CIS Ubuntu Linux 20.04 LTS Benchmark v3.0.0
CIS Ubuntu Linux 20.04 LTS Benchmark v3.0.0
04
LTS Benchmark
v3.0.0 - 03-31-2025
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These tools make the hardening process much more scalable for large numbers of
systems and applications.
NOTE: Some tooling focuses only on the Benchmark Recommendations that can
be fully automated (skipping ones marked Manual). It is important that ALL
Recommendations (Automated and Manual) be addressed since all are
important for properly securing systems and are typically in scope for
audits.
Key Stakeholders
Cybersecurity is a collaborative effort, and cross functional cooperation is imperative
within an organization to discuss, test, and deploy Benchmarks in an effective and
efficient way. The Benchmarks are developed to be best practice configuration
guidelines applicable to a wide range of use cases. In some organizations, exceptions
to specific Recommendations will be needed, and this team should work to prioritize the
problematic Recommendations based on several factors like risk, time, cost, and labor.
These exceptions should be properly categorized and documented for auditing
purposes.
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• Use the most recent version of a Benchmark: This is true for all Benchmarks,
but especially true for cloud technologies. Cloud technologies change frequently
and using an older version of a Benchmark may have invalid methods for
auditing and remediation.
Exceptions
The guidance items in the Benchmarks are called recommendations and not
requirements, and exceptions to some of them are expected and acceptable. The
Benchmarks strive to be a secure baseline, or starting point, for a specific technology,
with known issues identified during Benchmark development are documented in the
Impact section of each Recommendation. In addition, organizational, system specific
requirements, or local site policy may require changes as well, or an exception to a
Recommendation or group of Recommendations (e.g. A Benchmark could Recommend
that a Web server not be installed on the system, but if a system's primary purpose is to
function as a Webserver, there should be a documented exception to this
Recommendation for that specific server).
It is the responsibility of the organization to determine their overall security policy, and
which settings are applicable to their unique needs based on the overall risk profile for
the organization.
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NOTE: As previously stated, the PDF versions of the CIS Benchmarks™ are
available for free, non-commercial use on the CIS Website. All other formats
of the CIS Benchmarks™ (MS Word, Excel, and Build Kits) are available for
CIS SecureSuite® members.
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Intended Audience
This benchmark is intended for system and application administrators, security
specialists, auditors, help desk, and platform deployment personnel who plan to
develop, deploy, assess, or secure solutions that incorporate Ubuntu Linux 20.04 LTS
on x86_64 platforms.
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Convention Meaning
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Title
Concise description for the recommendation's intended configuration.
Assessment Status
An assessment status is included for every recommendation. The assessment status
indicates whether the given recommendation can be automated or requires manual
steps to implement. Both statuses are equally important and are determined and
supported as defined below:
Automated
Represents recommendations for which assessment of a technical control can be fully
automated and validated to a pass/fail state. Recommendations will include the
necessary information to implement automation.
Manual
Represents recommendations for which assessment of a technical control cannot be
fully automated and requires all or some manual steps to validate that the configured
state is set as expected. The expected state can vary depending on the environment.
Profile
A collection of recommendations for securing a technology or a supporting platform.
Most benchmarks include at least a Level 1 and Level 2 Profile. Level 2 extends Level 1
recommendations and is not a standalone profile. The Profile Definitions section in the
benchmark provides the definitions as they pertain to the recommendations included for
the technology.
Description
Detailed information pertaining to the setting with which the recommendation is
concerned. In some cases, the description will include the recommended value.
Rationale Statement
Detailed reasoning for the recommendation to provide the user a clear and concise
understanding on the importance of the recommendation.
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Audit Procedure
Systematic instructions for determining if the target system complies with the
recommendation.
Remediation Procedure
Systematic instructions for applying recommendations to the target system to bring it
into compliance according to the recommendation.
Default Value
Default value for the given setting in this recommendation, if known. If not known, either
not configured or not defined will be applied.
References
Additional documentation relative to the recommendation.
Additional Information
Supplementary information that does not correspond to any other field but may be
useful to the user.
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• Level 2 - Server
This profile extends the "Level 1 - Server" profile. Items in this profile exhibit one
or more of the following characteristics:
• Level 1 - Workstation
• Level 2 - Workstation
This profile extends the "Level 1 - Workstation" profile. Items in this profile exhibit
one or more of the following characteristics:
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Contributor
Ron Colvin
Dave Billing
Dominic Pace
Koen Laevens
Mark Birch
Thomas Sjögren
James Trigg
Matthew Burket
Marcus Burghardt
Graham Eames
Robert McSulla
Chad Streck
Ryan Jaynes
Cory Sherman
Simon John
Steve Cobrin
Mike Cross
Editor
Jonathan Lewis Christopherson
Eric Pinnell
Gokhan Lus
Randie Bejar
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1.1 Filesystem
The file system is generally a built-in layer used to handle the data management of the
storage.
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Several uncommon filesystem types are supported under Linux. Removing support for
unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the system. If a
filesystem type is not needed it should be disabled. Native Linux file systems are
designed to ensure that built-in security controls function as expected. Non-native
filesystems can lead to unexpected consequences to both the security and functionality
of the system and should be used with caution. Many filesystems are created for niche
use cases and are not maintained and supported as the operating systems are updated
and patched. Users of non-native filesystems should ensure that there is attention and
ongoing support for them, especially in light of frequent operating system changes.
Standard network connectivity and Internet access to cloud storage may make the use
of non-standard filesystem formats to directly attach heterogeneous devices much less
attractive.
Note: This should not be considered a comprehensive list of filesystems. You may wish
to consider additions to those listed here for your environment. For the current available
file system modules on the system see ls /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/fs | sort
-u
Start up scripts
Kernel modules loaded directly via insmod will ignore what is configured in the relevant
/etc/modprobe.d/*.conf files. If modules are still being loaded after a reboot whilst
having the correctly configured blacklist and install command, check for insmod
entries in start up scripts such as .bashrc.
Return values
Using /bin/false as the command in disabling a particular module serves two
purposes; to convey the meaning of the entry to the user and cause a non-zero return
value. The latter can be tested for in scripts. Please note that insmod will ignore what is
configured in the relevant configuration files. The preferred way to load modules is with
modprobe.
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The cramfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only Linux filesystem embedded in
small footprint systems. A cramfs image can be used without having to first
decompress the image.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
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{
l_mod_name="cramfs" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the cramfs kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the cramfs filesystem as part of the kernel opposed
to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return
anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned by the above script, verify the cramfs kernel module is not loaded
and not loadable by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the cramfs kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'cramfs'
Run the following command to verify the cramfs kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+cramfs\b'
Example output:
blacklist cramfs
install cramfs /bin/false
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Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "install cramfs /bin/false" >> cramfs.conf
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist cramfs" >> cramfs.conf
References:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The freevxfs filesystem type is a free version of the Veritas type filesystem. This is the
primary filesystem type for HP-UX operating systems.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
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Run the following script to determine if the freevxfs kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="freevxfs" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the freevxfs kernel module is not available on the system and
no further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the freevxfs filesystem as part of the kernel
opposed to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not
return anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the freevxfs kernel module is not loaded and not
loadable by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the freevxfs kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'freevxfs'
Run the following command to verify the freevxfs kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+freevxfs\b'
Example output:
blacklist freevxfs
install freevxfs /bin/false
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References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The hfs filesystem type is a hierarchical filesystem that allows you to mount Mac OS
filesystems.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
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Run the following script to determine if the hfs kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="hfs" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the hfs kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the hfs filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the hfs kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the hfs kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'hfs'
Run the following command to verify the hfs kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+hfs\b'
Example output:
blacklist hfs
install hfs /bin/false
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Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist hfs in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist hfs" >> hfs.conf
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The hfsplus filesystem type is a hierarchical filesystem designed to replace hfs that
allows you to mount Mac OS filesystems.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
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Run the following script to determine if the hfsplus kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="hfsplus" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the hfsplus kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the hfsplus filesystem as part of the kernel opposed
to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return
anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the hfsplus kernel module is not loaded and not loadable
by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the hfsplus kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'hfsplus'
Run the following command to verify the hfsplus kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+hfsplus\b'
Example output:
blacklist hfsplus
install hfsplus /bin/false
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References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The jffs2 (journaling flash filesystem 2) filesystem type is a log-structured filesystem
used in flash memory devices.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
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Run the following script to determine if the jffs2 kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="jffs2" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the jffs2 kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the jffs2 filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the jffs2 kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the jffs2 kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'jffs2'
Example output:
blacklist jffs2
install jffs2 /bin/false
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References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 38
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
overlay is a Linux filesystem that layers multiple filesystems to create a single unified
view which allows a user to "merge" several mount points into a unified filesystem.
Rationale:
The overlay has known CVE's: CVE-2023-32629, CVE-2023-2640, CVE-2023-0386.
Disabling the overlay reduces the local attack surface by removing support for
unnecessary filesystem types and mitigates potential risks associated with unauthorized
execution of setuid files, enhancing the overall system security.
Impact:
WARNING: If Container applications such as Docker, Kubernetes, Podman, Linux
Containers (LXC), etc. are in use proceed with caution and consider the impact on
containerized workloads, as disabling the overlay may severely disrupt
containerization.
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Run the following script to determine if the overlay kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="overlayfs" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the overlay kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the overlay filesystem as part of the kernel opposed
to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return
anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the overlay kernel module is not loaded and not loadable
by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the overlay kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'overlay'
Example output:
blacklist overlay
install overlay /bin/false
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References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
9.2 Ensure Only Approved Ports, Protocols and Services Are Running
v7 Ensure that only network ports, protocols, and services listening on a system with validated ● ●
business needs, are running on each system.
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• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The squashfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only Linux filesystem embedded in
small footprint systems. A squashfs image can be used without having to first
decompress the image.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
Impact:
As Snap packages utilize squashfs as a compressed filesystem, disabling squashfs
will cause Snap packages to fail.
Snap application packages of software are self-contained and work across a range of
Linux distributions. This is unlike traditional Linux package management approaches,
like APT or RPM, which require specifically adapted packages per Linux distribution on
an application update and delay therefore application deployment from developers to
their software's end-user. Snaps themselves have no dependency on any external store
("App store"), can be obtained from any source and can be therefore used for upstream
software deployment.
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Run the following script to determine if the squashfs kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="squashfs" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the squashfs kernel module is not available on the system and
no further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the squashfs filesystem as part of the kernel
opposed to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not
return anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the squashfs kernel module is not loaded and not
loadable by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the squashfs kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'squashfs'
Run the following command to verify the squashfs kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+squashfs\b'
Example output:
blacklist squashfs
install squashfs /bin/false
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Remediation:
Run the following commands to unload the squashfs kernel module:
# modprobe -r squashfs 2>/dev/null
# rmmod squashfs 2>/dev/null
References:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 45
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The udf filesystem type is the universal disk format used to implement ISO/IEC 13346
and ECMA-167 specifications. This is an open vendor filesystem type for data storage
on a broad range of media. This filesystem type is necessary to support writing DVDs
and newer optical disc formats.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it.
Impact:
Microsoft Azure requires the usage of udf.
udf should not be disabled on systems run on Microsoft Azure.
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{
l_mod_name="udf" l_mod_type="fs"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the udf kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the udf filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the udf kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the udf kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'udf'
Run the following command to verify the udf kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+udf\b'
Example output:
blacklist udf
install udf /bin/false
Page 47
Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist udf in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist udf" >> udf.conf
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 48
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
USB storage provides a means to transfer and store files ensuring persistence and
availability of the files independent of network connection status. Its popularity and utility
has led to USB-based malware being a simple and common means for network
infiltration and a first step to establishing a persistent threat within a networked
environment.
Rationale:
Restricting USB access on the system will decrease the physical attack surface for a
device and diminish the possible vectors to introduce malware.
Impact:
Disabling the usb-storage module will disable any usage of USB storage devices.
If requirements and local site policy allow the use of such devices, other solutions
should be configured accordingly instead. One example of a commonly used solution is
USBGuard.
Page 49
Run the following script to determine if the usb-storage kernel module is available on
the system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="usb-storage" l_mod_type="drivers"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the usb-storage kernel module is not available on the system
and no further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the usb-storage filesystem as part of the kernel
opposed to being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not
return anything. This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the usb-storage kernel module is not loaded and not
loadable by performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the usb-storage kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep -P -- 'usb(_|-)storage'
Run the following command to verify the usb-storage kernel module is not loadable:
# modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+usb_storage\b'
Example output:
blacklist usb_storage
install usb_storage /bin/false
Page 50
References:
Additional Information:
An alternative solution to disabling the usb-storage module may be found in USBGuard.
Use of USBGuard and construction of USB device policies should be done in alignment
with site policy.
Page 51
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 52
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Filesystem kernel modules are pieces of code that can be dynamically loaded into the
Linux kernel to extend its filesystem capabilities, or so-called base kernel, of an
operating system. Filesystem kernel modules are typically used to add support for new
hardware (as device drivers), or for adding system calls.
Rationale:
While loadable filesystem kernel modules are a convenient method of modifying the
running kernel, this can be abused by attackers on a compromised system to prevent
detection of their processes or files, allowing them to maintain control over the system.
Many rootkits make use of loadable filesystem kernel modules in this way.
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the
system. If this filesystem type is not needed, disable it. The following filesystem kernel
modules have known CVE's and should be made unavailable if no dependencies exist:
• afs - CVE-2022-37402
• ceph - CVE-2022-0670
• cifs - CVE-2022-29869
• exfat CVE-2022-29973
• ext CVE-2022-1184
• fat CVE-2022-22043
• fscache CVE-2022-3630
• fuse CVE-2023-0386
• gfs2 CVE-2023-3212
• nfs_common CVE-2023-6660
• nfsd CVE-2022-43945
• smbfs_common CVE-2022-2585
Impact:
This list may be quite extensive and covering all edges cases is difficult. Therefore, it's
crucial to carefully consider the implications and dependencies before making any
changes to the filesystem kernel module configurations.
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•Look at the filesystem kernel modules available to the currently running kernel.
•Exclude mounted filesystem kernel modules that don't currently have a CVE
•List filesystem kernel modules that are not fully disabled, or are loaded into the
kernel
Review the generated output
#! /usr/bin/env bash
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); a_modprope_config=(); a_excluded=(); a_available_modules=()
a_ignore=("xfs" "vfat" "ext2" "ext3" "ext4")
a_cve_exists=("afs" "ceph" "cifs" "exfat" "ext" "fat" "fscache" "fuse" "gfs2" "nfs_common" "nfsd"
"smbfs_common")
f_module_chk()
{
l_out2=""; grep -Pq -- "\b$l_mod_name\b" <<< "${a_cve_exists[*]}" && l_out2=" <- CVE exists!"
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"$l_mod_name"'\b' <<< "${a_modprope_config[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - Kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not fully disabled $l_out2")
elif ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"$l_mod_name"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(false|true)\b' <<<
"${a_modprope_config[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - Kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not fully disabled $l_out2")
fi
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_name" &> /dev/null; then # Check if the module is currently loaded
l_output2+=(" - Kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loaded" "")
fi
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_module_dir; do
a_available_modules+=("$(basename "$l_module_dir")")
done < <(find "$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/"$(uname -r)"/kernel/fs || readlink -f /lib/modules/"$(uname -
r)"/kernel/fs)" -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d ! -empty -print0)
while IFS= read -r l_exclude; do
if grep -Pq -- "\b$l_exclude\b" <<< "${a_cve_exists[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - ** WARNING: kernel module: \"$l_exclude\" has a CVE and is currently mounted! **")
elif
grep -Pq -- "\b$l_exclude\b" <<< "${a_available_modules[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - Kernel module: \"$l_exclude\" is currently mounted - do NOT unload or disable")
fi
! grep -Pq -- "\b$l_exclude\b" <<< "${a_ignore[*]}" && a_ignore+=("$l_exclude")
done < <(findmnt -knD | awk '{print $2}' | sort -u)
while IFS= read -r l_config; do
a_modprope_config+=("$l_config")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P '^\h*(blacklist|install)')
for l_mod_name in "${a_available_modules[@]}"; do # Iterate over all filesystem modules
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
if grep -Pq -- "\b$l_mod_name\b" <<< "${a_ignore[*]}"; then
a_excluded+=(" - Kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
else
f_module_chk
fi
done
[ "${#a_excluded[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" \
"The following intentionally skipped" \
"${a_excluded[@]}"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - No unused filesystem kernel modules are enabled" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "-- Audit Result: --" " ** REVIEW the following **" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "-- Correctly set: --" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
WARNING: disabling or denylisting filesystem modules that are in use on the system
may be FATAL. It is extremely important to thoroughly review this list.
Page 54
WARNING: unloading, disabling or denylisting filesystem modules that are in use on the
system maybe FATAL. It is extremely important to thoroughly review the filesystems
returned by the audit before following the remediation procedure.
Note:
• Disabling a kernel module by modifying the command above for each unused
filesystem kernel module
• The example gfs2 must be updated with the appropriate module name for the
command or example script bellow to run correctly.
Page 55
{
a_output2=(); a_output3=(); l_dl="" # Initialize arrays and clear variables
l_mod_name="gfs2" # set module name
l_mod_type="fs" # set module type
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_fix()
{
l_dl="y" # Set to ignore duplicate checks
a_showconfig=() # Create array with modprobe output
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_name//-/_}"'\b')
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_name" &> /dev/null; then # Check if the module is currently loaded
a_output2+=(" - unloading kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
modprobe -r "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null; rmmod "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - setting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" to \"$(readlink -f /bin/false)\"")
printf '%s\n' "install $l_mod_name $(readlink -f /bin/false)" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - denylisting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
printf '%s\n' "blacklist $l_mod_name" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do # Check if the module exists on the system
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_fix
else
echo -e " - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\""
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}" || printf '%s\n' "" " - No changes
needed"
printf '%s\n' "" " - remediation of kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" complete" ""
}
Page 56
1. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=filesystem
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 57
Directories that are used for system-wide functions can be further protected by placing
them on separate partitions. This provides protection for resource exhaustion and
enables the use of mounting options that are applicable to the directory's intended use.
Users' data can be stored on separate partitions and have stricter mount options. A user
partition is a filesystem that has been established for use by the users and does not
contain software for system operations.
The recommendations in this section are easier to perform during initial system
installation. If the system is already installed, it is recommended that a full backup be
performed before repartitioning the system.
Note:
-IF- you are repartitioning a system that has already been installed (This may require
the system to be in single-user mode):
• Mount the new partition to a temporary mountpoint e.g. mount /dev/sda2 /mnt
• Copy data from the original partition to the new partition. e.g. cp -a /var/tmp/*
/mnt
• Verify that all data is present on the new partition. e.g. ls -la /mnt
• Unmount the new partition. e.g. umount /mnt
• Remove the data from the original directory that was in the old partition. e.g. rm
-Rf /var/tmp/* Otherwise it will still consume space in the old partition that will
be masked when the new filesystem is mounted.
• Mount the new partition to the desired mountpoint. e.g. mount /dev/sda2
/var/tmp
• Update /etc/fstab with the new mountpoint. e.g. /dev/sda2 /var/tmp xfs
defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Page 58
Page 59
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /tmp directory is a world-writable directory used for temporary storage by all users
and some applications.
Note: If an entry for /tmp exists in /etc/fstab it will take precedence over entries in a
systemd unit file. There is an exception to this when a system is diskless and connected
to iSCSI, entries in /etc/fstab may not take precedence over a systemd unit file.
Rationale:
Making /tmp its own file system allows an administrator to set additional mount options
such as the noexec option on the mount, making /tmp useless for an attacker to install
executable code. It would also prevent an attacker from establishing a hard link to a
system setuid program and wait for it to be updated. Once the program was updated,
the hard link would be broken, and the attacker would have his own copy of the
program. If the program happened to have a security vulnerability, the attacker could
continue to exploit the known flaw.
This can be accomplished by either mounting tmpfs to /tmp, or creating a separate
partition for /tmp.
Impact:
By design files saved to /tmp should have no expectation of surviving a reboot of the
system. tmpfs is ram based and all files stored to tmpfs will be lost when the system is
rebooted.
If files need to be persistent through a reboot, they should be saved to /var/tmp not
/tmp.
Since the /tmp directory is intended to be world-writable, there is a risk of resource
exhaustion if it is not bound to tmpfs or a separate partition.
Running out of /tmp space is a problem regardless of what kind of filesystem lies under
it, but in a configuration where /tmp is not a separate file system it will essentially have
the whole disk available, as the default installation only creates a single / partition. On
the other hand, a RAM-based /tmp (as with tmpfs) will almost certainly be much
smaller, which can lead to applications filling up the filesystem much more easily.
Another alternative is to create a dedicated partition for /tmp from a separate volume or
disk. One of the downsides of a disk-based dedicated partition is that it will be slower
than tmpfs which is RAM-based.
Page 60
Example output:
/tmp tmpfs tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec
Ensure that systemd will mount the /tmp partition at boot time.
# systemctl is-enabled tmp.mount
Example output:
generated
Remediation:
First ensure that systemd is correctly configured to ensure that /tmp will be mounted at
boot time.
# systemctl unmask tmp.mount
For specific configuration requirements of the /tmp mount for your environment, modify
/etc/fstab.
Example of using tmpfs with specific mount options:
tmpfs /tmp tmpfs defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=2G 0 0
References:
1. https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/APIFileSystems/
2. https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-fstab-generator.html
3. https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.txt
4. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-7
5. RHEL 8 STIG Vul ID: V-230295
6. RHEL 8 Rule ID: SV-30295r627750
Page 61
• size: The limit of allocated bytes for this tmpfs instance. The default is half of
your physical RAM without swap. If you oversize your tmpfs instances the
machine will deadlock since the OOM handler will not be able to free that
memory.
• nr_blocks: The same as size, but in blocks of PAGE_SIZE.
• nr_inodes: The maximum number of inodes for this instance. The default is half
of the number of your physical RAM pages, or (on a machine with highmem) the
number of lowmem RAM pages, whichever is the lower.
These parameters accept a suffix k, m or g and can be changed on remount. The size
parameter also accepts a suffix % to limit this tmpfs instance to that percentage of your
physical RAM. The default, when neither size nor nr_blocks is specified, is size=50%.
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Page 62
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /tmp filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to ensure
that users cannot create a block or character special devices in /tmp.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /tmp | grep -v nodev
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nodev to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /tmp
References:
Page 63
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 64
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /tmp filesystem is only intended for temporary file storage, set this option to
ensure that users cannot create setuid files in /tmp.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp, verify that the nosuid option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /tmp | grep -v nosuid
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nosuid to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /tmp
References:
Page 65
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 66
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The noexec mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain executable
binaries.
Rationale:
Since the /tmp filesystem is only intended for temporary file storage, set this option to
ensure that users cannot run executable binaries from /tmp.
Impact:
Setting the noexec option on /tmp may prevent installation and/or updating of some 3rd
party software.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp, verify that the noexec option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the noexec mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /tmp | grep -v noexec
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add noexec to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /tmp
Page 67
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 68
Page 69
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /dev/shm directory is a world-writable directory that can function as shared
memory that facilitates inter process communication (IPC).
Rationale:
Making /dev/shm its own file system allows an administrator to set additional mount
options such as the noexec option on the mount, making /dev/shm useless for an
attacker to install executable code. It would also prevent an attacker from establishing a
hard link to a system setuid program and wait for it to be updated. Once the program
was updated, the hard link would be broken and the attacker would have his own copy
of the program. If the program happened to have a security vulnerability, the attacker
could continue to exploit the known flaw.
This can be accomplished by mounting tmpfs to /dev/shm.
Impact:
Since the /dev/shm directory is intended to be world-writable, there is a risk of resource
exhaustion if it is not bound to a separate partition.
/dev/shm utilizing tmpfs can be resized using the size={size} parameter in the
relevant entry in /etc/fstab.
Audit:
- IF - /dev/shm is to be used on the system, run the following command and verify the
output shows that /dev/shm is mounted. Particular requirements pertaining to mount
options are covered in ensuing sections.
# findmnt -kn /dev/shm
Example output:
/dev/shm tmpfs tmpfs rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,seclabel
Page 70
References:
1. https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/APIFileSystems/
2. https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-fstab-generator.html
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-7
CIS Controls:
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Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 71
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /dev/shm filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to
ensure that users cannot attempt to create special devices in /dev/shm partitions.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm, verify that the nodev option is set.
# findmnt -kn /dev/shm | grep -v 'nodev'
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nodev to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/dev/shm partition. See the fstab(5) manual page for more information.
Example:
tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /dev/shm with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /dev/shm
Page 72
Controls
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Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 73
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Setting this option on a file system prevents users from introducing privileged programs
onto the system and allowing non-root users to execute them.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm, verify that the nosuid option is set.
# findmnt -kn /dev/shm | grep -v 'nosuid'
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nosuid to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/dev/shm partition. See the fstab(5) manual page for more information.
Example:
tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /dev/shm with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /dev/shm
Page 74
Controls
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Page 75
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The noexec mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain executable
binaries.
Rationale:
Setting this option on a file system prevents users from executing programs from shared
memory. This deters users from introducing potentially malicious software on the
system.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm, verify that the noexec option is set.
# findmnt -kn /dev/shm | grep -v 'noexec'
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /dev/shm.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add noexec to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/dev/shm partition.
Example:
tmpfs /dev/shm tmpfs defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /dev/shm with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /dev/shm
Page 76
Controls
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Page 77
{
l_valid_shells="^($(awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' | paste -
s -d '|' - ))$"
awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '($1!~/^(root|halt|sync|shutdown|nfsnobody)$/ && ($3>='"$(awk
'/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)"' || $3 != 65534) && $(NF) ~ pat) {print $1 " - " $6}' /etc/passwd
}
Page 78
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The /home directory is used to support disk storage needs of local users.
Rationale:
The default installation only creates a single / partition. Since the /home directory
contains user generated data, there is a risk of resource exhaustion. It will essentially
have the whole disk available to fill up and impact the system as a whole. In addition,
other operations on the system could fill up the disk unrelated to /home and impact all
local users.
Configuring /home as its own file system allows an administrator to set additional mount
options such as noexec/nosuid/nodev. These options limit an attacker's ability to
create exploits on the system. In the case of /home options such as
usrquota/grpquota may be considered to limit the impact that users can have on each
other with regards to disk resource exhaustion. Other options allow for specific
behavior. See man mount for exact details regarding filesystem-independent and
filesystem-specific options.
As /home contains user data, care should be taken to ensure the security and integrity
of the data and mount point.
Impact:
Resizing filesystems is a common activity in cloud-hosted servers. Separate filesystem
partitions may prevent successful resizing or may require the installation of additional
tools solely for the purpose of resizing operations. The use of these additional tools may
introduce their own security considerations.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output shows /home is mounted:
# findmnt -kn /home
Page 79
References:
Additional Information:
When modifying /home it is advisable to bring the system to emergency mode (so auditd
is not running), rename the existing directory, mount the new file system, and migrate
the data over before returning to multi-user mode.
CIS Controls:
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Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 80
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /home filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to ensure
that users cannot create a block or character special devices in /home.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /home, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /home | grep -v nodev
Run the following command to remount /home with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /home
References:
Page 81
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 82
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /home filesystem is only intended for user file storage, set this option to
ensure that users cannot create setuid files in /home.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /home, verify that the nosuid option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /home | grep -v nosuid
Run the following command to remount /home with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /home
References:
Page 83
Controls
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techniques
Page 84
Page 85
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The /var directory is used by daemons and other system services to temporarily store
dynamic data. Some directories created by these processes may be world-writable.
Rationale:
The reasoning for mounting /var on a separate partition is as follows.
The default installation only creates a single / partition. Since the /var directory may
contain world writable files and directories, there is a risk of resource exhaustion. It will
essentially have the whole disk available to fill up and impact the system. In addition,
other operations on the system could fill up the disk unrelated to /var and cause
unintended behavior across the system as the disk is full. See man auditd.conf for
details.
Configuring /var as its own file system allows an administrator to set additional mount
options such as noexec/nosuid/nodev. These options limit an attacker's ability to
create exploits on the system. Other options allow for specific behavior. See man mount
for exact details regarding filesystem-independent and filesystem-specific options.
An example of exploiting /var may be an attacker establishing a hard-link to a system
setuid program and waiting for it to be updated. Once the program is updated, the
hard-link can be broken and the attacker would have their own copy of the program. If
the program happened to have a security vulnerability, the attacker could continue to
exploit the known flaw.
Impact:
Resizing filesystems is a common activity in cloud-hosted servers. Separate filesystem
partitions may prevent successful resizing or may require the installation of additional
tools solely for the purpose of resizing operations. The use of these additional tools may
introduce their own security considerations.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output shows /var is mounted.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var
Page 86
References:
Additional Information:
When modifying /var it is advisable to bring the system to emergency mode (so auditd
is not running), rename the existing directory, mount the new file system, and migrate
the data over before returning to multi-user mode.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 87
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /var filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to ensure
that users cannot create a block or character special devices in /var.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var | grep -v nodev
Run the following command to remount /var with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var
References:
Page 88
Controls
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Page 89
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /var filesystem is only intended for variable files such as logs, set this option
to ensure that users cannot create setuid files in /var.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var, verify that the nosuid option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var | grep -v nosuid
Run the following command to remount /var with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var
References:
Page 90
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Page 92
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The /var/tmp directory is a world-writable directory used for temporary storage by all
users and some applications. Temporary files residing in /var/tmp are to be preserved
between reboots.
Rationale:
The default installation only creates a single / partition. Since the /var/tmp directory is
world-writable, there is a risk of resource exhaustion. In addition, other operations on
the system could fill up the disk unrelated to /var/tmp and cause potential disruption to
daemons as the disk is full.
Configuring /var/tmp as its own file system allows an administrator to set additional
mount options such as noexec/nosuid/nodev. These options limit an attacker's ability
to create exploits on the system.
Impact:
Resizing filesystems is a common activity in cloud-hosted servers. Separate filesystem
partitions may prevent successful resizing or may require the installation of additional
tools solely for the purpose of resizing operations. The use of these additional tools may
introduce their own security considerations.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output shows /var/tmp is mounted.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/tmp
Remediation:
For new installations, during installation create a custom partition setup and specify a
separate partition for /var/tmp.
For systems that were previously installed, create a new partition and configure
/etc/fstab as appropriate.
Page 93
Additional Information:
When modifying /var/tmp it is advisable to bring the system to emergency mode (so
auditd is not running), rename the existing directory, mount the new file system, and
migrate the data over before returning to multi-user mode.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 94
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /var/tmp filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to
ensure that users cannot create a block or character special devices in /var/tmp.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/tmp | grep -v nodev
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nodev to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /var/tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/tmp
References:
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Page 96
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /var/tmp filesystem is only intended for temporary file storage, set this option
to ensure that users cannot create setuid files in /var/tmp.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp, verify that the nosuid option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/tmp | grep -v nosuid
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nosuid to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /var/tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/tmp
References:
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Page 98
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The noexec mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain executable
binaries.
Rationale:
Since the /var/tmp filesystem is only intended for temporary file storage, set this option
to ensure that users cannot run executable binaries from /var/tmp.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp, verify that the noexec option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the noexec mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/tmp | grep -v noexec
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/tmp.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add noexec to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/tmp partition.
Example:
<device> /var/tmp <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/tmp with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/tmp
References:
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Page 100
Page 101
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The /var/log directory is used by system services to store log data.
Rationale:
The default installation only creates a single / partition. Since the /var/log directory
contains log files which can grow quite large, there is a risk of resource exhaustion. It
will essentially have the whole disk available to fill up and impact the system as a whole.
Configuring /var/log as its own file system allows an administrator to set additional
mount options such as noexec/nosuid/nodev. These options limit an attackers ability
to create exploits on the system. Other options allow for specific behavior. See man
mount for exact details regarding filesystem-independent and filesystem-specific
options.
As /var/log contains log files, care should be taken to ensure the security and integrity
of the data and mount point.
Impact:
Resizing filesystems is a common activity in cloud-hosted servers. Separate filesystem
partitions may prevent successful resizing, or may require the installation of additional
tools solely for the purpose of resizing operations. The use of these additional tools may
introduce their own security considerations.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output shows /var/log is mounted:
# findmnt -kn /var/log
Remediation:
For new installations, during installation create a custom partition setup and specify a
separate partition for /var/log .
For systems that were previously installed, create a new partition and configure
/etc/fstab as appropriate.
Page 102
Additional Information:
When modifying /var/log it is advisable to bring the system to emergency mode (so
auditd is not running), rename the existing directory, mount the new file system, and
migrate the data over before returning to multiuser mode.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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Techniques / Sub-
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Page 103
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option to
ensure that users cannot create a block or character special devices in /var/log.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log | grep -v nodev
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nodev to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log
References:
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Page 105
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log filesystem is only intended for log files, set this option to ensure
that users cannot create setuid files in /var/log.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log, verify that the nosuid option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log | grep -v nosuid
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nosuid to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log
References:
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Page 107
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The noexec mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain executable
binaries.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log filesystem is only intended for log files, set this option to ensure
that users cannot run executable binaries from /var/log.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log, verify that the noexec option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the noexec mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log | grep -v noexec
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add noexec to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log
References:
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Page 109
Page 110
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The auditing daemon, auditd, stores log data in the /var/log/audit directory.
Rationale:
The default installation only creates a single / partition. Since the /var/log/audit
directory contains the audit.log file which can grow quite large, there is a risk of
resource exhaustion. It will essentially have the whole disk available to fill up and impact
the system as a whole. In addition, other operations on the system could fill up the disk
unrelated to /var/log/audit and cause auditd to trigger its space_left_action as
the disk is full. See man auditd.conf for details.
Configuring /var/log/audit as its own file system allows an administrator to set
additional mount options such as noexec/nosuid/nodev. These options limit an
attacker's ability to create exploits on the system. Other options allow for specific
behavior. See man mount for exact details regarding filesystem-independent and
filesystem-specific options.
As /var/log/audit contains audit logs, care should be taken to ensure the security
and integrity of the data and mount point.
Impact:
Resizing filesystems is a common activity in cloud-hosted servers. Separate filesystem
partitions may prevent successful resizing or may require the installation of additional
tools solely for the purpose of resizing operations. The use of these additional tools may
introduce their own security considerations.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output shows /var/log/audit is mounted:
# findmnt -kn /var/log/audit
Page 111
References:
Additional Information:
When modifying /var/log/audit it is advisable to bring the system to emergency
mode (so auditd is not running), rename the existing directory, mount the new file
system, and migrate the data over before returning to multi-user mode.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 112
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nodev mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain special devices.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log/audit filesystem is not intended to support devices, set this option
to ensure that users cannot create a block or character special devices in
/var/log/audit.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit, verify that the nodev option is set.
Run the following command to verify that the nodev mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log/audit | grep -v nodev
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nodev to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log/audit partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log/audit <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log/audit with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log/audit
References:
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Page 114
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nosuid mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain setuid files.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log/audit filesystem is only intended for variable files such as logs,
set this option to ensure that users cannot create setuid files in /var/log/audit.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit, verify that the nosuid option is
set.
Run the following command to verify that the nosuid mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log/audit | grep -v nosuid
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add nosuid to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log/audit partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log/audit <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log/audit with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log/audit
References:
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Page 116
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The noexec mount option specifies that the filesystem cannot contain executable
binaries.
Rationale:
Since the /var/log/audit filesystem is only intended for audit logs, set this option to
ensure that users cannot run executable binaries from /var/log/audit.
Audit:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit, verify that the noexec option is
set.
Run the following command to verify that the noexec mount option is set.
Example:
# findmnt -kn /var/log/audit | grep -v noexec
Remediation:
- IF - a separate partition exists for /var/log/audit.
Edit the /etc/fstab file and add noexec to the fourth field (mounting options) for the
/var/log/audit partition.
Example:
<device> /var/log/audit <fstype> defaults,rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime 0 0
Run the following command to remount /var/log/audit with the configured options:
# mount -o remount /var/log/audit
References:
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Page 118
Patch management procedures may vary widely between enterprises. Large enterprises
may choose to install a local updates server that can be used in place of their
distributions servers, whereas a single deployment of a system may prefer to get
updates directly. Updates can be performed automatically or manually, depending on
the site's policy for patch management. Organizations may prefer to test patches
against their environment on a non-production system before rolling out to production.
Outdated software is vulnerable to cyber criminals and hackers. Software updates help
reduce the risk to your organization. The release of software update notes often reveals
the patched exploitable entry points to the public. Public knowledge of these exploits
can make your organization more vulnerable to malicious actors attempting to gain
entry to your system's data.
Software updates often offer new and improved features and speed enhancements.
For the purpose of this benchmark, the requirement is to ensure that a patch
management process is defined and maintained, the specifics of which are left to the
organization.
Page 119
Patch management procedures may vary widely between enterprises. Large enterprises
may choose to install a local updates server that can be used in place of their
distributions servers, whereas a single deployment of a system may prefer to get
updates directly. Updates can be performed automatically or manually, depending on
the site's policy for patch management. Organizations may prefer to test patches
against their environment on a non-production system before rolling out to production.
Outdated software is vulnerable to cyber criminals and hackers. Software updates help
reduce the risk to your organization. The release of software update notes often reveals
the patched exploitable entry points to the public. Public knowledge of these exploits
can leave your organization more vulnerable to malicious actors attempting to gain
access to your system's data.
Note: Creation of an appropriate patch management policy is left to the organization.
Page 120
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Most package managers implement GPG key signing to verify package integrity during
installation.
Rationale:
It is important to ensure that updates are obtained from a valid source to protect against
spoofing that could lead to the inadvertent installation of malware on the system.
Audit:
Verify GPG keys are configured correctly for your package manager:
# apt-key list
Note:
• apt-key list is deprecated. Manage keyring files in trusted.gpg.d instead
(see apt-key(8)).
• With the deprecation of apt-key it is recommended to use the Signed-By option
in sources.list to require a repository to pass apt-secure(8) verification with a
certain set of keys rather than all trusted keys apt has configured.
- OR -
1. Run the following script and verify GPG keys are configured correctly for your
package manager:
#! /usr/bin/env bash
{
for file in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/*.{gpg,asc} /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.{gpg,asc} ; do
if [ -f "$file" ]; then
echo -e "File: $file"
gpg --list-packets "$file" 2>/dev/null | awk '/keyid/ && !seen[$NF]++ {print "keyid:", $NF}'
gpg --list-packets "$file" 2>/dev/null | awk '/Signed-By:/ {print "signed-by:", $NF}'
echo -e
fi
done
}
2. REVIEW and VERIFY to ensure that GPG keys are configured correctly for your
package manager IAW site policy.
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CIS Controls:
Controls
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techniques
T1195, T1195.001,
TA0001 M1051
T1195.002
Page 122
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Systems need to have package manager repositories configured to ensure they receive
the latest patches and updates.
Rationale:
If a system's package repositories are misconfigured important patches may not be
identified or a rogue repository could introduce compromised software.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify package repositories are configured correctly:
# apt-cache policy
Remediation:
Configure your package manager repositories according to site policy.
References:
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T1195, T1195.001,
TA0001 M1051
T1195.002
Page 124
Page 125
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Periodically patches are released for included software either due to security flaws or to
include additional functionality.
Rationale:
Newer patches may contain security enhancements that would not be available through
the latest full update. As a result, it is recommended that the latest software patches be
used to take advantage of the latest functionality. As with any software installation,
organizations need to determine if a given update meets their requirements and verify
the compatibility and supportability of any additional software against the update
revision that is selected.
Audit:
Verify there are no updates or patches to install:
# apt update
# apt -s upgrade
Remediation:
Run the following commands to update all packages following local site policy guidance
on applying updates and patches:
Run the following command to update the system with the available patches and
updates:
# apt update
Run one of the following commands to apply the updates and patches:
# apt upgrade
- OR -
# apt dist-upgrade
Note: When running the command apt dist-upgrade that apt has a "smart" conflict
resolution system, and it will attempt to upgrade the most important packages at the
expense of less important ones if necessary. So, dist-upgrade command may remove
some packages.
Page 126
Additional Information:
Site policy may mandate a testing period before installation onto production systems for
available updates.
• upgrade - is used to install the newest versions of all packages currently installed
on the system from the sources enumerated in /etc/apt/sources.list. Packages
currently installed with new versions available are retrieved and upgraded; under
no circumstances are currently installed packages removed, or packages not
already installed retrieved and installed. New versions of currently installed
packages that cannot be upgraded without changing the install status of another
package will be left at their current version. An update must be performed first so
that apt knows that new versions of packages are available.
• dist-upgrade - in addition to performing the function of upgrade, also intelligently
handles changing dependencies with new versions of packages; apt has a
"smart" conflict resolution system, and it will attempt to upgrade the most
important packages at the expense of less important ones if necessary. So, dist-
upgrade command may remove some packages. The /etc/apt/sources.list file
contains a list of locations from which to retrieve desired package files. See also
apt_preferences(5) for a mechanism for overriding the general settings for
individual packages.
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Page 128
Page 129
AppArmor provides a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) system that greatly augments
the default Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model. Under AppArmor MAC rules are
applied by file paths instead of by security contexts as in other MAC systems. As such it
does not require support in the filesystem and can be applied to network mounted
filesystems for example. AppArmor security policies define what system resources
applications can access and what privileges they can do so with. This automatically
limits the damage that the software can do to files accessible by the calling user. The
user does not need to take any action to gain this benefit. For an action to occur, both
the traditional DAC permissions must be satisfied as well as the AppArmor MAC rules.
The action will not be allowed if either one of these models does not permit the action.
In this way, AppArmor rules can only make a system's permissions more restrictive and
secure.
References:
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
AppArmor provides Mandatory Access Controls.
Rationale:
Without a Mandatory Access Control system installed only the default Discretionary
Access Control system will be available.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that apparmor is installed:
# dpkg-query -s apparmor &>/dev/null && echo "apparmor is installed"
apparmor is installed
apparmor-utils is installed
References:
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Page 132
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure AppArmor to be enabled at boot time and verify that it has not been
overwritten by the bootloader boot parameters.
Note: This recommendation is designed around the grub bootloader, if LILO or another
bootloader is in use in your environment enact equivalent settings.
Rationale:
AppArmor must be enabled at boot time in your bootloader configuration to ensure that
the controls it provides are not overridden.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that all linux lines have the apparmor=1
parameter set:
# grep "^\s*linux" /boot/grub/grub.cfg | grep -v "apparmor=1"
References:
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Page 134
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
AppArmor profiles define what resources applications are able to access.
Rationale:
Security configuration requirements vary from site to site. Some sites may mandate a
policy that is stricter than the default policy, which is perfectly acceptable. This item is
intended to ensure that any policies that exist on the system are activated.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that profiles are loaded, and are in either enforce
or complain mode:
# apparmor_status | grep profiles
Review output and ensure that profiles are loaded, and in either enforce or complain
mode:
37 profiles are loaded.
35 profiles are in enforce mode.
2 profiles are in complain mode.
4 processes have profiles defined.
Page 135
- OR -
Run the following command to set all profiles to complain mode:
# aa-complain /etc/apparmor.d/*
Note: Any unconfined processes may need to have a profile created or activated for
them and then be restarted
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1497 TA0005
Page 136
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
AppArmor profiles define what resources applications are able to access.
Rationale:
Security configuration requirements vary from site to site. Some sites may mandate a
policy that is stricter than the default policy, which is perfectly acceptable. This item is
intended to ensure that any policies that exist on the system are activated.
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify that profiles are loaded and are not in complain
mode:
# apparmor_status | grep profiles
Review output and ensure that profiles are loaded, and in enforce mode:
34 profiles are loaded.
34 profiles are in enforce mode.
0 profiles are in complain mode.
2 processes have profiles defined.
Run the following command and verify that no processes are unconfined:
apparmor_status | grep processes
Remediation:
Run the following command to set all profiles to enforce mode:
# aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/*
Note: Any unconfined processes may need to have a profile created or activated for
them and then be restarted
References:
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Page 138
The recommendations in this section focus on securing the bootloader and settings
involved in the boot process directly.
Page 139
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Setting the boot loader password will require that anyone rebooting the system must
enter a password before being able to set command line boot parameters
Rationale:
Requiring a boot password upon execution of the boot loader will prevent an
unauthorized user from entering boot parameters or changing the boot partition. This
prevents users from weakening security (e.g. turning off AppArmor at boot time).
Impact:
If password protection is enabled, only the designated superuser can edit a GRUB 2
menu item by pressing "e" or access the GRUB 2 command line by pressing "c"
If GRUB 2 is set up to boot automatically to a password-protected menu entry the user
has no option to back out of the password prompt to select another menu entry. Holding
the SHIFT key will not display the menu in this case. The user must enter the correct
username and password. If unable to do so, the configuration files will have to be edited
via a LiveCD or other means to fix the problem
You can add --unrestricted to the menu entries to allow the system to boot without
entering a password. A password will still be required to edit menu items.
More Information: https://help.ubuntu.com/community/Grub2/Passwords
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify output matches:
# grep "^set superusers" /boot/grub/grub.cfg
set superusers="<username>"
# awk -F. '/^\s*password/ {print $1"."$2"."$3}' /boot/grub/grub.cfg
Page 140
Default Value:
This recommendation is designed around the grub bootloader, if LILO or another
bootloader is in use in your environment enact equivalent settings.
Replace /boot/grub/grub.cfg with the appropriate grub configuration file for your
environment.
References:
Additional Information:
Changes to /etc/grub.d/10_linux may be overwritten during updates to the grub-
common package. You should review any changes to this file before rebooting otherwise
the system may unexpectedly prompt for a password on the next boot.
CIS Controls:
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Page 142
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The grub configuration file contains information on boot settings and passwords for
unlocking boot options.
Rationale:
Setting the permissions to read and write for root only prevents non-root users from
seeing the boot parameters or changing them. Non-root users who read the boot
parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to
exploit them.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access is
0600 or more restrictive.
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /boot/grub/grub.cfg
Remediation:
Run the following commands to set permissions on your grub configuration:
# chown root:root /boot/grub/grub.cfg
# chmod u-x,go-rwx /boot/grub/grub.cfg
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Additional Information:
This recommendation is designed around the grub bootloader, if LILO or another
bootloader is in use in your environment enact equivalent settings.
