DO YOU BELI EV E?

A B O O K S E R I E S F R O M R AT I O C H R I S T I

SCIENTISM

B Y J . P. M O R E L A N D
FAITH & R E A SO N are at odds in our culture. For many,
faith has come to mean little more than wishful thinking and
blind belief. Such a concept is completely foreign to the pages
of Scripture and historical Christianity. As Edward Feser notes,
“In short, reason tells us that there is a God and that he has re-
vealed such-and-such a truth; faith is then a matter of believing
what reason has shown God to have revealed. In that sense faith
is not only not at odds with reason but is grounded in reason.”

W H AT I S R ATI O CH R I S TI ?

Ratio Christi, Latin for "the reason of Christ," wants to help reverse
this trend of anti-intellectual Christianity. We organize apologetics
clubs at colleges, universities, and even for high school groups in order
to strengthen the faith of Christian students and faculty and challenge
the rampant atheism and secularism on most campuses. Our mission
is to fill the intellectual gap, to make Christianity something worth
thinking about, both personally and in the public square.

R ATI O C H R I S TI I S H I R I N G A P O LO G I S T S .

Ratio Christi isn’t just another apologetics organization. We use our

theological training to share the Gospel on college and university cam-
puses across the globe. We reach the people that nobody else can – and
we need your help.

[Link]/join | info@[Link]

NOTE: Some of the content in this booklet may not necessarily represent the views of
every person involved with, or the official position of, Ratio Christi. Ratio Christi’s official
statement of faith can be seen at [Link]/about/beliefs
 C H A PT ER 1
WH Y S H O U LD I S PE N D TI M E LE A R N I N G
A BO U T SCI E NTI S M ?

Since my childhood I have loved the sciences. In college, I majored in physical chem-
istry. When done correctly, science produces spectacular and beneficial insights into the
physical world. However, one set of ideas about science is foolish, mediocre, and insignif-
icant. The name given to this cluster of ideas is “scientism,” a viewpoint which promotes
science as the only reliable path to knowledge about reality. If scientism is so abundantly
silly, however, then why would I write a booklet about it? That’s a good question, and the
purpose of this chapter is to answer it. I will alert you to how widespread these ideas are
and how many well-educated people espouse them. Further, I want to inform you of how
hazardous these ideas are to your life.

Scientism is in our Drinking Water

As stated above, scientism is the philosophical doctrine that the only way—or, at
least, the vastly superior way—of knowing truths about reality is through the accepted
methods and theories of the hard, empirical sciences. All other fields of study—e.g., phi-
losophy, ethics, theology, history, and literature fail to give us knowledge of reality and
truth. According to philosopher of science, Tom Sorrell, “Scientism is the belief that, es-
pecially natural science, is [by far] the most valuable part of human learning—much the
most valuable part because it is [by far] the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial.
Other beliefs related to this one may also be regarded as scientistic, e.g., the belief that
science is the only valuable part of human learning…” 1
Since the 1920s in North America, scientism has grown slowly, steadily, and imper-
ceptibly. For some time now, scientism has been so pervasive and widely adopted, that it
is now the subconscious assumption of most Americans even if they aren’t consciously
aware of embracing it. For example, science is given vastly more intellectual respect and

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 authority than the humanities, the arts, ethics, and theology. To see how subtly entrenched
scientism is, consider the following examples:

Example 1: Time Magazine: On June 25, 2001, Time magazine featured

an article by Michael Kinsley defending stem-cell research on human embryos. He wrote:
“These [embryos] are microscopic groupings of a few differentiated cells. There is nothing
human about them, except potential—and, if you choose to believe it, a soul.” 2 Note first
that his conclusion is bad science; the claim that there is nothing really “human” about
human embryos a scientifically absurd statement contradicted by all the standard text-
books of embryology!
More importantly, I want to draw your attention to a part of Kinsley’s sentence that
you may not have noticed. Reread it carefully and observe what he presupposes: we know
scientific facts about human embryos, but we only believe or blindly accept the existence
human souls. For Kinsley, belief in a soul is not an item of knowledge. In his view, there is
no evidence for it. He would probably put it in the category of a unicorn. You can believe it
if you want, perhaps because someone told you that it exists or because you wish that such
a creature is out there, but you’ve never seen or heard or touched a unicorn, so your belief
does not count as knowledge. Kinsley undoubtedly thinks this kind of belief belongs in the
pages of fantasy literature, not in the items of what we can truly know and be justified in
believing. Michael Kinsley is not merely advocating science here; he’s expressing scientism.

Example 2: Marilyn vos Savant: For a long time, Marilyn vos

Savant (listed in the Guinness Book of World Records as the human with the highest
recorded IQ) has written a column in Parade Magazine entitled “Ask Marilyn,” where
people submit questions and Savant provides answers. In one post, a man explains that
his parents raised him in a certain religion. Now an adult, he still likes the religion, but his
friends are trying to get him to rationally consider others. He wonders if Savant thinks he
should consider his friends’ arguments or just go on accepting his parents’ religion.
Here is Savant’s response: “You’re smarter than those friends. Religions cannot be
proved true intellectually. They come from the heart—and your parents—not the mind.
In my opinion, you have behaved wisely [by not listening to your friends’ “arguments”].” 3
Marilyn vos Savant has no problem with this man holding to his parents’ religious be-
liefs; “no harm, no foul” she might say. But she’s critical of his friends for trying to reason
with him or to persuade him that other religious beliefs are more compelling or truthful
or accordant with the evidence.
From reading her columns over the years, I assure you Marilyn would not say that sci-
ence comes from the heart and not the mind or that it comes from what your parents told
you. Scientific claims can be known; religious claims cannot. Once again, this attitude is
not one of science but scientism.

