Keeping the Nuclear Energy

Option Open

H-Holger Rogner, Robert J. Budnitz,

Charles McCombie, Noura Y. Mansouri,
Robert N. Schock and Adnan Shihab-Eldin
March 2022 Doi: 10.30573/KS--2022-DP07
About KAPSARC
KAPSARC is an advisory think tank within global energy economics and sustainability
providing advisory services to entities and authorities in the Saudi energy sector
to advance Saudi Arabia's energy sector and inform global policies through
evidence-based advice and applied research.

This publication is also available in Arabic.

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Acknowledgments
This study originated from the preparation of a policy brief (Shihab-Eldin et al. 2020).
The policy brief was submitted to Task Force 2 on Climate Change and Environment
under Think 20 (T20) Saudi Arabia 2020, a G20 engagement group (T20TF2 2020). The
authors wish to thank several T20 participants who provided useful input and feedback.
The authors are also grateful to the World Federation of Scientists in Geneva and the
Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture in Sicily, Italy. These groups provided
fora from August 2019 to the present that allowed many of the authors to interact and
develop their ideas more fully. Special thanks are extended to Ali Ahmad, William
Barletta, Carmine Difiglio, Michael Jefferson and Richard Lanza. They provided valuable
comments and suggestions on a preliminary version of the manuscript. Finally, the
authors thank Gorgiana M. Alonzo for her excellent technical editing of the manuscript.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

2
Key Points

N
uclear energy is already playing a crucial Moreover, few economies with high electricity
role in reducing emissions from electricity demand are likely to successfully implement
generation. However, if this role is not and maintain stable low-carbon electrical
expanded, achieving the international goal of grids reliably and cost-effectively without
avoiding unacceptable global climate change will utilizing nuclear energy. This analysis leads to
be extremely difficult. The evidence presented recommendations for national energy policies
in this study shows that nuclear energy’s climate and measures, including technology sharing,
benefits can be obtained without significant research and development priorities, best
impacts to safety, security or energy costs. practices and international regulatory programs.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 3

Introduction1
The rationale for nuclear power in a This study addresses decision-makers, climate
climate-constrained world is twofold. experts, the scientific and technical community and
environmentally interested members of the public. It
The Paris Agreement aims to limit the global focuses on the current and potentially greater positive
temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius (°C) or even contributions that nuclear energy can make toward
1.5 degrees Celsius (°C) above pre-industrial levels. achieving agreed climate goals. Nuclear energy
To achieve this goal, all cost-effective measures can provide energy for electricity production and
must be taken to accelerate the transitions toward other industrial applications with near-zero carbon
carbon neutrality and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.
(GHG) emission energy systems.
We recommend several measures that can help to
Nuclear energy is a proven, mature and safe increase nuclear energy’s contribution to reducing
technology and has essentially zero GHG emissions. However, we recognize that public
emissions. It can provide the baseload and and political views on the acceptability of nuclear
load-following electricity needed to ensure 24-hour energy as a clean, safe and affordable technology
stability in electric grids as the supply of intermittent vary widely. Accordingly, we also address these
renewable energy increases. underlying issues. In addition to carbon dioxide
emissions, this study covers nuclear safety and
Achieving carbon neutrality in the second half of security, environmental impacts and sustainability.
this century while still ensuring energy security We also discuss economics and the political decision
is a major challenge under any plausible climate processes influencing national nuclear energy
scenario. This challenge cannot be met if important strategies.
electricity generating technologies with near-zero
carbon emissions are excluded from the solution.
As this study shows, excluding nuclear energy will
also compromise the availability of the electricity
supply. Other Paris-level climate policies require more
low-carbon electricity to replace fossil fuels in other
sectors, such as transport and industry.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

4
Challenges in Moving to Net-Zero
GHG Emissions

G
overnments increasingly face the challenge be communicated as well. Advanced nuclear power
of mitigating climate change amid visible plant technologies, including small modular reactors
impatience, especially among civil societies, (SMRs), must address new market and infrastructure
including non-governmental organizations and challenges posed by structural changes to the energy
youth groups. These groups call for multilateral transition.
mechanisms to limit the global temperature rise
to below 1.5 °C. This goal is set out in the Paris One of the important challenges to address is
Agreement in the context of the 2030 Agenda for how to promote national policies and multinational
Sustainable Development. Evidence-informed cooperation to support the global expansion of safe,
policies and the implementation of cost-effective secure, strictly regulated and economically viable
measures to accelerate the transitions toward nuclear energy. Doing so is particularly important
energy systems characterized by net-zero GHG in newcomer countries, where much of the nuclear
emissions are urgently needed2 (IEA 2021a). energy expansion is likely to take place.
The importance of assessing all low-emission
technologies and pathways as a part of the global All low-emission energy technologies and pathways
response portfolio cannot be overstated. Excluding must be assessed as part of any net-zero GHG
any technology restricts flexibility and increases total global strategy. For a level playing field, the criteria for
costs (Pierpont et al. 2017; Williams 2019; Mansouri choosing the most appropriate electricity production
et al. 2020). technologies are as follows:

The nuclear energy chain is a highly reliable baseload 1. Generating capacity that can be implemented on
electricity supplier with a proven track record and the required time scales
extremely low GHG emissions per unit of electricity
2. Grid compatibility of the generation system
generated (ONE 2020). Nevertheless, although
nuclear power is clearly favorable from a climate
3. Safety of plants and associated support systems
perspective, as explained below, it continues to face
challenges. These challenges involve sociopolitical,
4. Risks to human health
economic and strategic issues that are often
dominated by public perceptions. The public’s notable 5. Environmental aspects, including emissions, land
concerns are safety, security (including cybersecurity use, water use and waste management issues
and terrorist activities) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
disposal. 6. Economics on a full lifecycle basis

To address these concerns, it is necessary to raise 7. Resilience against major natural and anthropogenic
public awareness of the safety record of current hazards, including cybersecurity risks
nuclear power plants (NPPs). The advanced statuses
of various disposal approaches and projects 8. Sustainability of the energy resource
underway for SNF must also be communicated.
Information regarding the additional safety, security
and SNF management benefits offered by the
newest generation of nuclear power designs should

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 5

Challenges in Moving to Net-Zero GHG Emissions

Overall, nuclear power compares very well with nuclear energy can play an important role in
alternative low-emission technologies on all of post-COVID-19 recovery efforts. It can help to
these criteria, as the following sections illustrate. achieve long-term energy security, ensure the
Furthermore, the relevance of nuclear power has stability of electricity in uncertain times, create
been heightened by the recent outbreak and spread high-value jobs and deliver economic growth.
of COVID-19, which has impacted societies and Nuclear energy can help in “building a stronger
economies worldwide. Over the coming years, and cleaner tomorrow” (IEA 2020b, 2020c;
WNA 2020a, 2021a).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

6
Status of and Prospects for
Nuclear Energy
Global Status Most NPPs in OECD countries that traditionally
use nuclear power are aging and, absent license
At the end of 2020, 33 countries operated one or extensions, will soon face retirement. Today,
more NPPs. Two countries, Belarus and the United almost 70% of nuclear power reactors are over 30
Arab Emirates (UAE), connected their first NPPs years old, and new builds are being constructed
to their national grids in that year. During 2020, the outside the OECD. Since 2000, 96 of the 124 NPP
combined 393 gigawatt-electrical (GWe) contributed construction starts occurred in Asia (IAEA 2021b).
10.2% or 2,553 terawatthours (TWh) of the global
electricity supply and provided 28% of the world’s Table B1 in Appendix B summarizes the global
low-carbon electricity (IAEA 2020, 2021a, 2021b). status of nuclear power reactors in operation and
under construction by country at the end of 2020.
The global market share of 10.2% is low Of the 33 countries operating NPPs, 18 are actively
relative to the peak share of close to 18% in the constructing additional NPPs. This construction
mid-1990s.3 However, some countries rely much amounts to 52 reactors with a combined generating
more heavily on nuclear technology than others do. capacity of 55.3 GWe. Two newcomer countries
In one-third of the countries currently operating (Bangladesh and Turkey) are building their first
NPPs, nuclear electricity accounts for more than NPPs. Additionally, more than two dozen developed
30% of the national electricity mix. Furthermore, in and developing countries are considering, planning
all cases, NPPs provide more than just electricity. or actively working to include nuclear energy in their
For example, they are important for delivering energy mix.
auxiliary services ranging from frequency control to
grid stability.4 The latter service derives from a key Without recognition of the GHG benefits of nuclear
feature of nuclear technology. Nuclear power has energy in international climate debates, coupled
predominantly been a baseload electricity generator with dedicated domestic government policy
with nearly constant availability and scheduled support, nuclear energy is unlikely to return to
refueling and maintenance downtimes. In 2020, an expansionist path in industrialized countries,
the average availability of all NPPs worldwide was even in a climate-constrained world. Several
76.6%. This high availability enabled only 5% of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and national
the generating capacity share to produce 10.2% of institutions routinely issue warnings about the
global electricity. consequences of ignoring nuclear technology. They
bolster their cases by publishing pathways to carbon
neutrality, often showing the reductions of GHG
emissions (and associated mitigation costs) with and
without the expansion of nuclear energy (EC 2018;
IEA 2019b; NG-ESO 2019; MEAE 2020; U.N. 2020;
UNECE 2020)

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 7

Status of and Prospects for Nuclear Energy

Figure 1. Global carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation: estimated emissions avoided by low-carbon
technologies (upper panel) and the share of low-carbon electricity (lower panel), 1971–2019.

Nuclear
Hydro
Biofuels and waste
Solar
Wind
15% Other renewables Actual
emissions
10%
avoided emissions (Gt CO2)
Power sector, actual and

5%
Cumulative
avoided
0% Avoided
emissions
emissions by
1971 - 2019
-5% technology

-10% Nuclear
76 Gt CO2
100%
carbon electricity

75% Hydro
Share of low

101 Gt CO2
50%

25% All others

17 Gt CO2
0%

Source: Adapted from IAEA (2020).

Since 1970, hydroelectricity and nuclear power Nuclear power is second only to hydropower,
have provided the vast majority of low-carbon with cumulative emissions of 101 Gt of carbon
electricity globally (Figure 1). Starting essentially dioxide avoided. All other low-carbon-emitting,
from 0% in 1970, nuclear power grew to contribute non-hydropower renewables began to make
close to 50% of such electricity in the 1990s. noticeable contributions from around 1990.
Hypothetically, in the absence of nuclear energy, Since 2000, wind and solar power have been the
all non-nuclear fuels used for electricity generation fastest growing low-carbon electricity generators.
in a given year would increase proportionally to Their growth rates are comparable to that of
cover the nuclear share. Based on this assumption, nuclear power over the period from 1970 to 1990
nuclear power is estimated to have avoided a total (IAEA 2020). As of 2019, other renewables are
of 76 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon dioxide to date. estimated to have historically avoided 17 Gt of
carbon dioxide.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

8
 Status of and Prospects for Nuclear Energy

Global Prospects were not previously built within a country can take
up to 10 years or more. Altogether, it takes 10 to 15
A special report of the Intergovernmental Panel years from deciding to add an NPP to the generating
on Climate Change (IPCC) (2018) presents 89 mix to supplying electricity to the grid.
pathways to a stable global average temperature
More importantly, a new project can only succeed
increase of less than 1.5 °C. All of these pathways
in a stable and conducive political climate. A
show that renewables generate the bulk of electricity
nuclear energy program is a century-long national
by 2050. Most IPCC scenarios also show increasing
commitment and calls for a stable sociopolitical
shares of nuclear energy and fossil fuels with carbon
climate that supports the projects. In short, nuclear
capture and storage (CCS). Across the 89 pathways
power takes time to plan and implement and, thus, is
by 2050, the median expansion of nuclear electricity
not a quick-fix solution.
is from 392 GWe to 800 GWe. If nuclear power
were replaced exclusively by state-of-the-art coal
The IAEA (2021a) issues annual global nuclear
generation (i.e., without CCS), annual carbon dioxide
power projections. The International Energy
equivalent emissions would increase by 5.0 Gt to
Agency’s (IEA’s) (2020d) World Energy Outlook,
5.4 Gt by 2050. If nuclear power were replaced by
the World Energy Council (2019) and the World
natural gas, carbon dioxide equivalent emissions
Nuclear Association (2019a) all routinely publish
would increase by 2.8 Gt to 3.3 Gt.
nuclear energy projections. In a climate-constrained
future, IGOs project the global nuclear generation
Notably, the 1.5 °C target depends on the
capacity to range between 708 GWe and 715 GWe
large-scale utilization of carbon dioxide removal
by 2050. Most industry associations project this
(CDR) technologies (IPCC 2018). Currently, CDR
capacity to range between 844 GWe and 1,000
technologies are unproven beyond experimental
GWe. By these projections, the market share of
scales. Nevertheless, these pathways require CDR
nuclear electricity generation will be 11% to 13%. In
removal at rates of 2 Gt per year or more. Expanding
its ‘Harmony’ project, the WNA (2019a) proposes a
proven nuclear energy can provide the same carbon
more ambitious target of 25% by 2050 at the latest.
dioxide reductions as CDR in case its technical
implementation is less successful than projected or
A key parameter underlying these projections is
if its costs are too high.
the ramp-up rate and eventual steady-state level of
global manufacturing of major NPP components.
A difficulty in expanding nuclear energy is that
Since the turn of the millennium, NPP construction
building new NPPs is a lengthy process involving
starts have resulted in an annual average demand
numerous, often sequential steps. These steps
for components required for generation of 5,500
range from selecting a design to choosing the site
MWe of electricity, with a peak of 15,800 MWe
where the plant will be built. The design and site
in 2010. The historical peak in construction
must meet regulatory requirements before ground
starts is much higher, reaching 41,600 MWe in
is even broken. Plant construction then takes five
1976. However, only about 75% of these plants
to seven years (for current commercially available
were eventually completed, sometimes years
reactor sizes of 1,000-1,600 megawatt-electric
or even decades later, for reasons unrelated to
[MWe]) before grid connection (IAEA 2021b).
manufacturing capacity.
First-of-a-kind (FOAK) designs and designs that

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 9

Status of and Prospects for Nuclear Energy

Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) production, for electricity. By comparison, NPPs with a combined
example, is a highly specialized process. The capacity of merely 396 GWe generated 2,657 TWh
current global number of very heavy forging presses of dispatchable electricity in 2019.
dedicated to making RPVs reflects current demand
expectations. However, the enormous investments In recent years, electricity market reforms
in capacity expansion made 10 years ago when implemented to advance the ‘energy transition’ have
a nuclear renaissance was hoped for can be greatly accelerated the expansion of renewable
reactivated with firm orders. The manufacturing capacity and generation. Intended policy outcomes
capacity for smaller RPVs and related equipment have been technology learning and cost buy
will not constrain an accelerated global nuclear down of wind and solar electricity. These reforms
expansion, especially if demand shifts toward SMR and policies negatively impacted the economics
designs. of nuclear power by reducing load factors and
revenues (IAEA 2016c; NEA 2018).
An energy system that limits global warming to
below 2 oC above pre-industrial levels requires Fast technology learning, cost buy down and
900 GWe to 1,000 GWe of new nuclear generation dissemination are all more effective on MWe scales
capacity to be grid-connected between 2020 and than on GWe scales, further enabling the expansion
2050. This capacity includes between 190 GWe of renewables. For nuclear technology, the learning
to 290 GWe to replace retired NPPs (IEA 2020; and cost buy down arguments should support the
UNECE 2020). Annual global grid connections of 10 commercialization and market penetration of SMRs,
GWe starting in 2021 will have to be ramped up to as we discuss in Section 7. The IEA concludes
35 GWe by 2030. This annual level will need to be that “ever‐cheaper renewable energy technologies
maintained on average until 2050. give electricity the edge in the race to zero.” It also
states that “hydropower and nuclear, the two largest
Capacity increases of 35 GWe per annum require sources of low‐carbon electricity today, provide an
policy support and a level playing field. Similar essential foundation for transitions” (IEA 2021, 14).
support and subsidies have been instrumental
in firmly establishing wind and solar energy in While electricity market reforms and policy have
selected markets and countries. Future scenarios supported the expansion of renewable generation
of nuclear energy growth pale when compared with in national grids, they negatively impacted the
the expansions of wind and solar energy. In 2019, economics of nuclear generation by reducing
wind and solar capacities grew by 59 GWe and load factors and, consequently, revenues (IAEA
98 GWe, respectively. Their total global capacities 2016; NEA 2018). However, during the initial
reached 623 GWe and 586 GWe, respectively COVID-19 lockdowns, global energy demand
(IRENA 2020). Renewables (including hydropower, dropped significantly, and electricity generation,
biomass, etc.) accounted for 72% of global capacity especially from fossil fuels, was disrupted. This
growth in 2019. In 2030, wind and solar power change was due to the relatively high operating
combined are expected to provide 4,300 GWe costs of fossil fuels compared with nuclear power
of capacity and generate 8,120 TWh of variable and renewables. It was also driven by the standard