Replace /boot/grub/grub.cfg with the appropriate grub configuration file for your
environment
Page 143
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 144
Page 145
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is an exploit mitigation technique which
randomly arranges the address space of key data areas of a process.
Rationale:
Randomly placing virtual memory regions will make it difficult to write memory page
exploits as the memory placement will be consistently shifting.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameter is set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• kernel.randomize_va_space is set to 2
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 146
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); a_parlist=(kernel.randomize_va_space=2)
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-
sysctl)"
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check
running configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-
config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
f_kernel_parameter_chk
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:"
"${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 147
• kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
Example:
# printf "\n%s\n" "kernel.randomize_va_space = 2" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-kernel_sysctl.conf
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 148
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The ptrace() system call provides a means by which one process (the "tracer") may
observe and control the execution of another process (the "tracee"), and examine and
change the tracee's memory and registers.
The sysctl settings (writable only with CAP_SYS_PTRACE) are:
Rationale:
If one application is compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to attach to other
running processes (e.g. Bash, Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent, etc) to extract
additional credentials and continue to expand the scope of their attack.
Enabling restricted mode will limit the ability of a compromised process to
PTRACE_ATTACH on other processes running under the same user. With restricted
mode, ptrace will continue to work with root user.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameter is set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
Page 149
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); a_parlist=("kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=(1|2|3)")
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
f_kernel_parameter_chk
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 150
Example:
# printf "\n%s\n" "kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-kernel_sysctl.conf
Note:
Default Value:
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 0
References:
1. https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
2. https://github.com/raj3shp/termspy
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-6
Additional Information:
Ptrace is very rarely used by regular applications and is mostly used by debuggers such
as gdb and strace.
Page 151
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 152
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A core dump is the memory of an executable program. It is generally used to determine
why a program aborted. It can also be used to glean confidential information from a core
file. The system provides the ability to set a soft limit for core dumps, but this can be
overridden by the user.
Rationale:
Setting a hard limit on core dumps prevents users from overriding the soft variable. If
core dumps are required, consider setting limits for user groups (see limits.conf(5)
). In addition, setting the fs.suid_dumpable variable to 0 will prevent setuid programs
from dumping core.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output matches:
# grep -Ps -- '^\h*\*\h+hard\h+core\h+0\b' /etc/security/limits.conf /etc/security/limits.d/*
* hard core 0
• fs.suid_dumpable is set to 0
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 153
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); a_parlist=("fs.suid_dumpable=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
f_kernel_parameter_chk
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 154
Storage=none
# grep -Psi -- '^\s*ProcessSizeMax\s*=\s*0' /etc/systemd/coredump.conf
ProcessSizeMax=0
Remediation:
Add the following line to /etc/security/limits.conf or a
/etc/security/limits.d/* file:
* hard core 0
• fs.suid_dumpable = 0
Example:
# printf "\n%s" "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-fs_sysctl.conf
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
- IF - systemd-coredump is installed:
edit /etc/systemd/coredump.conf and add/modify the following lines:
Storage=none
ProcessSizeMax=0
References:
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 155
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
prelink is a program that modifies ELF shared libraries and ELF dynamically linked
binaries in such a way that the time needed for the dynamic linker to perform relocations
at startup significantly decreases.
Rationale:
The prelinking feature can interfere with the operation of AIDE, because it changes
binaries. Prelinking can also increase the vulnerability of the system if a malicious user
is able to compromise a common library such as libc.
Audit:
Verify prelink is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s prelink &>/dev/null && echo "prelink is installed"
References:
Page 156
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 157
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Apport Error Reporting Service automatically generates crash reports for
debugging
Rationale:
Apport collects potentially sensitive data, such as core dumps, stack traces, and log
files. They can contain passwords, credit card numbers, serial numbers, and other
private material.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the Apport Error Reporting Service is not
enabled:
# dpkg-query -s apport &> /dev/null && grep -Psi -- '^\h*enabled\h*=\h*[^0]\b' /etc/default/apport
Run the following commands to stop and mask the apport service
# systemctl stop apport.service
# systemctl mask apport.service
- OR -
Run the following command to remove the apport package:
# apt purge apport
Default Value:
enabled=1
Page 158
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 159
Presenting a warning message prior to the normal user login may assist in the
prosecution of trespassers on the computer system. Changing some of these login
banners also has the side effect of hiding OS version information and other detailed
system information from attackers attempting to target specific exploits at a system.
Guidelines published by the US Department of Defense require that warning messages
include at least the name of the organization that owns the system, the fact that the
system is subject to monitoring and that such monitoring is in compliance with local
statutes, and that use of the system implies consent to such monitoring. It is important
that the organization's legal counsel review the content of all messages before any
system modifications are made, as these warning messages are inherently site-specific.
More information (including citations of relevant case law) can be found at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
The /etc/motd, /etc/issue, and /etc/issue.net files govern warning banners for
standard command line logins for both local and remote users.
Note: The text provided in the remediation actions for these items is intended as an
example only. Please edit to include the specific text for your organization as approved
by your legal department.
Page 160
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/motd file are displayed to users after login and function as a
message of the day for authenticated users.
Unix-based systems have typically displayed information about the OS release and
patch level upon logging in to the system. This information can be useful to developers
who are developing software for a particular OS platform. If mingetty(8) supports the
following options, they display operating system information: \m - machine architecture
\r - operating system release \s - operating system name \v - operating system
version
Rationale:
Warning messages inform users who are attempting to login to the system of their legal
status regarding the system and must include the name of the organization that owns
the system and any monitoring policies that are in place. Displaying OS and patch level
information in login banners also has the side effect of providing detailed system
information to attackers attempting to target specific exploits of a system. Authorized
users can easily get this information by running the " uname -a " command once they
have logged in.
Page 161
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
a_files=()
for l_file in /etc/motd{,.d/*}; do
if grep -Psqi -- "(\\\v|\\\r|\\\m|\\\s|\b$(grep ^ID= /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | sed -e 's/"//g')\b)"
"$l_file"; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - File: \"$l_file\" includes system information"
else
a_files+=("$l_file")
fi
done
if [ "${#a_files[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
echo -e "\n- ** Please review the following files and verify their contents follow local site policy
**\n"
printf '%s\n' "${a_files[@]}"
elif [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "- ** No MOTD files with any size were found. Please verify this conforms to local site policy **
-"
fi
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
l_output=" - No MOTD files include system information"
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - Reason(s) for audit failure:\n$l_output2\n"
fi
}
Review any files returned and verify that they follow local site policy
Page 162
Run the following script and review and/or update all returned files' contents to:
{
a_files=()
for l_file in /etc/motd{,.d/*}; do
if grep -Psqi -- "(\\\v|\\\r|\\\m|\\\s|\b$(grep ^ID= /etc/os-release | cut -d= -f2 | sed -e 's/"//g')\b)"
"$l_file"; then
echo -e "\n - File: \"$l_file\" includes system information. Edit this file to remove these entries"
else
a_files+=("$l_file")
fi
done
if [ "${#a_files[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
echo -e "\n- ** Please review the following files and verify their contents follow local site policy
**\n"
printf '%s\n' "${a_files[@]}"
fi
}
References:
Page 163
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 164
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/issue file are displayed to users prior to login for local
terminals.
Unix-based systems have typically displayed information about the OS release and
patch level upon logging in to the system. This information can be useful to developers
who are developing software for a particular OS platform. If mingetty(8) supports the
following options, they display operating system information: \m - machine architecture
\r - operating system release \s - operating system name \v - operating system
version - or the operating system's name
Rationale:
Warning messages inform users who are attempting to login to the system of their legal
status regarding the system and must include the name of the organization that owns
the system and any monitoring policies that are in place. Displaying OS and patch level
information in login banners also has the side effect of providing detailed system
information to attackers attempting to target specific exploits of a system. Authorized
users can easily get this information by running the " uname -a " command once they
have logged in.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that the contents match site policy:
# cat /etc/issue
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/issue file with the appropriate contents according to your site policy,
remove any instances of \m , \r , \s , \v or references to the OS platform
Example:
# echo "Authorized users only. All activity may be monitored and reported." > /etc/issue
References:
Page 165
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 166
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/issue.net file are displayed to users prior to login for remote
connections from configured services.
Unix-based systems have typically displayed information about the OS release and
patch level upon logging in to the system. This information can be useful to developers
who are developing software for a particular OS platform. If mingetty(8) supports the
following options, they display operating system information: \m - machine architecture
\r - operating system release \s - operating system name \v - operating system
version
Rationale:
Warning messages inform users who are attempting to login to the system of their legal
status regarding the system and must include the name of the organization that owns
the system and any monitoring policies that are in place. Displaying OS and patch level
information in login banners also has the side effect of providing detailed system
information to attackers attempting to target specific exploits of a system. Authorized
users can easily get this information by running the " uname -a " command once they
have logged in.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that the contents match site policy:
# cat /etc/issue.net
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/issue.net file with the appropriate contents according to your site policy,
remove any instances of \m , \r , \s , \v or references to the OS platform
Example:
# echo "Authorized users only. All activity may be monitored and reported." > /etc/issue.net
References:
Page 167
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 168
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/motd file are displayed to users after login and function as a
message of the day for authenticated users.
Rationale:
- IF - the /etc/motd file does not have the correct access configured, it could be
modified by unauthorized users with incorrect or misleading information.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that if /etc/motd exists, Access is 644 or more
restrictive, Uid and Gid are both 0/root:
# [ -e /etc/motd ] && stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: { %g/ %G)' /etc/motd
Remediation:
Run the following commands to set mode, owner, and group on /etc/motd:
# chown root:root $(readlink -e /etc/motd)
# chmod u-x,go-wx $(readlink -e /etc/motd)
- OR -
Run the following command to remove the /etc/motd file:
# rm /etc/motd
References:
Page 169
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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Page 170
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/issue file are displayed to users prior to login for local
terminals.
Rationale:
- IF - the /etc/issue file does not have the correct access configured, it could be
modified by unauthorized users with incorrect or misleading information.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify Access is 644 or more restrictive and Uid and
Gid are both 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: { %g/ %G)' /etc/issue
Remediation:
Run the following commands to set mode, owner, and group on /etc/issue:
# chown root:root $(readlink -e /etc/issue)
# chmod u-x,go-wx $(readlink -e /etc/issue)
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 171
Controls
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Page 172
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The contents of the /etc/issue.net file are displayed to users prior to login for remote
connections from configured services.
Rationale:
- IF - the /etc/issue.net file does not have the correct access configured, it could be
modified by unauthorized users with incorrect or misleading information.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify Access is 644 or more restrictive and Uid and
Gid are both 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: { %g/ %G)' /etc/issue.net
Remediation:
Run the following commands to set mode, owner, and group on /etc/issue.net:
# chown root:root $(readlink -e /etc/issue.net)
# chmod u-x,go-wx $(readlink -e /etc/issue.net)
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 173
Controls
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Page 174
The GNOME Display Manager (GDM) is a program that manages graphical display
servers and handles graphical user logins.
This subsection requires user profiles to already exist on the system. A profile is a list of
configuration databases.
Sample profile:
user-db:user
system-db:local
system-db:site
Configuring a single user and multiple system databases allows for layering of
preferences. Settings from the user database file take precedence over the settings in
the local database file, and the local database file in turn takes precedence over the site
database file.
Note:
Page 175
• Level 2 - Server
Description:
The GNOME Display Manager (GDM) is a program that manages graphical display
servers and handles graphical user logins.
Rationale:
If a Graphical User Interface (GUI) is not required, it should be removed to reduce the
attack surface of the system.
Impact:
Removing the GNOME Display manager will remove the Graphical User Interface (GUI)
from the system.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify gdm3 is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s gdm3 &>/dev/null && echo "gdm3 is installed"
References:
Page 176
Controls
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Page 177
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
GDM is the GNOME Display Manager which handles graphical login for GNOME based
systems.
Rationale:
Warning messages inform users who are attempting to login to the system of their legal
status regarding the system and must include the name of the organization that owns
the system and any monitoring policies that are in place.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a user profile exists:
# grep -Psi "user-db|system-db" /etc/dconf/profile/*/*
/etc/dconf/profile/gdm:user-db:user
/etc/dconf/profile/gdm:system-db:local
Run the following commands to verify that the text banner on the login screen is
enabled and set:
# gsettings get org.gnome.login-screen banner-message-enable
true
# gsettings get org.gnome.login-screen banner-message-text
'Authorized uses only. All activity may be monitored and reported'
Page 178
Note:
1. Create or edit the gdm profile in the /etc/dconf/profile/gdm with the following
lines:
user-db:user
system-db:gdm
file-db:/usr/share/gdm/greeter-dconf-defaults
[org/gnome/login-screen]
banner-message-enable=true
banner-message-text='Type the banner message here.'
Note:
• Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
• There is no character limit for the banner message. gnome-shell autodetects
longer stretches of text and enters two column mode.
• The banner message cannot be read from an external file.
Default Value:
disabled
Page 179
1. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/login-banner.html.en
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Additional Information:
Additional options and sections may appear in the /etc/dconf/db/gdm.d/01-banner-
message file.
If a different GUI login service is in use, consult your documentation and apply an
equivalent banner.
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings:
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
TA0007 M1028
T1087, T1087.001,
T1087.002
Page 180
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
GDM is the GNOME Display Manager which handles graphical login for GNOME based
systems.
The disable-user-list option controls if a list of users is displayed on the login
screen
Rationale:
Displaying the user list eliminates half of the Userid/Password equation that an
unauthorized person would need to log on.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a user profile exists:
# grep -Psi "user-db|system-db" /etc/dconf/profile/*/*
/etc/dconf/profile/local:user-db:user
/etc/dconf/profile/local:system-db:local
Run the following command and to verify that the disable-user-list option is
enabled:
# gsettings get org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list
true
Page 181
Note:
[org/gnome/login-screen]
# Do not show the user list
disable-user-list=true
Note: When the user profile is created or changed, the user will need to log out and log
in again before the changes will be applied.
Default Value:
false
References:
1. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/login-userlist-
disable.html.en
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 182
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
TA0007 M1028
T1087, T1087.001,
T1087.002
Page 183
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
GNOME Desktop Manager can make the screen lock automatically whenever the user
is idle for some amount of time.
Rationale:
Setting a lock-out value reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized user access
to another user's session that has been left unattended.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a user profile exists:
# grep -Psi "user-db|system-db" /etc/dconf/profile/*/*
/etc/dconf/profile/local:user-db:user
/etc/dconf/profile/local:system-db:local
Run the following commands to verify that the screen locks when the user is idle:
# gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-delay
uint32 5
# gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.session idle-delay
uint32 900
# gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.screensaver lock-enabled
true
Notes:
Page 184
Note:
1. Create or edit the user profile in the /etc/dconf/profile/ and verify it includes
the following:
user-db:user
system-db:{NAME_OF_DCONF_DATABASE}
# Number of seconds after the screen is blank before locking the screen
lock-delay=uint32 0
Note: You must include the uint32 along with the integer key values as shown.
5. Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
Page 185
1. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/desktop-
lockscreen.html.en
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 186
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
GNOME Desktop Manager can lock down specific settings by using the lockdown mode
in dconf to prevent users from changing specific settings.
To lock down a dconf key or subpath, create a locks subdirectory in the keyfile directory.
The files inside this directory contain a list of keys or subpaths to lock. Just as with the
keyfiles, you may add any number of files to this directory.
Rationale:
Setting a lock-out value reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized user access
to another user's session that has been left unattended.
Without locking down the system settings, user settings take precedence over the
system settings.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify that the screen lock cannot be overridden:
# grep -Psi "idle-delay|lock-delay|lock-enabled" /etc/dconf/db/*/locks/*
/org/gnome/desktop/session/idle-delay
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-delay
/org/gnome/desktop/screensaver/lock-enabled
Page 187
1. To prevent the user from overriding these settings, create the file
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-screensaver with the following content:
Note:
• A user profile must exist in order to apply locks. If a user profile does not exist
review the remediation steps in the previous recommendation.
• Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
References:
1. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/desktop-
lockscreen.html.en
2. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/dconf-lockdown.html.en
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-11
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 188
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
By default GNOME automatically mounts removable media when inserted as a
convenience to the user.
Rationale:
With automounting enabled anyone with physical access could attach a USB drive or
disc and have its contents available in system even if they lacked permissions to mount
it themselves.
Impact:
The use of portable hard drives is very common for workstation users. If your
organization allows the use of portable storage or media on workstations and physical
access controls to workstations is considered adequate there is little value add in
turning off automounting.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a user profile exists:
# grep -Psi "user-db|system-db" /etc/dconf/profile/*/*
/etc/dconf/profile/local:user-db:user
/etc/dconf/profile/local:system-db:local
Page 189
Note:
2. After creating the file, apply the changes using below command :
# dconf update
Note: Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
References:
1. https://access.redhat.com/solutions/20107
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 190
Controls
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Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 191
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
By default GNOME automatically mounts removable media when inserted as a
convenience to the user.
By using the lockdown mode in dconf, you can prevent users from changing specific
settings. To lock down a dconf key or subpath, create a locks subdirectory in the keyfile
directory. The files inside this directory contain a list of keys or subpaths to lock. Just as
with the keyfiles, you may add any number of files to this directory.
Rationale:
With automounting enabled anyone with physical access could attach a USB drive or
disc and have its contents available in system even if they lacked permissions to mount
it themselves.
Impact:
The use of portable hard drives is very common for workstation users
Audit:
Run the following command to verify automount=false and automount-open=false is
correctly configured to ensure automatic mounting of removable media is not
overridden:
# grep -Psi "automount" /etc/dconf/db/*/locks/*
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-media-automount:automount=false
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-media-automount:automount-open=false
Page 192
1. To prevent the user from overriding these settings, create the file
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-media-automount with the following
content:
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount=false
automount-open=false
Note:
• A user profile must exist in order to apply locks. If a user profile does not exist
review the remediation steps in the previous recommendation.
• Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
References:
1. https://help.gnome.org/admin/system-admin-guide/stable/dconf-lockdown.html.en
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
3. https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/gsettings.1.html
4. https://access.redhat.com/solutions/20107
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 193
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The autorun-never setting allows the GNOME Desktop Display Manager to disable
autorun through GDM.
Rationale:
Malware on removable media may taking advantage of Autorun features when the
media is inserted into a system and execute.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a user profile exists:
# grep -Psi "user-db|system-db" /etc/dconf/profile/*/*
/etc/dconf/profile/local:user-db:user
/etc/dconf/profile/local:system-db:local
Run the following command to verify that autorun-never is set to true for GDM:
# gsettings get org.gnome.desktop.media-handling autorun-never
true
Page 194
Note:
Note: Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
Default Value:
false
References:
Page 195
Controls
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Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 196
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The autorun-never setting allows the GNOME Desktop Display Manager to disable
autorun through GDM.
By using the lockdown mode in dconf, you can prevent users from changing specific
settings.
To lock down a dconf key or subpath, create a locks subdirectory in the keyfile directory.
The files inside this directory contain a list of keys or subpaths to lock. Just as with the
keyfiles, you may add any number of files to this directory.
Rationale:
Malware on removable media may taking advantage of Autorun features when the
media is inserted into a system and execute.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that autorun-never=true cannot be overridden:
# grep -Psi "autorun-never" /etc/dconf/db/*/locks/*
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-media-autorun:autorun-never=true
Remediation:
1. To prevent the user from overriding these settings, create the file
/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-media-autorun with the following content:
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
autorun-never=true
Note:
• A user profile must exist in order to apply locks. If a user profile does not exist
review the remediation steps in the previous recommendation.
• Users must log out and back in again before the system-wide settings take effect.
Page 197
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 198
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
X Display Manager Control Protocol (XDMCP) is designed to provide authenticated
access to display management services for remote displays
Rationale:
XDMCP is inherently insecure.
Audit:
Run the following script and verify the output:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while IFS= read -r l_file; do
awk '/\[xdmcp\]/{ f = 1;next } /\[/{ f = 0 } f {if (/^\s*Enable\s*=\s*true/) print "The file:
\"'"$l_file"'\" includes: \"" $0 "\" in the \"[xdmcp]\" block"}' "$l_file"
done < <(grep -Psil -- '^\h*\[xdmcp\]' /etc/{gdm3,gdm}/{custom,daemon}.conf)
}
Page 199
[daemon]
# Uncomment the line below to force the login screen to use Xorg
#WaylandEnable=false
[security]
[xdmcp]
# Enable=true <- **This line should be removed or commented out**
[chooser]
[debug]
# Uncomment the line below to turn on debugging
# More verbose logs
# Additionally lets the X server dump core if it crashes
# Enable=true
Default Value:
false
References:
Page 200
Controls
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Page 201
Page 202
This section describes services that are installed on systems that specifically need to
run these services. If any of these services are not required, it is recommended that the
package be removed.
- IF - the package is required for a dependency:
The following commands can be used to stop and mask the service and socket:
# systemctl stop <service_name>.socket <service_name>.service
# systemctl mask <service_name>.socket <service_name>.service
Note: This should not be considered a comprehensive list of services not required for
normal system operation. You may wish to consider additions to those listed here for
your environment
Page 203
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
autofs allows automatic mounting of devices, typically including CD/DVDs and USB
drives.
Rationale:
With automounting enabled anyone with physical access could attach a USB drive or
disc and have its contents available in the filesystem even if they lacked permissions to
mount it themselves.
Impact:
The use of portable hard drives is very common for workstation users. If your
organization allows the use of portable storage or media on workstations and physical
access controls to workstations is considered adequate there is little value add in
turning off automounting.
There may be packages that are dependent on the autofs package. If the autofs
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the autofs package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the autofs.service leaving the
autofs package installed.
Page 204
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify autofs.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled autofs.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop autofs.service and remove the autofs
package:
# systemctl stop autofs.service
# apt purge autofs
- OR -
- IF - the autofs package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask autofs.service:
# systemctl stop autofs.service
# systemctl mask autofs.service
References:
Page 205
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 206
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Avahi is a free zeroconf implementation, including a system for multicast DNS/DNS-SD
service discovery. Avahi allows programs to publish and discover services and hosts
running on a local network with no specific configuration. For example, a user can plug
a computer into a network and Avahi automatically finds printers to print to, files to look
at and people to talk to, as well as network services running on the machine.
Rationale:
Automatic discovery of network services is not normally required for system
functionality. It is recommended to remove this package to reduce the potential attack
surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the avahi package. If the avahi
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the avahi package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the avahi-daemon.socket and
avahi-daemon.service leaving the avahi package installed.
Page 207
- OR -
- IF - the avahi package is required as a dependency:
Run the following command to verify avahi-daemon.socket and avahi-
daemon.service are not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled avahi-daemon.socket avahi-daemon.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop avahi-daemon.socket and avahi-
daemon.service, and remove the avahi-daemon package:
# systemctl stop avahi-daemon.socket avahi-daemon.service
# apt purge avahi-daemon
- OR -
- IF - the avahi-daemon package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the avahi-daemon.socket and avahi-
daemon.service:
# systemctl stop avahi-daemon.socket avahi-daemon.service
# systemctl mask avahi-daemon.socket avahi-daemon.service
References:
Page 208
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 209
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a service that allows machines to
be dynamically assigned IP addresses. There are two versions of the DHCP protocol
DHCPv4 and DHCPv6. At startup the server may be started for one or the other via the -4
or -6 arguments.
Rationale:
Unless a system is specifically set up to act as a DHCP server, it is recommended that
this package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the isc-dhcp-server package. If the
isc-dhcp-server package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as
well. Before removing the isc-dhcp-server package, review any dependent packages
to determine if they are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the isc-dhcp-server.service
and isc-dhcp-server6.service leaving the isc-dhcp-server package installed.
Page 210
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify isc-dhcp-server.service and isc-dhcp-
server6.service are not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled isc-dhcp-server.service isc-dhcp-server6.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop isc-dhcp-server.service and isc-dhcp-
server6.service and remove the isc-dhcp-server package:
# systemctl stop isc-dhcp-server.service isc-dhcp-server6.service
# apt purge isc-dhcp-server
- OR -
- IF - the isc-dhcp-server package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask isc-dhcp-server.service and isc-
dhcp-server6.service:
# systemctl stop isc-dhcp-server.service isc-dhcp-server6.service
# systemctl mask isc-dhcp-server isc-dhcp-server6.service
References:
Page 211
Controls
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Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 212
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical naming system that maps names to
IP addresses for computers, services and other resources connected to a network.
Note: bind9 is the package and bind.service is the alias for named.service.
Rationale:
Unless a system is specifically designated to act as a DNS server, it is recommended
that the package be deleted to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the bind9 package. If the bind9
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the bind9 package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask named.service leaving the
bind9 package installed.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify bind9 is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s bind9 &>/dev/null && echo "bind9 is installed"
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify named.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled named.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Page 213
- OR -
- IF - the bind9 package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask bind9.service:
# systemctl stop named.service
# systemctl mask named.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 214
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
dnsmasq is a lightweight tool that provides DNS caching, DNS forwarding and DHCP
(Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) services.
Rationale:
Unless a system is specifically designated to act as a DNS caching, DNS forwarding
and/or DHCP server, it is recommended that the package be removed to reduce the
potential attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the dnsmasq package. If the dnsmasq
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the dnsmasq package, review any dependent packages to determine if they
are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the dnsmasq.service leaving
the dnsmasq package installed.
Audit:
Run one of the following commands to verify dnsmasq is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s dnsmasq &>/dev/null && echo "dnsmasq is installed"
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify dnsmasq.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled dnsmasq.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Page 215
- OR -
- IF - the dnsmasq package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the dnsmasq.service:
# systemctl stop dnsmasq.service
# systemctl mask dnsmasq.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 216
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) provides networked computers with the ability to
transfer files.
Rationale:
FTP does not protect the confidentiality of data or authentication credentials. It is
recommended SFTP be used if file transfer is required. Unless there is a need to run
the system as a FTP server (for example, to allow anonymous downloads), it is
recommended that the package be deleted to reduce the potential attack surface.
Note: Other ftp server packages may exist. They should also be audited, if not required
and authorized by local site policy
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the vsftpd package. If the vsftpd
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the vsftpd package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the vsftpd.service leaving the
vsftpd package installed.
Page 217
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify vsftpd service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled vsftpd.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Run the following command to verify the vsftpd service is not active:
# systemctl is-active vsftpd.service 2>/dev/null | grep '^active'
Note:
• Other ftp server packages may exist. They should also be audited, if not required
and authorized by local site policy
• If the package is required for a dependency:
o Ensure the dependent package is approved by local site policy
o Ensure stopping and masking the service and/or socket meets local site
policy
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop vsftpd.service and remove the vsftpd
package:
# systemctl stop vsftpd.service
# apt purge vsftpd
- OR -
- IF - the vsftpd package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the vsftpd.service:
# systemctl stop vsftpd.service
# systemctl mask vsftpd.service
Note: Other ftp server packages may exist. If not required and authorized by local site
policy, they should also be removed. If the package is required for a dependency, the
service should be stopped and masked.
References:
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Page 219
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) was introduced as a replacement for
NIS/YP. It is a service that provides a method for looking up information from a central
database.
Rationale:
If the system will not need to act as an LDAP server, it is recommended that the
software be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the slapd package. If the slapd
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the slapd package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the slapd.service leaving the
slapd package installed.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify slapd is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s slapd &>/dev/null && echo "slapd is installed"
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify slapd.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled slapd.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Page 220
- OR -
- IF - the slapd package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask slapd.service:
# systemctl stop slapd.service
# systemctl mask slapd.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
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techniques
Page 221
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
dovecot-imapd and dovecot-pop3d are an open source IMAP and POP3 server for
Linux based systems.
Rationale:
Unless POP3 and/or IMAP servers are to be provided by this system, it is
recommended that the package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Note: Several IMAP/POP3 servers exist and can use other service names. These
should also be audited and the packages removed if not required.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on dovecot-imapd and/or dovecot-pop3d
packages. If dovecot-imapd and dovecot-pop3d packages are removed, these
dependent packages will be removed as well. Before removing dovecot-imapd and/or
dovecot-pop3d packages, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask dovecot.socket and
dovecot.service leaving dovecot-imapd and/or dovecot-pop3d packages installed.
Page 222
- OR -
- IF - a package is installed and is required for dependencies:
Run the following commands to verify dovecot.socket and dovecot.service are not
enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled dovecot.socket dovecot.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Run the following command to verify dovecot.socket and dovecot.service are not
active:
# systemctl is-active dovecot.socket dovecot.service 2>/dev/null | grep '^active'
Remediation:
Run one of the following commands to remove dovecot-imapd and dovecot-pop3d:
Run the following commands to stop dovecot.socket and dovecot.service, and
remove the dovecot-imapd and dovecot-pop3d packages:
# systemctl stop dovecot.socket dovecot.service
# apt purge dovecot-imapd dovecot-pop3d
- OR -
- IF - a package is installed and is required for dependencies:
Run the following commands to stop and mask dovecot.socket and
dovecot.service:
# systemctl stop dovecot.socket dovecot.service
# systemctl mask dovecot.socket dovecot.service
References:
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Page 224
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Network File System (NFS) is one of the first and most widely distributed file
systems in the UNIX environment. It provides the ability for systems to mount file
systems of other servers through the network.
Rationale:
If the system does not export NFS shares, it is recommended that the nfs-kernel-
server package be removed to reduce the remote attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the nfs-kernel-server package. If the
nfs-kernel-server package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed
as well. Before removing the nfs-kernel-server package, review any dependent
packages to determine if they are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the nfs-server.service
leaving the nfs-kernel-server package installed.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify nfs-kernel-server is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s nfs-kernel-server &>/dev/null && echo "nfs-kernel-server is installed"
Page 225
- OR -
- IF - the nfs-kernel-server package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the nfs-server.service:
# systemctl stop nfs-server.service
# systemctl mask nfs-server.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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Page 226
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Network Information Service (NIS) (formally known as Yellow Pages) is a client-
server directory service protocol for distributing system configuration files. The NIS
server is a collection of programs that allow for the distribution of configuration files. The
NIS client (ypbind) was used to bind a machine to an NIS server and receive the
distributed configuration files.
Rationale:
ypserv.service is inherently an insecure system that has been vulnerable to DOS
attacks, buffer overflows and has poor authentication for querying NIS maps. NIS
generally has been replaced by such protocols as Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP). It is recommended that ypserv.service be removed and other, more
secure services be used
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the ypserv package. If the ypserv
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the ypserv package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the ypserv.service leaving the
ypserv package installed.
Page 227
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify ypserv.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled ypserv.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop ypserv.service and remove ypserv package:
# systemctl stop ypserv.service
# apt purge ypserv
- OR -
- IF - the ypserv package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask ypserv.service:
# systemctl stop ypserv.service
# systemctl mask ypserv.service
References:
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Page 229
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Common Unix Print System (CUPS) provides the ability to print to both local and
network printers. A system running CUPS can also accept print jobs from remote
systems and print them to local printers. It also provides a web based remote
administration capability.
Rationale:
If the system does not need to print jobs or accept print jobs from other systems, it is
recommended that CUPS be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
Removing the cups package, or disabling cups.socket and/or cups.service will
prevent printing from the system, a common task for workstation systems.
There may be packages that are dependent on the cups package. If the cups package
is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before removing the
cups package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are required on the
system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask cups.socket and
cups.service leaving the cups package installed.
Page 230
- OR -
- IF - the cups package is required as a dependency:
Run the following command to verify the cups.socket and cups.service are not
enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled cups.socket cups.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Run the following command to verify the cups.socket and cups.service are not
active:
# systemctl is-active cups.socket cups.service 2>/dev/null | grep '^active'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop cups.socket and cups.service, and remove the
cups package:
# systemctl stop cups.socket cups.service
# apt purge cups
- OR -
- IF - the cups package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the cups.socket and cups.service:
# systemctl stop cups.socket cups.service
# systemctl mask cups.socket cups.service
References:
1. http://www.cups.org
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-7
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Page 232
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The rpcbind utility maps RPC services to the ports on which they listen. RPC
processes notify rpcbind when they start, registering the ports they are listening on and
the RPC program numbers they expect to serve. The client system then contacts
rpcbind on the server with a particular RPC program number. The rpcbind.service
redirects the client to the proper port number so it can communicate with the requested
service.
Portmapper is an RPC service, which always listens on tcp and udp 111, and is used to
map other RPC services (such as nfs, nlockmgr, quotad, mountd, etc.) to their
corresponding port number on the server. When a remote host makes an RPC call to
that server, it first consults with portmap to determine where the RPC server is listening.
Rationale:
A small request (~82 bytes via UDP) sent to the Portmapper generates a large
response (7x to 28x amplification), which makes it a suitable tool for DDoS attacks. If
rpcbind is not required, it is recommended to remove rpcbind package to reduce the
potential attack surface.
Impact:
Many of the libvirt packages used by Enterprise Linux virtualization, and the nfs-utils
package used for The Network File System (NFS), are dependent on the rpcbind
package. If the rpcbind package is removed, these dependent packages will be
removed as well. Before removing the rpcbind package, review any dependent
packages to determine if they are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the rpcbind.socket and
rpcbind.service leaving the rpcbind package installed.
Page 233
- OR -
- IF - the rpcbind package is required as a dependency:
Run the following command to verify rpcbind.socket and rpcbind.service are not
enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled rpcbind.socket rpcbind.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Run the following command to verify rpcbind.socket and rpcbind.service are not
active:
# systemctl is-active rpcbind.socket rpcbind.service 2>/dev/null | grep '^active'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop rpcbind.socket and rpcbind.service, and
remove the rpcbind package:
# systemctl stop rpcbind.socket rpcbind.service
# apt purge rpcbind
- OR -
- IF - the rpcbind package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the rpcbind.socket and
rpcbind.service:
# systemctl stop rpcbind.socket rpcbind.service
# systemctl mask rpcbind.socket rpcbind.service
References:
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Page 235
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The rsync service can be used to synchronize files between systems over network
links.
Rationale:
rsync.service presents a security risk as the rsync protocol is unencrypted.
The rsync package should be removed to reduce the attack area of the system.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the rsync package. If the rsync
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the rsync package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask rsync.service leaving the
rsync package installed.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify rsync is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s rsync &>/dev/null && echo "rsync is installed"
- OR -
- IF - the rsync package is required as a dependency:
Run the following command to verify rsync.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled rsync.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Page 236
- OR -
- IF - the rsync package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask rsync.service:
# systemctl stop rsync.service
# systemctl mask rsync.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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Page 237
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Samba daemon allows system administrators to configure their Linux systems to
share file systems and directories with Windows desktops. Samba will advertise the file
systems and directories via the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. Windows
desktop users will be able to mount these directories and file systems as letter drives on
their systems.
Rationale:
If there is no need to mount directories and file systems to Windows systems, then this
service should be deleted to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the samba package. If the samba
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the samba package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the smbd.service leaving the
samba package installed.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify samba is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s samba &>/dev/null && echo "samba is installed"
Page 238
- OR -
- IF - the samba package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the smbd.service:
# systemctl stop smbd.service
# systemctl mask smbd.service
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 239
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a widely used protocol for monitoring
the health and welfare of network equipment, computer equipment and devices like
UPSs.
Net-SNMP is a suite of applications used to implement SNMPv1 (RFC 1157), SNMPv2
(RFCs 1901-1908), and SNMPv3 (RFCs 3411-3418) using both IPv4 and IPv6.
Support for SNMPv2 classic (a.k.a. "SNMPv2 historic" - RFCs 1441-1452) was dropped
with the 4.0 release of the UCD-snmp package.
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) server is used to listen for SNMP
commands from an SNMP management system, execute the commands or collect the
information and then send results back to the requesting system.
Rationale:
The SNMP server can communicate using SNMPv1, which transmits data in the clear
and does not require authentication to execute commands. SNMPv3 replaces the
simple/clear text password sharing used in SNMPv2 with more securely encoded
parameters. If the the SNMP service is not required, the snmpd package should be
removed to reduce the attack surface of the system.
Note: If SNMP is required:
• The server should be configured for SNMP v3 only. User Authentication and
Message Encryption should be configured.
• If SNMP v2 is absolutely necessary, modify the community strings' values.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the snmpd package. If the snmpd
package is removed, these packages will be removed as well.
Before removing the snmpd package, review any dependent packages to determine if
they are required on the system. If a dependent package is required, stop and mask the
snmpd.service leaving the snmpd package installed.
Page 240
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify the snmpd.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled snmpd.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop snmpd.service and remove the snmpd package:
# systemctl stop snmpd.service
# apt purge snmpd
References:
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Page 242
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) is a simple protocol for exchanging files between
two TCP/IP machines. TFTP servers allow connections from a TFTP Client for sending
and receiving files.
Rationale:
Unless there is a need to run the system as a TFTP server, it is recommended that the
package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
TFTP does not have built-in encryption, access control or authentication. This makes it
very easy for an attacker to exploit TFTP to gain access to files
Impact:
TFTP is often used to provide files for network booting such as for PXE based
installation of servers.
There may be packages that are dependent on the tftpd-hpa package. If the tftpd-
hpa package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the tftpd-hpa package, review any dependent packages to determine if they
are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask tftpd-hpa.service leaving the
tftpd-hpa package installed.
Page 243
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify tftpd-hpa.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled tftpd-hpa.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop tftpd-hpa.service, and remove the tftpd-hpa
package:
# systemctl stop tftpd-hpa.service
# apt purge tftpd-hpa
- OR -
- IF - the tftpd-hpa package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask tftpd-hpa.service:
# systemctl stop tftpd-hpa.service
# systemctl mask tftpd-hpa.service
References:
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Page 245
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
squid - OR - squid-openssl is a standard proxy server used in many distributions and
environments.
Rationale:
Unless a system is specifically set up to act as a proxy server, it is recommended that
the squid package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Note: Several HTTP proxy servers exist. These should be checked and removed unless
required.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the squid - OR - squid-openssl
package. If the squid - OR - squid-openssl package is removed, these dependent
packages will be removed as well. Before removing the squid package, review any
dependent packages to determine if they are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the squid.service leaving the
squid - OR - squid-openssl package installed.
Page 246
- OR -
- IF - the package is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify squid.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled squid.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop squid.service and remove the squid and
squid-openssl packages:
# systemctl stop squid.service
# apt purge squid squid-openssl
References:
Additional Information:
Several HTTP proxy servers exist. These and other services should be checked
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Page 248
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Web servers provide the ability to host web site content.
Rationale:
Unless there is a local site approved requirement to run a web server service on the
system, web server packages should be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
Removal of web server packages will remove that ability for the server to host web
services.
- IF - the web server package is required for a dependency, any related service or
socket should be stopped and masked.
Note: If the remediation steps to mask a service are followed and that package is not
installed on the system, the service and/or socket will still be masked. If the package is
installed due to an approved requirement to host a web server, the associated service
and/or socket would need to be unmasked before it could be enabled and/or started.
Page 249
- OR -
- IF - a package is installed and is required for dependencies:
Run the following command to verify apache2.socket, apache2.service, and
nginx.service are not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled apache2.socket apache2.service nginx.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Note:
• Other web server packages may exist. They should also be audited, if not
required and authorized by local site policy
• If the package is required for a dependency:
o Ensure the dependent package is approved by local site policy
o Ensure stopping and masking the service and/or socket meets local site
policy
Page 250
- OR -
- IF - a package is installed and is required for dependencies:
Run the following commands to stop and mask apache2.socket, apache2.service,
and nginx.service:
# systemctl stop apache2.socket apache2.service nginx.service
# systemctl mask apache2.socket apache2.service nginx.service
Note: Other web server packages may exist. If not required and authorized by local site
policy, they should also be removed. If the package is required for a dependency, the
service and socket should be stopped and masked.
References:
Additional Information:
Several httpd servers exist and can use other service names. apache2 and nginx are
example services that provide an HTTP server. These and other services should also
be audited
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
9.2 Ensure Only Approved Ports, Protocols and Services Are Running
v7 Ensure that only network ports, protocols, and services listening on a system with validated ● ●
business needs, are running on each system.
Page 251
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The eXtended InterNET Daemon (xinetd) is an open source super daemon that
replaced the original inetd daemon. The xinetd daemon listens for well known
services and dispatches the appropriate daemon to properly respond to service
requests.
Rationale:
If there are no xinetd services required, it is recommended that the package be
removed to reduce the attack surface are of the system.
Note: If an xinetd service or services are required, ensure that any xinetd service not
required is stopped and masked
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the xinetd package. If the xinetd
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the xinetd package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
-IF- a dependent package is required: stop and mask xinetd.service leaving the xinetd
package installed.
Page 252
-OR-
-IF- the xinetd package is required as a dependency:
Run the following command to verify xinetd.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled xinetd.service 2>/dev/null | grep 'enabled'
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop xinetd.service, and remove the xinetd
package:
# systemctl stop xinetd.service
# apt purge xinetd
-OR-
-IF- the xinetd package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask the xinetd.service:
# systemctl stop xinetd.service
# systemctl mask xinetd.service
References:
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Page 254
• Level 2 - Server
Description:
The X Window System provides a Graphical User Interface (GUI) where users can have
multiple windows in which to run programs and various add on. The X Windows system
is typically used on workstations where users login, but not on servers where users
typically do not login.
Rationale:
Unless your organization specifically requires graphical login access via X Windows,
remove it to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
If a Graphical Desktop Manager (GDM) is in use on the system, there may be a
dependency on the xorg-x11-server-common package. If the GDM is required and
approved by local site policy, the package should not be removed.
Many Linux systems run applications which require a Java runtime. Some Linux Java
packages have a dependency on specific X Windows xorg-x11-fonts. One workaround
to avoid this dependency is to use the "headless" Java packages for your specific Java
runtime.
Audit:
- IF - a Graphical Desktop Manager or X-Windows server is not required and approved
by local site policy:
Run the following command to Verify X Windows Server is not installed.
# dpkg-query -s xserver-common &>/dev/null && echo "xserver-common is installed"
References:
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Page 256
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Mail Transfer Agents (MTA), such as sendmail and Postfix, are used to listen for
incoming mail and transfer the messages to the appropriate user or mail server. If the
system is not intended to be a mail server, it is recommended that the MTA be
configured to only process local mail.
Rationale:
The software for all Mail Transfer Agents is complex and most have a long history of
security issues. While it is important to ensure that the system can process local mail
messages, it is not necessary to have the MTA's daemon listening on a port unless the
server is intended to be a mail server that receives and processes mail from other
systems.
Page 257
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); a_port_list=("25" "465" "587")
for l_port_number in "${a_port_list[@]}"; do
if ss -plntu | grep -P -- ':'"$l_port_number"'\b' | grep -Pvq --
'\h+(127\.0\.0\.1|\[?::1\]?):'"$l_port_number"'\b'; then
a_output2+=(" - Port \"$l_port_number\" is listening on a non-loopback network interface")
else
a_output+=(" - Port \"$l_port_number\" is not listening on a non-loopback network interface")
fi
done
if command -v postconf &> /dev/null; then
l_interfaces="$(postconf -n inet_interfaces)"
elif command -v exim &> /dev/null; then
l_interfaces="$(exim -bP local_interfaces)"
elif command -v sendmail &> /dev/null; then
l_interfaces="$(grep -i "O DaemonPortOptions=" /etc/mail/sendmail.cf | grep -oP '(?<=Addr=)[^,+]+' | grep
-v '^127\.0\.0\.1$')"
fi
if [ -n "$l_interfaces" ]; then
if grep -Pqi '\ball\b' <<< "$l_interfaces"; then
a_output2+=(" - MTA is bound to all network interfaces")
elif ! grep -Pqi '(inet_interfaces\h*=\h*)?(0\.0\.0\.0|::1|loopback-only)' <<< "$l_interfaces"; then
a_output2+=(" - MTA is bound to a network interface" " \"$l_interfaces\"")
else
a_output+=(" - MTA is not bound to a non loopback network interface" " \"$l_interfaces\"")
fi
else
a_output+=(" - MTA not detected or in use")
fi
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " * Reasons for audit failure *" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Remediation:
Edit /etc/postfix/main.cf and add the following line to the RECEIVING MAIL
section. If the line already exists, change it to look like the line below:
inet_interfaces = loopback-only
Note:
References:
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A network port is identified by its number, the associated IP address, and the type of the
communication protocol such as TCP or UDP.
A listening port is a network port on which an application or process listens on, acting as
a communication endpoint.
Each listening port can be open or closed (filtered) using a firewall. In general terms, an
open port is a network port that accepts incoming packets from remote locations.
Rationale:
Services listening on the system pose a potential risk as an attack vector. These
services should be reviewed, and if not required, the service should be stopped, and the
package containing the service should be removed. If required packages have a
dependency, the service should be stopped and masked to reduce the attack surface of
the system.
Impact:
There may be packages that are dependent on the service's package. If the service's
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the service's package, review any dependent packages to determine if they
are required on the system.
- IF - a dependent package is required: stop and mask the <service_name>.socket
and <service_name>.service leaving the service's package installed.
Page 260
• All services listed are required on the system and approved by local site policy.
• Both the port and interface the service is listening on are approved by local site
policy.
• If a listed service is not required:
o Remove the package containing the service
o - IF - the service's package is required for a dependency, stop and mask
the service and/or socket
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop the service and remove the package containing
the service:
# systemctl stop <service_name>.socket <service_name>.service
# apt purge <package_name>
References:
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A number of insecure services exist. While disabling the servers prevents a local attack
against these services, it is advised to remove their clients unless they are required.
Note: This should not be considered a comprehensive list of insecure service clients.
You may wish to consider additions to those listed here for your environment.
Page 263
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Network Information Service (NIS), formerly known as Yellow Pages, is a client-
server directory service protocol used to distribute system configuration files. The NIS
client was used to bind a machine to an NIS server and receive the distributed
configuration files.
Rationale:
The NIS service is inherently an insecure system that has been vulnerable to DOS
attacks, buffer overflows and has poor authentication for querying NIS maps. NIS
generally has been replaced by such protocols as Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP). It is recommended that the service be removed.
Impact:
Many insecure service clients are used as troubleshooting tools and in testing
environments. Uninstalling them can inhibit capability to test and troubleshoot. If they
are required it is advisable to remove the clients after use to prevent accidental or
intentional misuse.
