Civil Procedure Chapter 8
Civil Procedure Chapter 8
8.1 Introduction
Application proceedings, also known as motion proceedings, are characterised by the
exchange of affidavits. The party bringing the application is known as the applicant
and the party opposing the application, if any, is known as the respondent. The appli-
cant commences proceedings by issuing a notice of motion, which serves to advise
the respondent of the applicant’s claim and the relief which the applicant seeks,1 after
which the application itself is served on the respondent (if there is a respondent).2 The
notice of motion is usually accompanied by a founding affidavit.3 Sometimes one or
more supporting affidavits and relevant documentation are attached to the affidavit.
The respondent who wants to oppose the application must deliver an opposing affi-
davit (also referred to as an answering affidavit) together with any supporting affidavits
and relevant documentation, in which the respondent answers the allegations of fact
contained in the founding affidavit. If necessary, the applicant may then deliver a
replying affidavit in order to address and respond to allegations contained in the
answering affidavit. In application proceedings, with the exception of certain proceed-
ings such as applications for summary judgment or applications in terms of HCR 43,
there are usually three sets of affidavits exchanged,4 namely:
(a) the founding (or initial) affidavit;
________________________
155
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
________________________
5 See National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) in which it was ex-
plained that motion proceedings deal with the resolution of legal issues based on common-cause
facts and that such proceedings can only in exceptional circumstances be used to resolve factual
disputes.
156
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
________________________
157
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
________________________
7 Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Van der Heever 1999 (3) SA 1051 (SCA) at 1057G–H.
8 See Ex parte Kaiser 1902 TH 165; Titty’s Bar and Bottle Store (Pty) Ltd v ABC Garage (Pty) Ltd
and Others 1974 (4) SA 362 (T) at 368, facts to establish locus standi and jurisdiction should be in
the founding affidavit and not in a replying affidavit.
9 See Sebenza Forwarding and Shipping Consultancy (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corpor-
ation of SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Petro SA and Another 2006 (2) SA 52 (C) at 58G–H; Minister of Land
Affairs and Agriculture and Others v D & F Wevell Trust and Others 2008 (2) SA 184 (SCA). See
also National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5)
continued on next page
158
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
(e) a request to the court to grant the relief as prayed for in the notice of motion.
Where the applicant refers to documentary evidence in the supporting affidavit, such
documents must be attached to the affidavit. The conclusion to be drawn from such
attached documents must be covered in the affidavits.10 Where the applicant refers in
the supporting affidavit to communications or actions by other persons, such reference
must be affirmed by obtaining affirming or confirmatory affidavits from the said per-
sons and attaching it to the supporting affidavit. The attachment of confirmatory affida-
vits is necessary in order to comply with the evidentiary rule against hearsay evidence.
Only admissible evidence should be contained in the affidavit.
In the current circumstances in which the court’s physical and personnel resources
are limited there is a tendency towards expediency in court proceedings and the
courts have warned against the use of ‘unnecessary prolix and repetitive material in
court papers’.11 Practitioners are therefore advised to keep their affidavits clear and
concise and in proper order to avoid the court’s disapproval or face a possible
adverse costs order.
SA 339 (SCA) at 349A–B; Atlantis Property Holdings CC v Atlantis Exel Service Station CC 2019
(5) SA 443 (GP) at 458E, the applicant must set out pertinent facts to support the relief sought and
also to inform the respondent of the case he or she is expected to meet. But note that an appel-
lant may in principle not make a case on appeal that was not pleaded on the original papers (at
349B–C). See also Molusi v Voges NO [2015] 3 All SA 131 (SCA) paras 20 and 39 and the cases
referred to there, reversed on appeal (on another point) in Molusi v Voges NO 2016 (3) SA 370
(CC).
10 Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture and Others v D & F Wevell Trust and Others 2008 (2) SA
184 (SCA) para. 43; National Credit Regulator v Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd 2020 (2) SA 390 (SCA)
para. 29. See also Molusi v Voges NO [2015] 3 All SA 131 (SCA) paras 20 and 39. E.g. see
annexure 4 for an example of a founding affidavit.
11 Venmop 275 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Cleverlad Projects (Pty) Ltd and Another 2016 (1) SA 78 (GJ)
paras 7–16 and the cases referred to there.
12 Van Loggerenberg DE and Bertelsmann E (Contributor) Erasmus Superior Court Practice 2nd edn
(Juta, 2015) (Erasmus) at D1-42–D1-92; Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein & Van Winsen:
The Civil Practice of the High Courts & the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 5th edn (Juta
& Co, 2017) (Herbstein & Van Winsen) Vol. I ch. 14. Neukircher B, Fourie HR, Haupt LC High
Court Motion Procedure: A Practical Guide (2012)
13 1949 (3) SA 1155 (T). See also Member of the Executive Council for Finance and Economic
Development, KwaZulu-Natal v Masifundisane Training and Development College CC [2015] JOL
33658 (SCA) at para. 10. See also Herbstein & Van Winsen Vol. I at 292–300.
