human rights victims-
plaintiffs.

All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of

respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they
acquired or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only
by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements
made by private respondents out of context that
petitioner was able to treat these as judicial
admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance,
materiality and implications of every pleading and
document submitted in this case. This Court carefully
scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We
analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if
each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an
admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and
political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the
parties, even if it might have bordered on factual
adjudication which, by authority of the rules and
jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There
is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses
admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.

We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that

an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and
becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is

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interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This

doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission,

verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.[105]

In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,

respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the
Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.

The individual and separate admissions of each

respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29
and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.

- The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his
authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration
of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.[106]

SEC. 31. Admission by privies. - Where one

derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter,
while holding the title, in relation to the
property, is evidence against the former.
[107]

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The declarations of a person are admissible against a

party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the
declarant and the party, the term "privity of estate"
generally denoting a succession in rights.[108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a
party to the record is competent.[109] Without doubt,
privity exists among the respondents in this case. And
where several co-parties to the record are jointly
interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the
admission of one is competent against all.[110]

Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in

ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a
prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.

We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the

Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as
its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the
voluminous records of this case.

Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever

any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. x x x"

The elements which must concur for this prima facie

presumption to apply are:

(1) the offender is a public officer or

employee;

(2) he must have acquired a

considerable amount of money or

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property during his incumbency;

and

(3) said amount is manifestly out of

proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired
property.

It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda

Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first
element is clearly extant.

The second element deals with the amount of money

or property acquired by the public officer during his
incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired
and owned properties during their term of office. In
fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly
owned by them. There is proof of the existence and
ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices
to comply with the second element.

The third requirement is met if it can be shown that

such assets, money or property is manifestly out of
proportion to the public officer's salary and his other
lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that
is crucial in determining whether a prima facie
presumption has been established in this case.

Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule

indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses
during their incumbency but also evidence that they
had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss
banks under the names of five different foundations.
We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties
acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public

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officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough

evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar
deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five
foundations, an amount way, way beyond their
aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43
during their incumbency as government officials.

Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the

Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to
the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the
presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully
acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the
petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount
of money and property acquired by the respondents,
and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations states:

Prima Facie Evidence. - Any accumulation of

assets, properties, and other material
possessions of those persons covered by
Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose
value is out of proportion to their known
lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-
gotten wealth.

Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to

dispute this presumption and show by clear and
convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were
lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof
of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it
must stand as proved.[111]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign

foundations should have been impleaded as they were
indispensable parties without whom no complete
determination of the issues could be made. She asserts

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that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the

foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder
of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of
judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the
foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed
by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the
funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court
and denied them their rights under the Swiss
constitution and international law.[112]

The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in

not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113] taken from
Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party
must be impleaded for the complete determination of
the suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party
does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule
regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court
is not divested of its power to render a decision even in
the absence of indispensable parties, though such
judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114]

An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:

[who] must have a direct interest in the

litigation; and if this interest is such that it
cannot be separated from that of the parties
to the suit, if the court cannot render justice
between the parties in his absence, if the
decree will have an injurious effect upon his
interest, or if the final determination of the
controversy in his absence will be
inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.

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There are two essential tests of an indispensable party:

(1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the
presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of
the other party?[116] There is, however, no fixed
formula for determining who is an indispensable party;
this can only be determined in the context and by the
facts of the particular suit or litigation.

In the present case, there was an admission by

respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was
the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in
controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the
estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117] Viewed against this
admission, the foreign foundations were not
indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the
proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding
the case on its merits and according full relief to
petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return
of the $356 million was neither inimical to the
foundations' interests nor inconsistent with equity and
good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda
Marcos only confirmed what was already generally
known: that the foundations were established precisely
to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from
petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there
was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a
nominal part of the assets in question.