Audit:
Verify nis is not installed. Use the following command to provide the needed
information:
# dpkg-query -s nis &>/dev/null && echo "nis is installed"
References:
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Page 265
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The rsh-client package contains the client commands for the rsh services.
Rationale:
These legacy clients contain numerous security exposures and have been replaced with
the more secure SSH package. Even if the server is removed, it is best to ensure the
clients are also removed to prevent users from inadvertently attempting to use these
commands and therefore exposing their credentials. Note that removing the rsh-
client package removes the clients for rsh , rcp and rlogin .
Impact:
Many insecure service clients are used as troubleshooting tools and in testing
environments. Uninstalling them can inhibit capability to test and troubleshoot. If they
are required it is advisable to remove the clients after use to prevent accidental or
intentional misuse.
Audit:
Verify rsh-client is not installed. Use the following command to provide the needed
information:
# dpkg-query -s rsh-client &>/dev/null && echo "rsh-client is installed"
References:
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Page 267
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The talk software makes it possible for users to send and receive messages across
systems through a terminal session. The talk client, which allows initialization of talk
sessions, is installed by default.
Rationale:
The software presents a security risk as it uses unencrypted protocols for
communication.
Impact:
Many insecure service clients are used as troubleshooting tools and in testing
environments. Uninstalling them can inhibit capability to test and troubleshoot. If they
are required it is advisable to remove the clients after use to prevent accidental or
intentional misuse.
Audit:
Verify talk is not installed. The following command may provide the needed
information:
# dpkg-query -s talk &>/dev/null && echo "talk is installed"
References:
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Page 269
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The telnet package contains the telnet client, which allows users to start
connections to other systems via the telnet protocol.
Rationale:
The telnet protocol is insecure and unencrypted. The use of an unencrypted
transmission medium could allow an unauthorized user to steal credentials. The ssh
package provides an encrypted session and stronger security and is included in most
Linux distributions.
Impact:
Many insecure service clients are used as troubleshooting tools and in testing
environments. Uninstalling them can inhibit capability to test and troubleshoot. If they
are required it is advisable to remove the clients after use to prevent accidental or
intentional misuse.
Audit:
Verify telnet is not installed. Use the following command to provide the needed
information:
# dpkg-query -s telnet &>/dev/null && echo "telnet is installed"
References:
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Page 271
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) was introduced as a replacement for
NIS/YP. It is a service that provides a method for looking up information from a central
database.
Rationale:
If the system will not need to act as an LDAP client, it is recommended that the software
be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Impact:
Removing the LDAP client will prevent or inhibit using LDAP for authentication in your
environment.
Audit:
Verify that ldap-utils is not installed. Use the following command to provide the
needed information:
# dpkg-query -s ldap-utils &>/dev/null && echo "ldap-utils is installed"
References:
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Page 273
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is a traditional and widely used standard tool for
transferring files between a server and clients over a network, especially where no
authentication is necessary (permits anonymous users to connect to a server).
Rationale:
FTP does not protect the confidentiality of data or authentication credentials. It is
recommended SFTP be used if file transfer is required. Unless there is a need to run
the system as a FTP server (for example, to allow anonymous downloads), it is
recommended that the package be removed to reduce the potential attack surface.
Audit:
Verify ftp is not installed. Use the following command to provide the needed
information:
# dpkg-query -s ftp &>/dev/null && echo "ftp is installed"
References:
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Page 276
It is recommended that physical systems and virtual guests lacking direct access to the
physical host's clock be configured to synchronize their time using a service such as
systemd-timesyncd, or chrony.
Page 277
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
System time should be synchronized between all systems in an environment. This is
typically done by establishing an authoritative time server or set of servers and having
all systems synchronize their clocks to them.
Note:
Rationale:
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms and
ensures log files have consistent time records across the enterprise, which aids in
forensic investigations.
Page 278
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
service_not_enabled_chk()
{
l_out2=""
if systemctl is-enabled "$l_service_name" 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'enabled'; then
l_out2="$l_out2\n - Daemon: \"$l_service_name\" is enabled on the system"
fi
if systemctl is-active "$l_service_name" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^active'; then
l_out2="$l_out2\n - Daemon: \"$l_service_name\" is active on the system"
fi
}
l_service_name="systemd-timesyncd.service" # Check systemd-timesyncd daemon
service_not_enabled_chk
if [ -n "$l_out2" ]; then
l_timesyncd="y"
l_out_tsd="$l_out2"
else
l_timesyncd="n"
l_out_tsd="\n - Daemon: \"$l_service_name\" is not enabled and not active on the system"
fi
l_service_name="chrony.service" # Check chrony
service_not_enabled_chk
if [ -n "$l_out2" ]; then
l_chrony="y"
l_out_chrony="$l_out2"
else
l_chrony="n"
l_out_chrony="\n - Daemon: \"$l_service_name\" is not enabled and not active on the system"
fi
l_status="$l_timesyncd$l_chrony"
case "$l_status" in
yy)
l_output2=" - More than one time sync daemon is in use on the system$l_out_tsd$l_out_chrony"
;;
nn)
l_output2=" - No time sync daemon is in use on the system$l_out_tsd$l_out_chrony"
;;
yn|ny)
l_output=" - Only one time sync daemon is in use on the system$l_out_tsd$l_out_chrony"
;;
*)
l_output2=" - Unable to determine time sync daemon(s) status"
;;
esac
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :\n$l_output2\n"
fi
}
Note: Follow the guidance in the subsection for the time synchronization daemon
available on the system and skip the other time synchronization daemon subsection.
Page 279
1. chrony
Run the following commands to stop and mask the systemd-timesyncd daemon:
# systemctl stop systemd-timesyncd.service
Note:
2. systemd-timesyncd
Note:
References:
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systemd-timesyncd is a daemon that has been added for synchronizing the system
clock across the network. It implements an SNTP client. In contrast to NTP
implementations such as chrony or the NTP reference server this only implements a
client side, and does not bother with the full NTP complexity, focusing only on querying
time from one remote server and synchronizing the local clock to it. The daemon runs
with minimal privileges, and has been hooked up with networkd to only operate when
network connectivity is available. The daemon saves the current clock to disk every time
a new NTP sync has been acquired, and uses this to possibly correct the system clock
early at bootup, in order to accommodate for systems that lack an RTC such as the
Raspberry Pi and embedded devices, and make sure that time monotonically
progresses on these systems, even if it is not always correct. To make use of this
daemon a new system user and group "systemd-timesync" needs to be created on
installation of systemd.
The default configuration is set during compilation, so configuration is only needed
when it is necessary to deviate from those defaults. Initially, the main configuration file
in /etc/systemd/ contains commented out entries showing the defaults as a guide to the
administrator. Local overrides can be created by editing this file or by creating drop-ins,
as described below. Using drop-ins for local configuration is recommended over
modifications to the main configuration file.
In addition to the "main" configuration file, drop-in configuration snippets are read from
/usr/lib/systemd/*.conf.d/, /usr/local/lib/systemd/*.conf.d/, and
/etc/systemd/*.conf.d/. Those drop-ins have higher precedence and override the
main configuration file. Files in the *.conf.d/ configuration subdirectories are sorted by
their filename in lexicographic order, regardless of in which of the subdirectories they
reside. When multiple files specify the same option, for options which accept just a
single value, the entry in the file sorted last takes precedence, and for options which
accept a list of values, entries are collected as they occur in the sorted files.
When packages need to customize the configuration, they can install drop-ins under
/usr/. Files in /etc/ are reserved for the local administrator, who may use this logic to
override the configuration files installed by vendor packages. Drop-ins have to be used
to override package drop-ins, since the main configuration file has lower precedence. It
is recommended to prefix all filenames in those subdirectories with a two-digit number
and a dash, to simplify the ordering of the files.
To disable a configuration file supplied by the vendor, the recommended way is to place
a symlink to /dev/null in the configuration directory in /etc/, with the same filename as
the vendor configuration file.
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• Level 1 - Server
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Description:
NTP=
FallbackNTP=
Rationale:
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms and to
ensure log files have consistent time records across the enterprise to aid in forensic
investigations
Page 284
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_output3=() a_out=() a_out2=() a_parlist=("NTP=[^#\n\r]+" "FallbackNTP=[^#\n\r]+")
l_analyze_cmd="$(readlink -f /bin/systemd-analyze)" l_systemd_config_file="/etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf"
f_config_file_parameter_chk()
{
l_used_parameter_setting=""
while IFS= read -r l_file; do
l_file="$(tr -d '# ' <<< "$l_file")"
l_used_parameter_setting="$(grep -PHs -- '^\h*'"$l_parameter_name"'\b' "$l_file" | tail -n 1)"
[ -n "$l_used_parameter_setting" ] && break
done < <($l_analyze_cmd cat-config "$l_systemd_config_file" | tac | grep -Pio
'^\h*#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b')
if [ -n "$l_used_parameter_setting" ]; then
while IFS=: read -r l_file_name l_file_parameter; do
while IFS="=" read -r l_file_parameter_name l_file_parameter_value; do
if grep -Pq -- "$l_parameter_value" <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_out+=(" - Parameter: \"${l_file_parameter_name// /}\"" \
" correctly set to: \"${l_file_parameter_value// /}\"" \
" in the file: \"$l_file_name\"")
else
a_out2+=(" - Parameter: \"${l_file_parameter_name// /}\"" \
" incorrectly set to: \"${l_file_parameter_value// /}\"" \
" in the file: \"$l_file_name\"" \
" Should be set to: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done <<< "$l_file_parameter"
done <<< "$l_used_parameter_setting"
else
a_out2+=(" - Parameter: \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" *** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure ***")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
f_config_file_parameter_chk
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_out[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
a_output+=("${a_out[@]}"); [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output3+=(" ** INFO: **" "${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output2+=("${a_out2[@]}")
fi
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "${a_output3[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Note: Please ensure the output for NTP and/or FallbackNTP is in accordance with local
site policy. The timeservers in the example output are provided as an example of
possible timeservers and they may not follow local site policy.
Page 285
{
a_settings=("NTP=time.nist.gov" "FallbackNTP=time-a-g.nist.gov time-b-g.nist.gov time-c-g.nist.gov")
[ ! -d /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf.d/
if grep -Psq -- '^\h*\[Time\]' /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf.d/60-timesyncd.conf; then
printf '%s\n' "" "${a_settings[@]}" >> /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf.d/60-timesyncd.conf
else
printf '%s\n' "" "[Time]" "${a_settings[@]}" >> /etc/systemd/timesyncd.conf.d/60-timesyncd.conf
fi
}
Note: If this setting appears in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
Run to following command to update the parameters in the service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart systemd-timesyncd
Default Value:
#NTP=
#FallbackNTP=
References:
1. https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/timesyncd.conf.html
2. https://tf.nist.gov/tf-cgi/servers.cgi
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-7, AU-8
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Page 287
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
systemd-timesyncd is a daemon that has been added for synchronizing the system
clock across the network
Rationale:
systemd-timesyncd needs to be enabled and running in order to synchronize the system
to a timeserver.
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms and to
ensure log files have consistent time records across the enterprise to aid in forensic
investigations
Audit:
- IF - systemd-timesyncd is in use on the system, run the following commands:
Run the following command to verify that the systemd-timesyncd service is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled systemd-timesyncd.service
enabled
Run the following command to verify that the systemd-timesyncd service is active:
# systemctl is-active systemd-timesyncd.service
active
Remediation:
- IF - systemd-timesyncd is in use on the system, run the following commands:
Run the following command to unmask systemd-timesyncd.service:
# systemctl unmask systemd-timesyncd.service
- OR -
If another time synchronization service is in use on the system, run the following
command to stop and mask systemd-timesyncd:
# systemctl --now mask systemd-timesyncd.service
Page 288
CIS Controls:
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Page 289
chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP) and is
designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source
that is highly accurate.
chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server.
More information on chrony can be found at: http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/.
Note:
Page 290
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
• server
o The server directive specifies an NTP server which can be used as a time
source. The client-server relationship is strictly hierarchical: a client might
synchronize its system time to that of the server, but the server’s system
time will never be influenced by that of a client.
o This directive can be used multiple times to specify multiple servers.
o The directive is immediately followed by either the name of the server, or
its IP address.
• pool
o The syntax of this directive is similar to that for the server directive, except
that it is used to specify a pool of NTP servers rather than a single NTP
server. The pool name is expected to resolve to multiple addresses which
might change over time.
o This directive can be used multiple times to specify multiple pools.
o All options valid in the server directive can be used in this directive too.
Rationale:
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms and to
ensure log files have consistent time records across the enterprise to aid in forensic
investigations
Page 291
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_config_files=("/etc/chrony/chrony.conf")
l_include='(confdir|sourcedir)' l_parameter_name='(server|pool)' l_parameter_value='.+'
while IFS= read -r l_conf_loc; do
l_dir="" l_ext=""
if [ -d "$l_conf_loc" ]; then
l_dir="$l_conf_loc" l_ext="*"
elif grep -Psq '\/\*\.([^#/\n\r]+)?\h*$' <<< "$l_conf_loc" || [ -f "$(readlink -f "$l_conf_loc")" ];
then
l_dir="$(dirname "$l_conf_loc")" l_ext="$(basename "$l_conf_loc")"
fi
if [[ -n "$l_dir" && -n "$l_ext" ]]; then
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file_name; do
[ -f "$(readlink -f "$l_file_name")" ] && a_config_files+=("$(readlink -f "$l_file_name")")
done < <(find -L "$l_dir" -type f -name "$l_ext" -print0 2>/dev/null)
fi
done < <(awk '$1~/^\s*'"$l_include"'$/{print $2}' "${a_config_files[*]}" 2>/dev/null)
for l_file in "${a_config_files[@]}"; do
l_parameter_line="$(grep -Psi '^\h*'"$l_parameter_name"'(\h+|\h*:\h*)'"$l_parameter_value"'\b'
"$l_file")"
[ -n "$l_parameter_line" ] && a_output+=(" - Parameter: \"$(tr -d '()' <<< ${l_parameter_name//|/ or
})\"" \
" Exists in the file: \"$l_file\" as:" "$l_parameter_line")
done
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -le "0" ] && a_output2+=(" - Parameter: \"$(tr -d '()' <<< ${l_parameter_name//|/ or
})\"" \
" Does not exist in the chrony configuration")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
fi
}
Page 292
{
[ ! -d "/etc/chrony/sources.d/" ] && mkdir /etc/chrony/sources.d/
printf '%s\n' "" "#The maxsources option is unique to the pool directive" \
"pool time.nist.gov iburst maxsources 4" >> /etc/chrony/sources.d/60-sources.sources
chronyc reload sources &>/dev/null
}
{
[ ! -d "/etc/chrony/sources.d/" ] && mkdir /etc/chrony/sources.d/
printf '%s\n' "" "server time-a-g.nist.gov iburst" "server 132.163.97.3 iburst" \
"server time-d-b.nist.gov iburst" >> /etc/chrony/sources.d/60-sources.sources
chronyc reload sources &>/dev/null
}
References:
Additional Information:
If pool and/or server directive(s) are set in a sources file in /etc/chrony/sources.d,
the line:
sourcedir /etc/chrony/sources.d
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The chrony package is installed with a dedicated user account _chrony. This account
is granted the access required by the chronyd service
Rationale:
The chronyd service should run with only the required privlidges
Audit:
- IF - chrony is in use on the system, run the following command to verify the chronyd
service is being run as the _chrony user:
# ps -ef | awk '(/[c]hronyd/ && $1!="_chrony") { print $1 }'
- OR -
If another time synchronization service is in use on the system, run the following
command to remove chrony from the system:
# apt purge chrony
# apt autoremove chrony
Default Value:
user _chrony
References:
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Page 296
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
chrony is a daemon for synchronizing the system clock across the network
Rationale:
chrony needs to be enabled and running in order to synchronize the system to a
timeserver.
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms and to
ensure log files have consistent time records across the enterprise to aid in forensic
investigations
Audit:
- IF - chrony is in use on the system, run the following commands:
Run the following command to verify that the chrony service is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled chrony.service
enabled
Run the following command to verify that the chrony service is active:
# systemctl is-active chrony.service
active
Remediation:
- IF - chrony is in use on the system, run the following commands:
Run the following command to unmask chrony.service:
# systemctl unmask chrony.service
- OR -
If another time synchronization service is in use on the system, run the following
command to remove chrony:
# apt purge chrony
# apt autoremove chrony
References:
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A job scheduler is used to execute jobs, commands, or shell scripts, at fixed times,
dates, or intervals
Page 299
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The cron daemon is used to execute batch jobs on the system.
Rationale:
While there may not be user jobs that need to be run on the system, the system does
have maintenance jobs that may include security monitoring that have to run, and cron
is used to execute them.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command to verify cron is enabled:
# systemctl list-unit-files | awk '$1~/^crond?\.service/{print $2}'
enabled
active
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to unmask, enable, and start cron:
# systemctl unmask "$(systemctl list-unit-files | awk '$1~/^crond?\.service/{print $1}')"
# systemctl --now enable "$(systemctl list-unit-files | awk '$1~/^crond?\.service/{print $1}')"
References:
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Description:
The /etc/crontab file is used by cron to control its own jobs. The commands in this
item make sure that root is the user and group owner of the file and that only the owner
can access the file.
Rationale:
This file contains information on what system jobs are run by cron. Write access to
these files could provide unprivileged users with the ability to elevate their privileges.
Read access to these files could provide users with the ability to gain insight on system
jobs that run on the system and could provide them a way to gain unauthorized
privileged access.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other :
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/crontab
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on /etc/crontab:
# chown root:root /etc/crontab
# chmod og-rwx /etc/crontab
Default Value:
Access: (644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
This directory contains system cron jobs that need to run on an hourly basis. The files
in this directory cannot be manipulated by the crontab command, but are instead
edited by system administrators using a text editor. The commands below restrict
read/write and search access to user and group root, preventing regular users from
accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.hourly/
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the
/etc/cron.hourly directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.hourly/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.hourly/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
The /etc/cron.daily directory contains system cron jobs that need to run on a daily
basis. The files in this directory cannot be manipulated by the crontab command, but
are instead edited by system administrators using a text editor. The commands below
restrict read/write and search access to user and group root, preventing regular users
from accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.daily/
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the
/etc/cron.daily directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.daily/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.daily/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
The /etc/cron.weekly directory contains system cron jobs that need to run on a
weekly basis. The files in this directory cannot be manipulated by the crontab
command but are instead edited by system administrators using a text editor. The
commands below restrict read/write and search access to user and group root,
preventing regular users from accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.weekly/
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the
/etc/cron.weekly directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.weekly/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.weekly/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
The /etc/cron.monthly directory contains system cron jobs that need to run on a
monthly basis. The files in this directory cannot be manipulated by the crontab
command but are instead edited by system administrators using a text editor. The
commands below restrict read/write and search access to user and group root,
preventing regular users from accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.monthly/
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the
/etc/cron.monthly directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.monthly/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.monthly/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
The /etc/cron.yearly directory contains system cron jobs that need to run on an
annual basis. The files in this directory cannot be manipulated by the crontab command
but are instead edited by system administrators using a text editor. The commands
below restrict read/write and search access to user and group root, preventing regular
users from accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.yearly/
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the
/etc/cron.yearly directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.yearly/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.yearly/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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Description:
The /etc/cron.d directory contains system cron jobs that need to run in a similar
manner to the hourly, daily weekly and monthly jobs from /etc/crontab, but require
more granular control as to when they run. The files in this directory cannot be
manipulated by the crontab command but are instead edited by system administrators
using a text editor. The commands below restrict read/write and search access to user
and group root, preventing regular users from accessing this directory.
Rationale:
Granting write access to this directory for non-privileged users could provide them the
means for gaining unauthorized elevated privileges. Granting read access to this
directory could give an unprivileged user insight in how to gain elevated privileges or
circumvent auditing controls.
Audit:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following command and verify Uid and Gid are both 0/root and Access does
not grant permissions to group or other:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/cron.d/
Note: If the directory does not exist, this is considered a passing state.
Remediation:
- IF - cron is installed on the system:
Run the following commands to set ownership and permissions on the /etc/cron.d
directory:
# chown root:root /etc/cron.d/
# chmod og-rwx /etc/cron.d/
Default Value:
Access: (755/drwxr-xr-x) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
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• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
crontab is the program used to install, deinstall, or list the tables used to drive the cron
daemon. Each user can have their own crontab, and though files are created, they are
not intended to be edited directly.
If the /etc/cron.allow file exists, then you must be listed (one user per line) therein in
order to be allowed to use this command. If the /etc/cron.allow file does not exist but
the /etc/cron.deny file does exist, then you must not be listed in the /etc/cron.deny
file in order to use this command.
If neither of these files exists, then depending on site-dependent configuration
parameters, only the super user will be allowed to use this command, or all users will be
able to use this command.
If both files exist then /etc/cron.allow takes precedence. Which means that
/etc/cron.deny is not considered and your user must be listed in /etc/cron.allow
in order to be able to use the crontab.
Regardless of the existence of any of these files, the root administrative user is always
allowed to setup a crontab.
The files /etc/cron.allow and /etc/cron.deny, if they exist, must be either world-
readable, or readable by group crontab. If they are not, then cron will deny access to
all users until the permissions are fixed.
There is one file for each user's crontab. Users are not allowed to edit the file directly to
ensure that only users allowed by the system to run periodic tasks can add them, and
only syntactically correct crontabs will be written. This is enforced by having the
directory writable only by the crontab group and configuring crontab command with the
setgid bid set for that specific group.
Note:
• Even though a given user is not listed in cron.allow, cron jobs can still be run
as that user
• The files /etc/cron.allow and /etc/cron.deny, if they exist, only controls
administrative access to the crontab command for scheduling and modifying cron
jobs
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• Exists
• Is mode 0640 or more restrictive
• Is owned by the user root
• Is group owned by the group root - OR - the group crontab
Run the following command to verify either cron.deny doesn't exist or is:
# [ -e "/etc/cron.deny" ] && stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Owner: (%U) Group: (%G)' /etc/cron.deny
Note: On systems where cron is configured to use the group crontab, if the group
crontab is not set as the owner of cron.allow, then cron will deny access to all users
and you will see an error similar to:
You (<USERNAME>) are not allowed to use this program (crontab)
See crontab(1) for more information
Page 317
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
[ ! -e "/etc/cron.deny" ] && touch /etc/cron.allow
chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx /etc/cron.allow
if grep -Pq -- '^\h*crontab\:' /etc/group; then
chown root:crontab /etc/cron.allow
else
chown root:root /etc/cron.allow
fi
}
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
if [ -e "/etc/cron.deny" ]; then
chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx /etc/cron.deny
if grep -Pq -- '^\h*crontab\:' /etc/group; then
chown root:crontab /etc/cron.deny
else
chown root:root /etc/cron.deny
fi
fi
}
Note: On systems where cron is configured to use the group crontab, if the group
crontab is not set as the owner of cron.allow, then cron will deny access to all users
and you will see an error similar to:
You (<USERNAME>) are not allowed to use this program (crontab)
See crontab(1) for more information
References:
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Description:
at allows fairly complex time specifications, extending the POSIX.2 standard. It accepts
times of the form HH:MM to run a job at a specific time of day. (If that time is already
past, the next day is assumed.) You may also specify midnight, noon, or teatime (4pm)
and you can have a time-of-day suffixed with AM or PM for running in the morning or
the evening. You can also say what day the job will be run, by giving a date in the form
month-name day with an optional year, or giving a date of the form MMDD[CC]YY,
MM/DD/[CC]YY, DD.MM.[CC]YY or [CC]YY-MM-DD. The specification of a date must
follow the specification of the time of day. You can also give times like now + count
time-units, where the time-units can be minutes, hours, days, or weeks and you can tell
at to run the job today by suffixing the time with today and to run the job tomorrow by
suffixing the time with tomorrow.
The /etc/at.allow and /etc/at.deny files determine which user can submit
commands for later execution via at or batch. The format of the files is a list of
usernames, one on each line. Whitespace is not permitted. If the file /etc/at.allow
exists, only usernames mentioned in it are allowed to use at. If /etc/at.allow does
not exist, /etc/at.deny is checked, every username not mentioned in it is then allowed
to use at. An empty /etc/at.deny means that every user may use at. If neither file
exists, only the superuser is allowed to use at.
Rationale:
On many systems, only the system administrator is authorized to schedule at jobs.
Using the at.allow file to control who can run at jobs enforces this policy. It is easier
to manage an allow list than a deny list. In a deny list, you could potentially add a user
ID to the system and forget to add it to the deny files.
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• Exists
• Is mode 0640 or more restrictive
• Is owned by the user root
• Is group owned by the group daemon or group root
Verify mode is 640 or more restrictive, owner is root, and group is daemon or root
Run the following command to verify at.deny doesn't exist, -OR- is:
# [ -e "/etc/at.deny" ] && stat -Lc 'Access: (%a/%A) Owner: (%U) Group: (%G)' /etc/at.deny
If a value is returned, verify mode is 640 or more restrictive, owner is root, and group is
daemon or root
Page 322
• /etc/at.allow:
o Create the file if it doesn't exist
o Change owner or user root
o If group daemon exists, change to group daemon, else change group to
root
o Change mode to 640 or more restrictive
• - IF - /etc/at.deny exists:
o Change owner or user root
o If group daemon exists, change to group daemon, else change group to
root
o Change mode to 640 or more restrictive
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
grep -Pq -- '^daemon\b' /etc/group && l_group="daemon" || l_group="root"
[ ! -e "/etc/at.allow" ] && touch /etc/at.allow
chown root:"$l_group" /etc/at.allow
chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx /etc/at.allow
[ -e "/etc/at.deny" ] && chown root:"$l_group" /etc/at.deny
[ -e "/etc/at.deny" ] && chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx /etc/at.deny
}
References:
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Description:
Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is the most recent version of Internet Protocol (IP). It's
designed to supply IP addressing and additional security to support the predicted
growth of connected devices. IPv6 is based on 128-bit addressing and can support 340
undecillion, which is 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 unique
addresses.
Features of IPv6
Rationale:
IETF RFC 4038 recommends that applications are built with an assumption of dual
stack. It is recommended that IPv6 be enabled and configured in accordance with
Benchmark recommendations.
- IF - dual stack and IPv6 are not used in your environment, IPv6 may be disabled to
reduce the attack surface of the system, and recommendations pertaining to IPv6 can
be skipped.
Note: It is recommended that IPv6 be enabled and configured unless this is against
local site policy
Impact:
IETF RFC 4038 recommends that applications are built with an assumption of dual
stack.
When enabled, IPv6 will require additional configuration to reduce risk to the system.
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{
l_output=""
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_output="- IPv6 is not enabled"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs -- "^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"
&& \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_output="- IPv6 is not enabled"
fi
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_output="- IPv6 is enabled"
echo -e "\n$l_output\n"
}
Remediation:
Enable or disable IPv6 in accordance with system requirements and local site policy
Default Value:
IPv6 is enabled
References:
Additional Information:
Having more addresses has grown in importance with the expansion of smart devices
and connectivity. IPv6 provides more than enough globally unique IP addresses for
every networked device currently on the planet, helping ensure providers can keep pace
with the expected proliferation of IP-based devices.
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• Level 1 - Server
Description:
Wireless networking is used when wired networks are unavailable.
Rationale:
-IF- wireless is not to be used, wireless devices can be disabled to reduce the potential
attack surface.
Impact:
Many if not all laptop workstations and some desktop workstations will connect via
wireless requiring these interfaces be enabled.
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{
l_output="" l_output2=""
module_chk()
{
# Check how module will be loaded
l_loadable="$(modprobe -n -v "$l_mname")"
if grep -Pq -- '^\h*install \/bin\/(true|false)' <<< "$l_loadable"; then
l_output="$l_output\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is not loadable: \"$l_loadable\""
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is loadable: \"$l_loadable\""
fi
# Check is the module currently loaded
if ! lsmod | grep "$l_mname" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
l_output="$l_output\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is not loaded"
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is loaded"
fi
# Check if the module is deny listed
if modprobe --showconfig | grep -Pq -- "^\h*blacklist\h+$l_mname\b"; then
l_output="$l_output\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is deny listed in: \"$(grep -Pl --
"^\h*blacklist\h+$l_mname\b" /etc/modprobe.d/*)\""
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - module: \"$l_mname\" is not deny listed"
fi
}
if [ -n "$(find /sys/class/net/*/ -type d -name wireless)" ]; then
l_dname=$(for driverdir in $(find /sys/class/net/*/ -type d -name wireless | xargs -0 dirname); do
basename "$(readlink -f "$driverdir"/device/driver/module)";done | sort -u)
for l_mname in $l_dname; do
module_chk
done
fi
# Report results. If no failures output in l_output2, we pass
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **"
if [ -z "$l_output" ]; then
echo -e "\n - System has no wireless NICs installed"
else
echo -e "\n$l_output\n"
fi
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - Reason(s) for audit failure:\n$l_output2\n"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "\n- Correctly set:\n$l_output\n"
fi
}
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Note: the *.conf file in /etc/modprobe.d/ in the above command can renamed as
needed.
References:
CIS Controls:
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• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Bluetooth is a short-range wireless technology standard that is used for exchanging
data between devices over short distances. It employs UHF radio waves in the ISM
bands, from 2.402 GHz to 2.48 GHz. It is mainly used as an alternative to wire
connections.
Rationale:
An attacker may be able to find a way to access or corrupt your data. One example of
this type of activity is bluesnarfing, which refers to attackers using a Bluetooth
connection to steal information off of your Bluetooth device. Also, viruses or other
malicious code can take advantage of Bluetooth technology to infect other devices. If
you are infected, your data may be corrupted, compromised, stolen, or lost.
Impact:
Many personal electronic devices (PEDs) use Bluetooth technology. For example, you
may be able to operate your computer with a wireless keyboard. Disabling Bluetooth will
prevent these devices from connecting to the system.
There may be packages that are dependent on the bluez package. If the bluez
package is removed, these dependent packages will be removed as well. Before
removing the bluez package, review any dependent packages to determine if they are
required on the system.
-IF- a dependent package is required: stop and mask bluetooth.service leaving the
bluez package installed.
Page 333
Remediation:
Run the following commands to stop bluetooth.service, and remove the bluez
package:
# systemctl stop bluetooth.service
# apt purge bluez
- OR -
- IF - the bluez package is required as a dependency:
Run the following commands to stop and mask bluetooth.service:
# systemctl stop bluetooth.service
# systemctl mask bluetooth.service
1. https://www.cisa.gov/tips/st05-015
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-7
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The Linux kernel modules support several network protocols that are not commonly
used. If these protocols are not needed, it is recommended that they be disabled in the
kernel.
Note: This should not be considered a comprehensive list of uncommon network
protocols, you may wish to consider additions to those listed here for your environment.
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• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) is a transport layer protocol that
supports streaming media and telephony. DCCP provides a way to gain access to
congestion control, without having to do it at the application layer, but does not provide
in-sequence delivery.
Rationale:
- IF - the protocol is not required, it is recommended that the drivers not be installed to
reduce the potential attack surface.
Audit:
Verify the dccp kernel module is not available on the system or has been disabled.
This can be verified by performing the following or by running the audit script included
below.
Run the following script to determine if the dccp kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="dccp" l_mod_type="net"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the dccp kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the dccp filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the dccp kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the dccp kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'dccp'
Page 337
Example output:
blacklist dccp
install dccp /bin/false
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="dccp" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_chk()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if ! lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loaded")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loaded")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loadable")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loadable")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is deny listed")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not deny listed")
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_chk
else
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Page 338
Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist dccp in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist dccp" >> dccp.conf
{
a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="dccp" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_fix()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output2+=(" - unloading kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
modprobe -r "$l_mod_chk_name" 2>/dev/null; rmmod "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - setting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" to \"$(readlink -f /bin/false)\"")
printf '%s\n' "install $l_mod_chk_name $(readlink -f /bin/false)" >>
/etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - denylisting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
printf '%s\n' "blacklist $l_mod_chk_name" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do # Check if the module exists on the system
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_fix
else
printf '%s\n' " - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\""
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}" || printf '%s\n' "" " - No changes
needed"
printf '%s\n' "" " - remediation of kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" complete" ""
}
Page 339
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 340
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC) protocol is designed to provide
communication between cluster nodes.
Rationale:
- IF - the protocol is not being used, it is recommended that kernel module not be
loaded, disabling the service to reduce the potential attack surface.
Audit:
Verify the tipc kernel module is not available on the system or has been disabled.
This can be verified by performing the following or by running the audit script included
below.
Run the following script to determine if the tipc kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="tipc" l_mod_type="net"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the tipc kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the tipc filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the tipc kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the tipc kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'tipc'
Page 341
Example output:
blacklist tipc
install tipc /bin/false
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="tipc" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_chk()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if ! lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loaded")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loaded")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loadable")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loadable")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is deny listed")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not deny listed")
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_chk
else
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Page 342
Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist tipc in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist tipc" >> tipc.conf
Page 343
{
a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="tipc" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_fix()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output2+=(" - unloading kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
modprobe -r "$l_mod_chk_name" 2>/dev/null; rmmod "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - setting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" to \"$(readlink -f /bin/false)\"")
printf '%s\n' "install $l_mod_chk_name $(readlink -f /bin/false)" >>
/etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - denylisting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
printf '%s\n' "blacklist $l_mod_chk_name" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do # Check if the module exists on the system
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_fix
else
printf '%s\n' " - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\""
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}" || printf '%s\n' "" " - No changes
needed"
printf '%s\n' "" " - remediation of kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" complete" ""
}
Page 344
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 345
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol is a transport layer protocol designed to
provide low-latency, high-bandwidth communications between cluster nodes. It was
developed by the Oracle Corporation.
Rationale:
- IF - the protocol is not being used, it is recommended that kernel module not be
loaded, disabling the service to reduce the potential attack surface.
Audit:
Verify the rds kernel module is not available on the system or has been disabled.
This can be verified by performing the following or by running the audit script included
below.
Run the following script to determine if the rds kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="rds" l_mod_type="net"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the rds kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the rds filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the rds kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the rds kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'rds'
Page 346
Example output:
blacklist rds
install rds /bin/false
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="rds" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_chk()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if ! lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loaded")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loaded")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loadable")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loadable")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is deny listed")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not deny listed")
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_chk
else
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Page 347
Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist rds in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist rds" >> rds.conf
Page 348
{
a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="rds" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_fix()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output2+=(" - unloading kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
modprobe -r "$l_mod_chk_name" 2>/dev/null; rmmod "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - setting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" to \"$(readlink -f /bin/false)\"")
printf '%s\n' "install $l_mod_chk_name $(readlink -f /bin/false)" >>
/etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - denylisting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
printf '%s\n' "blacklist $l_mod_chk_name" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do # Check if the module exists on the system
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_fix
else
printf '%s\n' " - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\""
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}" || printf '%s\n' "" " - No changes
needed"
printf '%s\n' "" " - remediation of kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" complete" ""
}
Page 349
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 350
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a transport layer protocol used to
support message oriented communication, with several streams of messages in one
connection. It serves a similar function as TCP and UDP, incorporating features of both.
It is message-oriented like UDP, and ensures reliable in-sequence transport of
messages with congestion control like TCP.
Rationale:
- IF - the protocol is not being used, it is recommended that kernel module not be
loaded, disabling the service to reduce the potential attack surface.
Audit:
Verify the sctp kernel module is not available on the system or has been disabled.
This can be verified by performing the following or by running the audit script included
below.
Run the following script to determine if the sctp kernel module is available on the
system:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_mod_name="sctp" l_mod_type="net"
while IFS= read -r l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A "$l_mod_path/${l_mod_name//-/\/}")" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$l_mod_name exists in $l_mod_path"
fi
done < <(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)
}
If nothing is returned, the sctp kernel module is not available on the system and no
further audit steps are required.
Note: Some systems may include the sctp filesystem as part of the kernel opposed to
being available as a kernel module. In this case, the above audit will not return anything.
This is also considered a passing state.
If anything is returned, verify the sctp kernel module is not loaded and not loadable by
performing the following:
Run the following command to verify the sctp kernel module is not loaded:
# lsmod | grep 'sctp'
Page 351
Example output:
blacklist sctp
install sctp /bin/false
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="sctp" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_chk()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if ! lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loaded")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loaded")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not loadable")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is loadable")
fi
if grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is deny listed")
else
a_output2+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" is not deny listed")
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_chk
else
a_output+=(" - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Page 352
Create a file ending in .conf with blacklist sctp in the /etc/modprobe.d/ directory
Example:
# printf '\n%s\n' "blacklist sctp" >> sctp.conf
Page 353
{
a_output2=() a_output3=() l_dl="" l_mod_name="sctp" l_mod_type="net"
l_mod_path="$(readlink -f /usr/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type || readlink -f
/lib/modules/**/kernel/$l_mod_type)"
f_module_fix()
{
l_dl="y" a_showconfig=()
while IFS= read -r l_showconfig; do
a_showconfig+=("$l_showconfig")
done < <(modprobe --showconfig | grep -P -- '\b(install|blacklist)\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b')
if lsmod | grep "$l_mod_chk_name" &> /dev/null; then
a_output2+=(" - unloading kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
modprobe -r "$l_mod_chk_name" 2>/dev/null; rmmod "$l_mod_name" 2>/dev/null
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\binstall\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\h+(\/usr)?\/bin\/(true|false)\b' <<<
"${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - setting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" to \"$(readlink -f /bin/false)\"")
printf '%s\n' "install $l_mod_chk_name $(readlink -f /bin/false)" >>
/etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
if ! grep -Pq -- '\bblacklist\h+'"${l_mod_chk_name//-/_}"'\b' <<< "${a_showconfig[*]}"; then
a_output2+=(" - denylisting kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\"")
printf '%s\n' "blacklist $l_mod_chk_name" >> /etc/modprobe.d/"$l_mod_name".conf
fi
}
for l_mod_base_directory in $l_mod_path; do # Check if the module exists on the system
if [ -d "$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A
"$l_mod_base_directory/${l_mod_name/-/\/}")" ]; then
a_output3+=(" - \"$l_mod_base_directory\"")
l_mod_chk_name="$l_mod_name"
[[ "$l_mod_name" =~ overlay ]] && l_mod_chk_name="${l_mod_name::-2}"
[ "$l_dl" != "y" ] && f_module_fix
else
printf '%s\n' " - kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" doesn't exist in \"$l_mod_base_directory\""
fi
done
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " -- INFO --" " - module: \"$l_mod_name\" exists in:"
"${a_output3[@]}"
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}" || printf '%s\n' "" " - No changes
needed"
printf '%s\n' "" " - remediation of kernel module: \"$l_mod_name\" complete" ""
}
References:
Page 354
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 355
The following network parameters are intended for use on both host only and router
systems. A system acts as a router if it has at least two interfaces and is configured to
perform routing functions.
Note:
The system's loaded kernel parameters and the files they're configured in can be
viewed by running the following command:
# /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl --cat-config
Page 356
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The net.ipv4.ip_forward and net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding flags are used to
tell the system whether it can forward packets or not.
Rationale:
Setting net.ipv4.ip_forward and net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding to 0 ensures
that a system with multiple interfaces (for example, a hard proxy), will never be able to
forward packets, and therefore, never serve as a router.
Impact:
IP forwarding is required on systems configured to act as a router. If these parameters
are disabled, the system will not be able to perform as a router.
Many Cloud Service Provider (CSP) hosted systems require IP forwarding to be
enabled. If the system is running on a CSP platform, this requirement should be
reviewed before disabling IP forwarding.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.ip_forward is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding is set to 0
Note:
• kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded,
the parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a
canonically later file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and
by the system during a normal kernel parameter load sequence.
• IPv6 kernel parameters only apply to systems where IPv6 is enabled
Page 357
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.ip_forward=0" "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 358
Page 359
• net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
• net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv6_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 0
References:
Page 360
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 361
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
ICMP Redirects are used to send routing information to other hosts. As a host itself
does not act as a router (in a host only configuration), there is no need to send
redirects.
Rationale:
An attacker could use a compromised host to send invalid ICMP redirects to other
router devices in an attempt to corrupt routing and have users access a system set up
by the attacker as opposed to a valid system.
Impact:
IP forwarding is required on systems configured to act as a router. If these parameters
are disabled, the system will not be able to perform as a router.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects is set to 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects is set to 0
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 362
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 363
Page 364
• net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 365
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 366
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Setting net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses to 1 prevents the kernel
from logging bogus responses (RFC-1122 non-compliant) from broadcast reframes,
keeping file systems from filling up with useless log messages.
Rationale:
Some routers (and some attackers) will send responses that violate RFC-1122 and
attempt to fill up a log file system with many useless error messages.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameter is set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses is set to 1
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 367
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 368
Page 369
• net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 370
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 371
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Setting net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts to 1 will cause the system to
ignore all ICMP echo and timestamp requests to broadcast and multicast addresses.
Rationale:
Accepting ICMP echo and timestamp requests with broadcast or multicast destinations
for your network could be used to trick your host into starting (or participating) in a
Smurf attack. A Smurf attack relies on an attacker sending large amounts of ICMP
broadcast messages with a spoofed source address. All hosts receiving this message
and responding would send echo-reply messages back to the spoofed address, which is
probably not routable. If many hosts respond to the packets, the amount of traffic on the
network could be significantly multiplied.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameter is set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts is set to 1
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 372
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 373
Page 374
• net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 375
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 376
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
ICMP redirect messages are packets that convey routing information and tell your host
(acting as a router) to send packets via an alternate path. It is a way of allowing an
outside routing device to update your system routing tables.
Rationale:
ICMP redirect messages are packets that convey routing information and tell your host
(acting as a router) to send packets via an alternate path. It is a way of allowing an
outside routing device to update your system routing tables. By setting
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects,
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects,
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects, and
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects to 0, the system will not accept any
ICMP redirect messages, and therefore, won't allow outsiders to update the system's
routing tables.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects is set to 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects is set to 0
Note:
• kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded,
the parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a
canonically later file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and
by the system during a normal kernel parameter load sequence.
• IPv6 kernel parameters only apply to systems where IPv6 is enabled
Page 377
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0"
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
Page 378
Page 379
• net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv6_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 1
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 1
References:
Page 380
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 381
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Secure ICMP redirects are the same as ICMP redirects, except they come from
gateways listed on the default gateway list. It is assumed that these gateways are
known to your system, and that they are likely to be secure.
Rationale:
It is still possible for even known gateways to be compromised. Setting
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects and
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects to 0 protects the system from routing
table updates by possibly compromised known gateways.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects is set to 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects is set to 0
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 382
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 383
Page 384
• net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 1
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 385
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 386
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Setting net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter and net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter to
1 forces the Linux kernel to utilize reverse path filtering on a received packet to
determine if the packet was valid. Essentially, with reverse path filtering, if the return
packet does not go out the same interface that the corresponding source packet came
from, the packet is dropped (and logged if log_martians is set).
Rationale:
Setting net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter and net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter to
1 is a good way to deter attackers from sending your system bogus packets that cannot
be responded to. One instance where this feature breaks down is if asymmetrical
routing is employed. This would occur when using dynamic routing protocols (bgp, ospf,
etc) on your system. If you are using asymmetrical routing on your system, you will not
be able to enable this feature without breaking the routing.
Impact:
If you are using asymmetrical routing on your system, you will not be able to enable this
feature without breaking the routing.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is set to 1
• net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter is set to 1
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 387
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1" "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 388
Page 389
• net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
• net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1" "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-
netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 2
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 390
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 391
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
In networking, source routing allows a sender to partially or fully specify the route
packets take through a network. In contrast, non-source routed packets travel a path
determined by routers in the network. In some cases, systems may not be routable or
reachable from some locations (e.g. private addresses vs. Internet routable), and so
source routed packets would need to be used.
Rationale:
Setting net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route,
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route,
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route and
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route to 0 disables the system from
accepting source routed packets. Assume this system was capable of routing packets to
Internet routable addresses on one interface and private addresses on another
interface. Assume that the private addresses were not routable to the Internet routable
addresses and vice versa. Under normal routing circumstances, an attacker from the
Internet routable addresses could not use the system as a way to reach the private
address systems. If, however, source routed packets were allowed, they could be used
to gain access to the private address systems as the route could be specified, rather
than rely on routing protocols that did not allow this routing.
Page 392
• net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route is set to 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route is set to 0
Note:
• kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded,
the parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a
canonically later file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and
by the system during a normal kernel parameter load sequence.
• IPv6 kernel parameters only apply to systems where IPv6 is enabled
Page 393
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0"
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
Page 394
Page 395
• net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
• net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0" "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv6_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Page 396
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 397
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
When enabled, this feature logs packets with un-routable source addresses to the
kernel log.
Rationale:
Setting net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians and
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians to 1 enables this feature. Logging these
packets allows an administrator to investigate the possibility that an attacker is sending
spoofed packets to their system.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians is set to 1
• net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians is set to 1
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 398
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1" "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians=1")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 399
Page 400
• net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
• net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1" "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1" >>
/etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 0
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 0
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 401
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 402
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
When tcp_syncookies is set, the kernel will handle TCP SYN packets normally until
the half-open connection queue is full, at which time, the SYN cookie functionality kicks
in. SYN cookies work by not using the SYN queue at all. Instead, the kernel simply
replies to the SYN with a SYN/ACK, but will include a specially crafted TCP sequence
number that encodes the source and destination IP address and port number and the
time the packet was sent. A legitimate connection would send the ACK packet of the
three way handshake with the specially crafted sequence number. This allows the
system to verify that it has received a valid response to a SYN cookie and allow the
connection, even though there is no corresponding SYN in the queue.
Rationale:
Attackers use SYN flood attacks to perform a denial of service attacked on a system by
sending many SYN packets without completing the three way handshake. This will
quickly use up slots in the kernel's half-open connection queue and prevent legitimate
connections from succeeding. Setting net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies to 1 enables SYN
cookies, allowing the system to keep accepting valid connections, even if under a denial
of service attack.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameter is set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is set to 1
Note: kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded, the
parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a canonically later
file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and by the system during a
normal kernel parameter load sequence.