159
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
avoid the delay and expense involved in a trial action. From this general rule, it follows
that motion proceedings should not be instituted in:
(a) claims for unliquidated damages;
(b) matters in which it is anticipated that a material dispute of fact will arise, unless
the application procedure is specifically authorised for that kind of claim;14
(c) claims for divorce.15
Notwithstanding the rule regarding anticipated disputes of fact, there are certain types
of proceedings in which application proceedings should always be used. Insolvency
proceedings are one example. It has also been held that where a party seeks urgent
relief, the application procedure is always appropriate, at least to obtain temporary
relief, regardless of an anticipated dispute of fact.16 It is also important to note that
frequently legislation lays down that a party may apply to court for relief of a particular
type. While the court may then be approached on notice of motion, despite the fore-
seeability of a dispute of fact, statutory provisions of this nature will not be interpreted
as rendering application proceedings peremptory in every case, sometimes proceed-
ings by way of action will be permitted instead.17
14 Moleah v University of the Transkei and Others 1998 (2) SA 522 (Tk).
15 See Ex parte Inkley and Inkley 1995 (3) SA 528 (C).
16 See Dunlop South Africa Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers Union and Another 1985 (1) SA 177 (D).
17 See Food and Nutritional Products (Pty) Ltd v Neumann 1986 (3) SA 464 (W); Adfin (Pty) Ltd v
Durable Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd 1991 (2) SA 366 (C).
160
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
with a view of ensuring a just and expeditious decision. In particular, the court may
direct that oral evidence be heard on specified issues with a view to resolving any
dispute of fact and to that end may order any deponent to appear personally or grant
leave for the deponent or any other person to be subpoenaed to appear and be exam-
ined and cross-examined as a witness, or it may refer the matter to trial with appropri-
ate directions as to pleadings or definition of issues. Therefore, if a material factual
dispute arises during application proceedings that cannot be resolved on the papers,
the court has a discretion to proceed as set out below.18 In Lombaard v Droprop CC
and Others,19 the court reiterated that an order to refer a matter for oral evidence
presupposes a genuine dispute of fact. A basis for such a dispute must be estab-
lished timeously, however, and the dispute will not be entertained if, for instance, it is
raised for the first time on appeal. According to Plascon-Evans Paints v Van Riebeeck
Paints,20 where a respondent denies a fact (raised by the applicant) that does not raise
a real, genuine or bona fide dispute, the court may decide the fact in the applicant’s
favour without calling for oral evidence, when convinced of the applicant’s credibility
(referred to as the Plascon-Evans rule).
________________________
18 See Miloc Financial Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Logistic Technologies (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (4) SA
325 (SCA) with regard to the discretion of the court. A word of caution was raised in Buffalo
Freight Systems (Pty) Ltd v Crestleigh Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another 2011 (1) SA 8 (SCA) para. 20
regarding conflicting affidavits, a court must always be cautious about deciding probabilities in
the face of conflicts of fact in affidavits’.
19 2010 (5) SA 1 (SCA) paras 24 and 26.
20 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 643E–635C. Cf. Mahala v Nkombombini 2006 (5) SA 524 (SE) para. 9
where a departure from the Plascon rules was considered on the facts and the court accepted
that too strict an approach may sometimes cause hardship for the applicant. See also Thint (Pty)
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions
2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) para. 8; Hassan v Berrange NO 2012 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para. 27; Media 24
Books (Pty) Ltd v Oxford University Press Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd 2017 (2) SA 1 (SCA) para. 37.
In Airports Company South Africa Soc Ltd v Airports Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books
[2016] 4 All SA 665 (SCA) para. 5 the court stated that the basis of the averments made by the
applicant must be accepted if these are not disputed by the respondent, and the version of the
respondent is not implausible or far-fetched.
21 See Pressma Services (Pty) Ltd v Schuttler 1990 (2) SA 411 (C) at 419E.
22 When such an issue arises the court must first determine whether there is indeed a real dispute of
fact. See Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA);
continued on next page
161
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
limited scope and not where it is extensive and complicated. The court will also not
allow oral evidence to help a party establish a defence that has not been made out in
that party’s affidavit.23 If the court is of the opinion that it is proper to hear oral evidence
in terms of HCR 6(5)(g), the court may determine which persons to call as witnesses
and may also determine the issues in respect of which oral evidence must be present-
ed. Apart from calling the deponents of the affidavits to give oral evidence, the court
may also order that any other person be called as a witness.