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 Example 3: Scientism in School: Scientism is not just found among
those writing columns in popular magazines. It is also the required dogma in our schools,
where it directly challenges Christianity’s claim to be a knowledge tradition. For exam-
ple, consider the Science Framework issued by the state of California in 1989, designed
to guide its public school’s science curricula. The document offered teachers advice
about how to address students who expressed reservations about the theory of biological
macroevolution:

At times some students may insist that certain conclusions of science cannot be true
because of certain religious or philosophical beliefs they hold. . . . It is appropriate
for the teacher to express in this regard, “I understand that you may have person-
al reservations about accepting this scientific evidence, but it is scientific knowledge
about which there is no reasonable doubt among scientists in their field, and it is
my responsibility to teach it because it is part of our common intellectual heritage.” 4

This statement’s significance comes not so much from its promoting evolution over
creation. The problem is the picture of knowledge it presupposes, that knowledge about
reality comes solely from science. Only empirical knowledge claims derived from the hard
sciences deserve the backing of public institutions.
Such reasoning implies that religious and philosophical claims are merely matters of
private feeling, which, by extension, downplays the significance of ethics, political theory,
and religion. Science, then, becomes associated with words such as “conclusions,” “evi-
dence,” and “knowledge,” while words like “beliefs” and “personal reservations” are asso-
ciated with non-empirical claims. This phrasing gives science the “right” to define reality,
while denigrating religious beliefs as mere ungrounded opinions. Put simply, the state of
California is requiring that all students must abide by the dictates, not merely of science,
but of scientism.
I could multiply examples ad nauseum, but the point has been made. Scientism has so
pervaded our institutions that scientists have become the priests of a secularized culture.

Scientism: A Silent Killer

At this point, you may be wondering what all of this has to do with you. Plenty. Ideas
matter. Indeed, we are largely at the mercy of our ideas. More importantly, having true
ideas and knowing they are true is necessary for living a flourishing life and sustaining
a healthy society. As scientism has become more pervasive in our culture, the Western
world has turned increasingly secular, and the power centers of culture (the universities,
the media and entertainment industry, the Supreme Court) regard religion as a private su-
perstition. And when our children go to college, unsurprisingly, many of them are giving

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 up on Christianity for no good reason. Culturally, we are all socialized to accept scientism.
As a result, we lose our ability to achieve knowledge and wisdom about things that matter
most in life—knowable answers to whether God exists and, if so, what is God like? Is
there any meaning/purpose to life and how do I know? Is there objective right and wrong?
What is a good person and how does one become a wise, good, and flourishing individual
filled with peace, joy, and a heart that loves and serves others? Is there life after death and,
if so, what is it like? None of these questions (and many more like them) can be answered
by the hard sciences, yet knowing the truth about them is essential to a robust and thriving
life, marriage, and culture.
Additionally, scientism has created at least five cultural shifts that prevent all of us
from being the kind of people we know deep down that we should be. See if you can
pinpoint the role scientism has played in facilitating each of these shifts:

• Morality and Christian theology, once understood as fields of knowledge,

have become items of blind faith and emotion
• The pursuit of wisdom, character, and objective knowledge has been traded
for instant gratification and satisfaction of desire
• Knowledge of objective moral truths, duties and virtues has succumbed to
moral relativism and constructivism
• Freedom, once defined as the ability to do what one ought, has been redefined
as the right to do what one wants
• Tolerance, once defined as treating respectably people who disagree, is now
thought to entail never judging that another’s beliefs or behaviors are wrong
in the first place.

In these and other ways, scientism has done tremendous damage to us all. But that
does not tell us whether scientism is true or rational. To this topic we now turn.

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 C H A PT ER 2
W H Y I S SCI E NTI S M A N
I R R ATI O N A L VI E WP O I NT ?

Years ago, I was invited to speak at an evangelistic event at a home in Baltimore. I

was warned by a Christian friend that he was bringing his boss, a man who had been
a chief engineer for decades and was finishing a belated Ph.D. in physics from Johns
Hopkins University. He apparently went out of his way to ridicule Christians for their
intellectual ignorance.
Upon being introduced to me at the dessert table, the gentleman wasted no time in
making his views known and his condescension clear: “I understand you are a philosopher
and theologian,” he said with a patronizing tone. Before I could respond, he proclaimed,
“I used to be interested in those things when I was a teenager. But I have outgrown those
interests. I know now that the only sort of knowledge of reality is that which can and has
been quantified and tested in the laboratory. If you can measure it and test it scientifically,
you can know it. If not, the topic is nothing but private opinion and idle speculation!” He
certainly was not lacking in confidence, but his claims were not so plausible as he assumed.

Strong Scientism is Self-Refuting

There are two forms of scientism: strong and weak. This gentleman was expressing
strong scientism, the viewpoint that the only knowledge or rationally justified belief we can
have about reality are those that have been certified by (especially) the hard sciences. Un-
fortunately, strong scientism is not only false, it could not possibly be true, any more than
2+2 could equal 17! And no amount of future scientific discoveries will change this fact.
Here’s why: strong scientism is self-refuting, meaning that it refutes or undermines itself.
Strong scientism asserts that science is the only path to knowledge, but it cannot itself be
certified by the hard sciences; it is self-refuting. Thus, even God could not create a word in
which strong scientism is true.

5
 Let’s go back to my encounter with the physicist in Baltimore. After allowing the
gentleman speak for two to three minutes, and I interrupted him with an expression of
puzzlement: “Sir, you have made thirty to forty assertions in the last few minutes, and as
far as I can tell, not one of them can be quantified, measured, and scientifically tested in
the laboratory. But this places me in an awkward position. By your own standards, all you
have been doing in our conversation is spouting your private opinions and idle specula-
tion. Given this, I am wondering why I or anyone else ought to give you the time of day or
think a single thing you said is knowably true.”
The gentleman’s face turned red—obviously, no one had ever pointed this out to
him—and he quickly changed the subject! It is an uncomfortable thing to realize that
one’s beliefs are so absurd that they disprove themselves. But that is precisely the predica-
ment for anyone who knowingly affirms strong scientism.

