COMMENTARY

Apr 10, 2025 | Current Trends in Islamist Ideology

Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Pakistan

Army's Narratives
M. Ilyas Khan & C. Christine Fair
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), more commonly known as Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) in
Pakistan, is well known for its military assistance to the Pakistan Army by conducting
terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan.1 What is less commonly understood is the
organization’s ideological support that it lends to the army. In this essay, we analyze a
2018 Urdu-language book titled Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism by Ameer
Hamza, a principle LeT ideologue. The book is a compilation of his previously
published columns as well as several articles written by his wife. We dilate upon
Hamza’s writings here.

Hamza organizes his articles in this volume around three central themes. First, the
A Pakistani soldier in the South Waziristan District on October 18, 2017.
(Getty Images)
author vigorously advocates his support for the Pakistani military, often phrasing it
in explicitly Islamic terms to paint the Pakistani military as the “Army of Allah.”
Second, Hamza’s intellectual work counters any drift, however partial, towards a
stable political process and media freedoms. It paints political leaders and some
journalists as part of a corrupt mafia, eager to protect their wealth by serving the
interests of Pakistan’s—and Islam’s—enemies, including India and the United States.
Third, it depicts the anti-military Islamist groups—of which there are many in the
region—as Kharejis, using religious violence to serve the interests of Pakistan’s and
Islam’s enemies. Finally, Hamza turns his attention to Pakistan’s external foes.

In this essay, we first provide a brief history of LeT/JuD. Subsequently, we explain

who Ameer Hamza is and why his opinions are significant in the context of LeT/JuD.
Third, we exposit the main themes of the volume mentioned previously: Support for
the military, arguments against Pakistan’s political leaders, arguments against other
Islamist groups, and arguments against Pakistan’s foreign adversaries (ostensibly
including the United States).
We conclude this essay with a discussion of the volume’s wider implications. Namely,
we discuss the ways in which the arguments of this book advance the interests of
Pakistan’s army itself and mirror the army’s own narratives. Consistent with the
Pakistan army’s worldview, the list of Pakistan’s ostensible internal and external foes
detailed by Hamza overlap. The Pakistan Army has long argued that its domestic
challenges are due to conspiratorial efforts of India as well the United States and
West.2

What is the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba?

Although the exact year in which Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT, meaning “Army of the
Righteous”)3 coalesced is unknown,4 scholars generally contend that it began in the
late 1980s. During that period, the Ahl-e-Hadees Islamist militant Zaki-ur-Rehman
Lakhvi gathered several Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadees5 adherents to wage jihad against the
Soviets in Afghanistan.6 Separately, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, two
professors from the Islamic studies department of Lahore Engineering University,
founded Jamaat ud Dawah (JuD) around 1985. JuD, the “Organization for
Preaching,” was initially a small group engaged in tabligh (proselytization) and
dawah (missionary work) with the intent of promulgating the Ahl-e-Hadees creed.
Around 1986, Lakhvi’s LeT amalgamated with Saeed and Iqbal’s JuD to form the
Markaz al-Dawah-wal-Irshad. This combined organization, the “Center for
Preaching and Guidance” (MDI), had three preoccupations: jihad; proselytization of
the Ahl-e-Hadees maslak (Islamic interpretive tradition), and the creation of a new
generation of Muslims committed to their ideology.7

Within a year of its formation, MDI established its first militant training camp,
Muaskar-e-Taiba, in the Afghan province of Paktia in eastern Afghanistan. It
established another camp, Muaskar-e-Aqsa, in Kunar, which abuts the Pakistani
tribal agencies of Bajaur and Mohmand in what was then known as Pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).8 After the Soviets withdrew from
Afghanistan in 1989, MDI reoriented its militant efforts toward Indian-administered
Kashmir because the group wanted to distance itself from the internecine infighting
among different so-called jihadi groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. MDI
relocated its training facilities to Pakistani-administered Kashmir where it
established numerous camps in the mountains. The organization’s decision to
eschew warlord infighting partly reflects MDI’s preference to abjure Muslim-on-
Muslim violence. The decision also reflects its belief that Kashmir is the most
legitimate open front for jihad in the region and indicates that MDI entered the fray
there before it became Pakistan’s proxy of choice.9

MDI’s headquarters (Markaz) was built in 1989 on a 200-acre campus in Muridke in

Pakistan’s Punjab province, some 30 kilometers from Lahore. Punjab, unlike the
FATA, is one of the most militarized provinces in Pakistan. Of the nine regular
Pakistan Army corps, six are in Punjab alongside the Army Air Defense Command
and Strategic Forces Command, which are treated as corps. The MDI Markaz, which
is now the headquarters for JuD, hosts numerous amenities and businesses,
including a madrasa (seminary), large jamia mosque, hospital, market, large
residential area for scholars and faculty members, garment factory, iron factory,
woodworking factory, stable, swimming pool, fish farm, and agricultural tracts.10

On January 25, 1990, MDI staged its first militant mission in Kashmir when its
operatives ambushed a jeep that was carrying Indian Air Force personnel traveling
toward Srinagar airport, killing one squadron leader and three pilots.11 In the early
1990s, MDI segmented its activities and organizational structure. While MDI
continued the mission of proselytization and education, it hived off LeT as a tightly
related militant wing of MDI.12 However, Hafiz Saeed was the leader (emir) of both
organizations, which attests to the degree to which it was nearly impossible to
distinguish MDI and LeT.13 Hafiz Saeed explained the continuity between the two
organizations as follows: “Islam propounds both dawah and jihad. Both are equally
important and inseparable. Since our life revolves around Islam, therefore both
dawah and jihad are essential; we cannot prefer one over the other.”14

Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had hoped that
LeT, with its demonstrable lethal capabilities,15 would intensify the conflict in
Kashmir and expand the geographical reach of the insurgency. In the early 1990s, the
ISI and the Pakistan Army began providing support to the organization. The army
helped build LeT’s military apparatus specifically for use against India, as opposed to
Afghanistan, Chechnya, or other theatres of international jihad where LeT activists
periodically fought. The Pakistan Army helped design the organization’s military
training regime and has long co-located army and ISI personnel at LeT training bases
to help oversee the regimen.16 Pakistan’s investments paid off: within a few years,
LeT became the biggest challenge to the Indian security forces in Kashmir, prior to
the 2000 introduction of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), a brutal Deobandi Kashmir-
oriented terrorist group.17