If a party to an application wants to present oral evidence to the court, the court’s
leave must be obtained in order to do so. The party must make such a request either
at the beginning of the case or after presenting the case on the papers.24 It is therefore
open to a party to request that if the principal argument based on the affidavits fails,
the application should not be dismissed, but should be referred to viva voce evi-
dence.25 In Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development,26 a number
of important points were made regarding the interpretation of HCR 6(5)(g) and the
referral of a matter to oral evidence. First, oral evidence in one form or another should
be allowed if there are reasonable grounds for doubting the correctness of the allega-
tions concerned. Secondly, the court has a discretionary power to order the cross-
examination of a deponent, and this discretion is not limited to cases in which a dis-
pute of fact is shown to exist.27 It has also been held that a court will be more inclined
to allow an applicant to adduce oral evidence and to cross-examine the deponents of
________________________
National Scrap Metal (Cape Town) (Pty) Ltd v Murray and Roberts Ltd 2012 (5) SA 300 (SCA) pa-
ra. 17; PMG Motors Kyalami (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) and Another v Firstrand Bank Ltd, Wesbank
Division [2015] 1 All SA 437 (SCA) para. 23. A bare denial of the applicant’s allegations in the
founding affidavit will not in general suffice to generate a genuine or real dispute of fact, accord-
ing to Minister of Environmental Affairs v Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South
Africa NPC 2018 (3) SA 604 (WCC) para. 13.
23 Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture and Others v D & F Wevell Trust and Others 2008 (2) SA
184 (SCA) para. 56.
24 See Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Theletsane and Others 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) at 200B–D
where it was observed that the recent tendency of the courts seems to be to allow counsel for the
applicant, as a general rule, to present a case on the basis that the applicant is entitled to the relief
on the papers, but to apply in the alternative for the matter to be referred to evidence if the main
argument should fail.
25 See also Abaany Property Investments Ltd v Fatima Ayob and Sons Ltd 1994 (2) SA 342 (T) at
345B–346H. When a judge decides that no proper decision on the matter may be made on the
affidavits and, in exercising a discretion in terms of HCR 6(5)(g), the judge postpones the applica-
tion to a future date for the hearing of oral evidence, and it happens that the matter comes before a
different judge, it is permissible for a party to make an application to the new judge for the matter
to be decided solely on the papers without the hearing of oral evidence. In this circumstance it is
legally competent for the judge to depart from the order made by the previous judge and to de-
cide the matter solely on the affidavits and without hearing oral evidence. However, such a step
should not be taken lightly, as held in Wallach v Lew Geffen Estates CC 1993 (3) SA 258 (A) at
262G–263I.
26 1991 (1) SA 158 (A) at 167G–168A.
27 In doing so the court confirmed the decision in Moosa Bros and Sons (Pty) Ltd v Rajah 1975 (4)
SA 87 (D). A court may order viva voce evidence even in the absence of a dispute where the
allegations of a party seems to be erroneous or false: Manuel v Sahara Computers (Pty) Ltd 2020
(2) SA 269 (GP) paras 88, 97, 100.
162
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
the answering affidavits where the applicant is obliged to proceed by way of applica-
tion, although not every request will be granted as a matter of course.28
________________________
28 See AECI Ltd v Strand Municipality 1991 (4) SA 688 (C) at 698I–699A.
29 HCR 6(1).
30 HCR 6(2).
31 Other examples include applications by a minor to be declared a major, applications for post-
nuptial registration of an antenuptial contract, applications concerning the alienation of a minor’s
property and applications for rehabilitation of an insolvent.
163
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
(b) when the application is merely a preliminary step in the matter, for example, where
application is made to sue by means of substituted service;
(c) when urgent or immediate relief is required and notice to the respondent and the
delay occasioned by such notice will result in prejudice to the applicant,32 for
example, where the applicant applies to attach a vehicle (in the other party’s pos-
session) that the other party plans to remove from the country.