Scientism Undercuts Core Scientific Assumptions

In addition to strong scientism there is a weaker form. Weak scientism acknowledges

the existence of truths apart from the hard sciences, granting them some minimal rational
status even if they don’t have scientific support. Nevertheless, weak scientism still implies
that science is by far the most authoritative sector of human knowing. If a conflict arises
between an accepted view in a hard science and a view in, say, philosophy, the scientific
claim always wins. If neuroscientists claim there is no soul, but a group of highly respected
philosophers argue that there is, the former must win because their assertion is scientific.
Like strong scientism, weak scientism is utterly irrational and false. To show this, I will
present two kinds of arguments against it. In my view, they are equally affective against
strong scientism, but here I limit my focus to the weak version. In 1980, philosopher John
Kekes made a crucial point about science and philosophy as competing paradigms for
rationaliy. The following numbered points will help us track his argument.

1. A successful argument for the claim that science is the paradigm of rationality
must be based on the demonstration that the presuppositions of science are
preferable to other presuppositions.
2. That demonstration requires showing that science, relying on these presuppo-
sitions, is better at solving some problems and achieving some ideals than its
competitors.
3. But showing the superiority of scientific presuppositions cannot be the task
of science.
4. It is, in fact, one task of philosophy.

6
 5. Thus the enterprise of justifying the presuppositions of science by showing
that with their help science is the best way of solving certain problems and
achieving some ideals is a necessary precondition of the justification of science.
6. Hence philosophy, and not science, is a stronger candidate for being the para-
digm of rationality. 5

Shortly, I will list some of these presuppositions. The issues before us are these: (1)
The nature and content of the presuppositions are not scientific; they are philosophical. So,
the task of stating and clarifying each assumption is a philosophical and not a scientific
one. (2) The job of defending, criticizing, and offering alternatives to each presupposition is
a philosophical one and not within the competence of science. With this in mind, here is a
list of some crucial philosophical presuppositions of science:

1. A world exists “out there,” independent of mind, language, or theory.

2. The nature of the world is orderly, especially its “deep structure” that lies
under and beyond the manifest world of ordinary perception.
3. Objective truth exists and truth is a correspondence between a proposition or
assertion and reality.
4. Our sensory and cognitive faculties are reliable for gaining truth and knowl-
edge of the world, including the world’s deep structure that lies beyond the
sense perceptible world.
5. Various types of intrinsic values and objective “oughts” exist (e.g., one ought
to report one’s data honestly; one ought to prefer the simpler to the more com-
plex theory, all things being equal).
6. The laws of logic and mathematics exist, are presupposed by science, and are
known in non-scientific, non-empirical ways.

Some Non-Scientific Facts are More Certain Than Any Scientific Facts

I was in the middle of a nine-day stay in the hospital following the removal of a can-
cerous tumor in my colon on April 27, 2016. During that time, several different shifts of
nurses had come and gone. On this particular day, a new nurse came to care for me, and
take my vital readings.
As we chatted, she asked me what I did for a living. I told her I was a philosophy pro-
fessor. “Where did you go to school?” she asked. Working backwards, I explained that my
Ph.D. in philosophy is from the University of Southern California, my M.A. in philosophy

7
 is from the University of California at Riverside, my Th.M. in theology is from Dallas
Seminary, and my B.S. in physical chemistry is from the University of Missouri.
A puzzled look came on her face. She mused out loud that I had taken two very un-
related, divergent paths. Before she could explain, I asked if this was what she meant: I
started off in science, which deals with reality—hard facts—and conclusions that could be
proved to be true. But theology and philosophy were, well, fields in which there were only
private opinions or personal feelings, where no one was right or wrong, or if they were, no
one could know who was right. Science was cognitive, and theology and philosophy were
personal and emotional. Looking surprised, as though I had read her mind, she acknowl-
edged that my understanding was exactly what she had in mind.
My nurse had absorbed weak scientism without knowing it, so I told her that we have
more certainty for many non-scientific facts that for many scientific facts. For example, we
have more evidence that objective moral truths exist than that electrons exist. As an illus-
tration, consider the following item of moral knowledge: “It is wrong to torture babies for
the fun of it.” Now it is not hard to imagine some possible scenario by which, in fifty years,
most people in our culture the could be deluded into rejecting this moral truth. But it is
very hard to imagine what we could learn in fifty years that would make this truth irratio-
nal to believe, or what evidence we might gain that would overturn it. It is self-evidently
and intuitively obvious. In fact, one can know it is true without knowing how one knows
it is true. We just do. If someone claims he doesn’t know that it is wrong to torture babies
for fun, that person needs therapy, not an argument!
Now, is the same thing true of electrons? Not at all—as the history of the electron
demonstrates. 6 Consider the different views of an electron held by J. J. Thomson (1856–
1940), Niels Bohr (1885–1962), and contemporary quantum physicists. Thomson, an
English physicist who won the Nobel Prize in Physics, is credited with discovering and
identifying the electron. He held that electrons were non-orbiting, negatively charged par-
ticles embedded in an atom much like raisins are embedded in plum pudding. He favored
the view that the force an electron exerted on another object was like fluid in the ether (a
view that presupposed absolute space and time). According to Thomson, the entire mass
of an atom was due to electrons (e.g., he thought an atom of hydrogen had 1836 electrons).
Bohr, a Danish physicist who also won the Nobel Prize in Physics and made import-
ant observations about quantum theory and atomic structure, disagreed with Thomson.
Rather than viewing electrons as non-orbiting, he argued that they orbit but only in dis-
crete, specific circular orbitals at specific energy levels. Electrons, according to Bohr, can
jump from one energy level to another, but they have no location (or at least no definable
location) in the space between orbitals involved in such a jump.
The current model of the electron is part of modern quantum theory and is distinct
from both Bohr’s and Thomson’s models. One interesting question of current quantum
theory is whether the constituents of the universe, including electrons, should be taken
as physical or non-physical according to some form of metaphysical idealism. Another