In December 2001, Pakistan officially banned LeT, along with several other militant
groups, after JeM attacked the Indian parliament, bringing India and Pakistan close
to the brink of war. These bans deceived no one. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies
alerted the soon-to-be banned organizations of the upcoming proscription, providing
them ample time to transfer their assets to new accounts and to reorganize and re-
launch under new names. In the case of LeT, Hafiz Saeed announced the
organization had been restructured and would operate as JuD, separate from LeT,
with the latter being a strictly Kashmiri organization led by Maula Abdul Wahid al-
Kashmiri. Saeed dissolved MDI and replaced it with JuD, which was the name of the
original organization he had founded in 1985 and which was still registered as a
Pakistani charity. He resigned as LeT’s emir and became the emir of JuD, which was
described as an “organization for the teaching of Islam, politics, [and] social work.”18
Yahya Mujahid, spokesperson for LeT-cum-JuD and one of the founding members of
MDI, announced that “We handed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba over to the Kashmiris in
December 2001. Now we have no contact with any jihadi organization.”19 This
purported division was merely a reorganization: JuD subsumed the vast majority of
LeT’s human, financial, and material assets while the organizational nodes and
operatives outside of Pakistan continued to serve under the banner of LeT. As further
evidence of the organizational continuity between the various groups, Hafiz Saeed,
Zafar Iqbal, Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki, and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi oversaw the
new organization while al-Kashmiri was merely a figurehead.20

Curiously, the US government did not recognize JuD as a Foreign Terrorist

Organization (FTO) until December 2001, reflecting American indifference to it.
Washington only did so after JEM’s attack on India’s Parliament in December of that
year, which had precipitated the largest Indian military mobilization along the
Pakistani border since the 1971 war. Both to preclude an Indo-Pakistani war and re-
concentrate Pakistani focus towards its Afghan border, where NATO military
operations were just commencing, Washington spent considerable political capital
persuading India to stand down. As a part of these diplomatic efforts, the United
States proscribed LeT and JeM among other Pakistan-based and Pakistan-backed
terrorist organizations. At the same time, the administration of President George W.
Bush pressured Pakistan’s military dictator and president, General Pervez
Musharraf, to ban LeT and other organizations that Washington had designated.
Washington also pressured Musharraf to make a series of public statements aimed at
mitigating Indian concerns and even persuaded him to curtail sending terrorists into
India for some time after the 2001 parliament attack.21 While Musharraf may have
conceded to Washington on some issues, the bans were a farce.

JuD has been part of several umbrella organizations with other Pakistani militant
groups as well as non-militant, right-of-center political groups. For example, in
January 2009, JuD was involved in a group called the Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal
(Movement for the Safeguarding of the First Center of Prayer), which held anti-Israel
protests in Lahore.22 Similarly, in 2010, JuD had a noticeable presence in the
Tehreek-e-Tahafuz-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool (“Movement to Defend the Honor of the
Prophet”), which organized protests against the Danish cartoons of the Prophet
Muhammad. Later in 2012, JuD was prominent in the Difa-e-Pakistan
Council (“Defense of Pakistan Council”), which organized large rallies in Lahore,
Rawalpindi, Karachi, and elsewhere to protest American policies in Pakistan as well
as U.S.-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) activities in Afghanistan. In
the spring of 2015, JuD also generated popular support for Pakistani military
assistance to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. To do so, JuD formed the Pasban-e-
Harmain-Sharifain (“Defenders of the Sacred Sites in Mecca and Medina”) and
argued that the Yemeni Houthi rebels aimed to invade Saudi Arabia and assault the
harmain—the Grand Mosque in Mecca—and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina.23

In August 2017, JuD opened a new front when it formed a political party named the
Milli Muslim League (MML, the “National Muslim League”) with the aim of
rendering Pakistan a “real Islamic and welfare state.”24 While Saeed initially said
that this party was separate from JuD this ultimately proved to be fiction, like many
of his other pronouncements. Upon Saeed’s release from “house arrest” in late
November 2017, the MML leadership opined, “Mr. Hafiz Saeed will soon start
planning out our membership strategy and getting others on board through
networking.”25 Saeed dropped the façade in early December when he announced
that JuD is “planning to contest the 2018 general elections under the banner of Milli
Muslim League.”26 The MML, headed by Saifullah Khalid, a close aide of Saeed and
a foundational member of JuD, fielded several candidates in the 2018 general
election but won no races.

Who is Amir Hamza?

Amir Hamza, the author of the 2018 book Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism,
is a core member of LeT/JuD and a member of the central committee of their mother
organization, the MDI. He is considered to be a top LeT/JuD ideologue and is
described by observers as a fiery speaker and prolific writer.27

He is said to have led JuD's fundraising campaigns and negotiated with authorities
for the release of JuD leaders arrested over the years. He is the founding editor of
JuD's official publications, including the weekly Jarrar. In a 2012 report, the U.S.
Department of Treasury provided details about his career, noting that:

"As of 2011, Amir Hamza, a member of LeT's central advisory committee, actively
maintained LeT's relationships with other groups under the direction of LeT emir
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Hamza has led an LeT-associated charity and, as of 2010,
was also an officer and member of an LeT university trust that was led by Saeed.
Hamza's responsibilities as of mid-2010 also included publishing propaganda on
behalf of LeT. Hamza has served as editor of an LeT weekly newspaper and, as of
mid-2011, he was contributing articles to the LeT publication. Hamza was also one
of three LeT leaders to negotiate the release of detained LeT members as of mid-
2010. Hamza served as the head of LeT's "special campaigns" department as of mid-
2009."28

In the beginning of Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, Hamza describes

himself as a widely traveled person, having traveled to Afghanistan several times, the
last being after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. He also claims to have “traveled to
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Moscow and Astrakhan, and
then wrote a travelogue. He also went to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Oman, United
Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, and wrote books about
those travels.” He further describes himself as “one of Pakistan’s prominent
newspaper columnists […] writing regular columns for daily 29

According to the book:

"Maulana Amir Hamza cites facts and events to prove that that the Pakistan Army is
the strongest army in the world. He also revealed to the enemy that apart from
defending the geographical and ideological borders of the country, the Pakistan Army
also represented the desires and dreams of the entire Islamic world. It is the army of
Islam as embodied by its motto “faith, piety, and jihad in the name of God.” It will
never let its enemies fulfill their desire to cause damage to Pakistan. He accomplished
this mission by visiting the homes of the martyred soldiers, speaking to their families,
and bringing forth those families’ sentiments regarding Islam and jihad. Likewise, he
penned credible material about the Khareji ideology and its links to terrorism. These
are the two subjects on which the present book is based."30

This volume is thus important because it bears the imprimatur of LeT/JuD’s inner-
most circle and reflects the thinking of one of the group’s principal ideologues and
propagandists.