Page 403
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 404
Page 405
• net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-netipv4_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
sysctl -w net.ipv4.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
Page 406
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 407
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Routers periodically multicast Router Advertisement messages to announce their
availability and convey information to neighboring nodes that enable them to be
automatically configured on the network.
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra and net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra determine
the systems ability to accept these advertisements
Rationale:
It is recommended that systems do not accept router advertisements as they could be
tricked into routing traffic to compromised machines. Setting hard routes within the
system (usually a single default route to a trusted router) protects the system from bad
routes. Setting net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra and
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra to 0 disables the system's ability to accept IPv6
router advertisements.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the following kernel parameters are set in the running
configuration and correctly loaded from a kernel parameter configuration file:
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra is set to 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra is set to 0
Note:
• kernel parameters are loaded by file and parameter order precedence. The
following script observes this precedence as part of the auditing procedure. The
parameters being checked may be set correctly in a file. If that file is superseded,
the parameter is overridden by an incorrect setting later in that file, or in a
canonically later file, that "correct" setting will be ignored both by the script and
by the system during a normal kernel parameter load sequence.
• IPv6 kernel parameters only apply to systems where IPv6 is enabled
Page 408
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ipv6_disabled=""
l_systemdsysctl="$(readlink -f /lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl || readlink -f /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysctl)"
a_parlist=("net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0")
l_ufwscf="$([ -f /etc/default/ufw ] && awk -F= '/^\s*IPT_SYSCTL=/ {print $2}' /etc/default/ufw)"
f_ipv6_chk()
{
l_ipv6_disabled="no"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b" && \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_disabled="yes"
fi
}
f_kernel_parameter_chk()
{
l_running_parameter_value="$(sysctl "$l_parameter_name" | awk -F= '{print $2}' | xargs)" # Check running
configuration
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_running_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\""
" in the running configuration")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_running_parameter_value\"" \
" in the running configuration" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
unset A_out; declare -A A_out # Check durable setting (files)
while read -r l_out; do
if [ -n "$l_out" ]; then
if [[ $l_out =~ ^\s*# ]]; then
l_file="${l_out//# /}"
else
l_kpar="$(awk -F= '{print $1}' <<< "$l_out" | xargs)"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <("$l_systemdsysctl" --cat-config | grep -Po '^\h*([^#\n\r]+|#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b)')
if [ -n "$l_ufwscf" ]; then # Account for systems with UFW (Not covered by systemd-sysctl --cat-config)
l_kpar="$(grep -Po "^\h*$l_parameter_name\b" "$l_ufwscf" | xargs)"
l_kpar="${l_kpar//\//.}"
[ "$l_kpar" = "$l_parameter_name" ] && A_out+=(["$l_kpar"]="$l_ufwscf")
fi
if (( ${#A_out[@]} > 0 )); then # Assess output from files and generate output
while IFS="=" read -r l_fkpname l_file_parameter_value; do
l_fkpname="${l_fkpname// /}"; l_file_parameter_value="${l_file_parameter_value// /}"
if grep -Pq -- '\b'"$l_parameter_value"'\b' <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is correctly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\"" \
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is incorrectly set to \"$l_file_parameter_value\""
" in \"$(printf '%s' "${A_out[@]}")\"" \
" and should have a value of: \"$l_value_out\"")
fi
done < <(grep -Po -- "^\h*$l_parameter_name\h*=\h*\H+" "${A_out[@]}")
else
a_output2+=(" - \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" ** Note: \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure **")
fi
}
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
if grep -q '^net.ipv6.' <<< "$l_parameter_name"; then
[ -z "$l_ipv6_disabled" ] && f_ipv6_chk
if [ "$l_ipv6_disabled" = "yes" ]; then
a_output+=(" - IPv6 is disabled on the system, \"$l_parameter_name\" is not applicable")
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
else
f_kernel_parameter_chk
fi
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_parlist[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
Page 409
Page 410
• net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 0
• net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0
Example:
# printf '%s\n' "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 0" "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0" >> /etc/sysctl.d/60-
netipv6_sysctl.conf
{
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0
sysctl -w net.ipv6.route.flush=1
}
Note: If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, these
settings will be overwritten
Default Value:
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 1
References:
Additional Information:
On systems with Uncomplicated Firewall, additional settings may be configured in
/etc/ufw/sysctl.conf
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Page 412
• Netfilter - A set of hooks inside the Linux kernel that allows kernel modules to
register callback functions with the network stack. A registered callback function
is then called back for every packet that traverses the respective hook within the
network stack. Includes the ip_tables, ip6_tables, arp_tables, and ebtables kernel
modules. These modules are some of the significant parts of the Netfilter hook
system.
• nftables - A subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification
of network packets/datagrams/frames. nftables is supposed to replace certain
parts of Netfilter, while keeping and reusing most of it. nftables utilizes the
building blocks of the Netfilter infrastructure, such as the existing hooks into the
networking stack, connection tracking system, userspace queueing component,
and logging subsystem. Is available in Linux kernels 3.13 and newer.
In order to configure firewall rules for Netfilter or nftables, a firewall utility needs to be
installed. Guidance has been included for the following firewall utilities:
Notes:
• Only one method should be used to configure a firewall on the system. Use of
more than one method could produce unexpected results
• This section is intended only to ensure the resulting firewall rules are in place, not
how they are configured
Page 413
Only one method should be used to configure a firewall on the system. Use of more
than one method could produce unexpected results.
This section ensures that only one firewall is in use on the system and provides
guidance to the subsequent subsection that should be followed for a single firewall utility
configuration.
Page 414
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
In Linux security, employing a single, effective firewall configuration utility ensures that
only legitimate traffic gets processed, reducing the system’s exposure to potential
threats. The choice between ufw, nftables, and iptables depends on organizational
needs.
Note: iptables is being phased out, and support for iptables will be reduced over
time. It is recommended to transition towards either nftables or ufw as the default
firewall management tool.
Rationale:
Proper configuration of a single firewall utility minimizes cyber threats and protects
services and data, while avoiding vulnerabilities like open ports or exposed services.
Standardizing on a single tool simplifies management, reduces errors, and fortifies
security across Linux systems.
Impact:
The use of more than one firewall utility may produce unexpected results.
Page 415
{
active_firewall=() firewalls=("ufw" "nftables" "iptables")
# Determine which firewall is in use
for firewall in "${firewalls[@]}"; do
case $firewall in
nftables)
cmd="nft" ;;
*)
cmd=$firewall ;;
esac
if command -v $cmd &> /dev/null && systemctl is-enabled --quiet $firewall && systemctl is-active --quiet
$firewall; then
active_firewall+=("$firewall")
fi
done
# Display audit results
if [ ${#active_firewall[@]} -eq 1 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "Audit Results:" " ** PASS **" " - A single firewall is in use follow the recommendation
in ${active_firewall[0]} subsection ONLY"
elif [ ${#active_firewall[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " Audit Results:" " ** FAIL **" "- No firewall in use or unable to determine firewall
status"
else
printf '%s\n' "" " Audit Results:" " ** FAIL **" " - Multiple firewalls are in use:
${active_firewall[*]}"
fi
}
Remediation:
Remediating to a single firewall configuration is a complex process and involves several
steps. The following provides the basic steps to follow for a single firewall configuration:
References:
1. https://wiki.debian.org/DebianFirewall
2. https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UncomplicatedFirewall
3. https://assets.ubuntu.com/v1/544d9904-ubuntu-server-guide-2024-01-22.pdf
4. https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/debian-reference/debian-reference.en.pdf
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Page 417
If nftables or iptables are being used in your environment, please follow the
guidance in their respective section and pass-over the guidance in this section.
Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) is a program for managing a netfilter firewall designed to
be easy to use.
Notes:
Page 418
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) is a frontend for iptables and is particularly well-suited
for host-based firewalls. ufw provides a framework for managing netfilter, as well as a
command-line interface for manipulating the firewall
Rationale:
A firewall utility is required to configure the Linux kernel's netfilter framework via the
iptables or nftables back-end.
The Linux kernel's netfilter framework host-based firewall can protect against threats
originating from within a corporate network to include malicious mobile code and poorly
configured software on a host.
Note: Only one firewall utility should be installed and configured. UFW is dependent on
the iptables package
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) is installed:
# dpkg-query -s ufw &>/dev/null && echo "ufw is installed"
ufw is installed
Remediation:
Run the following command to install Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW):
# apt install ufw
References:
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Page 420
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of
network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables.
Rationale:
Running both ufw and nftables may lead to conflict.
Audit:
Run the following commend to verify that nftables is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s nftables &>/dev/null && echo "nftables is installed"
- OR -
Run the following commands to stop and mask nftables.service:
# systemctl stop nftables.service
# systemctl mask nftables.service
References:
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Page 422
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The iptables-persistent is a boot-time loader for netfilter rules, iptables plugin
Rationale:
Running both ufw and the services included in the iptables-persistent package may lead
to conflict
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the iptables-persistent package is not
installed:
# dpkg-query -s iptables-persistent &>/dev/null && echo "iptables-persistent is installed"
References:
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Page 424
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
UncomplicatedFirewall (ufw) is a frontend for iptables. ufw provides a framework for
managing netfilter, as well as a command-line and available graphical user interface for
manipulating the firewall.
Note:
• When running ufw enable or starting ufw via its initscript, ufw will flush its chains.
This is required so ufw can maintain a consistent state, but it may drop existing
connections (eg ssh). ufw does support adding rules before enabling the firewall.
• Run the following command before running ufw enable.
• The rules will still be flushed, but the ssh port will be open after enabling the
firewall. Please note that once ufw is 'enabled', ufw will not flush the chains when
adding or removing rules (but will when modifying a rule or changing the default
policy)
• By default, ufw will prompt when enabling the firewall while running under ssh.
This can be disabled by using ufw --force enable
Rationale:
The ufw service must be enabled and running in order for ufw to protect the system
Impact:
Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being locked out
of the system.
Page 425
enabled
Run the following command to verify that the ufw daemon is active:
# systemctl is-active ufw
active
Status: active
Remediation:
Run the following command to unmask the ufw daemon:
# systemctl unmask ufw.service
Run the following command to enable and start the ufw daemon:
# systemctl --now enable ufw.service
active
References:
1. http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/precise/en/man8/ufw.8.html
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: SC-7
3. STIG ID: UBTU-20-010434 | Rule ID: SV-238355r958672 | CAT II
4. STIG ID: UBTU-22-251015 | Rule ID: SV-260515r958672 | CAT II
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Page 427
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny
traffic to the loopback network (127.0.0.0/8 for IPv4 and ::1/128 for IPv6).
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to
operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network
(127.0.0.0/8 for IPv4 and ::1/128 for IPv6) traffic should be seen, all other interfaces
should ignore traffic on this network as an anti-spoofing measure.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify loopback interface to accept traffic:
# grep -P -- 'lo|127.0.0.0' /etc/ufw/before.rules
Output includes:
# allow all on loopback
-A ufw-before-input -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-output -o lo -j ACCEPT
Run the following command and verify all other interfaces deny traffic to the loopback
network (127.0.0.0/8 for IPv4 and ::1/128 for IPv6)
# ufw status verbose
To Action From
-- ------ ----
Anywhere DENY IN 127.0.0.0/8
Anywhere (v6) DENY IN ::1
Note: ufw status only shows rules added with ufw and not the rules found in the
/etc/ufw rules files where allow all on loopback is configured by default.
Remediation:
Run the following commands to configure the loopback interface to accept traffic:
# ufw allow in on lo
# ufw allow out on lo
Run the following commands to configure all other interfaces to deny traffic to the
loopback network:
# ufw deny in from 127.0.0.0/8
# ufw deny in from ::1
Page 428
References:
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Page 429
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the firewall rules for new outbound connections.
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system.
• Unlike iptables, when a new outbound rule is added, ufw automatically takes care
of associated established connections, so no rules for the latter kind are required.
Rationale:
If rules are not in place for new outbound connections all packets will be dropped by the
default policy preventing network usage.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify all rules for new outbound connections match
site policy:
# ufw status numbered
Remediation:
Configure ufw in accordance with site policy. The following commands will implement a
policy to allow all outbound connections on all interfaces:
# ufw allow out on all
References:
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Page 431
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Services and ports can be accepted or explicitly rejected.
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• The remediation command opens up the port to traffic from all sources. Consult
ufw documentation and set any restrictions in compliance with site policy
Rationale:
To reduce the attack surface of a system, all services and ports should be blocked
unless required.
• Any ports that have been opened on non-loopback addresses need firewall rules
to govern traffic.
• Without a firewall rule configured for open ports, the default firewall policy will
drop all packets to these ports.
• Required ports should have a firewall rule created to allow approved connections
in accordance with local site policy.
• Unapproved ports should have an explicit deny rule created.
Page 432
{
unset a_ufwout
unset a_openports
# Find Differences
a_diff=("$(printf '%s\n' "${a_openports[@]}" "${a_ufwout[@]}" "${a_ufwout[@]}" | sort | uniq -u)")
Remediation:
For each port identified in the audit which does not have a firewall rule, evaluate the
service listening on the port and add a rule for accepting or denying inbound
connections in accordance with local site policy:
Examples:
# ufw allow in <port>/<tcp or udp protocol>
Note: Examples create rules for from any, to any. More specific rules should be
concentered when allowing inbound traffic e.g only traffic from this network.
Example to allow traffic on port 443 using the tcp protocol from the 192.168.1.0 network:
ufw allow from 192.168.1.0/24 to any proto tcp port 443
Page 433
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A default deny policy on connections ensures that any unconfigured network usage will
be rejected.
Note: Any port or protocol without a explicit allow before the default deny will be
blocked
Rationale:
With a default accept policy the firewall will accept any packet that is not configured to
be denied. It is easier to allow list acceptable usage than to deny list unacceptable
usage.
Impact:
Any port and protocol not explicitly allowed will be blocked. The following rules should
be considered before applying the default deny.
ufw allow out http
ufw allow out https
ufw allow out ntp # Network Time Protocol
ufw allow out to any port 53 # DNS
ufw allow out to any port 853 # DNS over TLS
ufw logging on
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that the default policy for incoming , outgoing ,
and routed directions is deny , reject , or disabled:
# ufw status verbose | grep Default:
Example output:
Default: deny (incoming), deny (outgoing), disabled (routed)
Remediation:
Run the following commands to implement a default deny policy:
# ufw default deny incoming
# ufw default deny outgoing
# ufw default deny routed
References:
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Page 436
• This section broadly assumes starting with an empty nftables firewall ruleset
(established by flushing the rules with nft flush ruleset).
• Remediation steps included only affect the live system, you will also need to
configure your default firewall configuration to apply on boot.
• Configuration of a live systems firewall directly over a remote connection will
often result in being locked out. It is advised to have a known good firewall
configuration set to run on boot and to configure an entire firewall structure in a
script that is then run and tested before saving to boot.
The following script will implement the firewall rules of this section and open port
22(ssh) from anywhere. Opening the ports for port 22(ssh) needs to be updated in
accordance with local site policy. Allow port 22(ssh) needs to be updated to only
allow systems requiring ssh connectivity to connect, as per site policy.
Save the script below as /etc/nftables.rules
Page 437
# Base chain for hook forward named forward (Filters forwarded network packets)
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority 0; policy drop;
}
# Base chain for hook output named output (Filters outbount network packets)
chain output {
type filter hook output priority 0; policy drop;
# Ensure outbound and established connections are configured
ip protocol tcp ct state established,related,new accept
ip protocol udp ct state established,related,new accept
}
}
Page 438
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
nftables provides a new in-kernel packet classification framework that is based on a
network-specific Virtual Machine (VM) and a new nft userspace command line tool.
nftables reuses the existing Netfilter subsystems such as the existing hook
infrastructure, the connection tracking system, NAT, userspace queuing and logging
subsystem.
Notes:
Rationale:
nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel that can protect against threats originating
from within a corporate network to include malicious mobile code and poorly configured
software on a host.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that nftables is installed:
# dpkg-query -s nftables &>/dev/null && echo "nftables is installed"
nftables is installed
Remediation:
Run the following command to install nftables:
# apt install nftables
References:
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) is a program for managing a netfilter firewall designed to
be easy to use.
Rationale:
Running both the nftables service and ufw may lead to conflict and unexpected
results.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify that ufw is either not installed or inactive. Only
one of the following needs to pass.
Run the following command to verify that ufw is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s ufw &>/dev/null && echo "ufw is installed"
Status: inactive
# systemctl is-enabled ufw.service
masked
Remediation:
Run one of the following to either remove ufw or disable ufw and mask ufw.service:
Run the following command to remove ufw:
# apt purge ufw
-OR-
Run the following commands to disable ufw and mask ufw.service:
# ufw disable
# systemctl stop ufw.service
# systemctl mask ufw.service
Note: ufw disable needs to be run before systemctl mask ufw.service in order to
correctly disable UFW
Page 441
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
nftables is a replacement for iptables, ip6tables, ebtables and arptables
Rationale:
It is possible to mix iptables and nftables. However, this increases complexity and also
the chance to introduce errors. For simplicity flush out all iptables rules, and ensure it is
not loaded
Audit:
Run the following commands to ensure no iptables rules exist
For iptables:
# iptables -L
For ip6tables:
# ip6tables -F
References:
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Tables hold chains. Each table only has one address family and only applies to packets
of this family. Tables can have one of five families.
Rationale:
nftables doesn't have any default tables. Without a table being built, nftables will not
filter network traffic.
Impact:
Adding rules to a running nftables can cause loss of connectivity to the system
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that a nftables table exists:
# nft list tables
Remediation:
Run the following command to create a table in nftables
# nft create table inet <table name>
Example:
# nft create table inet filter
References:
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• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Chains are containers for rules. They exist in two kinds, base chains and regular chains.
A base chain is an entry point for packets from the networking stack, a regular chain
may be used as jump target and is used for better rule organization.
Rationale:
If a base chain doesn't exist with a hook for input, forward, and delete, packets that
would flow through those chains will not be touched by nftables.
Impact:
If configuring nftables over ssh, creating a base chain with a policy of drop will
cause loss of connectivity.
Ensure that a rule allowing ssh has been added to the base chain prior to setting the
base chain's policy to drop
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify that base chains exist for INPUT.
# nft list ruleset | grep 'hook input'
Run the following commands and verify that base chains exist for FORWARD.
# nft list ruleset | grep 'hook forward'
Run the following commands and verify that base chains exist for OUTPUT.
# nft list ruleset | grep 'hook output'
Page 447
Example:
# nft create chain inet filter input { type filter hook input priority 0 \; }
# nft create chain inet filter forward { type filter hook forward priority 0 \; }
# nft create chain inet filter output { type filter hook output priority 0 \; }
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Page 448
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny
traffic to the loopback network
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to
the operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback
network traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network
as an anti-spoofing measure.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify that the loopback interface is configured:
Run the following command to verify the loopback interface is configured to accept
network traffic:
# nft list ruleset | awk '/hook input/,/}/' | grep 'iif "lo" accept'
Example output:
iif "lo" accept
Run the following command to verify network traffic from an iPv4 loopback interface is
configured to drop:
# nft list ruleset | awk '/hook input/,/}/' | grep 'ip saddr'
Example output:
ip saddr 127.0.0.0/8 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
Example output:
ip6 saddr ::1 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
Page 449
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Page 450
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the firewall rules for new outbound, and established connections
Rationale:
If rules are not in place for new outbound, and established connections all packets will
be dropped by the default policy preventing network usage.
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify all rules for established incoming connections
match site policy: site policy:
# nft list ruleset | awk '/hook input/,/}/' | grep -E 'ip protocol (tcp|udp) ct state'
Run the folllowing command and verify all rules for new and established outbound
connections match site policy
# nft list ruleset | awk '/hook output/,/}/' | grep -E 'ip protocol (tcp|udp) ct state'
Remediation:
Configure nftables in accordance with site policy. The following commands will
implement a policy to allow all outbound connections and all established connections:
# nft add rule inet filter input ip protocol tcp ct state established accept
# nft add rule inet filter input ip protocol udp ct state established accept
# nft add rule inet filter output ip protocol tcp ct state new,related,established accept
# nft add rule inet filter output ip protocol udp ct state new,related,established accept
References:
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Page 452
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Base chain policy is the default verdict that will be applied to packets reaching the end
of the chain.
Rationale:
There are two policies: accept (Default) and drop. If the policy is set to accept, the
firewall will accept any packet that is not configured to be denied and the packet will
continue transversing the network stack.
It is easier to allow list acceptable usage than to deny list unacceptable usage.
Note:
• Allow port 22(ssh) needs to be updated to only allow systems requiring ssh
connectivity to connect, as per site policy.
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system.
Impact:
If configuring nftables over ssh, creating a base chain with a policy of drop will cause
loss of connectivity.
Ensure that a rule allowing ssh has been added to the base chain prior to setting the
base chain's policy to drop
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify that base chains contain a policy of DROP.
# nft list ruleset | grep 'hook input'
Page 453
Example:
# nft chain inet filter input { policy drop \; }
Default Value:
accept
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 454
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nftables service allows for the loading of nftables rulesets during boot, or starting on
the nftables service
Rationale:
The nftables service restores the nftables rules from the rules files referenced in the
/etc/nftables.conf file during boot or the starting of the nftables service
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that the nftables service is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled nftables
enabled
Remediation:
Run the following command to enable the nftables service:
# systemctl enable nftables
References:
Page 455
Controls
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techniques
Page 456
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of
network packets/datagrams/frames.
The nftables service reads the /etc/nftables.conf file for a nftables file or files to
include in the nftables ruleset.
A nftables ruleset containing the input, forward, and output base chains allow network
traffic to be filtered.
Note: Saving the script and following the instruction in the Configure nftables section
overview will implement the rules in the configure nftable section, open port 22(ssh)
from anywhere, and applies nftables ruleset on boot.
Rationale:
Changes made to nftables ruleset only affect the live system, you will also need to
configure the nftables ruleset to apply on boot
Page 457
Review the input base chain to ensure that it follows local site policy
Run the following command to verify the forward base chain:
# [ -n "$(grep -E '^\s*include' /etc/nftables.conf)" ] && awk '/hook forward/,/}/' $(awk '$1 ~ /^\s*include/ {
gsub("\"","",$2);print $2 }' /etc/nftables.conf)
Review the forward base chain to ensure that it follows local site policy.
Run the following command to verify the forward base chain:
# [ -n "$(grep -E '^\s*include' /etc/nftables.conf)" ] && awk '/hook output/,/}/' $(awk '$1 ~ /^\s*include/ {
gsub("\"","",$2);print $2 }' /etc/nftables.conf)
Review the output base chain to ensure that it follows local site policy.
Page 458
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 459
Page 460
This section provides guidance for installing, enabling, removing, and disabling software
packages necessary for using IPTables as the method for configuring and maintaining a
Host Based Firewall on the system.
Note: Using more than one method to configure and maintain a Host Based Firewall
can cause unexpected results. If Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) or NFTables are being
used for configuration and maintenance, this section should be skipped and the
guidance in their respective section followed.
Page 461
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
iptables is a utility program that allows a system administrator to configure the tables
provided by the Linux kernel firewall, implemented as different Netfilter modules, and
the chains and rules it stores. Different kernel modules and programs are used for
different protocols; iptables applies to IPv4, ip6tables to IPv6, arptables to ARP, and
ebtables to Ethernet frames.
Rationale:
A method of configuring and maintaining firewall rules is necessary to configure a Host
Based Firewall.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that iptables is installed:
# dpkg-query -s iptables &>/dev/null && echo "iptables is installed"
iptables is installed
iptables-persistent is installed
Remediation:
Run the following command to install iptables and iptables-persistent:
# apt install iptables iptables-persistent
References:
Page 462
Controls
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techniques
Page 463
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of
network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables.
Rationale:
Running both iptables and nftables may lead to conflict.
Audit:
Run the following commend to verify that nftables is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s nftables &>/dev/null && echo "nftables is installed"
- OR -
Run the following commands to stop and mask nftables.service:
# systemctl stop nftables.service
# systemctl mask nftables.service
References:
Page 464
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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techniques
Page 465
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Uncomplicated Firewall (UFW) is a program for managing a netfilter firewall designed to
be easy to use.
Rationale:
Running iptables.persistent with ufw enabled may lead to conflict and unexpected
results.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify that ufw is either not installed or disabled. Only
one of the following needs to pass.
Run the following command to verify that ufw is not installed:
# dpkg-query -s ufw &>/dev/null && echo "ufw is installed"
Status: inactive
Run the following commands to verify that the ufw.service is not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled ufw 2>dev/null | grep '^enabled'
Page 466
- OR -
Run the following commands to disable ufw, and stop and mask ufw.service:
# ufw disable
# systemctl stop ufw.service
# systemctl mask ufw.service
Note: ufw disable needs to be run before systemctl mask ufw.service in order to
correctly disable UFW
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 467
iptables is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IP packet filter rules in
the Linux kernel. Several different tables may be defined. Each table contains a number
of built-in chains and may also contain user-defined chains.
Each chain is a list of rules which can match a set of packets. Each rule specifies what
to do with a packet that matches. This is called a 'target', which may be a jump to a
user-defined chain in the same table.
Note: This section broadly assumes starting with an empty iptables firewall ruleset
(established by flushing the rules with iptables -F). Remediation steps included only
affect the live system, you will also need to configure your default firewall configuration
to apply on boot. Configuration of a live systems firewall directly over a remote
connection will often result in being locked out. It is advised to have a known good
firewall configuration set to run on boot and to configure an entire firewall structure in a
script that is then run and tested before saving to boot. The following script will
implement the firewall rules of this section and open port 22(ssh) from anywhere:
#!/bin/bash
Page 468
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A default deny all policy on connections ensures that any unconfigured network usage
will be rejected.
Notes:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
With a default accept policy the firewall will accept any packet that is not configured to
be denied. It is easier to allow list acceptable usage than to deny list unacceptable
usage.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that the policy for the INPUT , OUTPUT , and
FORWARD chains is DROP or REJECT :
# iptables -L -n
Chain INPUT (policy DROP)
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP)
Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP)
Remediation:
Run the following commands to implement a default DROP policy:
# iptables -P INPUT DROP
# iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
# iptables -P FORWARD DROP
References:
Page 469
Controls
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techniques
Page 470
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny
traffic to the loopback network (127.0.0.0/8).
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to
the operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback
network (127.0.0.0/8) traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on
this network as an anti-spoofing measure.
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify output includes the listed rules in order (pkts
and bytes counts may differ, prot may be all or 0):
# iptables -L INPUT -v -n
Chain INPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
0 0 ACCEPT all -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0
0 0 DROP all -- * * 127.0.0.0/8 0.0.0.0/0
# iptables -L OUTPUT -v -n
Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
0 0 ACCEPT all -- * lo 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0
Remediation:
Run the following commands to implement the loopback rules:
# iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
# iptables -A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
References:
Page 471
Controls
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techniques
Page 472
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the firewall rules for new outbound, and established connections.
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
If rules are not in place for new outbound, and established connections all packets will
be dropped by the default policy preventing network usage.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify all rules for new outbound, and established
connections match site policy:
# iptables -L -v -n
Remediation:
Configure iptables in accordance with site policy. The following commands will
implement a policy to allow all outbound connections and all established connections:
# iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
References:
Page 473
Controls
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techniques
Page 474
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Any ports that have been opened on non-loopback addresses need firewall rules to
govern traffic.
Notes:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
• The remediation command opens up the port to traffic from all sources. Consult
iptables documentation and set any restrictions in compliance with site policy
Rationale:
Without a firewall rule configured for open ports default firewall policy will drop all
packets to these ports.
Audit:
Run the following command to determine open ports:
# ss -4tuln
Verify all open ports listening on non-localhost addresses have at least one firewall rule.
The last line identified by the tcp dpt:22 state NEW identifies it as a firewall rule for
new connections on tcp port 22.
Page 475
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 476
Ip6tables is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IPv6 packet filter rules in
the Linux kernel. Several different tables may be defined. Each table contains a number
of built-in chains and may also contain user-defined chains. Each chain is a list of rules
which can match a set of packets. Each rule specifies what to do with a packet that
matches. This is called a `target', which may be a jump to a user-defined chain in the
same table.
If IPv6 in enabled on the system, the ip6tables should be configured.
Note: This section broadly assumes starting with an empty ip6tables firewall ruleset
(established by flushing the rules with ip6tables -F). Remediation steps included only
affect the live system, you will also need to configure your default firewall configuration
to apply on boot. Configuration of a live systems firewall directly over a remote
connection will often result in being locked out. It is advised to have a known good
firewall configuration set to run on boot and to configure an entire firewall structure in a
script that is then run and tested before saving to boot.
The following script will implement the firewall rules of this section and open port
22(ssh) from anywhere:
#!/bin/bash
Page 477
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A default deny all policy on connections ensures that any unconfigured network usage
will be rejected.
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
With a default accept policy the firewall will accept any packet that is not configured to
be denied. It is easier to allow list acceptable usage than to deny list unacceptable
usage.
Page 478
- OR -
Verify IPv6 is disabled:
Run the following script. Output will confirm if IPv6 is enabled on the system.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_ipv6_enabled="is"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs -- "^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"
&& \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
fi
echo -e " - IPv6 $l_ipv6_enabled enabled on the system"
}
Remediation:
- IF - IPv6 is enabled on your system:
Run the following commands to implement a default DROP policy:
# ip6tables -P INPUT DROP
# ip6tables -P OUTPUT DROP
# ip6tables -P FORWARD DROP
References:
Page 479
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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techniques
Page 480
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the loopback interface to accept traffic. Configure all other interfaces to deny
traffic to the loopback network (::1).
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to
operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network
(::1) traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as
an anti-spoofing measure.
Page 481
# ip6tables -L OUTPUT -v -n
Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes)
pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination
0 0 ACCEPT all * lo ::/0 ::/0
- OR -
Verify IPv6 is disabled:
Run the following script. Output will confirm if IPv6 is enabled on the system.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_ipv6_enabled="is"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs -- "^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"
&& \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
fi
echo -e " - IPv6 $l_ipv6_enabled enabled on the system"
}
Remediation:
Run the following commands to implement the loopback rules:
# ip6tables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# ip6tables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
# ip6tables -A INPUT -s ::1 -j DROP
References:
Page 482
Controls
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techniques
Page 483
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the firewall rules for new outbound, and established IPv6 connections.
Note:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
Rationale:
If rules are not in place for new outbound, and established connections all packets will
be dropped by the default policy preventing network usage.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify all rules for new outbound, and established
connections match site policy:
# ip6tables -L -v -n
- OR -
Verify IPv6 is disabled:
Run the following script. Output will confirm if IPv6 is enabled on the system.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_ipv6_enabled="is"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs -- "^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"
&& \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
fi
echo -e " - IPv6 $l_ipv6_enabled enabled on the system"
}
Page 484
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 485
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Any ports that have been opened on non-loopback addresses need firewall rules to
govern traffic.
Notes:
• Changing firewall settings while connected over network can result in being
locked out of the system
• Remediation will only affect the active system firewall, be sure to configure the
default policy in your firewall management to apply on boot as well
• The remediation command opens up the port to traffic from all sources. Consult
iptables documentation and set any restrictions in compliance with site policy
Rationale:
Without a firewall rule configured for open ports default firewall policy will drop all
packets to these ports.
Page 486
Verify all open ports listening on non-localhost addresses have at least one firewall rule.
The last line identified by the "tcp dpt:22 state NEW" identifies it as a firewall rule for
new connections on tcp port 22.
{
l_ipv6_enabled="is"
! grep -Pqs -- '^\h*0\b' /sys/module/ipv6/parameters/disable && l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
if sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs -- "^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.all\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"
&& \
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 | grep -Pqs --
"^\h*net\.ipv6\.conf\.default\.disable_ipv6\h*=\h*1\b"; then
l_ipv6_enabled="is not"
fi
echo -e " - IPv6 $l_ipv6_enabled enabled on the system"
}
Remediation:
For each port identified in the audit which does not have a firewall rule establish a
proper rule for accepting inbound connections:
# ip6tables -A INPUT -p <protocol> --dport <port> -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
References:
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Page 488
Page 489
Secure Shell (SSH) is a secure, encrypted replacement for common login services such
as telnet, ftp, rlogin, rsh, and rcp. It is strongly recommended that sites abandon
older clear-text login protocols and use SSH to prevent session hijacking and sniffing of
sensitive data off the network.
The recommendations in this section only apply if the SSH daemon is installed on the
system, if remote access is not required the SSH daemon can be removed and
this section skipped.
sshd_config:
• The openSSH daemon configuration directives, Include and Match, may cause
the audits in this section's recommendations to report incorrectly. It is
recommended that these options only be used if they're needed and fully
understood. If these options are configured in accordance with local site policy,
they should be accounted for when following the recommendations in this
section.
• The default Include location is the /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d directory. This
default has been accounted for in this section. If a file has an additional Include
that isn't this default location, the files should be reviewed to verify that the
recommended setting is not being over-ridden.
• The audits of the running configuration in this section are run in the context of the
root user, the local host name, and the local host's IP address. If a Match block
exists that matches one of these criteria, the output of the audit will be from the
match block. The respective matched criteria should be replaced with a non-
matching substitution.
• Include:
o Include the specified configuration file(s).
o Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
glob(7) wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
o Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh/.
o An Include directive may appear inside a Match block to perform
conditional inclusion.
• Match:
o Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the Match line are
satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the
global section of the config file, until either another Match line or the end of
the file. If a keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied,
only the first instance of the keyword is applied.
o The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the
single token All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are User,
Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, and Address.
o The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists
and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
Page 490
sshd command:
• -T - Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the
effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, Match rules may be
applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more -C options.
• -C - connection_spec. Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T
extended test mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that
would apply are applied before the configuration is written to standard output.
The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be
supplied in any order, either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated
list. The keywords are addr, user, host, laddr, lport, and rdomain and
correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, local address,
local port number and routing domain respectively.
Page 491
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The file /etc/ssh/sshd_config, and files ending in .conf in the
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d directory, contain configuration specifications for sshd.
Rationale:
configuration specifications for sshd need to be protected from unauthorized changes
by non-privileged users.
Page 492
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
a_output=(); a_output2=()
perm_mask='0177' && maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$perm_mask)) )"
f_sshd_files_chk()
{
while IFS=: read -r l_mode l_user l_group; do
a_out2=()
[ $(( $l_mode & $perm_mask )) -gt 0 ] && a_out2+=(" Is mode: \"$l_mode\"" \
" should be mode: \"$maxperm\" or more restrictive")
[ "$l_user" != "root" ] && a_out2+=(" Is owned by \"$l_user\" should be owned by \"root\"")
[ "$l_group" != "root" ] && a_out2+=(" Is group owned by \"$l_user\" should be group owned by
\"root\"")
if [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ]; then
a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\":" "${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\":" " Correct: mode ($l_mode), owner ($l_user)" \
" and group owner ($l_group) configured")
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
}
[ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config" ] && l_file="/etc/ssh/sshd_config" && f_sshd_files_chk
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
[ -e "$l_file" ] && f_sshd_files_chk
done < <(find /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d -type f -name '*.conf' \( -perm /077 -o ! -user root -o ! -group root
\) -print0 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
- IF - other locations are listed in an Include statement, *.conf files in these locations
should also be checked.
Remediation:
Run the following script to set ownership and permissions on /etc/ssh/sshd_config
and files ending in .conf in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d directory:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
chmod u-x,og-rwx /etc/ssh/sshd_config
chown root:root /etc/ssh/sshd_config
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
chmod u-x,og-rwx "$l_file"
chown root:root "$l_file"
fi
done < <(find /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
}
- IF - other locations are listed in an Include statement, *.conf files in these locations
access should also be modified.
Page 493
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Page 494
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
An SSH private key is one of two files used in SSH public key authentication. In this
authentication method, the possession of the private key is proof of identity. Only a
private key that corresponds to a public key will be able to authenticate successfully.
The private keys need to be stored and handled carefully, and no copies of the private
key should be distributed.
Rationale:
If an unauthorized user obtains the private SSH host key file, the host could be
impersonated
Page 495
- OR -
• owned by the group designated to own openSSH private keys and mode 0640 or
more restrictive
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
a_output=(); a_output2=()
l_ssh_group_name="$(awk -F: '($1 ~ /^(ssh_keys|_?ssh)$/) {print $1}' /etc/group)"
f_file_chk()
{
while IFS=: read -r l_file_mode l_file_owner l_file_group; do
a_out2=()
[ "$l_file_group" = "$l_ssh_group_name" ] && l_pmask="0137" || l_pmask="0177"
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_pmask )) )"
if [ $(( $l_file_mode & $l_pmask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_out2+=(" Mode: \"$l_file_mode\" should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive")
fi
if [ "$l_file_owner" != "root" ]; then
a_out2+=(" Owned by: \"$l_file_owner\" should be owned by \"root\"")
fi
if [[ ! "$l_file_group" =~ ($l_ssh_group_name|root) ]]; then
a_out2+=(" Owned by group \"$l_file_group\" should be group owned by: \"$l_ssh_group_name\" or
\"root\"")
fi
if [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ]; then
a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" \
" Correct: mode: \"$l_file_mode\", owner: \"$l_file_owner\" and group owner: \"$l_file_group\"
configured")
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if ssh-keygen -lf &>/dev/null "$l_file"; then
file "$l_file" | grep -Piq -- '\bopenssh\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?private\h+key\b' && f_file_chk
fi
done < <(find -L /etc/ssh -xdev -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 496
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_ssh_group_name="$(awk -F: '($1 ~ /^(ssh_keys|_?ssh)$/) {print $1}' /etc/group)"
f_file_access_fix()
{
while IFS=: read -r l_file_mode l_file_owner l_file_group; do
a_out2=()
[ "$l_file_group" = "$l_ssh_group_name" ] && l_pmask="0137" || l_pmask="0177"
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_pmask )) )"
if [ $(( $l_file_mode & $l_pmask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_out2+=(" Mode: \"$l_file_mode\" should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive" \
" updating to mode: \:$l_maxperm\"")
if [ "l_file_group" = "$l_ssh_group_name" ]; then
chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx "$l_file"
else
chmod u-x,go-rwx "$l_file"
fi
fi
if [ "$l_file_owner" != "root" ]; then
a_out2+=(" Owned by: \"$l_file_owner\" should be owned by \"root\"" \
" Changing ownership to \"root\"")
chown root "$l_file"
fi
if [[ ! "$l_file_group" =~ ($l_ssh_group_name|root) ]]; then
[ -n "$l_ssh_group_name" ] && l_new_group="$l_ssh_group_name" || l_new_group="root"
a_out2+=(" Owned by group \"$l_file_group\" should be group owned by: \"$l_ssh_group_name\" or
\"root\"" \
" Changing group ownership to \"$l_new_group\"")
chgrp "$l_new_group" "$l_file"
fi
if [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ]; then
a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" "${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" \
"Correct: mode: \"$l_file_mode\", owner: \"$l_file_owner\", and group owner: \"$l_file_group\"
configured")
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if ssh-keygen -lf &>/dev/null "$l_file"; then
file "$l_file" | grep -Piq -- '\bopenssh\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?private\h+key\b' && f_file_access_fix
fi
done < <(find -L /etc/ssh -xdev -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le "0" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - No access changes required" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" " - Remediation results:" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
fi
}
References:
Page 497
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 498
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
An SSH public key is one of two files used in SSH public key authentication. In this
authentication method, a public key is a key that can be used for verifying digital
signatures generated using a corresponding private key. Only a public key that
corresponds to a private key will be able to authenticate successfully.
Rationale:
If a public host key file is modified by an unauthorized user, the SSH service may be
compromised.
Page 499
{
a_output=(); a_output2=()
l_pmask="0133"; l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_pmask )) )"
f_file_chk()
{
while IFS=: read -r l_file_mode l_file_owner l_file_group; do
a_out2=()
if [ $(( $l_file_mode & $l_pmask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_out2+=(" Mode: \"$l_file_mode\" should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive")
fi
if [ "$l_file_owner" != "root" ]; then
a_out2+=(" Owned by: \"$l_file_owner\" should be owned by: \"root\"")
fi
if [ "$l_file_group" != "root" ]; then
a_out2+=(" Owned by group \"$l_file_group\" should be group owned by group: \"root\"")
fi
if [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ]; then
a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" "${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" \
" Correct: mode: \"$l_file_mode\", owner: \"$l_file_owner\" and group owner: \"$l_file_group\"
configured")
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if ssh-keygen -lf &>/dev/null "$l_file"; then
file "$l_file" | grep -Piq -- '\bopenssh\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?public\h+key\b' && f_file_chk
fi
done < <(find -L /etc/ssh -xdev -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -le 0 ] && a_output+=(" - No openSSH public keys found")
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 500
{
a_output=(); a_output2=()
l_pmask="0133"; l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_pmask )) )"
f_file_access_fix()
{
while IFS=: read -r l_file_mode l_file_owner l_file_group; do
a_out2=()
[ $(( $l_file_mode & $l_pmask )) -gt 0 ] && \
a_out2+=(" Mode: \"$l_file_mode\" should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive" \
" updating to mode: \"$l_maxperm\"") && chmod u-x,go-wx "$l_file"
[ "$l_file_owner" != "root" ] && \
a_out2+=(" Owned by: \"$l_file_owner\" should be owned by \"root\"" \
" Changing ownership to \"root\"") && chown root "$l_file"
[ "$l_file_group" != "root" ] && \
a_out2+=(" Owned by group \"$l_file_group\" should be group owned by: \"root\"" \
" Changing group ownership to \"root\"") && chgrp root "$l_file"
if [ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ]; then
a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" "${a_out2[@]}")
else
a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\"" \
" Correct: mode: \"$l_file_mode\", owner: \"$l_file_owner\", and group owner: \"$l_file_group\"
configured")
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if ssh-keygen -lf &>/dev/null "$l_file"; then
file "$l_file" | grep -Piq -- '\bopenssh\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?public\h+key\b' && f_file_access_fix
fi
done < <(find -L /etc/ssh -xdev -type f -print0 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le "0" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - No access changes required" ""
else
printf '%s\n' " - Remediation results:" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
fi
}
Default Value:
644 0/root 0/root
References:
Page 501
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 502
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
There are several options available to limit which users and group can access the
system via SSH. It is recommended that at least one of the following options be
leveraged:
• AllowUsers:
o The AllowUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of
allowing specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space
separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this
variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by
only allowing the allowed users to log in from a particular host, the entry
can be specified in the form of user@host.
• AllowGroups:
o The AllowGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of
allowing specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists
of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized
with this variable.
• DenyUsers:
o The DenyUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of
denying specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space
separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this
variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by
specifically denying a user's access from a particular host, the entry can
be specified in the form of user@host.
• DenyGroups:
o The DenyGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of
denying specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists
of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized
with this variable.
Rationale:
Restricting which users can remotely access the system via SSH will help ensure that
only authorized users access the system.
Page 503
Verify that the output matches at least one of the following lines:
allowusers <userlist>
-OR-
allowgroups <grouplist>
-OR-
denyusers <userlist>
-OR-
denygroups <grouplist>
Review the list(s) to ensure included users and/or groups follow local site policy
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep -Pi -- '^\h*(allow|deny)(users|groups)\h+\H+'
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain).
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set one or more of the parameters above any
Include and Match set statements as follows:
AllowUsers <userlist>
- AND/OR -
AllowGroups <grouplist>
Note:
Page 504
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-3. MP-2
3. SSHD(8)
4. https://documentation.suse.com/en-us/sles/15-SP6/html/SLES-all/cha-ssh.html
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 505
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The Banner parameter specifies a file whose contents must be sent to the remote user
before authentication is permitted. By default, no banner is displayed.
Rationale:
Banners are used to warn connecting users of the particular site's policy regarding
connection. Presenting a warning message prior to the normal user login may assist the
prosecution of trespassers on the computer system.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify Banner is set:
# sshd -T | grep -Pi -- '^banner\h+\/\H+'
Example:
banner /etc/issue.net
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep -Pi -- '^banner\h+\/\H+'
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain).
Run the following command and verify that the contents or the file being called by the
Banner argument match site policy:
# [ -e "$(sshd -T | awk '$1 == "banner" {print $2}')" ] && cat "$(sshd -T | awk '$1 == "banner" {print $2}')"
Page 506
References:
CIS Controls:
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 507
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
This variable limits the ciphers that SSH can use during communication.
Notes:
Rationale:
Weak ciphers that are used for authentication to the cryptographic module cannot be
relied upon to provide confidentiality or integrity, and system data may be compromised.
• The Triple DES ciphers, as used in SSH, have a birthday bound of approximately
four billion blocks, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain clear text
data via a birthday attack against a long-duration encrypted session, aka a
"Sweet32" attack.
• Error handling in the SSH protocol; Client and Server, when using a block cipher
algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, makes it easier for remote
attackers to recover certain plain text data from an arbitrary block of cipher text in
an SSH session via unknown vectors.
Page 508
- IF - a line is returned, review the list of ciphers. If the line includes chacha20-
[email protected], review CVE-2023-48795 and verify the system has been
patched. No ciphers in the list below should be returned as they're considered "weak":
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file and add/modify the Ciphers line to contain a comma
separated list of the site unapproved (weak) Ciphers preceded with a - above any
Include entries:
Example:
Ciphers -3des-cbc,aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,[email protected]
- IF - CVE-2023-48795 has been addressed, and it meets local site policy, chacha20-
[email protected] may be removed from the list of excluded ciphers.
Note: First occurrence of an option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
Ciphers [email protected],aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-
[email protected],[email protected]
References:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48795
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1543
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2183
4. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-5161
5. https://www.openssh.com/txt/cbc.adv
6. https://www.openssh.com/txt/cbc.adv
7. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
8. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: SC-8
Page 509
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 510
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Note: To clarify, the two settings described below are only meant for idle connections
from a protocol perspective and are not meant to check if the user is active or not. An
idle user does not mean an idle connection. SSH does not and never had, intentionally,
the capability to drop idle users. In SSH versions before 8.2p1 there was a bug that
caused these values to behave in such a manner that they were abused to disconnect
idle users. This bug has been resolved in 8.2p1 and thus it can no longer be abused
disconnect idle users.
