RA 9262: The Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004

People v. Genosa

Facts:

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During
their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the
couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by
her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing,
appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to
run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information
for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating
through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self-defense and defense of her unborn child. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the
cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The
Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case
to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.

Issue:

Whether the appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self
defense.

Ruling:

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self defense.

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial tothe BWS defense is
the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real
threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.

To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would
amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of
the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the

required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self
defense may be appreciated. We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not
warrant self- defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete - - on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under
the circumstances.

AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018

Facts:

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. They had two children, CCC
who was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD who was born on October 1, [Link] started working in
Singapore as a chef on May 2007 and acquired a permanent resident status on September 2008.
Respondent sent little to nothing which compelled the petitioner to fly extra hours and take additional
jobs to augment to her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB
supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman who he has been living with in Singapore.
On April 19, 2011, AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room during her visit with their
kids. The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. AAA was able to secure a Hold-Departure Order
against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, BBB filed a Motion to Quash.
The trial court granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed
the case. AAA, aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of the case, sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court via the instant petition on a pure question of
law.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over complaint for psychological abuse under
Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004 when committed through marital infidelity outside the country.

Ruling:

Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social
and economic isolation of women, is also common.” Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 encompass in a non
limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be committed against women and their children.
What R.A. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing
mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said
circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. It provides that the case may
be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While
the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable
element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence
against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may
be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City
since March 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case. We say that
even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the
reach of Philippine courts.

Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, 08 September 2020

Facts:

On October 5, 1989, AAA married Araza. Initially and at the onset of their marriage, her husband Araza
was hardworking, loving and faithful. She had no marital issues with Araza until he went to

Zamboanga City in February 2007, for their networking business. It was at this point that she began to
notice Araza’s change in behavior. One day, she received a text telling that her husband is having an
affair with their best friend. She went to see it for herself and was able to confirm that her husband was
living with another woman, a certain Tessie Luy

Fabillar. She instituted a complaint against her husband Araza and his alleged mistress, for Concubinage.
The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby Araza and
Fabillar committed themselves never to see each other again. After the case was settled, Araza again
lived with AAA. However, it was only for a short time. Without saying a word, left AAA on November
22, 2007. To her surprise, Araza had returned to live with his mistress again. In the days to come, she
would receive text messages from her husband’s supposed mistress using various numbers. The messages
would tell her that Araza is sick and needed money for medicines. There was also another text message
threatening her that she will kill AAA’s husband. Because of this, she sought legal services believing that
Araza’s liberty was being restrained by Fabillar. Based on the investigation,

Araza left their conjugal abode on his own volition and he has been living with his mistress, as
husband and wife. As a matter of fact, three children were born out of their cohabitation. The truth caused
AAA emotional and psychological suffering. An information for crime of violence against women under
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 was filed in RTC Las Pinas City. RTC ruled in favor of AAA. This was
affirmed by the CA. Aggrieved, Aaraza filed this present case.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262 although his conviction was based on facts not alleged in the Information?
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza’s conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the acts allegedly
committed by Araza?

Ruling:

1. No. The elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were sufficiently alleged in the
Information. In this case the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute the crime
charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender Araza; (2) AAA
sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering is inflicted by
Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and had three illegitimate children with her.

2. No. The CA was correct in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by
committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering. The
prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he committed
psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and
credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is
a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional anguish and mental
suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.

Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent contracted marriage in Holland in 1990 and thereafter were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. However, after a few years, the

marriage ended by virtue of a decree of divorce obtained by the respondent. As a result of divorce,
petitioner and her son returned to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to
provide financial support for their son. However, the latter never gave any support since the former’s
return to the country. Subsequently, respondent contracted another marriage in the Philippines, and since
then, has been residing in Cebu with his new wife.

In 2009, petitioner sent a letter to the respondent demanding support. However, the latter refused to
receive the same. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit against the respondent for the
latter’s unjust

refusal to support their minor child in violation of Section 5, par. e (2) of R.A. No. 9262. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the charges against the respondent do not constitute an
offense because the same is an alien. A Motion for Reconsideration was later on filed by the petitioner
reiterating the respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code. She
further argued that the failure of the respondent to comply with the same makes him liable under R.A.
No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." The MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:

Yes, for both questions. While the obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties and is not applicable to respondent under the nationality principle which provides that
family rights and duties are governed by the personal law of the nation to which such person belong, this,
however, does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

This is in consonance with the principle in international law which states that the party who seeks to
apply a foreign law to a dispute or case, has the burden of proving such foreign [Link] respondent
pleaded that under laws of the Netherlands, he is not obliged to support his son, he, however failed to
prove the same. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as domestic
law. Thus, the laws of Netherlands are presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing non-compliance therewith.