JuD Narratives on The Army and Pakistan’s “Foes” at Home and

Abroad

Hamza’s columns compiled in this book exposit several themes that undergird LeT’s
support for the Pakistani military, widely using quotations from the Quran and
Sunna (sayings of the Prophet) to paint it explicitly as the Army of God. The author
also uses religious quotes and moral themes to ideologically counter the country’s
meager drift towards a stable political process and media freedoms. Hamza paints
political leaders and some journalists as part of a corrupt mafia, eager to protect their
wealth by serving the interests of Pakistan’s—and by extension Islam’s—enemies,
including India and the United States. In a subsequent section, Hamza portrays the
anti-military Islamist groups—or Kharejis—as using religious violence to serve the
interests of Pakistan’s and Islam’s enemies, just as politicians and secular-minded
journalists do. Finally, Hamza describes Pakistan’s external foes. The reader will note
that that there is considerable overlap in the internal and external foes because the
Pakistani state sees a foreign hand behind the activities of its internal enemies.

The Army of Allah

In his writing, Amir Hamza aims to ensure that the entire population of the country
is supportive of the military so as to secure the future of Pakistan. One example is a
speech he delivered at a JuD gathering in May 2014 and which he quotes in his
column:

"And praise be to God, I made an announcement there that every Pakistani needed to
become a symbolic minister of defense, and that we will train every child of the
country to that effect, so that they can step in time with the army, and when their
combined fist of self-defense lands on the terrorists, we could see [Narendra] Modi
falling flat on his face."31

The book opens with a column paying tribute to General Ziaul Haq, Pakistan’s
second military dictator (1977–1988), who toppled the country’s first elected
government and is widely seen as the main driving force behind the Islamization of
Pakistan and the subsequent evolution of its jihadist-based militant strategies in
Afghanistan and India. Here, Hamza claims that it was General Zia who founded the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with an aim to weaken
India.32 He writes, “I salute the vision of General Ziaul Haq who brought together the
countries of the sub-continent in the SAARC organization, and thereby compelled
India, which considers itself as the mini super-power of the region, to stand down as
an equal with (smaller) countries like Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and
Bangladesh.”33 In subsequent articles included in the book, Hamza also explores the
“divine” traits of the Pakistani soldiers, providing “physical” as well as “intellectual”
evidence of their supposedly godly character.

Physical stature of Pakistani soldiers

Hamza seeks to buff the physical stature of the Pakistan Army. This is perhaps
considered important given that Pakistan has started each of its wars with India and
failed to win any of them. In the 1971 war, it lost half of its population when East
Pakistan seceded and became independent Bangladesh with India’s assistance. In
one column originally published in December 2016 and included in the book,
Hamza gathers quotes from the Bible and the Quran to explain how, with his 12-foot-
tall stature, the pious King Saul of Bani-Israel was able to overcome and defeat 10-
foot-tall Goliath, the leader of the polytheists.34 This, he writes, happened despite
the fact that Saul hailed from a humble background as compared to Goliath, and
despite the fact that his people were not confident in his strength and acumen.35

Hamza next applies this divine logic to the “Saul-like” army chiefs of Pakistan, listing
among them General Raheel Sharif, whose term as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
had just ended at the time of writing in 2016, and the then-newly inducted army
chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, whom he describes as the tallest of them all, with
a height of six-foot-four-inches. Hamza contrasts General Bajwa to the then-Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, using coarse language to discredit the latter. He does this by
describing scenes in several pictures taken after General Bajwa’s induction as COAS,
in which the two men are shown standing together, looking at each other. Nawaz
Sharif, he writes:

"[Is] looking at Qamar Bajwa in the same way as one would look at the moon and stars
in the sky. It is understandable. Gen. Qamar is so tall that a man of middle-height like
Nawaz Sharif will have to bend his head up in order to look at him. On his part, Gen.
Qamar Bajwa looks at the man in front of him just as someone standing on the
terrace will look at someone down in the street.”36

Hamza then extends the comparison to Indian soldiers and the daily parades that
take place at the Wagah border-crossing between India and Pakistan. He writes of the
parade:

"[While Pakistani soldiers] rise to six and a quarter foot, those of India come up to just
five and a half feet. At times, it has happened that an Indian soldier fell to the ground
because one of our tall and broad-shouldered soldiers banged his foot down on the
ground in full force. During the parade, when our soldier lifts his foot, it rises higher
than the Indian soldiers’ chests, or even their heads. And when the Indian soldier lifts
his foot, it only goes up to the height of our soldiers’ hips."37

Prophetic traits of soldiers

Hamza attributes to Pakistan’s soldiers various prophetic traits, enhancing their
spiritual stature in addition their physical stature. For example, in a February 2015
piece titled “Military Intellectuals and Today’s Politicians,” Amir Hamza spins a
dramatic tale of how a senior military officer and former ISI chief, General Akhtar
Abdur Rahman, had predicted the December 1991 break-up of Soviet Union as early
as in 1976. He claims that General Rahman shared his prophecy with a LeT preacher
and ideologue, Asadullah Ghalib, after the end of a farewell ceremony of a retiring
officer that both of them had attended.

He writes:

"Brig. Akhtar Abdur Rahman38 holds Asadullah Ghalib’s hand and tells him, “We are
faced with an ignoble enemy (India) who cannot tolerate our existence. The problem
is that he is not alone in attacking us; a super-power, Russia, is standing behind him.
Pakistan is being punished for being an Islamic country. The real fun will start when
this enemy confronts us directly.” Mr. Ghalib is slightly confused, and asks him, “a
confrontation with Russia? How?” Brig. Rahman replies that there will be a direct
confrontation with Russia; there will be a clash. Russian intentions are not hidden
from anyone. It wants to have access to warm waters. From the era of the Tsars till the
age of its new communist monarchs, they have always craved for access to the
Arabian Sea. Afghanistan is their short cut to achieve this aim, and they will send
their troops there sooner or later. And this is where it will get trapped in a conflict so
serious that keeping itself in one piece will become hard despite all of its nuclear and
military strength."39

Amir Hamza narrates another story to prove a saying attributed to the Prophet
Mohammad that the earth will never eat up the body of a martyr—meaning that a
martyr’s body will never decay or decompose. Hamza says he came across this story
while sitting around a winter fire with some retired soldiers working as security
guards in his neighborhood. During a chat, he quotes one soldier as telling him:

"[T]here is a military graveyard in Bedyan area on the outskirts of Lahore, where

martyrs from the wars of 1965 and 1971 are buried. Some days ago, we had to bury a
soldier there who had recently died. My name was on the list of grave diggers. As I
was digging the grave, I accidentally discovered a human body down there. My hoe
hit one of its wrists and blood started sprouting from it like a spring. I tried to stop it
with my hand but failed. Finally, we called a doctor from a nearby village who
bandaged the slashed part to stop the blood flow."40

The column continues:

"Dear readers! I was listening to him, and wondering, if the body was that of a martyr
from 1965, it would be 50 years old. If it was from 1971, then it was 44 years old.
Whether 50 or 44, the body was nearly half a century old anyways, and yet it was still
fresh and oozing blood. Obviously, this blood is that of a prince of God’s paradise,
where billions of residents and all the angels know him and are aware of his exalted
status."41