The two options ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax control the timeout
of SSH sessions. Taken directly from man 5 sshd_config:
Rationale:
In order to prevent resource exhaustion, appropriate values should be set for both
ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax. Specifically, looking at the source
code, ClientAliveCountMax must be greater than zero in order to utilize the ability of
SSH to drop idle connections. If connections are allowed to stay open indefinitely, this
can potentially be used as a DDOS attack or simple resource exhaustion could occur
over unreliable networks.
Page 511
Example Output:
clientaliveinterval 15
clientalivecountmax 3
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep -Pi -- '(clientaliveinterval|clientalivecountmax)'
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain).
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the ClientAliveInterval and
ClientAliveCountMax parameters above any Include and Match entries according to
site policy.
Example:
ClientAliveInterval 15
ClientAliveCountMax 3
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. SSHD(8)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 512
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0001 M1026
T1078.002, T1078.003
Page 513
• Level 1 - Workstation
• Level 2 - Server
Description:
The DisableForwarding parameter disables all forwarding features, including X11,
ssh-agent(1), TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-related
options and may simplify restricted configurations.
• X11Forwarding provides the ability to tunnel X11 traffic through the connection to
enable remote graphic connections.
• ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication.
Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and
automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using
ssh.
• SSH port forwarding is a mechanism in SSH for tunneling application ports from
the client to the server, or servers to clients. It can be used for adding encryption
to legacy applications, going through firewalls, and some system administrators
and IT professionals use it for opening backdoors into the internal network from
their home machines.
Rationale:
Disable X11 forwarding unless there is an operational requirement to use X11
applications directly. There is a small risk that the remote X11 servers of users who are
logged in via SSH with X11 forwarding could be compromised by other users on the
X11 server. Note that even if X11 forwarding is disabled, users can always install their
own forwarders.
anyone with root privilege on the the intermediate server can make free use of ssh-
agent to authenticate them to other servers
Leaving port forwarding enabled can expose the organization to security risks and
backdoors. SSH connections are protected with strong encryption. This makes their
contents invisible to most deployed network monitoring and traffic filtering solutions.
This invisibility carries considerable risk potential if it is used for malicious purposes
such as data exfiltration. Cybercriminals or malware could exploit SSH to hide their
unauthorized communications, or to exfiltrate stolen data from the target network.
Page 514
disableforwarding yes
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the DisableForwarding parameter to yes
above any Include entry as follows:
DisableForwarding yes
Note: First occurrence of a option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
References:
1. sshd_config(5)
2. SSHD(8)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-7
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
9.2 Ensure Only Approved Ports, Protocols and Services Are Running
v7 Ensure that only network ports, protocols, and services listening on a system with validated ● ●
business needs, are running on each system.
Page 515
• Level 1 - Workstation
• Level 2 - Server
Description:
The GSSAPIAuthentication parameter specifies whether user authentication based on
GSSAPI is allowed
Rationale:
Allowing GSSAPI authentication through SSH exposes the system's GSSAPI to remote
hosts, and should be disabled to reduce the attack surface of the system
Audit:
Run the following command to verify GSSAPIAuthentication is set to no:
# sshd -T | grep gssapiauthentication
gssapiauthentication no
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep gssapiauthentication
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the GSSAPIAuthentication parameter to
no above any Include and Match entries as follows:
GSSAPIAuthentication no
Default Value:
GSSAPIAuthentication no
Page 516
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. SSHD(8)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0001 M1042
T1078.003
Page 517
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The HostbasedAuthentication parameter specifies if authentication is allowed
through trusted hosts via the user of .rhosts, or /etc/hosts.equiv, along with
successful public key client host authentication.
Rationale:
Even though the .rhosts files are ineffective if support is disabled in /etc/pam.conf,
disabling the ability to use .rhosts files in SSH provides an additional layer of
protection.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify HostbasedAuthentication is set to no:
# sshd -T | grep hostbasedauthentication
hostbasedauthentication no
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep hostbasedauthentication
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the HostbasedAuthentication parameter
to no above any Include and Match entries as follows:
HostbasedAuthentication no
Page 518
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. SSHD(8)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0001 M1042
T1078.003
Page 519
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The IgnoreRhosts parameter specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used
in RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication.
Rationale:
Setting this parameter forces users to enter a password when authenticating with SSH.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify IgnoreRhosts is set to yes:
# sshd -T | grep ignorerhosts
ignorerhosts yes
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the IgnoreRhosts parameter to yes above
any Include entry as follows:
IgnoreRhosts yes
Note: First occurrence of a option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
IgnoreRhosts yes
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. SSHD(8)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 520
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0001 M1027
T1078.003
Page 521
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Key exchange is any method in cryptography by which cryptographic keys are
exchanged between two parties, allowing use of a cryptographic algorithm. If the sender
and receiver wish to exchange encrypted messages, each must be equipped to encrypt
messages to be sent and decrypt messages received
Notes:
• Kex algorithms have a higher preference the earlier they appear in the list
• Some organizations may have stricter requirements for approved Key exchange
algorithms
• Ensure that Key exchange algorithms used are in compliance with site policy
• The only Key Exchange Algorithms currently FIPS 140 approved are:
o ecdh-sha2-nistp256
o ecdh-sha2-nistp384
o ecdh-sha2-nistp521
o diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
o diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
o diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
o diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
Rationale:
Key exchange methods that are considered weak should be removed. A key exchange
method may be weak because too few bits are used, or the hashing algorithm is
considered too weak. Using weak algorithms could expose connections to man-in-the-
middle attacks
Page 522
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file and add/modify the KexAlgorithms line to contain
a comma separated list of the site unapproved (weak) KexAlgorithms preceded with a -
above any Include entries:
Example:
KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group1-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
Note: First occurrence of an option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
KexAlgorithms [email protected],curve25519-
sha256,[email protected],ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-
sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-
sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
References:
1. https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/openssh-crypto-configuration
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: SC-8
3. SSHD(8)
4. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
Page 523
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 524
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The LoginGraceTime parameter specifies the time allowed for successful
authentication to the SSH server. The longer the Grace period is the more open
unauthenticated connections can exist. Like other session controls in this session the
Grace Period should be limited to appropriate organizational limits to ensure the service
is available for needed access.
Rationale:
Setting the LoginGraceTime parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of
successful brute force attacks to the SSH server. It will also limit the number of
concurrent unauthenticated connections While the recommended setting is 60 seconds
(1 Minute), set the number based on site policy.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that output LoginGraceTime is between 1 and
60 seconds:
# sshd -T | grep logingracetime
logingracetime 60
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the LoginGraceTime parameter to 60
seconds or less above any Include entry as follows:
LoginGraceTime 60
Note: First occurrence of a option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
LoginGraceTime 120
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-6
3. SSHD(8)
Page 525
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1036
T1110.003, T1110.004
Page 526
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
SSH provides several logging levels with varying amounts of verbosity. The DEBUG
options are specifically not recommended other than strictly for debugging SSH
communications. These levels provide so much data that it is difficult to identify
important security information, and may violate the privacy of users.
Rationale:
The INFO level is the basic level that only records login activity of SSH users. In many
situations, such as Incident Response, it is important to determine when a particular
user was active on a system. The logout record can eliminate those users who
disconnected, which helps narrow the field.
The VERBOSE level specifies that login and logout activity as well as the key fingerprint
for any SSH key used for login will be logged. This information is important for SSH key
management, especially in legacy environments.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that output matches loglevel VERBOSE or
loglevel INFO:
# sshd -T | grep loglevel
loglevel VERBOSE
- OR -
loglevel INFO
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep loglevel
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Page 527
Default Value:
LogLevel INFO
References:
1. https://www.ssh.com/ssh/sshd_config/
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-3, AU-12, SI-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 528
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
This variable limits the types of MAC algorithms that SSH can use during
communication.
Notes:
Rationale:
MD5 and 96-bit MAC algorithms are considered weak and have been shown to increase
exploitability in SSH downgrade attacks. Weak algorithms continue to have a great deal
of attention as a weak spot that can be exploited with expanded computing power. An
attacker that breaks the algorithm could take advantage of a MiTM position to decrypt
the SSH tunnel and capture credentials and information.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify none of the "weak" MACs are being used:
# sshd -T | grep -Pi -- 'macs\h+([^#\n\r]+,)?(hmac-md5|hmac-md5-96|hmac-ripemd160|hmac-sha1-96|umac-
64@openssh\.com|hmac-md5-etm@openssh\.com|hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh\.com|hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh\.com|hmac-
sha1-96-etm@openssh\.com|umac-64-etm@openssh\.com|umac-128-etm@openssh\.com)\b'
Page 529
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file and add/modify the MACs line to contain a comma
separated list of the site unapproved (weak) MACs preceded with a - above any
Include entries:
Example:
MACs -hmac-md5,hmac-md5-96,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,[email protected],[email protected],hmac-md5-
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
- IF - CVE-2023-48795 has not been reviewed and addressed, the following etm MACs
should be added to the exclude list: [email protected],hmac-sha2-256-
[email protected],[email protected]
Note: First occurrence of an option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
MACs [email protected],[email protected],hmac-sha2-256-
[email protected],[email protected],hmac-sha1-
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],hmac-sha2-
256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
References:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48795
2. More information on SSH downgrade attacks can be found here:
http://www.mitls.org/pages/attacks/SLOTH
3. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
4. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 530
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 531
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The MaxAuthTries parameter specifies the maximum number of authentication
attempts permitted per connection. When the login failure count reaches half the
number, error messages will be written to the syslog file detailing the login failure.
Rationale:
Setting the MaxAuthTries parameter to a low number will minimize the risk of
successful brute force attacks to the SSH server. While the recommended setting is 4,
set the number based on site policy.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that MaxAuthTries is 4 or less:
# sshd -T | grep maxauthtries
maxauthtries 4
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep maxauthtries
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the MaxAuthTries parameter to 4 or less
above any Include and Match entries as follows:
MaxAuthTries 4
Page 532
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-3
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1036
T1110.003
Page 533
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The MaxSessions parameter specifies the maximum number of open sessions
permitted from a given connection.
Rationale:
To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of concurrent
sessions, use the rate limiting function of MaxSessions to protect availability of sshd
logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that MaxSessions is 10 or less:
# sshd -T | grep maxsessions
maxsessions 10
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep maxsessions
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Page 534
Default Value:
MaxSessions 10
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
CIS Controls:
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 535
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The MaxStartups parameter specifies the maximum number of concurrent
unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon.
Rationale:
To protect a system from denial of service due to a large number of pending
authentication connection attempts, use the rate limiting function of MaxStartups to
protect availability of sshd logins and prevent overwhelming the daemon.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify MaxStartups is 10:30:60 or more restrictive:
# sshd -T | awk '$1 ~ /^\s*maxstartups/{split($2, a, ":");{if(a[1] > 10 || a[2] > 30 || a[3] > 60) print $0}}'
Note: First occurrence of a option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
MaxStartups 10:30:100
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 536
Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 537
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The PermitEmptyPasswords parameter specifies if the SSH server allows login to
accounts with empty password strings.
Rationale:
Disallowing remote shell access to accounts that have an empty password reduces the
probability of unauthorized access to the system.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify PermitEmptyPasswords is set to no:
# sshd -T | grep permitemptypasswords
permitemptypasswords no
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep permitemptypasswords
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Remediation:
Edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config and set the PermitEmptyPasswords parameter to no
above any Include and Match entries as follows:
PermitEmptyPasswords no
Page 538
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 539
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The PermitRootLogin parameter specifies if the root user can log in using SSH. The
default is prohibit-password.
Rationale:
Disallowing root logins over SSH requires system admins to authenticate using their
own individual account, then escalating to root. This limits opportunity for non-
repudiation and provides a clear audit trail in the event of a security incident.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify PermitRootLogin is set to no:
# sshd -T | grep permitrootlogin
permitrootlogin no
- IF - Match set statements are used in your environment, specify the connection
parameters to use for the -T extended test mode and run the audit to verify the setting
is not incorrectly configured in a match block
Example additional audit needed for a match block for the user sshuser:
# sshd -T -C user=sshuser | grep permitrootlogin
Note: If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply are
applied before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection
parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. The keywords are addr
(source address), user (user), host (resolved source host name), laddr (local
address), lport (local port number), and rdomain (routing domain)
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the PermitRootLogin parameter to no
above any Include and Match entries as follows:
PermitRootLogin no
Page 540
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5:AC-6
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 541
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The PermitUserEnvironment option allows users to present environment options to
the SSH daemon.
Rationale:
Permitting users the ability to set environment variables through the SSH daemon could
potentially allow users to bypass security controls (e.g. setting an execution path that
has SSH executing trojan'd programs)
Audit:
Run the following command to verify PermitUserEnvironment is set to no:
# sshd -T | grep permituserenvironment
permituserenvironment no
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the PermitUserEnvironment parameter to
no above any Include entries as follows:
PermitUserEnvironment no
Note: First occurrence of an option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
PermitUserEnvironment no
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1,CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
3. SSHD(8)
Page 542
Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 543
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The UsePAM directive enables the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) interface. If
set to yes this will enable PAM authentication using
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication directives in
addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types.
Rationale:
When usePAM is set to yes, PAM runs through account and session types properly. This
is important if you want to restrict access to services based off of IP, time or other
factors of the account. Additionally, you can make sure users inherit certain
environment variables on login or disallow access to the server
Audit:
Run the following command to verify UsePAM is set to yes:
# sshd -T | grep usepam
usepam yes
Remediation:
Edit the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file to set the UsePAM parameter to yes above any
Include entries as follows:
UsePAM yes
Note: First occurrence of an option takes precedence. If Include locations are enabled,
used, and order of precedence is understood in your environment, the entry may be
created in a file in Include location.
Default Value:
UsePAM yes
References:
1. SSHD_CONFIG(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
3. SSHD(8)
Page 544
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 545
There are various tools which allows a permitted user to execute a command as the
superuser or another user, as specified by the security policy.
sudo
sudo documentation
The invoking user's real (not effective) user ID is used to determine the user name with
which to query the security policy.
sudo supports a plug-in architecture for security policies and input/output logging. Third
parties can develop and distribute their own policy and I/O logging plug-ins to work
seamlessly with the sudo front end. The default security policy is sudoers, which is
configured via the file /etc/sudoers and any entries in /etc/sudoers.d.
pkexec
pkexec documentation
pkexec allows an authorized user to execute PROGRAM as another user. If username
is not specified, then the program will be executed as the administrative super user,
root.
Page 546
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command as the superuser or another user,
as specified by the security policy. The invoking user's real (not effective) user ID is
used to determine the user name with which to query the security policy.
Rationale:
sudo supports a plug-in architecture for security policies and input/output logging. Third
parties can develop and distribute their own policy and I/O logging plug-ins to work
seamlessly with the sudo front end. The default security policy is sudoers, which is
configured via the file /etc/sudoers and any entries in /etc/sudoers.d.
The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has to run sudo. The policy
may require that users authenticate themselves with a password or another
authentication mechanism. If authentication is required, sudo will exit if the user's
password is not entered within a configurable time limit. This limit is policy-specific.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that either sudo is installed:
# dpkg-query -s sudo &>/dev/null && echo "sudo is installed"
sudo is installed
- OR -
Run the following command to verify that either sudo-ldap is installed:
# dpkg-query -s sudo-ldap &>/dev/null && echo "sudo-ldap is installed"
sudo-ldap is installed
Remediation:
First determine is LDAP functionality is required. If so, then install sudo-ldap, else
install sudo.
Example:
# apt install sudo
References:
1. SUDO(8)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-6
Page 547
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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Page 548
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
sudo can be configured to run only from a pseudo terminal (pseudo-pty).
Rationale:
Attackers can run a malicious program using sudo which would fork a background
process that remains even when the main program has finished executing.
Impact:
WARNING: Editing the sudo configuration incorrectly can cause sudo to stop
functioning. Always use visudo to modify sudo configuration files.
Audit:
Verify that sudo can only run other commands from a pseudo terminal.
Run the following command to verify Defaults use_pty is set:
# grep -rPi -- '^\h*Defaults\h+([^#\n\r]+,\h*)?use_pty\b' /etc/sudoers*
Edit the file /etc/sudoers with visudo and any files in /etc/sudoers.d/ with visudo
-f <PATH TO FILE> and remove any occurrence of !use_pty
Page 549
• sudo will read each file in /etc/sudoers.d, skipping file names that end in ~ or
contain a . character to avoid causing problems with package manager or editor
temporary/backup files.
• Files are parsed in sorted lexical order. That is, /etc/sudoers.d/01_first will
be parsed before /etc/sudoers.d/10_second.
• Be aware that because the sorting is lexical, not numeric,
/etc/sudoers.d/1_whoops would be loaded after
/etc/sudoers.d/10_second.
• Using a consistent number of leading zeroes in the file names can be used to
avoid such problems.
References:
1. SUDO(8)
2. VISUDO(8)
3. sudoers(5)
4. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-6
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 550
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
sudo can use a custom log file
Rationale:
A sudo log file simplifies auditing of sudo commands
Impact:
WARNING: Editing the sudo configuration incorrectly can cause sudo to stop
functioning. Always use visudo to modify sudo configuration files.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that sudo has a custom log file configured:
# grep -rPsi "^\h*Defaults\h+([^#]+,\h*)?logfile\h*=\h*(\"|\')?\H+(\"|\')?(,\h*\H+\h*)*\h*(#.*)?$"
/etc/sudoers*
Remediation:
Edit the file /etc/sudoers or a file in /etc/sudoers.d/ with visudo or visudo -f
<PATH TO FILE> and add the following line:
Example:
Defaults logfile="/var/log/sudo.log"
Note:
• sudo will read each file in /etc/sudoers.d, skipping file names that end in ~ or
contain a . character to avoid causing problems with package manager or editor
temporary/backup files.
• Files are parsed in sorted lexical order. That is, /etc/sudoers.d/01_first will
be parsed before /etc/sudoers.d/10_second.
• Be aware that because the sorting is lexical, not numeric,
/etc/sudoers.d/1_whoops would be loaded after
/etc/sudoers.d/10_second.
• Using a consistent number of leading zeroes in the file names can be used to
avoid such problems.
Page 551
1. SUDO(8)
2. VISUDO(8)
3. sudoers(5)
4. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-3, AU-12
Additional Information:
visudo edits the sudoers file in a safe fashion, analogous to vipw(8). visudo locks the
sudoers file against multiple simultaneous edits, provides basic sanity checks, and
checks for parse errors. If the sudoers file is currently being edited you will receive a
message to try again later.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 552
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must be configured so that users must provide a password for
privilege escalation.
Rationale:
Without (re-)authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they
do not have authorization.
When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is
critical the user (re-)authenticate.
Impact:
This will prevent automated processes from being able to elevate privileges.
Audit:
Note: If passwords are not being used for authentication, this is not applicable.
Verify the operating system requires users to supply a password for privilege escalation.
Check the configuration of the /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d/* files with the
following command:
# grep -r "^[^#].*NOPASSWD" /etc/sudoers*
References:
Page 553
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 554
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must be configured so that users must re-authenticate for
privilege escalation.
Rationale:
Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they
do not have authorization.
When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is
critical the user re-authenticate.
Audit:
Verify the operating system requires users to re-authenticate for privilege escalation.
Check the configuration of the /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d/* files with the
following command:
# grep -r "^[^#].*\!authenticate" /etc/sudoers*
If any line is found with a !authenticate tag, refer to the remediation procedure below.
Remediation:
Configure the operating system to require users to reauthenticate for privilege
escalation.
Based on the outcome of the audit procedure, use visudo -f <PATH TO FILE> to edit
the relevant sudoers file.
Remove any occurrences of !authenticate tags in the file(s).
References:
Page 555
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 556
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
sudo caches used credentials for a default of 5 minutes. This is for ease of use when
there are multiple administrative tasks to perform. The timeout can be modified to suit
local security policies.
Rationale:
A timeout value reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized privileged sudo
access.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify the default sudo timeout is enabled and no greater
than 15 minutes:
# sudo -V | grep "Authentication timestamp timeout:"
Example output:
Authentication timestamp timeout: 15.0 minutes
Verify timeout is not: a negative number (disabled), greater than 15 minutes, and follows
local site policy.
Remediation:
- IF - the currently configured timeout is a negative number (disabled), greater than 15
minutes, or doesn't follow local site polity:
Run the visudo command and edit or add the following line:
Defaults timestamp_timeout=<N>
Example:
Defaults timestamp_timeout=15
Default Value:
timestamp_timeout=15
References:
1. https://www.sudo.ws/man/1.9.0/sudoers.man.html
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-6
Page 557
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 558
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The su command allows a user to run a command or shell as another user. The
program has been superseded by sudo, which allows for more granular control over
privileged access. Normally, the su command can be executed by any user. By
uncommenting the pam_wheel.so statement in /etc/pam.d/su, the su command will
only allow users in a specific groups to execute su. This group should be empty to
reinforce the use of sudo for privileged access.
Rationale:
Restricting the use of su , and using sudo in its place, provides system administrators
better control of the escalation of user privileges to execute privileged commands. The
sudo utility also provides a better logging and audit mechanism, as it can log each
command executed via sudo , whereas su can only record that a user executed the su
program.
Audit:
Run the following command:
# grep -Pi
'^\h*auth\h+(?:required|requisite)\h+pam_wheel\.so\h+(?:[^#\n\r]+\h+)?((?!\2)(use_uid\b|group=\H+\b))\h+(?:[^#\
n\r]+\h+)?((?!\1)(use_uid\b|group=\H+\b))(\h+.*)?$' /etc/pam.d/su
Run the following command and verify that the group specified in <group_name>
contains no users:
# grep <group_name> /etc/group
Verify the output does not contain any users in the relevant group:
<group_name>:x:<GID>:
Page 559
Add the following line to the /etc/pam.d/su file, specifying the empty group:
auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid group=sugroup
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 560
Page 561
Page 562
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) is a suite of libraries that allow a Linux
system administrator to configure methods to authenticate users. It provides a flexible
and centralized way to switch authentication methods for secured applications by using
configuration files instead of changing application code
The libpam-runtime provides the runtime support for the PAM library
Rationale:
Older versions of the libpam-runtime package may not include the latest security and
feature patches and updates.
Note: This Benchmark includes Recommendations that depend on newer libpam-
runtime features. These Recommendation were written and tested against version
1.3.1-5ubuntu4.7. Latest available version of the package should be used
Audit:
Run the following command to verify libpam-runtime is installed:
# dpkg-query -s libpam-runtime &>/dev/null && echo "libpam-runtime is installed"
libpam-runtime is installed
References:
1. PAM(7)
Page 563
Page 564
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
libpam-modules is a package containing a set of Pluggable Authentication Modules
(PAM) which allows system administrators to configure different authentication methods
for user logins, providing flexibility in how users can access applications by using
various authentication modules to include password checks and other security
mechanisms.
Rationale:
Older versions of the libpam-modules package may not include the latest security and
feature patches and updates.
Note: This Benchmark includes Recommendations that depend on newer libpam-
modules features. Theses recommendations were written and tested against version
1.3.1-5ubuntu4.7. The latest available version should be used.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify libpam-modules is installed:
# dpkg-query -s libpam-modules &>/dev/null && echo "libpam-modules is installed"
libpam-modules is installed
Page 565
Page 566
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
libpwquality provides common functions for password quality checking and scoring
them based on their apparent randomness. The library also provides a function for
generating random passwords with good pronounceability.
This module can be plugged into the password stack of a given service to provide some
plug-in strength-checking for passwords. The code was originally based on
pam_cracklib module and the module is backwards compatible with its options.
Rationale:
Strong passwords reduce the risk of systems being hacked through brute force
methods.
Older versions of the libpam-pwquality package may not include the latest security
and feature patches and updates.
Recommendations were written and tested against version 1.3.1-5ubuntu4.7. The
latest available version should be used.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify libpam-pwquality is installed:
# dpkg-query -s libpam-pwquality &>/dev/null && echo "libpam-pwquality is installed"
libpam-pwquality is installed
References:
1. https://packages.debian.org/buster/libpam-pwquality
Page 567
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 568
Page 569
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
pam_unix is the standard Unix authentication module. It uses standard calls from the
system's libraries to retrieve and set account information as well as authentication.
Usually this is obtained from the /etc/passwd and if shadow is enabled, the
/etc/shadow file as well.
The account component performs the task of establishing the status of the user's
account and password based on the following shadow elements: expire,
last_change, max_change, min_change, warn_change. In the case of the latter, it may
offer advice to the user on changing their password or, through the
PAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD return, delay giving service to the user until they have
established a new password. The entries listed above are documented in the shadow(5)
manual page. Should the user's record not contain one or more of these entries, the
corresponding shadow check is not performed.
The authentication component performs the task of checking the users credentials
(password). The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
service if their official password is blank.
Rationale:
The system should only provide access after performing authentication of a user.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that pam_unix is enabled:
# grep -PH -- '\bpam_unix\.so\b' /etc/pam.d/common-{account,auth,password,session,session-noninteractive}
Page 570
Note: If a site specific custom profile is being used in your environment to configure
PAM that includes the configuration for the pam_faillock module, enable that module
instead
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 571
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pam_faillock.so module maintains a list of failed authentication attempts per
user during a specified interval and locks the account in case there were more than the
configured number of consecutive failed authentications (this is defined by the deny
parameter in the faillock configuration). It stores the failure records into per-user files in
the tally directory.
Rationale:
Locking out user IDs after n unsuccessful consecutive login attempts mitigates brute
force password attacks against your systems.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify that pam_faillock is enabled:
# grep -P -- '\bpam_faillock\.so\b' /etc/pam.d/common-{auth,account}
Page 572
Example Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
arr=('Name: Enable pam_faillock to deny access' 'Default: yes' 'Priority: 0' 'Auth-Type: Primary' 'Auth:' '
[default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail')
printf '%s\n' "${arr[@]}" > /usr/share/pam-configs/faillock
}
Example Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
arr=('Name: Notify of failed login attempts and reset count upon success' 'Default: yes' 'Priority: 1024'
'Auth-Type: Primary' 'Auth:' ' requisite pam_faillock.so preauth' 'Account-Type:
Primary' 'Account:' ' required pam_faillock.so')
printf '%s\n' "${arr[@]}" > /usr/share/pam-configs/faillock_notify
}
Run the following command to update the common-auth and common-account PAM
files with the new profiles:
# pam-auth-update --enable <profile_filename>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable faillock
# pam-auth-update --enable faillock_notify
Page 573
• The name used for the file must be used in the pam-auth-update --enable
command
• The Name: line should be easily recognizable and understood
• The Priority: Line is important as it effects the order of the lines in the
/etc/pam.d/ files
• If a site specific custom profile is being used in your environment to configure
PAM that includes the configuration for the pam_faillock module, enable that
module instead
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1027
T1110.003
Page 574
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pam_pwquality.so module performs password quality checking. This module can
be plugged into the password stack of a given service to provide strength-checking for
passwords. The code was originally based on pam_cracklib module and the module is
backwards compatible with its options.
The action of this module is to prompt the user for a password and check its strength
against a system dictionary and a set of rules for identifying poor choices.
The first action is to prompt for a single password, check its strength and then, if it is
considered strong, prompt for the password a second time (to verify that it was typed
correctly on the first occasion). All being well, the password is passed on to subsequent
modules to be installed as the new authentication token.
Rationale:
Use of a unique, complex passwords helps to increase the time and resources required
to compromise the password.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that pam_pwhistory is enabled:
# grep -P -- '\bpam_pwquality\.so\b' /etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 575
Example:
# pam-auth-update pwquality
Example:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
arr=('Name: Pwquality password strength checking' 'Default: yes' 'Priority: 1024' 'Conflicts: cracklib'
'Password-Type: Primary' 'Password:' ' requisite pam_pwquality.so retry=3')
printf '%s\n' "${arr[@]}" > /usr/share/pam-configs/pwquality
}
Note:
• The name used for the file must be used in the pam-auth-update --enable
command
• The Name: line should be easily recognizable and understood
• The Priority: Line is important as it effects the order of the lines in the
/etc/pam.d/ files
• If a site specific custom profile is being used in your environment to configure
PAM that includes the configuration for the pam_pwquality module, enable that
module instead
Page 576
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 577
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pam_pwhistory.so module saves the last passwords for each user in order to
force password change history and keep the user from alternating between the same
password too frequently.
This module does not work together with kerberos. In general, it does not make much
sense to use this module in conjunction with NIS or LDAP, since the old passwords are
stored on the local machine and are not available on another machine for password
history checking.
Rationale:
Use of a unique, complex passwords helps to increase the time and resources required
to compromise the password.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that pam_pwhistory.so is enabled:
# grep -P -- '\bpam_pwhistory\.so\b' /etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 578
Example:
# pam-auth-update pwhistory
Example Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
arr=('Name: pwhistory password history checking' 'Default: yes' 'Priority: 1024' 'Password-Type: Primary'
'Password:' ' requisite pam_pwhistory.so remember=24 enforce_for_root
use_authtok')
printf '%s\n' "${arr[@]}" > /usr/share/pam-configs/pwhistory
}
Note:
• The name used for the file must be used in the pam-auth-update --enable
command
• The Name: line should be easily recognizable and understood
• The Priority: Line is important as it effects the order of the lines in the
/etc/pam.d/ files
• If a site specific custom profile is being used in your environment to configure
PAM that includes the configuration for the pam_pwhistory module, enable that
module instead
Page 579
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 580
Page 581
Page 582
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The deny=<n> option will deny access if the number of consecutive authentication
failures for this user during the recent interval exceeds .
Rationale:
Locking out user IDs after n unsuccessful consecutive login attempts mitigates brute
force password attacks against your systems.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that Number of failed logon attempts before the
account is locked is no greater than 5 and meets local site policy:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*deny\h*=\h*[1-5]\b' /etc/security/faillock.conf
deny = 5
Run the following command to verify that the deny argument has not been set, or 5 or
less and meets local site policy:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*auth\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_faillock\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?deny\h*=\h*(0|[6-
9]|[1-9][0-9]+)\b' /etc/pam.d/common-auth
Edit any returned files and remove the deny=<N> arguments from the
pam_faillock.so line(s):
Default Value:
deny = 3
Page 583
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1027
T1110.003
Page 584
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
unlock_time=<n> - The access will be re-enabled after seconds after the lock out. The
value 0 has the same meaning as value never - the access will not be re-enabled
without resetting the faillock entries by the faillock(8) command.
Note:
• The default directory that pam_faillock uses is usually cleared on system boot so
the access will be also re-enabled after system reboot. If that is undesirable a
different tally directory must be set with the dir option.
• It is usually undesirable to permanently lock out users as they can become easily
a target of denial of service attack unless the usernames are random and kept
secret to potential attackers.
• The maximum configurable value for unlock_time is 604800
Rationale:
Locking out user IDs after n unsuccessful consecutive login attempts mitigates brute
force password attacks against your systems.
Impact:
Use of unlock_time=0 may allow an attacker to cause denial of service to legitimate
users. This will also require a systems administrator with elevated privileges to unlock
the account.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the time in seconds before the account is
unlocked is either 0 (never) or 900 (15 minutes) or more and meets local site policy:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*unlock_time\h*=\h*(0|9[0-9][0-9]|[1-9][0-9]{3,})\b' /etc/security/faillock.conf
unlock_time = 900
Run the following command to verify that the unlock_time argument has not been set,
or is either 0 (never) or 900 (15 minutes) or more and meets local site policy:
# grep -Pi --
'^\h*auth\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_faillock\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?unlock_time\h*=\h*([1-9]|[1-
9][0-9]|[1-8][0-9][0-9])\b' /etc/pam.d/common-auth
Page 585
Run the following command: remove the unlock_time argument from the
pam_faillock.so module in the PAM files:
# grep -Pl -- '\bpam_faillock\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?unlock_time\b' /usr/share/pam-configs/*
Edit any returned files and remove the unlock_time=<N> argument from the
pam_faillock.so line(s):
Default Value:
unlock_time = 600
Additional Information:
If a user has been locked out because they have reached the maximum consecutive
failure count defined by deny= in the pam_faillock.so module, the user can be
unlocked by issuing the command faillock --user <USERNAME> --reset. This
command sets the failed count to 0, effectively unlocking the user.
Page 586
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1027
T1110.003
Page 587
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
even_deny_root - Root account can become locked as well as regular accounts
root_unlock_time=n - This option implies even_deny_root option. Allow access after n
seconds to root account after the account is locked. In case the option is not specified
the value is the same as of the unlock_time option.
Rationale:
Locking out user IDs after n unsuccessful consecutive login attempts mitigates brute
force password attacks against your systems.
Impact:
Use of unlock_time=0 or root_unlock_time=0 may allow an attacker to cause denial
of service to legitimate users.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that even_deny_root and/or root_unlock_time
is enabled:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*(even_deny_root|root_unlock_time\h*=\h*\d+)\b' /etc/security/faillock.conf
Example output:
even_deny_root
--AND/OR--
root_unlock_time = 60
Page 588
Edit any returned files and remove the even_deny_root and root_unlock_time
arguments from the pam_faillock.so line(s):
Default Value:
disabled
Additional Information:
If a user has been locked out because they have reached the maximum consecutive
failure count defined by deny= in the pam_faillock.so module, the user can be
unlocked by issuing the command faillock --user <USERNAME> --reset. This
command sets the failed count to 0, effectively unlocking the user.
Page 589
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
TA0006 M1027
T1110.003
Page 590
• difok - Number of characters in the new password that must not be present in
the old password. (default 1). The special value of 0 disables all checks of
similarity of the new password with the old password except the new password
being exactly the same as the old one.
• minlen - Minimum acceptable size for the new password (plus one if credits are
not disabled which is the default). (See pam_pwquality(8).) Cannot be set to
lower value than 6. (default 8)
• dcredit - The maximum credit for having digits in the new password. If less than
0 it is the minimum number of digits in the new password. (default 0)
• ucredit - The maximum credit for having uppercase characters in the new
password. If less than 0 it is the minimum number of uppercase characters in the
new password. (default 0)
• lcredit - The maximum credit for having lowercase characters in the new
password. If less than 0 it is the minimum number of lowercase characters in the
new password. (default 0)
• ocredit - The maximum credit for having other characters in the new password.
If less than 0 it is the minimum number of other characters in the new password.
(default 0)
• minclass - The minimum number of required classes of characters for the new
password (digits, uppercase, lowercase, others). (default 0)
• maxrepeat - The maximum number of allowed same consecutive characters in
the new password. The check is disabled if the value is 0. (default 0)
• maxsequence - The maximum length of monotonic character sequences in the
new password. Examples of such sequence are '12345' or 'fedcb'. Note that most
such passwords will not pass the simplicity check unless the sequence is only a
minor part of the password. The check is disabled if the value is 0. (default 0)
Page 591
Page 592
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pwquality difok option sets the number of characters in a password that must not
be present in the old password.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to
compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the
effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack
a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible
combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Page 593
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwdifok.conf:difok = 2
Verify returned value(s) are 2 or more and meet local site policy
Run the following command to verify that difok is not set, is 2 or more, and conforms to
local site policy:
grep -Psi --
'^\h*password\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_pwquality\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?difok\h*=\h*([0-1])\b'
/etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 594
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*difok\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s' "difok = 2" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwdifok.conf
}
Edit any returned files and remove the difok argument from the pam_pwquality.so
line(s):
Default Value:
difok = 1
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 595
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The minimum password length setting determines the lowers number of characters that
make up a password for a user account. There are many different theories about how to
determine the best password length for an organization, but perhaps "passphrase" is a
better term than "password".
The minlen option sets the minimum acceptable size for the new password (plus one if
credits are not disabled which is the default). Cannot be set to lower value than 6.
Rationale:
Strong passwords help protect systems from password attacks. Types of password
attacks include dictionary attacks, which attempt to use common words and phrases,
and brute force attacks, which try every possible combination of characters. Also
attackers may try to obtain the account database so they can use tools to discover the
accounts and passwords.
Impact:
In general, it is true that longer passwords are better (harder to crack), but it is also true
that forced password length requirements can cause user behavior that is predictable
and undesirable. For example, requiring users to have a minimum 16-character
password may cause them to choose repeating patterns like fourfourfourfour or
passwordpassword that meet the requirement but aren’t hard to guess. Additionally,
length requirements increase the chances that users will adopt other insecure practices,
like writing them down, re-using them or storing them unencrypted in their documents.
Having a reasonable minimum length with no maximum character limit increases the
resulting average password length used (and therefore the strength).6
Page 596
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwlength.conf:minlen = 14
Verify returned value(s) are no less than 14 characters and meet local site policy
Run the following command to verify that minlen is not set, or is 14 or more characters,
and conforms to local site policy:
# grep -Psi --
'^\h*password\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_pwquality\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?minlen\h*=\h*([0-9]|1[0-
3])\b' /etc/pam.d/system-auth /etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 597
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*minlen\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s' "minlen = 14" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwlength.conf
}
Edit any returned files and remove the minlen argument from the pam_pwquality.so
line(s):
Default Value:
minlen = 8
References:
1. pam_pwquality(8)
2. CIS Password Policy Guide
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: IA-5(1)
Page 598
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 599
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Password complexity can be set through:
Rationale:
Strong passwords protect systems from being hacked through brute force methods.
Requiring at least one non-alphabetic character increases the search space beyond
pure dictionary words, which makes the resulting password harder to crack.
Forcing users to choose an excessively complex password, e.g. some combination of
upper-case, lower-case, numbers, and special characters, has a negative impact. It
places an extra burden on users and many will use predictable patterns (for example, a
capital letter in the first position, followed by lowercase letters, then one or two numbers,
and a “special character” at the end). Attackers know this, so dictionary attacks will
often contain these common patterns and use the most common substitutions like, $ for
s, @ for a, 1 for l, 0 for o.
Impact:
Passwords that are too complex in nature make it harder for users to remember, leading
to bad practices. In addition, composition requirements provide no defense against
common attack types such as social engineering or insecure storage of passwords
Page 600
• dcredit, ucredit, lcredit, and ocredit are not set to a value greater than 0
• Complexity conforms to local site policy:
# grep -Psi -- '^\h*(minclass|[dulo]credit)\b' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf:minclass = 3
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf:ucredit = -2
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf:lcredit = -2
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf:dcredit = -1
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf:ocredit = 0
Page 601
Edit any returned files and remove the minclass, dcredit, ucredit, lcredit, and
ocredit arguments from the pam_pwquality.so line(s)
Create or modify a file ending in .conf in the /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
directory or the file /etc/security/pwquality.conf and add or modify the following
line(s) to set complexity according to local site policy:
• minclass = _N_
• dcredit = _N_ # Value should be either 0 or a number proceeded by a minus (-
) symbol
• ucredit = -1 # Value should be either 0 or a number proceeded by a minus (-)
symbol
• ocredit = -1 # Value should be either 0 or a number proceeded by a minus (-)
symbol
• lcredit = -1 # Value should be either 0 or a number proceeded by a minus (-)
symbol
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*minclass\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
sed -ri 's/^\s*[dulo]credit\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s' "minclass = 3" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwcomplexity.conf
}
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*minclass\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
sed -ri 's/^\s*[dulo]credit\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '%s\n' "dcredit = -1" "ucredit = -1" "lcredit = -1" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-
pwcomplexity.conf
}
Default Value:
minclass = 0
dcredit = 0
ucredit = 0
ocredit = 0
lcredit = 0
Page 602
1. pam_pwquality(8)
2. PWQUALITY.CONF(5)
3. https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/cis-password-policy-guide
4. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: IA-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 603
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pwquality maxrepeat option sets the maximum number of allowed same
consecutive characters in a new password.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to
compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the
effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack
a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible
combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Page 604
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwrepeat.conf:maxrepeat = 3
Verify returned value(s) are 3 or less, not 0, and meet local site policy
Run the following command to verify that maxrepeat is not set, is 3 or less, not 0, and
conforms to local site policy:
# grep -Psi --
'^\h*password\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_pwquality\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?maxrepeat\h*=\h*(0|[4-
9]|[1-9][0-9]+)\b' /etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 605
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*maxrepeat\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s' "maxrepeat = 3" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwrepeat.conf
}
Edit any returned files and remove the maxrepeat argument from the
pam_pwquality.so line(s):
Default Value:
maxrepeat = 0
References:
Page 606
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 607
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pwquality maxsequence option sets the maximum length of monotonic character
sequences in the new password. Examples of such sequence are 12345 or fedcb. The
check is disabled if the value is 0.
Note: Most such passwords will not pass the simplicity check unless the sequence is
only a minor part of the password.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to
compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the
effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack
a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible
combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Page 608
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwmaxsequence.conf:maxsequence = 3
Verify returned value(s) are 3 or less, not 0, and meet local site policy
Run the following command to verify that maxsequence is not set, is 3 or less, not 0, and
conforms to local site policy:
# grep -Psi --
'^\h*password\h+(requisite|required|sufficient)\h+pam_pwquality\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?maxsequence\h*=\h*(0|[4-
9]|[1-9][0-9]+)\b' /etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 609
{
sed -ri 's/^\s*maxsequence\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s' "maxsequence = 3" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwmaxsequence.conf
}
Edit any returned files and remove the maxsequence argument from the
pam_pwquality.so line(s):
Default Value:
maxsequence = 0
References:
Page 610
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 611
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pwquality dictcheck option sets whether to check for the words from the
cracklib dictionary.
Rationale:
If the operating system allows the user to select passwords based on dictionary words,
this increases the chances of password compromise by increasing the opportunity for
successful guesses, and brute-force attacks.
Page 612
Remediation:
Edit any file ending in .conf in the /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ directory
and/or the file /etc/security/pwquality.conf and comment out or remove any
instance of dictcheck = 0:
Example:
# sed -ri 's/^\s*dictcheck\s*=/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf
Edit any returned files and remove the dictcheck argument from the
pam_pwquality.so line(s)
Default Value:
dictcheck = 1
References:
Page 613
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 614
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The pam_pwquality module can be configured to either reject a password if it fails the
checks, or only print a warning.
This is configured by setting the enforcing=<N> argument. If nonzero, a password will
be rejected if it fails the checks, otherwise only a warning message will be provided.
This setting applies only to the pam_pwquality module and possibly other applications
that explicitly change their behavior based on it. It does not affect pwmake(1) and
pwscore(1).
Rationale:
Strong passwords help protect systems from password attacks. Types of password
attacks include dictionary attacks, which attempt to use common words and phrases,
and brute force attacks, which try every possible combination of characters. Also
attackers may try to obtain the account database so they can use tools to discover the
accounts and passwords.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that enforcing=0 has not been set in a
pwquality configuration file:
# grep -PHsi -- '^\h*enforcing\h*=\h*0\b' /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf
Page 615
Edit any returned files and remove the enforcing=0 argument from the
pam_pwquality.so line(s)
Edit /etc/security/pwquality.conf and all files ending in .conf in the
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ directory and remove or comment out any line
containing the enforcing = 0 argument:
Example:
# sed -ri 's/^\s*enforcing\s*=\s*0/# &/' /etc/security/pwquality.conf /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/*.conf
Default Value:
enforcing=1
References:
1. pam_pwquality(8)
2. PWQUALITY.CONF(5)
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: IA-5
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 616
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
If the pwquality enforce_for_root option is enabled, the module will return error on
failed check even if the user changing the password is root.
This option is off by default which means that just the message about the failed check is
printed but root can change the password anyway.
Note: The root is not asked for an old password so the checks that compare the old and
new password are not performed.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to
compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the
effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack
a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible
combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Page 617
Example output:
/etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwroot.conf:enforce_for_root
Note:
Remediation:
Edit or add the following line in a *.conf file in /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d or
in /etc/security/pwquality.conf:
Example:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
[ ! -d /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/ ] && mkdir /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/
printf '\n%s\n' "enforce_for_root" > /etc/security/pwquality.conf.d/50-pwroot.conf
}
Default Value:
disabled
References:
Page 618
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 619
Examples:
An example password section would be:
#%PAM-1.0
password required pam_pwhistory.so
password required pam_unix.so use_authtok
#%PAM-1.0
password required pam_passwdqc.so config=/etc/passwdqc.conf
password required pam_pwhistory.so use_authtok
password required pam_unix.so use_authtok
Page 620
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/security/opasswd file stores the users' old passwords and can be checked
to ensure that users are not recycling recent passwords. The number of passwords
remembered is set via the remember argument value in set for the pam_pwhistory
module.
Rationale:
Requiring users not to reuse their passwords make it less likely that an attacker will be
able to guess the password or use a compromised password.
Note: These change only apply to accounts configured on the local system.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify:
Page 621
Edit any returned files and edit or add the remember= argument, with a value of 24 or
more, that meets local site policy to the pam_pwhistory line in the Password section:
Example File:
Name: pwhistory password history checking
Default: yes
Priority: 1024
Password-Type: Primary
Password:
requisite pam_pwhistory.so remember=24 enforce_for_root use_authtok # <- **ensure line includes
remember=<N>**
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <MODIFIED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable pwhistory
References:
Page 622
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
T1078.004, T1110,
T1110.004
Page 623
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
If the pwhistory enforce_for_root option is enabled, the module will enforce
password history for the root user as well
Rationale:
Requiring users not to reuse their passwords make it less likely that an attacker will be
able to guess the password or use a compromised password
Note: These change only apply to accounts configured on the local system.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the enforce_for_root argument is exists on
the pwhistory line in /etc/pam.d/common-password:
# grep -Psi -- '^\h*password\h+[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_pwhistory\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?enforce_for_root\b'
/etc/pam.d/common-password
Page 624
Edit any returned files and add the enforce_for_root argument to the
pam_pwhistory line in the Password section:
Example File:
Name: pwhistory password history checking
Default: yes
Priority: 1024
Password-Type: Primary
Password:
requisite pam_pwhistory.so remember=24 enforce_for_root use_authtok # <- **ensure line includes
enforce_for_root**
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <MODIFIED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable pwhistory
Default Value:
disabled
References:
Page 625
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1110, T1110.001,
T1110.002, T1110.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1178.001, T1178.002,
T1178.003, T1178.004
Page 626
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
use_authtok - When password changing enforce the module to set the new password
to the one provided by a previously stacked password module
Rationale:
use_authtok allows multiple pam modules to confirm a new password before it is
accepted.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the use_authtok argument exists on the
pwhistory line in /etc/pam.d/common-password:
# grep -Psi -- '^\h*password\h+[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_pwhistory\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?use_authtok\b' /etc/pam.d/common-
password
Remediation:
Run the following command:
# awk '/Password-Type:/{ f = 1;next } /-Type:/{ f = 0 } f {if (/pam_pwhistory\.so/) print FILENAME}'
/usr/share/pam-configs/*
Edit any returned files and add the use_authtok argument to the pam_pwhistory line
in the Password section:
Example File:
Name: pwhistory password history checking
Default: yes
Priority: 1024
Password-Type: Primary
Password:
requisite pam_pwhistory.so remember=24 enforce_for_root use_authtok # <- **ensure line includes
use_authtok**
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <MODIFIED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable pwhistory
Page 627
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 628
Page 629
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The nullok argument overrides the default action of pam_unix.so to not permit the
user access to a service if their official password is blank.
