o Non repudiation, Destination: This is a proof that a particular message was indeed received by a particular receiver. y Pe. 2 Security mechanisms \ 7 -T (X.800) specifies security mechanisms as shown in Fig. 1.10. et us briefly describe these security mechanisms: herment: eee hiding data. Hence, this takes care lentiality. The ‘aphy and steganography can be used to achieve encipherment, op i it rt extract of the original data is computes b using a specific mech original data or extract invalidates the other, and there signals loss ofJP Pepmartcd. en) gels erat tue. ot Veer si, 2 type 4 Ra@munteltas tame med 1.5.3 Security services linked to security mechanismsa pe = nO a i wing points should be ensured. ec mss whee un tha fae that A and B will think of. in such a case? A will write the check for $100, pull ta egoclope, and send it: ie iple of authentic B would I has indeed come from A, and pg as A (as it could be a f xk in that case). This is the What will b en rnorea ith dejo Oe money js Sa jm A's account B's account and then A the check? The cour gf il law will use A's signature to disallow A ne dispue, Thal principle of non-repudiation | These are the four chief principles of security. There are two more, access control and avaMabig hich are not related to a particular message, but ae linked to the overall system as a wh | 1.4.1 Confidentiality The principle of confidentiality specifics that only the sender and the intended recipient(s) should be abel to access ar i : shown in Fig A H the use a of con B. (Actually, from here onwards : computers of user A, B, etc.) Another ‘ nis message, which is not desired, ail therefore, defeats the purpose of con Exam could be a confidential email mesial tack is call \ and B. This type interception.[Tinterception10 “O>pscpupay 1.4.3 Integrity When the contents of a messag are changed after the sender send los. For example, suppone you gad f the message is n the US. However are startled to see that th integrity. Conceptually, this is shown in Fig. 1.6. Here, ns bY user A which is actually destined for user B. User © someon mont the mosey an’ Send the changed message to user B. User B has no way of bees hanged after user A had sent it. User A also does not knoe about this eg hangs {ype of attack is called as Fig. 1.6 Loss of integrity Modification causes loss of message integrity 1.4.4 Non-repudiation 1 © situations where a user sends a me: and later that she had sent that ma For user A could ser ansfer request to 3 over the Intemet. Afer lg performs the funds transfer as tctions, A could claim that she never sent the fund instruction to the bank! Thus, A repudia ies, he nsfer instruction. The ping f non-repudiation defe hilities of denying something, having done it, This all Beit Fig.ror oy he Compe of Scenty 14 EEE DE WTS age PPT message. fd message To sis ‘hie te Wa aa : Fat sea ae 1.4.5 Access control == me principle of access control determines wh gh pe able to specify that user A can view the? oh ght be allowed to » records er B might be allowed to make upd Mes as we ee, We should ra cattol is broadly related vo wore CONT! Mecham gee Home -ment concentrates on the 4 rich weer Management and rule page Role mand focuses on the resources side (which re lanagement and ra do what), when 88 rule management Amstances). Based on Users against a list of nly update files ¥ and the decisions taken here. an access contol say 4 under what circ matrix is prepared, which f hat user A can a ich lists th sober A can Wri eX, but ea items they can access (e.g. it can say th 7). An Access Control List (ACL) is 4 ; ‘an access Whal 1.4.6 Availability The princi ple, due to the intentional arties at all times. For exai ation) should be aval He to authorised authorised user A may nc to contact a set tions of another unauthorised uset C. an Bs eecinie ee acaiion * server computer B, a shown in Fig. { defeat the principle of availability. Such an attack is eaten Oe Fig. 1.8 Attack on availability [Gnterruption puts the availability of r nal OSI standard for Network Model (titled OSI Network Model (application, presentation, ilar lines is the We may be aware of the trad 7498-1), which describes th network, data link rs of the networki and physical). A very less known standard on si session, transporNetwork Security 1.6.1 Attacks: A general view From a coi a to three cate common person's point of view, we can classify attacks into Fig. 1.11 fe Types oF attacks as understood by @ | [achrina aracks — Seiicy wach Een anaes | acks as understood in general terms Fig. 1.11 Classification of Let us now discuss these attacks. «164.1 Criminal attacks the simplest to understand. Here, computer systems) Table 1 TTists some forms of criminal atiach Criminal attacks are ic aim of the attackers is to. financial gain by attackit Table 1.2 Types of criminal aaa TT Desrinton | eraud ] Modem fraud attacks concentrate on manipulating