Likewise, assuming arguendo that the foreign law was properly pleaded and proved in court, said foreign
law would still not find applicability. As has been held by the High Court, when the foreign law, judgment
or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.

Hence, in the instant case, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the same is entitled thereto.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, the High Court finds that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
Under the same, the deprivation or denial of financial support to a child is considered an act of violence
against women and children. In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, the Territoriality Principle in criminal law is applicable in this case. Under Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, "penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." In this sense, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child is punishable under Philippine courts.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) led, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, namely Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old a natural child of the petitioner but whom the private
respondent adopted; Jessi Anthony J. Garci, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduardo J. Garcia, 3 years old; a veri
ed petition (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262.

She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband.

On the other hand, petitioner, Jesus Garcia, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and
deliberately isolated her from her friends.

The petitioner was guilty of infidelity and physical and emotional abuse against his wife and children. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force
that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the
lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had
seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-
Ann on the chest and slapped her many times

The RTC was able to issue several Temporary Protection Orders against the complied by the latter. Jesus
Garcia, herein, petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262, alleging that said law is violative
of the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Issues:

1) WHETHER THE R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.

2)WHETHER THE ISSUANCE OF RA 9262 TPO VIOLATES THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.

Ruling:

1) No, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the Constitution. Since, the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Hence, it
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.

The equal protection clause simply requires that all persons or things similarly \situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, and the enactment of the RA 9262 aims to
address discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women, because there have been
unequal power relations between men and women which led to domination over discrimination against
women by men. Hence, the equal protection of the laws clause of the constitution through a gender-based
classification and special remedies provided by law under RA 9262 should be sustained.

2) No, RA 9262 did not violate the due process clause of the constitution, most especially in the issuance
of Protection owner against the petitioner since, the said law states that the TPO’s purpose is to prevent
further acts of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the utilization
thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate and
uncomplicated access to the same. Thus, Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as
well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.

Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852, 30 September 2008

Facts:

Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, herein petitioner, married Steven L. Tan on April 18, 1999, from which union,
two children were born. On January 12, 2005, due to alleged verbal, psychological, and economic abuses
by Steven and his parents (respondents), Sharica filed a petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) under the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” (R.A.
No. 9262). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, initially granted a TPO on
January 25,

2005. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 7, 2005, arguing that R.A. No. 9262 does not
apply to them as they are not the woman’s husband.

Sharica opposed this motion, arguing for a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 9262. On March 7, 2005, the
RTC dismissed the petition against the respondents, interpreting R.A. No. 9262 narrowly to exclude
parents-in-law. A Verified Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC on July 11, 2005.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents-spouses, as parents-in-law, may be included in the petition for the
issuance of a protective order, under R.A. No. 9262.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, reversing and setting aside the RTC’s resolutions. The
Court highlighted that Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly allows for the supplemental application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), including the principle of conspiracy. Considering this, and given the
law’s intent for liberal construction to protect victims, the Court found that parents-in-law could be
involved in perpetrating violence and thus could be

covered under R.A. No. 9262 via the principle of conspiracy. The principle of conspiracy as stipulated in
the Revised Penal Code can be applied suppletorily to cases under the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004” (R.A. No. 9262), even if the alleged perpetrator is not the partner but a
close relative such as the parents-in-law.

Bouncing Checks (B.P. 22)

Saguiguit v. People, G.R. No. 144054, 30 June 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Nieves A. Saguiguit was charged in eight separate informations with violations of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The informations alleged that in
April 1991, in Angeles City, Saguiguit issued eight Traders Royal Bank checks to Elmer Evangelista,
knowing she had insufficient funds or that the account was closed. The checks were dishonored upon
presentment for payment with the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED,"

and Saguiguit failed to redeem them within five days of notice of dishonor.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City found Saguiguit guilty on all eight counts, sentencing
her to one year imprisonment and a fine for each count, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and ordering her to indemnify the complainant. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC's decision. Saguiguit then appealed to the Supreme Court, urging it to reexamine the established
jurisprudence on B.P. Blg. 22, particularly arguing that the mere issuance of a dishonored check should
not ipso facto be a criminal offense without an intent to commit the prohibited act, and that the checks
must be issued "on account or for value." She also sought a review of factual findings, claiming the CA's
findings differed from the RTC's.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the intent of the issuer or the purpose of the check's issuance is an essential element for
conviction under B.P. Blg. 22.