In accordance with the audi alteram partem principle and as a general rule, justice
and fairness demand that the court should not make an order against any person
unless the affected person has received prior notice of the legal relief sought. Ex parte
applications represent a departure from this rule, at least in the case of an ex parte
application in which the applicant seeks relief against another party. The courts will
therefore examine any such application very carefully so that the interests of persons
affected can be properly safeguarded. Furthermore, there are two important principles
that apply to ex parte applications in order to ensure fairness to the party against
whom relief is sought:
(a) Firstly, in ex parte applications the applicant is obliged to observe the utmost good
faith in placing all material facts before the court. If the court makes an order pur-
suant to an ex parte application and it subsequently transpires that material facts,
which might have influenced the decision of the court, were not disclosed by the
applicant, the court has the discretion to set the order aside on the grounds of non-
disclosure. This applies irrespective of whether the failure to disclose was wilful,
mala fide or negligent.33
(b) Secondly, if another person’s interests stand to be affected by an order in an ex
parte application, the court will not grant a final order without giving the respond-
ent the opportunity to present a defence. The court will merely grant a provisional
order with a return date, known as a rule nisi.34 After the order has been provision-
ally granted, it is then served on the respondent. The rule nisi calls upon the re-
spondent to appear before the court on a certain date to furnish reasons why the
provisional order should not be confirmed and made final. The respondent must
then deliver an answering affidavit, unless the respondent relies solely on a point
________________________
32 E.g. see annexure 18 at the back of this book for an Anton Piller type application.
33 See De Jager v Heilbron 1947 (2) SA 415 (W); Power NO v Bieber 1955 (1) SA 490 (W); Wilkie’s
Continental Circus v De Raedt’s Circus 1958 (2) SA 598 (SWA); Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1979
(4) SA 342 (W); Hall v Heyns 1991 (1) SA 381 (C) at 397B–C; Trakman NO v Livshitz 1995 (1) SA
282 (A); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Basson 2002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) para. 21. A sim-
ilar, albeit slightly less onerous, duty is placed on parties in opposed applications. However,
where there has been material non-disclosure or dishonesty in opposed applications, the court
will generally show its disapproval with an adverse order as to costs. See Trakman NO v Livshitz
1995 (1) SA 282 (A) at 288F–H. In exercising its discretion to set aside an order on the basis of
non-disclosure, the court will have regard to the extent of the non-disclosure, the reasons for non-
disclosure and the consequences of setting the provisional order aside: Phillips and Others v
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA) para. 29. See also Minister of
Environmental Affairs v Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa NPC 2018
(3) SA 604 (WCC) paras 45–52 for a useful summary of the principles relating to good faith in ex
parte applications.
34 See Scott v Hough 2007 (3) SA 425 (O).
164
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
of law. The audi alteram partem rule is therefore complied with by affording the
affected party the opportunity to state a case on the return day.35
The requirements for an ex parte application are described in HCR 6(4).
8.4.5.2 Enrolment
HCR 6(4)(a) provides that ex parte applications must be enrolled with the registrar
before noon but on one court day preceding the day on which it will be heard.
________________________
35 See, however, HCR 6(8), which provides that any person against whom an order is granted ex
parte may anticipate the return day upon delivery of not less than 24 hours’ notice.
36 HCR 6(4)(a).
37 It is correct practice to set out these details in the notice of motion rather than to simply state in
the notice that the relief sought is that referred to elsewhere in the papers. See HCR 6(4)(a).
38 HCR 6(4)(c).
165
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
with a return date will be granted. The respondent will then be served with the provi-
sional order and must indicate to the court on the return date, by means of an oppos-
ing affidavit, why the provisional order should not be made final. If the respondent
successfully opposes the provisional order, it will be discharged. If the respondent is
unable to oppose it successfully, the provisional order will be confirmed. A person
against whom an ex parte order is granted, may anticipate the return date with 24
hours’ notice.39
It is possible that the court may, after hearing an ex parte application, refuse an order
except with regard to costs, but grant the applicant leave to renew the application on
the same papers, supplemented by such further affidavits as may be necessary. In
application proceedings it is also possible for a party to bring a counter-application or
to join a party to the same extent as would be competent, if the party wishing to bring
such counter-application or join such party were a defendant in an application and the
other parties to the application were parties to such action.40
________________________
39 HCR 6(8).
40 HCR 6(7) provides that in such cases HCR 10, dealing with joinder of parties, applies mutatis
mutandis.
41 HCR 6(5)(a).
42 It is correct practice to set out these details in the notice of motion rather than to simply state in
the notice that the relief sought is that referred to elsewhere in the papers. See also the opening
words of HCR 6(5)(d), which refer to ‘the grant of an order sought in the notice of motion’.