some aspects of eleetronie currency, credit | cards, electronic stock certificates, checks, leters of eredit, pure ers, ATMS, ee a Scams come in various forms, some of the most common ones being sale of services, auctions, tnult-level marketing schemes, general merchandise, nd business opportunities, etc. People | Me enticed to send money in return of great retums, but end up losing their money. A veqy [i is the Nigeria scam. where an email from Nigeria (and other Altiean | common examp s) entices people to deposit money into a bank account with a promise of hefty gains Whosoever gets caught in this scam loses money heavily For example, unhappy employees 2 \s. For example, ack against popular Internet sites such as Yahoo!, CNN, eBay, sites failed to log in Adentity th This is best understood with a quote from Bruce Schneier: Why steal from someone whe ‘ou can just become that person? In other words, an attacker does not steal anything froma ser he becomes that legitimate user! For exumple, itis much easier to manage as vord of someon bank account, or to actually be able to gét a creditcard ie se’s name. Then that privilege can be misused until it gets detected A _ Tntellectual Intellectual property theft ranges from stealing companies’ trade secrets, databases, digital s, software, and so on, property thi tronic documents and by es that look like real Web sites. How would a comma or an attacker's site? Innocent users enid Up ickers. The attackers ip fake Web [Bfand tt user know if she is visiting the HDFC Bank nd personal details on these fake sites to the at iccess the real site, causing an identity theftand sed ecepne Hy age a su fing a novel approach of attackin mae oem of panty acs ame ane Eo ‘of the most faMoUS SUCH attacks occurred es or setae), oa ck cad at} ties employees in large ote ihe Web the US gh Neb ages ose by an tment of Jasna ey ACK One iced mem of Sece We ten fo the court) ere sire tthe attack ee exarnple, an aitscher may sua-etes oe mi ae em. In sont, he ott 2 Trane aoe et ap eee el that ened thereafter. A judge ie icker tries to 1s Reacer ties o comings the 1.6.2 Attacks: A technical view eae ier into two categories for better understanding: al concras bend tae aoe moe cr a ta) Ree eo Practical approaches used by the attackers. Let us discuss these one by-on ae 4.6.2.1. Theoretical concepts (Adve discussed earlier, the principles of secusty fi RET fy clasifd ino four eateries, ax mention carer etek aa CE Ameren Dis in te nen of ofa ie mes a a party has gained access toa resource, The party canbe a person, program, or eompuler eed tystem, Examples of interception are copying of data or programs, and listening (0 network fratic: wae cation: Discussed in the context of authentication, earlier. This involves creation of illegal yada fake records toa database nbjects on a computer system. For example, the attacker ma fodification: Discussed in the context of integrity, earlier. Here, the attacker may modify the Aralues in a di mple. Interruption: Discussed in the context of availability, earlier. Here, the resource’ ‘becomes sable. Examples of interruption are causing problems to,a hardware unayailable, lost, or un device, erasing program, data, or operating system components. Theos atacks are urther grouped into two types: pasive attacks and active tsi: shown in Fig. 1.12.18 Com Let us discuss these two types of attacks now Passive attacks we those, wherein the attacker indulges |p Lg that sea The term passive indicates thatthe attacker 7h feations to the data + ‘i acs, PcGky are hander io detect\Thus, the general approach to degh Woes Hot attempt to perform any m TH Tact, this is al passive attacks Ist hy passiv ink about prevention, rather than detec with Passive anacks do not involve any modifications to the contents of an original message = Masq Figure 1.13 shows further classification of passive attacks into 1wo sub-categories. These eaggal seen, us are name vessage contents and traffic analysis, tong ona masque Passive atack tion) attack | those ¢ oa Ina ) is eels 1 Fig. 1.13 Passive att Bank © understand. When we send @ confidential ema fe to our friend, we desire that only she be able to access it. Otherwise, the contents of all s to someone else. Using certain security mechanisms, wel ing a code languages Release of message contents is quite simple hat only the desired parties understand th because only they know the en har language. However, if many such mess ive attacker could try to fighfe gi D similarities between them to come up with provides her some clues regan " the communication that is taking place. S ing (encoded) messages to comiligl a » with likely patterns are the work of the sraffic analysis att net Active attacks e nner, or the creation of a false mi Th acks eannc ' Th can be detected with some effort, and attemp i cover from them. These attacks al cs be in the form of interruption, modification