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

10
 Status of and Prospects for Nuclear Energy

pricing mechanism in electricity markets. Cleaner So far, NPP operations have shown resilience to
generation prevailed, especially in countries with the COVID-19 pandemic. There have been no
obligations to transmission system operators to shutdowns owing to disruptions to the nuclear
schedule and dispatch renewables ahead of other workforce or supply chains (Chatzis 2020; Watson
generators. The share of nuclear energy and and Pyy 2021). The IAEA quickly launched the
renewables in the energy mix increased as a result. COVID-19 NPP OPEX Network to cope with the
For example, nuclear energy’s share in South Korea pandemic. The agency continued its safeguarding
rose by nine percentage points during the pandemic activities by chartering its own plane due to the
(Magné, Turton, and Paillere 2020). unavailability of commercial flights.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

11
Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the
Energy Mix
Grid Compatibility and can be handled, problems with daily fluctuations
Stability are not yet totally solved. Furthermore, no current
solutions for seasonal mismatches exist. Thus, more
New renewables (i.e., solar and wind) cannot research is needed (McCamey 2021).
continuously provide 100% power to a national
grid at a reasonable cost, even if production costs The variable nature of wind and solar power
are low. Electricity production from these sources will necessitate a complementary dispatchable
is highly variable across days and weeks and electricity supply through the second half of this
between summer and winter. Renewables cannot century or later.6 In countries with adequate grid
supply reliable baseload power, and the cost of capacity, nuclear power is the most suitable
electricity storage to maintain the baseload remains candidate for reducing GHG emissions and
prohibitive. The key issues are the daily, weekly achieving baseload carbon neutrality by around
and seasonal structures of electricity demand and 2050. Nuclear power holds a key advantage over
the nature of renewable resources. Resources like coal and natural gas, its traditional competitors
solar and wind power are highly dependent on in the electricity market. Reducing carbon
variable amounts of daylight, wind and clouds. For emissions requires coal or gas to be equipped
an introduction to the debate on this issue, see, for with CCS, thereby increasing costs. The cost of
example, Heard et al. (2017), Brown et al. (2018) and CCS is typically estimated to be about $30 per
Barclays (2021). megawatthour (MWh), enough to increase the
generating costs of many coal plants by 50%.
As an example, in Germany, storage capacity of Furthermore, nuclear power produces fewer
about 1,000 gigawatthours (GWh) would be needed emissions per MWh than CCS can provide. Whether
to balance out weekly variations in wind and solar the various obstacles to CCS can be overcome
generation. In Switzerland, the large imbalance remains uncertain based on the limited experience
between summer and winter would necessitate of commercial carbon-capture coal plants over the
seasonal storage of about 3,000 GWh (Aegerter last two decades.
2017). By comparison, the huge lithium-ion battery
storage system installed by Tesla in South Australia Many NPPs, especially some advanced designs,
has a capacity of only 0.2 GWh. The largest pumped offer economic electricity that can be dispatched
storage facility in the world, located in Virginia in the according to grid requirements. Advanced NPPs can
United States (U.S.), has a capacity of 24 GWh. be designed to vary over relatively short intervals
to complement the baseload capabilities of large
A team from the U.S. Department of Energy’s NPPs. Hence, wind, solar power, hydropower and
National Renewable Energy Laboratory and its NPPs collectively can provide all of the necessary
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy electricity in a carbon-neutral energy system. Such
has commented on this issue. Specifically, the team systems are fully feasible for both advanced national
recently addressed the challenges of aiming for grids and smaller or weaker grids. However, the
100% renewable electricity in the U.S. (Denholm et mix of generation technologies in a given system
al. 2021). It concluded that the difficulties and costs will depend on local conditions. For example, a grid
associated with renewables rise steeply as their with significant contributions from wind and solar
penetration increases. Although short-term variability power may require substantial baseload capacity.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

12
 Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

However, that baseload may be needed most but not More importantly, nuclear energy can provide
all of the time. In that case, modern load-following several energy services beyond electricity. These
(dispatchable) NPPs are an ideal fit. However, if the services include district heat, industrial process
grid needs only modest and infrequent increments heat, chemical fuel production (especially hydrogen)
supplementing wind and solar generation, then and desalination services. These services can
modern load-following nuclear designs may be a displace carbon-emitting processes that are largely
poor fit. Such designs are capital-intensive with only outside of the electricity system. Thus, they can
modest operating costs. support the complete transformation of the energy
economy required to meet the Paris targets. The
Existing large NPPs have proven to be fully inherent flexibility and adaptability of new NPP
grid-compatible for baseload electricity in advanced designs, especially SMRs, will allow nuclear energy
countries with large national electricity grids. For to facilitate the transition to net-zero energy systems
smaller grids, however, adding 1,000 megawatts of (NREL 2020).
capacity from a conventional NPP is not sensible
and may present a major reliability issue. This
rationale partially explains why about 50 engineering
development projects are underway worldwide to
develop smaller nuclear power units (i.e., SMRs).
These reactors can be integrated into both small and
large grids much more easily (see Section 7).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 13

Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Environmental, Resource and kWh of electricity, respectively. The ranges around

Health Aspects the median values can vary considerably depending
on the technology vintage, performance and
GHG Emissions local conditions. Figure 2 shows this relationship
graphically, including emission ranges per
Nuclear power and renewables result in much technology.
lower GHG emissions than fossil fuels. The IPCC’s Many studies have recommended the expansion of
5th Assessment Report (IPCC 2014) cites carbon nuclear power as a key approach to reducing carbon
dioxide emission data confirming that nuclear energy dioxide emissions (MIT 2018; IAEA 2019; IEA 2019b,
is among the lowest carbon generators. Together 2020a; MEAE 2020; PMQ 2020). Meeting net-zero
with wind turbines, nuclear energy produces 12 targets by 2050 with only renewables is not feasible.
grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatthour (kWh) of Consequently, the only way to meet carbon dioxide
electricity. This value is the median of emissions emissions targets while maintaining energy security
reported in the literature. Hydropower has lifecycle is through the increased use of nuclear energy for
emissions of 24 grams of carbon dioxide per kWh. electricity (Thought Collective 2020). Most recently,
Solar technologies have lifecycle emissions of 27 the United Kingdom (U.K.) Committee on Climate
grams to 48 grams of carbon dioxide per kWh. Change recommended significant decarbonization
For comparison, median emissions for coal-fired of the U.K.’s energy sector to achieve net-zero
electricity and natural gas are 820 grams and 490 emissions by 2050. The committee projected that
grams of carbon dioxide per kWh of electricity, new nuclear power will play a key role in supporting
respectively. The corresponding values with CCS deep decarbonization while maintaining energy
are 200 grams and 170 grams of carbon dioxide per supply and security (NIRAB 2020).

Figure 2. Comparison of direct GHG emissions and full lifecycle emissions of different energy technologies.
2,200 grams carbon dioxide equivalent / kWh

1,000
GHG emissions (grams carbon dioxide equivalent/kWh)

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Coal PC Gas CCGT Biomass* Geothermal Hydropower Nuclear CSP PV rooftop PV utllity Wind on Wind off Coal CCS Gas CCS

Lifecycle GHG emissions Direct (smokestack) emissions Median

*Biomass CO2 emissions from combustion are assumed to be absorbed again when biomass regrows again.
The global median GHG emissions from hydropower are 24 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh.
Hydropower reservoirs can release up to 2,200 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh owing to the
decoposition of flooded organic material.

Source: Adapted from Table 2.7 in IPCC (2018).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

14
 Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Health Effects with significant environmental and public health

concerns. These issues include acid, mercury and
All energy technologies produce air pollutants at nitrogen deposition, global warming, ground-level
some point in their lifecycles. These pollutants ozone, regional haze and fine particle air pollution.
include particulates, nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide The latter can lead to asthma and other respiratory
and volatile organic compounds. Nuclear and fossil illnesses. The European Environment Agency
fuels also result in some radioactive releases. At the attributed about 400,000 premature deaths in 2018
local and regional levels, air quality can be severely to ambient air pollution in the European Union (EU)
affected by carbon monoxide, particulate matter, (EEA 2019, 2020). About 5% of them, or 20,000
sulfur and nitrogen oxides (EEA 2020). Numerous premature deaths, resulted from coal-sourced
studies investigate the lifecycle emissions of sulfur electricity generation (HEAL 2013).
dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter per
GWh of electricity generated. The emissions from Nuclear, wind and small hydropower plants offer
fossil fuels and biomass are far greater than those the lowest health risks per unit of electricity
from nuclear power and renewables (Perera 2018; output (Figure 3). Two major nuclear accidents,
EIA 2019; Bielecki et al. 2020). Chernobyl and Fukushima, produced widespread
contamination, economic damage worth hundreds
In 2018, the 100 largest U.S. electricity producers of billions of U.S. dollars and health impacts.
emitted about 1.02 million tonnes of sulfur dioxide However, very few direct fatalities were caused
and 0.83 million tonnes of nitrogen oxides from by the release of radiation from Chernobyl (WHO
fossil fuel combustion. They also emitted 3.40 2006). No direct fatalities from radiation resulted
tonnes of mercury and 1.60 billion tonnes of from Fukushima (IAEA 2011; UNSCEAR 2014).7 The
carbon dioxide (van Atten et al. 2020). At sufficient Fukushima accident did lead to some fatalities due
concentrations, these pollutants are associated to evacuation and relocation (Tanigawa et al. 2012).

Figure 3. Numbers of fatalities due to electricity generation, including accidents and air pollution.

25
24.6

20 18.4
Fatalities per TWa

15

10

5 4.6
2.8

0 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01

Coal Oil Biomass Natural gas Wind Hydro Solar Nuclear

Source: Adapted from Markandya et al. (2010), Sovacool et al. (2016) and WNA (2021b).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 15

Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Economic Aspects However, the LCOE is not the only determining

factor of the economic viability of an energy source.
Levelized Cost of Electricity Two generating options with identical LCOEs can
Generation have fundamentally different operational implications
and economic and financial risks. The LCOE
NPPs are expensive to build and difficult to finance for nuclear energy considers the high upfront
but inexpensive to operate. In many countries, the investment and interest costs during the long lead
projected levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) from time before a new NPP earns revenue. It also
nuclear energy is often lower than that from fossil accounts for the decades during which the plant will
fuels. This relationship especially holds if carbon produce electricity at predictable and stable costs.
dioxide mitigation costs are considered (Squassoni In contrast, the LCOE of a wind generator does
2009; WNA 2017; OECD 2020). NPPs can also not include the uncertainties and costs imposed on
be competitive with many renewable energy the electricity system by its intermittency. However,
technologies on a continuously dispatchable basis these factors are hidden within the LCOE. Thus,
(Figure 4). comparing the LCOE of a wind generator with that
of another technology must be done with caution.
In any transition to a carbon-neutral future, nuclear
energy’s mitigation potential in terms of the costs
of carbon dioxide emissions avoided is among the
largest of all potential electricity generating options.

Figure 4. Levelized cost of electricity (2018 dollars per MWh).

250
LCOE [$2018/MWh]

200

150

100

50

0
Solar PV (utility(scale)

Solar PV (commercial)

Solar PV (residential)

Solar thermal (CSP)

Lignite

Coal
Gas (CCGT)

Lignite (CCUS)

Coal (CCUS)

Gas (CCGT,CCUS)

Nuclear

Nuclear (LTO)

Onshore wind (>= 1 MW)

Offshore Wind

Hydro (reservoir >= 5 MW)

Hydro (run of river >= 5 MW)

Geothermal

Biomass

Fossil fuel technologies Non-fossil fuel technologies

CCGT (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine); CCUS (Carbon Capture,Utilization and Storage); LTO (Long-term Operation);
PV (Photovoltaic); CSP(Concentrated Solar Power)

Notes: Values are based on a 7% discount rate and a $30 per tonne carbon dioxide tax. Decommissioning and SNF costs are included. The box
plots indicate the maximum, median and minimum values. The boxes indicate the central 50% of values, that is, the second and third quartiles.

Source: Adapted from OECD (2020).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

16
 Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Assessing Financial Risks lowest-cost supply-side GHG mitigation options

available. However, doing so requires governments
High capital requirements and long amortization to make the climate benefits of nuclear energy
periods are often viewed by private sector entities visible to investors by monetizing avoided
as being too risky. These aspects of NPPs pose emissions. Governments must create level playing
problems in securing necessary financing. The fields in markets dominated by inexpensive natural
French-designed European pressurized water gas and subsidized renewables. Over the past 50
reactors (EPRs) in Olkiluoto, Finland, and Flamanville, years, the use of nuclear power has avoided 76
France, serve as an example of this issue. They Gt of carbon dioxide emissions (Figure 1). If the
are reported to be up to 4.5 times more costly and lifetimes of existing NPPs are not extended, an
will take over 3.5 times longer to complete than additional 4 Gt of carbon dioxide emissions may
originally estimated (NEA 2020). Irrespective of the result. Many reactors worldwide have received or
market structure, liberalized or regulated, and the are applying for license extensions to operate for
role of the government, such cost overruns and 60 years, or even 80 years in the U.S.
delays do not make a business case for nuclear
power. Clearly, private sector market entities are Interest and inflation add to the already high
unlikely to sponsor nuclear projects based only on overnight capital (OC) cost per installed
short-term market signals. Instead, they also expect kilowatt-electric (kWe) for NPPs. Construction
long-term stable returns and determined government costs are therefore highly sensitive to interest
policy support beyond the vagaries of the market. rates. Failure to complete a plant on time and on
Government policy support can reduce the economic budget is the single highest risk factor for investors.
risk of nuclear power (see also Section 9.1.1). Market Uncertainties concerning regulation, policy and
structures and policy support largely define the markets also adversely affect the economics of
economic risk exposure of nuclear projects and are NPPs. The vagaries of monetizing the climate and
essential components of nuclear financing costs. energy security benefits of nuclear energy in terms
of dollars per MWh also create uncertainty.
FOAK designs often encounter construction delays
and cost overruns that are usually overcome in Capital costs make up 60% to 70% of total nuclear
subsequent builds. Overall, with the increased generating costs. Uranium fuel accounts for 5%
commercialization of new-generation NPPs, to 7% of costs. Other costs include front-end fuel
technology learning and regulatory experience, costs cycle costs (i.e., enrichment and fuel fabrication
are expected to fall (see Section 7, Figure 6). Some costs), and NPP operation and maintenance
national governments are providing direct or indirect (O&M) costs. Finally, some costs are associated
financing support owing to the climate benefits, with the back end of the fuel cycle (i.e., SNF
reliability and dispatchability of nuclear electricity. management, high-level waste [HLW] disposal and
For example, governments are introducing investor plant decommissioning). Unit size affects finance
risk-reduction measures, such as regulated asset and, thus, economics and risks, which is a major
base funding, contracts for difference and capacity advantage of SMRs. A recent study (Ingersoll et
markets. Even more can be done. al. 2020) suggests that advanced reactors with
capital costs below $3,000 per kilowatt (kW) will
License extensions of existing NPPs in full be attractive investments. Such reactors will create
compliance with all safety regulations is one of the the highest value for plant owners.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 17

Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Internalization of External Costs renewable chains (EC 2003; NRC 2010; Markandya,
Bigano, and Porchia 2010; Ricci 2010; IPCC 2014). If
The economic ranking of different electricity externalities are monetized and added to the private
generation options can change when externalities cost of electricity generation without technology
along each technology’s full energy chain are discrimination, nuclear energy may be competitive,
monetized and included. Externalities refers to depending on local conditions.
situations when the effect of the production or
consumption of goods and services imposes Subsidies and taxes are public policy instruments
costs or benefits on others not directly involved in designed to influence consumer behavior and
the transaction. These costs and benefits are not investor decisions. Their intention is to tilt the playing
reflected in the prices charged for the goods and field toward measures and investments that lead to
services (OECD 2002) but are generally borne by a desired outcome. For the last decade, wind and
society at large. Externalities can be positive or solar have received sizable subsidies in various
negative. GHG emissions from electricity generation forms to incentivize and accelerate the transition
are an obvious example of a negative externality.9 toward low-GHG energy systems. Although
Without internalizing the externalities in the price subsidies with sunset clauses are widely used,
of electricity, neither producers nor electricity they distort the market. Thus, they can become
customers pay for the health damages, the costs counterproductive when they crowd out other
of environment degradation or adaptations to the low-GHG emitting technologies (e.g., nuclear energy
impacts of climate changes. “Externalities are and end-use efficiency).
among the main reasons governments intervene
Subsidies and taxes favoring renewables can
in the economic sphere” (Helbig 2020). The Paris
also generate externalities (e.g., intermittent
Agreement is a case in point.
renewables without a continuous supply
Internalizing external costs into the market price responsibility, which creates a burden on the rest
of electricity would result in higher prices for of the electricity system). System costs rise quickly
all technologies, reflecting the magnitude of as the penetration of variable renewable energy
their respective externalities. Thus, internalizing (VRE) in the generating mix increases (NEA
externalities may change the merit order of 2018). While uncertainties are considerable, most
dispatching priorities during grid operations and estimates recognize that the grid-level system
the ranking order of investment decisions for new costs associated with VRE integration are large
builds. It may also reduce electricity demand and and increase disproportionally with the share in
GHG emissions, subsequently further reducing electricity generated (see Appendix B, Figure B-1).
externalities.
Absent a carbon-equivalent tax on carbon dioxide
In most jurisdictions, most nuclear externalities have emissions or methane leakages, ostensibly
already been internalized, usually through enforced inexpensive natural gas for electricity generation
regulations. The consequences of severe nuclear creates another market distorting externality. The
accidents are only partially internalized. Still, the other mechanisms that have been employed to
negative externalities of nuclear energy chains are reduce carbon dioxide emissions have not achieved
among the lowest and are comparable to the best large reductions in many countries. Instead, they