166
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
(f) indicate that the application is supported by a founding affidavit and indicate the
name of the deponent;
(g) indicate that the applicant has appointed an address within 15 kilometres of the
office of the registrar at which the applicant will accept notices and service of all
processes in the proceedings;
(h) inform the respondent that in order to oppose the application, a notification must
be made to the applicant’s attorney in writing before a certain date, which must
not be less than five days after service of the application on the respondent;
(i) be served together with a notice indicating the applicant’s agreement or opposi-
tion to a referral of the dispute to mediation.43 In terms of HCR 41A(2)(c), the no-
tice must substantially correspond with Form 27 of the First Schedule and
concisely indicate the reasons for the applicant’s belief that the dispute is or is not
capable of being mediated44 (see annexure 6);
(j) inform the respondent that within 15 days after giving notice of the intention to
oppose, an answering affidavit must be filed;
(k) inform the respondent to appoint an address within 15 kilometres of the office of
the registrar at which the respondent will accept notices and service of all pro-
cesses in the proceedings;
(l) state that if no notice of intention to oppose is delivered by the respondent, the
application will be set down for hearing on a specific date and at a specific time,
which shall be not less than ten days after service of the application on the re-
spondent;
(m) be signed and dated by the applicant (if unrepresented) or by his or her attorney.
The time periods stipulated in the rules of court must be calculated exclusive of the
first day (the date on which the notice of motion is served on the respondent) and
inclusive of the last day.45 There are circumstances where the time period allowed by
HCR 6(5)(b) with regard to the entry of an appearance to defend, will not apply and
where a longer period is provided for. This will be the case where the papers launch-
ing the application are served outside the court’s area of jurisdiction. In this circum-
stance section 24(a) and (b) of the Superior Courts Act will apply, unless the applica-
tion is brought on an urgent basis.46 Where an application is made against the State, at
least 15 court days must be allowed after the service of the notice of motion, unless
the court has authorised a shorter period.47
________________________
43 HCR 41A(2)(a).
44 For an analysis of the court-annexed mediation process see ch. 15.10.
45 Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 s 4.
46 See Turquoise River Incorporated v McMenamin 1992 (3) SA 653 (D) at 656E–657D.
47 HCR 6(13).
167
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
court day before the day that the application will be heard.48 The notice of set-down is
a formal document requesting the registrar to place the matter on the motion roll for
hearing.49
________________________
48 HCR 6(5)(c).
49 Although the court begins at 10h00, it is not certain at the time of set-down what position the matter
will occupy on the motion roll. Therefore, the notice of motion and the notice of set-down will state
that the matter is set down for hearing ‘at 10:00 or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard’.
50 HCR 6(5)(d)(i). The notice of intention to oppose is a formal document addressed to the applicant
and the registrar simply advising that the respondent will oppose the application, and it does not
address the merits of the matter. See annexure 5 for an example of an opposing affidavit.
51 HCR 6(5)(d)(ii).
52 HCR 6(5)(d)(iii).
53 HCR 41A(2)(b) and see further ch. 15.10 re the mediation procedure.
54 HCR 41A(2)(c). For an analysis of the mediation process see ch. 15.10.
55 See Ebrahim v Georgoulas 1992 (2) SA 151 (B).
56 See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v RTS Techniques and Planning (Pty) Ltd and Others 1992
(1) SA 432 (T).
168
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
________________________
57 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA). See also Venmop 275 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Cleverlad Projects (Pty) Ltd
and Another 2016 (1) SA 78 (GJ).
58 Tumisi and Others v African National Congress 1997 (2) SA 741 (O). See Mostert v FirstRand
Bank Ltd t/a RMB Private Bank 2018 (4) SA 443 (SCA) para. 13 where a court’s discretion to allow
a new matter in a replying affidavit is explained as follows: ‘as a respondent has the right to know
what case he or she has to meet and to respond thereto, the general rule is that an applicant will
not be permitted to make or supplement his or her case in the replying affidavit. This, however, is
not an absolute rule. A court may in the exercise of its discretion in exceptional cases allow new
matter in a replying affidavit.’ See also Shephard v Tuckers Land and Development Corporation
(Pty) Ltd (1) 1978 (1) SA 173 (W) at 177G–178A; Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton
Energy Coal South Africa Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 204 (SCA) para. 26, ’in the exercise of this
discretion a court should have regard to: (i) whether all the facts necessary to determine the new
matter raised in the replying affidavit were placed before the court; (ii) whether the determination
of the new matter will prejudice the respondent in a manner that could not be put right by orders
in respect of postponement and costs; (iii) whether the new matter was known to the applicant
when the application was launched; and (iv) whether the disallowance of the new matter will result
in unnecessary waste of costs.’
59 Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Theletsane and Others 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) at 199B.
60 James Brown and Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Simmons NO 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D–H; Hano Trading
CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA) paras 11, 14. See also
Kasiyamhuru v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1999 (1) SA 643 (W); Broodie NO v Maposa
2018 (3) SA 129 (WCC) para. 27.