a i © Trying to pose as another entity involves masquerade attacks. © Modification atta be classified fu r attacks and alteration of message ¢ Fabrication causes Denial of Service (DOS) atMasquerade is caused when an unauthor seen, user C might pose as user A an; age, and would treat this as a second, transfer twice: once authorised, once through a replay ataclc on Bt the Pens of the fonds Alteration of messages involves some change to the origina ee al ees eh Koni me oun User C might capture this, and change it to Transfer $/0000 10 C’s account. Note that both the beneficiary and the amount have been changed — instead, only one of these could have also caused alteration of the message Denial of Service (DOS) attack make an attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing some services, which they are eligible for. For instance, an unauthorised user might send too many login. requests to a server using random user ids one after the other in quick succession, $0 as to flood the network and deny other legitimate users to use the network facilities. . 1.6.3 The practical side of attacks The attacks discussed earlier can come in a number of forms in real life. They can be classified into two broad categories: application-level attacks and network-level attacks, as shown in Fig. 1.15. | | “Application level attacks Network level attacks a: Fig. 1.15 Practical side of attacksLat di ee aks: These sche Dapp te oT colar oi y «the application itself, Examples of this are yin Pe ‘he amount ina (ta q «+ Networksevelatacs: Tes attacks generally sit a8 6 a elie ee ‘a number of possi bl eee + Note tha this automatically 6 an lead to applications completely bring thal, computer METS Ty gocess to a network, usualy she is able lel SO a eve information, causing havoc accessimodify at least some sensitive infOunal TT "mechanisms, as discussed next. We will not classify these attacks nto the above two cates aries, since they a application ag well as network evel Scour ama ca aspen ot 6 laa ag 4.6.4 Attacks on wireless networks Spas tacks J active attacks 1.6.4.1 Passive attacks } By definition, a passive attack is the one where the cker simply keeps listening to the traffi¢ instead of a ares anoffesive attack on te vei. The same principles tue the cas of pase a a Here, the attacker listens o tht is eavesdrops on he wircess trafic passing by, Fa Fe ier on a vce bat can capt wie oa oa Here, tervreless network interface card us piop runs in a promiscuous mode Th an ne Ge lS veto rin coral ih a and hands it dre Pl item St i. oh on ee a ees f ac = n, such = ner smi letScout Sniffer, W earlier called as Ethereal), ete. ommetnes iis Claimed tha using tools listed earlier to capture wireless traffic on public OF private ml networks is illegal. Hoy ever, there is also another way of looking at this. Many people who use the ols oe Give canutng wi a, aa Of security systems. While both claims seem to be right, finally the situation decides wha is more appropriate ess traffic claim that they are doing this for research, educati improveme Pyisive attacks are more difficult 1o detec I One of the main purposes behind th Gither to gain free Inter mmon and are very easy to launch iver unprotected wireless HeTwOrks access or to also report such networks to the authorities for correctivZnid frame to such a network, hoping esponds, the attacker's device stone aoe The attacker's device now becomes ceive a res respo! fr administrators of wireless networks should conn HERES. itis 2a To muh eae ns MoU congue hem so ha ey ee a ‘ sing passwords and enerypti 1.6.4.2 Active attacks re ‘Once an attacker is able to succes ha pase ack, a pase lack, the atacker can on a wired network. In other word, te wines ae = ofana (DOS), flooding, introducing malware ooshA naa selingintamaishe OFS sespsing ats es connen ae ee Herat, Ose gue weuorsed aces MAC filtering. Here, the administrator can specity only capac aa he cae of adios tt canbe aloe oer no hs ile er ace urine ase ele oes not have a hardware address belon neste Sines 1 aller ev am se, alackers know how to overcome this problem also, For this purpose the attacker ean change the hardware address of her devicelaptop only fn softwar, Le. forte popes ole seston toe Eri sdaresses in the list allowed by the witlens neve: Reece ane pecs in he y the wireless network. As a result, the attacker's device fan impersonate another legal wireless computer, ic clam that (ls «diferent and lpal compan than what it really is 1.6.4.3 Person-in-the-middle attacks Ina person-in-the-middle attack, the attacker plays a different role than who she really is. Al Wireless networks use some form of Access Point (AP), which is usually a wireless router that provides network: In a person-in-the-middle wireless attack, the attacker sets up her own AP. In other words, she owns the underlying wireless network. This is called as a rouge