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should revisit or abandon its established jurisprudence classifying
B.P. Blg. 22 as malum prohibitum.

Ruling:

1. No. The Court reiterated its consistent jurisprudence that B.P. Blg. 22 is a malum prohibitum law,
meaning the act of issuing a dishonored check is itself the offense, regardless of the issuer's intent or

the purpose for which the check was issued. The law's objective is to prevent the circulation of worthless
checks that harm the banking system and public interest, making intent to defraud irrelevant for
conviction. 2. No. The Court affirmed its adherence to the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere,
finding no compelling reason to deviate from its long-standing interpretation of B.P. Blg. 22. It clarified
that re examining the policy or wisdom of the statute falls within the purview of the legislative branch,
not the judiciary.

Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992

Facts:

Sometime in April 1983, Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, but he did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also lacked the funds with which to
purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra
Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of
Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repairs service equipment of
which Mancor was a distributor. Corazon Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and
provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit of thirty per
centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,750.00.
Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to
look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however,
unknown to petitioner it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest. As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS
Finance entered into a leasing agreement. After documentation was completed, the equipment were
delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who unknown to
petitioner delivered it to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey
Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. The petitioner
issued another set of six (6) postdated checks Two (2) were deposited and cleared while four (4) others
were which were momentarily held by Corazon Teng did not have sufficient funds which became the
cause of the charges.

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused
petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases as follows: “x x x finding the
accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing
the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695, Q-35696 and
to pay complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks”.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is punishable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special statutory law, violations
of which are mala prohibita?

Ruling:

No. Despite there being no error that the petitioner had violated B.P. Blg. 22, a mala prohibitum law
(which does not look at the intent of the violator), the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by lessor
(Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying, possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure. It was lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

The petitioner was a victim of a modus operandi. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using a mala prohibita doctrine, the noble objective of the law is
tainted with materialism and opportunism to the highest degree. For all intents and purposes, the law was
devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user.
Least should be it used as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with somecolor of
“get-rich” scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.

Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, 18 December 1986

Facts:

Petitioners were charged with a violation of the Bouncing Check Law (Batas Pambansa Bilang 22). Said
law punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or creditor would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment” which violates the inhibition against
imprisonment for debt explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, specifically Art. 3, sec. 20 which provides
that “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax."

Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non
payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather
than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The
statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of
penal sanction.

Issue:

Whether or not the Bouncing Check Law transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt?

Ruling:

NO. The enactment of the Bouncing Check Law is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by the law is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation that the law punishes. The law is

not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act,
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only wrong to the payee or holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system, and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.

The enactment of the Bouncing Check Law is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.

Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 108738, 17 June 1994

Facts:

Roberto Cruz (petitioner) repeatedly borrowed money from Andrea Mayor, a businesswoman engaged in
lending and rediscounting checks. On April 6, 1989, Cruz borrowed P176,000.00 from Mayor and issued
Premiere Bank Check No. 057848, postdated April 20, 1989, for the same amount. When presented for
payment, the check was dishonored because the account was "account closed." Cruz promised to pay in
cash but failed. An information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) was filed against
him.

During trial, Cruz initially denied issuing the check, signing it, or knowing Mayor. However, on appeal to
the Court of Appeals, he changed his defense, admitting to issuing the check but claiming it was merely
a memorandum of indebtedness and not intended for circulation or negotiation. He also argued that
Mayor knew his account was already closed.

The trial court found Cruz guilty, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Cruz then appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for violation of BP 22 for issuing a check, even if he claims it was
merely a memorandum of indebtedness or that the payee knew his account was closed.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Roberto Cruz's conviction for violating B.P. Blg. 22. The Court
reiterated the well-established principle that B.P. Blg. 22 is a malum prohibitum statute, meaning the
gravamen of the offense is the mere act of issuing a worthless check, regardless of the drawer's intent or
the purpose for which the check was issued.