The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as

formal owners, must be given an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings hinged on the
assumption that they owned a nominal share of the
assets.[118] But this was already refuted by no less
than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue
that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the
conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given

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by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in

the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting
whatever nominal interest they might have had in the
assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their
ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda
Marcos, they could no longer be considered as
indispensable parties and their participation in the
proceedings became unnecessary.

In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled

that impleading the firms which are the res of the
action was unnecessary:

"And as to corporations organized with ill-

gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty
of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit
conduct - in other words, the companies
themselves are not the object or thing
involved in the action, the res thereof -
there is no need to implead them either.
Indeed, their impleading is not proper on
the strength alone of their having been
formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any
other particular wrongdoing on their part...

Such showing of having been formed with,

or having received ill-gotten funds, however
strong or convincing, does not, without
more, warrant identifying the corporations
in question with the person who formed or
made use of them to give the color or
appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to
illegally amassed wealth - at the least, not
so as place on the Government the onus of
impleading the former with the latter in
actions to recover such wealth.
Distinguished in terms of juridical
personality and legal culpability from their

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erring members or stockholders, said

corporations are not themselves guilty of
the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement,
asportation, etc., that gave rise to the
Government's cause of action for recovery;
their creation or organization was merely
the result of their members' (or
stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers
to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or
monies invested therein. In this light, they
are simply the res in the actions for the
recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and
there is, in principle, no cause of action
against them and no ground to implead
them as defendants in said actions."

Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case,

the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the
illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus,
they were simply the res in the action for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for
lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.

Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations

were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to
implead them was a curable error, as held in the
previously cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:
[120]

"Even in those cases where it might

reasonably be argued that the failure of the
Government to implead the sequestered
corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural abberation, as where said firms
were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as
instruments or conduits for conversion of
public funds and property or illicit or
fraudulent obtention of favored government

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contracts, etc., slight reflection would

nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under
applicable adjective rules - e.g., Section 10,
Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the
remedy of amendment during trial to
authorize or to conform to the evidence];
Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments
before trial], in relation to the rule
respecting omission of so-called necessary
or indispensable parties, set out in Section
11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is
relevant in this context to advert to the old
familiar doctrines that the omission to
implead such parties "is a mere technical
defect which can be cured at any stage of
the proceedings even after judgment"; and
that, particularly in the case of
indispensable parties, since their presence
and participation is essential to the very life
of the action, for without them no judgment
may be rendered, amendments of the
complaint in order to implead them should
be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact
even after rendition of judgment by this
Court, where it appears that the complaint
otherwise indicates their identity and
character as such indispensable parties."
[121]

Although there are decided cases wherein the non-

joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the
dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment,
such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The
better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to
dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on
joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity.
And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule

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3[122] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits

the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or
misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through
motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.
[123]

Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of

Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124] on
indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of
indispensable parties even after judgment has been
entered if such is needed to afford the moving party
full relief.[125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion
does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as
long as the delay is excusable.[126] Thus, respondent
Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment
rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the
non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had
jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the
parties before it though not on the absent party.[127] If
she really felt that she could not be granted full relief
due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she
should have moved for their inclusion, which was
allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never
did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.

In the face of undeniable circumstances and the

avalanche of documentary evidence against them,
respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature
of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss
deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and
forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with
Section 6 of RA 1379:

SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is

unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the

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property in question, then the court shall

declare such property forfeited in favor of
the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become
property of the State x x x.

THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED

TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS

Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable

Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
himself on the ground that the original copies of the
authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated
translations were not submitted to the court a quo.
Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from
the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss
decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he
denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the
human rights victims.

While we are in reality perplexed by such an

incomprehensible change of heart, there might
nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue.
The presentation of the authenticated translations of
the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de
rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of
fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the
Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the
determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter,
neither is this Court's.

The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the

PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this
jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner
Republic. What is important is our own assessment of
the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either
petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this
instance, despite the absence of the authenticated

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translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on

hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits
which were transferred to and are now deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-

Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result
Quisumbing, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official
leave.
Carpio, J., no part.

[1] An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State

Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any

Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Procedure Therefor.