AP, The red in such a way that users who normally connect 10 (0 the attacker's rouge AP without ‘connectivity. the attacker poses as if settings of the original wireless network are cl the AP of the original network are mistaken and they now connect t ng fooled, lack, the attacker usually makes use of a laptop that has two wireless ‘of these cards is used to create a rouge AP. The other card is used to when a genuine User sends a request over the wireless | network, Instead, it comes to the rouge AP set Up. knowing that they are bein For launching such an att network interface cards. One connect wirelessly to the original network. Now, he original network, it does not go to the AP of t2o ography and Network Security by the attacker. The attacker captures this information, optionally makes changes and then forwanig it to the original AP. In the process, the attacker can get valuable information about passwords, Key authentication requests, security policies being used and many other secrets. Tools such as Netstumbleg and AiroPeck provide services for detection of such attacks. 1.6.4.4 Jamming attacks i in the context of wireless networks. The idea is to dismupy ig wireless data frames, These rouge data frameg a pying the bandwidth of the wireless ial type of DoS attac f the wireless network by introduci sent by the attacker have no purpose beyond just wastefully occup network or colliding with the genuine data frames to cause disruption. For this purpose, the attache sends these rouge data frames ata frequency that matches the frequency used by the genuine Wirelegg network for its normal operation. Hene ¢ which data frames are genuine ang sible to del itis not possible Which data frames are rouge, just on the basis of their physical characteristics 1.6.5 Programs that attack Let us now discuss a few programs that attack computer systems to cause some damage of to ereaia attack using a virus. In simple terms, nate program code, and runs whem the il 1.6.5.1 Virus One ean launch an application-level attack ym code that attaches itself to le a virus is a piece of pr fam runs. It can then infect other programs in that computer, oF p ms that are in gitimate pro “other computers but on the same network. This is shown in Fig. 1.16, In this example, after deleting all the files from the cur +s computer, the virus self-propagates by sending its code to all users whose email addresses are stored in the current user's addr | Perform Print-Job doom Bess ‘ | crform Close-Tob ou = | |B Perforn ¢ ing this E k | ginal clean cok ) L F | Viruses can also be triggered by specific even every Usually viruses cause d ; aacatically Oe be repaired, assuming that the organisation deploys good eae (0 he Sen up an Ty procedures.Dormant phase: Here, the vir ee regs ree of self, thus “If, thus propagating the vir soy Triggering phase: A dormant vi waiting is initiated. o ‘ection phase: This is the actual won isceas on the screen} or kof the virus, which The Tone el fle oh a ey ome (a) Parasitic virus: This is the most vag des executable files and keeps replic; ond torn) vin i itself and spread. = ‘virus looks lemory-resident virus: This t #3 FP asot sectoc virus This ype of RL Stealth virus: This virus has intelligence built in, which i- from detecting it Prevents anti-virus software programs (e) Polymorphic virus: A virus that keeps chan; making it very difficult to detect. te boot record ofthe disk and spreads ¢ Computer, = - iging its signanere (ic. identity) on every execution, () Metamorphic virus: In addition to changing its sis i aa fits signature like « polymorphic virus, this of virus keeps rewriting itself every time, making its detection ro bated Cae There is another popular category of viruses, called as the maero virus. This speci 2 , called as ro virus. This virus affects speci plication softrare such as Microsof Word or Microsoft cel, They fe he ean ea tsers, and spread quite easily since such documents are very commonly exchanged over email. There is a feature called as macro these application software programs, which allows the user t waite small. useful utility programs within the documents. Viruses attack these macros, and henge the mame macro virus: 1.6.5.2 Worm Similar in concept to a virus, a worm is actually different in implementation. A virus modifis a program (ie. it attaches itself to the program under attack). A worm, however, does not modify a program. wa in Fig. 1.17. The replication grows so much .e worm resides, becomes very slow, ultimately cis different from that of a virus. A worm attack unusable by eating all its resources. Instead, it replicates itself again and again. This is sho that ultimately the computer or the network on which th coming to a halt. Thus, the basic purpose of a worm att attack attempts to make the computer or the network under4.6.6 Dealing with viruses Preventing viruses is the best option. However, iti