Therefore, even if Cruz intended the check merely as a memorandum of indebtedness and not for
circulation, his act of issuing a dishonored check still falls within the ambit of the law. Furthermore, the
Court held that the payee's knowledge of the drawer's insufficient funds or closed account at the time of
issuance is immaterial to the crime, as B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of issuing the bouncing check itself,
which causes damage to the banking system and public confidence. The Court also noted the
impermissibility of changing one's defense theory for the first time on appeal.

Domagsang v. CA, G.R. No. 139292, 05 December 2002

Facts:

Josephine Domagsang approached Ignacio Garcia, an assistant president of Metrobank, to ask for
financial assistance. Garcia accommodated the former and gave a long in the sum of Php 573,800.00.
Petitioner issued and delivered to Garcia 18 postdated checks for the payment of the loan. When the
checks matured and deposited, all 18 checks were dishonored for being “account closed”. Garcia
demanded payment by calling the petitioner at her office. Failing to pay, Garcia sent a demand letter for
the payment of the loan, which was ignored. On May 8, 1992, a criminal case against Domagsang was
lodged at the Regional Trial Court Makati.

On September 7, 1993, Domagsang filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of court, premised on the
absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment but as evidence of
indebtedness of petitioner, the demurrer was denied by the trial court. In the hearing of February 17,
1994, Domagsang waived her right to present evidence in her defense.

The RTC ruled against Domagsang and found her guilty of violation of BP 22, the decision was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue:

Whether an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient to convict herein petitioner for the crime of violation
of BP 22?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court acquitted Domagsang of the crime charged for reasonable doubt, while also holding
her liable to pay the sum of Php 563,800.00 with 12% legal interest per annum. The Court ruled through
the basis that BP 22 does not explicitly require a written notice of dishonor, the law’s provisions,
particularly Section 3, necessitate that the reason for dishonor must be clearly stated in any notice
provided. The Court upheld that mere verbal notice or demand is insufficient to warrant a conviction,
further upholding the principle that laws must be construed strictly against the State and Liberally in
favor of the accused.

The Court also found that the prosecution failed to establish that Domagsang had actual knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds, as there was no formal written notice of dishonor presented. The absence of such
notice deprived her of the opportunity to avert prosecution, which is a fundamental aspect of procedural
due process. The Court also noted that the prosecution did not formally offer the alleged written demand
letter into evidence, which further weakened the case against the petitioner.

Campos vs. People, G.R. No. 187401

Facts:

Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's Credit Corporation in
the amount of P50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed
installment payments. Fourteen of these checks drawn against her account were dishonored when
presented for payment. The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be

drawn against a "closed account."

After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged
before the MeTC. The MeTC rendered the accused convicted of fourteen counts of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Campos appealed to the RTC and rendered its decision upholding Campos'
conviction. Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Campos
moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is meritorious.

Ruling:

No. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have suffcient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and the subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos through
the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity
in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but
as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the
check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P.
22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2
of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 163494

Facts:

In 1983, Tan Tiac Chiong, morley known as Ernesto Tan, entered into several business transactions with
Jesusa T. Dela Cruz, supplying textile materials worth Php 27,090,641.25. In exchange for these
materials, Dela Cruz post dated checks made payable to Cash. When the said checks matured and
deposited, said checks were dishonored due to “drawn against insufficient funds” or “account closed”.
Dela Cruz then issued replacement checks which were also

dishonored. Tan filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 in March 1989. The petitioner pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution, presenting its evidence, were faced
with no evidence presented by the defense after multiple postponements.

On August 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner of 23 counts of violating BP 22,
sentencing her to one year of imprisonment for each count and ordering her to indemnify Tan. Dela Cruz
appealed the ruling to the CA, which the latter affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether a conviction may be warranted when the petitioner received no notice of dishonor?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court acquitted Dela Cruz for reasonable doubt but held her liable to indemnify Tan
equivalent to Php 6,226,390.29 with interest. The Supreme Court based its ruling on the fact that the
petitioner was not notified of the scheduled hearings, which led to her being deemed to have waived her
right to present evidence. The prosecution also failed to prove that the petitioner received a notice of
dishonor for the checks, which is crucial for establishing the second element of the offense under BP 22.
The absence of such notice deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to settle her obligations before
criminal prosecution, thus violating her procedural due process rights. While Dela Cruz was acquitted
from the crime committed, the same cannot be said for her obligation, the Court held her liable for the
payment of civil damages.

