he tort of negligence has evolved significantly from a mere component of other

torts to a distinct and pivotal area of common law. Its development reflects a
societal shift towards holding individuals and entities accountable for foreseeable
harm caused by their carelessness.

I. Historical Development of Negligence

Historically, liability for harm was often tied to direct force (trespass) or
specific, pre-existing duties, often arising from contract. Early common law did
not recognize a general principle of negligence. Instead, "negligence" was often
used to describe carelessness within specific forms of action.

Early Stages (Pre-19th Century): Before the 19th century, negligence was not an
independent tort. Actions were generally categorized as trespass (direct
interference with person or property) or "actions on the case" (for indirect harm).
Even within "actions on the case," negligence was more a description of the conduct
than a standalone cause of action. For instance, apothecaries, doctors, and other
professionals could be held liable for negligent performance of their duties, but
this was rooted in their specific calling rather than a general duty of care.

19th Century Evolution: The 19th century saw a gradual shift. Courts began to focus
more on the concept of "fault" and foreseeability. The rise of industrialization
led to more complex interactions and new types of accidents, necessitating a
broader framework for liability.

Mitchil v. Alestree (1676): While early, this case is sometimes cited as an example
of liability for foreseeable harm, involving a defendant who brought unruly horses
into a public place, leading to injury.

The Dawn of the Modern Tort: Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562

This landmark House of Lords decision is widely considered the genesis of
modern negligence as an independent tort.

Facts: Mrs. Donoghue consumed ginger beer from an opaque bottle, purchased by her
friend, and discovered a decomposed snail at the bottom. She suffered shock and
gastroenteritis. As there was no contractual relationship between Mrs. Donoghue and
the manufacturer, she could not sue for breach of contract.
Principle (The "Neighbour Principle" by Lord Atkin): Lord Atkin famously
articulated the "neighbour principle," stating:
"You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in law is my neighbour?
The answer seems to be: persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I
am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."

Significance: This case established that a duty of care could exist independently
of a contract, expanding liability to manufacturers for their products. It laid the
foundation for the general duty of care concept, emphasizing foreseeability and
proximity.
II. Supporting Principles in Determining and Proving Negligence
Following Donoghue v. Stevenson, courts have developed and refined the principles
for determining and proving negligence. These are generally understood as the "four
elements" of negligence: Duty of Care, Breach of Duty, Causation, and Damages.

A. Duty of Care
The first step is to establish that the defendant owed a legal duty of care to the
plaintiff.
Foreseeability: A crucial aspect of duty of care. The harm must be reasonably
foreseeable to a person in the defendant's position.
Bourhill v. Young [1943] AC 92: A pregnant woman suffered a miscarriage after
hearing a motor accident and seeing blood on the road, but did not see the accident
itself. The court held that the motorcyclist did not owe her a duty of care because
her injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his negligent driving to
a "normal" person at that distance.
Haley v. London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778: The defendant electricity board
dug a trench and placed a warning sign. A blind pedestrian, tapping with his cane,
tripped over the sign and was injured. The court held the board liable, as it was
foreseeable that blind people would use the pavement, and therefore, more adequate
precautions were required.
Proximity: This refers to the closeness of the relationship between the claimant
and defendant. It doesn't necessarily mean physical closeness, but a direct and
immediate relationship where the defendant's actions could directly affect the
claimant.
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605: This case introduced the "three-
stage test" for establishing a duty of care, particularly in novel situations where
an existing duty is not clearly established:
Foreseeability of harm: Was it reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's actions
would cause harm to the plaintiff?
Proximity of relationship: Was there a sufficiently close relationship between the
parties?
Fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty: Is it fair, just, and reasonable in
all the circumstances to impose a duty of care on the defendant towards the
plaintiff? This stage often involves policy considerations, such as the potential
for "floodgates of litigation" or indeterminate liability.
Special Categories: Certain relationships automatically give rise to a duty of care
(e.g., doctor-patient, driver-pedestrian, employer-employee).
B. Breach of Duty
Once a duty of care is established, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
breached that duty by failing to meet the required standard of care.