lowever, it is almost impossible to achi jieve today with the world connected to the Internet all the time. We : . We have to accept that viruses will attack, and would need to find ways to deal with them. Hence, we can attempt to detect, iden aad ate 3 i fe viruses, This is shown in Fig. 1.19 [Detection | mmm ae [inaction | mm | = [Removal | am [Reno 1.19 Virus elimination steps26 Cryptography and Network Security rn that a virus has attacked. Then we Detection of viruses involves locating the virus, having Kn Te removicits For (Sam cific virus that as attacked), F nally. We ipl ocignal sate TH T ese simple scanners eo ra depicted in Fig. 1.20. szenerations ae] - a (4 [Pennie] -= sv | i = | els Fig. 1.20. Generations of anti-virus software Let us summarise the key c istics of the four generations of 1% generation: These anti-virus soft a virus si nti-virus software. simple scanners. They needed programs kept a watch on the length of nature to identify a virus. A variation of suct programs and looked for changes so as to possibly ntify a virus attack 2" generation: These anti-virus softwat ms did not rely on simple virus signatures Rather, they used heuristic rules to look for possible virus attacks. The -a was to look for code uch a program could look virus, and clean the code, ntification about the file s in the contents of the files esident, They watched f0F Thus, it is not necessary to maintain a large’ d, the focus is to keep watch on a small number of suspect blocks that were commonly associated with viruses. F for encryption key used by a virus, find it, d Another variation of these jecrypt and remove th anti-virus programs used to store some id (eg. amessage digest, which we shall study later) to dete 3” generation: These anti-virus software programs were memory viruses based on actions, rather than their structur database of virus signatures. | actions 4" generation: These anti-virus software programs pack: ge many anti-virus techniques together (e.g. scanners, activity monitoring). They also contain access control features, thus thwarting the attempts of viruses to infect files.‘There is a category of sofiw, aie {htrdaction othe Coney Sec ng system ofthe Computer and haces PSRAV a keeps software, an action is detected, this software block. jt Match On virusciee gap de after an attack. 1. locks it, prev deleting file + Opening, viewing, modifying Network commanications Modification of settings such as stare, Attempts to forma disks SUP sci Modification of executable fies Seripting of email and ‘The main advantage of suc section. n ober words, they stop virgen ening xP SAMABES. The actions union instant messa ‘Aging to send execu -ecutable content | tent to others iat they are mor before they can ge ne it ras prevention than vay * san do any damage, rather than detecting Yost 6.7 Specific attacks 1.6.7.1 Sniffing and spoofing On call information. Attackers target these computer over the Internet. These attucks snooping) and (b) Packet spoofing, Prot the Internet, computers exchange mess Packets, as they tray n the form of smi data to be sent, from the source computer ‘wo main forms: (a) Packet sniff the protocol used in this comn ee munication i ull groups of data, nd the addressing, to the destination ing (also called as is called as Internet ince xocol (IP), other names for these two remains the same. (©) IP sniffing and (b) IP spoofing. The meaning L (a) Packet si 0) Let us discuss these two attacks, 8: Packet sniffing is a passive attack on an ongoing conversation. An attacker conversation, but instead, can simply obbane ! observe (sn) packets ey pss by, Clearly, o prevent an attacker rom snifing oct the fomaton a seat eee be protected in some ways. This en be done at tw ltl ()'The da that eee aa encoded in some ways or (i) The tarsmission link set can be encoded To eats pete ee need not hij ker somehow needs to access it in the first place. The simplest way to do this is to control a computer via which the traffic goes through. Usually, this is a router. However, routers are highly protected resources. Therefore, an attacker might not be able to attack it, and instead, attack a less-protected computer on the same path. Packet spoofing: In this technique, an attacker sends packets with an incorect source address. When this happens, the receiver (Le. the party who receives these packets containing false address) would inadvertently send replies back to this forged address (called as spoofed address), ‘and not to the attacker. This can lead to three possible cases: () The attacker can intercept the reply ~ If the attacker is between the destination and the forged source, the attacker can see the reply and use that information for hijacking attacks ‘The attacker need not see the reply - Ifthe atiacker’s intention was a Denial Of Service attack, the attacker need not bother about the reply. eae a the reply ~The attacker could simply be angry with the host, (iii) The attacker does not28 Cryptography and Network Security so it may put that host's address as the forged source address ‘and send the packs destination, The attacker does not want a reply from the destination, as it wants With the forged address to receive it and get confused. 