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Dependency Confusion Overview Clean

Dependency Confusion is a software supply chain vulnerability that exploits the way package managers resolve dependencies by allowing attackers to upload malicious public packages that mimic private ones. This attack was notably demonstrated by Alex Birsan in 2021, leading to significant breaches in major companies. Mitigations include prioritizing private registries, locking down package names, and conducting regular dependency audits to enhance security.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views3 pages

Dependency Confusion Overview Clean

Dependency Confusion is a software supply chain vulnerability that exploits the way package managers resolve dependencies by allowing attackers to upload malicious public packages that mimic private ones. This attack was notably demonstrated by Alex Birsan in 2021, leading to significant breaches in major companies. Mitigations include prioritizing private registries, locking down package names, and conducting regular dependency audits to enhance security.

Uploaded by

javalo1871
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Dependency Confusion: An Overview

Dependency Confusion, also known as "Substitution Attack" or "Name-Squatting Attack", is a

software supply chain vulnerability

that targets package managers (like npm, PyPI, RubyGems, etc.) by exploiting the way they resolve

dependencies in software projects.

How Dependency Confusion Works

The core of dependency confusion lies in the distinction between internal (private) and public

package registries:

1. Private Packages: Large organizations often maintain private/internal package repositories to

distribute proprietary software libraries.

2. Public Packages: Open-source packages that are distributed on public registries like npm, PyPI,

or RubyGems.

Attack Vector:

If a project uses both private and public package repositories, a malicious actor can upload a public

package to a public registry

that mimics the name of a private package.

Package Managers' Default Behavior: Many package managers prioritize public packages over

internal/private ones when fetching dependencies,

especially if the private package name is not locked down.

By uploading a package with the same name as an internal one to a public registry, the attacker can

trick the dependency resolver into pulling


the malicious public package instead of the legitimate private one. This allows the attacker to

execute arbitrary code or exfiltrate sensitive data.

Key Discovery: 2021 - Alex Birsan's Report

In early 2021, Alex Birsan, a security researcher, publicly demonstrated how this attack could be

used to infiltrate major companies by exploiting

dependency confusion in their software builds.

He successfully injected malicious code into the internal systems of well-known companies like

Microsoft, Apple, PayPal, and Tesla by publishing

packages with the same names as their internal dependencies to public repositories.

Evolution of Dependency Confusion

1. Initial Discovery (2021)

- First widespread proof-of-concept led to increased awareness of this vulnerability.

- Bug bounties and major companies were affected.

2. Response from Ecosystems and Vendors

- Package Manager Changes: Improvements in package resolution, warning messages, and

reserved namespaces.

- Private Registry Hardening: Companies started to enforce stronger security policies.

3. Increased Attention to Supply Chain Security

- Supply Chain Attacks Rise: Dependency confusion became a major part of supply chain security

concerns.

- SaaS Solutions and Tools emerged for detecting typosquatting and conducting dependency

audits.
4. Advanced Variations and Ongoing Challenges (2022-2024)

- Advanced Exploits: Attackers started combining dependency confusion with typosquatting and

hijacking abandoned packages.

- Focus on CI/CD Pipelines: Organizations worked to secure their build pipelines and prevent

malicious packages from being pulled.

- Enhanced Monitoring: Security teams began to focus on monitoring package sources for unusual

behavior.

Key Mitigations for Dependency Confusion:

1. Private Registry Prioritization: Ensure that private repositories are prioritized over public ones.

2. Namespace Lockdown: Lock down or preemptively register important package names in public

registries.

3. Dependency Whitelisting/Blacklisting: Implement strict rules on which sources packages can be

downloaded from.

4. Version Pinning: Pin exact versions of dependencies to prevent unintended upgrades or

substitutions.

5. Regular Dependency Audits: Regularly audit dependencies and their sources to ensure they are

legitimate.

Conclusion:

Dependency confusion has evolved from a novel discovery to a widespread attack vector. While

companies have responded by hardening their systems

and processes, attackers continue to explore advanced variations of this attack. It remains a crucial

concern for software supply chain security.

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