169
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
must be satisfied that no prejudice will be caused (to the opposing party) that cannot
be remedied by an appropriate costs order. A satisfactory explanation is one which
negates mala fides or culpable negligence.61
________________________
61 Transvaal Racing Club v Jockey Club of South Africa 1958 (3) SA 599 (W) at 604.
62 HCR 6(5)(f).
63 HCR 6(5)(f).
64 HCR 6(5)(f).
65 HCR 6(5)(f).
66 See Selepe v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (2) SA 1025 (D) at 1028F–H, when an interlocutory
matter can be decided without affidavits, this is an appropriate course to take and one which sen-
sibly conserves costs. However, certain interlocutory matters should be supported by affidavit.
E.g., in an application for leave to amend a pleading, an amendment cannot be granted for the
mere asking, some explanation must be offered therefor. See Commercial Union Assurance Co
Ltd v Waymark NO 1995 (2) SA 73 (Tk) at 77, such explanation will be contained in an affidavit.
170
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
applicant is therefore free, as far as the rules of court are concerned, to allow any
period as is deemed necessary between delivery of the application and the hearing
thereof, subject, of course, to the risk of a postponement in the event of the defend-
ant’s having inadequate opportunity to oppose the application.67 Therefore, the appli-
cant must allow a reasonable time for the filing of affidavits, and it is clear that a
reasonable time would certainly not be longer than the time prescribed in terms of
HCR 6(5)(e), except under special circumstances.68
________________________
171
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
period of notice of the hearing, may the applicant set the matter down for hearing
on the next motion day while giving the registrar a shorter period of notice.
(c) Only if the urgency is such that the applicant dare not wait even for the next
motion day, may the matter be set down for hearing on the next court day at the
normal time of 10h00, or for the same day if the court has not yet adjourned.
(d) Once the court has adjourned for the day, only if the applicant cannot possibly
wait for the hearing until the next court day at the normal time when the court sits,
may the matter be set down forthwith for hearing at any reasonably convenient
time, in consultation with the registrar, even if that is at night or during a weekend.
If necessary, even the submission of written documents may be dispensed with.
The court explained that practitioners should carefully analyse the facts of each case
to determine, for the purposes of setting the case down for hearing, whether a greater
or lesser degree of relaxation of the rules is required. The degree of relaxation should
not be greater than what the exigency of the case demands and must be commensu-
rate therewith. An applicant must make out a case in the founding affidavit to justify the
particular extent of the departure from the norm.74
It is important to note that the rule allows a deviation not only in respect of the time
periods but also in respect of other rules, such as the rules relating to the service of
affidavits and the manner in which service is to be effected. However, in either event,
the applicant must make out a case for such deviation in the affidavit, as discussed in
paragraph 8.4.8.3. However, in South African Airways Soc v BDFM Publishers (Pty)
Ltd,75 the court made it clear that the general rule in such applications remains that the
respondent be informed of the application according to constitutional values and the
audi alteram partem rule; deviation should only be considered in exceptional cases.
________________________
74 Ibid. at 137F.
75 2016 (2) SA 561 (GJ) at 571C–537B. See also Erasmus at D1-85 for the modus operandi in
instances where an urgent application is contemplated on less than 24 hours’ notice.
76 See Gallagher v Norman’s Transport Lines (Pty) Ltd 1992 (3) SA 500 (W).
77 See Venture Capital Ltd v Mauerberger 1991 (1) SA 96 (W) at 98H where the court refers to
Republikeinse Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) SA 773
(A), particularly at 782B–E.
172
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
reasons why the applicant would not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in
due course.78 It is therefore necessary for the applicant to set out detailed reasons for
proceeding by way of urgency. The importance of this stipulation cannot be overstated
and, if the court is not satisfied with the explanation as to urgency set out in the affida-
vit, the application will be dismissed.79
Whether a matter is urgent will also depend on the nature of the right which is being
threatened. A threat to the life or liberty of an individual will usually be regarded as a
valid ground for urgency.80 Whether a threat to a commercial interest, for example the
potential loss of profits, will constitute a valid ground of urgency is less clear, although
in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd,81 the court
had little difficulty in finding that the threat to a commercial interest may in certain cir-
cumstances justify the invocation of HCR 6(12) no less than any other interest.
8.4.8.4 Enrolment
It is important to note that a person against whom an order is granted in his or her
absence as a result of an urgent application may, by notice, set down the matter for
reconsideration of the order.82
________________________
78 HCR 6(12)(b).
79 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin (t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers) 1977 (4)
SA 135 (W) at 137F. See also Salt v Smith 1991 (2) SA 186 (Nm); Ntozini and Others v African
National Congress and Others (18798/2018) [2018] ZAGPJHC 415 (25 June 2018) where the
court dismissed the application on the basis that the urgency was self-created.