[2] E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986,

only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country,
creating the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist
the President in the recovery of vast government
resources allegedly amassed by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates, both here and abroad.

[3] E.O. No. 2 - issued twelve (12) days later, warning

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all persons and entities who had knowledge of

possession of ill-gotten assets and properties under
pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them
from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or
from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery
efforts of the government.

[4] E.O. No. 14 - Series of 1986, as amended by E.O.

No. 14-A.

[5] Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the

exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases, whether

civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The
law also declared that the civil actions for the recovery
of unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No.
1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or
indemnification for consequential and other damages
or any other civil action under the Civil Code or other
existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed independently of
any criminal proceedings and may be proved by
preponderance of evidence.

[6] Declared null and void by this Court on December 9,

1998 in the case of "Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and

Magtanggol Gunigundo, docketed as G.R. No. 130716.

[7] In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic

of the Philippines through the PCGG filed a request for

mutual assistance with the Swiss Federal Police
Department, under the procedures of the International
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to
freeze the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in
Switzerland.

IMAC is a domestic statute of Switzerland which

generally affords relief to the kind of request from

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foreign governments or entities as authorized under

E.O. No. 2.

The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted

the request of petitioner Republic, and ordered the
Swiss deposits to be "blocked" until the competent
Philippine court could decide on the matter.

[8] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.

[9] Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and

concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E.

Garchitorena and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.

[10] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218.

[11] Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E.

Garchitorena with the separate concurring opinions of
Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R.
Castañeda, Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote
their respective dissenting opinions.

[12] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.

[13] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.

[14] Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.

[15] Sec. 3 - the petition shall contain the following

information

xxx

(c) The approximate amount of property he has

acquired during his incumbency in his past and present
offices and employments.

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[16] (d) A description of said property, or such thereof

as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

[17] (e) The total amount of his government salary and

other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately

acquired property xxx.

[18] Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.

[19] Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of

Court.

[20] Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222

[1996].

[21] Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].

[22] 240 SCRA 376 [1995].

[23] Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316

[1997].

[24] 69 SCRA 524 [1976].

[25] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the

old Rules of Court.

[26] Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].

[27] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.

[28] Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the

old Rules of Court.

[29] 16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910].

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[30] 197 SCRA 391 [1991].

[31] Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246

[1973].

[32] Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236.

[33] Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064.

[34] 61A Am. Jur., 172-173.

[35] Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428,

Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1995 ed.].

[36] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the

old Rules of Court.

[37] Supra.

[38] Supra.

[39] "All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow

chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty

Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by
Annex `R-5' hereto attached as integral part hereof."

[40] 22 SCRA 48 [1968]

[41] XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a)

Contract for opening of deposit dated March 21, 1968;
(b) Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3,
1970; (d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated
February 13, 1970; (e) Letter of instruction dated
March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions dated March
10, 1991.

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TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a)

Management agreement dated August 28,
1990; (b) Letter of instruction dated August
26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich; (c)
Approval of Statutes and By-laws of Trinidad
Foundation dated August 26, 1990; (d)
Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated
August 28, 1970; (e) Regulations of the
Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers
Geel dated August 28, 1970; (f) Letter of
Instructions to the Board of Rayby
Foundation dated March 10, 1981; (g)
Letter of Instructions to the Board of
Trinidad Foundation dated March 10, 1981.

MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a)

Rules and Regulations of Maler dated
October 15, 1968; (b) Letter of
Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to
Barbey d Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to
Muler to Swiss Bank dated October 19,
1968.

[42] "Where an action or defense is founded upon a

written instrument, copied in or attached to the

corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party under oath, specifically denies
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts
xxx."

[43] Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.

[44] Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941,

43 F. Supp. 281.

[45] Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-

31869, Aug. 8, 1973.

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[46] Warner Barnes Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G.

3109-3111.

[47] Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of

Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 [1991].

[48] 28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].

[49] Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but

the change(s) had no adverse effects on the rights of

private respondents.

[50] Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-

49410, 169 SCRA 409 [1989].

[51] Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the

old Rules of Court.

[52] adopted by the Marcos children.