Syndicated Estafa (P.D. 1689)\

Hao v. People, G.R. No. 183345, 17 September 2014

Facts:
Private complainant Dy invested P10,000,000.00 in State Resources relying on Ngo and Ma. Gracia
Hao’s promise that he will earn a higher investment return. The initial investment earned the promised
interests which pushed Dy to increase his investments and in return, Gracia issued checks by Dy
representing his earnings for his investment. However, the checks she issued were subsequently
dishonored. When Dy sought for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks, he discovered that
Gracia invested hiis money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao.
Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy’s money.

Dy filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa
penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689.

Issue:

Whether the estafa was committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate

Ruling:

The third element of syndicated estafa is wanting, thus, only simple estafa by means of deceit was
committed in this case. There are different modes by whic estafa may be committed. One of these modes
is estafa by means of deceit as outlined in Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Under this
provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which induced him to part withhis money or property; and
4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage. Applying the foregoing, petitioners induced Dy to
invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse
to secure his money to be used in

Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they
admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. Deceit is the false representation of
a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury.

Now on to the issue as to whether estafa was committed through a syndicate, the factual circumstances
merely showed that there is probable cause for simple estafa and the number of accused who allegedly
participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five. However, it did not show that there are other

people aside from Dy who fell victim to the ruse conducted by the petitioners. The third element provides
that the funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must come from the general public, which is
absent in this case.

HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, 31 July 2018

Facts:
Globe Asiatique entered into various Funding Commitment Agreements (FCAs) and Memoranda of
Agreement (MOA) with the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), also known as the Pag-Ibig
Fund, allowing the former to pre-process and collect monthly amortizations on the loans obtained by its
buyers. The Special Other Working Group (OWG) Membership Program was then introduced where
HMDF members who were not formally employed but derived income from non-formal sources. HDMF
released funds to Globe Asiatique amounting to billions of pesos, however, it allegedly discovered
fraudulent activities and false representations committed by the latter. Due to the OWG Membership
Program or the “special buyer scheme,” there were borrowers who were unaware of the loans, or merely
agreed to the same in exchange of a fee, or their location was unknown or non-inexistent, incurring
damages amounting to P1.04 billion.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly reversed the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ insofar as it
found probable cause to charge Sagun with syndicated estafa,

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in reversing the review resolution of the DOJ. The concept of probable cause has
been discussed in Napoles v. De Lima as follows: x x x During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor
determines the existence of probable cause for filing an information in court or dismissing the criminal
complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation
whether "there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." At this stage, the
determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this
determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial
function. No less than the Constitution commands that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]" Based on the foregoing elements of syndicated
estafa, the Court holds that the CA did not err in reversing the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the
DOJ insofar as Sagun was concerned and in quashing the warrants of arrest issued against the
respondents.

Given the rationale and purpose behind the enactment of P.D. No. 1689, it becomes inevitable to
conclude that the crime of syndicated estafa can only be committed by the enumerated groups created for
the sole purpose of defrauding its members through misappropriating the funds solicited from and
contributed by them. Evidently, the evil sought to be prevented by [Link]. 1689 does not exist in this
case.

Thus, the CA did not err in reversing the resolution of DOJ taking into consideration that an essential
element of the crime filed as indicated in the complaint or information by the latter was absent.

Debuque vs. Nilson, G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021

Facts:
A Complaint-Affidavit for Syndicated Estafa was filed by respondent Matt C. Nilson before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against petitioner Ramon H. Debuque and other accused. Nilson
alleged that during his tenure as Managing Director of Tongsat in the early 1990s, he established a
business relationship and subsequent friendship with Atty. Ignacio D. Debuque, Jr. The friendship led to
numerous

instances where Atty. Debuque borrowed sizable funds from Nilson, promising to yield large profits
through a prospective business venture.