In another column published soon after the retirement of COAS General Raheel
Sharif in November 2016, he demonstrates how the newly inducted army chief,
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, has been treading in the path of the Holy Prophet. He
starts with a conversation of the Holy Prophet, quoted in the compilation titled
Tirmizi Sharif: “Once a man walked up to the Prophet, and said, ‘O Prophet of God, I
have committed a grave sin; is there any room for forgiveness?’ The Prophet asked, ‘Is
your mother alive?’ He said, ‘no.’ The Prophet said, ‘do you have an aunt (mother’s
sister)?’ He said yes. The Prophet said, ‘be kind to her, and your sins will be
forgiven’.”42 Then Hamza turns directly to the topic of General Bajwa:

"Dear readers, soon after being inducted as the army chief, Gen. Bajwa went to his
mother’s grave, raised his hands in prayers, and wept. Then, from the graveyard, he
headed to the house of his maternal aunt, Safia Begum. She doesn’t have any children
of her own. So, whenever Gen. Bajwa called on her, he would invariably convey to her
the impression that he was her child. And so, after his mother’s death, she also took
the place of his mother. While my Holy Sire (Prophet Mohammad) granted a paternal
uncle the status of a father, He also granted an aunt the place of a mother. So, the first
thing Gen. Bajwa did after becoming the army chief was to go and pay his respects to
relations with an exalted status."43

Hamza’s conclusive description of the character of army officers comes in one

column, where he writes that an army general “is a creature of God, an heir of the
martyrs, having an honest heart and a straight tongue; he believes in action,
considers state’s assets as a trust of the nation, and tries to live within the means of
his monthly salary. Most of all, he believes in God, and humbly requests his
interlocuters to remember him in their prayers.”44 It should be noted that Pakistan’s
military does not describe its own soldiers in these ways. Thus, in a sense, Hamza is
filling a propaganda niche that the army has left vacant.

Pakistan’s Internal Foes

Because the army fiercely protects its primacy in the ostensibly civilian-led
government, the army conflates its own domestic enemies with those of Pakistan.
This tendency is evidenced in this volume in which Amir Hamza identifies several
internal foes: politicians, journalists, and Kharejis and Takfiris, all of whom oppose
the military’s role in Pakistan’s politics. We discuss each theme in turn.

Politicians

In a clear contrast to army officers, the book paints politicians as a driving force
behind the social, political, economic, and security problems that the army is trying
to bring under control. Those heading larger political parties are painted as a corrupt,
self-serving mafia focused on personal gains, thereby compromising national
interests. And those representing different regions of the country—particularly the
restive and insurgency-prone provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—
are painted as anti-Pakistan.

As mentioned previously, the columns reproduced in the book were written during
the period when the chief of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N),45 Nawaz
Sharif, was the country’s prime minister. Consequently, he is the most consistent
target in these columns, although Hamza does not spare other leaders such as Asif
Zardari and Bilawal Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP).46 The main
narrative contrasts political corruption with the sacrifices made by the army and how
this has led the army to supposedly rise above the politicians in terms of popularity.

One example is a column published in September 2015, in which Hamza describes

the scene at a gathering following the oath-taking ceremony of the country’s new
chief justice, Anwar Zaheer Jamali. He writes “As soon as the oath-taking ended and
tea-party started, all the people present there gathered around Army Chief, General
Raheel Sharif. The prime minister [Nawaz Sharif] was also present there, but nobody
went to him. His own ministers and governors also joined the crowd around the
COAS. When Nawaz Sharif saw this, he thought it would be better to leave. So, he left
promptly, without taking tea.” The column further adds; “The tragic part is that this
event has flung his popularity from heavens to Earth, and the sound of the crash has
shaken my heart.”47

Why did this happen? It happened because, as Hamza sees it, the politicians care
more for their “stomachs” than the safety and well-being of the nation. He writes in
one column: “The Holy Prophet once said that the stomach was the worst of all bags.
Today’s politicians are busy filling this foul-smelling bag, while those who are
sacrificing their lives to save Pakistan are none other than army soldiers.”48

Hamza also examines how politicians are supposedly responsible for the rise of
terrorism in the country. In one January 2015 column titled “The Prophet’s Love for
Martyrs’ Children,” Hamza is extremely critical of PPP leader Asif Zardari as well as
PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif for continuing with a moratorium on the death penalty
which had been signed by Mr. Zardari when he had been president back in 2008.49
Human rights advocacy groups within the country had demanded the moratorium,
citing flaws in the system that allowed powerful circles to manipulate the judiciary.50

Advocating in favor of the death penalty for terrorists following the December 2014
attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School that killed more than 150 people (mostly
school children), Hamza writes:

"Pakistan’s legal system has totally collapsed. Criminals continue to practice

terrorism; when judges convict them, they kill those judges; when imprisoned, they
break jails or use threats to avail facilities inside jail and thereby continue their
business of bloodshed via their operatives in the field. They were further facilitated
when in return for a few pennies worth of trade agreement,51 former president Asif
Ali Zardari put a moratorium on executions. Mian Nawaz Sharif has continued that
policy… Yes sir! Such cooperation by the state has helped murderers and terrorists to
further accelerate their activities. The rulers have security cordons around them, but
the common people and their children don’t have it, and so they are the ones who are
being killed."52

In a December 2017 column titled “Drift of Military and Today’s Politicians,” Hamza
focuses on so-called anti-Pakistan politicians, and how Nawaz Sharif has started to
drift in their direction after he was disqualified by the Supreme Court in July of that
year.53 In a dramatic sequence, the column first mentions a quote from a Nawaz
Sharif ’s speech and then discloses where the speech was delivered. The quote from
the speech says, “a prime minister has been sacked; such are the decisions that
destroy countries, that create anarchy and confusion, and thereby undermine the
nation’s sense of its intended destiny.”54 He then reveals to the readers that Sharif
“expressed these thoughts at a public meeting organized in Quetta by a nationalist
party led by Mehmood Khan Achakzai.” Hamza continues:

"The meeting was held to mark the death anniversary of Abdus Samad Achakzai,55 a
political and ideological friend of Abdul Ghaffar Khan,56 known as the Frontier
Gandhi. It was presided by Mehmood Achakzai, the son of Abdus Samad Achakzai.
So, nowadays, Mian Nawaz Sharif is propagating his ideas from the platforms of the
people who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan; people who were causing
troubles to Quaid-e-Azam [Mohammad Ali Jinnah]."57

This is an allusion to the fact that Abdul Ghaffar Khan opposed joining Pakistan and
advocated for the Northwest Frontier Province to join India.

Journalists

A central theme of all the columns in the book is the need to counter the secular, anti-
military sentiment that was arising at the time. The rise of independent reporting
and analysis, which started with the return of democracy in 1988, had by then
started to expose the secretive terror and business interests of the military.58 In most
cases, such reports were published without directly naming the military, but they did
add to the mass perception of how the military was using backdoor channels to
influence political decision-making.