1.6.7.2. Phishing i cent times. In 2004, the estimated losses due to phishi Phishing has become a big problem in recent t : phishing, mae nee Sf USD 137 million, according to Tower Group. Attackers set up fake Web sites, wh Took like real Web sites, Its quite simple to do so, since creating Web pages involves relatively sim echnologies suct ML, JavaScript, Cascading Style Sheets ( 2 and using tha ee an ster decides to create het own website, which looks very identical to a real websiil enantiomer ‘will not be able to distinguish between the real (Citibank’s) and fake (attacker's) sites now, The ter Sends am nal tothe legtimate customers of the bank. The email self appt have come from the bank. For ensuring this, the attacker exploits the email system to suggest that the sender of the email is some bank official (¢.g. [email protected]). This fake email w. the user that there has been some sort of attack on the Citibank’s computer systems and that the ban ‘wants to issue new passwords to all its customers, or verify their existing PINs, etc. For this purposey the customer is asked to visit a URL mentioned in the same email. This is conceptually shown im Fig. 1.21. | Atacker Subject: Verify your E-mail with Citibank Ppl aod win soma) ee ce ee eee omer er crane ec cae | Ss: | To verify your E-mail address and access your bank account, click on the link below bank.convsignin/citifi/scripts/email_verifyjsp Beles od oan ten hannah Fig. 1.21 Attacker sends a forged email to the innocent victim (customer)Ghrer confidential information, sue Sxactly lke the original bank sit, the : customer Sop eran a nv uses the victim : ny wansaction as if she is the viet) no FIN # ACCES the bank's fea die sea ee _areallife example of this kindof possible atack i =a i" A atte te atten, ‘Provides this Dear Tax Payer, ‘Net banking Account. a 00 a hus:www,incometaxingla, eee wa. 20%. in-PaymentChallan lease download and save a copy of your Paymeat Challa below, | Sincerely, Income Tax Department Fig. 1.22 Fake emai from the attacker When the user clicks the link, the antivirus software installed in the users about the fake link and prevents any damage. Fig, 123 depicts hi, nt Same ne mE [ ‘Website you are visiting may be harmful, fsa: vn cm/sec a out | Ifyou think this is mistake, to report click here. Fig. 1.23 Warning about fake Web site Ifno such anti-virus software is installed, the gullible user would become an easy victim! 1.6.7.3; Phérming (DNS spoofing) “Another attack, known earlier as DNS spoof or DNS poisoning is now called as pharming aitack, AS weknow, using the Domain Name System (DNS), people jridentify Web sites with human-readabl names (such as www.yahoo.com), and computers can continue to treat them a Iresses (such 4s 120.10.81.67). For this, a special server computer called as a DNS server maintains the mappings between domain names and the corresponding IP addresses. The DNS server could be located anywhere. Usually, it is with the Internet Service Provider (ISP) of the users, With this background, the DNS spoofing attack works as follows.os . +, whos site's domain name is wore. com and hg Suppose that there is a merchant (Bol i for Bob in all the DNS servers is maining : 20. Therefore. the DNS ¢ as follows i Pe « IP address of Bob with her ow he IP address of her own y Alice. Therefore, the Dy cr (Say Trudy) manage DSN server ISP of Ali t hack and replace hy the ISP of a user, Sa sintained b now has the 2. The attack {00.20.20.20) in the ees shle maintained by the ISP would be changed, j ) is shown in Fig. 1.24 the attack) i ‘After the attack attack | Before of the DNS attack Fig. 1.24 Web browser queries the DNS serve icate with Bob's site Aue ISP for Bob's IP address, providing it the domain name (i.e. www: bob ¢om dress, which is 100.20.21 hat she is communicating with Bob Even worse, the attackep ble to hack the 3, When Alice wants to communi > simply (Trudy) does not t DNS server of the ISP and replace a A protocol called as DNSSec ( anfortunately it is not widely used. CHAPTER SUMMARY = Network and Internet security has gained immense prominence in the last few years, as conducting business using these technologies has become very crucial i = Automation of attacks, priv ning iramaterial are some of the Key haracteristics of modern = The non-r = Confidentiality the contents of a message. y concems, and distance icks, inciples of any security mechanism are confidentiality, authentication, integrity udiation, access control and availability ecifies that only the sender and the intended recipients should be able t0 eves