United Nations Organizations

United Nations General Assembly

First Committee
The Disarmament and International Security
15ᵗʰ June, 2025

Draft Resolution
Agenda: “Evaluating the Regional Security Implications of the India-Pakistan conflict with
emphasis on Nuclear Deterrence and Arms control”

Sponsors: The United States of America, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, French Republic,

Signatories: Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, The Islamic Republic of Iran, The Arab
Republic of Egypt, Russian Federation, Sultanate of Oman, Malaysia, Republic of India,
Commonwealth of Australia, People’s Republic of China, The Republic of Iraq, Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, Japan, The Kingdom of Sweden,

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned by the ongoing military standoffs and cross border incidents between the
Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which continue to undermine
regional stability and risk inadvertent escalation into a broader conflict threatening
international peace and security,

Bearing in mind the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear

Catastrophe (A/ RES/36/100), which emphasizes that nuclear war would have devastating
humanitarian consequences and reaffirms the imperative of avoiding nuclear confrontation,

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Recalling Security Council Resolution 1172 , which unanimously condemned the May 1998
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan and urged both States to refrain from further nuclear tests
and resume diplomatic dialogue to ease tensions and prevent an arms race,​

Recalling Article 33 of the UN Charter, which mandates that parties to any dispute
endangering international peace should seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means,

Recognizing the emergence of sea based nuclear deterrents such as India’s INS Arihant SSBN
program and Pakistan’s cruise‑missile armed submarines and the attendant rise in ambiguity,
misperception, and escalation danger in the maritime domain,

Acknowledging that modern financial networks, particularly global payment systems like
SWIFT and CHIPS, form part of the international community’s toolkit for voluntary
economic deterrence, as seen in prior sanctions regimes leveraged to prevent proliferation
and aggression,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 49/57 on enhancing regional cooperation between

the United Nations and regional organizations such as SAARC which is a party to the 1988
Agreement on Non Attack of Nuclear Installations and Facilities, whose broader mandate has
been constrained by Indian and Pakistan tensions ,

Guided by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, which
emphasized the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of
nuclear weapons and underscored that their threat or use must comply with the principles of
necessity, proportionality, and distinction under international humanitarian law ,

Deeply concerned by the potential for illicit procurement networks to exploit complex
financial systems especially through dual use supply chains and noting that modern sanctions
regimes leverage payment messaging platforms to disrupt proliferation financing,

Noting the ongoing work of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA),
established in 1992 to enhance transparency in conventional arms transfers and thereby serve

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as a critical measure for States to report imports, exports, and holdings of major weapons
systems,

Noting the continued operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
(UNROCA), established by General Assembly resolution 46/36 and periodically reviewed by
a Group of Governmental Experts in 2024–2025, as a model for voluntary transparency in
conventional arms transfers that can be emulated in the nuclear context,

Recognizing that strengthening regional arms‑control frameworks through trilateral

workshops, expert panels, and joint risk‑reduction centers will reinforce strategic stability
while preserving each State’s sovereign deterrence options,

Emphasizing that enhanced crisis communication, maritime risk‑reduction measures, and

targeted financial safeguards are indispensable to preventing inadvertent escalation and
maintaining long‑term peace and security in South Asia,

Deeply alarmed by the gaps experienced in the enforcement mechanisms as an upshot of lack
of universally accepted definitions of non-state actors in the pre-existing international
framework,

Alarmed by the absence of any formal bilateral arms control treaty between India and
Pakistan despite both nations being de facto nuclear weapon states for over two decades, and
stressing the urgent need for sustained dialogue to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons,

Acknowledging the pivotal role that secure and transparent financial architectures play in
preventing proliferation financing, particularly through systems like SWIFT and CHIPS,
which can serve as non-kinetic instruments of arms control enforcement when applied
judiciously and multilaterally,

Bearing in mind the precedent of regional security frameworks in other geopolitical contexts
such as the Stockholm Document in Europe or ASEAN’s multilateral security mechanisms
and expressing openness to adapting similar regional risk-reduction instruments to South
Asia,