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

18
 Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

have distorted the electricity sector in ways that do The Cour des Comptes is the court in charge of
not produce lower carbon dioxide emissions and, in auditing public administration and some private
some instances, increase them (Cunningham et al. companies in France. To emphasize the importance
2018; Nordhaus 2021). of financing, it requires Électricité de France to
ensure the financing and profitability of its proposed
Cost Reductions Ahead EPR2 reactors before starting construction (Cour
des Comptes 2020; WNN 2020b). These reactors
A recent report by the Nuclear Energy Agency are a simplified version of EPR reactors.
(NEA) (2020) assesses opportunities to reduce
the construction costs of NPPs. The report states Resource Sustainability
that recent construction cost increases are due to
indirect costs and reflect the non-recurring costs Uranium deposits are plentiful and pose no
of deploying a new generation of reactors. In some constraint to future nuclear energy deployment.
cases, capital accounts for more than 70% of new Traces of uranium-containing minerals, such as
nuclear generating costs. The report presents ways uranium dioxide, are ubiquitous. The average
to “unlock nuclear construction cost reductions” uranium concentration in the Earth’s continental
(NEA 2020, 14), including by capitalizing on lessons crust is about 2.8 parts per million (ppm). The total
learned from Generation III construction projects. Its uranium content is 100 teratonnes (Tt), of which 25
key messages are as follows: Tt occur within 1.6 kilometers of the surface (Lewis
1972). Seawater also contains 4.5 Gt of uranium at
Prioritize design maturity and regulatory stability; a much lower concentration of 3 parts per billion
(Bunn et al. 2003).
Commit to a standardized nuclear program;
Economic and practical considerations currently
Enable and sustain supply chain development suggest that a minimum ore concentration of 100
and industrial performance; ppm is needed for mineable uranium deposits.
Given present market conditions and expected
Foster innovation, talent and collaboration at all global uranium demand, recoverable uranium
levels; resources are those with extraction costs below
$130 per kilogram (kg). In total, 6.2 megatonnes (Mt)
Support robust and predictable market and
of recoverable resources have been identified. The
financing frameworks;
amount of identified uranium with extraction costs up
to $260/kg is 8 Mt (NEA 2020b). Research in Japan
Encourage concerted stakeholder efforts and
and the U.S. indicates that the uranium dissolved in
tailor government involvement to program needs.
seawater that can be feasibly extracted (currently at
The NEA expects overnight costs to gradually $600/kg) is enough for centuries.
decrease from $5,000/kWe in 2020 to $4,000/kWe
To put these quantities into perspective, current
in 2025–2030. This decrease will result from greater
uranium prices are about $55/kg, and global annual
design maturity and lessons learned from FOAK
reactor demand is 60,000 tonnes. Moreover, there
projects (NEA 2020).
is no current market for uranium beyond nuclear
energy, and uranium accounts for just 3% to 5% of

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 19

Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

nuclear generation costs. Thus, generating costs of uranium means that there is no strong rationale
would only be marginally affected if uranium for developing an entirely new set of thorium-fueled
prices doubled or even tripled. To summarize, designs (IAEA 2005).
uranium availability per se is not constraining the
When uranium availability was considered a
expansion of nuclear energy. However, unlocking
constraint on commercial NPP expansion, an
underground resources requires timely policy
interest in breeder reactor technology also arose.
and investment decisions.
Breeder designs are based on a fast-neutron-
When commercial nuclear reactors were initially spectrum chain reaction. Thus, they can utilize
developed during the Cold War, information on the isotope U-238, which comprises over 99%
uranium resources was considered geopolitically of natural uranium ore, as fission fuel rather than
sensitive and a national security matter. Thus, the fissionable isotope U-235. Today, U-235 is
interest in thorium, a potential alternative reactor sufficiently available for fission to meet worldwide
fuel that is abundant and available globally, projections for a very long time (i.e., centuries or
began to grow. Specifically, thorium is three to longer). Fast-spectrum reactors can extend that
four times more abundant than uranium and is resource by almost two orders of magnitude (i.e.,
found in seawater, soil and rocks. Technically, a thousand years or longer). Overall, it is fair to
there is no insurmountable reason that thorium conclude that enough economically recoverable
cannot be used as a fuel for nuclear reactors. U-235 is available to fuel any feasible NPP growth
Reactors using thorium have been designed, projection for centuries or more.
analyzed and shown to be adequately safe and Finally, a section on nuclear resources would be
secure. They are not significantly different from incomplete without mentioning fusion reactors.
current uranium-based reactors in terms of their Fusion may become both technically feasible and
overall economic performance (i.e., capital costs, economically viable. However, no one knows with
operating costs, etc.). However, experience with confidence if or when that may occur. If fusion
thorium is limited to a few projects conducted reactors are ever realized, however, the amount of
many years ago and several projects still in the deuterium fuel would be sufficient to power fusion
design stage. The initial interest in using thorium reactors for millennia.
also arose because thorium-fueled reactors can
be used to make fissionable material for nuclear Other Resource Requirements
weapons. The technical issues are different,
involving uranium-233 instead of plutonium-239. Energy and electricity supply infrastructures embody
However, the vulnerability to proliferation large quantities of non-energy materials and
that cannot be detected by outsiders is not other natural resources. The material extraction,
qualitatively different. Additionally, the types of processing, manufacturing and construction of
radioactive waste from thorium reactors differ energy conversion plants and the associated
from those from uranium reactors in some ways. equipment have direct and indirect implications for
However, they are not different enough to affect GHG emissions. The overuse of land and water
the waste’s ultimate disposal. To summarize, pose serious sustainability challenges beyond
thorium-fueled reactors are technically and climate change. As with GHG emissions, the
economically feasible. However, the abundance non-energy resource intensity per unit of electricity
varies considerably across electricity chains.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

20
 Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

Materials (CSP) and 2.25 (nuclear), respectively, over their

lifetimes (Kis, Pandya, and Koppelaar 2018). For all
Different generating technologies have different non-concrete materials, NPPs fall between coal and
material requirements (other than fuels). All gas generation but are much less material-intensive
technologies use similar types of materials, but than renewables (Figure 5).
they use different quantities per unit of electricity
generated over their respective lifetimes. Wind and photovoltaic technologies are generally
Common materials include cement, iron, copper, thought to depend on abundant and easily
aluminum and silicon, all of which are not seriously accessible bulk materials, such as iron, steel,
constrained. silicon and so forth. However, solar power also uses
sizable amounts of rare-earth elements (REEs).
Per MWe capacity, hydro power, onshore wind, These chemical elements include yttrium and the
concentrated solar power (CSP) and nuclear power 15 lanthanide elements. Although the term ‘REEs’
generally have the highest total material intensities, suggests that these elements are rare, they are
with concrete being the dominant component. The relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust. REEs fall
intensities are site dependent (geology, geography) into the 50th percentile of elemental abundances,
and can vary considerably for different locations. and the least abundant REEs are almost 200 times
Material use per TWh generated is a function of a more abundant than gold (King 2020). The term
technology’s aggregate utilization over its lifetime. ‘rare’ refers to their low concentrations, meaning that
Typical intensities in terms of tonnes per TWh finding deposits with sufficiently high concentrations
generated are 15.80 (hydro power), 9.98 (wind), 8.67 for economic extraction is difficult.

Figure 5. Material intensities of different electricity-generating technologies.10

4.5

4.0
Tonnes of material per TWh generated

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
Coal Coal-lGCC GT-peak CCGT-lf CCGT-bl Lignite Nuclear Fuel oil Wind-on Wind-off PV-PC CSP

Steel Copper Aluminium Glass Silicon Other

IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle); GT-peak (Single Cycle Natural Gas Peaker); CCGT-if
(Load-following Natural Gas Combined Cycle Turbine); ccgt-bi(Baseload Natural Gas Combined Cycle
Turbine); PV-PC(Photovoltaic Polycrystalline); CSP (Concentrated Solar Power).

Source: Adapted from Kis et al. (2018).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 21

Why Nuclear Energy is Essential in the Energy Mix

The necessary REE materials create the principal Water Use

material concerns with wind and solar energy
technologies. Wind turbines and solar panels Water usage by power plants is second only to that
currently depend on neodymium, dysprosium, required for agriculture. However, most of the water
terbium, europium and yttrium. Shortages in the used for cooling plants is returned to rivers or seas.
short-to-medium term have been identified and are NPPs consume about 2,000 to 3,000 liters of water
likely to impact these materials’ availability and cost per MWh over their lifecycle, with coal plants having
(IEA 2021b). similar or somewhat lower consumption rates.
Photovoltaic energy requires about six times less
As of 2017, known world reserves of REEs water than nuclear and coal. However, concentrated
amounted to about 120 Mt. This quantity represents solar power uses about 4,000 liters of water per
a reserve-to-production rate of 900 years with MWh. Wind power has negligible water consumption
current annual production of 130,000 tonnes11 (King (McCombie and Jefferson 2016).
2020), assuming no new reserves are discovered.
Historically, however, the demand for REEs has Land Use
risen at a rate of about 10% per year. If demand
continues to grow at this rate and no produced The estimated land requirements to operate power
REEs are recycled, known world reserves will plants have been compared across energy types
be exhausted sometime after the middle of the (McCombie and Jefferson 2016). For nuclear power,
twenty-first century (King 2020). However, the the land requirement is only 0.6 square meters (m2)
current reserves do not necessarily indicate the per GWh. The estimates for hydropower and large
supply of these materials yet to be discovered and solar power are 49 m2/GWh and 1,275 m2/GWh,
exploited if the economics make pursuing them respectively. However, solar panels on buildings
worthwhile. require no additional land. The area needed for a
wind farm is about 300 to 500 times that needed
Whereas there exists no commercial demand for for an NPP. A more recent detailed analysis by
uranium outside nuclear energy, numerous other Cheng and Hammond (2017) estimates that nuclear
technologies and products compete for REE power requires 0.3 m2/GWh of land and that coal’s
materials. These technologies include batteries, requirement is 10 times greater. They estimate land
catalysts, electronic devices, electric vehicles, requirements of 44 m2/GWh, 20 m2/GWh and 470
magnets and LEDs. Demand from these sources m2/GWh for on-shore wind, photovoltaic power and
also continues to increase. Substitutes for REEs biomass, respectively.
exist, but they are either more costly or do not
enhance the efficiency of the devices in which they
are used (Graedel et al. 2015; Pavel et al. 2016).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

22
Growth of Nuclear Power
Initial public opposition to nuclear power in the Low oil and gas prices prior to the first oil supply
1960s and 1970s was primarily due to its perceived crisis in 1973 also worked against replacing oil
connection to nuclear weapons. An increased and natural gas for electricity generation.12 More
understanding of the actual connection (i.e., the recently, hydraulic fracturing has significantly
material concentration and the difficulties of using reduced the cost of producing natural gas and
civilian material for weapons) has modified this has vastly increased the quantity of economically
opinion. The evidence that this opinion has changed recoverable gas reserves. Although hydraulic
is that nuclear power has become accepted in many fracturing is mostly only carried out in North
countries. Countries that have decided to cease or America, the international natural gas market has
reduce their nuclear capacity (e.g., Germany and become much more liquid. Liquefied natural gas
France) have not done so based on non-proliferation exports from several suppliers, including the U.S.,
arguments. Africa, Australia and the traditional Middle East
suppliers have increased. Furthermore, new natural
Moreover, the initial performance of many NPPs gas pipelines are expanding the supplies to Europe
was poor; that is, they had relatively low availability and Asia. Consequently, natural gas is becoming a
(e.g., a median of 66% availability in the 1970s). This greater component of electricity generation in many
poor performance contributed to some of the early countries.
opposition. NPP performance has greatly improved;
the median availability is now over 83%, and the Natural gas complements intermittent renewables,
top quartile is almost 91% (IAEA 2021b). Opposition as natural gas plants have fast ramp-up rates and
was also driven by an initial reluctance to engage low capital costs. Natural gas power also meets
the public in the technological aspects of nuclear the increasing need for load-following capabilities
energy. This reluctance was exacerbated by the caused by higher shares of intermittent renewables.
classification of nuclear weapons work. These developments have increased competition
and have slowed down plans to build new NPPs.
Initially, it was also broadly believed that fast-breeder Because natural gas is a fossil fuel, however, it
reactors would become necessary because of requires commercially viable CCS to contribute to
a perceived long-term shortage of uranium ore. climate neutrality. Furthermore, methane leakages
These reactors use a complicated process in along the gas supply chain must be addressed,
which nuclear fuel is reprocessed chemically. The as methane has a much higher climate effect per
plutonium in the reprocessed material can be used molecule than carbon dioxide.13
to make nuclear weapons. Now, however, it is clear
that enough uranium ore exists to power nuclear Overall, the largest obstacle to NPP construction is
reactors for centuries. Hence, breeder reactors are the high costs and construction overruns associated
not urgently needed. However, they have several with the newest reactor designs. Some of the delays
technically attractive features, including excellent can be attributed to increased regulatory oversight
safety performances (Gen IV 2015) and the ability and rules, particularly around safety (Iurshina et
to consume much of the actinides in nuclear waste. al. 2019; Eash-Gates et al. 2020). However, poor
Thus, they may still be an important component of vendor performance and underestimates of the
the ultimate NPP mix depending on how technical challenges of building NPPs in different national
developments play out. environments are major factors in these delays. As

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 23

Growth of Nuclear Power

discussed previously, examples of overruns include Safety of Operating Nuclear

the Finnish Olkiluoto reactor, whose costs have Power Plants
grown to more than three times the initial estimate.
The time to finish construction has tripled from five The riskiness of an event is quantified by assessing
to 17 years. The French Flamanville reactor currently its probability and its consequences. For NPPs,
has a cost overrun of 4.5 and a completion delay of the risks are very low but not zero. However, the
11 years (NEA 2020; WNN 2021). public is justifiably concerned about the potential
consequences of a nuclear accident independent of
Finally, another obstacle is the broad public its probability. In addition, people are often unable to
perception that there is no viable technical solution fully grasp the meanings of the very low probabilities
for radioactive waste disposal. This perception of rare accidents of all kinds, including nuclear
arises because there are no geological disposal accidents.14 The probability of a nuclear accident
facilities (GDFs). The lack of GDFs does not imply is estimated to be in the range of one in 10,000 or
that they are technically not feasible, however. lower per year per reactor. This probability applies
Instead, most countries have underestimated the to a well-run nuclear power program using current
challenge of finding a region, state or community reactors (True and Butler 2020); the probability is
that is willing to site a repository. Some countries lower still for modern advanced designs (NEA 2016).
have not implemented GDFs because SNF and
HLW must be cooled for decades before disposal. Given the public’s focus on the potential for major
The inventory must be large enough to justify radiological consequences, it is instructive to review
repository construction and implementation, and the most important nuclear accidents to date. These
sufficient funding needs to accumulate. Funds are accidents are Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl
typically raised by charging utilities a radioactive in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Chernobyl caused
waste management fee per unit of electricity very few direct fatalities to the general public
generated. The money then remains in escrow for from radiation (WHO 2006), and none resulted
constructing and managing a GDF many decades in from Fukushima (IAEA 2011; UNSCEAR 2014).
the future. Both accidents resulted in widespread radioactive
releases of low-level radiation. Assuming that their
Countries have also tended to delay repository harmful effects have no lower limit, these accidents
decisions because they must decide whether open- can be expected to produce long-term impacts on
or closed-fuel cycles should be used. In some public health, including cancers. However, these
cases, this delay is explained by the possibility that impacts have low incidence levels that cannot be
SNF may one day be viewed as a valuable resource. directly observed given the much higher incidence
However, some of the delays may be attributed to of such illnesses arising from other causes (NRC
politicians avoiding unpopular decisions that have no 2006). Additionally, Chernobyl and Fukushima also
near-term payoff. All of these factors have delayed produced major offsite contamination of both land
the implementation of final disposal solutions for and property.
radioactive waste.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

24
 Growth of Nuclear Power

In contrast, the Three Mile Island accident led to possible. However, such accidents are much less
no onsite or offsite deaths and no important offsite likely to occur than in the past. Their consequences
contamination (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will also be more benign than they would have
1980). Reducing potential offsite contamination risks been before the adoption of major advances in
has been a major goal of reactor operators and engineering, training, regulation and other factors.
designers. This goal is a key driver of the designs of The worldwide engineering community has
the much safer advanced reactors being developed observed these trends. It is continually working not
worldwide. only to maintain the safety of the operating fleet but
also to further improve it.
The safety of nuclear power reactors has been
steadily improving for decades based on actual The new advanced reactor designs for both large
operating experience. This experience includes data and small plants will be safer still. From the start,
about off-normal operational events, equipment these designs have incorporated key insights and
failures, operator errors and recoveries (NEI 2020; improvements, whereas older reactors have needed
True and Butler 2020). Most advanced technologies, to retrofit them. In particular, new designs generally
such as commercial aircraft and complicated and feature more easily controlled safety systems.
intrusive surgeries, have also undergone safety These systems rely on computer-based information
improvements. Thus, the currently operating nuclear systems to assist the operators, analogous to similar
reactors are safer than reactors that operated years systems used in commercial aircraft. These designs
ago, and newer advanced reactor designs are even are less reliant on operator actions and generally
safer. have more passive safety features (NEA 2016).