8
feature is that electrons are considered to be probability clouds around an atom’s nucleus.
Now, when I asked the nurse if she believed in electrons, my question was intention-
ally ambiguous. I should have specified which electron I was asking about. We no longer
believe that “Thomsonian electrons” exist. While features of “Bohr’s electrons” have been
retained in current theory, it is a legitimate question as to whether there ever were any such
things as Bohr electrons, given what we now take electrons to actually be. Does current
theory refine or replace Bohr’s? At the present time, it is difficult to say.
But why take you through this mini crash-course on the history of the electron? To
illustrate the key point that as the science of a particular area moves forward, older views
of some entities are often abandoned, such that scientists no longer believe there ever were
such entities.
The history and theory of the electron is hardly an isolated example. Wikipedia has
an entire page devoted to “Superseded Scientific Theories,” ranging across the disciplines
of biology, chemistry, physics, astronomy and cosmology, geography and climate, geology,
psychology, etc. But, then, is it hard to imagine that in fifty years, no one will think it
rational to believe in electrons as they are currently depicted? Given the history of sci-
ence’s track record for abandoning old theories and the alleged entities that populated
them, it is not at all hard to imagine such a situation. Thus, the strength of one’s belief
in the quantum electron should be appropriately curtailed. Consequently, it seems clear
that our knowledge of the moral truth listed above (the wrongness of torturing babies) is
known with greater rational strength than our knowledge that electrons (i.e., our current
understanding of electrons) exist. Weak scientism does not allow for this case and, thus,
weak scientism is false.
In fact, there are many non-scientific truths that we can know with more certainty
than many scientific truths. For example, the laws of logic and math are items of philo-
sophical knowledge – not scientific knowledge. And yet, our knowledge that 2+2=4 is
more certain than most scientific knowledge. Similarly, when we experience a conscious
state like a thought or a pain, we are far more certain of the content of such conscious
states than we are of the scientific data on our brain states. In fact, in order to correlate
any brain state with particular thoughts or experiences, scientists have to ask the subject
what is going on in their consciousness while they measure the brain state. The scientif-
ic knowledge of the brain is almost entirely dependent on the private experience of the
knower himself.
I conclude that strong and weak scientism are false and irrational, no matter who
affirms them. In exploring these issues, I have frequently used philosophy in my argu-
ments, so now is a good time to raise a related question: What is the relationship between
philosophy and the hard sciences?

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 C H A PT ER 3
H OW DO PH I LOSO PH Y A N D SCI E N CE
R E L ATE TO E ACH OTH E R ?

To put the matter simply, philosophy operates outside, underneath, and inside of science.
I know that statement isn’t very helpful, so I’ll unpack and illustrate each mode of philo-
sophical involvement with science.

Outside and Underneath: First-philosophy and the Autonomy and

Authority Theses.

What, exactly, is first philosophy? Roughly, first philosophy is the notion that there
is a realm of rational investigation that is the proper domain of philosophy. Within this
realm, philosophical inquiry is independent of and more basic than science, and it gives us
knowledge of the topics within its domain, including knowledge of reality. Hence, science
is built upon the foundational results of first philosophy.
Philosopher George Bealer unpacked first philosophy into the following two theses:

The Autonomy of Philosophy: . . . Most [of the central questions in philosophy] can in
principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying
substantively on the sciences.

Examples of this thesis are numerous. The development and interpretation of various
systems of logic, for example, depend upon no scientific investigation. Similarly, meta-
ethics and normative ethics are largely independent of science. Other foundational phil-
osophical questions are similar, such as the metaphysical study of whether properties are
universals, particulars, or mere words. The development of different theories of free will
is another such example. In these areas and many others, philosophy generally progresses
without requiring input from the sciences.

10
 The Authority of Philosophy: [When] science and philosophy . . . answer the same
central philosophical questions . . . the authority of philosophy in most cases can be
greater in principle. 7

First philosophy has been central to philosophical thought since Plato. Since the
advent of scientism in the mid-twentieth century, however, the public has had little expo-
sure to philosophy in our educational system. As a result, the idea of first philosophy has
fallen into disfavor. The autonomy and authority theses are frequently violated by those
who have little understanding of first philosophy and its significance.
One illustration of this comes from The Grand Design, by Stephen Hawking and
Leonard Mlodinow. In this book, Hawking and Mlodinow claim that quantum physics
has made the need for a creator and designer superfluous. 8 How? The universe can “create
itself.” It came into existence out of nothing; no creation necessary! Now this claim upset
the faith of many believers because it was the considered judgment of a scientist, indeed,
one of the top living scientists. Unfortunately, Hawking and Mlodinow may well be great
scientists, but they are very poor philosophers. They failed to grasp that their concept
of “nothing” is not the same as the philosophical one, and it is the philosophical notion
which is relevant one to deciding on the “need” for a Creator. For Hawking and Mlodi-
now, “nothing” means a quantum vacuum, which contains energy and is itself located in
space. The universe comes into being spontaneously as a fluctuation of the energy in the
vacuum.
But this is hardly a case of the universe coming into being from nothing! The philo-
sophical notion of nothing is the complete and total lack of any being whatsoever, includ-
ing the absence of particles, causal powers, fields, properties, and so on. Given this notion
of nothing, it is self-evident that, necessarily, something cannot come from nothing with-
out a cause, because there is nothing to come from! Here, philosophical considerations
carry more weight than do the scientific claims about the “same” topic.