80 Katofa v Administrator-General for South West Africa 1985 (4) SA 211 (SWA) at 2151–J.
81 1982 (3) SA 582 (W) at 586F–G. For a contrary view see IL & B Marcow Caterers (Pty) Ltd v
Greatermans SA Ltd; Aroma Inn (Pty) Ltd v Hypermarkets (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 108 (C).
82 HCR 6(12)(c).
83 See Bellengere A, Theophilopoulos C and Palmer R (eds.) The Law of Evidence in South Africa:
Basic Principles (Oxford University Press, 2019) ch. 25. See also Passenger Rail Agency of South
Africa v Swifambo Rail Agency (Pty) Ltd 2017 (6) SA 223 (GJ) at paras 20–25 regarding the
court’s discretion to accept hearsay evidence.
84 The relaxation of the hearsay evidence rule in the circumstances set out above is in accordance
with s 3(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which provides that hearsay evi-
dence may be admissible in a number of specified circumstances, e.g., in the interests of justice.
continued on next page
173
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
NO85 the court adopted the approach that in complicated cases affidavits of every
person involved will not be required since it would be impracticable.
________________________
See also Lehane NO v Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2015 (4) SA 72 (WCC) at 79F–G, overturned
on appeal but not on this point: Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Lehane NO 2016 (3) SA 143
(SCA). See further Erasmus at D1-86 fn 1.
85 Lehane NO v Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd above at 150H–151D.
86 Jordan v Penmill Investments CC 1991 (2) SA 430 (E) at 435E. See also Mokoena v Minister of
Law and Order 1991 (3) SA 187 (T) at 194H–195A.
174
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
application procedure is the exception rather than the norm. In In re Pennington Health
Committee87 it was argued that the legislature drew a clear distinction between actions
and applications. Procedure by way of application is recognised, but the intention
appears to have been to confer jurisdiction generally in actions in the narrow sense,
while authorising application proceedings only in specific cases.
Therefore, unlike the position in the High Court, a litigant may proceed by way of appli-
cation only when such a procedure is specifically permitted by the Magistrates’ Courts
Act or by another piece of legislation88 or by the Magistrates’ Courts rules.
The general procedure to be used in application procedures is prescribed in MCR 55,
but this general procedure must be read with specific sections or rules that prescribe
applications in particular instances. The types of order that may be sought on applica-
tion in Magistrates’ Courts are listed below.89
________________________
175
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
176
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
An analysis of the above list reveals that only a limited number of applications may be
brought in the Magistrates’ Courts. Because these courts do not possess the same
kind of inherent discretion as that of the High Court, many types of relief granted by
way of application in the High Court have to be dealt with in the Magistrates’ Courts
either by way of action or not at all.92
It must be noted, however, that the amended Magistrates’ Courts rules of 2010 have,
to some extent, brought MCR 55 in line with HCR 6 in relation to application proce-
dures and, as indicated above in paragraph 8.3.1, the forms also now provide for a
________________________
177
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
short and a long form of motion. It may well be argued that the new version of MCR 55
is of a more general nature, but it is submitted that when a specific section or rule
prescribes a particular application in a specific instance, the specific provision must
be complied with first.93
________________________
93 See the principle in Chelsea Estates and Contractors CC v Speed-O-Rama 1993 (1) SA 198 (E) at
202C which still applies.
94 Jones & Buckle Vol. II at 55-1–55-38.
95 See e.g. Form 1B regarding an application to execute against immovable residential property of
the debtor. See also Jones & Buckle Vol. II at 55-4.
96 MCR 55(1)(b).
97 MCR 55(1)(c).
98 MCR 55(1)(d).
178
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
(b) state the applicant’s postal, facsimile or electronic mail addresses, where they are
available;
(c) indicate a day not less than five days after service of the application on the re-
spondent on or before the day the respondent is required to notify the applicant in
writing whether he or she intends to oppose the application. Also, should no such
notification be given, the application will be set down for hearing on a stated day
not less than ten days after service on the respondent of the notice.99
In an application against a Minister, Deputy Minister, Provincial Premier, Member of
the Executive Council or officer appointed in the public service in such a person’s
official capacity, the respective periods referred to in MCR 55(1)(e) (as set out above
or for the return of a rule nisi) may not be less than 15 days after the service of the
notice of motion or the rule nisi, as the case may be, unless the court has especially
authorised a shorter period.100
(b) Unopposed matter
If the respondent does not notify the applicant, on or before the day mentioned in the
notice of motion, of his or her intention to oppose the matter, the applicant may place
the matter on the roll for hearing by giving the registrar or clerk of the court notice of
set-down five days before the day on which the application is to be heard.101
(c) Opposed matter
Any party who opposes the granting of an order sought by way of a notice of motion
must:
(i) within the time stated in the notice, give applicant notice, in writing, that he or
she intends to oppose the application, and in such notice appoint an address,
which address must, in places where there are three or more attorneys or firms
of attorneys practising independently of one another, be within 15 kilometres of
the office of the registrar or clerk of the court, at which [address] he or she will
accept notice and service of all documents, as well as such party’s postal, fac-
simile or electronic mail addresses where available;
(ii) within 10 days of notifying the applicant of his or her intention to oppose the
application, deliver his or her answering affidavit, if any, together with any rele-
vant documents; and
(iii) where it intends to raise questions of law only, deliver notice of intention to do
102
so, within the time stated in subparagraph (ii), setting forth such question[s].