Most of the columns included in this volume that focus on Pakistani media and
journalists build a narrative to support the military’s evolving strategies to influence
and control the media.59 Among other tactics, the military at the time was accused of
using its terrorist proxies to eliminate journalists who could potentially damage the
military’s image in the public’s eye.

The opening column in the book, titled “Fashion and the Army,” was published on
May 7, 2014, against a backdrop of an unprecedented wave of attacks on journalists.
At least seven news reporters were killed in attacks by armed militants in 2013,
according to international advocacy group Reporters Sans Frontièrs (RSF), while
many others were injured. Among the latter was Raza Rumi, a well-known columnist
and television anchor associated with the Express Media Group. Rumi had emerged
as an authentic analyst of the Pakistani politico-security landscape and a frontline
critic of the ideology promoted by the military establishment. Armed militants
attacked his car on March 28, 2014, killing his driver and causing many injuries to
Rumi.60 A mere three weeks later, on April 19, Geo TV’s most popular talk-show
host, Hamid Mir, was attacked and suffered severe bullet wounds. Like Raza Rumi,
he was an outspoken critic of the military, its intelligence services, as well as of the
judiciary, which he said was harming the political establishment and thereby creating
room for the military to protect its political and economic interests. Soon after the
attack, Mir’s brother, also a journalist, quoted him as saying that the attack was part
of an assassination plan hatched by the ISI.61 This claim was repeatedly aired by Geo
TV and also picked up by other media outlets, thereby damaging the public image of
the military. In response, military-promoted religious groups started to pour out onto
the streets in all the major urban centers of the country, chanting pro-military
slogans, expressing their love for the army and ISI, demanding the cancellation of
Geo’s license, and calling on the media network to issue an apology.62 While the
country’s media regulator, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA), put Geo TV off the air at that time, the decision apparently came from
quarters beyond the control of the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, who, on his
part, was among the first political leaders to visit Hamid Mir in the hospital to
express his sympathies.63

In one column, Hamza weaves a long tail of the threats Pakistan faces from hostile
forces and the sacrifices rendered by the army to protect the Pakistani people from
those threats. He then writes:
"But on the other side, our own people have started condemning our defenders. There
are certain “patriots” in the mainstream media who never mention occupied Kashmir
and the violent suppression of its innocent Muslims by the Indian army. They never
see how the Gulfams and Ayeshas of Kashmir are pricked and plucked and killed by
the Indian army. They just look for a chance to assault the army with taunts and
catcalls. It is said that these patriots are pocketing sizeable benefits from America."64

He then compares those journalists to the “real patriots”—the male and female
religious activists who staged demonstrations against Geo TV at that time, raising
posters that carried pictures of then-army chief General Raheel Sharif and then-ISI
chief Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar. He writes, “So, these are the circumstances in which
patriots have walked onto the scene so as to challenge those people.”65 While it is
impossible to know how readers have received these writings, rhetorically, they help
delegitimize the press’s attacks on the military and firmly characterize Pakistan’s
anti-military media as domestic enemies to be countered.

Kharejis and Takfiris

Due to events explained further below under the title “Pakistan’s External Foes,” by
the 2010s, Deobandi Islamist groups once raised and equipped by the Pakistani
military had broken into factions, and many of them had turned against Pakistan and
its army. Perhaps the most important example of this is the Pakistani Taliban
(Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, or TTP). Since these groups were raised in the name
of Islam, Hamza uses numerous quotes from the Quran and Prophet Mohammad to
establish how they had transgressed the principles of Islamic faith.

He defines such groups as Kharejis (extremists who also use Takfir) and
Takfiris (those who declare other sects as apostates and frequently kill them) on the
grounds that “when they plan an attack, they launch it on Muslims. When they chose
a target, it is either a mosque, a school or an institution that defends Muslims. They
attack women and children.”66

He supports his claim in the same column by interpreting a saying of the Prophet
according to his own perception:
"According to a saying of the Prophet, quoted by Ibn-e-Maja, “the Kharejis are the
dogs of hell.” The way I see it in the light of this saying, their faces will transform into
faces of dogs, and they will enter the hell barking. But since they believe in Kalima
(Muslim statement of faith), the question that arose in my mind was, why is God so
harsh on them. The answer I received was, because when they kill, they only kill
Muslims. When they bark, it’s only on the believers of Kalima. And therefore, their
punishment will be the severest of all."67

In another column published in March 2016, he follows up on this theme in the

context of the killing of four Pakistani soldiers by TTP militants in a clash in the
Waziristan region: “And while the Khareji narrative terms all the people linked to the
security forces, and even their children, as Satans, the message from God is that
theirs is the holy blood, spilled on the path of righteousness. The message from
Pakistan’s four provinces is also the same, that they will fight terrorists. Hence,
victory belongs to these uniformed men, on earth as well as in the heavens.”68

Regarding militant attacks on non-Muslims in Pakistan, he writes: “There is a saying

of the Prophet that ‘guard yourself against the curse of the oppressed, even if the
oppressed is not a Muslim.’ Yes sir. Muslim or no Muslim, he is still a creature of God.
God is the creator of the world, and does not tolerate maltreatment of anyone,
whether a believer or a non-believer.”69 This argument is consistent with LeT’s more
general position against violence committed against Pakistanis or in Pakistan, as
articulated in his manifesto Hum Jihad Kyon Kar Rahe Hain.70This puts LeT in start
contrast to the various sectarian groups that target religious minorities as well as other
Muslims due to their sectarian commitments.

Pakistan’s External Foes

In this volume, Hamza primarily identifies and dilates upon two external foes: India
and the United States (and the West more broadly). This may come as a surprise to
many given the substantial military and non-military assistance the United States
has given Pakistan in recent decades. Between financial year 2002 and 2022, the
United States gave Pakistan $8.4 billion in military assistance, nearly $11.9 billion in
economic assistance, and $14.6 billion to the Coalition Support Fund (created after
the September 11 attacks to support Pakistani counterterrorism operations) for a
grand total of $34.9 billion.71

India

Amir Hamza penned the opening column of the book, “Fashion and The Army,” on
May 7, 2014, the day general elections were held in India. Modi’s Bharatya Janata
Party (BJP) won those elections, and he was tipped to be the next Prime Minister of
India at the time of Hamza’s writing. In the column, Hamza reminds his readers that
as Chief Minister of Gujrat province in 2002, Modi “burnt to death 5,000 Muslims in
his provincial capital, Ahmadabad, by sprinkling oil on them” in reference to the
anti-Muslim riots that Modi tolerated (or actively stoked, according to some
testimonies). According to Hamza, when asked if he felt sorry for Muslim deaths, “he
replied that he felt just as sorry as when his car overran a dog.”72