Inside: Philosophy operates within Science

Finally, philosophy operates within science in at least three ways. First, philosophy
analyzes and clarifies concepts used in scientific investigation. Second, philosophy spec-
ifies and defends key features of reality appropriated by science. And finally, philosophy
confronts science with external conceptual problems. We will look at each of these tasks
in turn.
(1) Conceptual analysis and clarity: Scientific theories often have fuzzy, seemingly
contradictory or circular concepts that philosophical analysis can clarify. Here’s one ex-
ample. Some critics claim that the evolutionary notion of survival of the fittest is circu-
lar. It is sometimes defined as a process which selects for those traits that contribute to

11
 survival. And which traits contribute to survival? They are the ones that evolutionary
processes select. Different philosophers have responded in different ways to this conceptu-
al confusion, and in doing so, they resolve this difficulty.
(2) Scientific theories use various philosophical concepts, such as Leibniz’s Law of the
Indiscernibility of Identicals, the distinction between essential and accidential properties,
and so on. These ideas and others have been rigorously analyzed by philosophers and they
can make a scientific theory that employs such concepts more precise.
(3) An External Conceptual Problem (ECP) is a rationally justified belief that is part
of a non-scientific discipline, but enters into scientific evaluation when that belief chal-
lenges or contradicts some aspect of scientific investigation. Scientific theories need to
solve empirical problems, and ECPs are relevant to those theories because they may not
square with scientific observations. For example, there are rigorous philosophical argu-
ments that provide significant justification for the claim that the universe must have had a
beginning. Now, if a scientific theory is developed that entails an eternal universe, that sci-
entific theory must be evaluated in light of the philosophical reasons to think otherwise.

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 C H A PT ER 4
WH AT A R E SO M E WAYS TH AT WE
E XPL AI N TH I N G S ?

Explaining things is the heart of an intellectually virtuous life. However, there are
different types of explanations for various phenomena. 9 As the philosopher of religion
Richard Swinburne observes, there is a great difference between a physical, scientific ex-
planation for some event and a personal explanation.10 In this chapter I will illustrate how
each type of explanation helps us accounting for different kinds of events. This will pro-
vide a foundation for the next chapter, where I will mention various things that science
cannot, even in principle, explain.

Standard Scientific Explanations

Standard scientific explanations seek to explain states or changes in states.. For exam-
ple, we may try to explain why a gas enters into a certain state under certain pressures. In
in such cases, one event causes another event in accordance with some law of nature, and so
the standard scientific explanation employs event-event causation (event A causes event B).
Associated with event causation is a “covering law” model of explanation according
to which some event is explained—or covered—by giving a valid deductive or inductive
argument for that event. Such an argument utilizes two features: (1) a universal or sta-
tistical law of nature and (2) some initial conditions. For example, consider the ideal gas
law: PV=nRT (P, V, T are pressure, volume, temperature; n is the number of moles of the
gas; R is a constant (.0821…). Accordingly, a covering law model of explanation for the
temperature of the gas would look like this:

1. PV=nRT
2. The gas in our container has P1, V1 and n1.
3. Therefore, the gas in our container has T1.

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 In this case, we want to explain why our gas has temperature T1. And we explain
this by citing the law of nature (the equation in premise 1), plug in our initial conditions
(premise 2), and we explain the fact (stated in the conclusion, 3).
While covering law of explanations may be a necessary condition of explanation, it
is not sufficient by itself. It needs to be supplemented by some model that tells us why
the universal law is true in the first place. Let’s look again at our attempt to explain the
temperature of the gas in our container. Yes, PV=nRT is the relevant law of nature of ideal
gases. However, one can still ask why this equation succeeds in describing the behavior of
gases. And to answer that, scientists have developed a model that includes a mechanism
which undergirds and further explains the ideal gas law.
That model is the ideal gas model. Gases are taken to be collections of tiny point par-
ticles (atoms or molecules) that engage in completely efficient elastic collisions (no loss of
momentum). Moreover, temperature is reduced to atomic/molecular motion, and pressure
is reduced to the rate at which the atoms/molecules of the gas collide with a certain area of
the container wall. Thus, if we keep the volume constant (as in a pressure cooker) and in-
crease the temperature, the atoms/molecules will be agitated and will move around much
faster (this process is what temperature is in the ideal gas theory), and this will, in turn,
cause more of them to hit the container wall per second (pressure). The ideal gas model
provides an explanatory model of what is going on, including a mechanism (agitating the
gas’s atoms/molecules) that explains the ideal gas law.

Personal Explanations

Standard scientific explanations are crucial, but they are not the only way to explain
why things happen; there are also personal explanations. A personal explanation involves
some event which is purposefully brought about by a person, whether divine, human, or
otherwise. Personal explanations will employ notions such as the intention of the agent
and the relevant power of the agent to cause the event.
Let’s say that Rae sets the dinner table in a certain way, intending to provide a re-
laxing dinner for her neighbors. A personal explanation of her actions would utilize a
Result (the dinner table is set a certain way) brought about by a Person (Rae) by citing her
Intention (to provide a relaxing meal for her neighbor) and the exercise of her basic power
(to set the dinner table). This power, by the way, is not just a theoretical capacity but an
actual ability—so Rae has the basic power of setting the table but not of lifting a piano
by herself. Furthermore, not everyone has this power (e.g., her two-year-old son Alex). To
summarize, a personal explanation involves an agent bringing about a result by exercising
a power in order to realize an intention as an irreducibly teleological (i.e., purposeful) goal.
These kinds of explanation are used all the time, especially in court. In a murder
trial, for example, the jury seeks personal explanations: Who committed the murder? What

14
power did he use to do this? Did the alleged killer actually possess that power and could he
exercise it at the right place at the right time? What was his intention?