A large accident may still occur at a nuclear power Furthermore, new SMRs should achieve even
reactor for a variety of reasons. They include better safety performance than new large-reactor
equipment failures, operator or maintenance errors, designs. They typically have less internal thermal
design flaws, construction errors and a poorly and mechanical energy to manage and have
chosen or poorly engineered site. Various underlying simpler thermalhydraulic, mechanical and electrical
governance factors, including a weak regulatory design features. These features should reduce
regime, can also cause accidents. Any accident the likelihood of an accidental radioactive release.
would involve some combination of these factors, Moreover, if an accident were to occur, the offsite
and safety engineers and regulators aim to reduce consequences would be much smaller owing to
or eliminate as many of them as possible. SMRs’ much smaller inventories of radioactive
materials (NEA 2016).
Improvements have occurred in each of these
technical areas worldwide over the last few The implementation of a nuclear power program
decades. These improvements have arisen from with a strong safety record does not just require
both advances in engineering and lessons from state-of-the-art technology. A key element of such
experience and have led to changes in designs, a program, especially in newcomer countries, is a
operations and regulations. The data from these full set of necessary governance components. A
improvements are incontrovertible (IAEA 2021b). An program must address corruption and encourage
accident with a serious radioactivity release is still no-fault reporting of problems as they arise. It

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 25

Growth of Nuclear Power

should analyze the causes and likely remedies of In 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower made the
problems and learn from others (INSAG 1991). In all famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech at the United
countries, another prerequisite is a strong national Nations. This speech encouraged widespread
regulatory agency that is authorized to implement peaceful applications of nuclear energy by
and enforce appropriate rules and regulations. proposing a ‘Grand Bargain.’ Specifically, any
country that explicitly stated that it would not pursue
Nuclear Power and the nuclear weapons was guaranteed access to the
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons technologies underlying peaceful uses. These
technologies were primarily nuclear reactors for
Soon after nuclear fission’s discovery, it was electricity and technologies supporting medical
broadly recognized that its very large energy and industrial applications and uses in research
density could be used for both peaceful purposes (Eisenhower 1953).
and for nuclear weapons. Nuclear fission’s energy
density is more than a million times that of coal. The essential features of this ‘Grand Bargain’
Immediately after World War II, significant political were embedded in the newly formed International
initiatives emerged among major global players to Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (UNTC 1957) and the
eventually promote two ideas. First, peaceful uses Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 (NPT 1968).
of nuclear fission should not be linked with weapons This treaty explicitly captured the bargain’s trade-off
applications. Second, international agreements in a binding arrangement among its signatories. It
should be adopted and enforced to ensure that also required declared nuclear weapons states to
outcome. This approach was first promoted in the work toward general and complete disarmament.
U.S. with the Acheson–Lilienthal Report (Barnard et Importantly, the NPT recognized a crucial distinction
al. 1946). This report proposed controlling nuclear between declared nuclear weapons states (i.e., the
fission worldwide to ensure that peaceful uses U.S., the FSU, the U.K., France and China) and the
were encouraged. The goal was that weapons rest of the world. Soon after the NPT’s signing, the
development would eventually be abandoned IAEA developed a broad inspection program. This
by widespread mutual agreement, including the program was meant to ensure that no NPT signatory
dismantling of existing stockpiles. besides the declared nuclear weapons states would
use elements of its peaceful program to develop
However, the former Soviet Union (FSU) did not nuclear weapons.
align its policies with those of the other major
nuclear powers, dooming the plan’s goals. An arms A weapons program may use power reactor
race, principally between the U.S. and the FSU but technology directly to make weapons material. In
soon including the U.K., France and China, resulted. practice, however, the link between nuclear power
Within a few years, several other countries began and nuclear weapons technologies does not just
nuclear weapons development programs. However, refer to such explicit linkages. Instead, less direct
most (but not all) of these programs were either linkages arise because both technologies have a
aborted or not completed. common knowledge base and common commercial
and industrial capacities. These indirect links
include the capability to enrich the fissionable
U-235 concentration in uranium and the capability

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

26
 Growth of Nuclear Power

to reprocess spent reactor fuel to extract fissionable on a nuclear power program (e.g., using plutonium
plutonium-239. Both capabilities may be used extracted from commercial fuel reprocessing)
either for peaceful purposes or for parallel weapons is understood to be difficult. This process is
programs. For both enrichment and reprocessing, challenging both technically and in terms of its costs
the IAEA emphasizes inspections as the approach and schedules. Additionally, countries generally
for ensuring that a nuclear weapons program is want to hide their weapons programs from the world.
not being carried out. These inspections include Thus, using nuclear power to develop weapons
inspections of countries’ commercial nuclear power materials is not an approach that a country eager
programs. to develop nuclear weapons is likely to use. This
premise holds even in the absence of the IAEA’s
Additionally, for 50 or more years after World and other safeguards.
War II, worldwide policy initiatives and technical
efforts concerning non-proliferation had one major International Regulation
(or nearly exclusive) emphasis. They aimed to
preclude national governments from pursuing Nuclear safety regulation is the responsibility of
nuclear weapons capabilities (e.g., Schock et al. the national jurisdiction in which a nuclear reactor
[2004]). Although the possibility of a non-state entity operates. Thus, safety standards, regulation,
pursuing nuclear weapons was never ignored, it was enforcement and safety culture vary between
given much less emphasis almost everywhere until countries. One crucial observation is that any
September 11, 2001. Since then, proliferation by nuclear accident in any country has important
non-state actors has received more attention. The international implications. Although the implications
terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington are much greater if radioactive releases travel
D.C. on that day indicated that in utilizing terrorism beyond national boundaries, they exist even if no
there are no limits, and non-state actors could also releases cross such boundaries. Thus, international
try to obtain a nuclear weapon for use in a terrorist cooperation is important both to improve safety and
act. Since then, proliferation by non-state actors has to provide assurances that other countries’ programs
received more attention. are adequately safe and pose no transboundary
threats. Although significant cooperation exists, a
Although a comprehensive overview of proliferation strong case can be made that the benefits would be
issues is beyond the scope of this study, one point even greater with more international cooperation.
is relevant here. In addition to the original nuclear Particularly, permanent, effective and mandatory
weapon states (i.e., the U.S., the FSU/Russia, the international arrangements would be beneficial.
U.K., France and China), four other countries now
have nuclear weapons. These countries are Israel, A true international safety regime would be
India, Pakistan and North Korea. Moreover, a few even more effective, if such a regime could
countries have undertaken weapons programs but be established. An example may be the way
abandoned them before making much progress. international commercial air safety is achieved and
assured through a set of international conventions
Notably, however, no country has successfully used and standards, albeit enforced country-by-country.
NPPs as a major element in their nuclear weapons Similarly, in the case of nuclear power, even if
programs. Developing nuclear weapons by building the responsibility for safety regulation should and

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 27

Growth of Nuclear Power

will remain the responsibility of each nation, such The IAEA also offers several programs to assist
a cooperative regime would have clear benefits, countries in achieving and improving their nuclear
although it does not appear to be feasible in the reactor safety. However, the IAEA currently has
short term. no mandate to enforce safety. Its role is strictly
advisory, and it only plays an advisory role if
Today, the IAEA plays this role to a certain extent. It a country requests assistance. We propose
has sponsored safety conventions and continuously modifying and broadening the IAEA’s role.
disseminates best practices to its members. Upon Although enforcement will remain the responsibility
a member state’s voluntary request, it dispatches of individual countries, mandatory international
safety review missions to inspect local nuclear inspections and oversight are recommended to
facilities or review the country’s nuclear regulatory identify weak performance and disseminate best
agency. Nevertheless, more can be achieved. A practices. Such a program can significantly increase
model for future work may be the IAEA’s strong and confidence worldwide that a major nuclear accident
internationally accepted role in safeguarding against and the associated social and economic costs will
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. not occur.

One major step in the right direction was the It is not realistic at present to expect the IAEA
establishment of the International Convention to take on the role of an actual safety regulatory
on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in the mid-1990s (CNS agency. However, broadening its role via a
1994, 2017). The CNS plays a role in helping step-by-step approach is feasible. This approach
individual countries achieve the IAEA’s Fundamental can gradually lead to improved safety worldwide.
Safety Principles (FSPs) (IAEA 2006a). Part of It will also provide more assurance that safety
the CNS’s stated objective is to “achieve and compromises will be identified and remedied, either
maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through a country’s voluntary initiative or from
through enhancement of national measures and international pressure. Perhaps the most important
international cooperation” (CNS 2017). To that end, new initiative that we recommend is to make the
each country that is a party to the CNS must put IAEA’s safety review services mandatory rather
in place and maintain certain legislative, regulatory than voluntary. These services include the IAEA’s
and administrative measures. These measures are Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)15
intended to enhance the safety and security of each and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)16
country’s nuclear reactors. Moreover, each country missions. They also include the Independent Safety
must develop and submit a national report every Culture Self-Assessment (ISCA)17 program and the
three years. The report must present evidence as to Peer Review of Operational Safety Performance
how the country’s obligations to the CNS are being Experience (PROSPER)18 program. If these
met based on the FSPs. Among the most important programs are implemented everywhere, they can
of those obligations is compliance with the provision help all countries achieve high levels of safety.
for peer review by representatives of other countries. The international community can be assured that
all countries’ nuclear power programs are of high
quality and are leveraging global knowledge and
experience.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

28
 Growth of Nuclear Power

International enforcement measures, such as arise. Even if the findings of such reviews are
sanctions, may remain beyond reach. Nevertheless, unenforceable, they can inform an operator of
compulsory review, inspection and oversight a plant about possible safety improvements.
can provide a vital international check on poor They can also create peer pressure from other
safety performance. These processes can identify reactor-operating organizations to conform to
necessary changes to remedy problems if they broad international norms.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 29

Spent Fuel Management
The challenge of ensuring the safe, secure and facilities is underway or in advanced stages of study
affordable disposal of spent fuel and radioactive and regulatory review in some countries, such as
waste from nuclear reactors has generated much Finland, France and Sweden.
controversy. In the nuclear community, the most
common view is that this challenge is primarily By comparison, some solar modules contain
societal for two reasons. First, the waste quantities potentially dangerous materials that do not decay
involved are low in volume relative to those of with time. One example is cadmium, which is
alternative energy sources. Second, technically permanently highly chemotoxic and is used in the
feasible and affordable disposal approaches have manufacture of thin-film solar panels. A quantitative
been developed and are continually being improved. comparison with toxic nuclear waste is worthwhile.
The 550-MWe peak capacity Desert Sunlight
Waste Quantities Solar Farm in the Mojave Desert has 8 million
solar panels. Its cadmium inventory is about 40
Because nuclear fuel has enormously higher energy tonnes (McCombie and Jefferson 2016). Unless this
density, NPPs produce much smaller quantities of cadmium is all recycled after the plant’s 25-year
waste per kWh than fossil fuel plants or renewables. lifetime, the toxic waste inventory per GWe year
The most objective comparison normalizes will be about 6 tonnes, even with the generous
the waste produced by a plant to the electricity assumption that the plant operates at full capacity
generated. However, the toxicity of the waste is also for 50% of the time. Unlike the nuclear reactor
a major factor, because toxicity, along with volume, described above, the solar farm is not required
determines the feasibility and affordability of safe to prepare technical and financial measures for
disposal solutions. decommissioning and disposing of its waste.

A 1,000-MWe light-water reactor generates about Geological Disposal as the

200 to 350 cubic meters of low- and intermediate- Solution
level waste and about 25 tonnes of SNF per year.
This quantity translates to about 1,500 tonnes A key aspect of demonstrating that nuclear energy
of SNF over an assumed 60-year plant lifetime. is clean and sustainable is ensuring the availability
Assuming a capacity factor of 80%, the electricity of safe and reliable management, and the disposal
produced over that lifetime is about 50 GWe years. of used nuclear fuel and any high-level radioactive
Thus, the reactor creates a specific spent fuel waste resulting from reprocessing. There is a wide
inventory of 30 tonnes per GWe year. About 5% of consensus that every country is responsible for
this consists of actinides and fission products, and ensuring the safe and environmentally acceptable
thus the highly toxic waste inventory is about 1.5 management and disposal of its final waste.
tonnes per GWe year. Radioactive waste decays
with time, but this decay can take over hundreds The only recognized practicable solution for the final
of thousands of years for some elements. Safe disposal of radioactive materials is emplacement in
disposal in deep geological repositories that can be deep geological formations that have been stable
stable over this time frame is the accepted waste for millions of years. This timescale is far beyond the
management strategy for governments worldwide active lifetimes of even very long-lived radionuclides.
(NEA/OECD 2020). The implementation of such This solution utilizes existing advanced science and
technology and does not require the development

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

30
 Spent Fuel Management

of fundamentally new technologies or scientific Disposal Strategies

approaches (IAEA 2020c). Deep geologic disposal
is the official policy of all G20 member states and SNF or radioactive waste can be safely stored at
virtually all other countries using or planning nuclear the Earth’s surface for decades or even hundreds
power stations. The first such repository will be in of years, but disposal is ultimately necessary. The
operation in Finland in a few years, followed soon broad approaches for implementing the required
by a repository in Sweden. However, many other disposal facilities have been identified in several
repositories have been delayed for various, mostly IAEA technical documents. They are summarized as
non-technical, reasons. follows:

In practice, a country does not need to develop its Option 1 – A national GDF: Typical planning
own repository. The implementation of a GDF is schedules in national disposal programs indicate
expensive in absolute terms; current national cost that the full process for establishing a national
estimates range from several to many billions of U.S. GDF takes over 20 years. This process includes
dollars. For a large nuclear power program, these the initial choice of disposal concept, facility
disposal costs represent a relatively small fraction design, site selection and characterization,
of the total costs of nuclear activities. Importantly, repository construction and operation. Establishing
the necessary funds can be raised with only a small a management and disposal strategy should begin
surcharge on the electricity produced (NEA 2013). early in a national nuclear power program. Several
critical activities should have commenced by the
For small nuclear power programs with only one or time a national nuclear power program starts.
a few nuclear reactors, however, financing a national They include building the necessary technical
GDF is a serious challenge. Another challenge may competences, establishing an effective regulatory
be identifying geographical regions and geological system and accumulating the funds required to
environments that are suitable for a GDF within eventually construct and operate the repository.
a country. It is widely accepted that the ultimate
responsibility for the management of radioactive Option 2 – Alternative geological disposal
waste lies with the generating country. This is stated, approaches: There is considerable interest in
for example, in the IAEA Joint Convention on Spent developing an approach that promises to be more
Fuel and Radioactive Wastes Management (IAEA cost efficient than a ‘typical’ GDF consisting of
1997) and the Spent Fuel and Waste Management mined tunnels and caverns at hundred-meter
Directive of the European Commission (EC 2011). depths. One option is deep borehole disposal
However, it is acknowledged in both that, in certain (DBD). The disposal of highly active waste in
circumstances, the safe and efficient management boreholes drilled to depths of a few kilometers
of SNF and radioactive waste may be fostered has been discussed at various times over the
through agreements to share facilities. Accordingly, past decades. Modern drilling technology allows
as described below, agreements between sovereign long horizontal boreholes to be drilled at great
states may eventually lead to the development of a depths, and recent U.S. studies indicate that the
multinational repository (MNR). estimated DBD disposal costs are a fraction of
existing budgets for mined disposal facilities (Deep
Isolation 2020).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 31