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Emphasizing on the need for international co-operation for mitigating the risks caused by
surrounding circumstances, lack of certain provisions in the pre-existing international
framework, and past instances,

1. Strongly urges Member States and relevant international financial institutions to employ
economic leverage via global payment systems to deter nuclear escalation and support
disarmament efforts by:

a.​ Excluding proliferation‑linked financial entities from SWIFT, ensuring that

banks or intermediaries identified as facilitators of illicit nuclear procurement
are barred from the global payments network, in line with existing UN
Security Council sanctions regimes,

b.​ Reserving the right to impose targeted financial penalties including asset
freezes, transaction bans, and secondary sanctions should either party
undertake actions that dangerously escalate tensions with the United States
prepared to enact such measures as a last resort to reinforce restraint and
uphold regional stability;

2. Suggests the UN Treaty on Bilateral Nuclear Transparency & Crisis Communication

(BTNTCC) Type: Universal Treaty Encouraging Structured Communication which would:

a.​ Requires state parties in bilateral strategic conflict to:

i. Establish military-to-military hotlines between nuclear command structures,

ii. Implement pre-launch notification systems for ballistic missile tests,

iii. Publish declassified summaries of nuclear doctrines annually,

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 iv. Optional compliance monitored by UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research)

3. Modernise the 1988 Nuclear Installations Non-Attack Agreement: Encourages

enhancement of the 1988 India–Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against
Nuclear Installations and Facilities, expanding its scope to cover other critical infrastructure
such as and establishing mechanisms for timely information-sharing on security threats, in
order to restore its relevance and strengthen regional nuclear safety;

4. Calls for the creation of a South Asian Maritime Nuclear Risk Reduction Framework
(SMNRRF), to be facilitated by the United States of America, French Republic and the
United Kingdom as neutral mediators, in order to decrease ambiguity and prevent incidents at
sea involving sea‑based nuclear forces:

a.​ Establishment of Maritime Risk Reduction Centers (MRRCs):

i. Co‑locate MRRCs in New Delhi and Islamabad as 24/7 liaison hubs for
real‑time exchange of submarine deployment schedules, naval missile test
notifications, and anomalous surface or under‑sea activities,

ii. Staff each MRRC with naval, technical and diplomatic officers drawn
equally from India, Pakistan and a rotating delegation of US, UK and French
experts, empowering them to validate and immediately relay urgent maritime
alerts,

b.​ A Dedicated Naval Hotline Network which would Install and regularly test
encrypted voice‑and‑data hotlines between Indian and Pakistani naval
headquarters, backed by automatic translation and priority routing protocols
and would Conduct semi‑annual “at‑sea communication drills” under UN or
third‑party supervision to ensure proficiency in crisis notifications and
de‑confliction procedures,​

c.​ Advance Notifications of Sea Based Activities which would require both
parties to notify the MRRCs at least 72 hours in advance of any planned
deterrent patrols, SLBM tests or nuclear‑capable cruise missile launches;

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5. Recommends the adoption of a phased diplomatic engagement structure between India and
Pakistan to address nuclear risk reduction and conventional arms transparency:​

a. Encourages the initiation of Track 2 dialogues (civil society and retired officials)
within 3 months, facilitated by neutral institutions such as the Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI),

b. Urges the transition to Track 1.5 discussions involving mid-level officials and
experts within 6 months of Track 2 commencement, aiming to identify common
ground on doctrines like No-First Use and safe command-and-control protocols,

c. Calls for formal Track 1 negotiations within 12 months, with involvement from the
UN Secretary-General or a designated neutral party, to discuss treaty modernization
and the codification of agreed-upon transparency initiatives;

6. Recommends the establishment of a Joint Counter-Militancy Verification Framework

between India and Pakistan, supported by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive
Directorate (CTED), which shall:

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a. Facilitate intelligence-sharing and coordinated operations aimed at dismantling
cross-border militant networks,

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b. Establish a hybrid monitoring mechanism, wherein CTED conducts periodic
evaluations and bilateral verification teams ensure on-ground compliance,

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c. Align verification procedures with obligations under UNSCR 1373, promoting
transparency, non-politicization, and legal due process,