A Criterion for Things that Are Scientifically Unexplainable

In the next chapter, we will observe five things that science cannot explain, even in
principle. But first we need to have criteria in place for knowing why this would be the
case. Several have been adopted, but here is a crucial one: When phenomena are too odd to
fit into a pattern of scientific explanation, those phenomena cannot in principle be explained
by science. Philosopher Richard Swinburne has clarified what “too odd” means and there-
by identified two sorts of phenomena that satisfy these conditions.11
First, a phenomenon is too odd to fit a scientific explanation when you must suggest
new laws solely to make sense of the phenomenon. Indeed, if there is good scientific evi-
dence for a theory covering a range of phenomena, and if certain phenomena occur within
this range that are not a consequence of the theory, then any attempt to revise the theory
so that it now has laws that predict such phenomena would make it complex and ad hoc.
For example, consider a scientific system of medical laws that cover various phenome-
na regarding the body (how it breaks down, what disease does and does not do to it, etc.).
Then imagine we then encounter various strange phenomena that fit within the purview
of the medical theory’s range of application, such as

• deformed limbs returning to normal when prayed for, 12

• people who have been dead for two to three days come back to life due to
prayer, 13
• people going through significant periods of time when they are dead and have
no brain activity at all returning to life and reporting having been conscious
during the entire time and provide evidence of things they saw in the emer-
gency room and elsewhere that they could not have known if they were not
conscious and out of their body.14

Swinburne’s point is that any attempt to revise the medical theory so that its laws can
now predict apparent miracles would make the theory hopelessly complex and arbitrary.
Think of all the laws that would have to be revised to take the form “when missionary
doctors pray for deformed limbs they will straighten out.” And the only reason these bi-
zarre new formulations would have to be incorporated into the medical theory would be
to avoid a miraculous, theistic explanation. Here’s the bottom line: Changing the laws of
nature to incorporate what are obviously miracles is an example of incorporating the odd
(a miracle) into a law that just doesn’t fit the medical theory.

15
 Second, a phenomena is too odd for a scientific theory when it is new and utterly
unique from anything in the old theory and cannot, in principle, be predicted from that
old theory. If the new phenomenon incorporated into the old theory is so utterly unique
and different from every other entity in the theory such that the new phenomenon’s ap-
pearance cannot, in principle, have been predicted by the old theory, then the expanded
version falsifies the old theory.
The example of consciousness provides a case of oddness. According to scientism, the
entire history of the universe was a history of strictly physical entities until the very first
sentient beings evolved. Prior to the appearance of these beings, there were no sensations,
thoughts, desires, and so forth. And the appearance of consciousness was utterly unpre-
dictable from even exhaustive God-like knowledge of brute matter.
Thus, the nature of consciousness is odd—it does not fit comfortably in a naturalis-
tic physical worldview. As naturalist philosopher Colin McGinn admits, consciousness
is one of the most mystifying features of the cosmos. He claims that its arrival borders on
sheer magic because there seems to be no naturalistic explanation for it:

How can mere matter originate consciousness? How did evolution convert the water
of biological tissue into the wine of consciousness? Consciousness seems like a radical
novelty in the universe, not prefigured by the after-effects of the Big Bang; so how did
it contrive to spring into being from what preceded it? 15

Purely physicalist scientific theories of consciousness fail to meet the criterion of odd-
ness. And labeling the properties of consciousness “emergent properties” is just a name
for the problem, not a solution. Indeed, it is tantamount to admitting defeat for purely
physicalist theories of consciousness.
In sum, according to Swinburne, a phenomenon is scientifically inexplicable if it is
odd in the relevant ways. I have spelled out two kinds of oddness:

1. When the previous physical theory must take on new laws that leave the ad-
justed theory overly complex and ad hoc in its formulation.
2. When the new phenomenon is so utterly unique compared to anything else in
the old theory and cannot properly be explained by an expanded new theory.
In the next chapter, we will look at specific items that science cannot explain.

16
 C H A PT ER 5
WH AT A R E FIV E TH I N G S SCI E N CE C A N N OT
E XPL AI N B U T TH E I S M C A N ?

The heart of scientism is the notion that science can explain virtually everything.
According to scientism, if there is not a valid scientific explanation for an event, then we
cannot know that the event took place. In reality, however, there are many things that
science cannot explain. And the problem is not merely that we lack sufficient data, but that
science cannot explain such things, even in principle. Even more significantly, theism can
explain them. Let’s look at five things that theism can explain but science cannot.

1. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of the Universe

It is now beyond reasonable doubt that the universe—the system of time, space, and
matter/non-personal energy—began to exist at some finite time ago (e.g., 13.8 billion
years). The kalam cosmological argument—a powerful argument for God’s existence from
this fact—was formulated many centuries ago, but it has received renewed interest in the
last few decades.16 I cannot investigate the argument here, but for those who do, they will
find a powerful argument for the claim that God’s existence and initial creative activity
is the best explanation for the universe’s origin. Important for present purposes is the
fact that science cannot—even in principle—explain the origin of the universe, for at least
three reasons.
First, science can only explain one aspect of the universe by appealing to another
aspect of the universe, often subsuming them both under a law of nature. For example,
we explain the formation of water by appealing to the chemical properties of hydrogen
and oxygen, along with some energy-releasing event that caused the two to come togeth-
er according to these chemical properties. In all cases of scientific explanation, one must
already have a universe in existence before scientific explanations such as initial condi-
tions, laws of nature, and so forth have something to which they can apply. Scientific