While appreciating Pakistan’s military ruler, General Ziaul Haq, for creating SAARC
and thereby compelling India to behave as an equal with the smaller states of South
Asia (noted previously), the writer builds a narrative of how Modi exacted his revenge
against Pakistan. Hamza writes, without providing credible evidence,73 that India
was behind the assassination of Nepal’s King Burendra and his family in 2001. This
was because, according to Hamza, “King Burendra loved Pakistan despite being a
Hindu and had issues with India.” 74 Hamza also claims, with greater evidentiary
basis, that India “helped Sheikh Hasina Wajid become Bangladesh’s prime minister
for the third time—the same Hasina Wajid who had banned the waving of Pakistani
flags in the sports stadiums because they had started emitting hot air for her.” Hamza
continues, “India has also provided triggers for Buddhist-Muslim clashes in Sri
Lanka, which has come very close to Pakistan because of Gen. Zia’s efforts. And now,
India has started playing a role in Afghanistan, with which it shares neither a border
nor faith. And from there, it is sending its agents to launch attacks on our armed
forces.”2 It should be noted that each of these claims have quite varying degrees of
empirical underpinnings. While India’s posited role in Burendra’s assassination has
little evidentiary support, India was indeed a staunch supporter of Sheikh Hasina’s
continued premiership and did intervene in 2024 to support her onward tenure.76
Indian involvement in Afghanistan is well known, even if the extent of India’s
involvement is debatable.77
In a September 2016 column titled “War, Despite Avoiding War,” Hamza is writing in
the aftermath of an attack carried out by militants on an Indian army base in the Uri
region of Indian Kashmir.78 In response to this Pakistani provocation, the Indian Air
Force carried out “surgical strikes” on suspected militant hideouts on Pakistani side
of the region.79 In the column, Hamza blames Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharif, for his peace overtures to India, which Hamza claims were viewed in India as
Pakistani weakness. Hamza opines that, “We flew around our ‘doves of peace’ [an
Urdu idiom] so much that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even invited Modi to the
wedding of his granddaughter, and also sent him a gift of sarees for his mother.” 80
The author claims that this hospitality was not reciprocated. Hamza further criticizes
Nawaz Sharif because he “even went to the extent of ordering the lodging of a
criminal case in Gujranwala against the perpetrators of the Pathankot attack,”81
which the author sees as another effort at rapprochement towards an arrogant and
unbending Modi. Hamza accuses Modi of exhibiting politeness and humility only for
the sake of maintaining a tactical peace. But by issuing his exaggerated war threats,
Modi only proves that he is truculent, trouble-monger.82

Hamza also blames India for the rise of violence in the Pashtun and Baloch regions.
He writes: “This [Indian-backed] war is being fought on the ideological as well as the
media front. The sad part is that India has been able to avail the services of not only
the gun carrying fighters (Pakistani Taliban, TTP), but also proxy ideologues and
media platforms within Pakistan.”83

The United States and the West

Throughout the successive columns published in the book, Hamza promotes a

narrative that India is fomenting terrorism in Pakistan with the help of the United
States and the West more broadly. Their purported aim is to rid Pakistan of its
nuclear power by breaking up the country along ethnic lines. He writes that this
Indian policy has continued since the time that “the Americans decided to leave
.
Afghanistan and hand the region over to India ” But since the whole world “knows
that Pakistan Army has become unbeatable, India is only waging a proxy war at the
moment. And it recruits its proxies from within Pakistan…”84 This is a clear
reference to the anti-state militant groups in Pakistan, with Hamza further
elaborating that “attacks on Pakistan’s defense institutions are launched by these
same Kharejis, and India is behind them. These Kharejis set up their sanctuaries in
Afghanistan, which means that they enjoy American support.”85

Hamza extends this conspiratorial mindset that sees Western support behind
militancy to several other parts of the Muslim world. For example, he claims in
another column published in November 2016:

"During his recent visit to Pakistan, Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also
disclosed in clear terms that the West was behind Daesh,86 which was carrying out
terror attacks in Turkey. The ill-fated suicide bomber who recently attacked the Holy
Abode of Medina has also been found to be linked to the same Khareji group.
Similarly, a missile attack launched on Mecca from the side of Yemen, which the
Saudi air force successfully countered by destroying the missile in the air some 65
kilometers away from Mecca, was also launched by the Khareji group of Houthi
rebels."87

Relatedly, in a September 2015 column, Hamza builds an anti-American narrative in

the context of America’s reported request to establish a military base in Deosai plains
in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan.88 He writes:

"I was lost in my thoughts, thinking about America which often spoke about being a
friend of ours. During the September (1965) war,89 it continued to assure us that
India will restrict the fight to Kashmir and will never cross the international border.
But in secret parleys with India, it had already planned that India will attack Lahore
and Sialkot. During the era of Gen. Ziaul Haq, the same America backed India to
capture Siachen,90 where a limited war between Pakistan and India has continued
for several years. Almost every unit of our army has gone through the experience of
confronting the enemy in Siachen. On the other hand, the duplicitous America is
asking Pakistan to let it set up an airbase in Deosai, so that it can keep a close watch
over China. How can Pakistan keep throwing its axe on its own feet by handing its
vast and most beautiful earthen “roof ” to an enemy disguised as a friend, so that he
could create problems for Pakistan’s bosom buddy, China."91

LeT’s depiction of the United States is widely shared by the Pakistani military as well
as Pakistanis more generally. In a 2012 Pew Poll (the most recent conducted), 74% of
Pakistanis viewed the United States as an enemy compared to 8 percent who viewed
it as a partner.92 As seen in Hamza’s quote above, from the Pakistani military’s point
of view, the United States evinced its duplicity as early as 1962 when the United
States aided India—Pakistan’s archnemesis—in its war against China. Then again in
1965, the United States cut off assistance to Pakistan as well as India due the
outbreak of hostilities between the two countries; however, Pakistan was dependent
upon the United States for military maintenance and supplies whereas India was not.
This sentiment deepened when the United States sanctioned Pakistan for nuclear-
proliferation-related concerns after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and
Pakistan was no longer needed as a security partner.93

Conclusion

This volume offers important insights into the ways in which LeT promotes
narratives that support the Pakistan Army. Prior to the identification and translation
of this volume, scholarship on the relationship between LeT and the army focused
upon the way in which LeT contributes to Pakistan’s grand strategic objectives, with
Pakistan relaying on militants to execute its foreign policy objectives.94 Hamza’s
book also advances the military’s objectives in domestic politics, as Hamza goes to
great lengths to bolster the Pakistani army’s image during a period when Pakistan’s
media and public began to criticize the army. This volume’s arguments about the
pious and Islamic nature of the Pakistan Army may be more even more important in
contemporary Pakistan as the army is under relentless criticism for its persecution of
the highly popular politician, Imran Khan.95 Second, Hamza’s volume identifies
Pakistan’s (ostensible) internal and external foes. It should be noted that LeT’s
identification is very similar to that of the Pakistan Army, thus legitimizing the
arguments of the latter. Domestically, these enemies include journalists, political
parties, as well as the militants attacking Pakistan’s armed forces. Externally, LeT
refers to India and the United States and the “West” more generally. Consistent with
the Pakistan Army’s understanding, Pakistan’s internal and external enemies are
intertwined in LeT’s telling. The Pakistani army has long propounded the theory that
India, the United States, and the West are engaged in a wide array of conspiracies to
undermine Pakistan through brutal proxies.96 As such, Hamza’s book provides
invaluable insights for scholars who are looking for answers as to why Pakistan feels
the need to sustain religious militants such as LeT.