The "Reasonable Person" Standard: The standard of care is objective, judged by what
a "reasonable person" in the defendant's position would have done. It's not about
the defendant's best efforts, but what a reasonably prudent individual would have
done under similar circumstances.
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Exch 781: Alderson B defined negligence
as "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."
Factors Determining Breach:
Magnitude of the Risk: The likelihood of harm and the gravity of the potential
harm. A higher risk requires greater precautions.
Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 850: A cricket ball hit and injured the claimant outside
a cricket ground. The court held that while the risk was foreseeable, the
likelihood of injury was so small that a reasonable person would not have taken
further precautions.
Practicability/Cost of Precautions: The burden of taking precautions to eliminate
or reduce the risk. If the cost or difficulty of precautions is disproportionate to
the risk, failure to take them may not be a breach.
Latimer v. AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643: A factory floor became slippery after a flood.
The defendant took reasonable steps to minimize the risk, but the claimant still
slipped. The court held that the defendant was not negligent as they had done all
that a reasonable employer could be expected to do.
Social Utility of the Defendant's Activity: In some cases, the social benefit of
the defendant's activity may be considered.
Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 1 WLR 835: A fireman was injured while
responding to an emergency call when heavy lifting equipment fell on him. The court
held that the fire authority was not negligent, balancing the risk against the
public benefit of saving a life.
Special Skills: If the defendant possesses a special skill, they are judged by the
standard of a reasonably competent person exercising that skill.
Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582: Established the
"Bolam test" for medical professionals: a doctor is not negligent if they acted in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men
skilled in that particular art. This applies to all professionals.
C. Causation
The plaintiff must prove a causal link between the defendant's breach of duty and
the damage suffered.

Factual Causation (Cause-in-Fact - "But For" Test): This asks whether the damage
would have occurred "but for" the defendant's breach. If the damage would have
happened anyway, the defendant is not liable.
Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428: A
man presented at a hospital with symptoms of arsenic poisoning. The doctor
negligently sent him home. He died later. The court found that even if the doctor
had acted competently, the man would have died anyway, so there was no factual
causation.
Legal Causation (Proximate Cause/Remoteness of Damage): This limits liability to
foreseeable types of harm. Even if factual causation is established, the defendant
may not be liable if the damage is too remote a consequence of their breach.
The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388: Oil spilled from the defendant's ship onto
the water. The oil then caught fire due to welding operations on a nearby wharf,
causing significant damage. The Privy Council held that the defendants were not
liable for the fire damage because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the oil
would ignite on water. This established foreseeability as the test for remoteness
of damage.
D. Damages
Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered actual damage, which can be in the form
of physical injury, property damage, or in some limited cases, pure economic loss
or psychiatric injury.

Legally Recognized Harm: The harm suffered must be of a type recognized by law.
Quantifiable Loss: The plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that they have
suffered a loss that can be compensated by damages.
III. Proving Negligence
The burden of proof generally lies with the plaintiff to prove all four elements of
negligence on the balance of probabilities (i.e., that it is more likely than not
that the defendant was negligent and caused the harm).

Evidence: This can include witness testimony, expert opinions (especially in

professional negligence cases), documents, and physical evidence.
Res Ipsa Loquitur ("The thing speaks for itself"): In certain circumstances, the
mere fact that an accident happened may be sufficient to infer negligence, shifting
the burden to the defendant to disprove it. This doctrine applies when:
The event that caused the injury is of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence.
The instrument or agency causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the
defendant.
There is no explanation for the event other than the defendant's negligence.
Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722: A barrel of flour fell from the defendant's
warehouse and injured the plaintiff. The court applied res ipsa loquitur, stating
that barrels do not normally fall out of warehouses unless there is negligence.
In conclusion, the journey of negligence from an incidental concept to an
independent tort is a testament to the common law's adaptability. Donoghue v.
Stevenson was the catalyst, providing the foundational "neighbour principle."
Subsequent cases, particularly Caparo Industries v Dickman, further refined the
duty of care, while the principles of breach (reasonable person standard),
causation (factual and legal), and damage provide the framework for determining and
proving liability in this crucial area of tort law.