17
 explanations presuppose the universe in order for them to be employed in the first place.
Thus, a scientific explanation cannot be used to explain the very thing (the universe) that must
exist before scientific explanation can get off the ground.
Second, scientific explanations apply to ongoing temporal states or changes of states
(both are events) of various things according to relevant laws. The moving of the conti-
nents, the formation of the solar system, and so on are all events that are explained by other
events and laws that connect the events. Accordingly, scientific explanation presupposes
the reality of both events and time, since events are temporal episodes and no sense can be
given to the idea of a timeless event. Two things follow from this. For one thing, science
will never be able to explain the first event (the beginning of the universe) because to do
so, it would have to appeal to a prior event and a law connecting them. But in this case,
the origin of the universe would no longer be the first event; the prior explanatory event
would be. But then, to explain this first event, one would need to postulate another prior
event, and a vicious regress ensues.
Furthermore, since scientific explanations tie one event to another via a law, such ex-
planations presuppose time for them to be applicable. Thus, again, science cannot explain
the origin of the very thing (time) that must exist before scientific explanations can be
proffered in the first place.
Third, coming-into-existence is not a process but an instantaneous occurrence. Con-
sider the process of walking into a room. One starts completely outside the room, then one
is 20% into the room, then 30%, and so on, as one passes through the entrance. Finally, one
is 100% in the room. But coming into existence from nothing is not a process. It is not as
though the entity in question starts off being 100% non-existent, then is 90% non-existent
and so on until it is 100% existent. Remember, by “90% non-existent” I don’t mean that
10% of the entity fully exists and 90% is completely non-existent. Rather, I mean that the
entire entity is 10% real. It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that notions like 90% non-exis-
tent are incoherent.
Something either does or does not exist. Period. It follows that, apart from the cre-
ative activity of God, there can be in principle no reason, no explanation for why one
thing—say, the universe—popped into existence as opposed to another thing—a Honda
Civic, a bass’s backbone, one half of Mt. Everest, or a pair of chicken wings. Science can
only be applied to transitions of one thing into another, but coming into existence is not
a transition; it is, as it were, a point action or instantaneous event. So, science cannot in
principle explain the coming-into-existence of the universe from nothing.

2. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of the Fundamental Laws of

Nature

Not all laws of nature are equally fundamental. Some can be derived from others.

18
For example, Newton’s first law of motion (an object at rest stays at rest, and an object in
motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon
by an unbalanced force) builds on Galileo’s concept of inertia (the tendency of matter to
resist change in velocity; objects do not spontaneously change their velocities, which will
remain constant unless acted upon by a force). However, such derivations cannot continue
indefinitely. There must be fundamental laws of nature. But the existence and precise nature
of these laws cannot be explained by science. All scientific explanation presupposes them. As
far as scientific explanation is concerned, they are simply brute givens to be used to explain
scientifically other things but which themselves cannot be explained scientifically.
So, how do we explain the existence and nature of these laws? Where did they come
from? There are two major options here: (1) take them as unexplainable brute entities, or
(2) provide a theistic explanation. For many thinkers, myself included, the “unexplain-
able-brute-entity” option is not a good one. Since the actual brute entity (e.g., natural
laws) might not have existed, we naturally seek an explanation as to why the contingent
entity exists instead of not existing. Option (2) is the best alternative.

3. Science Cannot Explain the Fine-Tuning of the Universe

What do we mean by fine-tuning? 17 At minimum, it refers to the fact that there are
certain features of our world which, if they were altered even slightly, would make life of
any sort impossible. These features make our universe look “fine-tuned” to allow for life.
For example, our universe contains various constants (like the gravitational constant G
in Newton’s law of gravity: (F=Gm1m2/d 2) and certain arbitrary physical quantities (such
as the specific low entropy R 2 Level in the universe—the amount of disorder or useful
energy to do work in the universe) that are not determined by the laws of nature but, as
far as science is concerned, are brute facts that are just there.18 And as philosopher William
Lane Craig points out, even “small deviations from the actual values of the constants and
quantities in question render the universe life-prohibiting . . . the range of life-permitting
values is extremely narrow.” 1 9 These factors are in principle incapable of being explained
by science because they are ultimates—brute givens plugged into scientific laws. However,
they can be explained quite persuasively by theism. To put it simply, rigged dice are best
explained by a dice rigger.
The main naturalistic attempt to avoid this argument is called the Many Worlds Hy-
pothesis, according to which there are a near-infinite number of actual, concrete universes
parallel to our own and with which we are incapable of interacting in any way, including
scientific means of interaction. Given that each world in this so-called “World Ensemble”
would have its own combination of values for its constants and arbitrary physical mag-
nitudes, it is probable that there will be many universes that contain beings capable of
observing their own universe. And, thus, it is necessary that our observed universe be one

19
 that contains the right combination of constants and magnitudes because if it did not, we
would not be here to debate the question!
In my view, the Many Worlds Hypothesis fails to be plausible. But that is not the
point here. The central point, rather, is that the idea of a World Ensemble is a philosophical
assertion which is not scientifically testable. Science cannot explain fine tuning.

4. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of Consciousness

Various features of human persons, consciousness being among them, have provided
very serious problems for scientistic naturalism. But given Theism, consciousness is easily
explained.20 Consider the following quote from one of the world’s leading scientism and
naturalism advocates, Crispin Wright:

A central dilemma in contemporary metaphysics is to find a place for . . . semantic,

moral, and psychological [subject matters] . . . in a world as conceived by modern
naturalism: a stance which inflates the concepts and categories deployed by (finished)
physical science into a metaphysics of the kind of thing the real world essentially and
exhaustively is.
On one horn, if we embrace this naturalism, it seems we are committed either
to reductionism . . . or to disputing that the discourses in question involve reference to
what is real at all.
On the other horn, if we reject this naturalism, then we accept that there is more
to the world than can be embraced within a physicalist ontology—and so take on a
commitment, it can seem, to a kind of eerie supernaturalism. 21

If one’s view of reality begins with a Mind, there is no difficulty in embracing subse-
quent, finite conscious beings. But if one begins with brute matter, and the history of the
universe is the rearrangement of brute matter into larger and more complexes of material
entities, you will end up with larger and more complex material entities. For consciousness to
appear would seem to get something from nothing. It would be magic without a magician.

5. Science Cannot Explain the Existence of Objective Moral, Ratio-

nal and Aesthetic Laws and Values

Most people acknowledge the existence of objectively true normative “oughts/

ought nots” in morality (one ought to be honest), rationality (one ought to believe the
best hypothesis, given the evidence), and aesthetics (one ought not mix certain colors in a
painting).