Atty. Debuque, acting on behalf of himself and the other accused (including relatives and key
officers/shareholders of Investa Land Corporation or ILC), invited Nilson to join a business venture.
Nilson was promised shares in ILC equivalent to the amounts he advanced, as well as participation in the
potential rise in the value of commercial lots allegedly purchased in General Santos City. Specific
transactions included: Payment of ₱6 million on September 20, 1997, as his share in the purchase of
commercial lots. Payment of ₱3 million on November 19, 1997, purportedly in exchange for a release of
a pledged title (TCT No. 203836), which turned out to be questionable. Additional monetary
contributions by Nilson and his wife, Racquel, intended for advancing the operational funds and equity
of ILC.

Issue:

Whether the alleged relationship of the accused as relatives and officers of ILC was sufficient to impute a
joint conspiracy or establish the presence of a syndicate as required by PD 1689.

Ruling:

The elements of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are as follows: (a) there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and, (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage

This relation, PD 1689 imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death if the estafa is committed by a
syndicate, defined as a group of "five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme...". Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are
as follows: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is
committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five [5] or more persons; and, (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

The Court found that there was no syndicate or conspiracy involving Ramon and the other accused in
defrauding Matt Nilson. It concluded that Atty. Debuque acted alone and without authority from the other
shareholders or officers of Investa Land Corporation (ILC), including Ramon. There was no evidence
showing that the other accused participated in or were aware of Debuque’s dealings with Nilson, nor did
Ramon commit any independent act of fraud.
The Court emphasized that being related to Atty. Debuque or holding corporate positions in ILC did not
establish conspiracy, especially in the absence of any overt act supporting a joint scheme to defraud.
Thus, only Atty. Debuque was found liable for estafa. However, since he had already passed away, no
criminal case for estafa could proceed against him. The DOJ correctly identified him as solely
responsible in its 2007 resolution.

People vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 234818, November 5, 2018

Facts: The instant case stemmed from thirty-three (33) separate Informations6 filed before the RTC each
charging Felix and his co-accused, namely, Iris Z. Aquino (Iris), Eleanor Macabbalug, Genalyn Nasol,
Arturo Delgado, Jr., Pearl Militar, and Catherine Anna Dela Cruz of the aforesaid crime.

Contrary to law

The prosecution alleged that spouses Felix and Iris are the owners of Everflow Group of Companies, Inc.
(Everflow), with the latter being its chairperson. Private complainants alleged that on various dates
between 2000 and 2002, they were convinced by Iris and Felix to invest their money in Everflow. When
complainants went back to Everflow to get their investments, Felix promised the return of their money.
After the closure of Everflow because of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, they demanded the return of their money, but to no avail. Thus, they were
compelled to file multiple charges of Syndicated Estafa against Felix, Iris, and their co-accused who are
allegedly members of the board of directors of Everflow.

In a Joint Decision dated July 22, 2014, the RTC found Felix guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sixteen
(16) counts15 of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment for each count.16 It further ordered him to pay the total amount of P2,323,504.00 and
US$4,983.00,17 with legal interest from the filing of the Information until fully paid. Aggrieved, Felix
appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated July 28, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.

Issue:

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Felix is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Syndicated Estafa.

Ruling: The appeal is without merit. The elements of Estafa as contemplated in Art. 315. Swindling
(estafa) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a

result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is committed by a syndicate
of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)" or farmers' association, or
of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Felix and his co-accused repeatedly induced
the public to invest in Everflow on the undertaking that their investment would yield a huge percentage
of returns. Under such lucrative promise, the public as represented by private complainants were enticed
to invest their hard-earned money into Everflow. Lest it be misunderstood, not all proposals to invest in
certain business ventures are tainted with fraud. As case law instructs,

In this light, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa are present in the
instant case, as shown in the following circumstances: (a) the officers/directors of Everflow, comprising
of Felix and his co-accused who are more than five (5) people, made false pretenses and representations
to the investing public, i.e., private complainants, regarding a lucrative investment opportunity with
Everflow in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made
prior to and simultaneous with the commission of fraud, which is made more apparent by the fact that
Everflow was not authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to solicit investments from the
public in the first place; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested various amounts of
money into Everflow; and (d) Felix and his co-accused failed to deliver their promised returns and ended
up running away with private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

As such, Felix's conviction for twenty-one (21) counts of Syndicated Estafa must be upheld. Accordingly,
he should suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count of the aforesaid crime.