Spent Fuel Management

Option 3 - Multinational disposal: A key Option 3c: Utilizing take-back or take-away

characteristic of a GDF program is that the fixed services by a supplier of a broader nuclear
costs constitute a relatively large part of the total service, such as power plant construction, reactor
costs. The fixed costs include all steps from siting fuel fabrication or reprocessing. A logical spent
to the construction of access shafts or tunnels. fuel disposal solution for small or new nuclear
The variable costs, which are proportional to programs is that the supplier of such services
inventory, include the costs of excavating disposal takes back any spent fuel elements. The supplier
tunnels or caverns, encapsulating waste and then manages these elements along with the
waste emplacement operations. Sharing the fixed much larger inventory from its own program and
costs among regional or multinational partners other take-back users via one of the other options.
that combine their waste inventories can result in
economies of scale, and thus significant savings Option 3d: Adding on to a country that is already
for all participants. organizing a large-scale GDF. This option could be
provided as a commercial service, as in option 3b.
A multinational repository can be developed in four The economic case is even simpler because the
ways:19 marginal costs to the disposer are small and the
savings to a small user country are large.
Option 3a: Sharing with other small programs.
This approach has been studied extensively, These options are not mutually exclusive. For
particularly since the early 2000s. The IAEA, the newcomer countries, the final repository decision
Arius Association (Chapman, McCombie, and can be left open for some time. Commencing a
Verhoef 2013) and the Working Group of the national program, including competence-building
European Repository Development Organization and funding, while keeping multinational options
(ERDO n.d.) have produced reports. The IAEA’s open has been described as a dual-track strategy.
TECDOC 1413 (IAEA 2004) provided an extensive
summary of the work done as of its publication A regional approach to disposal using an MNR will
date. It also identified potential mechanisms be of immediate interest to newcomer countries
for the realization of a multinational repository. that foresee having only one or a few NPPs. Such
Subsequent IAEA publications have considered countries will have too little waste to economically
the associated challenges and the project risks in justify a national GDF. Another option for newcomer
more detail (IAEA 2016b). countries with limited expected nuclear capacity is to
use one of the many SMR design concepts currently
Option 3b: Using a commercial disposal under development. With this option, a country
service. There have been few in-depth studies can ship an entire SMR core back to the provider
of this approach. In 2016, the South Australian nation at the end of the core’s lifetime. Alternatively,
government established a Royal Commission it can ship the core to a third-party country willing to
(Royal Commission 2016) to re-examine the implement an MNR. This approach may be one of
possibility of hosting a commercial multinational the most promising fuel-management strategies and
repository in that state. The International may provide impetus for regional cooperation.
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation project
also recently examined the service provider option
and has specifically studied possible financing
mechanisms (RNSWG 2016).
Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open
32
 Spent Fuel Management

Another argument for the implementation of an No national repositories for spent fuel and HLW
MNR is regional security concerns. This argument are currently operating. The first facilities will
particularly applies in regions where several commence operation in this decade, and many
countries are contemplating initiating nuclear countries with nuclear power have target dates
power programs (e.g., Southeast Asia or the some decades in the future. Currently, no projects
Middle East and North Africa). The international for the implementation of an MNR are underway.
non-proliferation community may support the idea of Key issues include the identification of a willing host
consolidating sensitive facilities, including a GDF, in country and the preparation of the appropriate legal
fewer locations. Finally, although this report focuses frameworks for imports and exports. Agreements on
primarily on countries that have or wish to have funding and sharing liability are also needed.
nuclear power, an MNR can offer advantages for
other regional neighbors. Countries without NPPs The path forward is for each country to develop
may have small quantities of radioactive waste, a credible path to accessing a GDF for disposal.
such as spent fuel from research reactors, for which International organizations, such as the IAEA (1997)
geological disposal is preferred. and the European Commission (EC 2011), have
already published recommendations and regulations
Path Forward for doing so. This path will likely be demonstrated
by the repositories in Finland, Sweden and France,
For nuclear power to be considered clean and all of which are in advanced stages of development.
sustainable, an acceptable, safe and secure The success of these projects will then encourage
method for managing and disposing of long-lasting progress in other national programs. When GDF
radioactive waste is needed. Disposal in a deep operation is eventually deemed safe and routine
GDF is currently the only recognized and practical and becomes an industrial enterprise, hurdles to
way to achieve this goal. Countries are individually implementing repositories in other countries will be
responsible for ensuring that a GDF will be available lower.
for their long-lived waste. The GDF can be in a
national repository exclusively for waste from the
producing country or in an MNR that accepts waste
from several countries. In either case, the scientific,
technical and financial approaches available today
ensure that radioactive waste can be disposed of
safely, securely and economically using current
technologies. The technologies neither exhaust
natural resources nor place burdens on future
generations.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 33

Small Modular Reactors
Commercially available reactor designs with and hydrogen. Crucially, most new SMR designs are
unit sizes of 1,000 MWe to 1,600 MWe need significantly safer than the existing large LWRs.
to be supplemented by smaller designs. For
example, SMRs may have unit sizes of 20 MWe SMRs can provide electricity more
to 300 MWe (IAEA 2018). Major motivations for cost-competitively than current designs can.
developing SMRs include that they can deliver SMRs will be fabricated in factories and delivered
a range of energy services at competitive costs to generation sites instead of requiring on-site
and have much lower upfront capital costs. They construction. Thus, the risks of project delays
are also expected to have few or no construction and cost overruns are lower with SMRs. From an
delays and risks and are much more scalable economic perspective, a smaller reactor does not
(Mignacca and Locatelli 2020). SMRs can have benefit from economies of scale. In contrast, a large
markets in almost all electricity grids without reactor can achieve significant economies of scale
requiring major grid reinforcements. They can be when it does not experience construction delays
added incrementally to large grids to match the and cost overruns. Thus, although investment
growth in electricity demand or replace retiring costs per generation unit are much lower for SMRs,
capacity in the face of demand uncertainty. investment costs per kilowatt of capacity are higher.
SMRs’ generating costs are also likely to be higher
NPPs are not naturally seen as playing a initially than those of a conventional NPP, assuming
load-balancing role relative to natural gas or on-time, on-budget completion (IAEA 2016a).
electricity storage systems. However, SMRs
can be designed to have faster ramp-up rates Overall, the projected FOAK generation costs
than today’s large light water reactors (LWRs). for SMRs range from slightly below to over 50%
Thus, they can function effectively in a load- greater than those of a new-build large reactor.
balancing role. Rather than competing with Achieving better economic performance will require
renewables, SMRs can increase their market technology learning in all aspects of manufacturing,
penetration by compensating for renewables’ field installation and operations. Once experience
intrinsic variability. Thus, SMRs can support with factory fabrication and operations is gained,
grid modernization (e.g., smart grids) and help however, costs are likely to fall rapidly with
to replace aging infrastructure (Canadian Small increasing production. SMRs are likely to have a
Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee high learning ratio with production growth (IAEA
2018; Ontario Power Generation et al. 2021). 2013; EFWG 2018).20 This learning should more than
Some SMR concepts are also being designed overcome the disadvantages of lower economies of
to provide energy services besides electricity, scale (Figures 6 and 7).
such as process and district heat, desalination

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

34
 Small Modular Reactors

Figure 6. Technology learning and the economics of multiples.

First-of-a-kind
Sponsor bears all risks
Capital costs per kWe installed

The area under the curve represents the total cost of buy-down to commercialize first-of-a-kind (FOAK) technology. This area is where government support,
such as risk sharing (loan guarantees, the weighted average cost of capital with external debt, capacity markets, etc.), can make a difference.

Benchmark for competitiveness

Technology learning by doing

Assumed learning rate: 8% reduction per doubling of SMR completions

Cumulative construction experience (number of units produced)

Source: Adapted from IAEA (2013).

The large-scale deployment of SMRs will ultimately More than 50 SMR designs and concepts are in
depend on two factors. The first is modularity different stages of development worldwide, and
leading to lower capital and generating costs. The they target different applications and markets
second is whether shorter and on-time completion beyond electricity generation. As noted earlier, most
can reduce financial risks relative to those of large SMR designs offer demonstrably superior safety
LWRs, leading to affordable financing schemes. The features (IAEA 2020a). Their small sizes mean
first SMRs, such as the 35 MWe floating reactors less heat energy to manage, less radioactivity to
in Russia, have recently entered service in niche manage or release and fewer and smaller systems
markets (Astrasheuskaya 2019). Government overall. Compared with the large LWRs currently
support for SMR commercialization is beginning to operating, these SMR designs also typically rely
emerge and should increase with wider commercial less on operator intervention. They have simpler
availability by 2025 (IAEA 2020a, 2020f; NEA 2021). safety systems and designs that employ passive
heat dissipation, a very important factor in improving
reactor safety.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 35

Small Modular Reactors

Figure 7. Estimated decline in the LCOE for a 300-MWe SMR owing to improved financing conditions.

140

$3
120

$39
Generating cost (US$2018/MWh)

100

$126
80
$123 $17

60

$84
40

$67

20 4.6
$45

0
WACC NGCC
Streamlining Technology learning
FOAK (55% debt, LG) SMR (2030 gas price
preconstruction on time construction
risk sharing of $4.33/GJ)

Estimated cost reductions from first SMR to commercial deployment

Source: EFWG (2018).

Notes: This figure illustrates improved financing related to the weighted cost of capital (WACC), loan guarantees (LG),
required returns on investment, shorter construction times and learning. The final bar compares the estimated cost of
a natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plant with and without carbon costs. All costs are given in 2018 U.S. dollars and
exchange rates.

Some countries have recently begun conducting uniform set of regulatory requirements that countries
regulatory safety reviews of innovative SMR can adopt would greatly assist SMR development
designs. The implementation process for SMRs and commercialization. With unified requirements,
entails lengthy and costly pilot and demonstration a designer would not need to make unnecessary
stages, which involve government support and design changes to seek regulatory approval in
financial commitments. Such efforts are a major different countries (NEA 2019; WNA 2019b). This
element of the governmental support that is approach would help lead to a more standardized
beginning to emerge. However, many national product, improve safety and greatly enhance
regulatory authorities also lack the expertise to cost-competitiveness.
review and approve SMR designs. Thus, a more

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

36
Political Decisions, Public Opinion and
Technical Choices
Often, national energy strategies are not based continuing or expanding the use of nuclear power
solely on rational, objective analyses of costs, is its potential for combating climate change. The
environmental aspects, safety and so on. They major arguments against nuclear power are rising
are also in large part based on political decisions, costs, safety and security concerns and delays
often driven by overarching political goals, public in implementing permanent disposal solutions for
opinion and lobbying by supporters of particular SNF and nuclear waste. The balances between
technologies. These factors strongly influence many these arguments differ across countries, leading to
energy supply chains, including those of coal mining, large differences in current national nuclear power
oil and gas drilling, and wind and solar technologies. programs and plans.

Nuclear power is especially prone to political A severe setback for nuclear energy occurred in
influence. In many countries, the dual energy 1979 with the Three Mile Island accident in the U.S.
and weapons capabilities of nuclear technology The accident was very minor in terms of its health
mean that nuclear technology planning and effects and offsite contamination. Nevertheless, it
implementation have remained at the government exacerbated ongoing concerns about the safety of
level. Additionally, the environmental movement nuclear power and accidental radiation releases.
has focused on the risks of nuclear power for a The Chernobyl nuclear accident in the FSU in 1986
long time. This focus predates the growing public led to much more severe setbacks. It increased the
awareness of nuclear energy’s potential role in opposition to nuclear power, and some countries,
mitigating other energy sources’ negative impacts on such as Italy, chose to shut down their nuclear
human health and the climate. In the 70 years since power programs altogether. However, the impacts
the first NPPs, opinions on their roles in national of Chernobyl on nuclear power planning in Western
energy policy have varied widely among countries. countries were lessened because the reactor was
This debate continues to directly influence choices an internal Soviet design with no containment and
to deploy nuclear power. was being used for a risky series of tests that the
reactor was not designed to handle. The Fukushima
Most technologically advanced countries initially accident in Japan in 2011, which involved three
held positive attitudes toward the implementation Western-designed reactors, had more immediate,
and expansion of civilian nuclear power, especially important impacts on some national programs.
after the oil shocks of the 1970s. Energy security
became an important political goal. Nuclear energy The impacts of these accidents on public and
could provide power at stable prices irrespective political opinion were huge. They caused some
of volatile commodity markets, especially the oil nuclear countries to phase out nuclear power and
market. From the earliest days, however, there some non-nuclear countries to legislate against
has also been opposition to nuclear energy, nuclear power’s introduction. However, these
initially because of fears that civilian nuclear power impacts have declined over time. Today, countries
would encourage the spread of nuclear weapons. expanding, maintaining or introducing nuclear
Nevertheless, some countries, such as the U.S., power outnumber those that rejected or have firm
France, Germany and Japan, built large fleets policies against introducing the technology (see the
of civilian NPPs. Today, a major justification for table in Appendix A-5 and figures B-1 and B-2 in
Appendix B).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 37

Political Decisions, Public Opinion and Technical Choices

The direct impacts of political decisions on some Group (b): Countries that have NPPs and have
countries’ national nuclear programs have been pro-nuclear policies indicating that they intend
particularly clear. These decisions have had to continue replacing or expanding their nuclear
far-reaching consequences on future energy and programs. This group is a subset of group (a).
environmental policies. Appendix A describes
developments in Germany and Switzerland, Group (c): The relatively few countries that have
both of which have switched from strong nuclear legislated against introducing NPPs or have decided
support to shutdown plans. It also describes the to abandon the technology.
case of Sweden, which remains a major user of
nuclear energy despite earlier political shutdown Group (d): The comparatively long list of
policies. Multinational organizations can also create potential newcomer countries that have publicly
conditions that directly impact the development of announced an interest in introducing nuclear power.
nuclear energy in their member countries. Appendix
A also describes the efforts of anti-nuclear European These groups are shown in Appendix B. This
governments to hinder the use of nuclear power in division clearly illustrates that nuclear power is
the fight against climate change. currently a major global supplier of low-carbon
electricity. Group (a) includes 35 countries that
Overview of National Attitudes operate 442 reactors. Group (b) contains 14
and Policies Toward Nuclear countries with plans for expansion. Group (d)’s
Power membership indicates that 34 countries worldwide
are interested in introducing nuclear power. In
A review of national nuclear power policies divides contrast, Group (c) contains only eight countries,
countries into several separate groups with key and the anti-nuclear policies remain under debate in
characteristics, as follows. some of them. Overall, these numbers demonstrate
that global support for nuclear energy clearly
Group (a): Countries currently operating and/ outweighs the opposition to its use.
or constructing NPPs, thereby illustrating the
widespread deployment of the technology. (Table
B-1 of the Appendix lists the countries along with the
sizes of their programs).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

38
Newcomer and Developing Country
Issues
Nuclear energy is being considered by many of the IAEA Milestones approach. Addressing
developing countries. It can reduce GHG emissions, issues related to public acceptance and perceptions
improve energy security and increase energy access requires engaging with public, policy and industry
for growing populations with increasing demand stakeholders in all stages of nuclear projects.
for modern services. These newcomer countries Transparent, fact-based communication can
need to address several challenges. They include enhance the public’s understanding of safety and
the development of soft infrastructure, including security.
a nuclear-literate workforce, the establishment
of a safety culture and nuclear laws and safety All nuclear states, regardless of developing or
regulations. The IAEA Milestones approach provides newcomer status, face common challenges of costs,
guidance to newcomer countries aiming to start industrial bottlenecks, personnel constraints and
nuclear energy programs (IAEA 2015). This phased nuclear waste. However, developing countries face
comprehensive process is outlined in Figure 8. unique challenges that result from a lack of finances,
institutional capacity and physical infrastructure.
Embarking upon a nuclear power program requires Their financial challenges may be eased by the
the development of legal, regulatory and support introduction of SMRs, which have lower capital
infrastructure in parallel with the construction of costs. For all new nuclear projects, financing
an NPP. One important early step is preparing hurdles may be reduced with investments by state-
a legal framework that governs all activities owned companies, government-backed loans and
related to nuclear power. Another is establishing price guarantees. Newcomer countries may also
an independent nuclear regulatory body that benefit from experienced nuclear nations facilitating
is responsible for establishing and ensuring and supporting global cooperative approaches to
compliance with that framework. In addition, it is nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, experienced nuclear
necessary to develop human resources and address nations can help with SNF management (including
all financial and sociopolitical considerations. take-backs or multinational repository development,
Developing human resources for all operational as discussed in section 6.3.)
aspects of nuclear energy is a critical component

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 39

 Newcomer and Developing Country Issues

Figure 8. Infrastructure development for a national nuclear energy program.

NUCLEAR POWER INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

MILESTONE 1 MILESTONE 2 MILESTONE 3

Ready to make a Ready to invite Ready to commission
knowledgeable bids/negotiate a
and operate the first
commitment contract for the
Nuclear power nuclear power plant
to a nuclear first nuclear
option included
power program power plant
in national
energy strategy
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3

Considerations before Preparatory work for the Activities to implement

a decision to launch contracting and the first
a nuclear power construction of nuclear power plant
programme is taken a nuclear power plant
after a policy decision
has been taken

AT LEAST 10-15 YEARS

FIRST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROJECT

Final investment Commissioning
decision Operation
Pre-project activities Project development
Contracting Decommissioning
Construction

Source: IAEA (2015).