20
 The problem for scientism is that science is descriptive, not prescriptive; science at-
tempts to describe what is the case, but it cannot prescribe what ought to be the case. Thus,
science must remain silent when it comes to normative laws and principles. This is why
evolutionary ethics is a failure. It can only describe what is the case, e.g., the given the
behavior of a group of chipmunks; it cannot prescribe what ought to be the case. As one
of the leading philosophers of evolutionary biology, atheist Michael Ruse puts it:

Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth. Con-
sidered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics
is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” they
think they are referring above and beyond themselves. Nevertheless, such reference is
truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction . . .
and any deeper meaning is illusory. 22

Ruse’s point applies with equal force to rationality and aesthetics. However, if there is
a virtuous, good God, then the moral, rational, and aesthetic duties he imposes on us will
be objectively true (that is, true independent of what humans think or believe), conducive
to prescriptively good human flourishing, and real whether one believes in them or not.
In this booklet, I have tried to present an honest and unfavorable evaluation of sci-
entism, but not of science itself. Science is indeed a powerful path to knowledge, but there
are many ways of knowing things. A “One size fits all” approach should not be taken to
the pursuit of truth, because how one knows a thing depends on the nature of the item
known. More significantly, restricting knowledge to only that which is scientifically ver-
ifiable will undercut one’s confidence in some of the most meaningful areas of life, from
faith to ethics to art. Your future will be deeply affected by where you come down on this
topic, so think very carefully before you drink the scientistic cool-aid.

21
 E N D N OTE S

1 Tom Sorell, Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science (London: Routledge, 1991), p.
1.
2 Michael Kinsley, “If You Believe Embryos Are Humans . . .,” Time (June 25, 2001), 80.
3 Marilyn vos Savant, “Ask Marilyn,” Parade Magazine (October 7, 2001), 25.
4 Cited in Mark Hartwig and P. A. Nelson. Invitation to Conflict (Colorado Springs, Colorado:
Access Research Network, 1992), p. 20.
5 John Kekes, The Nature of Philosophy (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), p. 158.
6 For a brief treatment of this history, along with other resources, see J. P. Moreland, Christianity
and the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1989), pp. 162-65.
7 George Bealer, “On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge,” in Philosophical Perspectives 10:
Metaphysics, 1996, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 1.
8 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books,
2010.)
9 Phenomena is a general term for any type of thing, event, situation, or experience which is
known to exist or to be experienced.
10 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d. ed. 2004), pp. 26-45.
I am not claiming that personal explanation cannot be scientific. Later, we will see that personal
explanation is central to the Intelligent Design science. I am simply pointing out that there is a
standard type of physical explanation used in science and it differs from personal explanation.
11 Swinburne, p. 74.
12 See cardiologist Chauncey Crandall’s Touching Heaven (New York, New York: FaithWords,
2015), p. 37.
13 See Reinhardt Bonnke, Raised from the Dead (New Kensington, PA: 2014); also, consult
the accounts in Crandall. It would be foolish to make judgments about the credibility of these
accounts without having the integrity to first read them with an open mind. For a scholarly treat-
ment and documentation of the numerous miraculous acts of God happening all over the world
today, see Craig Keener’s two-volume set Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 2011). Furthermore, no discussion of people being raised from
the dead would be complete without mentioning the evidence for the bodily resurrection of Jesus
of Nazareth from the dead. See N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Philadelphia,
PA: Fortress Press, 2003); Gary Habermas and Mike Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel, 2004); Mike Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historio-
graphical Approach (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2010); William Lane Craig, The
Son Rises (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2000).
14 See Eben Alexander, Proof of Heaven (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2012). In my view,

22
it is beyond reasonable doubt that Alexander had left his body, was conscious when his brain was
completely unable to sustain consciousness, and went to another realm. However, I think that the
interpretation he gives to some of his experiences is erroneous. For more on the stunning evidence
for the reality of Near-Death Experiences (which should be called “After Death Experiences”), see
the sources cited in chapter 3, note 11.
15 Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 13-14.
16 For fuller developments of this argument, see J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1986), chapter one; Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2011), pp. 214-234; and William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith
(Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 2009), pp. 111-56.
17 I am indebted to William Lane Craig’s excellent discussion of this topic in Reasonable Faith
(Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 3d. ed., 2008), pp. 158-59.
18 For a list and nice explanation of these constants and physical quantities, see Hugh Ross, The
Creator and the Cosmos (Colorado Springs, Colorado: NavPress, 3d. revised and expanded ed.,
2001), pp. 145-167.
19 Craig, Reasonable Faith, p. 158.
20 See J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (London: SCM Press, 2009).
21 Crispin Wright, “The Conceivability of Naturalism,” in Conceivability and Possibility, ed.
Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), p. 401. The paragraph
breaks are mine.
22 Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics,” in The Darwinian Paradigm
(London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 262-269.

23
 FU R TH E R R E A D I N G

Axe, Douglas. Undeniable: How Biology Confirms Our Intuition That Life is Designed. N.Y.: Harp-
erOne, 2016.

Moreland, J. P. Scientism and Secularism. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 2018.

Sorell, Tom. Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science (London: Routledge, 1991).

Stokes, Mitch. How to be an (A)theist: Why Many Skeptics Aren’t Skeptical Enough. Wheaton, IL:
Crossway, 2016.

24
 ABO UT TH E AUTH O R
J. P. Moreland is Distinguished Professor of philos-
ophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola Universi-
ty. He has authored, edited, or contributed papers
to ninety-five books, including Does God Exist?
(Prometheus), Universals (McGill-Queen’s), Con-
sciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge),
The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, The
Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, and
Debating Christian Theism (Oxford.) He has also
published over ninety articles in journals such as
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Amer-
ican Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, MetaPhilosophy, Philosophia Christi,
Religious Studies, and Faith and Philosophy. Mo-
reland was selected in August, 2016 by The Best
Schools as one of the 50 most influential living phi-
losophers in the world.

Do You Believe? Series

General Editor Rick James

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