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SECURITY ALLIANCES DEFENSE STRATEGY

References (96)

1. C. Christine Fair, In Their Own Words: Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2019). ↝

2. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
↝

3. This section draws from Fair, In Their Own Words. ↝

4. It is impossible to adjudicate which version—if any—of this history is accurate given that studies tend to rely
upon interviews with militants and Pakistani officials who may not be truthful and/or who may remember events
incorrectly. Indeed, scholars who have interviewed LeT militants find that they often disagree with one another on
key dates, pivotal events, and even important personalities involved in the group’s history and operations.
Pakistani officials, moreover, have their own incentive to dissemble about the role of the state in supporting the
organization. See Yoginder Sikand, “The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,” in The
Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, ed. Aparna Rao et al.(New
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 215–238; and Mariam Abou Zahab, “I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise: The
Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure),” in The Practice of War, 133–158; Saeed Shafqat,
“From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Pakistan: Nationalism
without a Nation, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books, 2002),131–147; and Zaigham Khan, “Allah’s
Army,” The Herald Annual, January 1998, 123–130. ↝

5. In Pakistan there are five major sectarian traditions, referred to as maslak (school of Islamic thought, which
derives from the Arabic salaka, which means “to walk” or “to walk on a path”): four are Sunni and include Barelvi,
Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadees and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); while the fifth is Shia, which also includes several distinct
traditions. Most Sunnis in Pakistan follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). For example, even
though Deobandis and Barelvis have many differences, they are both Hanafi. Ahl-e-Hadees rejects all fiqh and
self-identify as ghair-muqallid (those who do not follow taqlid, which is guidance that has been historically given).
Ahl-e-Hadees proponents see the various schools of jurisprudence as being tantamount to personality cults
surrounding their various founders. As such, they are even more zealous than Deobandis in establishing a
singular standard of piety and behavior, and even more unrelenting in extirpating the various customary practices
that they understand to be bid’at (literally translates to innovation, but it carries the valence that it is heretical and
displeasing to Allah). They also propound a rigorous doctrine of the oneness of god (tawheed). Ahl-e-Hadees
followers are frequently confused with Wahhabis; however, Wahhabis follow the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.
See Mariam Abou Zahab, “Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadees Movement,” in Global Salafism: Islam's New
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), 126–139; and Barbara Metcalf, Islamic
Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). ↝

6. The Geneva Accord which brought the conflict to a close was signed in 1988. See Stephen Tankel, Storming
the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011);and Stephen Tankel,
“Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects,” New America Foundation, National Security Studies
Program Policy Paper, April 2011. ↝

7. In total, around seventeen persons helped found the MDI, one of whom was Abdullah Azzam, an associate of
Osama Bin Laden who was affiliated with the Islamic University of Islamabad and the Maktab ul Khadamat
(Bureau of Services for Arab mujahedeen). Azzam was killed in a bomb blast in 1989 in Peshawar. See Zaigham
Khan, “Allah’s Army,” The Herald Annual, January 1998, 123–130. Yasmeen’s timeline is somewhat different. She
says that linkages between JuD and Lakhvi’s militia happened in 1995. Yasmeen Khan, Jihad and Dawah:
Evolving Narratives of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamat ud Dawa (London: Hurst, 2017). ↝

8. See Sikand, “The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir”; and Abou Zahab, “I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise”;
and Shafqat, “From official Islam to Islamism.” The FATA was subsequently merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2018 through the 25th Constitutional Amendment. Amir Wasim, “President signs KP-Fata merger bill into law,”
The Dawn, May 31, 2018. [Link] ↝

9. Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects.” ↝

10. Khan, “Allah’s Army.” There are various unconfirmed rumors that Osama bin Laden contributed ten million
Pakistani rupees (approximately $480,000 in 1990 dollars) to help build the mosque and residential area at the
Markaz. There are also rumors that, until 1992, when he was ostensibly “banned” from travelling or staying in
Pakistan, bin Laden regularly attended rallies at the Markaz. See Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Capture or Kill:
The Pursuit of the 9/11 Masterminds and the Killing of Osama bin Laden (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012);
and John Wilson, Caliphate’s Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s Long War (New Delhi: Amaryllis and the ORF,
2011). ↝

11. Fair, In Their Own Words. ↝

12. See Tankel, Storming the World Stage, which says that this happened in 1990; other sources suggest it
happened later in 1993: “Hafiz Saeed asks govt to curb foreign bid to bolster IS in Pakistan,” Indian Express, 17
Oct, 2015, [Link] Sikand, “The Islamist
Militancy in Kashmir”; Abou Zahab, “I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise” and “Salafism in Pakistan”; and
Shafqat, “From Official Islam to Islamism.” ↝

13. Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects.” ↝

14. Saeed, “From official Islam to Islamism,” 143. ↝

15. C. Christine Fair, "Insights from a database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militants," Journal of
Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014): 259–290. ↝

16. See Tankel, Storming the World Stage and “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects”; and
Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Taj Hotel (New York: Penguin, 2013). ↝

17. Bhattacharya, Sanchita. "Jaish-e-Mohammad (The “Army of Mohammed”)." Handbook of Terrorist and
Insurgent Groups. CRC Press 644–650. ↝

18. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 116. ↝

19. Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects.” ↝

20. See Tankel, Storming the World Stage; and Sean Noonan and Scott Steward, “The Evolution of a Pakistani
Militant Network,” Stratfor, September 15, 2011, [Link]
network. ↝

21. See C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2004); and Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba leads the Kashmiri insurgency,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, 14, 10, (Dec. 2002): 1–5. ↝

22. LeT/JuD attendees at such protests are easily identified by the organization’s distinctive black and white flag.
↝

23. C. Christine Fair and Ali Hamza, “The Foreign Policy Essay: Whether or Not Pakistan Will Join the War in
Yemen May Depend on a Group You’ve Probably Never Heard Of,” Lawfare, April 12,
2015, [Link]
depend-group-youve-probably. ↝

24. “Hafiz Saeed’s JuD Launches Political Party in Pakistan,” The Quint, August 8,
2017, [Link] ↝
25. Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “India dictating terms to Pakistan’ claims Jamaaat ud Dawa,” Asia Times, 24
November, 2017, [Link] ↝