Rationale:
Using a strong password is essential to helping protect personal and sensitive
information from unauthorized access
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the nullok argument is not set on the
pam_unix.so module:
# grep -PHs -- '^\h*[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_unix\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?nullok\b' /etc/pam.d/common-
{password,auth,account,session,session-noninteractive}
Page 630
Edit any files returned and remove the nullok argument for the pam_unix lines
Example File:
Name: Unix authentication
Default: yes
Priority: 256
Auth-Type: Primary
Auth:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so try_first_pass # <- **ensure line does not include nullok
nullok**
Auth-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so # <- **ensure line does not include nullok nullok**
Account-Type: Primary
Account:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Account-Initial:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Session-Type: Additional
Session:
required pam_unix.so
Session-Initial:
required pam_unix.so
Password-Type: Primary
Password:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure use_authtok try_first_pass yescrypt
Password-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure yescrypt
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <EDITED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable unix
Note: If custom files are being used, the corresponding files in /etc/pam.d/ would
need to be edited directly, and the pam-auth-update --enable
<EDITED_PROFILE_NAME> command skipped
Page 631
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 632
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The remember=n argument saves the last n passwords for each user in
/etc/security/opasswd in order to force password change history and keep the user
from alternating between the same password too frequently. The MD5 password hash
algorithm is used for storing the old passwords. Instead of this option the
pam_pwhistory module should be used. The pam_pwhistory module saves the last n
passwords for each user in /etc/security/opasswd using the password hash
algorithm set on the pam_unix module. This allows for the yescrypt or sha512 hash
algorithm to be used.
Rationale:
The remember=n argument should be removed to ensure a strong password hashing
algorithm is being used. A stronger hash provides additional protection to the system by
increasing the level of effort needed for an attacker to successfully determine local
user's old passwords stored in /etc/security/opasswd.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the remember argument is not set on the
pam_unix.so module:
# grep -PHs -- '^\h*^\h*[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_unix\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?remember=\d+\b' /etc/pam.d/common-
{password,auth,account,session,session-noninteractive}
Page 633
Edit any files returned and remove the remember=_<N>_ argument for the pam_unix
lines
Example output:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure use_authtok try_first_pass yescrypt remember=5 # **<- remove
remember=<N>**
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure yescrypt remember=5 # **<- remove remember=<N>**
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <EDITED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable unix
Note: If custom files are being used, the corresponding files in /etc/pam.d/ would
need to be edited directly, and the pam-auth-update --enable
<EDITED_PROFILE_NAME> command skipped
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 634
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A cryptographic hash function converts an arbitrary-length input into a fixed length
output. Password hashing performs a one-way transformation of a password, turning
the password into another string, called the hashed password.
The pam_unix module can be configured to use one of the following hashing algorithms
for user's passwords:
• md5 - When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the MD5
algorithm.
• bigcrypt - When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the DEC C2
algorithm.
• sha256 - When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA256
algorithm. The SHA256 algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3) function.
• sha512 - When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA512
algorithm. The SHA512 algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3) function.
• blowfish - When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the
blowfish algorithm. The blowfish algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3)
function.
Rationale:
The SHA-512 algorithm provides a stronger hash than other algorithms used for
password hash generation. A stronger hash provides additional protection to the system
by increasing the level of effort needed for an attacker to successfully determine local
user passwords.
Note: These changes only apply to the local system.
Page 635
Remediation:
Run the following command:
# awk '/Password-Type:/{ f = 1;next } /-Type:/{ f = 0 } f {if (/pam_unix\.so/) print FILENAME}' /usr/share/pam-
configs/*
Edit any returned files and edit or add a the strong sha512 hashing algorithm to the
pam_unix lines in the Password section:
Example File:
Name: Unix authentication
Default: yes
Priority: 256
Auth-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Auth" section
Auth:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so try_first_pass
Auth-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Account-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Account" section
Account:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Account-Initial:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Session-Type: Additional # <- Start of "Session" section
Session:
required pam_unix.so
Session-Initial:
required pam_unix.so
Password-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Password" section
Password:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure use_authtok try_first_pass sha512 # <- **ensure
hashing algorithm is sha512**
Password-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure sha512 # <- **ensure hashing algorithm is sha512**
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable unix
References:
Page 636
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 637
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
use_authtok - When password changing enforce the module to set the new password
to the one provided by a previously stacked password module
Rationale:
use_authtok allows multiple pam modules to confirm a new password before it is
accepted.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that use_authtok is set on the pam_unix.so
module lines in the password stack:
# grep -PH -- '^\h*password\h+([^#\n\r]+)\h+pam_unix\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?use_authtok\b' /etc/pam.d/common-
password
Page 638
Edit any returned files add use_authtok to the pam_unix line in the Password section
under Password: subsection:
Note: The if the file's Password section includes a Password-Initial: subsection,
use_authtok should not be added to the pam_unix line in the Password-Initial:
subsection
Example File:
Name: Unix authentication
Default: yes
Priority: 256
Auth-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Auth" section
Auth:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so try_first_pass
Auth-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Account-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Account" section
Account:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Account-Initial:
[success=end new_authtok_reqd=done default=ignore] pam_unix.so
Session-Type: Additional # <- Start of "Session" section
Session:
required pam_unix.so
Session-Initial:
required pam_unix.so
Password-Type: Primary # <- Start of "Password" section
Password:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure use_authtok try_first_pass yescrypt # <- **ensure
line includes use_authtok**
Password-Initial:
[success=end default=ignore] pam_unix.so obscure yescrypt # <- **Password-Initial: subsection does
not include use_authtok
Run the following command to update the files in the /etc/pam.d/ directory:
# pam-auth-update --enable <MODIFIED_PROFILE_NAME>
Example:
# pam-auth-update --enable unix
References:
Page 639
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 640
This section provides guidance on setting up secure defaults for system and user
accounts and their environment.
Page 641
While a majority of the password control parameters have been moved to PAM, some
parameters are still available through the shadow password suite. Any changes made to
/etc/login.defs will only be applied if the usermod command is used. If user IDs are
added a different way, use the chage command to effect changes to individual user IDs.
Page 642
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The PASS_MAX_DAYS parameter in /etc/login.defs allows an administrator to force
passwords to expire once they reach a defined age.
PASS_MAX_DAYS <N> - The maximum number of days a password may be used. If the
password is older than this, a password change will be forced. If not specified, -1 will be
assumed (which disables the restriction).
Rationale:
The window of opportunity for an attacker to leverage compromised credentials or
successfully compromise credentials via an online brute force attack is limited by the
age of the password. Therefore, reducing the maximum age of a password also reduces
an attacker's window of opportunity.
We recommend a yearly password change. This is primarily because for all their good
intentions users will share credentials across accounts. Therefore, even if a breach is
publicly identified, the user may not see this notification, or forget they have an account
on that site. This could leave a shared credential vulnerable indefinitely. Having an
organizational policy of a 1-year (annual) password expiration is a reasonable
compromise to mitigate this with minimal user burden.
Impact:
The password expiration must be greater than the minimum days between password
changes or users will be unable to change their password.
Excessive password expiration requirements do more harm than good, because these
requirements make users select predictable passwords, composed of sequential words
and numbers that are closely related to each other. In these cases, the next password
can be predicted based on the previous one (incrementing a number used in the
password for example). Also, password expiration requirements offer no containment
benefits because attackers will often use credentials as soon as they compromise them.
Instead, immediate password changes should be based on key events including, but not
limited to:
• Indication of compromise
• Change of user roles
• When a user leaves the organization.
Page 643
Example output:
PASS_MAX_DAYS 365
Modify user parameters for all users with a password set to match:
# chage --maxdays 365 <user>
Edit /etc/login.defs and set PASS_MAX_DAYS to a value greater than 0 that follows
local site policy:
Example:
PASS_MAX_DAYS 365
Run the following command to modify user parameters for all users with a password set
to a maximum age no greater than 365 or less than 1 that follows local site policy:
# chage --maxdays <N> <user>
Example:
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($5 > 365 || $5 < 1)system ("chage --maxdays 365 " $1)}' /etc/shadow
Warning: If a password has been set at system install or kickstart, the last change
date field is not set, In this case, setting PASS_MAX_DAYS will immediately expire the
password. One possible solution is to populate the last change date field through a
command like: chage -d "$(date +%Y-%m-%d)" root
Default Value:
PASS_MAX_DAYS 99999
Page 644
Additional Information:
A value of -1 will disable password expiration.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
T1078.004, T1110,
T1110.001, T1110.002,
T1110.003, T1110.004
Page 645
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
PASS_MIN_DAYS <N> - The minimum number of days allowed between password
changes. Any password changes attempted sooner than this will be rejected. If not
specified, 0 will be assumed (which disables the restriction).
Rationale:
Users may have favorite passwords that they like to use because they are easy to
remember and they believe that their password choice is secure from compromise.
Unfortunately, passwords are compromised and if an attacker is targeting a specific
individual user account, with foreknowledge of data about that user, reuse of old,
potentially compromised passwords, may cause a security breach.
By restricting the frequency of password changes, an administrator can prevent users
from repeatedly changing their password in an attempt to circumvent password reuse
controls
Impact:
If a users password is set by other personnel as a procedure in dealing with a lost or
expired password, the user should be forced to update this "set" password with their
own password. e.g. force "change at next logon".
If it is not possible to have a user set their own password immediately, and this
recommendation or local site procedure may cause a user to continue using a third
party generated password, PASS_MIN_DAYS for the effected user should be temporally
changed to 0via chage --mindays <user>, to allow a user to change their password
immediately.
For applications where the user is not using the password at console, the ability to
"change at next logon" may be limited. This may cause a user to continue to use a
password created by other personnel.
Page 646
Example output:
PASS_MIN_DAYS 1
Run the following command to verify all passwords have a PASS_MIN_DAYS greater than
0:
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($4 < 1)print "User: " $1 " PASS_MIN_DAYS: " $4}' /etc/shadow
Run the following command to modify user parameters for all users with a password set
to a minimum days greater than zero that follows local site policy:
# chage --mindays <N> <user>
Example:
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($4 < 1)system ("chage --mindays 1 " $1)}' /etc/shadow
Default Value:
PASS_MIN_DAYS 0
References:
Page 647
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
TA0006 M1027
T1078.004, T1110,
T1110.004
Page 648
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The PASS_WARN_AGE parameter in /etc/login.defs allows an administrator to notify
users that their password will expire in a defined number of days.
PASS_WARN_AGE <N> - The number of days warning given before a password expires. A
zero means warning is given only upon the day of expiration, a negative value means
no warning is given. If not specified, no warning will be provided.
Rationale:
Providing an advance warning that a password will be expiring gives users time to think
of a secure password. Users caught unaware may choose a simple password or write it
down where it may be discovered.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify PASS_WARN_AGE is 7 or more and follows local
site policy:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*PASS_WARN_AGE\h+\d+\b' /etc/login.defs
Example output:
PASS_WARN_AGE 7
Page 649
Run the following command to modify user parameters for all users with a password set
to a minimum warning to 7 or more days that follows local site policy:
# chage --warndays <N> <user>
Example:
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($6 < 7)system ("chage --warndays 7 " $1)}' /etc/shadow
Default Value:
PASS_WARN_AGE 7
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 650
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
A cryptographic hash function converts an arbitrary-length input into a fixed length
output. Password hashing performs a one-way transformation of a password, turning
the password into another string, called the hashed password.
ENCRYPT_METHOD (string) - This defines the system default encryption algorithm for
encrypting passwords (if no algorithm are specified on the command line). It can take
one of these values:
Note:
Rationale:
The SHA-512 and yescrypt algorithms provide a stronger hash than other algorithms
used by Linux for password hash generation. A stronger hash provides additional
protection to the system by increasing the level of effort needed for an attacker to
successfully determine local group passwords.
Page 651
Example output:
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
- OR -
ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
Remediation:
Edit /etc/login.defs and set the ENCRYPT_METHOD to SHA512 or YESCRYPT:
ENCRYPT_METHOD <HASHING_ALGORITHM>
Example:
ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
Note:
• This only effects local groups' passwords created after updating the file to use
sha512 or yescrypt.
• If it is determined that the password algorithm being used is not sha512 or
yescrypt, once it is changed, it is recommended that all group passwords be
updated to use the stronger hashing algorithm.
• It is recommended that the chosen hashing algorithm is consistent across
/etc/login.defs and the PAM configuration
Default Value:
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
References:
Page 652
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 653
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
User accounts that have been inactive for over a given period of time can be
automatically disabled.
INACTIVE - Defines the number of days after the password exceeded its maximum age
where the user is expected to replace this password.
The value is stored in the shadow password file. An input of 0 will disable an expired
password with no delay. An input of -1 will blank the respective field in the shadow
password file.
Rationale:
Inactive accounts pose a threat to system security since the users are not logging in to
notice failed login attempts or other anomalies.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify INACTIVE conforms to site policy (no more than
45 days):
# useradd -D | grep INACTIVE
INACTIVE=45
Verify all users with a password have Password inactive no more than 45 days after
password expires
Verify all users with a password have Password inactive no more than 45 days after
password expires: Run the following command and Review list of users and INACTIVE
to verify that all users INACTIVE conforms to site policy (no more than 45 days):
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($7 > 45 || $7 < 0)print "User: " $1 " INACTIVE: " $7 "Days"}' /etc/shadow
Page 654
Example:
# useradd -D -f 45
Run the following command to modify user parameters for all users with a password set
to a inactive age of 45 days or less that follows local site policy:
# chage --inactive <N> <user>
Example:
# awk -F: '($2~/^\$.+\$/) {if($7 > 45 || $7 < 0)system ("chage --inactive 45 " $1)}' /etc/shadow
Default Value:
INACTIVE=-1
References:
Additional Information:
A value of -1 would disable this setting.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 655
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
All users should have a password change date in the past.
Rationale:
If a user's recorded password change date is in the future, then they could bypass any
set password expiration.
Audit:
Run the following script and verify nothing is returned:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while IFS= read -r l_user; do
l_change=$(date -d "$(chage --list $l_user | grep '^Last password change' | cut -d: -f2 | grep -v
'never$')" +%s)
if [[ "$l_change" -gt "$(date +%s)" ]]; then
echo "User: \"$l_user\" last password change was \"$(chage --list $l_user | grep '^Last password
change' | cut -d: -f2)\""
fi
done < <(awk -F: '$2~/^\$.+\$/{print $1}' /etc/shadow)
}
Remediation:
Investigate any users with a password change date in the future and correct them.
Locking the account, expiring the password, or resetting the password manually may be
appropriate.
Page 656
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
T1078.002, T1078.003,
T1078.004, T1110,
T1110.001, T1110.002,
T1110.003, T1110.004
Page 657
Page 658
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Any account with UID 0 has superuser privileges on the system.
Rationale:
This access must be limited to only the default root account and only from the system
console. Administrative access must be through an unprivileged account using an
approved mechanism as noted in the Recommendation "Ensure access to the su
command is restricted".
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that only "root" is returned:
# awk -F: '($3 == 0) { print $1 }' /etc/passwd
root
Remediation:
Run the following command to change the root account UID to 0:
# usermod -u 0 root
Modify any users other than root with UID 0 and assign them a new UID.
References:
Page 659
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 660
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The usermod command can be used to specify which group the root account belongs
to. This affects permissions of files that are created by the root account.
Rationale:
Using GID 0 for the root account helps prevent root -owned files from accidentally
becoming accessible to non-privileged users.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify the root user's primary GID is 0, and no other
user's have GID 0 as their primary GID:
# awk -F: '($1 !~ /^(sync|shutdown|halt|operator)/ && $4=="0") {print $1":"$4}' /etc/passwd
root:0
Note: User's: sync, shutdown, halt, and operator are excluded from the check for other
user's with GID 0
Remediation:
Run the following command to set the root user's GID to 0:
# usermod -g 0 root
Remove any users other than the root user with GID 0 or assign them a new GID if
appropriate.
References:
Page 661
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 662
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The groupmod command can be used to specify which group the root group belongs
to. This affects permissions of files that are group owned by the root group.
Rationale:
Using GID 0 for the root group helps prevent root group owned files from accidentally
becoming accessible to non-privileged users.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify no group other than root is assigned GID 0:
# awk -F: '$3=="0"{print $1":"$3}' /etc/group
root:0
Remediation:
Run the following command to set the root group's GID to 0:
# groupmod -g 0 root
Remove any groups other than the root group with GID 0 or assign them a new GID if
appropriate.
References:
Page 663
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 664
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
There are a number of methods to access the root account directly. Without a password
set any user would be able to gain access and thus control over the entire system.
Rationale:
Access to root should be secured at all times.
Impact:
If there are any automated processes that relies on access to the root account without
authentication, they will fail after remediation.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that either the root user's password is set or the
root user's account is locked:
# passwd -S root | awk '$2 ~ /^(P|L)/ {print "User: \"" $1 "\" Password is status: " $2}'
Note:
• P - Password is set
• L - Password is locked
Remediation:
Run the following command to set a password for the root user:
# passwd root
- OR -
Run the following command to lock the root user account:
# usermod -L root
Page 665
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 666
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The root user can execute any command on the system and could be fooled into
executing programs unintentionally if the PATH is not set correctly.
Rationale:
Including the current working directory (.) or other writable directory in root's
executable path makes it likely that an attacker can gain superuser access by forcing an
administrator operating as root to execute a Trojan horse program.
Page 667
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_output2=""
l_pmask="0022"
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_pmask )) )"
l_root_path="$(sudo -Hiu root env | grep '^PATH' | cut -d= -f2)"
unset a_path_loc && IFS=":" read -ra a_path_loc <<< "$l_root_path"
grep -q "::" <<< "$l_root_path" && l_output2="$l_output2\n - root's path contains a empty directory (::)"
grep -Pq ":\h*$" <<< "$l_root_path" && l_output2="$l_output2\n - root's path contains a trailing (:)"
grep -Pq '(\h+|:)\.(:|\h*$)' <<< "$l_root_path" && l_output2="$l_output2\n - root's path contains current
working directory (.)"
while read -r l_path; do
if [ -d "$l_path" ]; then
while read -r l_fmode l_fown; do
[ "$l_fown" != "root" ] && l_output2="$l_output2\n - Directory: \"$l_path\" is owned by:
\"$l_fown\" should be owned by \"root\""
[ $(( $l_fmode & $l_pmask )) -gt 0 ] && l_output2="$l_output2\n - Directory: \"$l_path\" is mode:
\"$l_fmode\" and should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive"
done <<< "$(stat -Lc '%#a %U' "$l_path")"
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - \"$l_path\" is not a directory"
fi
done <<< "$(printf "%s\n" "${a_path_loc[@]}")"
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n *** PASS ***\n - Root's path is correctly configured\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :\n$l_output2\n"
fi
}
Remediation:
Correct or justify any:
References:
Page 668
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 669
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The user file-creation mode mask (umask) is used to determine the file permission for
newly created directories and files. In Linux, the default permissions for any newly
created directory is 0777 (rwxrwxrwx), and for any newly created file it is 0666 (rw-rw-
rw-). The umask modifies the default Linux permissions by restricting (masking) these
permissions. The umask is not simply subtracted, but is processed bitwise. Bits set in
the umask are cleared in the resulting file mode.
umask can be set with either Octal or Symbolic values:
umask is set by order of precedence. If umask is set in multiple locations, this order of
precedence will determine the system's default umask.
Order of precedence:
1. /root/.bash_profile
2. /root/.bashrc
3. The system default umask
Page 670
Default Value:
System default umask
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
T1083 TA0007
Page 671
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
There are a number of accounts provided with most distributions that are used to
manage applications and are not intended to provide an interactive shell. Furthermore,
a user may add special accounts that are not intended to provide an interactive shell.
Rationale:
It is important to make sure that accounts that are not being used by regular users are
prevented from being used to provide an interactive shell. By default, most distributions
set the password field for these accounts to an invalid string, but it is also recommended
that the shell field in the password file be set to the nologin shell. This prevents the
account from potentially being used to run any commands.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify system accounts, except for root, halt, sync,
shutdown or nfsnobody, do not have a valid login shell:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_valid_shells="^($(awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' | paste
-s -d '|' - ))$"
awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '($1!~/^(root|halt|sync|shutdown|nfsnobody)$/ && ($3<'"$(awk
'/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)"' || $3 == 65534) && $(NF) ~ pat) {print "Service account: \"" $1
"\" has a valid shell: " $7}' /etc/passwd
}
Page 672
Example script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_valid_shells="^($( awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' |
paste -s -d '|' - ))$"
awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '($1!~/^(root|halt|sync|shutdown|nfsnobody)$/ && ($3<'"$(awk
'/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)"' || $3 == 65534) && $(NF) ~ pat) {system ("usermod -s '"$(command -
v nologin)"' " $1)}' /etc/passwd
}
References:
Additional Information:
The root, sync, shutdown, and halt users are exempted from requiring a non-login
shell.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0005 M1026
T1078.003
Page 673
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
There are a number of accounts provided with most distributions that are used to
manage applications and are not intended to provide an interactive shell. Furthermore,
a user may add special accounts that are not intended to provide an interactive shell.
Rationale:
It is important to make sure that accounts that are not being used by regular users are
prevented from being used to provide an interactive shell. By default, most distributions
set the password field for these accounts to an invalid string, but it is also recommended
that the shell field in the password file be set to the nologin shell. This prevents the
account from potentially being used to run any commands.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify all non-root accounts without a valid login shell are
locked.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_valid_shells="^($(awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' | paste
-s -d '|' - ))$"
while IFS= read -r l_user; do
passwd -S "$l_user" | awk '$2 !~ /^L/ {print "Account: \"" $1 "\" does not have a valid login shell and
is not locked"}'
done < <(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '($1 != "root" && $(NF) !~ pat) {print $1}' /etc/passwd)
}
Page 674
Example script::
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_valid_shells="^($(awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' | paste
-s -d '|' - ))$"
while IFS= read -r l_user; do
passwd -S "$l_user" | awk '$2 !~ /^L/ {system ("usermod -L " $1)}'
done < <(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '($1 != "root" && $(NF) !~ pat) {print $1}' /etc/passwd)
}
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0005 M1026
T1078.003
Page 675
Page 676
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
/etc/shells is a text file which contains the full pathnames of valid login shells. This
file is consulted by chsh and available to be queried by other programs.
Be aware that there are programs which consult this file to find out if a user is a normal
user; for example, FTP daemons traditionally disallow access to users with shells not
included in this file.
Rationale:
A user can use chsh to change their configured shell.
If a user has a shell configured that isn't in in /etc/shells, then the system assumes
that they're somehow restricted. In the case of chsh it means that the user cannot
change that value.
Other programs might query that list and apply similar restrictions.
By putting nologin in /etc/shells, any user that has nologin as its shell is
considered a full, unrestricted user. This is not the expected behavior for nologin.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that nologin is not listed in the /etc/shells file:
# grep -Ps '^\h*([^#\n\r]+)?\/nologin\b' /etc/shells
References:
1. shells(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5
Page 677
Page 678
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
TMOUT is an environmental setting that determines the timeout of a shell in seconds.
Rationale:
Setting a timeout value reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized user access
to another user's shell session that has been left unattended. It also ends the inactive
session and releases the resources associated with that session.
Page 679
{
a_output=(); a_output2=(); l_tmout_set="900"
f_tmout_read_chk()
{
a_out=(); a_out2=()
l_tmout_readonly="$(grep -P -- '^\h*(typeset\h\-xr\hTMOUT=\d+|([^#\n\r]+)?\breadonly\h+TMOUT\b)'
"$l_file")"
l_tmout_export="$(grep -P -- '^\h*(typeset\h\-xr\hTMOUT=\d+|([^#\n\r]+)?\bexport\b([^#\n\r]+\b)?TMOUT\b)'
"$l_file")"
if [ -n "$l_tmout_readonly" ]; then
a_out+=(" - Readonly is set as: \"$l_tmout_readonly\" in: \"$l_file\"")
else
a_out2+=(" - Readonly is not set in: \"$l_file\"")
fi
if [ -n "$l_tmout_export" ]; then
a_out+=(" - Export is set as: \"$l_tmout_export\" in: \"$l_file\"")
else
a_out2+=(" - Export is not set in: \"$l_file\"")
fi
}
while IFS= read -r l_file; do
l_tmout_value="$(grep -Po -- '^([^#\n\r]+)?\bTMOUT=\d+\b' "$l_file" | awk -F= '{print $2}')"
f_tmout_read_chk
if [ -n "$l_tmout_value" ]; then
if [[ "$l_tmout_value" -le "$l_tmout_set" && "$l_tmout_value" -gt "0" ]]; then
a_output+=(" - TMOUT is set to: \"$l_tmout_value\" in: \"$l_file\"")
[ "${#a_out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output+=("${a_out[@]}")
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_out[@]}")
fi
if [[ "$l_tmout_value" -gt "$l_tmout_set" || "$l_tmout_value" -le "0" ]]; then
a_output2+=(" - TMOUT is incorrectly set to: \"$l_tmout_value\" in: \"$l_file\"")
[ "${#a_out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" ** Incorrect TMOUT value **" "${a_out[@]}")
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_out2[@]}")
fi
else
[ "${#a_out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" - TMOUT is not set" "${a_out[@]}")
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" - TMOUT is not set" "${a_out2[@]}")
fi
done < <(grep -Pls -- '^([^#\n\r]+)?\bTMOUT\b' /etc/*bashrc /etc/profile /etc/profile.d/*.sh)
[[ "${#a_output[@]}" -le 0 && "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]] && a_output2+=(" - TMOUT is not configured")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " * Reasons for audit failure *" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Note: If TMOUT is set as readonly through readonly TMOUT and/or typeset -xr in
more than once, you will receive an error message when logging into a terminal session
or connecting with openSSH. It is recommended that TMOUT be set only once in only
one file.
Page 680
Deprecated methods:
• As multiple lines:
TMOUT=900
readonly TMOUT
export TMOUT
• As a single line:
readonly TMOUT=900 ; export TMOUT
Additional Information:
The audit and remediation in this recommendation apply to bash and shell. If other
shells are supported on the system, it is recommended that their configuration files also
are checked. Other methods of setting a timeout exist for other shells not covered here.
Ensure that the timeout conforms to your local policy.
Page 681
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 682
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The user file-creation mode mask (umask) is used to determine the file permission for
newly created directories and files. In Linux, the default permissions for any newly
created directory is 0777 (rwxrwxrwx), and for any newly created file it is 0666 (rw-rw-
rw-). The umask modifies the default Linux permissions by restricting (masking) these
permissions. The umask is not simply subtracted, but is processed bitwise. Bits set in
the umask are cleared in the resulting file mode.
umask can be set with either Octal or Symbolic values:
The default umask can be set to use the pam_umask module or in a System Wide
Shell Configuration File. The user creating the directories or files has the
discretion of changing the permissions via the chmod command, or choosing a different
default umask by adding the umask command into a User Shell Configuration
File, ( .bash_profile or .bashrc), in their home directory.
Setting the default umask:
• pam_umask module:
o will set the umask according to the system default in /etc/login.defs
and user settings, solving the problem of different umask settings with
different shells, display managers, remote sessions etc.
o umask=<mask> value in the /etc/login.defs file is interpreted as Octal
o Setting USERGROUPS_ENAB to yes in /etc/login.defs (default):
▪ will enable setting of the umask group bits to be the same as owner
bits. (examples: 022 -> 002, 077 -> 007) for non-root users, if the
uid is the same as gid, and username is the same as the
<primary group name>
Page 683
umask is set by order of precedence. If umask is set in multiple locations, this order of
precedence will determine the system's default umask.
Order of precedence:
1. A file in /etc/profile.d/ ending in .sh - This will override any other system-
wide umask setting
2. In the file /etc/profile
3. On the pam_umask.so module in /etc/pam.d/postlogin
4. In the file /etc/login.defs
5. In the file /etc/default/login
Rationale:
Setting a secure default value for umask ensures that users make a conscious choice
about their file permissions. A permissive umask value could result in directories or files
with excessive permissions that can be read and/or written to by unauthorized users.
Page 684
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
file_umask_chk()
{
if grep -Psiq -- '^\h*umask\h+(0?[0-7][2-7]7|u(=[rwx]{0,3}),g=([rx]{0,2}),o=)(\h*#.*)?$' "$l_file"; then
l_output="$l_output\n - umask is set correctly in \"$l_file\""
elif grep -Psiq -- '^\h*umask\h+(([0-7][0-7][01][0-7]\b|[0-7][0-7][0-7][0-6]\b)|([0-7][01][0-7]\b|[0-
7][0-7][0-
6]\b)|(u=[rwx]{1,3},)?(((g=[rx]?[rx]?w[rx]?[rx]?\b)(,o=[rwx]{1,3})?)|((g=[wrx]{1,3},)?o=[wrx]{1,3}\b)))'
"$l_file"; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - umask is incorrectly set in \"$l_file\""
fi
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
file_umask_chk
done < <(find /etc/profile.d/ -type f -name '*.sh' -print0)
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/profile" && file_umask_chk
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/bashrc" && file_umask_chk
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/bash.bashrc" && file_umask_chk
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/pam.d/postlogin"
if [ -z "$l_output" ]; then
if grep -Psiq -- '^\h*session\h+[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_umask\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?umask=(0?[0-7][2-7]7)\b'
"$l_file"; then
l_output1="$l_output1\n - umask is set correctly in \"$l_file\""
elif grep -Psiq '^\h*session\h+[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_umask\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?umask=(([0-7][0-7][01][0-
7]\b|[0-7][0-7][0-7][0-6]\b)|([0-7][01][0-7]\b))' "$l_file"; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - umask is incorrectly set in \"$l_file\""
fi
fi
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/login.defs" && file_umask_chk
[ -z "$l_output" ] && l_file="/etc/default/login" && file_umask_chk
[[ -z "$l_output" && -z "$l_output2" ]] && l_output2="$l_output2\n - umask is not set"
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :\n$l_output2"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "\n- * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
fi
}
Page 685
{
l_output="" l_output2="" l_out=""
file_umask_chk()
{
if grep -Psiq -- '^\h*umask\h+(0?[0-7][2-7]7|u(=[rwx]{0,3}),g=([rx]{0,2}),o=)(\h*#.*)?$' "$l_file"; then
l_out="$l_out\n - umask is set correctly in \"$l_file\""
elif grep -Psiq -- '^\h*umask\h+(([0-7][0-7][01][0-7]\b|[0-7][0-7][0-7][0-6]\b)|([0-7][01][0-7]\b|[0-
7][0-7][0-
6]\b)|(u=[rwx]{1,3},)?(((g=[rx]?[rx]?w[rx]?[rx]?\b)(,o=[rwx]{1,3})?)|((g=[wrx]{1,3},)?o=[wrx]{1,3}\b)))'
"$l_file"; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - \"$l_file\""
fi
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
file_umask_chk
done < <(find /etc/profile.d/ -type f -name '*.sh' -print0)
[ -n "$l_out" ] && l_output="$l_out"
l_file="/etc/profile" && file_umask_chk
l_file="/etc/bashrc" && file_umask_chk
l_file="/etc/bash.bashrc" && file_umask_chk
l_file="/etc/pam.d/postlogin"
if grep -Psiq '^\h*session\h+[^#\n\r]+\h+pam_umask\.so\h+([^#\n\r]+\h+)?umask=(([0-7][0-7][01][0-7]\b|[0-
7][0-7][0-7][0-6]\b)|([0-7][01][0-7]\b))' "$l_file"; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - \"$l_file\""
fi
l_file="/etc/login.defs" && file_umask_chk
l_file="/etc/default/login" && file_umask_chk
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e " - No files contain a UMASK that is not restrictive enough\n No UMASK updates required to
existing files"
else
echo -e "\n - UMASK is not restrictive enough in the following file(s):$l_output2\n\n- Remediation
Procedure:\n - Update these files and comment out the UMASK line\n or update umask to be \"0027\" or more
restrictive"
fi
if [ -n "$l_output" ]; then
echo -e "$l_output"
else
echo -e " - Configure UMASK in a file in the \"/etc/profile.d/\" directory ending in \".sh\"\n\n
Example Command (Hash to represent being run at a root prompt):\n\n# printf '%s\\\n' \"umask 027\" >
/etc/profile.d/50-systemwide_umask.sh\n"
fi
}
Notes:
• This method only applies to bash and shell. If other shells are supported on the
system, it is recommended that their configuration files also are checked
• If the pam_umask.so module is going to be used to set umask, ensure that it's not
being overridden by another setting. Refer to the PAM_UMASK(8) man page for
more information
Default Value:
UMASK 022
References:
Page 686
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1083 TA0007
Page 687
Page 688
AIDE is a file integrity checking tool, similar in nature to Tripwire. While it cannot prevent
intrusions, it can detect unauthorized changes to configuration files by alerting when the
files are changed. When setting up AIDE, decide internally what the site policy will be
concerning integrity checking. Review the AIDE quick start guide and AIDE
documentation before proceeding.
Page 689
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
AIDE takes a snapshot of filesystem state including modification times, permissions,
and file hashes which can then be used to compare against the current state of the
filesystem to detect modifications to the system.
Rationale:
By monitoring the filesystem state compromised files can be detected to prevent or limit
the exposure of accidental or malicious misconfigurations or modified binaries.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify aide is installed:
# dpkg-query -s aide &>/dev/null && echo "aide is installed"
aide is installed
aide-common is installed
Remediation:
Install AIDE using the appropriate package manager or manual installation:
# apt install aide aide-common
Configure AIDE as appropriate for your environment. Consult the AIDE documentation
for options.
Run the following commands to initialize AIDE:
# aideinit
# mv /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new /var/lib/aide/aide.db
References:
Page 690
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 691
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Periodic checking of the filesystem integrity is needed to detect changes to the
filesystem.
Rationale:
Periodic file checking allows the system administrator to determine on a regular basis if
critical files have been changed in an unauthorized fashion.
Audit:
Run the following command:
# systemctl list-unit-files | awk '$1~/^dailyaidecheck\.(timer|service)$/{print $1 "\t" $2}'
Example output:
dailyaidecheck.service static
dailyaidecheck.timer enabled
active
Remediation:
Run the following command to unmask dailyaidecheck.timer and
dailyaidecheck.service:
# systemctl unmask dailyaidecheck.timer dailyaidecheck.service
References:
1. https://github.com/konstruktoid/hardening/blob/master/config/aidecheck.service
2. https://github.com/konstruktoid/hardening/blob/master/config/aidecheck.timer
3. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-2
Page 692
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1036, T1036.002,
T1036.003, T1036.004,
TA0040 M1022
T1036.005, T1565,
T1565.001
Page 693
Page 694
References:
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 695
• Ensure transport layer security is implemented between the client and the log
server.
• Ensure that logs are rotated as per the environment requirements.
• Ensure all locally generated logs have the appropriate permissions.
• Ensure all security logs are sent to a remote log server.
• Ensure the required events are logged.
What is covered
This section will cover the minimum best practices for the usage of either rsyslog - OR
- journald. The recommendations are written such that each is wholly independent of
each other and only one is implemented.
Page 696
systemd-journald is a system service that collects and stores logging data. It creates
and maintains structured, indexed journals based on logging information that is received
from a variety of sources:
The daemon will implicitly collect numerous metadata fields for each log messages in a
secure and unfakeable way. See systemd.journal-fields man page for more information
about the collected metadata.
The journal service stores log data either persistently below /var/log/journal or in a
volatile way below /run/log/journal/. By default, log data is stored persistently if
/var/log/journal/ exists during boot, with an implicit fallback to volatile storage. Use
Storage= in journald.conf to configure where log data is placed, independently of
the existence of /var/log/journal/.
On systems where /var/log/journal/ does not exist but where persistent logging is
desired, and the default journald.conf is used, it is sufficient to create the directory
and ensure it has the correct access modes and ownership.
Note: systemd-journald.service must be configured appropriately for either
journald - OR - rsyslog to operate effectively.
Page 697
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Ensure that the systemd-journald service is enabled to allow capturing of logging
events.
Rationale:
If the systemd-journald service is not enabled to start on boot, the system will not
capture logging events.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify systemd-journald is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled systemd-journald.service
static
Note: By default the systemd-journald service does not have an [Install] section
and thus cannot be enabled / disabled. It is meant to be referenced as Requires or
Wants by other unit files. As such, if the status of systemd-journald is not static,
investigate why
Run the following command to verify systemd-journald is active:
# systemctl is-active systemd-journald.service
active
Remediation:
Run the following commands to unmask and start systemd-journald.service
# systemctl unmask systemd-journald.service
# systemctl start systemd-journald.service
References:
Page 698
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 699
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald will create logfiles that do not already exist on the system. This setting controls
what permissions will be applied to these newly created files.
Rationale:
It is important to ensure that log files have the correct permissions to ensure that
sensitive data is archived and protected.
Page 700
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
a_output=() a_output2=()
l_systemd_config_file="/etc/tmpfiles.d/systemd.conf" l_analyze_cmd="$(readlink -f /bin/systemd-analyze)"
f_file_chk()
{
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_perm_mask )) )"
if [ $(( $l_mode & $l_perm_mask )) -le 0 ] || [[ "$l_type" = "Directory" && "$l_mode" =~ 275(0|5) ]];
then
a_out+=(" - $l_type \"$l_logfile\" access is:" \
" mode: \"$l_mode\", owned by: \"$l_user\", and group owned by: \"$l_group\"")
else
a_out2+=(" - $l_type \"$l_logfile\" access is:" \
" mode: \"$l_mode\", owned by: \"$l_user\", and group owned by: \"$l_group\"" \
" should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive")
fi
}
while IFS= read -r l_file; do
l_file="$(tr -d '# ' <<< "$l_file")" a_out=() a_out2=()
l_logfile_perms_line="$(awk '($1~/^(f|d)$/ && $2~/\/\S+/ && $3~/[0-9]{3,}/){print $2 ":" $3 ":" $4 ":"
$5}' "$l_file")"
while IFS=: read -r l_logfile l_mode l_user l_group; do
if [ -d "$l_logfile" ]; then
l_perm_mask="0027" l_type="Directory"
grep -Psq '^(\/run|\/var\/lib\/systemd)\b' <<< "$l_logfile" && l_perm_mask="0022"
else
l_perm_mask="0137" l_type="File"
fi
grep -Psq '^(\/run|\/var\/lib\/systemd)\b' <<< "$l_logfile" && l_perm_mask="0022"
f_file_chk
done <<< "$l_logfile_perms_line"
[ "${#a_out[@]}" -gt "0" ] && a_output+=(" - File: \"$l_file\" sets:" "${a_out[@]}")
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt "0" ] && a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_file\" sets:" "${a_out2[@]}")
done < <($l_analyze_cmd cat-config "$l_systemd_config_file" | tac | grep -Pio
'^\h*#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b')
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** REVIEW **" \
" - Review file access to ensure they are set IAW site policy:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
References:
Page 701
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 702
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald includes the capability of rotating log files regularly to avoid filling up the
system with logs or making the logs unmanageably large. The file
/etc/systemd/journald.conf is the configuration file used to specify how logs
generated by Journald should be rotated.
Rationale:
By keeping the log files smaller and more manageable, a system administrator can
easily archive these files to another system and spend less time looking through
inordinately large log files.
Page 703
{
a_output=() a_output2=() l_analyze_cmd="$(readlink -f /bin/systemd-analyze)"
l_systemd_config_file="systemd/journald.conf"
a_parameters=("SystemMaxUse=^.+$" "SystemKeepFree=^.+$" "RuntimeMaxUse=^.+$" "RuntimeKeepFree=^.+$"
"MaxFileSec=^.+$")
f_config_file_parameter_chk()
{
l_used_parameter_setting=""
while IFS= read -r l_file; do
l_file="$(tr -d '# ' <<< "$l_file")"
l_used_parameter_setting="$(grep -PHs -- '^\h*'"$l_parameter_name"'\b' "$l_file" | tail -n 1)"
[ -n "$l_used_parameter_setting" ] && break
done < <($l_analyze_cmd cat-config "$l_systemd_config_file" | tac | grep -Pio
'^\h*#\h*\/[^#\n\r\h]+\.conf\b')
if [ -n "$l_used_parameter_setting" ]; then
while IFS=: read -r l_file_name l_file_parameter; do
while IFS="=" read -r l_file_parameter_name l_file_parameter_value; do
if grep -Pq -- "$l_parameter_value" <<< "$l_file_parameter_value"; then
a_output+=(" - Parameter: \"${l_file_parameter_name// /}\"" \
" set to: \"${l_file_parameter_value// /}\"" \
" in the file: \"$l_file_name\"")
fi
done <<< "$l_file_parameter"
done <<< "$l_used_parameter_setting"
else
a_output2+=(" - Parameter: \"$l_parameter_name\" is not set in an included file" \
" *** Note: ***" " \"$l_parameter_name\" May be set in a file that's ignored by load procedure")
fi
}
for l_input_parameter in "${a_parameters[@]}"; do
while IFS="=" read -r l_parameter_name l_parameter_value; do # Assess and check parameters
l_parameter_name="${l_parameter_name// /}"; l_parameter_value="${l_parameter_value// /}"
l_value_out="${l_parameter_value//-/ through }"; l_value_out="${l_value_out//|/ or }"
l_value_out="$(tr -d '(){}' <<< "$l_value_out")"
f_config_file_parameter_chk
done <<< "$l_input_parameter"
done
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 704
Note:
• If these settings appear in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
• Logfile size and configuration to move logfiles to a remote log server should be
accounted for when configuring these settings
References:
Additional Information:
See man 5 journald.conf for detailed information regarding the parameters in use.
Page 705
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 706
Page 707
Page 708
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald systemd-journal-remote supports the ability to send log events it gathers to
a remote log host or to receive messages from remote hosts, thus enabling centralized
log management.
Rationale:
Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker
gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is
stored on the local system.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
- IF - journald will be used for logging on the system:
Run the following command to verify systemd-journal-remote is installed.
# dpkg-query -s systemd-journal-remote &>/dev/null && echo "systemd-journal-remote is installed"
Remediation:
Run the following command to install systemd-journal-remote:
# apt install systemd-journal-remote
References:
Page 709
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 710
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald systemd-journal-upload supports the ability to send log events it gathers to
a remote log host.
Rationale:
Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker
gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is
stored on the local system.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify systemd-journal-upload authentication is
configured:
# grep -Psi "URL=|ServerKeyFile=|ServerCertificateFile=|TrustedCertificateFile=" /etc/systemd/journald.conf
/etc/systemd/journal-upload.conf.d/*
Example output:
/etc/systemd/journal-upload.conf.d/60-journald_upload.conf:URL=192.168.50.42
/etc/systemd/journal-upload.conf.d/60-journald_upload.conf:ServerKeyFile=/etc/ssl/private/journal-upload.pem
/etc/systemd/journal-upload.conf.d/60-journald_upload.conf:ServerCertificateFile=/etc/ssl/certs/journal-
upload.pem
/etc/systemd/journal-upload.conf.d/60-journald_upload.conf:TrustedCertificateFile=/etc/ssl/ca/trusted.pem
Review the output to ensure it matches your environments' certificate locations and the
URL of the log server.
Page 711
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 712
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald systemd-journal-upload supports the ability to send log events it gathers to
a remote log host.
Rationale:
Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker
gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is
stored on the local system.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify systemd-journal-upload is enabled.
# systemctl is-enabled systemd-journal-upload.service
enabled
active
Remediation:
Run the following commands to unmask, enable and start systemd-journal-upload:
# systemctl unmask systemd-journal-upload.service
# systemctl --now enable systemd-journal-upload.service
References:
Page 713
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 714
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Journald systemd-journal-remote supports the ability to receive messages from
remote hosts, thus acting as a log server. Clients should not receive data from other
hosts.
Note:
Rationale:
If a client is configured to also receive data, thus turning it into a server, the client
system is acting outside it's operational boundary.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify systemd-journal-remote.socket and systemd-
journal-remote.service are not enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled systemd-journal-remote.socket systemd-journal-remote.service | grep -P -- '^enabled'
Page 715
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 716
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Data from journald should be kept in the confines of the service and not forwarded to
other services.
Rationale:
- IF - journald is the method for capturing logs, all logs of the system should be
handled by journald and not forwarded to other logging mechanisms.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
- IF - journald is the method for capturing logs
Run the following command to verify ForwardToSyslog is set to no:
# grep -Psi "^ForwardToSyslog=no" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*
Remediation:
- IF - rsyslog is the preferred method for capturing logs, this section and
Recommendation should be skipped and the "Configure rsyslog" section followed.
- IF - journald is the preferred method for capturing logs:
Set the following parameter in the [Journal] section in
/etc/systemd/journald.conf or a file in /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/ ending
in .conf:
ForwardToSyslog=no
Note: If this setting appears in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
Run to following command to update the parameters in the service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart systemd-journald
Default Value:
ForwardToSyslog=no
Page 717
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 718
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The journald system includes the capability of compressing overly large files to avoid
filling up the system with logs or making the logs unmanageably large.
Rationale:
Uncompressed large files may unexpectedly fill a filesystem leading to resource
unavailability. Compressing logs prior to write can prevent sudden, unexpected
filesystem impacts.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
- IF - journald is the method for capturing logs
Run the following command to verify Compress is set to yes:
# grep -Psi "^Compress=yes" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*
Remediation:
- IF - rsyslog is the preferred method for capturing logs, this section and
Recommendation should be skipped and the "Configure rsyslog" section followed.