Institutional Nuclear Infrastructure for a country’s first nuclear power project (IAEA
2015).
The IAEA guide to newcomer countries, summarized
in Figure 8, sets out a phased milestone approach The IAEA guidance identifies 19 nuclear
to establishing a nuclear energy program. Phase I, infrastructure issues that must be dealt with by a
the pre-project phase (one to three years), involves newcomer nation before embarking on a nuclear
deciding to commit to a nuclear power program program. These issues include the national
and establishing an organization to implement the position, nuclear safety, management, funding
program. Phase II, the project decision-making phase and financing, the legal framework, safeguards,
(three to seven years), involves preparatory work after radiation protection, the regulatory framework
the decision is made and bid invitations are issued. and the electrical grid. They also include human
The regulatory body should be established in this resource development, stakeholder involvement,
phase. In Phase III, the construction phase (seven to site and supporting facilities, environmental
10 years), the regulatory body should be operational. protection, emergency planning, nuclear
After this phase, a country is ready to commission security, the nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive
and operate its first NPP (WNA 2020b). Experience waste management, industrial involvement and
shows that it takes at least 10 to 15 years to prepare procurement (IAEA 2015).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

40
 Newcomer and Developing Country Issues

Nuclear law is an important component of a involvement and human performance to support

country’s institutional infrastructure. The IAEA’s nuclear power programs (IAEA 2020g). Since 2009,
Handbook on Nuclear Law defines it as “the body of the IAEA has also offered ‘Integrated Nuclear
special legal norms created to regulate the conduct Infrastructure Review’ missions to help newcomers
of legal or natural persons engaged in activities meet the requirements for establishing a nuclear
related to fissionable materials, ionizing radiation energy sector.
and exposure to natural sources of radiation”
(Stoiber et al. 2003, 2010). This law is intended to The intentions of newcomer countries, especially
ensure the protection of individuals, property and the developing countries, to introduce nuclear energy
environment. Nuclear law sets the legal framework may pose challenges to global safety and security.
upon which all activities related to nuclear power Newcomer countries must fully understand the risks
and ionizing radiation are adequately governed. The and liabilities of NPPs. As mentioned above, they
establishment of an independent nuclear regulatory must develop nuclear laws that adhere to the highest
body is also essential for newcomer countries. This standards of safety, security and the peaceful use
body is responsible for adopting and enforcing of nuclear technology. Establishing an independent
requirements and regulations for nuclear safety regulator early in the process and developing the
and licensing and ensuring compliance with the financial and human resource capacity to sustain
regulatory framework (IAEA 2015; Budnitz, Rogner, NPPs are critical.
and Shihab-Eldin 2018).
International cooperation is also important in
Moreover, engaging all stakeholders in every ensuring the coordinated review and approval of
stage of a nuclear project is especially important new NPP designs by national regulatory agencies.
in newcomer countries. This engagement ensures Such cooperation allows the companies designing
transparent and fact-based communication to the these reactors to meet international standards when
public from all parties involved. The important entering global marketplaces. Activities to achieve
stakeholders include the government, regulatory regulatory coordination are already underway (WNA
bodies, the scientific community, the public, 2020b). The IAEA (2020d) provides guidance on
the media and the business community. This the establishment and development of an owner/
engagement must be maintained throughout the operator and its activities and responsibilities
main phases of a nuclear facility’s lifecycle, including throughout the phases of the program. It assumes
its construction, operation, radioactive waste that the same organization will both own and
management and decommissioning. operate a new NPP.

To support the responsible development of nuclear In addition to the IAEA, the World Association of
power, the IAEA has established the Nuclear Energy Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the French Nuclear
Capacity Building Hub. This hub brings together a Safety Authority (ASN) offer support for new nuclear
community of practitioners for information-sharing, programs. The WANO offers pre-startup peer
capacity-building and networking. It focuses on reviews for new plants in countries with no previous
workforce planning, leadership, training, stakeholder nuclear power experience. The French ASN has
indicated that it will support new nuclear power

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 41

Newcomer and Developing Country Issues

projects in countries with no previous experience. Financing schemes, such as public–private

With the creation of Agency France Nuclear partnerships, build-operate-transfer schemes,
International under the Atomic Energy Commission, build-own-operate schemes and their variations,
France hopes to provide international assistance for define the ultimate ownership of a project (IAEA
civil nuclear programs (WNA 2020b). 2008). In addition to traditional government funding,
numerous types of financing exist. They include
Finance corporate balance sheet financing, the French
Exceltium model21 and the Finnish Mankala model.22
Especially for newcomer countries, the most Other financing types include vendor equity, export
challenging aspect of nuclear projects is financing. credit agency (ECA) and debt financing, and private
NPP construction cost estimates vary considerably financing with government support mechanisms
across countries and regions but have increased (Reilly 2016).
significantly in recent years, especially in North
America and Europe. OC costs for new NPPs with Developing countries may obtain funds to build
capacities of 1.1 GW to 1.4 GW can range from NPPs from international aid organizations and
$5.1 billion to $9.3 billion in the U.S. and the EU. In development banks, other government-sponsored
China, India, Korea and Russia, the corresponding aid programs or ECA insurance schemes. They
costs are $2.8 billion to $4 billion. All of these may leverage institutions, such as the Overseas
figures exclude escalation and financing costs (IEA Private Investment Corporation and the Multilateral
2019a; NEA 2020). NPPs are notably much more Investment Guarantee Agency, or equity investments
capital-intensive than other projects, and many of and commercial loans (IAEA 2008).
the total costs are accrued upfront. Moreover, most
of these OC ranges describe FOAK projects. Thus, Russia, for example, provides innovative financing
lower costs can be expected with design maturity schemes as a part of the state-owned Rosatom’s
and ongoing construction experience (NEA 2020). appeal to interested countries. Rosatom provides
generous loans backed by government subsidies,
Governments are typically heavily involved mostly from Russia’s Wealth Funds. Russia
in planning and financing NPPs, especially in covered 90% of the costs of the Rooppur NPP in
developing countries. Because these countries Bangladesh, providing $11.85 billion in credit out
often lack the necessary human capital for of a total cost of $12.65 billion. In Hungary, Russia
nuclear development, construction is often on a offered to fund 100% of a $12 billion investment
turnkey basis. The reactor vendor assumes all of in an NPP. In Egypt, Russia offered a loan for
the technical and commercial risks in delivering $25 billion of the $30 billion required for reactor
a functioning plant on time at a particular price. construction (Schepers 2019).
Alternatively, the vendor may set up a consortium
to build, own and operate a plant. As the industry Benefits of Sharing Infrastructure
becomes more international, new arrangements,
including public–private partnerships, are likely to The success of nuclear power programs depends
develop (WNA 2020b). largely on local infrastructure. Thus, the IAEA has
introduced guidelines on the sharing of nuclear
power infrastructure with similar technologies,
physical facilities, programs and knowledge (IAEA

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

42
 Newcomer and Developing Country Issues

2006b). This sharing can facilitate the adoption of

nuclear programs in newcomer nations by helping
to overcome the high cost of infrastructure. These
costs often deter countries from engaging in the
industry and gaining the benefits of nuclear power.

Sharing similar technologies involves two or

more countries deciding to build NPPs of the
same design. Thus, they can share research and
development (R&D), training and other mutually
beneficial resources. Such sharing requires
strong political will and strong bilateral and
intergovernmental relations.

Sharing physical facilities involves sharing the

manufacturing of nuclear components, such as
pumps and valves, and the nuclear fuel cycle
from cradle to grave. Countries can also share
industries for fabricating key equipment, such
as steam generators, and heavy-duty erection
equipment for moving reactor vessels, steam
generators, and so forth. They can share R&D
facilities, transportation vehicles for heavy
equipment and radioactive waste mobile units.

The sharing of common programs involves

sharing environmental impact assessments,
transboundary movements of spent fuel,
emergency preparedness and R&D programs.

The sharing of knowledge involves sharing

education and training, codes and standards,
regulatory standards and operating experience.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 43

Conclusions and Recommendations
Nuclear energy can play a stronger role than is security or energy costs. Furthermore, a stable
envisioned in many national energy transition electrical grid system will be increasingly difficult
strategies. Without a sizable expansion of nuclear to maintain if intermittent renewables increase and
power, “the world’s climate challenge will get a NPPs are excluded from the energy mix.
whole lot harder” (Birol and Grossi 2020). Nuclear
power’s widespread acceptance and expansion has These conclusions strongly suggest that many
three prerequisites. First, it needs to be accepted countries’ national energy policies should be
politically as an effective GHG mitigation technology. reconsidered with respect to nuclear power. Nuclear
Second, its positive economic performance energy clearly provides important benefits. At
must prevail more consistently. Third, its record the same time, nuclear power operations must
of safe operations needs to be acknowledged, utilize continually enhanced safety regulations and
maintained and continuously advanced. In safeguards of fissile materials. Most importantly,
addition, a widespread acknowledgment that the efforts to advance the culture of nuclear safety
deep geological disposal of nuclear waste can be must continue in countries with and without
accomplished safely is needed. experience operating NPPs. The recommendations
in this section are addressed to the nations that
Dispatchable baseload power will likely remain operate or intend to operate NPPs. These nations
the foundation of most electricity systems unless represent over 80% of the global population. Some
the significant economic and scalability problems recommendations also apply to non-nuclear energy
facing electricity storage can be overcome. Among countries, resulting in enhanced safety and security.
the generating technologies with essentially zero
emissions, nuclear power is clearly technologically 1. To achieve the benefits of nuclear energy
proven, scalable and economically practical. An outlined above, its use must be expanded
increasing number of governments, research globally. Policies and measures supporting the
institutes and IGOs are acknowledging that the implementation of low-emission energy systems
Paris Agreement climate targets likely cannot be should include nuclear energy. Countries with
met without nuclear energy. Nuclear power also nuclear power must consider extending the
lowers emissions that directly affect human health licenses of existing plants, whenever it is safe
(e.g., particulates, sulfur, nitrogen oxides, mercury and economical to do so, construct new plants,
and other pollutants). It produces a low volume and develop and implement advanced nuclear
of toxic waste per GWe-year, and safely handling technologies, including SMRs. These countries
this waste is technically and economically feasible. should also support research, pilot projects and
Thus, nuclear power deserves to be reconsidered educational activities highlighting the positive
as a clean energy technology that should be contributions of nuclear energy, including climate
treated similarly to the many other clean energy stabilization. Furthermore, these countries
technologies. should also assist in financing, technology
transfer and capacity building in developing
Countries operating NPPs help to mitigate climate countries working to introduce nuclear energy
change, a benefit that accrues to all nations. programs.
Evidence shows that the benefits of nuclear energy
can be obtained without significantly affecting safety, 2. Countries with ongoing nuclear power programs

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

44
 Conclusions and Recommendations

should share best practices with other countries. and oversight, thereby decreasing the global risk
In addition, they should encourage newcomers of a major accident.
to utilize the IAEA Milestones approach to
assess their infrastructure readiness. This 5. Countries introducing or expanding nuclear
approach allows newcomers to comply with the energy should work closely with countries with
highest standards of nuclear safety, security major nuclear programs. Together, they can
and non-proliferation. Current and future nations support the development and implementation
with nuclear power should develop back-end of advanced reactors and fuel cycles, including
management strategies, particularly for the SMRs. These efforts will help to uphold the
disposal of spent fuel and high-level radioactive highest standards of safety, security, SNF
waste. These strategies should conform with disposal and non-proliferation.
the requirements of the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 6. All countries should coordinate and support work
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. toward the early commercialization of innovative
SMR designs, building on recent IAEA and
3. National energy strategies are largely based on OECD analyses and recommendations. If all
political decisions, which are strongly influenced countries support standardized licensing criteria
by public opinion. Thus, all countries should for SMRs, the time and cost to commission
engage a wide range of stakeholders at every new units will decrease. To advance these
stage of a nuclear power project, as is best objectives, countries should cooperate to initiate
practice. The relevant stakeholders include the the development of user requirements covering
government, regulatory bodies, the scientific countries with active nuclear power programs
and business communities, environmental and newcomer countries. This work will focus
groups and the public. The implementation or commercialization efforts on a manageable
expansion of a nuclear power program cannot fraction of the over 50 designs currently in
just rely on state-of-the-art technology. It must development.
also incorporate a full set of necessary societal
attributes. These attributes include national 7. An internationally supported endorsement of
legislation, an independent regulatory agency, MNR initiatives and take-backs of spent fuel
an absence of corruption, a strong safety culture will particularly benefit newcomer countries and
and an open and inclusive public-participation countries with small nuclear power programs.
policy. The security and safety enhancements resulting
from the implementation of MNRs is globally
4. All countries should support strengthening the important. Thus, these efforts should be
international regulatory and safety regimes by supported even by non-nuclear power countries.
empowering the IAEA to gradually become an
international regulator. All countries should also
collaborate with the IAEA to depoliticize nuclear
energy by establishing globally accepted norms,
policies and practices. This process includes
moving to mandatory international inspections

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 45

Endnotes
1
This study originated from the preparation of a policy brief (Shihab-Eldin et al. 2020). The policy brief was
submitted to Task Force 2 on Climate Change and Environment under Think 20 (T20) Saudi Arabia 2020
(T20TF2 2020). T20 Saudi Arabia 2020 is an official engagement group that serves as an ideas bank. It provides
research-based policy recommendations to the G20, a group of leading rich and developing nations. It also
facilitates interactions between the G20 and the think-tank and research communities and communicates with
the broader public about issues of global importance. Task Force 2 contributed to accelerating nations’ climate
actions while ensuring environmental protections and economic growth by preparing key recommendations for G20
governments.

2
Net-zero emissions are achieved when all GHG emissions released by anthropogenic activity are counterbalanced
by the removal of GHGs from the atmosphere.

3
In absolute terms, since 2000 annual global nuclear generation has fluctuated between 2400 and 2650 TWh.

4
During the summer of 2020, the early restart after a maintenance outage for the Swedish NPP Ringhals 1 was
agreed between the operator Ringhals AB and the national electricity transmission system operator Svenska
Kraftnät (SvK). The agreement aimed to secure voltage stability and short-circuit power in the transmission network
to handle the operating situation in southern Sweden at that time (Vattenfall 2020; WNN 2020a).

5
Absent climate mitigation policies, global nuclear generating capacity may be as low as 394 GWe by 2050 (IAEA
2021a).

6
Many studies project a future renewables-only electricity system for the European Union and other OECD entities
without the need for non-renewable baseload generation. Such a system may be feasible because the costs
of batteries and other energy storage technologies (e.g., electrolysis for hydrogen production) continue to fall
rapidly. However, the IEA and other multilateral energy organizations and think tanks continue to see a need for
complementary low-GHG baseload supply. This supply may come from nuclear and fossil fuel generation (i.e., coal
and gas with CCS) (IAEA 2020e; IEA 2020a, 2020d; A. T. Kearney 2021; Long et al. 2021; National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2021; Vine 2021). The share of renewables will continue to rise. However, it is
expected to grow more slowly as the cost of balancing the system begins to rise noticeably. These increased costs
will counter the advantages of renewables. The lower costs of renewable generation only apply when renewable
resources are available and do not account for the costs of balancing the system.

7
The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 led to a total loss of the plant. In contrast to Chernobyl and Fukushima,
however, no significant offsite contamination occurred (Rogovin and Frampton, Jr. 1980).

8
For example, investors prefer 10 investment projects of $100 million each over a single $1 billion exposure.

9
A positive externality arises when research and development (R&D) activities by one entity benefit the
commercialization of innovative elements in other sectors and returns to society exceed those to the R&D sponsoring
entity.

10
The figure does not include cement, as it would distort the vertical scale and obscure non-cement materials.

11
All of the masses in this document are given in metric tonnes.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

46
 Endnotes

The 1973 oil supply crisis increased concerns about oil supply security. These concerns accelerated the
12

construction and deployment of NPPs in the U.S., Japan and many European countries, such as France and Sweden.

13
The greenhouse warming potential (GWP) of a molecule of methane is a function of atmospheric methane
concentrations. Assuming a GWP of 25 for methane, a leakage rate of 4% along the gas supply chain erases its
climate benefits versus coal. By comparison, the GWP of carbon dioxide equals one.

14
Lay people can assess annual fatalities if they are asked to do so, and they produce similar estimates to the
technical estimates. However, their judgments of risk are related more to other hazard characteristics (e.g., the
catastrophic potential threat to future generations). Thus, people’s evaluations of risk tend to differ from their own (and
experts’) estimates of annual fatalities (Slovic and Weber 2002).

15
IRRS Guidelines are available here: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/SVS-37web.pdf.

OSART Guidelines are available here: https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/s-reviews/osart/osart_brochure.

16

pdf.

17
ISCA Guidelines are available here: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/SVS-32_web.pdf.

18
PROSPER Guidelines are available here: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/01/prosper-guidelines.pdf.

The increased need for the international transport of radioactive materials has often been raised as a potential
19

hurdle. However, the safety of transporting spent fuel and radioactive waste has been well demonstrated (e.g. Conolly
and Pope 2016).

20
Technology learning is based on empirical data showing that a new technology experiences a linear cost reduction
(learning ratio) as commercial production doubles. This relation is shown in Figure 6.

21
The French Exceltium Model provides a stable and competitive price for electro-intensive industries over the long
run. The price includes two main parts. The first part covers the interest and repays the debt contracted to cover the
upfront payment. The second part covers the operating costs of NPPs (i.e., the production costs excluding capital). A
complementary part is related to market prices and nuclear production performance (https://www.exeltium.com/).