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d. Report progress biannually to the UN Security Council and relevant regional observers
such as SAARC;

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7. Calls upon all Member States to adopt immediately a unified UN‑wide definition of
‘non-state actors,’ defined to mean any individual or group not affiliated with a State that
engages in violence or malicious cyber activity; this definition shall explicitly include
terrorists, insurgents (rebel/guerrilla groups), militias, and cyber actors;

8. Encourages the establishment of a cooperative space‐based and aerial surveillance regime

for South Asia, This would include shared access to high-resolution commercial satellite
imagery and other sensor data, with the aim of transparently monitoring nuclear test sites,
missile deployment areas and related facilities. As experts note, commercial satellites have
long been used to verify nuclear tests, and new proposals highlight that cooperative
observation “would build confidence” and reduce inadvertent escalations A joint monitoring
initiative, possibly supported by neutral partners, could maintain a shared database of images
and apply real-time analysis;

9. Recommends the establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along designated sections

of the Line of Control (LoC), to be negotiated bilaterally and structured as follows:

a. A primary demilitarized strip of 5 kilometers on each side of the LoC, wherein:

i. All deployment of heavy artillery, missile systems, permanent garrisons, and

offensive air assets shall be prohibited,​

ii. Only light border patrols with limited arms will be permitted, under mutual
notification and observation,​

b. A secondary buffer zone extending an additional 25 kilometers on each side, in

which:

i. All large-scale military exercises, troop mobilizations, and construction of

offensive infrastructure shall require prior bilateral and third-party
notification,

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 ii. Military assets exceeding a defined threshold (to be mutually agreed) shall
be temporarily or permanently relocated,​

c. Monitoring of the DMZ shall be conducted by a Joint Verification Mission,

comprising:

i. The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

(UNMOGIP),​

ii. The UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) for monitoring

non-state threats and militant movements,​

iii. Regional observers, potentially from SAARC or ASEAN+ platforms,​

d. Privileges granted to states fully adhering to DMZ conditions shall include:

i. Access to technical aid and verification technologies for border monitoring,​

ii. Eligibility for UN-sponsored military de-escalation grants,​

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e. Violation responses shall be tiered as follows:

i. First-level infractions (e.g., accidental incursions) will trigger immediate

joint investigation and a 72-hour hotline activation;​

ii. Second-level infractions (e.g., unnotified troop movement into buffer zone)
will lead to suspension of privileges and mandatory reporting to the UN
Secretary-General;​

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 iii. Third-level or deliberate violations (e.g., weapon placements in the DMZ)
will be referred to the UN Security Council under Chapter VI, and may lead to
collective condemnation and revocation of arms cooperation benefits;​

10. Encourages the establishmentUnited Nations Statute for First-Strike Prevention

and Conflict Stabilization (UNSFPCS):

a.​ Automatic Activation of Conflict Buffer Zones:

i. As soon as armed conflict is verified between two nuclear-armed countries, the UN

through a pre-approved international legal mechanism triggers the creation of
temporary boundary buffer zones,

ii. These zones would be recognized by the UN Security Council and international
law as "frozen zones of sovereignty", meaning neither country can advance without
being seen as breaching UN-sanctioned sovereignty protections;

11. UN Framework for Arms Control and War Impact Assessment in Nuclear Tense
Regions (UN-FAWN),”as a preventative and regulatory initiative under the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), designed to analyze, mitigate,
and regulate the arms buildup and humanitarian risks associated with nuclear-armed
regional rivalries, which shall:

a. Urges to Conduct regular Arms Flow Mapping exercises in regions facing high
risk of nuclear conflict such as South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Eastern Europe
by tracking:

i. The export and import of conventional and dual-use weapons systems,

ii. The proliferation of tactical nuclear delivery platforms, including short-range

missiles and mobile launchers,

iii. The role of third-party states in escalating arms races through proxy support,

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 b. Publish annual “War Implications Risk Reports (WIRRs)” evaluating the
potential fallout of armed conflict between nuclear dyads, with projections on:

i. Civilian casualty estimates,

ii. Refugee and displacement flows,

iii. Environmental and economic devastation at regional and global scales.

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