- IF - journald is the preferred method for capturing logs:
Set the following parameter in the [Journal] section in
/etc/systemd/journald.conf or a file in /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/ ending
in .conf:
Compress=yes
Note: If this setting appears in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
Run to following command to update the parameters in the service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart systemd-journald
Default Value:
Compress=yes
Page 719
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 720
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Data from journald may be stored in volatile memory or persisted locally on the server.
Logs in memory will be lost upon a system reboot. By persisting logs to local disk on the
server they are protected from loss due to a reboot.
Rationale:
Writing log data to disk will provide the ability to forensically reconstruct events which
may have impacted the operations or security of a system even after a system crash or
reboot.
Note: This recommendation only applies if journald is the chosen method for
client side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if rsyslog is used.
Audit:
- IF - journald is the method for capturing logs
Run the following script to verify Storage is set to persistent:
# grep -Psi "^Storage=persistent" /etc/systemd/journald.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*
Remediation:
- IF - rsyslog is the preferred method for capturing logs, this section and
Recommendation should be skipped and the "Configure rsyslog" section followed.
- IF - journald is the preferred method for capturing logs:
Set the following parameter in the [Journal] section in
/etc/systemd/journald.conf or a file in /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/ ending
in .conf:
Storage=persistent
Note: If this setting appears in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
Run to following command to update the parameters in the service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart systemd-journald
Default Value:
Storage=persistent
Page 721
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Page 722
The rsyslog software package may be used instead of the default journald logging
mechanism.
Rsyslog has evolved over several decades. For this reason it supports three different
configuration formats (“languages”):
• basic - previously known as the sysklogd format, this is the format best used to
express basic things, such as where the statement fits on a single line.
o It stems back to the original syslog.conf format, in use now for several
decades.
o The most common use case is matching on facility/severity and writing
matching messages to a log file.
• advanced - previously known as the RainerScript format, this format was first
available in rsyslog v6 and is the current, best and most precise format for non-
trivial use cases where more than one line is needed.
o Prior to v7, there was a performance impact when using this format that
encouraged use of the basic format for best results. Current versions of
rsyslog do not suffer from this (historical) performance impact.
o This new style format is specifically targeted towards more advanced use
cases like forwarding to remote hosts that might be partially offline.
• obsolete legacy - previously known simply as the legacy format, this format is
exactly what its name implies: it is obsolete and should not be used when writing
new configurations. It was created in the early days (up to rsyslog version 5)
where we expected that rsyslog would extend sysklogd just mildly. Consequently,
it was primarily aimed at small additions to the original sysklogd format.
o Practice has shown that it was notoriously hard to use for more advanced
use cases, and thus we replaced it with the advanced format.
o In essence, everything that needs to be written on a single line that starts
with a dollar sign is legacy format. Users of this format are encouraged to
migrate to the basic or advanced formats.
Note: This section only applies if rsyslog is the chosen method for client side logging.
Do not apply this section if journald is used.
Page 723
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Once the rsyslog package is installed, ensure that the service is enabled.
Rationale:
If the rsyslog service is not enabled to start on boot, the system will not capture
logging events.
Audit:
- IF - rsyslog is being used for logging on the system:
Run the following command to verify rsyslog.service is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled rsyslog
enabled
active
Remediation:
- IF - rsyslog is being used for logging on the system:
Run the following commands to unmask, enable, and start rsyslog.service:
# systemctl unmask rsyslog.service
# systemctl enable rsyslog.service
# systemctl start rsyslog.service
References:
Page 724
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Page 725
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The rsyslog software is recommended in environments where journald does not
meet operation requirements.
Rationale:
The security enhancements of rsyslog such as connection-oriented (i.e. TCP)
transmission of logs, the option to log to database formats, and the encryption of log
data en route to a central logging server) justify installing and configuring the package.
Audit:
- IF - rsyslog is being used for logging on the system:
Run the following command to verify rsyslog is installed:
# dpkg-query -s rsyslog &>/dev/null && echo "rsyslog is installed"
Remediation:
Run the following command to install rsyslog:
# apt install rsyslog
Default Value:
Installed
References:
Page 726
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Page 727
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Data from systemd-journald may be stored in volatile memory or persisted locally on
the server. Utilities exist to accept remote export of systemd-journald logs, however,
use of the rsyslog service provides a consistent means of log collection and export.
Rationale:
- IF - rsyslog is the preferred method for capturing logs, all logs of the system should
be sent to it for further processing.
Note: This recommendation only applies if rsyslog is the chosen method for client
side logging. Do not apply this recommendation if systemd-journald is used.
Audit:
- IF - rsyslog is the preferred method for capturing logs
Run the following command to verify systemd-journald.service and
rsyslog.service are loaded and active:
# systemctl list-units --type service | grep -P -- '(journald|rsyslog)'
Run the following command to verify that logs are forwarded to rsyslog by setting
ForwardToSyslog to yes in the systemd-journald configuration:
# grep -Psi "^ForwardToSyslog=yes" /etc/systemd/journal.conf /etc/systemd/journald.conf.d/*
Page 728
Note: If this setting appears in a canonically later file, or later in the same file, the
setting will be overwritten
Run to following command to update the parameters in the service:
Restart systemd-journald.service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart systemd-journald.service
References:
Additional Information:
As noted in the systemd-journald man pages, systemd-journald logs may be
exported to rsyslog either through the process mentioned here, or through a facility
like systemd-journald.service. There are trade-offs involved in each
implementation, where ForwardToSyslog will immediately capture all events (and
forward to an external log server, if properly configured), but may not capture all boot-up
activities. Mechanisms such as systemd-journald.service, on the other hand, will
record bootup events, but may delay sending the information to rsyslog, leading to the
potential for log manipulation prior to export. Be aware of the limitations of all tools
employed to secure a system.
Page 729
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Page 730
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The $FileCreateMode parameter allows to specify the creation mode with which
rsyslogd creates new files.
Rationale:
It is important to ensure that log files have the correct permissions to ensure that
sensitive data is archived and protected.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify $FileCreateMode to set to mode 0640 or more
restrictive:
# grep ^\$FileCreateMode /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
Should a site policy dictate less restrictive permissions, ensure to follow said policy.
Note: More restrictive permissions such as 0600 is implicitly sufficient.
Remediation:
Edit either /etc/rsyslog.conf or a dedicated .conf file in /etc/rsyslog.d/ and set
$FileCreateMode to 0640 or more restrictive:
$FileCreateMode 0640
References:
1. RSYSLOG.CONF(5)
2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2
3. https://www.rsyslog.com/doc/configuration/action/rsconf1_filecreatemode.html
Page 731
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Page 732
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The rsyslog and configuration files specifies rules for logging and which files are to be
used to log certain classes of messages.
Rationale:
A great deal of important security-related information is sent via rsyslog (e.g.,
successful and failed su attempts, failed login attempts, root login attempts, etc.).
Audit:
Review the contents of /etc/rsyslog.conf and /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf files to
ensure appropriate logging is set. In addition, run the following command and verify that
the log files are logging information as expected:
# ls -l /var/log/
Example output:
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:auth,authpriv.* /var/log/secure
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:mail.* -/var/log/mail
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:mail.info -/var/log/mail.info
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:mail.warning -/var/log/mail.warn
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:mail.err /var/log/mail.err
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:cron.* /var/log/cron
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:*.=warning;*.=err -/var/log/warn
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:*.crit /var/log/warn
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:*.*;mail.none;news.none -/var/log/messages
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:local0,local1.* -/var/log/localmessages
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:local2,local3.* -/var/log/localmessages
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:local4,local5.* -/var/log/localmessages
/etc/rsyslog.d/60-rsyslog.conf:local6,local7.* -/var/log/localmessages
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf:auth,authpriv.* /var/log/auth.log #<- Will be ignored
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf:*.*;auth,authpriv.none -/var/log/syslog
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf:kern.* -/var/log/kern.log
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf:mail.* -/var/log/mail.log #<- Will be ignored
/etc/rsyslog.d/50-default.conf:mail.err /var/log/mail.err #<- Will be ignored
Note:
Page 733
References:
Page 734
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Page 735
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
rsyslog supports the ability to send log events it gathers to a remote log host or to
receive messages from remote hosts, thus enabling centralized log management.
Rationale:
Storing log data on a remote host protects log integrity from local attacks. If an attacker
gains root access on the local system, they could tamper with or remove log data that is
stored on the local system.
Audit:
Run the following command and review the output of rsyslog configuration. Verify that
logs are sent to a central host used by your organization:
basic format
# grep "^*.*[^I][^I]*@" /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
- OR -
Run the following command and review the output of rsyslog configuration. Verify that
logs are sent to a central host used by your organization:
advanced format
# grep -E '^\s*([^#]+\s+)?action\(([^#]+\s+)?\btarget=\"?[^#"]+\"?\b' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
Page 736
References:
Additional Information:
In addition, see the rsyslog documentation for implementation details of TLS.
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Page 737
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
rsyslog supports the ability to receive messages from remote hosts, thus acting as a
log server. Clients should not receive data from other hosts.
Rationale:
If a client is configured to also receive data, thus turning it into a server, the client
system is acting outside its operational boundary.
Audit:
Unless the system's primary function is to serve as a logfile server, run the following
script to review the rsyslog configuration and verify that the system is not configured to
accept incoming logs.
advanced format
# grep -P -- '^\h*module\(load="imtcp"\)|^\h*module\(load="imudp"\)' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
# grep -P -- '^\h*input\(type="imtcp" port="514"\)|^\h*input\(type="imudp" port="514"\)' /etc/rsyslog.conf
/etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
No output expected.
obsolete legacy format
# grep -P -- '(^\$ModLoad imtcp|^\$InputTCPServerRun)' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
# grep -P -- '(^\$ModLoad imudp|^\$UDPServerRun)' /etc/rsyslog.conf /etc/rsyslog.d/*.conf
No output expected.
Page 738
Note: obsolete legacy - previously known as the legacy format. This format is
obsolete and should not be used when writing new configurations. It was aimed at small
additions to the original sysklogd format and has been replaced due to its limitations.
Reload the service:
# systemctl reload-or-restart rsyslog
References:
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Page 739
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The system includes the capability of rotating log files regularly to avoid filling up the
system with logs or making the logs unmanageably large. The file
/etc/logrotate.d/rsyslog is the configuration file used to rotate log files created by
rsyslog.
Rationale:
By keeping the log files smaller and more manageable, a system administrator can
easily archive these files to another system and spend less time looking through
inordinately large log files.
Audit:
Run the following script to analyze the logrotate configuration:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_analyze_cmd="$(readlink -f /bin/systemd-analyze)" l_config_file="/etc/logrotate.conf"
l_include="$(awk '$1~/^\s*include$/{print$2}' "$l_config_file" 2>/dev/null)"
[ -d "$l_include" ] && l_include="$l_include/*"
$l_analyze_cmd cat-config "$l_config_file" $l_include
}
Note: The last occurrence of a argument is the one used for the logrotate
configuration
Remediation:
Edit /etc/logrotate.conf, or the appropriate configuration file provided by the script
in the Audit Procedure, as necessary to ensure logs are rotated according to site policy.
References:
Additional Information:
If no maxage setting is set for logrotate a situation can occur where logrotate is
interrupted and fails to delete rotated log files. It is recommended to set this to a value
greater than the longest any log file should exist on your system to ensure that any such
log file is removed but standard rotation settings are not overridden.
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Page 741
Page 742
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Log files contain information from many services on the the local system, or in the event
of a centralized log server, others systems logs as well.
In general log files are found in /var/log/, although application can be configured to
store logs elsewhere. Should your application store logs in another, ensure to run the
same test on that location.
Rationale:
It is important that log files have the correct permissions to ensure that sensitive data is
protected and that only the appropriate users / groups have access to them.
Page 743
{
a_output=(); a_output2=()
f_file_test_chk()
{
a_out2=()
maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$perm_mask)) )"
[ $(( $l_mode & $perm_mask )) -gt 0 ] && \
a_out2+=(" o Mode: \"$l_mode\" should be \"$maxperm\" or more restrictive")
[[ ! "$l_user" =~ $l_auser ]] && \
a_out2+=(" o Owned by: \"$l_user\" and should be owned by \"${l_auser//|/ or }\"")
[[ ! "$l_group" =~ $l_agroup ]] && \
a_out2+=(" o Group owned by: \"$l_group\" and should be group owned by \"${l_agroup//|/ or }\"")
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_fname\" is:" "${a_out2[@]}")
}
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
while IFS=: read -r l_fname l_mode l_user l_group; do
if grep -Pq -- '\/(apt)\h*$' <<< "$(dirname "$l_fname")"; then
perm_mask='0133' l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|adm)"; f_file_test_chk
else
case "$(basename "$l_fname")" in
lastlog | lastlog.* | wtmp | wtmp.* | wtmp-* | btmp | btmp.* | btmp-* | README)
perm_mask='0113' l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|utmp)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
cloud-init.log* | localmessages* | waagent.log*)
perm_mask='0133' l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
secure{,*.*,.*,-*} | auth.log | syslog | messages)
perm_mask='0137' l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
SSSD | sssd)
perm_mask='0117' l_auser="(root|SSSD)" l_agroup="(root|SSSD)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
gdm | gdm3)
perm_mask='0117' l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|gdm|gdm3)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
*.journal | *.journal~)
perm_mask='0137' l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|systemd-journal)"
f_file_test_chk ;;
*)
perm_mask='0137' l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
if [ "$l_user" = "root" ] || ! grep -Pq -- "^\h*$(awk -F: '$1=="'"$l_user"'" {print $7}'
/etc/passwd)\b" /etc/shells; then
! grep -Pq -- "$l_auser" <<< "$l_user" && l_auser="(root|syslog|$l_user)"
! grep -Pq -- "$l_agroup" <<< "$l_group" && l_agroup="(root|adm|$l_group)"
fi
f_file_test_chk ;;
esac
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%n:%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
done < <(find -L /var/log -type f \( -perm /0137 -o ! -user root -o ! -group root \) -print0)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
a_output+=(" - All files in \"/var/log/\" have appropriate permissions and ownership")
printf '\n%s' "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}" ""
else
printf '\n%s' "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
fi
}
Page 744
Page 745
{
a_output2=()
f_file_test_fix()
{
a_out2=()
maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$perm_mask)) )"
if [ $(( $l_mode & $perm_mask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_out2+=(" o Mode: \"$l_mode\" should be \"$maxperm\" or more restrictive" " x Removing excess
permissions")
chmod "$l_rperms" "$l_fname"
fi
if [[ ! "$l_user" =~ $l_auser ]]; then
a_out2+=(" o Owned by: \"$l_user\" and should be owned by \"${l_auser//|/ or }\"" " x Changing
ownership to: \"$l_fix_account\"")
chown "$l_fix_account" "$l_fname"
fi
if [[ ! "$l_group" =~ $l_agroup ]]; then
a_out2+=(" o Group owned by: \"$l_group\" and should be group owned by \"${l_agroup//|/ or }\"" "
x Changing group ownership to: \"$l_fix_account\"")
chgrp "$l_fix_account" "$l_fname"
fi
[ "${#a_out2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" - File: \"$l_fname\" is:" "${a_out2[@]}")
}
l_fix_account='root'
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
while IFS=: read -r l_fname l_mode l_user l_group; do
if grep -Pq -- '\/(apt)\h*$' <<< "$(dirname "$l_fname")"; then
perm_mask='0133' l_rperms="u-x,go-wx" l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|adm)"; f_file_test_fix
else
case "$(basename "$l_fname")" in
lastlog | lastlog.* | wtmp | wtmp.* | wtmp-* | btmp | btmp.* | btmp-* | README)
perm_mask='0113' l_rperms="ug-x,o-wx" l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|utmp)"
f_file_test_fix ;;
cloud-init.log* | localmessages* | waagent.log*)
perm_mask='0133' l_rperms="u-x,go-wx" l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
file_test_fix ;;
secure | auth.log | syslog | messages)
perm_mask='0137' l_rperms="u-x,g-wx,o-rwx" l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
f_file_test_fix ;;
SSSD | sssd)
perm_mask='0117' l_rperms="ug-x,o-rwx" l_auser="(root|SSSD)" l_agroup="(root|SSSD)"
f_file_test_fix ;;
gdm | gdm3)
perm_mask='0117' l_rperms="ug-x,o-rwx" l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|gdm|gdm3)"
f_file_test_fix ;;
*.journal | *.journal~)
perm_mask='0137' l_rperms="u-x,g-wx,o-rwx" l_auser="root" l_agroup="(root|systemd-journal)"
f_file_test_fix ;;
*)
perm_mask='0137' l_rperms="u-x,g-wx,o-rwx" l_auser="(root|syslog)" l_agroup="(root|adm)"
if [ "$l_user" = "root" ] || ! grep -Pq -- "^\h*$(awk -F: '$1=="'"$l_user"'" {print $7}'
/etc/passwd)\b" /etc/shells; then
! grep -Pq -- "$l_auser" <<< "$l_user" && l_auser="(root|syslog|$l_user)"
! grep -Pq -- "$l_agroup" <<< "$l_group" && l_agroup="(root|adm|$l_group)"
fi
f_file_test_fix ;;
esac
fi
done < <(stat -Lc '%n:%#a:%U:%G' "$l_file")
done < <(find -L /var/log -type f \( -perm /0137 -o ! -user root -o ! -group root \) -print0)
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then # If all files passed, then we report no changes
a_output+=(" - All files in \"/var/log/\" have appropriate permissions and ownership")
printf '\n%s' "- All files in \"/var/log/\" have appropriate permissions and ownership" " o No changes
required" ""
else
printf '\n%s' "${a_output2[@]}" ""
fi
}
Note: You may also need to change the configuration for your logging software or
services for any logs that had incorrect permissions.
If there are services that log to other locations, ensure that those log files have the
appropriate permissions.
Page 746
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Page 747
The Linux Auditing System operates on a set of rules that collects certain types of
system activity to facilitate incident investigation, detect unauthorized access or
modification of data. By default events will be logged to /var/log/audit/audit.log,
which can be configured in /etc/audit/auditd.conf.
The following types of audit rules can be specified:
• On the command line using the auditctl utility. These rules are not persistent
across reboots.
• In /etc/audit/audit.rules. These rules have to be merged and loaded before
they are active.
Notes:
• For 64 bit systems that have arch as a rule parameter, you will need two rules:
one for 64 bit and one for 32 bit systems calls.
• If the auditing system is configured to be locked (-e 2), a system reboot will be
required in order to load any changes.
• Key names are optional on the rules and will not be used as a compliance
auditing. The usage of key names is highly recommended as it facilitates
organization and searching, as such, all remediation steps will have key names
supplied.
• It is best practice to store the rules, in number prepended files, in
/etc/audit/rules.d/. Rules must end in a .rules suffix. This then requires
the use of augenrules to merge all the rules into /etc/audit/audit.rules
based on their their alphabetical (lexical) sort order. All benchmark
recommendations follow this best practice for remediation, specifically using the
prefix of 50 which is centre weighed if all rule sets make use of the number
prepending naming convention.
• Your system may have been customized to change the default UID_MIN. All
samples output uses 1000, but this value will not be used in compliance auditing.
To confirm the UID_MIN for your system, run the following command: awk
'/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs
Page 748
• With regards to users whose login UID is not set, the values -1 / unset /
4294967295 are equivalent and normalized to -1.
• When comparing field types and both sides of the comparison is valid fields
types, such aseuid!=uid, then the auditing system may normalize such that the
output is uid!=euid.
• Some parts of the rule may be rearranged whilst others are dependant on
previous syntax. For example, the following two statements are the same:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F auid!=-1 -F key=user_emulation
and
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -C euid!=uid -F auid!=unset -S execve -k user_emulation
Capacity planning
The recommendations in this section implement auditing policies that not only produces
large quantities of logged data, but may also negatively impact system performance.
Capacity planning is critical in order not to adversely impact production environments.
Page 749
The capturing of system events provides system administrators with information to allow
them to determine if unauthorized access to their system is occurring.
Page 750
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
auditd is the userspace component to the Linux Auditing System. It's responsible for
writing audit records to the disk
Rationale:
The capturing of system events provides system administrators with information to allow
them to determine if unauthorized access to their system is occurring.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify auditd is installed:
# dpkg-query -s auditd &>/dev/null && echo auditd is installed
auditd is installed
audispd-plugins is installed
Remediation:
Run the following command to Install auditd and audispd-plugins
# apt install auditd audispd-plugins
References:
Page 751
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Page 752
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Turn on the auditd daemon to record system events.
Rationale:
The capturing of system events provides system administrators with information to allow
them to determine if unauthorized access to their system is occurring.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify auditd is enabled:
# systemctl is-enabled auditd | grep '^enabled'
enabled
active
References:
Page 753
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Page 754
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Configure grub2 so that processes that are capable of being audited can be audited
even if they start up prior to auditd startup.
Rationale:
Audit events need to be captured on processes that start up prior to auditd , so that
potential malicious activity cannot go undetected.
Audit:
Run the following command:
# find /boot -type f -name 'grub.cfg' -exec grep -Ph -- '^\h*linux' {} + | grep -v 'audit=1'
References:
Additional Information:
This recommendation is designed around the grub2 bootloader, if another bootloader is
in use in your environment enact equivalent settings.
Page 755
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Page 756
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
In the kernel-level audit subsystem, a socket buffer queue is used to hold audit events.
Whenever a new audit event is received, it is logged and prepared to be added to this
queue.
The kernel boot parameter audit_backlog_limit=N, with N representing the amount of
messages, will ensure that a queue cannot grow beyond a certain size. If an audit event
is logged which would grow the queue beyond this limit, then a failure occurs and is
handled according to the system configuration
Rationale:
If an audit event is logged which would grow the queue beyond the
audit_backlog_limit, then a failure occurs, auditd records will be lost, and potential
malicious activity could go undetected.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify the audit_backlog_limit= parameter is set:
# find /boot -type f -name 'grub.cfg' -exec grep -Ph -- '^\h*linux' {} + | grep -Pv 'audit_backlog_limit=\d+\b'
Default Value:
if audit_backlog_limit is not set, the system defaults to audit_backlog_limit=64
References:
Page 757
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Page 758
When auditing, it is important to carefully configure the storage requirements for audit
logs. By default, auditd will max out the log files at 5MB and retain only 4 copies of
them. Older versions will be deleted. It is possible on a system that the 20 MBs of audit
logs may fill up the system causing loss of audit data. While the recommendations here
provide guidance, check your site policy for audit storage requirements.
Page 759
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Configure the maximum size of the audit log file. Once the log reaches the maximum
size, it will be rotated and a new log file will be started.
Rationale:
It is important that an appropriate size is determined for log files so that they do not
impact the system and audit data is not lost.
Audit:
Run the following command and ensure output is in compliance with site policy:
# grep -Po -- '^\h*max_log_file\h*=\h*\d+\b' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
max_log_file = <MB>
Remediation:
Set the following parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf in accordance with site
policy:
max_log_file = <MB>
Default Value:
max_log_file = 8
References:
Additional Information:
The max_log_file parameter is measured in megabytes.
Other methods of log rotation may be appropriate based on site policy. One example is
time-based rotation strategies which don't have native support in auditd configurations.
Manual audit of custom configurations should be evaluated for effectiveness and
completeness.
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Page 761
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The max_log_file_action setting determines how to handle the audit log file reaching
the max file size. A value of keep_logs will rotate the logs but never delete old logs.
Rationale:
In high security contexts, the benefits of maintaining a long audit history exceed the cost
of storing the audit history.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output matches:
# grep max_log_file_action /etc/audit/auditd.conf
max_log_file_action = keep_logs
Remediation:
Set the following parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf:
max_log_file_action = keep_logs
References:
Page 762
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Page 763
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The auditd daemon can be configured to halt the system or put the system in single
user mode, if no free space is available or an error is detected on the partition that holds
the audit log files.
The disk_full_action parameter tells the system what action to take when no free
space is available on the partition that holds the audit log files. Valid values are ignore,
syslog, rotate, exec, suspend, single, and halt.
• ignore, the audit daemon will issue a syslog message but no other action is
taken
• syslog, the audit daemon will issue a warning to syslog
• rotate, the audit daemon will rotate logs, losing the oldest to free up space
• exec, /path-to-script will execute the script. You cannot pass parameters to the
script. The script is also responsible for telling the auditd daemon to resume
logging once its completed its action
• suspend, the audit daemon will stop writing records to the disk
• single, the audit daemon will put the computer system in single user mode
• halt, the audit daemon will shut down the system
The disk_error_action parameter tells the system what action to take when an error
is detected on the partition that holds the audit log files. Valid values are ignore,
syslog, exec, suspend, single, and halt.
Rationale:
In high security contexts, the risk of detecting unauthorized access or nonrepudiation
exceeds the benefit of the system's availability.
Page 764
• Set to halt - the auditd daemon will shutdown the system when the disk
partition containing the audit logs becomes full.
• Set to single - the auditd daemon will put the computer system in single user
mode when the disk partition containing the audit logs becomes full.
disk_error_action parameter:
• Set to halt - the auditd daemon will shutdown the system when an error is
detected on the partition that holds the audit log files.
• Set to single - the auditd daemon will put the computer system in single user
mode when an error is detected on the partition that holds the audit log files.
• Set to syslog - the auditd daemon will issue no more than 5 consecutive
warnings to syslog when an error is detected on the partition that holds the audit
log files.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify the disk_full_action is set to either halt or
single:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*disk_full_action\h*=\h*(halt|single)\b' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
disk_full_action = <halt|single>
Run the following command and verify the disk_error_action is set to syslog,
single, or halt:
# grep -Pi -- '^\h*disk_error_action\h*=\h*(syslog|single|halt)\b' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
disk_error_action = <syslog|single|halt>
Remediation:
Set one of the following parameters in /etc/audit/auditd.conf depending on your
local security policies.
disk_full_action = <halt|single>
disk_error_action = <syslog|single|halt>
Example:
disk_full_action = halt
disk_error_action = halt
References:
Page 765
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Page 766
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The auditd daemon can be configured to halt the system, put the system in single user
mode or send a warning message, if the partition that holds the audit log files is low on
space.
The space_left_action parameter tells the system what action to take when the
system has detected that it is starting to get low on disk space. Valid values are ignore,
syslog, rotate, email, exec, suspend, single, and halt.
The admin_space_left_action parameter tells the system what action to take when
the system has detected that it is low on disk space. Valid values are ignore, syslog,
rotate, email, exec, suspend, single, and halt.
Page 767
Run the following command and verify the admin_space_left_action is set to single
- OR - halt:
grep -P -- '^\h*admin_space_left_action\h*=\h*(single|halt)\b' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
Note: A Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) must be installed and configured properly to set
space_left_action = email
Remediation:
Set the space_left_action parameter in /etc/audit/auditd.conf to email, exec,
single, or halt:
Example:
space_left_action = email
Note: A Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) must be installed and configured properly to set
space_left_action = email
References:
Page 768
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Page 769
The Audit system operates on a set of rules that define what is to be captured in the log
files.
The following types of Audit rules can be specified:
• Control rules: Allow the Audit system's behavior and some of its configuration to
be modified.
• File system rules: Allow the auditing of access to a particular file or a directory.
(Also known as file watches)
• System call rules: Allow logging of system calls that any specified program
makes.
• on the command line using the auditctl utility. Note that these rules are not
persistent across reboots.
• in a file ending in .rules in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory.
Note: The Linux Benchmarks are written and tested against x86_64 processor
architecture. If you are running a different processor type, please review and update the
audit rules for the processor architecture of the system
Page 770
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor scope changes for system administrators. If the system has been properly
configured to force system administrators to log in as themselves first and then use the
sudo command to execute privileged commands, it is possible to monitor changes in
scope. The file /etc/sudoers, or files in /etc/sudoers.d, will be written to when the
file(s) or related attributes have changed. The audit records will be tagged with the
identifier "scope".
Rationale:
Changes in the /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d files can indicate that an
unauthorized change has been made to the scope of system administrator activity.
Audit:
On disk configuration
Run the following command to check the on disk rules:
# awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&/\/etc\/sudoers/ \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&/\/etc\/sudoers/ \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 771
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 772
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Page 773
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
sudo provides users with temporary elevated privileges to perform operations, either as
the superuser or another user.
Rationale:
Creating an audit log of users with temporary elevated privileges and the operation(s)
they performed is essential to reporting. Administrators will want to correlate the events
written to the audit trail with the records written to sudo's logfile to verify if unauthorized
commands have been executed.
Audit:
On disk configuration
Run the following command to check the on disk rules:
# awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&(/ -C *euid!=uid/||/ -C *uid!=euid/) \
&&/ -S *execve/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&(/ -C *euid!=uid/||/ -C *uid!=euid/) \
&&/ -S *execve/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 774
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 775
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Page 776
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor the sudo log file. If the system has been properly configured to disable the use
of the su command and force all administrators to have to log in first and then use sudo
to execute privileged commands, then all administrator commands will be logged to
/var/log/sudo.log . Any time a command is executed, an audit event will be
triggered as the /var/log/sudo.log file will be opened for write and the executed
administration command will be written to the log.
Rationale:
Changes in /var/log/sudo.log indicate that an administrator has executed a
command or the log file itself has been tampered with. Administrators will want to
correlate the events written to the audit trail with the records written to
/var/log/sudo.log to verify if unauthorized commands have been executed.
Page 777
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
SUDO_LOG_FILE=$(grep -r logfile /etc/sudoers* | sed -e 's/.*logfile=//;s/,? .*//' -e 's/"//g' -e 's|/|\\/|g')
[ -n "${SUDO_LOG_FILE}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-w/ \
&&/"${SUDO_LOG_FILE}"/ \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'SUDO_LOG_FILE' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Note: This recommendation requires that the sudo logfile is configured. See guidance
provided in the recommendation "Ensure sudo log file exists"
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor events that modify the sudo log file.
Example:
# {
SUDO_LOG_FILE=$(grep -r logfile /etc/sudoers* | sed -e 's/.*logfile=//;s/,? .*//' -e 's/"//g')
[ -n "${SUDO_LOG_FILE}" ] && printf "
-w ${SUDO_LOG_FILE} -p wa -k sudo_log_file
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-sudo.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'SUDO_LOG_FILE' is unset.\n"
}
Page 778
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Page 779
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Capture events where the system date and/or time has been modified. The parameters
in this section are set to determine if the;
system calls have been executed. Further, ensure to write an audit record to the
configured audit log file upon exit, tagging the records with a unique identifier such as
"time-change".
Rationale:
Unexpected changes in system date and/or time could be a sign of malicious activity on
the system.
Page 780
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&/ -S/ \
&&(/adjtimex/ \
||/settimeofday/ \
||/clock_settime/ ) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 781
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 782
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Page 783
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Record changes to network environment files or system calls. The below parameters
monitors the following system calls, and write an audit event on system call exit:
Rationale:
Monitoring system events that change network environments, such as sethostname
and setdomainname, helps identify unauthorized alterations to host and domain names,
which could compromise security settings reliant on these names. Changes to
/etc/hosts can signal unauthorized attempts to alter machine associations with IP
addresses, potentially redirecting users and processes to unintended destinations.
Surveillance of /etc/issue and /etc/issue.net is crucial to detect intruders inserting
false information to deceive users. Monitoring /etc/network/ reveals modifications to
network interfaces or scripts that may jeopardize system availability or security.
Additionally, tracking changes in the /etc/netplan/ directory ensures swift detection
of unauthorized adjustments to network configurations. All audit records should be
appropriately tagged for relevance
Page 784
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&/ -S/ \
&&(/sethostname/ \
||/setdomainname/) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 785
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 786
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Page 787
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor privileged programs, those that have the setuid and/or setgid bit set on
execution, to determine if unprivileged users are running these commands.
Rationale:
Execution of privileged commands by non-privileged users could be an indication of
someone trying to gain unauthorized access to the system.
Impact:
Both the audit and remediation section of this recommendation will traverse all mounted
file systems that is not mounted with either noexec or nosuid mount options. If there
are large file systems without these mount options, such traversal will be significantly
detrimental to the performance of the system.
Before running either the audit or remediation section, inspect the output of the following
command to determine exactly which file systems will be traversed:
# findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid"
To exclude a particular file system due to adverse performance impacts, update the
audit and remediation sections by adding a sufficiently unique string to the grep
statement. The above command can be used to test the modified exclusions.
Page 788
{
for PARTITION in $(findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep
-Pv "noexec|nosuid" | awk '{print $1}'); do
for PRIVILEGED in $(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f); do
grep -qr "${PRIVILEGED}" /etc/audit/rules.d && printf "OK: '${PRIVILEGED}' found in auditing rules.\n"
|| printf "Warning: '${PRIVILEGED}' not found in on disk configuration.\n"
done
done
}
{
RUNNING=$(auditctl -l)
[ -n "${RUNNING}" ] && for PARTITION in $(findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }'
/proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep -Pv "noexec|nosuid" | awk '{print $1}'); do
for PRIVILEGED in $(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f); do
printf -- "${RUNNING}" | grep -q "${PRIVILEGED}" && printf "OK: '${PRIVILEGED}' found in auditing
rules.\n" || printf "Warning: '${PRIVILEGED}' not found in running configuration.\n"
done
done \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'RUNNING' is unset.\n"
}
Page 789
{
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
AUDIT_RULE_FILE="/etc/audit/rules.d/50-privileged.rules"
NEW_DATA=()
for PARTITION in $(findmnt -n -l -k -it $(awk '/nodev/ { print $2 }' /proc/filesystems | paste -sd,) | grep -
Pv "noexec|nosuid" | awk '{print $1}'); do
readarray -t DATA < <(find "${PARTITION}" -xdev -perm /6000 -type f | awk -v UID_MIN=${UID_MIN} '{print "-a
always,exit -F path=" $1 " -F perm=x -F auid>="UID_MIN" -F auid!=unset -k privileged" }')
for ENTRY in "${DATA[@]}"; do
NEW_DATA+=("${ENTRY}")
done
done
readarray &> /dev/null -t OLD_DATA < "${AUDIT_RULE_FILE}"
COMBINED_DATA=( "${OLD_DATA[@]}" "${NEW_DATA[@]}" )
printf '%s\n' "${COMBINED_DATA[@]}" | sort -u > "${AUDIT_RULE_FILE}"
}
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 790
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Page 791
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor for unsuccessful attempts to access files. The following parameters are
associated with system calls that control files:
• creation - creat
• opening - open , openat
• truncation - truncate , ftruncate
An audit log record will only be written if all of the following criteria is met for the user
when trying to access a file:
Rationale:
Failed attempts to open, create or truncate files could be an indication that an individual
or process is trying to gain unauthorized access to the system.
Page 792
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&(/ -F *exit=-EACCES/||/ -F *exit=-EPERM/) \
&&/ -S/ \
&&/creat/ \
&&/open/ \
&&/truncate/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Page 793
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 794
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Page 795
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Record events affecting the modification of user or group information, including that of
passwords and old passwords if in use.
The parameters in this section will watch the files to see if they have been opened for
write or have had attribute changes (e.g. permissions) and tag them with the identifier
"identity" in the audit log file.
Rationale:
Unexpected changes to these files could be an indication that the system has been
compromised and that an unauthorized user is attempting to hide their activities or
compromise additional accounts.
Page 796
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/etc\/group/ \
||/\/etc\/passwd/ \
||/\/etc\/gshadow/ \
||/\/etc\/shadow/ \
||/\/etc\/security\/opasswd/ \
||/\/etc\/nsswitch.conf/ \
||/\/etc\/pam.conf/ \
||/\/etc\/pam.d/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 797
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 798
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Page 799
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor changes to file permissions, attributes, ownership and group. The parameters in
this section track changes for system calls that affect file permissions and attributes.
The following commands and system calls effect the permissions, ownership and
various attributes of files.
• chmod
• fchmod
• fchmodat
• chown
• fchown
• fchownat
• lchown
• setxattr
• lsetxattr
• fsetxattr
• removexattr
• lremovexattr
• fremovexattr
In all cases, an audit record will only be written for non-system user ids and will ignore
Daemon events. All audit records will be tagged with the identifier "perm_mod."
Rationale:
Monitoring for changes in file attributes could alert a system administrator to activity that
could indicate intruder activity or policy violation.
Page 800
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -S/ \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&(/chmod/||/fchmod/||/fchmodat/ \
||/chown/||/fchown/||/fchownat/||/lchown/ \
||/setxattr/||/lsetxattr/||/fsetxattr/ \
||/removexattr/||/lremovexattr/||/fremovexattr/) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Page 801
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 802
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 803
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor the use of the mount system call. The mount (and umount ) system call controls
the mounting and unmounting of file systems. The parameters below configure the
system to create an audit record when the mount system call is used by a non-
privileged user
Rationale:
It is highly unusual for a non privileged user to mount file systems to the system. While
tracking mount commands gives the system administrator evidence that external media
may have been mounted (based on a review of the source of the mount and confirming
it's an external media type), it does not conclusively indicate that data was exported to
the media. System administrators who wish to determine if data were exported, would
also have to track successful open, creat and truncate system calls requiring write
access to a file under the mount point of the external media file system. This could give
a fair indication that a write occurred. The only way to truly prove it, would be to track
successful writes to the external media. Tracking write system calls could quickly fill up
the audit log and is not recommended. Recommendations on configuration options to
track data export to media is beyond the scope of this document.
Page 804
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -S/ \
&&/mount/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor successful file system mounts.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F auid>=$UID_MIN -F auid!=unset -k mounts
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=$UID_MIN -F auid!=unset -k mounts
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-mounts.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Page 805
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 806
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor session initiation events. The parameters in this section track changes to the
files associated with session events.
Page 807
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/var\/run\/utmp/ \
||/\/var\/log\/wtmp/ \
||/\/var\/log\/btmp/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Remediation:
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor session initiation information.
Example:
# printf "
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-session.rules
References:
Page 808
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 809
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor login and logout events. The parameters below track changes to files
associated with login/logout events.
Rationale:
Monitoring login/logout events could provide a system administrator with information
associated with brute force attacks against user logins.
Audit:
On disk configuration
Run the following command to check the on disk rules:
# awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/var\/log\/lastlog/ \
||/\/var\/run\/faillock/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/var\/log\/lastlog/ \
||/\/var\/run\/faillock/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 810
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 811
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 812
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor the use of system calls associated with the deletion or renaming of files and file
attributes. This configuration statement sets up monitoring for:
Rationale:
Monitoring these calls from non-privileged users could provide a system administrator
with evidence that inappropriate removal of files and file attributes associated with
protected files is occurring. While this audit option will look at all events, system
administrators will want to look for specific privileged files that are being deleted or
altered.
Page 813
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -S/ \
&&(/unlink/||/rename/||/unlinkat/||/renameat/) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor file deletion events by users.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S rename,unlink,unlinkat,renameat -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -F key=delete
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S rename,unlink,unlinkat,renameat -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -F key=delete
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-delete.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Page 814
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 815
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor AppArmor, an implementation of mandatory access controls. The parameters
below monitor any write access (potential additional, deletion or modification of files in
the directory) or attribute changes to the /etc/apparmor/ and /etc/apparmor.d/
directories.
Note: If a different Mandatory Access Control method is used, changes to the
corresponding directories should be audited.
Rationale:
Changes to files in the /etc/apparmor/ and /etc/apparmor.d/ directories could
indicate that an unauthorized user is attempting to modify access controls and change
security contexts, leading to a compromise of the system.
Audit:
On disk configuration
Run the following command to check the on disk rules:
# awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/etc\/apparmor/ \
||/\/etc\/apparmor.d/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-w/ \
&&(/\/etc\/apparmor/ \
||/\/etc\/apparmor.d/) \
&&/ +-p *wa/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 816
References:
Additional Information:
Potential reboot required
If the auditing configuration is locked (-e 2), then augenrules will not warn in any way
that rules could not be loaded into the running configuration. A system reboot will be
required to load the rules into the running configuration.
System call structure
For performance (man 7 audit.rules) reasons it is preferable to have all the system
calls on one line. However, your configuration may have them on one line each or some
other combination. This is important to understand for both the auditing and remediation
sections as the examples given are optimized for performance as per the man page.
Page 817
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 818
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must generate audit records for successful/unsuccessful uses of
the chcon command.
Rationale:
The chcon command is used to change file security context. Without generating audit
records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would
be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or
identify those responsible for one.
Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system
(e.g., module or policy filter).
Page 819
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -F *perm=x/ \
&&/ -F *path=\/usr\/bin\/chcon/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor successful and unsuccessful attempts to use the
chcon command.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chcon -F perm=x -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k perm_chng
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-perm_chng.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
References:
Page 820
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 821
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must generate audit records for successful/unsuccessful uses of
the setfacl command
Rationale:
This utility sets Access Control Lists (ACLs) of files and directories. Without generating
audit records that are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it
would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an
incident or identify those responsible for one.
Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system
(e.g., module or policy filter).
Page 822
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -F *perm=x/ \
&&/ -F *path=\/usr\/bin\/setfacl/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor successful and unsuccessful attempts to use the
setfacl command.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/setfacl -F perm=x -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k perm_chng
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-perm_chng.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
References:
Page 823
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 824
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must generate audit records for successful/unsuccessful uses of
the chacl command.
chacl is an IRIX-compatibility command, and is maintained for those users who are
familiar with its use from either XFS or IRIX.
Rationale:
chacl changes the ACL(s) for a file or directory. Without generating audit records that
are specific to the security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to
establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those
responsible for one.
Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system
(e.g., module or policy filter).
Page 825
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -F *perm=x/ \
&&/ -F *path=\/usr\/bin\/chacl/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor successful and unsuccessful attempts to use the
chacl command.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chacl -F perm=x -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k perm_chng
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-perm_chng.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
References:
Page 826
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 827
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The operating system must generate audit records for successful/unsuccessful uses of
the usermod command.
Rationale:
The usermod command modifies the system account files to reflect the changes that are
specified on the command line. Without generating audit records that are specific to the
security and mission needs of the organization, it would be difficult to establish,
correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible
for one.
Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system
(e.g., module or policy filter).
Page 828
Running configuration
Run the following command to check loaded rules:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && auditctl -l | awk "/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&(/ -F *auid!=unset/||/ -F *auid!=-1/||/ -F *auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -F *auid>=${UID_MIN}/ \
&&/ -F *perm=x/ \
&&/ -F *path=\/usr\/sbin\/usermod/ \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)" \
|| printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor successful and unsuccessful attempts to use the
usermod command.
Example:
# {
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usermod -F perm=x -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k usermod
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-usermod.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
References:
Page 829
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 830
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Monitor the loading and unloading of kernel modules. All the loading / listing /
dependency checking of modules is done by kmod via symbolic links.
The following system calls control loading and unloading of modules:
Any execution of the loading and unloading module programs and system calls will
trigger an audit record with an identifier of modules.
Rationale:
Monitoring the use of all the various ways to manipulate kernel modules could provide
system administrators with evidence that an unauthorized change was made to a kernel
module, possibly compromising the security of the system.
Page 831
{
awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F auid!=unset/||/ -F auid!=-1/||/ -F auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -S/ \
&&(/init_module/ \
||/finit_module/ \
||/delete_module/ \
||/create_module/ \
||/query_module/) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules
Running configuration
Run the following script to check loaded rules:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
auditctl -l | awk '/^ *-a *always,exit/ \
&&/ -F *arch=b(32|64)/ \
&&(/ -F auid!=unset/||/ -F auid!=-1/||/ -F auid!=4294967295/) \
&&/ -S/ \
&&(/init_module/ \
||/finit_module/ \
||/delete_module/ \
||/create_module/ \
||/query_module/) \
&&(/ key= *[!-~]* *$/||/ -k *[!-~]* *$/)'
Page 832
{
a_files=("/usr/sbin/lsmod" "/usr/sbin/rmmod" "/usr/sbin/insmod" "/usr/sbin/modinfo" "/usr/sbin/modprobe"
"/usr/sbin/depmod")
for l_file in "${a_files[@]}"; do
if [ "$(readlink -f "$l_file")" = "$(readlink -f /bin/kmod)" ]; then
printf "OK: \"$l_file\"\n"
else
printf "Issue with symlink for file: \"$l_file\"\n"
fi
done
}
Verify the output states OK. If there is a symlink pointing to a different location it should
be investigated
Remediation:
Create audit rules
Edit or create a file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, ending in .rules extension,
with the relevant rules to monitor kernel module modification.
Example:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
UID_MIN=$(awk '/^\s*UID_MIN/{print $2}' /etc/login.defs)
[ -n "${UID_MIN}" ] && printf "
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module,finit_module,delete_module,create_module,query_module -F
auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k kernel_modules
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/kmod -F perm=x -F auid>=${UID_MIN} -F auid!=unset -k kernel_modules
" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/50-kernel_modules.rules || printf "ERROR: Variable 'UID_MIN' is unset.\n"
}
References:
Page 833
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 834
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Set system audit so that audit rules cannot be modified with auditctl . Setting the flag
"-e 2" forces audit to be put in immutable mode. Audit changes can only be made on
system reboot.
Note: This setting will require the system to be rebooted to update the active auditd
configuration settings.
Rationale:
In immutable mode, unauthorized users cannot execute changes to the audit system to
potentially hide malicious activity and then put the audit rules back. Users would most
likely notice a system reboot and that could alert administrators of an attempt to make
unauthorized audit changes.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify output matches:
# grep -Ph -- '^\h*-e\h+2\b' /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules | tail -1
-e 2
Remediation:
Edit or create the file /etc/audit/rules.d/99-finalize.rules and add the line -e
2 at the end of the file:
Example:
# printf '\n%s' "-e 2" >> /etc/audit/rules.d/99-finalize.rules
References:
Page 835
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 836
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The Audit system have both on disk and running configuration. It is possible for these
configuration settings to differ.
Note: Due to the limitations of augenrules and auditctl, it is not absolutely
guaranteed that loading the rule sets via augenrules --load will result in all rules
being loaded or even that the user will be informed if there was a problem loading the
rules.
Rationale:
Configuration differences between what is currently running and what is on disk could
cause unexpected problems or may give a false impression of compliance
requirements.