26. “Hafiz Saeed's JuD to contest 2018 Pakistan general elections,” Economic Times, December 3, 2017,
[Link] ↝

27. Arif Jamal, "Analyzing the Role of the Top LeT Ideologue: A Profile of Amir Hamza" in Militant Leadership
Monitor, Volume III, Issue 6 (June 2012), 6. ↝

28. U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Lashkar-E Tayyiba Leadership,” August 30,
2012, [Link] ↝

29. Amir Hamza, Dihshat gardī ke k̲h̲ilāf Jamāʻatuddaʻvah kā kirdār (Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism)
(Lahore: Dar Ul Andalus, 2018), 13. ↝

30. Ibid., 13–14. ↝

31. Ibid., 38. ↝

32. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organization of South Asian nations
established on December 8, 1985. It aims to promote regional cooperation, peace, and development. See
[Link] ↝

33. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 35. ↝

34. This claim is odd, because in both the biblical and Islamic tradition, it was David (Dawud) who defeated
Goliath. ↝

35. Ibid., 125. ↝

36. Ibid., 123. ↝

37. Ibid., 124. ↝

38. Akhtar Abdur Rahman (11 June 1924 – 17 August 1988) was a Pakistan Army general who served as the 5th
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1987 until his death in 1988. He previously served as the 12th
Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence from 1979 to 1987. ↝

39. Ibid., 48. ↝

40. Ibid., 94. ↝

41. Ibid., 93-94. ↝

42. Ibid., 116. ↝

43. Ibid., 116. ↝

44. Ibid., 80. ↝

45. The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), commonly known as PML-N, is a center-right political party in Pakistan
founded 1993 by Nawaz Sharif. Its stronghold is in the Punjab province although it is considered a national party.
↝

46. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) is a center-left political party in Pakistan, founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto. It’s stronghold is in the Sindh although it has national standing. ↝

47. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 78–79. ↝

48. Ibid., 50. ↝

49. In Pakistan, the head of government is the prime minister and the head of state is the president. ↝

50. Manipulation of the judiciary by the military to control the country’s political landscape has been an ongoing
phenomenon. At times, certain judges within the judiciary have risen above their fears and/or privileges to comply
with the principles of justice. For example, a Supreme Court ruling in March 2024 revealed that the judicial
proceedings that led to the 1979 death sentence and execution of Pakistan’s first elected prime minister, Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, had violated principles of due process and the right to a fair trial. See Saroop Ijaz, “Pakistan’s
Supreme Court Finally Rules on Martial Law-Era Trial,” Human Rights Watch, March 6,
2024. [Link] ↝

51. M. Ilyas Khan, “Pakistan: A forced marriage to the IMF?,” BBC, October 27, 2008,
[Link] ↝

52. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 221. ↝

53. Haseeb Bhati, “Nawaz Sharif steps down as PM after SC's disqualification verdict,” Dawn, July 28, 2017,
[Link] ↝

54. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 178. ↝

55. Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “Non-Fiction: The Gandhi Of Balochistan,” Dawn, December 25, 2022.
[Link] ↝

56. Babar Ayaz, “Bacha Khan: A misunderstood leader,” The Herald, September 11, 2017,
[Link] ↝

57. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 179. ↝

58. Shamil Shams, “Spotlight on the military's corruption,” DW, April 22, 2016, [Link]
spotlight-on-the-pakistani-militarys-corruption…. ↝

59. Ayesha Siddiqua, “How The Military in Pakistan Influences The Country’s Media,” Caravan Magazine, April 9,
2017, [Link] ; see also Media
Ownership Monitor, Pakistan, “History,” [Link] ↝

60. “Columnist, anchor Raza Rumi attacked, driver loses life,” Dawn, March 28, 2014.
[Link] ↝
61. “Hamid Mir wounded in Pakistan gun attack,” BBC News, April 19, 2014. [Link]
asia-27089646. ↝

62. “Why ISI spy posters are all over Islamabad,” BBC News, April 20, 2014. [Link]
asia-27202002. ↝

63. “PM inquires after Hamid Mir's health in Karachi hospital,” The Nation, April 21, 2014.
[Link] ↝

64. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 36. ↝

65. Ibid., 37. ↝

66. Ibid., 83. ↝

67. Ibid., 87. ↝

68. Ibid., 95. ↝

69. Ibid., 58. ↝

70. See C. Christine Fair, “ ‘Why We Are Waging Jihad’: A Critical Translation of Lashkar-eTayyaba’s Foundational
Document,” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 34 (October 2023): 5–43. ↝

71. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan and U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” Congressional Research Service, May 22, 2023,
[Link] ↝

72. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 36. ↝

73. “India, US behind 2001 palace massacre conspiracy: Ex-minister,” India Today, April 2, 2010,
[Link] ↝

74. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 35. ↝

75. Ibid., 35. ↝

76. Arafatul Islam, “India's influence in Bangladesh: Support or meddling?,” DW, March 4, 2024m
[Link] ↝

77. C. Christine. Fair, "Under the shrinking US security umbrella: India's end game in Afghanistan?" The
Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 179–192; Avinash Paliwal, My enemy's enemy: India in Afghanistan from
the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). ↝

78. “Kashmir attack: Bomb kills 40 Indian paramilitary police in convoy,” BBC, February 14, 2019,
[Link] ↝

79. M. Ilyas Khan, “India's 'surgical strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or illusion?,” BBC, October 23, 2016,
[Link] ↝
80. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 103–104. ↝

81. Ibid. Also see “Pathankot attack: India PM Modi urges Pakistan action,” BBC, January 15, 2016.
[Link] ↝

82. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 103–104. ↝

83. Ibid., 41 ↝

84. Ibid., 41. ↝

85. Ibid., 275. ↝

86. Faisal Irshaid, “Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names,” BBC, December 2, 2015,
[Link] ↝

87. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 275. ↝

88. Ali Hassnain, “Strategic Importance of Deosai Plains,” Voice of East, May 21,
2017, [Link] ↝

89. M. Ilyas Khan, “Operation Gibraltar: The Pakistani troops who infiltrated Kashmir to start a rebellion,” BBC,
September 5, 2015, [Link] ↝

90. Andrew North, “Siachen dispute: India and Pakistan’s glacial fight,” BBC, April 12, 2014.
[Link] ↝

91. Hamza, Jamaat ud Dawa’s Role Against Terrorism, 74–75. ↝

92. “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.,” Pew Research Center, June 27, 2012,
[Link] ↝

93. Fair, Fighting to the End,193. ↝

94. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). ↝

95. Abid Hussain, “Why are Imran Khan’s supporters angry with Pakistan’s military?,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2013,
[Link] ↝

96. Fair, In Their Own Words. ↝

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