22
The Finnish Mankala Model is used to finance large clean energy investments in Finland, where the government
regulates but does not support nuclear power investments. Mankala enables investors and companies to invest in
energy production to enhance the availability of capital for large energy investments. It enables utilities and industrial
companies of different sizes to participate in various energy production investments. It allows groups of companies to
share the risks of energy investments and provides a stable electricity price for industrial users. Finally, it guarantees
the availability of electricity for the process and metal industries. For example, Fennovoima NPP sells all of the
electricity that it generates to its owners at cost. This price accounts for operations, fuel, nuclear waste management,
financial and organizational expenses. The owners may then use the electricity in their own processes or sell it in the
electricity markets.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

47
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Appendix A: Examples of Political
Impacts on National Nuclear Programs
This appendix provides examples of the immediate and drastic effects that political decisions can have on
national nuclear energy policies. We summarize the efforts of anti-nuclear governments in the European
Union (EU) to hinder the acknowledgment that expanding nuclear power can help combat climate change.
We then briefly present case studies from three different countries. First, we describe the cases of Germany
and Switzerland. Their national governments reacted strongly and swiftly to the 2011 Fukushima accident
by deciding to abandon nuclear power. Subsequently, parliamentary and public approval for these decisions
was (paradoxically) achieved by building them into a wider energy policy that was promoted as a part of the
battle against climate change. Next, we describe the case of Sweden. In that case, an interesting series of
government decisions led to the reversal of initial decisions to shut down nuclear power. The decisions were
reversed as the overall implications of their impacts on the country’s economics and national climate goals
became clear.

A 1 The EU’s Disagreements over the Role of Nuclear Power

More than half of the countries in the EU operate nuclear reactors that generate about a quarter of the EU’s
electricity. Nevertheless, attitudes toward nuclear power vary widely across the EU, which often renders
decision-making on this issue difficult. The most consistently anti-nuclear country, Austria, has even
attempted (unsuccessfully) to legally block nuclear power plant (NPP) developments in other EU Member
States (European Court of Justice 2020).

Recent events in the European Parliament and the European Council (EC) provide a good illustration of the
continuing polarized political debate on nuclear power. In the run-up to the 2019 United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Madrid, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on nuclear energy. The
resolution stated that it “believes that nuclear energy can play a role in meeting climate objectives because
it does not emit greenhouse gases and can also ensure a significant share of electricity production in
Europe” (European Parliament 2019). The original text of the resolution was diametrically opposed to this
statement. It stated that “nuclear power is neither safe nor environmentally or economically sustainable” and
called for the EU to phase out nuclear power.

The political debate on nuclear energy in the EU was also reflected in the development of a taxonomy on
sustainable investment in 2019. The original report, released in June 2019, excluded nuclear investment,
primarily because of objections based on waste disposal. The 863 respondents to the report provided
feedback. France and many eastern European countries were in favor of nuclear energy being included,
but Austria, Germany and Luxembourg resisted (EUTEG 2019). The final compromise was that both
nuclear energy and gas were “neither included nor excluded in principle” (Weber 2019) from parts of the
list. Instead, they would qualify if they complied with the so-called ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) criterion.
Nuclear technology is classified not as green technology but as low-carbon technology that can critically
help in the transition to full carbon neutrality (Simon 2019).

The EU has made some positive moves toward supporting nuclear power, which currently generates 25%
of the EU’s electricity and accounts for almost half of its low-carbon electricity. Nevertheless, it missed

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 60

an opportunity at the beginning of 2020 to signal its belief that nuclear power can help mitigate climate
change. The European Green Deal Investment Plan earmarks 1 trillion euros for investments in sustainable
technologies that can help the EU become climate neutral by 2050. These funds can help EU countries
move away from coal-fired electricity production and can support the development of gas-fired plants.
However, they cannot be used to help finance nuclear power stations (Dalton 2020; EC 2020). In 2020, the
EU proposed a €750 billion fund to help with recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. This fund will also use
the DNSH criterion embedded in the taxonomy to exclude certain technologies, such as nuclear power.

The EC issued a report on sustainable technologies in April 2021 (EC-EFSM 2021). This report did not
resolve the issue of whether nuclear power satisfied the DNSH criterion. Instead, the conclusions were
to be based on a technical report prepared by the Joint Research Centre of the EC (JRC 2021). This
comprehensive report investigated all aspects of nuclear electricity production, including waste disposal,
and it arrived at an extended list of conclusions. The most important of these conclusions was that “the
analyses did not reveal any science-based evidence that nuclear energy does more harm to human health
or to the environment than other electricity production technologies already included in the Taxonomy as
activities supporting climate change mitigation.”

The JRC report was reviewed by two expert groups in mid-2011. One of these groups (Article 31 Group
of Experts 2021) agreed with the JRC findings. The other (Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental
and Emerging Risks – SCHEER 2021) acknowledged its lack of expertise regarding the debate’s most
controversial aspect, that is, the application of the DNSH criterion to geological disposal. Thus, the
outcome appeared promising for nuclear energy. Nevertheless, ministers from Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Luxembourg and Spain have written to the EC on this topic. They propose that nuclear energy should
remain excluded from the EU Taxonomy on Sustainable Finance. The opposite view has been put to the
EU by 10 Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia), and at the end of 2021 no final decision has yet been taken.

A 2 Germany — A Tale of Two Cities

It is interesting to consider the nuclear power debate in Germany in some detail. Germany’s current national
policy is to shut down all NPPs by the end of 2022 and all coal plants by 2038 (BMWi 2020). Instead, it will
rely on primarily on renewable energy and some natural gas. This approach has been presented by the
government and praised by some environmental groups as a pioneering, world-leading green approach.
Others view it as an unrealistic strategy that has delayed reductions in German carbon dioxide emissions,
led to some of the highest electricity costs in Europe, and disrupted the European electrical energy market.

For a long time, the political debate in Germany on the use of nuclear power has been more intense than
those in many other countries. Radical policy changes based on political decisions have occurred frequently
(Kirchhof and Trischler 2020). Today, Germany is a major economy that has set the ambitious goal of
establishing a zero-carbon electricity supply system using only renewables without nuclear power. We
summarize the process by which these decisions were made and review the current status of the German

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 61

energy transition (Energiewende).

Germany was a pioneer in the build-up of civilian nuclear power. The company Siemens-KWU built 17 large
reactors which, until March 2011, were producing around one quarter of the nation’s electricity. The last of
these plants came online in 1989. From the 1970s onward, however, significant opposition to nuclear power
arose. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident in the FSU intensified opposition to nuclear power that was
led by the Green Party. In 1998, it became the first environmental political party to become a partner in a
national government. In 1986, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) passed a resolution to abandon nuclear
power. This resolution was not supported by the Christian Democratic Union, but elections in 1998 brought
an SPD–Green coalition to power.

With the SPD–Green coalition in power, protracted negotiations on how to phase out nuclear power began.
These negotiations ended with an agreement that all plants should be shut down after an agreed average
lifetime of 32 years. This agreement was reached despite the technical recognition of the feasibility of
much longer lifetimes of 40 or 60 years. In 2010, some extensions were agreed to only on the condition
that the power plants would pay extra taxes on fuel loaded into their reactors. Some of these funds were
used to subsidize renewable energy sources, particularly solar and wind power. The conformity of the taxes
imposed by the German government was the subject of intense legal battles.

German law laid out plans for a complete energy transition (i.e., the Energiewende). This transition was
meant to lead to an electricity supply system based only on low-carbon renewable energy technologies.
Nevertheless, the government also agreed to the construction of new coal-fired and gas-fired plants. This
decision was because the loss of all nuclear capacity could not be balanced out by increased renewables in
the short term. Additionally, some flexible baseload electricity is always necessary to handle fluctuations in
solar or wind generation.

The situation in Germany changed drastically in 2011, following the March earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
accident in Fukushima, Japan. With elections due later that year, the Chancellor ordered that older reactors
should be shut down immediately and all plants should undergo a safety review. In May 2011, the Federal
Reactor Safety Commission analyses concluded that all 17 plants were safe. Nevertheless, the government
passed a new law in June 2011 reinstating the earlier shutdown requirements. Of all the national political
reactions to the Fukushima accident, Germany’s and Switzerland’s were the most rapid. They were
also openly acknowledged as not being based on safety criteria. Currently, only seven NPPs operate in
Germany, and they are scheduled to be closed by the end of 2022.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 62

A 2.1 Current Status of Germany’s Energiewende?

The percentage of electricity produced by renewables in Germany rose to 42%; the goal for 2030 is 65%.
However, Germany’s ability to reach its ultimate goals in the planned timescales is seriously in doubt, as the
following statistics for 2019 show.

• Germany has installed wind and solar capacity of 61 gigawatts (GW) and 49 GW, respectively, providing
total capacity of 110 GW. Together, these sources are more than sufficient to meet Germany’s entire
peak demand of 83 GW when they operate at full capacity.

• In practice, however, wind and solar provided only 174 Terawatthours (TWh) of the total 606 TWh of
electricity produced in Germany in 2019. Including biomass (51 TWh) and hydropower (19 TWh), all
renewables generated 243 TWh of electricity.

• The remaining 60% of Germany’s electricity was produced by coal (195 TWh), gas (91 TWh) and the
seven operational NPPs (75 TWh).

• Notably, Germany’s 110 GW of wind and solar capacity delivers 1.6 TWh/GW installed capacity,
whereas its 8 GW NPP delivered 9.2 TWh/GW.

• The most extreme conditions occurred in January 2019. For a period, renewables contributed only 12%
of power generation. Only 3% of power generation came from wind and solar energy, with the shortfall
coming mainly from gas and coal.

Clearly, Germany is far from its zero-carbon goals. Since shutting down half of its nuclear fleet, it has
been forced to build new coal-fired plants. These plants are necessary to provide the baseload capacity
to compensate for fluctuating renewables and the closure of older plants. This continuing reliance on
fossil fuels is being met with growing opposition. The commissioning of a new, large coal plant in North
Rhine Westphalia has been blocked by objectors. Two other factors are hindering progress toward the
all-renewables goal and even the 65% renewables goal by 2030. First, the expansion of wind and solar
capacities has slowed drastically. Second, the necessary expansion of transmission capabilities has been
even slower (i.e., of the planned 7,700 kilometers [km], only about 1,200 km have been realized).

A large fraction of the German public accepts that climate change is a vitally important issue. Thus, the
economic impacts of these governmental policies have not yet led to major objections. This outcome is
somewhat surprising because these economic impacts are very severe. The average wholesale price of
electricity in Germany, 3.76 eurocents per kilowatthour [kWh], is the lowest in Europe. This low price is
largely because of the significant subsidies paid to renewable energy producers. However, the retail price of
electricity, 30.9 eurocents/kWh, is the highest in Europe (Agora Energiewende 2020). Electricity users pay
over 6 eurocents/kWh to subsidize renewables, and producers of renewable electricity can be subsidized
up to 30 eurocents/kWh. In practice, German electricity users provide over €30 billion in annual subsidies
to produce electricity, which sells on the market for about one-tenth of that sum.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 63

The economic impacts of Germany’s electrical energy policy also affect neighboring countries because
of the open exchange through the Europe-wide grid. This exchange is profitable for neighbors that can
purchase low-cost subsidized German electricity on the spot market. Particularly, Germany’s overcapacity
on windy, sunny days leads to massive price cuts. In fact, several times per year, Germany exports
electricity at a negative price. The negative prices arise because Germany cannot easily scale back
domestic subsidized wind and solar electricity production. However, the availability of low-price subsidized
German electricity negatively impacts the economics of low-carbon production facilities in other countries.
In Switzerland, for example, neither hydroelectric plants nor NPPs can compete with Germany’s price. Thus,
Germany’s neighbors increasingly depend on German imports. However, they have no assurance that the
low prices will continue after Germany’s planned closures of nuclear and coal plants.

In the context of climate discussions, the impact of Germany’s Energiewende on GHG emissions is a key
open question. The political goals of massive carbon dioxide reductions, the rapid shutdown of nuclear
power and the eventual phasing out of coal cannot all be achieved. In the short term, the government has
prioritized shutting down NPPs over reducing carbon dioxide emissions. It has allowed new coal-fired
power stations to be built and has encouraged coal mines to remain open to supply them. Germany has the
highest carbon dioxide emissions in the EU. A 2019 analysis of the impacts of Germany’s nuclear shutdown
concludes that the lost electricity production was replaced primarily by coal-fired production and electricity
imports (Jarvis, Deschenes, and Jha 2019). The social cost of this shift from nuclear power to coal was
estimated to be about 12 billion dollars per year. Most of this cost stems from the increased mortality risk
due to air pollution from fossil fuels.

A 3 Switzerland — Following in Germany’s Footsteps

Switzerland, like Germany, was an advanced nuclear country that reacted immediately to the Fukushima
accident in Japan in 2011. As in Germany, nuclear power was already a controversial topic in Switzerland,
and as in Germany, the responsible government minister belonged to a political party that faced imminent
national elections in 2011.

In Switzerland, first-stage licensing applications for three new NPPs were being prepared in March 2011.
These applications were instantly cancelled, and the government initiated a study of the five operating
NPPs, which produced almost 40% of Switzerland’s electricity. The study investigated whether they should
be shut down immediately, continue to run or be replaced by newer plants. Before these options were
analyzed, however, the government decided that nuclear power should be phased out in Switzerland.
Instead, the government decided to introduce a new energy strategy, aiming at increasing the use of
renewables and promoting energy efficiency and demand-side management. The strategy’s ambitious goals
include reducing energy use per person by 43% by 2035 and electricity demand by 13%. These goals were
set despite plans for electromobility, heat pumps, and so forth.

It was acknowledged that phasing out Switzerland’s NPPs would require the introduction of gas turbine
plants. Thus, Switzerland would lose its status as a carbon-free electricity producer. The reaction to
introducing fossil fuels was not positive, and the government has backed off from these plans. The only

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 64

alternative is importing about 30% of its electricity by the year 2030, which is the more likely strategy.
Switzerland’s new energy act of 2016 also included measures to encourage energy saving to promote
renewables and rule out any new NPP license applications. As in Germany, the two issues of reducing
carbon emissions and banning NPPs were put to the public in a combined package. However, these
measures have diametrically opposed consequences.

In Switzerland, a stable electricity supply without nuclear energy is feasible in 2035 only under certain
conditions. First, fossil-fuel production can be introduced in the form of gas turbine generators. Second,
massive amounts of electricity can be imported from neighbors, if Switzerland’s neighbors are able to
supply it. Third, electricity use in the Swiss economy can be severely restricted. Finally, decisions can be
made to extend the operational lifetimes of the existing NPPs or even reverse the ban on new plants. This
situation is explicitly documented in reports on Swiss energy perspectives issued by the Energy Department
(BFE 2021). Discussions between the government and the NPP owners about extending the current
reactors’ operational periods are already in progress.

A 4 Sweden — Return to Nuclear after Earlier Phase-out Decisions

Sweden was among the European countries that decided to introduce nuclear power in the 1960s and
1970s. The goal of introducing nuclear power was to reduce its 20% dependence on oil for electricity
production. Reactor construction started in 1969 with the Ringhals plant, and by the end of the 1980s, 12
reactors were in operation around the Swedish coast. In 1977, Sweden took a pioneering step in its nuclear
program by passing the Stipulation Act. This law stated that no new reactors could be built unless a project
was submitted demonstrating that the resulting radioactive waste could be safely managed through to
disposal. The establishment of the KBS 3 project put Sweden in a leading position in preparing a deep
geological repository. Along with Finland and France, it is one of the first countries in which such a facility
will be implemented.

In 1979, following the Three Mile Island accident in the U.S., and in the run-up to national elections, it was
decided to hold a non-binding referendum (after the election) on the future of nuclear power in Sweden. All
of the options put forward to the public involved phasing out nuclear power. Sweden’s Parliament selected
2010 as a target date for this phase out, provided that new energy sources were available to replace NPPs
by then.

The 1986 Chernobyl accident led Sweden’s government to propose an earlier phase-out date, but
this decision was reversed soon afterwards. Closing all NPPs even by the 2010 date was found to be
economically infeasible. Complex political negotiations on progressively closing the plants began. The
influence of politics was once again highlighted when the first two reactors to be selected for shutdown were
at the Barsebäck site, about which the Danish public in Copenhagen, located only 20 km away, had been
protesting for some time.

Sweden also decided that the remaining 10 reactors could extend their lifetimes beyond the original plan of
25 years to 40 or even 60 years. Interestingly, the new political consensus on the extended nuclear program

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 65

arose because the main anti-nuclear political party in Sweden reversed its position. The party decided that
combating climate change was a more important goal than phasing out nuclear power was. In 2010, new
legislation was introduced allowing for the construction of new nuclear reactors provided that they were built
to replace reactors at existing sites.

Public support for nuclear power has always been strong in Sweden. Even after the 2011 Fukushima
accident, polling showed that about 70% of the population felt that existing reactors should continue to
operate. Currently, Sweden has seven NPPs in operation following decisions in 2015 to close four of the
older reactors for economic reasons. These seven NPPs provide about 40% of Swedish electricity. In
2016, the government stated that it would shut down all operating NPPs by 2050 but gave no specific plans
for replacing the energy supplied. Sweden has been expanding its wind power and operates the largest
onshore windfarm in Europe. Interestingly, in 2020, Ringhals NPP, which had been shut down for the
summer because of low electricity prices, needed to be reconnected because it was needed to restore grid
stability in a period of high-wind-energy production.

A 5 Nuclear Policy Landscape

A review of national nuclear power policies (McCombie 2020) can usefully divide countries into four
separate groups with distinct characteristics.

Group (a): Countries currently operating or constructing NPPs, thereby illustrating the widespread
deployment of the technology. They are listed in Table B.1 along with the sizes of their programs.

Group (b): Countries that have both NPPs and pro-nuclear policies, indicating that they intend to continue
with replacing or expanding their nuclear operations. This group is a subset of group (a).