Audit:
Merged rule sets
Ensure that all rules in /etc/audit/rules.d have been merged into
/etc/audit/audit.rules:
# augenrules --check
/usr/sbin/augenrules: No change
Should there be any drift, run augenrules --load to merge and load all rules.
Remediation:
If the rules are not aligned across all three () areas, run the following command to
merge and load all rules:
# augenrules --load
References:
Page 837
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 838
Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are
audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events.
Page 839
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit log files contain information about the system and system activity.
Rationale:
Access to audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers,
potentially compromising its confidentiality.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify audit log files are mode 0640 or more restrictive:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_perm_mask="0137"
if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]; then
l_audit_log_directory="$(dirname "$(awk -F= '/^\s*log_file\s*/{print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf |
xargs)")"
if [ -d "$l_audit_log_directory" ]; then
l_maxperm="$(printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_perm_mask )) )"
a_files=()
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
[ -e "$l_file" ] && a_files+=("$l_file")
done < <(find "$l_audit_log_directory" -maxdepth 1 -type f -perm /"$l_perm_mask" -print0)
if (( "${#a_files[@]}" > 0 )); then
for l_file in "${a_files[@]}"; do
l_file_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_file")"
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - File: \"$l_file\" is mode: \"$l_file_mode\"\n
(should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive)\n"
done
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - All files in \"$l_audit_log_directory\" are mode:
\"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive"
fi
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - Log file directory not set in \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\"
please set log file directory"
fi
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - File: \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\" not found.\n - ** Verify
auditd is installed **"
fi
}
Remediation:
Run the following command to remove more permissive mode than 0640 from audit log
files:
# [ -f /etc/audit/auditd.conf ] && find "$(dirname $(awk -F "=" '/^\s*log_file/ {print $2}'
/etc/audit/auditd.conf | xargs))" -type f -perm /0137 -exec chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx {} +
Page 840
CIS Controls:
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Page 841
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit log files contain information about the system and system activity.
Rationale:
Access to audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers,
potentially compromising its confidentiality.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify audit log files are owned by the root user:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]; then
l_audit_log_directory="$(dirname "$(awk -F= '/^\s*log_file\s*/{print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf |
xargs)")"
if [ -d "$l_audit_log_directory" ]; then
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
l_output2="$l_output2\n - File: \"$l_file\" is owned by user: \"$(stat -Lc '%U' "$l_file")\"\n
(should be owned by user: \"root\")\n"
done < <(find "$l_audit_log_directory" -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -user root -print0)
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - Log file directory not set in \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\" please set log
file directory"
fi
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - File: \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\" not found.\n - ** Verify auditd is installed
**"
fi
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
l_output="$l_output\n - All files in \"$l_audit_log_directory\" are owned by user: \"root\"\n"
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - * Correctly configured * :$l_output"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :$l_output2\n"
fi
}
Remediation:
Run the following command to configure the audit log files to be owned by the root
user:
# [ -f /etc/audit/auditd.conf ] && find "$(dirname $(awk -F "=" '/^\s*log_file/ {print $2}'
/etc/audit/auditd.conf | xargs))" -type f ! -user root -exec chown root {} +
References:
Page 842
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 843
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit log files contain information about the system and system activity.
Rationale:
Access to audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers,
potentially compromising its confidentiality.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify log_group parameter is set to either adm or root
in /etc/audit/auditd.conf:
# grep -Piws -- '^\h*log_group\h*=\h*\H+\b' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | grep -Pvi -- '(adm)'
{
if [ -e /etc/audit/auditd.conf ]; then
l_fpath="$(dirname "$(awk -F "=" '/^\s*log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | xargs)")"
find -L "$l_fpath" -not -path "$l_fpath"/lost+found -type f \( ! -group root -a ! -group adm \) -exec ls
-l {} +
fi
}
Run the following command to set the log_group parameter in the audit configuration
file to log_group = adm:
# sed -ri 's/^\s*#?\s*log_group\s*=\s*\S+(\s*#.*)?.*$/log_group = adm\1/' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
Run the following command to restart the audit daemon to reload the configuration file:
# systemctl restart auditd
Page 844
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
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Page 845
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
The audit log directory contains audit log files.
Rationale:
Audit information includes all information including: audit records, audit settings and
audit reports. This information is needed to successfully audit system activity. This
information must be protected from unauthorized modification or deletion. If this
information were to be compromised, forensic analysis and discovery of the true source
of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the audit log directory is mode 0750 or more restrictive:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_perm_mask="0027"
if [ -e "/etc/audit/auditd.conf" ]; then
l_audit_log_directory="$(dirname "$(awk -F= '/^\s*log_file\s*/{print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf |
xargs)")"
if [ -d "$l_audit_log_directory" ]; then
l_maxperm="$(printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_perm_mask )) )"
l_directory_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_audit_log_directory")"
if [ $(( $l_directory_mode & $l_perm_mask )) -gt 0 ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - Directory: \"$l_audit_log_directory\" is mode:
\"$l_directory_mode\"\n (should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive)\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - Directory: \"$l_audit_log_directory\" is mode:
\"$l_directory_mode\"\n (should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive)\n"
fi
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - Log file directory not set in \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\"
please set log file directory"
fi
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - File: \"/etc/audit/auditd.conf\" not found\n - ** Verify
auditd is installed **"
fi
}
Remediation:
Run the following command to configure the audit log directory to have a mode of
"0750" or less permissive:
# chmod g-w,o-rwx "$(dirname "$(awk -F= '/^\s*log_file\s*/{print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | xargs)")"
Page 846
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
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Page 847
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit configuration files control auditd and what events are audited.
Rationale:
Access to the audit configuration files could allow unauthorized personnel to prevent the
auditing of critical events.
Misconfigured audit configuration files may prevent the auditing of critical events or
impact the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfiguration of the
audit configuration files may also make it more difficult to establish and investigate
events relating to an incident.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify that the audit configuration files are mode 0640 or more
restrictive:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_output="" l_output2="" l_perm_mask="0137"
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_perm_mask )) )"
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_fname; do
l_mode=$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_fname")
if [ $(( "$l_mode" & "$l_perm_mask" )) -gt 0 ]; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - file: \"$l_fname\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" (should be mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or
more restrictive)"
fi
done < <(find /etc/audit/ -type f \( -name "*.conf" -o -name '*.rules' \) -print0)
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - All audit configuration files are mode: \"$l_maxperm\" or
more restrictive"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n$l_output2"
fi
}
Remediation:
Run the following command to remove more permissive mode than 0640 from the audit
configuration files:
# find /etc/audit/ -type f \( -name '*.conf' -o -name '*.rules' \) -exec chmod u-x,g-wx,o-rwx {} +
References:
Page 848
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 849
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit configuration files control auditd and what events are audited.
Rationale:
Access to the audit configuration files could allow unauthorized personnel to prevent the
auditing of critical events.
Misconfigured audit configuration files may prevent the auditing of critical events or
impact the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfiguration of the
audit configuration files may also make it more difficult to establish and investigate
events relating to an incident.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the audit configuration files are owned by the
root user:
# find /etc/audit/ -type f \( -name '*.conf' -o -name '*.rules' \) ! -user root
References:
Page 850
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 851
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit configuration files control auditd and what events are audited.
Rationale:
Access to the audit configuration files could allow unauthorized personnel to prevent the
auditing of critical events.
Misconfigured audit configuration files may prevent the auditing of critical events or
impact the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfiguration of the
audit configuration files may also make it more difficult to establish and investigate
events relating to an incident.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify that the audit configuration files are owned by the
group root:
# find /etc/audit/ -type f \( -name '*.conf' -o -name '*.rules' \) ! -group root
References:
Page 852
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 853
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools
needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and
records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.
Rationale:
Protecting audit information includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view
and manipulate log data. Protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized
operation on audit information.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify the audit tools are mode 0755 or more restrictive:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_output="" l_output2="" l_perm_mask="0022"
l_maxperm="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_perm_mask )) )"
a_audit_tools=("/sbin/auditctl" "/sbin/aureport" "/sbin/ausearch" "/sbin/autrace" "/sbin/auditd"
"/sbin/augenrules")
for l_audit_tool in "${a_audit_tools[@]}"; do
l_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_audit_tool")"
if [ $(( "$l_mode" & "$l_perm_mask" )) -gt 0 ]; then
l_output2="$l_output2\n - Audit tool \"$l_audit_tool\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" and should be mode:
\"$l_maxperm\" or more restrictive"
else
l_output="$l_output\n - Audit tool \"$l_audit_tool\" is correctly configured to mode: \"$l_mode\""
fi
done
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - * Correctly configured * :$l_output"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :$l_output2\n"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "\n - * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
fi
unset a_audit_tools
}
Remediation:
Run the following command to remove more permissive mode from the audit tools:
# chmod go-w /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/augenrules
References:
Page 854
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 855
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools
needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and
records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.
Rationale:
Protecting audit information includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view
and manipulate log data. Protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized
operation on audit information.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify the audit tools are owned by the root user:
# stat -Lc "%n %U" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/augenrules |
awk '$2 != "root" {print}'
References:
Page 856
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 857
• Level 2 - Server
• Level 2 - Workstation
Description:
Audit tools include, but are not limited to, vendor-provided and open source audit tools
needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and
records. Audit tools include custom queries and report generators.
Rationale:
Protecting audit information includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view
and manipulate log data. Protecting audit tools is necessary to prevent unauthorized
operation on audit information.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify the audit tools are owned by the group root
# stat -Lc "%n %G" /sbin/auditctl /sbin/aureport /sbin/ausearch /sbin/autrace /sbin/auditd /sbin/augenrules |
awk '$2 != "root" {print}'
References:
Page 858
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 859
Page 860
This section provides guidance on securing aspects of system files and directories.
Page 861
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/passwd file contains user account information that is used by many system
utilities and therefore must be readable for these utilities to operate.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/passwd file is protected from unauthorized write
access. Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/passwd is mode 644 or more restrictive, Uid
is 0/root and Gid is 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/passwd
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/passwd:
# chmod u-x,go-wx /etc/passwd
# chown root:root /etc/passwd
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 862
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 863
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/passwd- file contains backup user account information.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/passwd- file is protected from unauthorized access.
Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/passwd- is mode 644 or more restrictive,
Uid is 0/root and Gid is 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: { %g/ %G)' /etc/passwd-
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/passwd-:
# chmod u-x,go-wx /etc/passwd-
# chown root:root /etc/passwd-
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: { 0/ root)
References:
Page 864
Controls
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techniques
Page 865
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/group file contains a list of all the valid groups defined in the system. The
command below allows read/write access for root and read access for everyone else.
Rationale:
The /etc/group file needs to be protected from unauthorized changes by non-
privileged users, but needs to be readable as this information is used with many non-
privileged programs.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/group is mode 644 or more restrictive, Uid
is 0/root and Gid is 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/group
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/group:
# chmod u-x,go-wx /etc/group
# chown root:root /etc/group
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 866
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
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Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 867
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/group- file contains a backup list of all the valid groups defined in the
system.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/group- file is protected from unauthorized access.
Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/group- is mode 644 or more restrictive, Uid
is 0/root and Gid is 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/group-
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/group-:
# chmod u-x,go-wx /etc/group-
# chown root:root /etc/group-
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 868
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 869
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/shadow file is used to store the information about user accounts that is critical
to the security of those accounts, such as the hashed password and other security
information.
Rationale:
If attackers can gain read access to the /etc/shadow file, they can easily run a
password cracking program against the hashed password to break it. Other security
information that is stored in the /etc/shadow file (such as expiration) could also be
useful to subvert the user accounts.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/shadow is mode 640 or more restrictive, Uid
is 0/root and Gid is 0/root or ({GID}/ shadow):
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/shadow
Example:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
Remediation:
Run one of the following commands to set ownership of /etc/shadow to root and
group to either root or shadow:
# chown root:shadow /etc/shadow
-OR-
# chown root:root /etc/shadow
Default Value:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
References:
Page 870
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 871
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/shadow- file is used to store backup information about user accounts that is
critical to the security of those accounts, such as the hashed password and other
security information.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/shadow- file is protected from unauthorized access.
Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/shadow- is mode 640 or more restrictive,
Uid is 0/root and Gid is 0/root or {GID}/shadow:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/shadow-
Example:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
Remediation:
Run one of the following commands to set ownership of /etc/shadow- to root and
group to either root or shadow:
# chown root:shadow /etc/shadow-
-OR-
# chown root:root /etc/shadow-
Default Value:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
References:
Page 872
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 873
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/gshadow file is used to store the information about groups that is critical to
the security of those accounts, such as the hashed password and other security
information.
Rationale:
If attackers can gain read access to the /etc/gshadow file, they can easily run a
password cracking program against the hashed password to break it. Other security
information that is stored in the /etc/gshadow file (such as group administrators) could
also be useful to subvert the group.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/gshadow is mode 640 or more restrictive,
Uid is 0/root and Gid is 0/root or `{GID}/shadow:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/gshadow
Example:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
Remediation:
Run one of the following commands to set ownership of /etc/gshadow to root and
group to either root or shadow:
# chown root:shadow /etc/gshadow
-OR-
# chown root:root /etc/gshadow
Default Value:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
References:
Page 874
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 875
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The /etc/gshadow- file is used to store backup information about groups that is critical
to the security of those accounts, such as the hashed password and other security
information.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/gshadow- file is protected from unauthorized
access. Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/gshadow- is mode 640 or more restrictive,
Uid is 0/root and Gid is 0/root or {GID}/shadow:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/gshadow-
Example:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
Remediation:
Run one of the following commands to set ownership of /etc/gshadow- to root and
group to either root or shadow:
# chown root:shadow /etc/gshadow-
-OR-
# chown root:root /etc/gshadow-
Default Value:
Access: (0640/-rw-r-----) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 42/ shadow)
References:
Page 876
Controls
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techniques
Page 877
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
/etc/shells is a text file which contains the full pathnames of valid login shells. This
file is consulted by chsh and available to be queried by other programs.
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that the /etc/shells file is protected from unauthorized access.
Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following command to verify /etc/shells is mode 644 or more restrictive, Uid
is 0/root and Gid is 0/root:
# stat -Lc 'Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)' /etc/shells
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/shells:
# chmod u-x,go-wx /etc/shells
# chown root:root /etc/shells
Default Value:
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 878
Controls
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Techniques / Sub-
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techniques
Page 879
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
/etc/security/opasswd and it's backup /etc/security/opasswd.old hold user's
previous passwords if pam_unix or pam_pwhistory is in use on the system
Rationale:
It is critical to ensure that /etc/security/opasswd is protected from unauthorized
access. Although it is protected by default, the file permissions could be changed either
inadvertently or through malicious actions.
Audit:
Run the following commands to verify /etc/security/opasswd and
/etc/security/opasswd.old are mode 600 or more restrictive, Uid is 0/root and
Gid is 0/root if they exist:
# [ -e "/etc/security/opasswd" ] && stat -Lc '%n Access: (%#a/%A) Uid: ( %u/ %U) Gid: ( %g/ %G)'
/etc/security/opasswd
Remediation:
Run the following commands to remove excess permissions, set owner, and set group
on /etc/security/opasswd and /etc/security/opasswd.old is they exist:
# [ -e "/etc/security/opasswd" ] && chmod u-x,go-rwx /etc/security/opasswd
# [ -e "/etc/security/opasswd" ] && chown root:root /etc/security/opasswd
# [ -e "/etc/security/opasswd.old" ] && chmod u-x,go-rwx /etc/security/opasswd.old
# [ -e "/etc/security/opasswd.old" ] && chown root:root /etc/security/opasswd.old
Default Value:
/etc/security/opasswd Access: (0600/-rw-------) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
References:
Page 880
Controls
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techniques
Page 881
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
World writable files are the least secure. Data in world-writable files can be modified and
compromised by any user on the system. World writable files may also indicate an
incorrectly written script or program that could potentially be the cause of a larger
compromise to the system's integrity. See the chmod(2) man page for more
information.
Setting the sticky bit on world writable directories prevents users from deleting or
renaming files in that directory that are not owned by them.
Rationale:
Data in world-writable files can be modified and compromised by any user on the
system. World writable files may also indicate an incorrectly written script or program
that could potentially be the cause of a larger compromise to the system's integrity.
This feature prevents the ability to delete or rename files in world writable directories
(such as /tmp ) that are owned by another user.
Page 882
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
l_smask='01000'
a_file=(); a_dir=() # Initialize arrays
a_path=(! -path "/run/user/*" -a ! -path "/proc/*" -a ! -path "*/containerd/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/pods/*"
-a ! -path "*/kubelet/plugins/*" -a ! -path "/sys/*" -a ! -path "/snap/*")
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
[ -f "$l_file" ] && a_file+=("$l_file") # Add WR files
if [ -d "$l_file" ]; then # Add directories w/o sticky bit
l_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_file")"
[ ! $(( $l_mode & $l_smask )) -gt 0 ] && a_dir+=("$l_file")
fi
fi
done < <(find "$l_mount" -xdev \( "${a_path[@]}" \) \( -type f -o -type d \) -perm -0002 -print0 2>
/dev/null)
done < <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target | awk '($1 !~ /^\s*(nfs|proc|smb|vfat|iso9660|efivarfs|selinuxfs)/ &&
$2 !~ /^(\/run\/user\/|\/tmp|\/var\/tmp)/){print $2}')
if ! (( ${#a_file[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - No world writable files exist on the local filesystem."
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - There are \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_file[@]}")\" World writable files on the
system.\n - The following is a list of World writable files:\n$(printf '%s\n' "${a_file[@]}")\n - end of
list\n"
fi
if ! (( ${#a_dir[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - Sticky bit is set on world writable directories on the local filesystem."
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - There are \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_dir[@]}")\" World writable directories without
the sticky bit on the system.\n - The following is a list of World writable directories without the sticky
bit:\n$(printf '%s\n' "${a_dir[@]}")\n - end of list\n"
fi
unset a_path; unset a_arr; unset a_file; unset a_dir # Remove arrays
# If l_output2 is empty, we pass
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :\n$l_output2"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "- * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
fi
}
Note: On systems with a large number of files and/or directories, this audit may be a
long running process
Page 883
{
l_smask='01000'
a_file=(); a_dir=() # Initialize arrays
a_path=(! -path "/run/user/*" -a ! -path "/proc/*" -a ! -path "*/containerd/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/pods/*"
-a ! -path "*/kubelet/plugins/*" -a ! -path "/sys/*" -a ! -path "/snap/*")
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
l_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_file")"
if [ -f "$l_file" ]; then # Remove excess permissions from WW files
echo -e " - File: \"$l_file\" is mode: \"$l_mode\"\n - removing write permission on \"$l_file\"
from \"other\""
chmod o-w "$l_file"
fi
if [ -d "$l_file" ]; then # Add sticky bit
if [ ! $(( $l_mode & $l_smask )) -gt 0 ]; then
echo -e " - Directory: \"$l_file\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" and doesn't have the sticky bit set\n
- Adding the sticky bit"
chmod a+t "$l_file"
fi
fi
fi
done < <(find "$l_mount" -xdev \( "${a_path[@]}" \) \( -type f -o -type d \) -perm -0002 -print0 2>
/dev/null)
done < <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target | awk '($1 !~ /^\s*(nfs|proc|smb|vfat|iso9660|efivarfs|selinuxfs)/ &&
$2 !~ /^(\/run\/user\/|\/tmp|\/var\/tmp)/){print $2}')
}
References:
Page 884
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 885
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Administrators may delete users or groups from the system and neglect to remove all
files and/or directories owned by those users or groups.
Rationale:
A new user or group who is assigned a deleted user's user ID or group ID may then end
up "owning" a deleted user or group's files, and thus have more access on the system
than was intended.
Page 886
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
a_nouser=(); a_nogroup=() # Initialize arrays
a_path=(! -path "/run/user/*" -a ! -path "/proc/*" -a ! -path "*/containerd/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/pods/*"
-a ! -path "*/kubelet/plugins/*" -a ! -path "/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/*" -a ! -path "/var/*/private/*")
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
while IFS=: read -r l_user l_group; do
[ "$l_user" = "UNKNOWN" ] && a_nouser+=("$l_file")
[ "$l_group" = "UNKNOWN" ] && a_nogroup+=("$l_file")
done < <(stat -Lc '%U:%G' "$l_file")
fi
done < <(find "$l_mount" -xdev \( "${a_path[@]}" \) \( -type f -o -type d \) \( -nouser -o -nogroup \) -
print0 2> /dev/null)
done < <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target | awk '($1 !~ /^\s*(nfs|proc|smb|vfat|iso9660|efivarfs|selinuxfs)/ &&
$2 !~ /^\/run\/user\//){print $2}')
if ! (( ${#a_nouser[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - No files or directories without a owner exist on the local filesystem."
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - There are \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_nouser[@]}")\" unowned files or directories on
the system.\n - The following is a list of unowned files and/or directories:\n$(printf '%s\n'
"${a_nouser[@]}")\n - end of list"
fi
if ! (( ${#a_nogroup[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - No files or directories without a group exist on the local filesystem."
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - There are \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_nogroup[@]}")\" ungrouped files or directories
on the system.\n - The following is a list of ungrouped files and/or directories:\n$(printf '%s\n'
"${a_nogroup[@]}")\n - end of list"
fi
unset a_path; unset a_arr ; unset a_nouser; unset a_nogroup # Remove arrays
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then # If l_output2 is empty, we pass
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** PASS **\n - * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n ** FAIL **\n - * Reasons for audit failure * :\n$l_output2"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "\n- * Correctly configured * :\n$l_output\n"
fi
}
Note: On systems with a large number of files and/or directories, this audit may be a
long running process
Remediation:
Remove or set ownership and group ownership of these files and/or directories to an
active user on the system as appropriate.
References:
Page 887
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 888
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The owner of a file can set the file's permissions to run with the owner's or group's
permissions, even if the user running the program is not the owner or a member of the
group. The most common reason for a SUID or SGID program is to enable users to
perform functions (such as changing their password) that require root privileges.
Rationale:
There are valid reasons for SUID and SGID programs, but it is important to identify and
review such programs to ensure they are legitimate. Review the files returned by the
action in the audit section and check to see if system binaries have a different
checksum than what from the package. This is an indication that the binary may have
been replaced.
Page 889
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
a_suid=(); a_sgid=() # initialize arrays
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
l_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_file")"
[ $(( $l_mode & 04000 )) -gt 0 ] && a_suid+=("$l_file")
[ $(( $l_mode & 02000 )) -gt 0 ] && a_sgid+=("$l_file")
fi
done < <(find "$l_mount" -xdev -type f \( -perm -2000 -o -perm -4000 \) -print0 2>/dev/null)
done < <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target,options | awk '($1 !~
/^\s*(nfs|proc|smb|vfat|iso9660|efivarfs|selinuxfs)/ && $2 !~ /^\/run\/user\// && $3 !~/noexec/ && $3
!~/nosuid/) {print $2}')
if ! (( ${#a_suid[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - No executable SUID files exist on the system"
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - List of \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_suid[@]}")\" SUID executable files:\n$(printf
'%s\n' "${a_suid[@]}")\n - end of list -\n"
fi
if ! (( ${#a_sgid[@]} > 0 )); then
l_output="$l_output\n - No SGID files exist on the system"
else
l_output2="$l_output2\n - List of \"$(printf '%s' "${#a_sgid[@]}")\" SGID executable files:\n$(printf
'%s\n' "${a_sgid[@]}")\n - end of list -\n"
fi
[ -n "$l_output2" ] && l_output2="$l_output2\n- Review the preceding list(s) of SUID and/or SGID files to\n-
ensure that no rogue programs have been introduced onto the system.\n"
unset a_arr; unset a_suid; unset a_sgid # Remove arrays
# If l_output2 is empty, Nothing to report
if [ -z "$l_output2" ]; then
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n$l_output\n"
else
echo -e "\n- Audit Result:\n$l_output2\n"
[ -n "$l_output" ] && echo -e "$l_output\n"
fi
}
Note: on systems with a large number of files, this may be a long running process
Remediation:
Ensure that no rogue SUID or SGID programs have been introduced into the system.
Review the files returned by the action in the Audit section and confirm the integrity of
these binaries.
References:
1. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-1, CM-2, CM-6, CM-7, IA-5, AC-3, MP-2
Page 890
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 891
This section provides guidance on securing aspects of the local users and groups.
Note: The recommendations in this section check local users and groups. Any users or
groups from other sources such as LDAP will not be audited. In a domain environment
similar checks should be performed against domain users and groups.
Page 892
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Local accounts can uses shadowed passwords. With shadowed passwords, The
passwords are saved in shadow password file, /etc/shadow, encrypted by a salted
one-way hash. Accounts with a shadowed password have an x in the second field in
/etc/passwd.
Rationale:
The /etc/passwd file also contains information like user ID's and group ID's that are
used by many system programs. Therefore, the /etc/passwd file must remain world
readable. In spite of encoding the password with a randomly-generated one-way hash
function, an attacker could still break the system if they got access to the /etc/passwd
file. This can be mitigated by using shadowed passwords, thus moving the passwords in
the /etc/passwd file to /etc/shadow. The /etc/shadow file is set so only root will be
able to read and write. This helps mitigate the risk of an attacker gaining access to the
encoded passwords with which to perform a dictionary attack.
Note:
• All accounts must have passwords or be locked to prevent the account from
being used by an unauthorized user.
• A user account with an empty second field in /etc/passwd allows the account to
be logged into by providing only the username.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that no output is returned:
# awk -F: '($2 != "x" ) { print "User: \"" $1 "\" is not set to shadowed passwords "}' /etc/passwd
Remediation:
Run the following command to set accounts to use shadowed passwords and migrate
passwords in /etc/passwd to /etc/shadow:
# pwconv
Investigate to determine if the account is logged in and what it is being used for, to
determine if it needs to be forced off.
Page 893
Additional Information:
The pwconv command creates shadow from passwd and an optionally existing shadow.
• The pwunconv command creates passwd from passwd and shadow and then
removes shadow.
• The grpconv command creates gshadow from group and an optionally existing
gshadow.
• The grpunconv command creates group from group and gshadow and then
removes gshadow.
These four programs all operate on the normal and shadow password and group files:
/etc/passwd, /etc/group, /etc/shadow, and /etc/gshadow.
Each program acquires the necessary locks before conversion. pwconv and grpconv
are similar. First, entries in the shadowed file which don't exist in the main file are
removed. Then, shadowed entries which don't have x' as the password in the
main file are updated. Any missing shadowed entries are added.
Finally, passwords in the main file are replaced with x'. These programs
can be used for initial conversion as well to update the shadowed file if the main file is
edited by hand.
pwconv will use the values of PASS_MIN_DAYS, PASS_MAX_DAYS, and PASS_WARN_AGE
from /etc/login.defs when adding new entries to /etc/shadow.
pwunconv and grpunconv are similar. Passwords in the main file are updated from the
shadowed file. Entries which exist in the main file but not in the shadowed file are left
alone. Finally, the shadowed file is removed. Some password aging information is lost
by pwunconv. It will convert what it can.
Page 894
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 895
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
An account with an empty password field means that anybody may log in as that user
without providing a password.
Rationale:
All accounts must have passwords or be locked to prevent the account from being used
by an unauthorized user.
Audit:
Run the following command and verify that no output is returned:
# awk -F: '($2 == "" ) { print $1 " does not have a password "}' /etc/shadow
Remediation:
If any accounts in the /etc/shadow file do not have a password, run the following
command to lock the account until it can be determined why it does not have a
password:
# passwd -l <username>
Also, check to see if the account is logged in and investigate what it is being used for to
determine if it needs to be forced off.
References:
Page 896
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0003 M1027
T1078.003
Page 897
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Over time, system administration errors and changes can lead to groups being defined
in /etc/passwd but not in /etc/group .
Rationale:
Groups defined in the /etc/passwd file but not in the /etc/group file pose a threat to
system security since group permissions are not properly managed.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify all GIDs in /etc/passwd exist in /etc/group:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
a_passwd_group_gid=("$(awk -F: '{print $4}' /etc/passwd | sort -u)")
a_group_gid=("$(awk -F: '{print $3}' /etc/group | sort -u)")
a_passwd_group_diff=("$(printf '%s\n' "${a_group_gid[@]}" "${a_passwd_group_gid[@]}" | sort | uniq -u)")
while IFS= read -r l_gid; do
awk -F: '($4 == '"$l_gid"') {print " - User: \"" $1 "\" has GID: \"" $4 "\" which does not exist in
/etc/group" }' /etc/passwd
done < <(printf '%s\n' "${a_passwd_group_gid[@]}" "${a_passwd_group_diff[@]}" | sort | uniq -D | uniq)
unset a_passwd_group_gid; unset a_group_gid; unset a_passwd_group_diff
}
Page 898
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 899
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The shadow group allows system programs which require access the ability to read the
/etc/shadow file. No users should be assigned to the shadow group.
Rationale:
Any users assigned to the shadow group would be granted read access to the
/etc/shadow file. If attackers can gain read access to the /etc/shadow file, they can
easily run a password cracking program against the hashed passwords to break them.
Other security information that is stored in the /etc/shadow file (such as expiration)
could also be useful to subvert additional user accounts.
Audit:
Run the following commands and verify no results are returned:
# awk -F: '($1=="shadow") {print $NF}' /etc/group
# awk -F: '($4 == '"$(getent group shadow | awk -F: '{print $3}' | xargs)"') {print " - user: \"" $1 "\"
primary group is the shadow group"}' /etc/passwd
Remediation:
Run the following command to remove all users from the shadow group
# sed -ri 's/(^shadow:[^:]*:[^:]*:)([^:]+$)/\1/' /etc/group
Change the primary group of any users with shadow as their primary group.
# usermod -g <primary group> <user>
References:
Page 900
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 901
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Although the useradd program will not let you create a duplicate User ID (UID), it is
possible for an administrator to manually edit the /etc/passwd file and change the UID
field.
Rationale:
Users must be assigned unique UIDs for accountability and to ensure appropriate
access protections.
Satisfies: SRG-OS-000104-GPOS-00051, SRG-OS-000121-GPOS-00062, SRG-OS-
000042-GPOS-00020
Audit:
Run the following script and verify no results are returned:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while read -r l_count l_uid; do
if [ "$l_count" -gt 1 ]; then
echo -e "Duplicate UID: \"$l_uid\" Users: \"$(awk -F: '($3 == n) { print $1 }' n=$l_uid /etc/passwd |
xargs)\""
fi
done < <(cut -f3 -d":" /etc/passwd | sort -n | uniq -c)
}
Remediation:
Based on the results of the audit script, establish unique UIDs and review all files owned
by the shared UIDs to determine which UID they are supposed to belong to.
References:
Page 902
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0005 M1027
T1078.003
Page 903
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Although the groupadd program will not let you create a duplicate Group ID (GID), it is
possible for an administrator to manually edit the /etc/group file and change the GID
field.
Rationale:
User groups must be assigned unique GIDs for accountability and to ensure appropriate
access protections.
Audit:
Run the following script and verify no results are returned:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while read -r l_count l_gid; do
if [ "$l_count" -gt 1 ]; then
echo -e "Duplicate GID: \"$l_gid\" Groups: \"$(awk -F: '($3 == n) { print $1 }' n=$l_gid /etc/group |
xargs)\""
fi
done < <(cut -f3 -d":" /etc/group | sort -n | uniq -c)
}
Remediation:
Based on the results of the audit script, establish unique GIDs and review all files
owned by the shared GID to determine which group they are supposed to belong to.
References:
Additional Information:
You can also use the grpck command to check for other inconsistencies in the
/etc/group file.
Page 904
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0005 M1027
T1078.003
Page 905
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Although the useradd program will not let you create a duplicate user name, it is
possible for an administrator to manually edit the /etc/passwd file and change the user
name.
Rationale:
If a user is assigned a duplicate user name, it will create and have access to files with
the first UID for that username in /etc/passwd . For example, if "test4" has a UID of
1000 and a subsequent "test4" entry has a UID of 2000, logging in as "test4" will use
UID 1000. Effectively, the UID is shared, which is a security problem.
Audit:
Run the following script and verify no results are returned:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while read -r l_count l_user; do
if [ "$l_count" -gt 1 ]; then
echo -e "Duplicate User: \"$l_user\" Users: \"$(awk -F: '($1 == n) { print $1 }' n=$l_user /etc/passwd
| xargs)\""
fi
done < <(cut -f1 -d":" /etc/passwd | sort -n | uniq -c)
}
Remediation:
Based on the results of the audit script, establish unique user names for the users. File
ownerships will automatically reflect the change as long as the users have unique UIDs.
References:
Page 906
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0004 M1027
T1078.003
Page 907
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
Although the groupadd program will not let you create a duplicate group name, it is
possible for an administrator to manually edit the /etc/group file and change the group
name.
Rationale:
If a group is assigned a duplicate group name, it will create and have access to files
with the first GID for that group in /etc/group . Effectively, the GID is shared, which is
a security problem.
Audit:
Run the following script and verify no results are returned:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
while read -r l_count l_group; do
if [ "$l_count" -gt 1 ]; then
echo -e "Duplicate Group: \"$l_group\" Groups: \"$(awk -F: '($1 == n) { print $1 }' n=$l_group
/etc/group | xargs)\""
fi
done < <(cut -f1 -d":" /etc/group | sort -n | uniq -c)
}
Remediation:
Based on the results of the audit script, establish unique names for the user groups. File
group ownerships will automatically reflect the change as long as the groups have
unique GIDs.
References:
Page 908
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1078, T1078.001,
TA0004 M1027
T1078.003
Page 909
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
The user home directory is space defined for the particular user to set local environment
variables and to store personal files. While the system administrator can establish
secure permissions for users' home directories, the users can easily override these.
Users can be defined in /etc/passwd without a home directory or with a home directory
that does not actually exist.
Rationale:
Since the user is accountable for files stored in the user home directory, the user must
be the owner of the directory. Group or world-writable user home directories may enable
malicious users to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system
privileges. If the user's home directory does not exist or is unassigned, the user will be
placed in "/" and will not be able to write any files or have local environment variables
set.
Page 910
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_exists2=() a_mode2=() a_owner2=()
l_valid_shells="^($( awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' |
paste -s -d '|' - ))$"
l_mask='0027'; l_max="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_mask)) )"
l_users="$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd | wc -l)"
[ "$l_users" -gt 10000 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " ** INFO **" \
" $l_users Local interactive users found on the system" " This may be a long running check" " **********"
while IFS=" " read -r l_user l_home; do
if [ -d "$l_home" ]; then
while IFS=: read -r l_own l_mode; do
[ "$l_user" != "$l_own" ] && a_owner2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home \"$l_home\" is owned by:
\"$l_own\"")
[ $(( $l_mode & $l_mask )) -gt 0 ] && a_mode2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home \"$l_home\" is mode:
\"$l_mode\"" \
" should be mode: \"$l_max\" or more restrictive")
done <<< "$(stat -Lc '%U:%#a' "$l_home")"
else
a_exists2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\" Doesn't exist")
fi
done <<< "$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd)"
[ "${#a_exists2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_exists2[@]}") || \
a_output+=(" - All interactive users home directories exist")
[ "${#a_mode2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_mode2[@]}") || \
a_output+=(" - All interactive users home directories are mode \"$l_max\" or more restrictive")
[ "${#a_owner2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_owner2[@]}") || \
a_output+=(" - All interactive users own their home directory")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **" "${a_output[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - Reason(s) for audit failure:" "${a_output2[@]}"
[ "${#a_output[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "- Correctly set:" "${a_output[@]}"
fi
}
Page 911
{
a_output=() a_output2=() a_exists2=() a_mode2=() a_owner2=()
l_valid_shells="^($( awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' |
paste -s -d '|' - ))$"
l_mask='0027'; l_max="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_mask)) )"
l_users="$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd | wc -l)"
[ "$l_users" -gt 10000 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " ** INFO **" \
" $l_users Local interactive users found on the system" " This may be a long running process" "
**********"
while IFS=" " read -r l_user l_home; do
if [ -d "$l_home" ]; then
while IFS=: read -r l_own l_mode; do
if [ "$l_user" != "$l_own" ]; then
a_owner2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home \"$l_home\" is owned by: \"$l_own\"" \
" changing owner to: \"$l_user\"") && chown "$l_user" "$l_home"
fi
if [ $(( $l_mode & $l_mask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_mode2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home \"$l_home\" is mode: \"$l_mode\"" \
" changing to mode: \"$l_max\" or more restrictive")
chmod g-w,o-rwx "$l_home"
fi
done <<< "$(stat -Lc '%U:%#a' "$l_home")"
else
a_exists2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\" Doesn't exist")
fi
done <<< "$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd)"
[ "${#a_exists2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_exists2[@]}")
[ "${#a_mode2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_mode2[@]}")
[ "${#a_owner2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=("${a_owner2[@]}")
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}"
else
printf '%s\n' "" "- No changes required"
fi
}
References:
Page 912
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
Page 913
• Level 1 - Server
• Level 1 - Workstation
Description:
While the system administrator can establish secure permissions for users' "dot" files,
the users can easily override these.
• .forward file specifies an email address to forward the user's mail to.
• .rhost file provides the "remote authentication" database for the rcp, rlogin, and
rsh commands and the rcmd() function. These files bypass the standard
password-based user authentication mechanism. They specify remote hosts and
users that are considered trusted (i.e. are allowed to access the local system
without supplying a password)
• .netrc file contains data for logging into a remote host or passing authentication
to an API.
• .bash_history file keeps track of the user’s commands.
Rationale:
User configuration files with excessive or incorrect access may enable malicious users
to steal or modify other users' data or to gain another user's system privileges.
Audit:
Run the following script to verify local interactive user dot files:
Note: If a .netrc file is required, and follows local site policy, it should be mode 0600 or
more restrictive.
Page 914
{
a_output2=(); a_output3=()
l_maxsize="1000" # Maximum number of local interactive users before warning (Default 1,000)
l_valid_shells="^($( awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' |
paste -s -d '|' - ))$"
a_user_and_home=() # Create array with local users and their home directories
while read -r l_local_user l_local_user_home; do # Populate array with users and user home location
[[ -n "$l_local_user" && -n "$l_local_user_home" ]] &&
a_user_and_home+=("$l_local_user:$l_local_user_home")
done <<< "$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd)"
l_asize="${#a_user_and_home[@]}" # Here if we want to look at number of users before proceeding
[ "${#a_user_and_home[@]}" -gt "$l_maxsize" ] && printf '%s\n' "" " ** INFO **" \
" - \"$l_asize\" Local interactive users found on the system" \
" - This may be a long running check" ""
file_access_chk()
{
a_access_out=()
l_max="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_mask)) )"
if [ $(( $l_mode & $l_mask )) -gt 0 ]; then
a_access_out+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" and should be mode: \"$l_max\" or more
restrictive")
fi
if [[ ! "$l_owner" =~ ($l_user) ]]; then
a_access_out+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" owned by: \"$l_owner\" and should be owned by \"${l_user//|/
or }\"")
fi
if [[ ! "$l_gowner" =~ ($l_group) ]]; then
a_access_out+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" group owned by: \"$l_gowner\" and should be group owned by
\"${l_group//|/ or }\"")
fi
}
while IFS=: read -r l_user l_home; do
a_dot_file=(); a_netrc=(); a_netrc_warn=(); a_bhout=(); a_hdirout=()
if [ -d "$l_home" ]; then
l_group="$(id -gn "$l_user" | xargs)";l_group="${l_group// /|}"
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_hdfile; do
while read -r l_mode l_owner l_gowner; do
case "$(basename "$l_hdfile")" in
.forward | .rhost )
a_dot_file+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" exists") ;;
.netrc )
l_mask='0177'; file_access_chk
if [ "${#a_access_out[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
a_netrc+=("${a_access_out[@]}")
else
a_netrc_warn+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" exists")
fi ;;
.bash_history )
l_mask='0177'; file_access_chk
[ "${#a_access_out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_bhout+=("${a_access_out[@]}") ;;
* )
l_mask='0133'; file_access_chk
[ "${#a_access_out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_hdirout+=("${a_access_out[@]}") ;;
esac
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a %U %G' "$l_hdfile")
done < <(find "$l_home" -xdev -type f -name '.*' -print0)
fi
if [[ "${#a_dot_file[@]}" -gt 0 || "${#a_netrc[@]}" -gt 0 || "${#a_bhout[@]}" -gt 0 || "${#a_hdirout[@]}"
-gt 0 ]]; then
a_output2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\"" "${a_dot_file[@]}" "${a_netrc[@]}"
"${a_bhout[@]}" "${a_hdirout[@]}")
fi
[ "${#a_netrc_warn[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output3+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\""
"${a_netrc_warn[@]}")
done <<< "$(printf '%s\n' "${a_user_and_home[@]}")"
if [ "${#a_output2[@]}" -le 0 ]; then # If l_output2 is empty, we pass
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' " ** WARNING **" "${a_output3[@]}"
printf '%s\n' "- Audit Result:" " ** PASS **"
else
printf '%s\n' "- Audit Result:" " ** FAIL **" " - * Reasons for audit failure * :" "${a_output2[@]}" ""
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' " ** WARNING **" "${a_output3[@]}"
fi
}
Page 915
Page 916
{
a_output2=(); a_output3=()
l_maxsize="1000" # Maximum number of local interactive users before warning (Default 1,000)
l_valid_shells="^($( awk -F\/ '$NF != "nologin" {print}' /etc/shells | sed -rn '/^\//{s,/,\\\\/,g;p}' |
paste -s -d '|' - ))$"
a_user_and_home=() # Create array with local users and their home directories
while read -r l_local_user l_local_user_home; do # Populate array with users and user home location
[[ -n "$l_local_user" && -n "$l_local_user_home" ]] &&
a_user_and_home+=("$l_local_user:$l_local_user_home")
done <<< "$(awk -v pat="$l_valid_shells" -F: '$(NF) ~ pat { print $1 " " $(NF-1) }' /etc/passwd)"
l_asize="${#a_user_and_home[@]}" # Here if we want to look at number of users before proceeding
[ "${#a_user_and_home[@]}" -gt "$l_maxsize" ] && printf '%s\n' "" " ** INFO **" \
" - \"$l_asize\" Local interactive users found on the system" \
" - This may be a long running check" ""
file_access_fix()
{
a_access_out=()
l_max="$( printf '%o' $(( 0777 & ~$l_mask)) )"
if [ $(( $l_mode & $l_mask )) -gt 0 ]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - File: \"$l_hdfile\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" and should be mode: \"$l_max\" or more
restrictive" \
" Updating file: \"$l_hdfile\" to be mode: \"$l_max\" or more restrictive"
chmod "$l_change" "$l_hdfile"
fi
if [[ ! "$l_owner" =~ ($l_user) ]]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - File: \"$l_hdfile\" owned by: \"$l_owner\" and should be owned by \"${l_user//|/
or }\"" \
" Updating file: \"$l_hdfile\" to be owned by \"${l_user//|/ or }\""
chown "$l_user" "$l_hdfile"
fi
if [[ ! "$l_gowner" =~ ($l_group) ]]; then
printf '%s\n' "" " - File: \"$l_hdfile\" group owned by: \"$l_gowner\" and should be group owned by
\"${l_group//|/ or }\"" \
" Updating file: \"$l_hdfile\" to be group owned by \"${l_group//|/ or }\""
chgrp "$l_group" "$l_hdfile"
fi
}
while IFS=: read -r l_user l_home; do
a_dot_file=(); a_netrc=(); a_netrc_warn=(); a_bhout=(); a_hdirout=()
if [ -d "$l_home" ]; then
l_group="$(id -gn "$l_user" | xargs)";l_group="${l_group// /|}"
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_hdfile; do
while read -r l_mode l_owner l_gowner; do
case "$(basename "$l_hdfile")" in
.forward | .rhost )
a_dot_file+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" exists" " Please review and manually delete this
file") ;;
.netrc )
l_mask='0177'; l_change="u-x,go-rwx"; file_access_fix
a_netrc_warn+=(" - File: \"$l_hdfile\" exists") ;;
.bash_history )
l_mask='0177'; l_change="u-x,go-rwx"; file_access_fix ;;
* )
l_mask='0133'; l_change="u-x,go-wx"; file_access_fix ;;
esac
done < <(stat -Lc '%#a %U %G' "$l_hdfile")
done < <(find "$l_home" -xdev -type f -name '.*' -print0)
fi
[ "${#a_dot_file[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output2+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\""
"${a_dot_file[@]}")
[ "${#a_netrc_warn[@]}" -gt 0 ] && a_output3+=(" - User: \"$l_user\" Home Directory: \"$l_home\""
"${a_netrc_warn[@]}")
done <<< "$(printf '%s\n' "${a_user_and_home[@]}")"
[ "${#a_output3[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" " ** WARNING **" "${a_output3[@]}" ""
[ "${#a_output2[@]}" -gt 0 ] && printf '%s\n' "" "${a_output2[@]}"
}
Page 917
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Techniques / Sub-
Tactics Mitigations
techniques
T1222, T1222.001,
T1222.002, T1552, TA0005 M1022
T1552.003, T1552.004
Page 918
Yes No
1 Initial Setup
1.1 Filesystem
Page 919
Yes No
Page 920
Yes No
Page 921
Yes No
Page 922
Yes No
2 Services
Page 923
Yes No
Page 924
Yes No
Page 925
Yes No
2.4.2 Configure at
3 Network
Page 926
Yes No
Page 927
Yes No
4.2.7 Ensure ufw firewall rules exist for all open ports
(Automated)
Page 928
Yes No
4.4.2.4 Ensure iptables firewall rules exist for all open ports
(Automated)
Page 929
Yes No
4.4.3.4 Ensure ip6tables firewall rules exist for all open ports
(Automated)
5 Access Control
Page 930
Yes No
Page 931
Yes No
Page 932
Yes No
Page 933
Yes No
5.4.1.6 Ensure all users last password change date is in the past
(Automated)
Page 934
Yes No
Page 935
Yes No
Page 936
Yes No
6.3.2.4 Ensure system warns when audit logs are low on space
(Automated)
6.3.3.3 Ensure events that modify the sudo log file are collected
(Automated)
6.3.3.4 Ensure events that modify date and time information are
collected (Automated)
Page 937
Yes No
Page 938
Yes No
7 System Maintenance
Page 939
Yes No
Page 940
Yes No
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