GIO-SAMAR v.

DOTC

FACTS:

The petitioner contended that the bundling of the Projects violates several constitutional provisions:
The anti-dummy rule and the constitutional guarantee of equal opportunity for citizen participation in
public utilities (Section 11, Article XII). The prohibition against monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade (Section 19, Article XII). It was argued that by bundling, companies with
questionable financial capability could join consortia to bid for projects that would be financially
unattainable for a single Filipino entity, thus facilitating a de facto monopoly.The petitioner further
claimed that bundling unduly restrains trade by effectively excluding medium-sized companies from
competing in projects that have become larger in scope.

The DOTC argued that the petition was premature because no actual bidding had commenced.It also
maintained that the petitioner lacked legal standing to bring the suit either as a taxpayer or as a
private individual. The respondents contended that the alleged violations were speculative and that
the bundling process did not contravene any clear statutory prohibition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the bundling of the airport projects violate the constitutional mandate against monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade under Section 19, Article XII

2. Whether the bundling of the airport Projects violates the constitutional prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article XII regarding anti-dummy rules and equal opportunity for investing in public
utilities.

RULING:

1. NO. In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, we clarified that the Constitution does not
prohibit the operation of monopolies per se. In short, the Court find that the grant of a concession
agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder, for the exclusive development, operation, and
maintenance of any or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly violative of the
provisions of the Constitution. In any event, the Constitution provides that the State may, by law,
prohibit or regulate monopolies when the public interest so requires.

2. NO. Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Dummy Law, was
enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations.
Section 2 . For liability for violation of Section 2 to attach, it must first be established that there is a
law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least a certain percentage of which is
owned by such citizens.

In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the bundling of the Projects
violated the Anti-Dummy Law. It did not identify what corporation or association falsely simulated the
composition of its stock ownership.

For the same reasons above, petitioner's allegation that bundling violated Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution - which prescribes a 60% Filipino ownership requirement for franchises, certificate, or for
the operation of public utilities - must be rejected. It did not allege that there is a law limiting,
reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or development projects must be awarded only to
corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which is exclusively owned by Filipinos.
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICE

1. Created by law or by authority of law.

2. Possess delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government, to be exercised for the
benefit of the public.
3. Powers conferred and duties imposed must be defined, directly, or impliedly, by the legislature or
by the legislative authority.
4. Duties must be performed independently and without the control of a superior power other than
the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the
legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a superior office or body.
5. Must have permanence or continuity.

CREATION OF PUBLIC OFFICE

a) By the Constitution, e.g., Office of the President

b) By valid statutory enactments, e.g., Office of the Insurance Commissioner
c.) By authority of law, e.g., the Davide Commission

FRIVALDO v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon.

However, later on 27 Oct 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its
President (Salvador Estuye) filed a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's election and proclamation
before the Comelec on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen.

Frivaldo's Defenses:

>He admitted that he was naturalized in US but pleaded a special and affirmative defenses that he
had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against then President Marcos.
>His oath in his CoC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation.

SolGen supported the contention of the public respondents that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as American citizen. Thus, he was
disqualified from public office in the country. Moreover, his election did not cure such defect.

ISSUE: WON Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as provincial governor
of Sorsogon

RULING: NO. Article XI, Sec. 9, of the Constitution states that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the LGC that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this
being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Here, evidence shows that Frivaldo was naturalized as US citizen in 1983 which was not denied by
him. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from
the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no
reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so,
it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship.
His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is
totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not
find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos.

MAQUERA v. BORRA

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 4421 which mandated all candidates for national, provincial, city, and municipal
offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary of the position they were contesting.
This bond would be forfeited if the candidate, except when declared the winner, failed to secure at
least 10% of the votes, provided there were not more than four candidates for the same position.
Implemented by COMELEC requiring deposits from candidates: P60,000 for President, P40,000 for
Vice-President, and P32,000 for Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4421, arguing it imposed a financial
barrier preventing eligible citizens from candidacy due to property qualifications, infringing on
constitutional rights to suffrage and equal protection under the law

ISSUE: WON Republic Act No. 4421, requiring a surety bond to be posted by political candidates,
unconstitutional as it imposes property qualifications, thereby infringing on the fundamental
democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution

RULING: YES. The Court found RA 4421 enforced property qualifications evocative of financial
prerequisites to candidacy, inconsistent with the Constitution’s democratic ethos, which emphasizes
that public office should not be contingent upon an individual’s wealth. It disproportionately
penalized candidates based on financial capacity which the Court ruled was contrary to equal
protection principles ensured by the Constitution. An individual’s right to candidacy should not be
contingent on financial prospects or results in an election.

FLORES v. DRILON

FACTS:

The respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged by petitioners,
taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall
be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such
infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure," (because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices). The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon
the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

ISSUES:

Whether or not said provision violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING: YES, Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7. first par. Art. IX-B. of
the Constitution. The Court held that the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them
function without the distraction of other governmental duties. Since the ineligibility of an elective
official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however
resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he
may be considered fit for appointment. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of
the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government... during his term without forfeiting his seat...." The
difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators
lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office, while
other incumbent elective officials should resign first before be appointed.

DUMALAO v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and
he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

He filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao challenged the constitutionality of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which disqualifies
retired officials who are 65 years old at the commencement of the term they are seeking, and have
received retirement benefits, from running for the same elective local office from which they retired,
for being unconstitutional and violate the equal protection law clause.

ISSUE: WON the Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is unconstitutional

RULING: NO. The Court declared the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
constitutionally valid, citing the legitimacy of classifying retirees aged 65 differently based on the
rationale for promoting younger leadership in local governance and the retirees’ previously expressed
disinterest in government work by retiring.