Group (c): The relatively few countries that have legislated against introducing NPPs or have decided to
abandon the technology.

Group (d): The comparatively long list of potential newcomer countries that have publicly announced an
interest in introducing nuclear power. The countries in groups (b), (c) and (d) are listed in Table B.2.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 66

Examples of policies in Group (b) countries, in which nuclear power is operational and/or expansion is planned
In 2015, Canada decided to approve a lifetime extension of 10 of its 19 nuclear units. Proposals to build several nuclear
reactors to go into operation in the next decade have been deferred, have lapsed, or have been dropped. Instead,
Canada
Canada is favoring a major refurbishment of its existing capacity. Currently, Canada is aiming to be an international
leader in the development and commercialization of small modular reactors (SMRs).
The government’s long-term target is outlined in its Energy Development Strategy Action Plan 2014–2020. It aims for
capacity of 58 gigawatt-electric (GWe) by 2020, with 30 GWe more under construction. If all of the proposed reactors
China
are built, China will have 170 units by 2040, providing about 10% of its electricity supply. The impetus for nuclear power
in China is increasing owing to air pollution from coal-fired plants.
The Czech government is very supportive of nuclear power. Under the 2015 national energy plan, nuclear power is
Czech expected to become the main source of electricity production. Its share should rise to about 50% in 2040. Currently,
Republic new NPP licenses are being applied for, and the government is creatively exploring approaches to ease the financing
challenges.
Using innovative financing structures, Finland has one plant under construction, with another in an advanced planning
stage. It is planning for nuclear energy to contribute about 60% of the energy mix. Public and political support for
Finland
nuclear power is strong. Finland also has the world’s most advanced deep geological disposal facility for spent nuclear
fuel, which is nearing operation.
France has the second largest number of NPPs and has one of the highest shares of nuclear-generated electricity
globally, at over 70%. Following Fukushima, a political decision reduced the share of nuclear energy in the energy mix.
France
In 2014, the Green Growth bill set a target of 50% for nuclear energy’s share of electricity generation. In 2017, France
postponed this target to 2035, and the option to build new nuclear reactors remains open.
Hungary has four nuclear reactors that generate about half of its electricity. The Hungarian Parliament has
Hungary
overwhelmingly supported building two new power reactors, and a contract has been signed.
The government’s 12th five-year plan for 2012 to 2017 targeted the addition of 94 GWe over that period. In 2018,
India however, the government stated that India’s nuclear capacity is likely to be about 22.5 GWe by the year 2031. The
Atomic Energy Commission envisages a nuclear capacity of about 500 GWe by 2060.
After Fukushima, the number of operating reactors steadily dwindled from 50 to zero. In 2015, however, the
government’s Plan for Electricity Generation to 2030 was approved. In this plan, nuclear power was expected to
contribute 20% to 22% of energy in 2030. The expected contributions of renewables, liquefied natural gas and coal
Japan
were 22% to 24%, 27% and 26%, respectively. The 5th Basic Energy Plan, approved in July 2018, maintains the
same electricity percentages as those agreed upon in mid-2015. Japan has restarted several NPPs following their
post-Fukushima closures.
Russia has 36 operating reactors providing capacity of 29 GWe. Russia has an ambitious export program, and over 20
Russia nuclear power reactors are confirmed or planned for export. Russia is also pioneering the concept of floating NPPs.

Sweden See Appendix A 4.

The first of four large Korean-designed NPPs is in operation at Barakah. All four will eventually provide 20% of the
UAE
country’s electricity. A further four NPPs may also be sited at the same location.
After becoming a world leader in nuclear energy, the government oscillated about its future plans for several years.
Now, the U.K. is the most ambitious nuclear planner in Europe, with plans for new large NPPs. Two large NPPs are
U.K.
in construction, and four further units are proposed or planned. The government has provided direct support for the
development of SMRs.
About half of Ukraine’s electricity is generated by 15 reactors. An updated energy strategy in August 2017 aimed to
achieve a nuclear share of electricity of about 50% in 2035. In 2018, Energoatom signed an agreement to replace
Ukraine
the oldest reactors by 2030 with multiple SMR-160 units. This project is intended to be a pilot that will lead to the
establishment of a manufacturing hub for these reactors.
The U.S. is the nation with the most operating power plants. However, further expansion is hampered to some extent
by financing and competitiveness challenges in an era when natural gas is plentiful and cheap. Recently, the U.S.
U.S.
government has allocated funds for the development of advanced reactors. It has also lifted its legacy prohibition on
funding nuclear energy projects overseas.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 67

Examples of policies in Group (c) countries that have formally decided or even legislated at the government level to ban or phase out
nuclear power
Australia’s successive governments have ruled out nuclear power, although the issue is brought forward relatively
Australia often. Recently, Australia’s energy minister stated that the government is considering incorporating emerging nuclear
technologies into the country’s energy mix (WNN 2019).
The Austrian government decided against commissioning the already-built Zwentendorf NPP in 1978. This followed a
Austria referendum in which national party politics was a key factor because the sitting Chancellor Bruno Kreisky coupled his
political future to the outcome.
The Federal Act of 2003 prohibited the building of new NPPs and limited the operating lifetimes of the seven existing
Belgium units to 40 years. In 2015, however, the parliament passed legislation to enable 10-year lifetime extensions. In 2018, the
government reaffirmed its phase-out policy.
Germany See Appendix A 2 for an account of Germany’s major energy strategy changes following Fukushima.
In reaction to a referendum following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Italy’s government published a new policy that
effectively cancelled Italy’s nuclear program. However, in 2008, the government proposed building 10 NPPs that would
Italy
provide 25% of Italy’s electricity needs; a referendum was scheduled for June 2011. In March 2011, however, the
Fukushima accident occurred, and 94.7% of voters rejected the government’s nuclear plans.
In Korea, 24 nuclear power units provide about one-third of the electricity supply. Four more are under construction.
Republic of In 2014, a target capacity of 42.7 GWe was set for 2035, but this target was later reduced to 28.3 GWe. The current
Korea government has expressed a goal of phasing out nuclear power over 40 years. Korea supplied the UAE with NPPs and
is also trying vigorously to export further reactors and develop new advanced designs.
Switzerland See Appendix A 3 for an account of Switzerland’s major energy strategy changes following Fukushima.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) enacted the 2025 Nuclear Free Homeland project in 2016. A
referendum on nuclear power in November 2018 showed 59% support for retaining nuclear power in Taiwan.
Taiwan Nevertheless, the DPP’s new energy strategy in January 2019 maintained the phase-out policy. However, in May 2019,
the Legislative Yuan removed the provision in Article 95 of the Electricity Act that all nuclear energy generation facilities
must stop operations before 2025. Two of Taiwan’s six reactors have been shut down since the end of 2018.

Group (d) countries considering, planning or starting nuclear power programs

Europe Croatia, Poland* and Turkey**
Middle East and Egypt,* Jordan,* Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia* and Tunisia
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria
Central and South Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela
America
Central and southern Azerbaijan, Belarus,** Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan*
Asia
Southeast Asia and Bangladesh,** Cambodia, Indonesia,* Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam
Oceania
* Projects underway
** First NPP already under construction

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 68

Appendix B: Nuclear Power Global
Status
Table B-1. Nuclear power reactors in operation and under construction worldwide as of December 31, 2020

Reactors under Nuclear electricity

Country Reactors in operation
construction generation in 2020
% of total
No. of units Total MWe No. of units Total MWe TWh
generation
Argentina 3 1 641 1 25 10.0 7.2
Armenia 1 415 2.6 34.5
Bangladesh 2 2 160
Belarus 1 1 110 1 1 110 0.3 1.0
Belgium 7 5 942 32.8 37.6
Brazil 2 1 884 1 1 340 13.2 2.2
Bulgaria 2 2 006 15.9 40.4
Canada 19 13 624 92.2 14.6
China 50 47 528 13 12 565 344.7 4.7
Czech Republic 6 3 934 28.4 37.9
Finland 4 2 794 1 1 600 22.4 34.1
France 56 61 370 1 1 630 338.7 66.4
Germany 6 8 113 60.9 11.2
Hungary 4 1 902 15.2 48.9
India 22 6 255 7 4 824 40.4 2.8
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1 915 1 974 5.8 1.9
Japan 33 31 679 2 2 653 43.1 5.1
Korea, Republic of 24 23 150 4 5 360 152.6 28.1
Mexico 2 1 552 10.9 3.5
Netherlands 1 482 3.9 3.3
Pakistan 5 1 318 2 2 028 9.6 7.1
Romania 2 1 300 10.6 20.3
Russia 38 28 578 3 3 459 201.8 19.8
Slovakia 4 1 837 2 880 14.4 56.2
Slovenia 1 688 6.0 36.9
South Africa 2 1 860 11.6 5.2
Spain 7 7 121 55.8 22.1
Sweden 6 6 882 47.4 29.8
Switzerland 4 2 960 23.0 33.5
Taiwan, China 4 3 844 30.3 11.3
Turkey 2 2 228
Ukraine 15 13 107 2 2 070 71.5 54.0
United Arab Emirates 1 1 345 3 4 035 1.6 1.2
United Kingdom 15 8 923 2 3 260 45.7 15.3
United States 94 96 553 2 2 234 789.9 19.5
Total 442 392 612 52 54 435 2 553.2 10.2
Source: IAEA (2021a, 2021b).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 69

 Table B-2: Newcomer countries.

Country status Number Countries

Belarus*, Bangladesh, Turkey, UAE*

First NPPs under construction 4 *First plant completed in 2020 – more under
construction
First NPP ordered 1 Egypt
Decision made, preparing
4 Jordan, Kenya, Poland, Saudi Arabia
infrastructure
Active preparation with no final Ghana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco,
10
decision Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan, Uzbekistan
Albania, Algeria, Chile, Croatia, DR Congo, Peru, Sri
Considering nuclear energy program 12
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia

Source: Rogner (2021).

Figure B-1. Grid-level system costs of selected generation technologies for 10% and 30% shares of variable
renewable energy generation.
Connection costs T&D grid costs Balancing costs Utilization costs

45

40

35
Total system costs, $/MWh

30

25

20

15

10

0
10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30% 10% 30%
Onshore Offshore Residential Commercial
Gas Coal Nuclear
wind wind PV PV

Source: Adapted from NEA (2018).

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 70

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Notes

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open 73

Notes

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

74
About the Authors

H-Holger Rogner

H-Holger Rogner received an M.Sc. in industrial engineering (1975) and a Ph.D. in energy
economics (1981). He started his career at the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria concentrating on global energy system modeling,
energy resource and technology assessments. From 1990-1997 he directed the System
Analysis Group’s work at the Institute for Integrated Energy Systems, University of Victoria,
Canada on hydrogen energy systems. He joined the IAEA in 1997 as section head, planning
and economic studies, leading work on comparative assessments of different energy demand
and supply options, nuclear energy, climate change and sustainable development.

Robert J. Budnitz

Robert J. Budnitz has been involved with nuclear reactor and radioactive waste safety for
many years, with an emphasis on seismic safety, probabilistic-risk-assessment methods, and
using risk insights in regulation. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering. He
retired in spring 2017 from the University of California’s (UC’s) Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, where he continues to work as an affiliate and guest scientist. From 2002 to 2007
he was at UC’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), during which period he
worked on a two-year special assignment (late 2002 to late 2004) in Washington to assist the
director of DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management to develop a new science
and technology program. Prior to joining LLNL in 2002, he ran a one-person consulting
practice in Berkeley, California for over two decades. He earned a Ph.D. in experimental
physics from Harvard in 1968 and a B.A. from Yale in 1961.

Charles McCombie

Charles McCombie is an independent strategic and technical adviser to various national and
international waste management programs and is the executive director of the Association for
Regional and International Underground Storage, or Arius. For 20 years, he was the scientific
and technical director of Nagra, the Swiss cooperative for the disposal of radioactive waste.
He has chaired the International Technical Advisory Committee and the International Board
of Counselors of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan, was vice chairman
of the U.S. National Research Council’s Board on Radioactive Waste Management, and
currently chairs the Nuclear Advisory Committee of the Paul Scherrer Institut.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

75
 Noura Y. Mansouri

Noura Mansouri is a research fellow at KAPSARC, a research affiliate at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology (MIT), and an expert at the World Energy Council (WEC). She is
the co-chair of T20 Indonesia Task Force 3 on Governing Climate Target, Energy Transition
and Environmental Protection and served as the (lead) co-chair of T20 Task Force 2 on
Climate Change and Environment/Sustainable Energy during both the Saudi and Italian G20
presidencies. Mansouri has over 16 years of research and professional experience, including
working for the Center for Global Energy Studies (London), and the French nuclear company
AREVA. She earned her M.B.A. and Ph.D. degrees in sustainability and energy transitions
from University of London. She is the author of Greening the Black Gold: Saudi Arabia’s Quest
for Clean Energy. Mansouri completed a post-doctoral research fellowship at MIT. She served
as a member of the Zayed Sustainability Prize Review Committee for 2018 and the Selection
Committee for 2019-2022, and received the 2015 Women Excellence Leadership Award. She
has many publications on climate change and sustainable energy.

Robert N. Schock

Robert Schock is an associate senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). He is also co-chair of the Energy Permanent
Monitoring Panel for the World Federation of Scientists and senior advisor and former director
of studies for the World Energy Council in London. He was a coordinating lead author (Energy
Sources) for the 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). Schock worked for 34 years at the LLNL, has served on the editorial boards of five
scientific journals and on national scientific panels for the U.S. National Research Council, the
Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation. He is an author and coauthor
of more than 150 scientific and technical papers. He holds a B.S. degree in geology from
Colorado College, an M.S. degree in geochemistry from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and
a Ph.D. in geophysics also from Rensselaer.

Adnan Shihab-Eldin

Adnan Shihab-Eldin is a member of the Board of Directors of Kearney Energy Transition

Institute (Nederland) and Gulf Bank. Adnan Shihab-Eldin is former director general of the
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (2011-2021) and former acting secretary
general and director of research at OPEC. He held earlier senior director positions at both
UNESCO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In Kuwait, he served as director
general of the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) and vice president, academic
affairs, and faculty member at Kuwait University. He continues to teach, and publish research
papers and articles in the physical and engineering sciences, as well as energy policy,
technology and economics. He is a member of many international boards of directors and
international advisory councils (IAC), including, recently, the IAC of KASPARC, the American
University of Beirut (AUB) and Georgetown University, Qatar (GU-Q), as well as a member
of the Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications (SAGNA) at the IAEA. He earned all
his university degrees from UC Berkeley and is a recipient of many prestigious international
awards and honors.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

76
About the Project
This paper has its origin in the preparation of a policy brief “Does A Climate-Constrained World
Need Nuclear Energy?” submitted to Task Force 2 on Climate Change and Environment under
Think 20 (T20) Saudi Arabia 2020 (T20TF2 2020). Given the limited word count of the policy brief
and consequently the succinct treatment of key issues, this paper was developed by the authors
as part of the activities of the Energy Permanent Monitoring Panel (Energy PMP). The Energy
PMP is one of 15 PMPs constituted by the World Federation of Scientists (WFS) to undertake
research, publish results in papers and present the findings at scientific meetings in Erice (Italy)
and other international meetings, as part of the WFS global project that aims to address planetary
emergencies.

The Energy PMP monitors scientific and technical advances in the field of energy. It fosters
the science-policy-interface (SPI) by contributing to the formulation of science-informed policy
recommendations on important energy subjects which have major impacts on the world’s security
and sustainability. Currently it focuses on: energy services to the poor; technologies and policies
to limit greenhouse gas emission including energy efficiency, renewable and nuclear energy;
international oil and gas markets; and energy and cities.

The project “Keep the Nuclear Option Open” evolved not only from the policy brief but also from the
discussions and deliberations of the series of International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary
Emergencies organized by the World Federation of Scientists (WFS) at the Ettore Majorana Centre
for Scientific Culture, in Erice, Sicily.

Over the years, these Erice Seminars have discussed many varieties of planetary emergencies,
including a large exchange of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, the seminars are not entirely devoted to world-changing threats such as nuclear war.
They also consider everyday problems that cause suffering to millions of people, such as poverty,
malnutrition and disease. In this spirit, Professor Zichichi, Chairman of the World Federation of
Scientists and founder of the Erice meetings, has focused the Seminars on everyday problems
that cause human suffering with the understanding that scientific enquiry and consequent action
can solve them. To achieve this goal, the Erice meetings bring together a wide variety of scientists,
policy analysts and government officials to have multi-disciplinary discussions concerning severe
threats to humanity as well as urgent everyday problems.

The WFS was founded in Erice, Sicily, in 1973, by a group of eminent scientists led by Isidor Isaac
Rabi and Antonino Zichichi. Since then, many other scientists have affiliated themselves with the
Federation, among them T. D. Lee, Laura Fermi, Eugene Wigner, Paul Dirac and Piotr Kapitza.
For more on the WFS, the Ettore Majorane Foundation Center, the Energy PMP and other PMPs
groups working on the global international emergencies project, visit the WFS web page, http://
www.federationofscientists.org.

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

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 www.kapsarc.org

Keeping the Nuclear Energy Option Open

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