[53] dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos;

dated October 5, 2000 as jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc

and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;

[54] dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000

as filed by the Marcos children.

[55] TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999.

[56] Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses

Antera and Virgilio Soriano, April 20, 2001.

[57] Plantadosi vs. Loew's, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service,

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786, June 2, 1943.

[58] Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].

[59] Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,

180 SCRA 348 [1989].

[60] Rollo, pp. 2659-70.

[61] Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule

34 of the old Rules of Court.

[62] Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an

answer is served in an action to recover a debt or a
liquidated demand arising,

1. on a contract, express or implied,

sealed or not sealed; or

2. on a judgment for a stated sum;

the answer may be struck out and judgment entered

thereon on motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or
of any other person having knowledge of the facts,
verifying the cause of action and stating the amount
claimed, and his belief that there is no defense to the
action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other proof,
shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge
hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend.
(emphasis ours)

[63] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.

[64] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.

II. (1996), pp. 183-184.

[65] 19 NYS2d 250 [1940].

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[66] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.

[67] Supra.

[68] Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et.

al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976].

[69] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the

old Rules of Court.

[70] Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].

[71]Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277

[1956].

[72] Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].

[73] Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764,

October 4, 2002; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution.

[74] Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124

Phil. 472 [1966].

[75] Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].

[76] An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State

any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired

by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor, approved on June 18, 1955.

[77] Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.

[78] Ibid.

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[79] Id., p. 1062.

[80] Exhibit "S."

[81] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of

the old Rules of Court.

[82] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II,

1997 ed., p. 650.

[83] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V,

1980 ed., p. 64.

[84] Section 9, Article VII.

[85] Section 4(1), Article VII.

[86] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the

old Rules of Court.

[87] Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.

[88] Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100.

[89] Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].

[90] Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of

the old Rules of Court.

[91] Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205.

[92] 31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721.

[93] Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178.

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[94] Ibid, p. 1181.

[95] Ibid, p. 1188.

[96] Ibid, p. 1201.

[97] 29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.

[98] 31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.

[99] Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.

[100] Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the

old Rules of Court.

[101] Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.

[102] Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256.

[103] Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.

[104] Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].

[105] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of

the old Rules of Court.

[106] Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of

the old Rules of Court.

[107] Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of

the old Rules of Court.

[108] 29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.

[109] 31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.

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[110] Ibid, p. 814.

[111] Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court

Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.

[112] Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.

[113] Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable

parties.--Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section
7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.

[114] 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §97 (2000).

[115] Supra note 3 § 13 (2000).

[116] Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786,

199 SE2d 223.

[117] Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:

"Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent

Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court,
most respectfully manifests:

I. That respondent Imelda R. Marcos

owns 90% of the subject-matter of
the above-entitled case, being the
sole beneficiary of the dollar
deposits in the name of the various
Foundations alleged in the case;
II. That in fact only 10% of the
subject-matter in the above-
entitled case belongs to the Estate
of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos;"

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[118] Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18,

2000 memorandum of respondent Mrs. Marcos:

"On the other hand, the opponent to the

appeal, formally the owner of the assets to
be seized and restituted, has not been
involved in the collecting procedure pending
in the Philippines. Even though such
opponent is nothing but a legal construction
to hide the true ownership to the assets of
the Marcos family, they nevertheless are
entitled to a hearing as far as the
proceedings are concerned with accounts
which are nominally theirs. The guarantees
of the Republic of the Philippines therefore
must include the process rights not only of
the defendants but also of the formal
owners of the assets to be delivered."

[119] 240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995].

[120] Supra.

[121] Id at 470-471.

[122] Substantially the same as Section 11, Rule 3 of

the old Rules of Court.

[123] Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. -

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground

for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.

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[124] Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of

Court.

[125] Supra note 3 § 265 (2000)

[126] Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571,

18 FR Serv 2d 221, later app (CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 1090,

on reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that a failure to
request the joinder of a defendant was excused where
the moving party's former counsel, who had resisted
the joinder, abruptly withdrew his appearance and
substitute counsel moved promptly to join the
corporation.

[127] Supra note 3.

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