Within ten days of the service on him or her of the affidavit and documents referred to
in MCR 55(1)(g)(ii), the applicant may deliver a replying affidavit.103 The court has a
discretion to permit the filing of further affidavits.104
In terms of MCR 55(1)(j)(i) and when no answering affidavit or notice in terms of MCR
55(1)(g)(iii) is delivered within the period referred to in MCR 55(1)(g)(ii), the applicant
________________________
99 MCR 55(1)(e).
100 MCR 55(6).
101 MCR 55(1)(f).
102 MCR 55(1)(g).
103 MCR 55(1)(h).
104 MCR 55(1)(i).
179
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
may within five days of the expiry thereof apply to the registrar or clerk of the court to
allocate a date for the hearing of the application.
When an answering affidavit is delivered, MCR 55(1)(j)(ii) entitles the applicant to
apply for an allocation of the date for the hearing of the application within five days of
the delivery of his or her replying affidavit, or, if no replying affidavit is delivered,
within five days of the expiry of the period referred to in MCR 55(1)(h). When notice
is delivered, the applicant may within five days after such delivery apply for alloca-
tion of a date.
When the applicant fails to apply within the appropriate period provided for in
MCR 55(1)(j)(ii), the respondent may in terms of MCR 55(1)(j)(iii) do so immediately
upon the expiry thereof.
Notice in writing of the date allocated by the registrar or clerk of the court must be
delivered by the applicant or respondent, as the case may be, to the opposite party
not less than ten days before the date allocated for the hearing.105
(d) The court’s discretion
In terms of MCR 55(1)(k) the court may:
(i) Where an application cannot properly be decided on affidavit . . . dismiss the
application or make such order as it deems fit with a view to ensuring a just and
expeditious decision.
(ii) . . . in particular, but without affecting the generality of subparagraph (i) direct
that oral evidence be heard on specified issues with a view to resolving any
dispute of fact and to that end may order any deponent to appear personally or
grant leave for that person or any other person to be subpoenaed to appear
and be examined and cross-examined as a witness or it may refer the matter to
trial with appropriate directions as to pleadings or definition of issues, or other-
wise.
(e) Counter-application
MCR 55(2) allows for a counter-application in the following terms:
(a) Any party to any application proceedings may bring a counter-application or may join
any party to the same extent as would be competent if the party wishing to bring such
counter-application or join such party were a defendant in an action and the other par-
ties to the application were parties to such action.
(b) The periods prescribed with regard to applications apply with appropriate changes to
counter-applications: Provided that the court may on good cause shown postpone the
hearing of the application.
________________________
180
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
(b) The notice of motion in every application brought ex parte must correspond substantial-
ly to Form 1 of Annexure 1.
(c) Any order made against a party on an ex parte basis must be of an interim nature and
must call upon the party against whom it is made to appear before the court on a speci-
fied return date to show cause why the order should not be confirmed.
(d) Any person against whom an order is granted ex parte may anticipate the return day
upon delivery of not less than 24 hours [sic] notice.
(e) A copy of any order made ex parte and of the affidavit, if any, on which it was made
must be served on the respondent thereto.
(f) Where cause is shown against any order made ex parte against a party the court may
order the applicant or respondent or the deponent to any affidavit on which it was made
to attend court for examination or cross-examination.
(g) Any order made ex parte may be confirmed, discharged or varied by the court on
cause shown by any person affected thereby and on such terms as to costs as the
court may deem fit.
(h) Ex parte applications may be heard in chambers.
________________________
181
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
________________________
182
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
________________________
183
Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
Should technical issues with the application – such as a party’s lacking locus standi
or the court’s lacking jurisdiction or non-compliance with prescribed formalities – be
alleged, a point in limine may first be argued by the party who raises the point. If the
point in limine stands, it may dispose of the matter or only delay it (that is, be dilatory in
nature).
Parties may prepare their arguments by way of heads of argument which they submit
to the court as well.
184
CHAPTER 8 The Application Procedure
185